EN 

BANC

[ AC. No. 8010, Jun 16, 2009 ]

KELD STEMMERIK v. ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS +

RESOLUTION
607 Phil. 89

PER CURIAM:
Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips
to the Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his
misfortune.

In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and
expressed his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted
respondent who advised him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the
Philippines. Respondent even suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin,
Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable.

Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent

as his representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the services of
respondent for the preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose,
respondent demanded and received a P400,000 fee.

Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant returned to
Denmark, entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent.

Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant,

represented by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of
the property.[1] Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in
which de Mesa sold and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for P3.8
million.[2] Respondent also drafted and notarized an agreement between complainant
and Gonzales stating that it was complainant who provided the funds for the purchase
of the property.[3] Complainant then gave respondent the full amount of the purchase
price (P3.8 million) for which respondent issued an acknowledgment receipt. [4]

After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in
touch with respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his
name. However, respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer
complainant's calls and e-mail messages.

When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the
services of the Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office
to ascertain the status of the property he supposedly bought.  He was devastated to
learn that aliens could not own land under Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at
the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was
inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation. [5] The CENRO
also stated that the property was not subject to disposition or acquisition under
Republic Act No. 141.[6]

Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact,[7] exerted diligent efforts to

locate respondent for purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts.
Inquiry with the Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
disclosed that respondent was in arrears in his annual dues and that he had already
abandoned his law office in Olongapo City.[8]Search of court records of cases handled
by respondent only yielded his abandoned office address in Olongapo City.

Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Commission

on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.[9] He deplored respondent's acts of serious
misconduct. In particular, he sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal
profession for gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the
Philippines and for maliciously absconding with complainant's P3.8 million. [10]

Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his
last known address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In
this connection, the CBD found that respondent abandoned his law practice in
Olongapo City after his transaction with complainant and that he did not see it fit to
contest the charges against him.[11]

The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant
on the matter of land ownership by a foreigner.[12] He even went through the motion of
preparing falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these
shameless acts, he collected P400,000 from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8
million and absconded with it.[13]

The CBD found respondent to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who misused his
professional status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding
with complainant's money.[14]Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the
trust and confidence reposed by complainant in him. The CBD recommended the
disbarment of respondent.[15]

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the
CBD with the modification that respondent was further required to return the amount
of P4.2 million to respondent.[16]

We agree with the IBP.

SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE OF
THE DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS

We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the
disbarment proceedings against him? Yes.

The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the
scheduled mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known
address, his law office in Olongapo City, after he committed the embezzlement.

Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither
defeat this Court's jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade
administrative liability by the mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of
the complaint and other orders and processes on respondent's office was sufficient
notice to him.

Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice
requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law
does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.[17] The law
obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way
that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality. [18]

In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the
IBP National Office or their respective chapters[19] of any change in office or residential
address and other contact details.[20] In case such change is not duly updated, service of
notice on the office or residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National
Office shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative
proceedings against him.
RESPONDENT'S ADMINISTRATIVE INFRACTIONS
AND   HIS   LIABILITY   THEREFOR

Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the
law and uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law,
they must ensure that the law functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of
oppression or deception.

Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal profession and has
been found wanting.

Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of

culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the
legal profession.

All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no
falsehood.[21] That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a
sacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. [22]

Lawyers are servants of the law[23]and the law is their master. They should not simply
obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as
exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.
This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds,[24] to mean that "under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire
private or agricultural lands, including residential lands." The provision is a declaration
of imperative constitutional policy.[25]

Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional

policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse,
he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.

By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and
that de Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and
in behalf of complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the
Anti-Dummy Law.[26]

Respondent's misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner
could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring
complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a
falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed
in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled him into parting
with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by
pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the
purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in
nature.

Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act
after unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.

For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyer's oath and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESSAND

LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN
HIM. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal
knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and
present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the
image of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also
betrays everything that the legal profession stands for.

It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support
Dick the Butcher's call, "Kill all lawyers!"[27]A disgrace to their professional brethren,
they must be purged from the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk

of Court is directed to immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the total

amount of P4.2 million with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation
of this resolution until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to
the Court proof of payment of the amount within ten days from payment.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file
the appropriate criminal charges against him.  The NBI is further DIRECTED to
regularly report the progress of its action in this case to this Court through the Bar
Confidant.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant who shall forthwith record
it in the personal file of respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all
courts of the Philippines, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall disseminate
copies to all its chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial
agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
500 Phil. 382

THIRD DIVISION

[ A.C. NO. 5712, June 29, 2005 ]

FRANCISCO LORENZANA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CESAR G.

