United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987)
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987)
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987)
828
107 S.Ct. 2148
95 L.Ed.2d 772
Syllabus
Title 8 U.S.C. 1326 provides that any alien who has been deported and
thereafter enters the United States is guilty of a felony. Respondents,
Mexican nationals, were arrested and deported after a group hearing at
which they purportedly waived their rights to apply for suspension of
deportation and to appeal. Subsequently, respondents were again arrested
in this country and indicted on charges of violating 1326. However, the
District Court dismissed the indictments, ruling that respondents could
collaterally attack their previous deportation orders. The court found that
they had not understood the Immigration Judge's explanation of
suspension of deportation, and concluded that the reliability of the
proceedings had been totally undermined by the fact that they had not
made knowing and intelligent waivers of their right to that remedy or their
right to appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, since a
material element of the offense prohibited by 1326 was a "lawful"
deportation order, principles of fundamental fairness required a pretrial
review of the underlying deportation to determine whether respondents
received due process of law. Because they did not fully understand the
proceedings, the court found a due process violation rendering the
deportation order unlawful and therefore not a proper basis for the charges
against respondents.
Held:
1. The text, legislative history, and background of 1326 indicate that
Congress did not intend the validity of an underlying deportation order to
On December 12, 1984, both respondents were once again separately arrested
in Lincoln, Nebraska. They were subsequently indicted by a grand jury in the
District of Nebraska on charges of violating 8 U.S.C. 1326, which provides:
"(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported, and thereafter
"(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States . . .
ground that they were denied fundamentally fair deportation hearings. They
contended that the Immigration Law Judge inadequately informed them of their
right to counsel at the hearing, and accepted their unknowing waivers of the
right to apply for suspension of deportation.3
9
The District Court ruled that respondents could collaterally attack their previous
deportation orders. United States v. Landeros-Quinones, CR 85-L-06 (Feb. 28,
1985). It rejected their claims that they were not adequately informed of their
right to counsel. It found, however, that respondents had apparently failed to
understand the Immigration Judge's explanation of suspension of deportation.4
The District Court concluded that respondents had not made knowing and
intelligent waivers of their rights to apply for suspension of deportation or their
rights to appeal, finding it "inconceivable that they would so lightly waive their
rights to appeal, and thus to the relief they now claim entitlement, [sic] if they
had been fully apprised of the ramifications of such a choice." App. to Pet. for
Cert. 23a. Holding that the "failure to overcome these defendants' lack of
understanding about the proceedings, which is apparent from listening to the
tape recording, totally undermined the reliability of the proceedings" and that
"substantial justice was not done," the District Court dismissed the indictments
in both cases. Id., at 26a.
10
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 781 F.2d 111 (1985).
Noting a conflict among the Circuits regarding whether a defendant prosecuted
under 1326 may collaterally attack a deportation order, the court agreed with
those Courts of Appeals that had concluded that a material element of the
offense prohibited by 1326 was a "lawful" deportation. Id., at 112. It went on
to state that principles of fundamental fairness required a pretrial review of the
underlying deportation to examine whether the alien received due process of
law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's conclusion that there
was a due process violation in this case, holding that, "[b]ecause the defendants
did not fully understand the proceedings, the hearing was fundamentally unfair,
and the deportation order was obtained unlawfully. Thus, it cannot stand as a
material element forming the basis of the charges against the defendants." Id.,
at 113. 5
11
To resolve the conflict among the Circuits, 6 we granted certiorari. 479 U.S.
811, 107 S.Ct. 59, 93 L.Ed.2d 19 (1986). We affirm.
II
12
In United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 72 S.Ct. 591, 96 L.Ed. 863 (1952),
we left open whether the validity of an underlying order of deportation may be
The first question we must address is whether the statute itself provides for a
challenge to the validity of the deportation order in a proceeding under 1326.
Some of the Courts of Appeals considering the question have held that a
deportation is an element of the offense defined by 1326 only if it is
"lawful,"9 and that 1326 therefore permits collateral challenge to the legality
of an underlying deportation order. The language of the statute, however,
suggests no such limitation, stating simply that "[a]ny alien who has been
arrested and deported or excluded and deported," 8 U.S.C. 1326(1), will be
guilty of a felony if the alien thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in, the United States. 8 U.S.C. 1326(2).
