WILLIAM ONG GENATO, complainant,

SILAPAN, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

ESSEX

L.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against

respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan, complainant alleged that in July 1992,
respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in complainants
building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant acceded and
introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainants retained
lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building and made him handle
some of complainants cases. Hence, the start of the legal relationship
between complainant and respondent.
The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from complainant which he intended
to use as downpayment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent
issued to complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to
answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to
complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title
claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution proceedings before the
Quezon City Register of Deeds.
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new
car. However, the document of sale of the car was issued in complainants
name and financed through City Trust Company.
In January 1993, respondent introduced to complainant a certain
Emmanuel Romero. Romero likewise wanted to borrow money from
complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this transaction,
respondent earned commission in the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant
used the commission to pay respondents arrears with the car financing firm.
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the
financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to
encash respondents postdated check with the drawee bank but it was
dishonored as respondents account therein was already closed.

Respondent failed to heed complainants repeated demands for

payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
In the foreclosure case, respondent made the following allegation in his
Answer:
xxxxxxxxx
4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate business,
trading and buy and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other
shady deals and has many cases pending in court;
xxxxxxxxx
Complainant denied respondents charges and claimed that respondents
allegation is libelous and not privilege as it was irrelevant to the foreclosure
case. Complainant further pointed to paragraph 12 of respondents Answer,
thus:
12. That on January 29, 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car on
January 30, 1993, defendant Essex L. Silapan asked the complainant to execute a
Deed of Sale transferring ownership of the car to him but the latter said that he will
only do so after the termination of his criminal case at Branch 138 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, x x x where he (complainant) wanted Essex L.
Silapan, his former counsel in that case, to offer bribe money to the members of
the review committee of the Department of Justice where a petition for review of
the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor was pending at the time, x x x or, in
the event that the said petition for review is denied, he wanted Essex L. Silapan
to offer bribe money to the prosecutor assigned at the above-mentioned Court,
and even to the presiding Judge, for his eventual acquittal, which defendant
Essex L. Silapan all refused to do not only because such acts are immoral and
illegal, but also because the complainant confided to him that he was really
involved in the commission of the crime that was charged of in the abovementioned case. (emphasis supplied)
Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to
the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to defame him. He charged

that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of breaking their

confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively
liable therefor. Consequently, he filed this complaint for disbarment, praying
also that an administrative sanction be meted against respondent for his
issuance of a bouncing check.
When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained that it
was complainant who offered him an office space in his building and retained
him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22
case filed against complainant. Respondent insisted that there was nothing
libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and
his revelation of complainants desire to bribe government officials in relation
to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made these statements in
the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit
complainants credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit
fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his
confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made the
disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.
[1]

[2]

Secondly, respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage

in favor of complainant without consideration and only as a formal requirement
so he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not
surrender his title over the mortgaged property to complainant.
Thirdly, respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for
account or for value, but only: (a) to serve as some kind of acknowledgment
that he already received in advance a portion of his attorneys fees from the
complainant for the legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form of
assurance that he will not abandon the cases he was handling for
complainant.
Lastly, respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from
Romeros loan which he allegedly helped facilitate. He alleged that the amount
was paid to him by Romero as attorneys fees, the latter being his client. He
used this amount to pay his arrears with the car financing firm. On January 29,
1993, before paying the next amortization on the car, he asked complainant to
execute a deed of sale transferring ownership of the car to him. Complainant
refused and insisted that he would transfer ownership of the car only after the
termination of his criminal case which respondent was handling as his

defense lawyer. Consequently, respondent stopped paying the amortization

on the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury case against
complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him.
In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report
of the investigating commissioner finding the respondent guilty as charged
and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
We affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Prefatorily, we stress that we shall not delve into the merits of the various
criminal and civil cases pending between the parties. It is for the trial courts
handling these cases to ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations made
therein. For this reason, it is not for us to sanction respondent for his issuance
of a bouncing check. His liability has yet to be determined by the trial court
where his case is pending.
The only issue in this administrative case is whether respondent
committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to complainant illegal
practices and disclosing complainants alleged intention to bribe government
officials in connection with a pending case.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney
is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional
character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve
the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their
relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not
cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys
ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change
of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
[3]

[4]

It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of

confidential communications or information is limited only to communications

which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of
a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or
perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the
complainants alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his
case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not
consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to
advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for
hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no
professional employment in the strict sense.
[5]

Be that as it may, respondents explanation that it was necessary for him to

make the disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were
not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the
foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the
complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of
litigation therein and respondents professional competence and legal advice
were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself,
especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is
beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by
the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
Thus, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds that
respondents allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a
breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him. However, the recommended penalty of one (1) year suspension
of respondent from the practice of law seems to be disproportionate to his
breach of duty considering that a review of the records of this Court reveals
that this is the first administrative complaint against him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective
upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The
Court Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
-------------------------------------------

G.R. No. L-961

September 21, 1949

BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB
ASSAD,respondents.
Delgado, Dizon and Flores for petitioner.
Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob
Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs.
Hilado's now deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant; and
on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel
for the plaintiff. On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad
as party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the
defendant in substitution for Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the
case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to
discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him about
her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and
the latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorney Delgado,
Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case
was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.
Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and identified as Exhibit A, is in full as
follows:
VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila

July 13, 1945.

Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado

Manila, Philippines
My dear Mrs. Hilado:
From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case No. 70075 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, entitled "Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J. Assad," I find that the

basic facts which brought about the controversy between you and the defendant therein are
as follows:
(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described in the complaint, as the
same was purchased and/or built with funds exclusively belonging to you, that is to say, the
houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;
(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with your husband, Mr. Serafin P.
Hilado; and
(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your knowledge on the aforesaid date of
May 3, 1943.
Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action against Mr. Assad will not
ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the right to presume that your husband had the legal right
to dispose of the property as the transfer certificate of title was in his name. Moreover, the
price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of May 3, 1943, does not quite strike me as
so grossly inadequate as to warrant the annulment of the sale. I believe, lastly, that the
transaction cannot be avoided merely because it was made during the Japanese occupation,
nor on the simple allegation that the real purchaser was not a citizen of the Philippines. On
his last point, furthermore, I expect that you will have great difficulty in proving that the real
purchaser was other than Mr. Assad, considering that death has already sealed your
husband's lips and he cannot now testify as to the circumstances of the sale.
For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advise you that I cannot appear in the proceedings in
your behalf. The records of the case you loaned to me are herewith returned.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO

VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that about May, 1945, a
real estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal separation of a woman who had
been deserted by her husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought
by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin
Hilado had made to the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was
willing to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales of
real property during the Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid for in Japanese military
notes; that this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would have no objection to defending the
Syrian;
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had instituted against a
certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband had made; that according
to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away
from them; that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not hesitate to tell her
frankly that hers was a lost case for the same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado

retorted that the basis of her action was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military
notes, but that the premises were her private and exclusive property; that she requested him to read
the complaint to be convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked Mrs. Hilado if
there was a Torrens title to the property and she answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he
told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in her husband's favor, her case would not
prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was informed by
Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him and that
when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned legal matters he attended to her and
requested her to leave the "expediente" which she was carrying, and she did; that he told Attorney
Agrava that the firm should not handle Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the papers, calling
Agrava's attention to what he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter
which had been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expedients" to Mrs. Hilado; that
Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava's request that Agrava thought it more
proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he forthwith signed the
letter without reading it and without keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs.
Hilado since their last meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed
extrajudicial settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating that his
American lawyer had gone to the States and left the case in the hands of other attorneys; that he
accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the Court of Appeals,
dismissed the complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than that already alleged in
plaintiff's complaint in the main cause was conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and concluded that the
intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the point of creating the relation of
attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That Attorney Francisco's
law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that this
opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's
purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's professional services.
Granting the facts to be no more than these, we agree with petitioner's counsel that the relation of
attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following rules accord
with the ethics of the legal profession and meet with our approval:
In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not merely
one of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a
legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in
legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like. (Atkinson vs. Howlett, 11 Ky.
Law Rep. (abstract), 364; cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . . It is not necessary that
any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was

had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as established. . . . (5 Jones Commentaries on
Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or
advocating his client's cause in open court. (Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 20 Colo., 107;
36 P., 848.)
Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract may be
express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought
and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied
on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by
the latter. (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see Hirach Bros. and Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L.
R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot, without the consent
of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an
attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in
express terms from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to
each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted. (In re De la
Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact the prohibition derives validity from sources higher than written laws and
rules. As has been aptly said in In re Merron, 22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so
received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the interest
of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence
which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client."
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this
being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary the
situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers, personal and private in
character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere
relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's
retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from
thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though during
the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the
attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C.
J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the
court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former
during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party.
(Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)

In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is
unnecessary that the ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's affairs might
have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the attorney's
knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
This rule has been so strictly that it has been held an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could
operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs.
Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity
of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only
further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of other un salutary
results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent; i.e., to make the
employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in
determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be
sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The
condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the attorney has received
and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be
wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceedings, if an investigation be
held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him. "Now
the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to
the administration of justice." (John H. Wigmore's Evidence, 1923, Section 2285, 2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as
the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent
the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n, 183 Ill., 97; 47
L.R.A., 792.) It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another
case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys,
like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
So without impugning respondent's good faith, we nevertheless can not sanction his taking up the
cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not
necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity
of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or
fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly in expedient. It had the tendency to
bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and suspicion and
undermine the integrity of justice."
There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the realization
that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional
advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on
behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance
of the rule that a separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and
authorized. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure

his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being
deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of
receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to
the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has
no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained
him to perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco did not take
the trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was written under
the circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the fact
remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore
demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estop him in the
same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained
from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628;
7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our
case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his
connection with the firm is available to his associates or employers. The rule is all the more to be
adhered to where, as in the present instance, the opinion was actually signed by the head of the firm
and carries his initials intended to convey the impression that it was dictated by him personally. No
progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that the client in consulting his legal adviser ought
to be free from apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the prohibition were not extended to
the attorney's partners, employers or assistants.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date Attorney
Francisco first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for his
disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance of an attorney was allowed even on appeal
as a ground for reversal of the judgment. In that case, in which throughout the conduct of the cause
in the court below the attorney had been suffered so to act without objection, the court said: "We are
all of the one mind, that the right of the appellee to make his objection has not lapsed by reason of
failure to make it sooner; that professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by
expiration of professional employment." (Nickels vs. Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A. L. R. 1316.)
The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and not by certiorari deserves scant attention.
The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any
conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of the justice. The summary jurisdiction of the
courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but
embraces authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in
their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts from the general principles of equity and policy, will
always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue
consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts acts on the
same principles whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer
declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718 C.J.S., 1005.) This summary remedy against attorneys flows from the
facts that they are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the
law for the administration of justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the courts and
to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients.
(Charest vs. Bishop, 137 Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.) Attorney stand on
the same footing as sheriffs and other court officers in respect of matters just mentioned.
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed. It is so ordered, without
costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.