FAJARDO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Francisco Lorenzana, complainant, charges respondent Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo with
violation of the Civil Service Law and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and seeks his disbarment from the practice of the law profession.

In a verified complaint dated May 27, 2002, complainant alleged that respondent,
while employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office in Manila, until his
retirement on May 15, 2002, was a member of the People's Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB) of Quezon City, receiving a monthly honorarium of P4,000.00. [1]He was also a
member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper, also receiving
a monthly allowance/ honorarium.[2]

Complainant also alleged that respondent was engaged in the private practice of law,
receiving acceptance fees ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.  He lives in a house
and lot owned by complainant's family without paying any rental and refuses to leave
the place despite the latter's demands.

Asked to comment on the complaint, respondent countered that his membership in the
PLEB of Quezon City, representing the NGO, was without fixed compensation.  He
reported only once a week in the afternoon for which he received only per diems
allowed under Section 43 par. (c) of Republic Act No. 6975. [3] As regards his
designation as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the same is authorized under
Section 406 of the Local Government Code of 1991; and his monthly
allowance/honorarium is allowed under Section 393.

While he received allowances, honoraria and other emoluments as member of the

PLEB and of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, even as he is in the government service, the
same is authorized by law.  Hence, there was no double compensation.  He admitted
having appeared as private counsel in several cases.  However, his clients were his
relatives and friends, among them were complainant's father and brother Ricardo.  He
emphasized that his services were pro bono.

Respondent denied that the lot on which his house is built belongs to complainant's
family.  In fact, it is now the subject of an "Accion Publiciana" filed against him by one
Dionisio delos Reyes before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100.

In a Resolution dated January 20, 2003, we referred the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

IBP Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila, who conducted the investigation, found that
respondent's appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Town Proper, Novaliches, Quezon City, while concurrently employed as a legal officer
of the Manila Urban Settlements Office is not unlawful.  Such appointment is in
accordance with the Local Government Code of 1991.  Nor could respondent be found
liable for receiving honoraria as a Lupon member, since the Local Government Code of
1991 authorizes Lupon members to receive honoraria, allowances, and other
emoluments. With respect to respondent's appointment as PLEB member, IBP
Commissioner Aguila stated that the same is not an exception to the prohibition
against dual appointments or employment of government officials or employees.

IBP Commissioner Aguila found that respondent's court appearances as counsel for
litigants do not constitute private practice of law since complainant failed to show that
he received compensation.  However, respondent should still be held liable for violation
of Civil Service Rules and Regulations since he failed to show that he was permitted by
his Office to appear as counsel for his clients.

On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-93
quoted as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and in view of respondent's accepting appointment as Board Member of the
People's Law Enforcement Board of Quezon City while he was still employed as Legal
Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month and hereby REPRIMANDED
with stern WARNING for failing to obtain written permission from his superiors to
appear as counsel to certain relatives and friends as required by Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules.
The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or
appointed, from concurrently holding any other office or position in the government is
contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution which provides:

"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no

appointive official shall hold any other office or 2employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."[4]
In trying to justify his appointment as PLEB member, respondent invoked Section 43
(c) of R.A. No. 6975[5] quoted below which, according to him, is the law allowing him to
be appointed as such member of the Quezon City PLEB.

"Section 43.  People's Law Enforcement Board

x x x                                         x x x                               x x x

(c) Compensation, Membership in the PLEB is a civic duty.  However, PLEB members
may be paid per diem as may be determined by the city or municipal council from city
or municipal funds."
It is clear that this provision pertains only to the compensation of PLEB members.  It
cannot be construed as an exception to the Constitutional and statutory prohibition
against dual or multiple appointments of appointive public employees.

Respondent also failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer of the
Manila Urban Settlements Office allow his appointment as PLEB member, an
exception to dual appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes.  Indeed,
respondent, in accepting such appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Local Government Code of 1991.   Being contra
leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Attorney's Oath.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
These duties are further enshrined in the Attorney's Oath, which every lawyer in this
jurisdiction has to take before he is allowed to practice law.  The Attorney's Oath states
in part that every lawyer "shall support the Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities…"

The lawyer's paramount duty to society is to obey the law.  For of all classes
and professions, it is the lawyer who is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, for he
is their sworn servant.[6] Sadly, respondent failed to fulfill this exacting duty.