14
Nor does the sparse legislative history contain any evidence that Congress
intended to permit challenge to the validity of the deportation in the 1326
proceeding. Before 1326 was enacted, three statutory sections imposed
criminal penalties upon aliens who reentered the country after deportation: 8
U.S.C. 180(a) (1946 ed.) (repealed 1952), which provided that any alien who
had been "deported in pursuance of law" and subsequently entered the United
States would be guilty of a felony; 8 U.S.C. 138 (1946 ed.) (repealed 1952),
which provided that an alien deported for prostitution, procuring, or similar
immoral activity, and who thereafter reentered the United States, would be
guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a different penalty; and 8 U.S.C. 1377(b) (1946 ed., Supp. V) (repealed 1952), which stated that any alien who
reentered the country after being deported for subversive activity would be
guilty of a felony and subject to yet a third, more severe penalty.10 See
H.R.Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 219-220 (1952), U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1952, p. 1653.
15
The Immigration and Nationality Act does include sections that limit judicial
review of deportation orders. 8 U.S.C. 1105a provides that, outside of
enumerated exceptions, the procedures prescribed by Title 28 of the United
States Code for review of federal agency orders "shall be the sole and exclusive
procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation." The
enumerated exceptions permit an alien to challenge a deportation order, the
validity of which has not previously been judicially determined, in a criminal
proceeding against the alien for violation of 8 U.S.C. 1252(d) or (e), 8
U.S.C. 1105a(a)(6), and any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of
deportation may obtain judicial review of that order in a habeas corpus
proceeding, 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(9). These sections are not directly applicable
to this case, since respondents did not ask the District Court to vacate their
deportation orders and the court did not do so. It ruled only that the orders
could not properly be used as the predicate for a 1326 conviction. Yet the text
of 1105a indicates that Congress considered and addressed some of the
various circumstances in which challenges to deportation orders might arise and
did not mention 1326. See also 8 U.S.C. 1101(g) ("For the purposes of this
chapter any alien ordered deported . . . who has left the United States, shall be
considered to have been deported in pursuance of law . . ."); but see Mendez v.
INS, 563 F.2d 956, 959 (CA9 1977).13
17
III
A.
18
That Congress did not intend the validity of the deportation order to be
contestable in a 1326 prosecution does not end our inquiry. If the statute
envisions that a court may impose a criminal penalty for reentry after any
deportation, regardless of how violative of the rights of the alien the
deportation proceeding may have been, the statute does not comport with the
constitutional requirement of due process.14
19
427, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444, 64 S.Ct.
660, 677, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944); cf. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 196197, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1664-1665, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969). 15 This principle means
at the very least that where the defects in an administrative proceeding
foreclose judicial review of that proceeding, an alternative means of obtaining
judicial review must be made available before the administrative order may be
used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal offense.16 The result of
those proceedings may subsequently be used to convert the misdemeanor of
unlawful entry into the felony of unlawful entry after a deportation. Depriving
an alien of the right to have the disposition in a deportation hearing reviewed in
a judicial forum requires, at a minimum, that review be made available in any
subsequent proceeding in which the result of the deportation proceeding is used
to establish an element of a criminal offense.17
B
20
C
21
The United States asserts that our decision in Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S.
55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980), answered any constitutional
objections to the scheme employed in 1326. In Lewis, the Court held that a
state-court conviction, even though it was uncounseled and therefore obtained
in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the defendant
under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799
(1963), could be used as a predicate for a subsequent conviction under
1202(a)(1) of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C.App. 1202(a)(1), which forbade any person
convicted of a felony from receiving, possessing, or transporting a firearm. We
do not consider Lewis to control the issues raised by this case. The question in
Lewis was whether Congress could define that "class of persons who should be
disabled from dealing in or possessing firearms," 445 U.S., at 67, 100 S.Ct., at
922, by reference to prior state felony convictions, even if those convictions
had resulted from procedures, such as the denial of counsel, subsequently
condemned as unconstitutional.18 The Court there rejected Lewis' statutory
challenge, holding that Congress had manifested no intent to permit collateral
attacks upon the prior state convictions in federal criminal proceedings, and
further held that this use of uncounseled prior convictions did not violate the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. In rejecting the notion that the statute permitted, or the
Constitution required, this "new form of collateral attack" on prior convictions,
the Court pointed to the availability of alternative means to secure judicial
review of the conviction: "[I]t is important to note that a convicted felon may
challenge the validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise remove his disability,
before obtaining a firearm." Ibid.
22
23
Because respondents were deprived of their rights to appeal, and of any basis to
appeal since the only relief for which they would have been eligible was not
adequately explained to them, the deportation proceeding in which these events
occurred may not be used to support a criminal conviction, and the dismissal of
the indictments against them was therefore proper. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals is
24
Affirmed.