On respondent's appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay

Novaliches Proper, while serving as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlements
Office, we agree with the IBP Investigating Commissioner that the same is in order,
being allowed by law.

"Section 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members

x x x                x x x                 x x x

(b) The lupon or pangkat members shall serve without compensation, except as
provided for in Section 393 and without prejudice to incentives as provided for in this
Section and in Book IV of this Code.  The Department of Interior and Local
Government shall provide for a system of granting economic or other incentives to
the lupon or pangkat members who adequately demonstrate the ability to judiciously
and expeditiously resolve cases referred to them.  While in the performance of
their duties, the lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private
employment, shall be deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer
from any diminution in compensation or allowance from said employment
by reason thereof."
The above provision allows government officials and employees to sit
as lupon or pangkat members.  The phrase "whether in public or private employment"
sustains respondent's posture.

We now determine whether respondent engaged in the practice of law while employed
as Legal Officer V in the Manila Urban Settlement Office.  Private practice of law
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one's self to the public as a lawyer.[7] Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it
consists in frequent or customary action a succession of acts of the same kind.  The
practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition
of statutes has been interpreted as customarily habitually holding one's self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. [8]

In the case at bar, respondent's appearance as counsel is not merely isolated.  Evidence
presented by complainant shows that he had an extensive practice of law.  While
employed as a Legal Officer in the Urban Resettlement Office of Manila, he maintained
a law office.  The pleadings he signed as "counsel" for his clients filed with the courts
indicate his office address as "Room 201 7 JA Building, 244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches,
Quezon City."  Following is the letter head appearing on the letters and
envelopes[9] sent to his clients:

"Cesar G. Fajardo
Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law
Room 201 7 J & A Building
244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches
Quezon City."
Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the Manila
Urban Resettlement) is "not really strict when it comes to appearing in some private
cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to render service even on holidays
without additional compensation."  At most, he should have asked written permission
from his chief as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
that "(n)o officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department."

As to respondent's alleged unlawfulstay on complainant's property affecting his

conduct as a member of the Bar, suffice it to state that any discussion on this issue is
premature since the case is still pending in the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City.

Anent the penalty to be imposed, as mentioned earlier, the IBP Board of Governors
recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) month for accepting a
prohibited appointment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City and be reprimanded
for failing to obtain a written permission from his "superiors" to appear as counsel "for
certain friends and relatives."  We believe that a heavier penalty should be imposed
upon him for he transgressed not only the statutes but the very fundamental law itself,
in violation of his Attorney's Oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which is he is
required to take before admission to practice, for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so.  The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice (Stress supplied).
WHEREFORE, for accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City
while concurrently employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office,
in violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which in turn contravene his
Attorney's Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal
practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months effective from notice and is REPRIMANDED and
WARNED that any repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be spread
upon the records of Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo; the Office of the Court Administrator to be
furnished to the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ.,concur.

459 Phil. 209

 FIRST DIVISION

[ A. C. No. 6061, October 03, 2003 ]

DR. RAUL C. SANCHEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SALUSTINO

SOMOSO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In his complaint-affidavit filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Dr. Raul C. Sanchez, a member of the medical
staff of Sta. Lucia General Hospital, stated that he was the attending physician of
respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso during the latter's confinement at the hospital from
31 March to 09 April 1998. When respondent was discharged on 09 April 1998, he
urged complainant that, since it was a public holiday and banks were closed that day
for business, the latter be good enough to accept a check in payment of the hospital
bills due complainant totalling P44,347.00. Although apprehensive at first,
complainant was later persuaded, however, by respondent's plea of his being a lawyer
who can be trusted as such. Complainant thus accepted two personal checks from
respondent; to wit:

BANK CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT

 
Metrobank
2620115754 04/14/98 P22,347.00
(Lagro Branch)
 
Metrobank
2620115755 04/16/98 P22,000.00
(Lagro Branch)
When deposited, the checks were dishonored. Complainant immediately met with and
informed respondent about it. Respondent promised to redeem the dishonored checks
in cash; he never did.

Ultimately, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On 15 August 2001, the City
Prosecutor issued a resolution holding that the necessary Informations for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) should be filed against respondent. Pursuant to the
resolution, two Informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against respondent
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. A warrant for his arrest was issued
but, somehow, respondent was able to evade arrest.