25
26
I agree with the Court's ruling that the language of 8 U.S.C. 1326, its history,
and other provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act suggest that
Congress did not intend to allow challenges to the validity of a deportation
order in a 1326 proceeding. I also agree with the view that there may be
exceptional circumstances where the Due Process Clause prohibits the
Government from using an alien's prior deportation as a basis for imposing
criminal liability under 1326. In my view, however, respondents have fallen
far short of establishing such exceptional circumstances here. The Court, in
reaching a contrary conclusion, misreads the decision of the District Court.
27
28
It is true that the District Court, sua sponte, raised the issue whether
respondents knowingly waived their rights to appeal the deportation orders. The
court, however, treated the issue as subsidiary to its determination that the
Immigration Judge did not fully apprise respondents of their rights to apply for
suspension of deportation. In ultimately disposing of the issue, the court stated:
29
30
The narrow scope of the District Court's resolution of the question whether
respondents had effectively waived their appeal rights is further demonstrated
by the District Court's examination of the prejudice resulting from the manner
In affirming the District Court's decision in this case, the Court of Appeals did
not at all address the question whether respondents knowingly waived their
rights to appeal, but instead limited its discussion to respondents' failure to
understand that they could seek suspension of deportation. The Court of
Appeals decision thus also does not support this Court's sweeping assertion that
"[t]he fundamental procedural defects of the deportation hearing in this case
rendered direct review of the Immigration Judge's determination unavailable to
respondents." Ante, at 841.
32
The Court's desire to inject into this case a finding that respondents suffered
from a denial of their rights to appeal for all purposes is understandable.
Without such a finding, the only articulated basis for the Court's due process
holding is respondents' claim that their deportation orders were invalid because
they were not adequately informed that they could apply for suspension of
deportation. The Court's acceptance of this latter claim provides little
foundation for its decision.
33
Recognizing that Congress intended to limit the number of aliens qualifying for
suspension of deportation, we have interpreted the statutory section providing
for such relief, 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1), as establishing strict threshold criteria
that must be met before the Attorney General may grant the relief. See INS v.
Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985); INS v.
Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 584, 78 L.Ed.2d 401 (1984); INS v. Jong
Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 101 S.Ct. 1027, 67 L.Ed.2d 123 (1981). Even if all of
the requirements of 1254(a)(1) are satisfied, we have recognized that "it
remains in the discretion of the Attorney General to . . . refuse to suspend
deportation." INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S., at 446, 105 S.Ct., at 2100.
Moreover, if the Attorney General decides that relief should be denied as a
matter of discretion, he need not even inquire whether an alien meets the
35
36
37
When respondents were deported from the United States in October 1984, they
were specifically warned that 8 U.S.C. 1326 made it a felony for them to
reenter the United States illegally. Two months later, they were apprehended in
the United States and charged with violating 1326. Respondents assert that
even if their reentry was illegal, they cannot lawfully be punished for violating
1326, because the proceedings in which they were originally deported
violated the Due Process Clause.1 I agree with the Court that the lawfulness of
respondents' original deportation proceedings is irrelevant to the question
whether respondents violated 1326. I dissent, however, because I do not share
the Court's view that the lawfulness of those proceedings is relevant to the
question whether respondents may constitutionally be punished if they violated
1326.
38
39
the State to punish violations of that law unless it either makes the agency's
listing decisions judicially reviewable or permits those charged with violating
the law to defend themselves on the ground that the original listing decisions
were in some way unlawful.
40
41
42
For these reasons, I think that if respondents' reentry into the United States was
unlawful, respondents may constitutionally be punished for violating 1326. I
would reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The statute excepts those aliens who have either received the express consent of
the Attorney General to reapply for admission or who otherwise establish that
they were not required to obtain such consent. 8 U.S.C. 1326(2)(A), (B).
Respondents do not contend that either exception applies to them.
The District Court found that the Immigration Judge did not answer a question
from one of the respondents regarding application for suspension of
deportation; that the Immigration Judge addressed the wrong respondent while
discussing eligibility for the remedy; that the Immigration Judge did not make
clear how much time he would allow respondents to apply for suspension; and
that Landeros-Quinones asked a question which demonstrated that he did not
understand the concept of suspension of deportation, but that the Immigration
Judge failed to explain further. The District Court contrasted this cursory and
confusing treatment of the issue of suspension of deportation with the extensive
inquiry that took place when two of the other aliens sought voluntary departure
in lieu of deportation, one of whom was ultimately granted voluntary departure.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-22a.