Complainant in his administrative complaint submits that respondent is a disgrace to

the law profession and unfit to be a member of the bar, and that he should be disbarred
and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Pursuant to an order, dated 31 July 2002, of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), respondent was furnished with a copy of the
complaint and ordered to submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of
a copy of the complaint. Despite the receipt of the IBP-CBD order in his two given
addresses, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. Respondent was finally
declared to be in default.

In its report and recommendation, the IBP-CBD found sufficient evidence on record to
substantiate the charges made by complainant against respondent and recommended
that the latter be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. In
Resolution No. XV-2003-177, dated 26 April 2003, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

The Court accepts the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Clearly, respondent's
action of issuing his personal checks in payment for his medical bills, knowing fully
well that his account with the drawee bank has by then already been closed, constitutes
a gross violation of the basic norm of integrity required of all members of the legal
profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that:

"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

"Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
"Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

"Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
The canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer
not only in the practice of the legal profession but also in his personal dealings as well.
A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond
reproach anywhere and at all times.[2]

When respondent paid, with a personal check from a bank account which he knew had
already been closed, the person who attended to his medical needs and persisted in
refusing to settle his due obligation despite demand, respondent exhibited an
extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession he should,
instead, hold in high esteem. His conduct deserve nothing less than a severe
disciplinary sanction.

The law profession is a noble calling, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only
upon individuals who are competent and fit to exercise it.[3]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso GUILTY of

misconduct, and he is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective from receipt of this decision, with a warning that any further
infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and to the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,concur.

EN BANC

A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC August 19, 2009

QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court - BRANCH
81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON - ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE
PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4, 2008 of Atty. Karen
M. Silverio-Buffe (Atty. Buffe) addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator,
which query the latter referred to the Court for consideration. In the course of its action
on the matter, the Court discovered that the query was beyond pure policy
interpretation and referred to the actual situation of Atty. Buffe, and, hence, was a
matter that required concrete action on the factual situation presented.

The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713, as amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees). This provision places a limitation on public officials and employees
during their incumbency, and those already separated from government employment
for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their
profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:

SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of

public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; or

xxx

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2)
above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with
any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition
shall likewise apply.

In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: "Why may an incumbent engage
in private practice under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict
with his official duties, but a non-incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently
prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the former allowed, who is still
occupying the very public position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like
myself – who is no longer in a position of possible abuse/exploitation – cannot?"1

The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position
effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of prohibition
mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the private practice of law by
appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to
an incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private practice of his
profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who has retired, resigned, or has
been separated from government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in
private practice on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of
one (1) year from the date of her separation from government employment.
Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to remove the
exercise of clout, influence or privity to insider information, which the incumbent
public employee may use in the private practice of his profession. However, this
situation did not obtain in her case, since she had already resigned as Clerk of Court of
RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon. She advanced the view that she could engage in the
private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long as her appearance as
legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former duties as former Clerk
of Court of that Branch.

Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez made the
following observations when the matter was referred to him:

The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is "to uphold the time-honored
principle of public office being a public trust." Section 4 thereof provides for the norms
of conduct of public officials and employees, among others: (a) commitment to public
interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and sincerity. Of particular significance is
the statement under professionalism that "[t]hey [public officials and employees] shall
endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of
undue patronage.

Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety
or the appearance of impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the
retired government employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors
brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may
be.21avvphi1

Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15, 2008, we resolved to refer this
case to the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.3 The OCAT took the view that:

The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket
authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. Clearly, there is a misreading
of that provision of law.4 and further observed:
The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term "such practice" after the phrase
"provided that." It may indeed be misinterpreted as modifying the phrase "engage in
the private practice of their profession" should be prefatory sentence that public
officials "during their incumbency shall not" be disregarded. However, read in its
entirety, "such practice" may only refer to practice "authorized by the Constitution or
law" or the exception to the prohibition against the practice of profession. The term
"law" was intended by the legislature to include "a memorandum or a circular or an
administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of law."

xxx

The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent public officials
and employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a
prohibited and unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy on accountability of
public officers stated in Article XI of the Constitution …

xxx

The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time public
service so that in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter should
take precedence over the former.5[Footnotes omitted]

With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel – the rule that deals with outside employment by
an incumbent judicial employee and which limits such outside employment to one that
"does not require the practice of law."6 The prohibition to practice law with respect to
any matter where they have intervened while in the government service is reiterated in
Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs the
conduct of lawyers in the government service.7