Compare, e.g., United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089, 1090 (CA9
1985), and United States v. Bowles, 331 F.2d 742, 749-750 (CA3 1964)
(collateral attack on legality of deportation permitted in 1326 proceeding),
with United States v. Petrella, 707 F.2d 64, 66 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
921, 104 S.Ct. 289, 78 L.Ed.2d 265 (1983), United States v. Gonzalez-Parra,
438 F.2d 694, 697 (CA5), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1010, 91 S.Ct. 2196, 29
L.Ed.2d 433 (1971), and Arriaga-Ramirez v. United States, 325 F.2d 857, 859
(CA10 1963) (collateral attacks barred in prosecutions under 1326); see also
United States v. Rosal-Aguilar, 652 F.2d 721, 723 (CA7 1981) (trial de novo on
the factual basis of the underlying deportation is not a constitutional
prerequisite to conviction under 1326, but "the Government must prove the
underlying deportation to have been based on a valid legal predicate and
obtained according to law"); Petrella v. United States, 464 U.S. 921, 922, 104
S.Ct. 289, 78 L.Ed.2d 265 (1983) (WHITE, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (internal quotation omitted).
7
In its petition for certiorari, the United States did not seek review of the Court
of Appeals' holding that the deportation proceeding in this case was
fundamentally unfair and that the deportation order was therefore unlawful. Pet.
for Cert. 7.
See, e.g., United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (CA9 1975) ("A
material element of the offense defined by 8 U.S.C. 1326 is a lawful
deportation"); United States v. Bowles, supra, at 749 ("When Congress made
use of the word 'deported' in the statute, it meant 'deported according to law' ").
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in deciding this case, noted that
other courts had permitted collateral attack on the ground that "a material
element of the offense prohibited by 8 U.S.C. 1326 is a 'lawful' deportation"
and stated that it "agree[d] with this rationale." 781 F.2d, at 112. The court does
not appear to have relied entirely on the statute in ruling that the propriety of
the deportation could be reviewed in the 1326 proceeding, since it then
continued: "Allowing a pretrial review of the underlying deportation to
examine whether due process was provided insures fundamental fairness to the
rights of the criminal defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that defendants in
section 1326 prosecutions may collaterally attack their previous deportation
orders on the ground that they were not accorded due process at the deportation
hearing." Id., at 112-113.
10
Section 180(a) provided for punishment by imprisonment of not more than two
years or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both; 138 provided solely for
imprisonment for up to two years; 137-7(b) provided for imprisonment for up
to five years. The purpose of 1326 was to impose the same penalty on any
person who returned to the United States without permission after deportation,
regardless of the basis of the original deportation. See S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess., 655, 656 (1950).
11
That Congress had before it the text of all three sections was cleartheir text
was in all pertinent respects reproduced as "existing law" in the House Report
on the statute that included 1326. H.R.Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
219-220 (1952).
12
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Beck v. Neelly, 202 F.2d 221, 222, 224 (CA7)
(declining to decide whether deported alien may challenge prior deportation in
habeas corpus proceeding), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997, 73 S.Ct. 1139, 97 L.Ed.
1403 (1953); United States ex rel. Steffner v. Carmichael, 183 F.2d 19, 20
(CA5) (collateral attack on deportation proceeding in later deportation
proceeding impermissible unless there was "gross miscarriage of justice" in the
former proceeding; prior order here was valid), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 829, 71
S.Ct. 67, 95 L.Ed. 609 (1950); Daskaloff v. Zurbrick, 103 F.2d 579, 580-581
(CA6 1939) (alien deported as a prostitute who reentered country and was
detained on warrant of deportation under 8 U.S.C. 155 (1946 ed.) (repealed
1952) could not collaterally attack validity of earlier deportation through
habeas corpus).
13
Contrary to Justice SCALIA'S suggestion, post, at ----, our opinion today does
not reject the holding in Mendez, as to which we express no view.
14
The Government stated at oral argument that it was the position of the United
States that there were "absolutely no due process limitations to the enforcement
of Section 1326." Tr. of Oral Arg. 10.
15
Even with this safeguard, the use of the result of an administrative proceeding
to establish an element of a criminal offense is troubling. See United States v.
Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 179, 72 S.Ct. 591, 597, 96 L.Ed. 863 (1952) (Jackson,
J., dissenting). While the Court has permitted criminal conviction for violation
of an administrative regulation where the validity of the regulation could not be
challenged in the criminal proceeding, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64
S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944), the decision in that case was motivated by the
exigencies of wartime, dealt with the propriety of regulations rather than the
legitimacy of an adjudicative procedure, and, most significantly, turned on the
fact that adequate judicial review of the validity of the regulation was available
in another forum. Under different circumstances, the propriety of using an
administrative ruling in such a way remains open to question. We do not reach
this issue here, however, holding that, at a minimum, the result of an
administrative proceeding may not be used as a conclusive element of a
criminal offense where the judicial review that legitimated such a practice in
the first instance has effectively been denied.
16
17
judge); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-544, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 12161217, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (mob violence,
knowing use of perjured testimony). While the procedures required in an
administrative proceeding are less stringent than those demanded in a criminal
trial, analogous abuses could operate, under some circumstances, to deny
effective judicial review of administrative determinations.
We note parenthetically that permitting collateral challenge to the validity of
deportation orders in proceedings under 1326 does not create an opportunity
for aliens to delay deportation, since the collateral challenge we recognize
today is available only in criminal proceedings instituted after reentry.
18
Cf. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115, 88 S.Ct. 258, 262, 19 L.Ed.2d 319
(1967); see also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226-227, 100 S.Ct. 1585,
1587-1588, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980) (MARSHALL, J., concurring) (court may
not constitutionally use prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction collaterally
to enhance a subsequent misdemeanor to a felony with an increased term of
imprisonment); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d
592 (1972) (court may not consider constitutionally invalid prior convictions in
imposing sentence on unrelated offense); see also 8 U.S.C. 1325, which
provides that an unlawful entry into the United States constitutes a
misdemeanor. Section 1326 serves to enhance the penalty for unlawful entry,
imposing a steeper punishment on individuals who violate 1325 and who
have previously been deported.
Because the Government took the position before this Court that deportation
orders may never be collaterally attacked in a 1326 proceeding, it did not
request the Court to pass on the question whether respondents' deportation
proceedings violated their due process rights. The Government, however, has
not conceded that the deportation proceedings were fundamentally unfair. See,
e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-14. Because the fairness of these proceedings was
litigated in the courts below and is a matter subsumed in the precise question
presented for this Court's review, it cannot be seriously argued that the issue is
not properly before this Court. Indeed, the Court itself has chosen to decide the
issue, albeit in a manner different from that suggested here.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals both held that the proceedings in
question violated the Due Process Clause. I agree with the Court that, because
the Government did not ask us to review those holdings, see Pet. for Cert. 7, n.
6; Brief for United States 5-6, n. 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7, it is not appropriate to
do so. See this Court's Rule 21.1(a) ("Only the questions set forth in the petition
or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court"). See also, e.g., INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-449, n. 32, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1222, n. 32,
94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). In arguing to the contrary, THE CHIEF JUSTICE first
observes that the lawfulness of respondents' deportation proceedings was
litigated in the Court of Appeals, and that the Government has not conceded the
point. Ante, n. * While these observations dispose of other possible objections
to consideration of the unchallenged holdings, they in no way displace the
application of Rule 21.1(a). THE CHIEF JUSTICE also suggests that the
dissent is free to consider the due process holdings because the Court itself
does. Ibid. But I understand the Court to accept rather than review the holdings.
See ante, at 840. Finally, THE CHIEF JUSTICE asserts that the question of the
correctness of the holdings is "subsumed in the precise question presented for
this Court's review." Ante, at 846, n. *. I disagree. As formulated by the
Government, the question presented is "Whether a defendant prosecuted under
8 U.S.C. 1326 for reentering the United States after having been deported
may collaterally attack the validity of his deportation proceeding?" Pet. for
Cert. I. I fail to see how there is subsumed within this the question whether a
collateral attack in the present case would be successful. But for these points, I
would agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that no due process violation
occurred.
2
Lewis involved a statute that relied upon the fact of a prior criminal conviction,
rather than, as in this case, the fact of a prior civil deportation. As the Court
notes, ante, at 838, n. 15, it has been suggested that the Constitution may in
some circumstances forbid use of the outcomes of administrative proceedings
even those lawfully conducted and subject to judicial reviewin subsequent
criminal proceedings. Whether or not that is so, I do not believe this case
presents such circumstances. In any event, respondents have not claimed that it
does, instead arguing only that they must be permitted to show that their
deportation proceedings were not lawfully conducted. The validity of that
argument can have nothing to do with whether the proceedings were
administrative or criminal.