In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations, we issued an En Banc Resolution

dated November 11, 2008 directing the Court Administrator to draft and submit to the
Court a circular on the practice of profession during employment and within one year
from resignation, retirement from or cessation of employment in the Judiciary. We
likewise required the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to (i) verify if Atty. Buffe
had appeared as counsel during her incumbency as clerk of court and after her
resignation in February 2008, and (ii) submit to the Court a report on his verification.8

In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-
Branch 81 of Romblon reported the following appearances made by Atty. Buffe:

(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. versus Leonardo
M. Macalam, et al. on February 19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April 10, 2008 and July 9,
2008 as counsel for the plaintiffs;

(2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal versus Zosimo Malasa, et al., on
(sic) February, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff;

(3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled Solomon Y. Mayor versus Jose J. Mayor, on
February 21, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff; and

(4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National Bank versus Sps. Mariano and
Olivia Silverio, on April 11, 2008 and July 9, 2008, as counsel for the defendants.

Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our November 11, 2008 En Banc Resolution
and she filed a Manifestation (received by the Court on February 2, 2009)
acknowledging receipt of our November 11, 2008 Resolution. She likewise stated that
her appearances are part of Branch 81 records. As well, she informed the Court that she
had previously taken the following judicial remedies in regard to the above query:

1. SCA No. 089119028 (Annex C), filed with Branch 54 of the RTC Manila, which had
been dismissed without prejudice on July 23, 2008 (Annex D) – a recourse taken when
undersigned was still a private practitioner;

2. SCA No. 08120423 (Annex A), filed with Branch 17 of the RTC of Manila, which had
been also dismissed (with or without prejudice) on December 4, 2008 (Annex B) – a
recourse taken when undersigned was already a public prosecutor appearing before the
same Branch 81, after she took her oath of office as such on August 15, 2008.[Emphasis
supplied]

She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the above cases "so that
eventually, the Honorable Supreme Court may put to rest the legal issue/s presented in
the above petitions which is, why is it that R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7 (b)(2) and last par.
thereof, apparently contains an express prohibition (valid or invalid) on the private
practice of undersigned’s law profession, before Branch 81, while on the other hand not
containing a similar, express prohibition in regard to undersigned’s practice of
profession, before the same court, as a public prosecutor – within the supposedly
restricted 1-year period?"

OUR ACTION AND RULING

Preliminary Considerations

As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not merely with the
task of determining how the Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the
substance and form (as the Court does not give interpretative opinions9 but can issue
circulars and regulations relating to pleading, practice and procedure in all courts10
and in the exercise of its administrative supervision over all courts and personnel
thereof11), but also with the task of responding to admitted violations of Section 7 (b)
(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses on the same subject.

After our directive to the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a circular on the
subject of the query for the guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we consider this
aspect of the present administrative matter a finished task, subject only to
confirmatory closure when the OCA reports the completion of the undertaking to us.

Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and
immediately after her resignation, is a violation that we cannot close our eyes to and
that she cannot run away from under the cover of the letter-query she filed and her
petition for declaratory relief, whose dismissal she manifested she would pursue up to
our level. We note that at the time she filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty.
Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases. The terms of
Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any way and her misgivings about
the fairness of the law cannot excuse any resulting violation she committed. In other
words, she took the risk of appearing before her own Branch and should suffer the
consequences of the risk she took.

Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief petitions she filed, both of which
were dismissed, and her intent to elevate the dismissal to this Court for resolution. The
first, filed before the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, was dismissed on July 23, 2008 because
the "court declined to exercise the power to declare rights as prayed for in the petition,
as any decision that may be rendered will be inutile and will not generally terminate the
uncertainty or controversy."12 The second, filed with the RTC, Branch 17, Manila, was
dismissed for being an inappropriate remedy after the dismissal ordered by the RTC,
Branch 54, Manila, on December 4, 2008.13 Under these circumstances, we see
nothing to deter us from ruling on Atty. Buffe’s actions, as no actual court case other
than the present administrative case, is now actually pending on the issue she raised.
On the contrary, we see from Atty. Buffe’s recourse to this Court and the filing of the
two declaratory petitions the intent to shop for a favorable answer to her query. We
shall duly consider this circumstance in our action on the case.

A last matter to consider before we proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffe’s actions relates
to possible objections on procedural due process grounds, as we have not made any
formal directive to Atty. Buffe to explain why she should not be penalized for her
appearance before Branch 81 soon after her resignation from that Branch. The essence
of due process is the grant of the opportunity to be heard; what it abhors is the lack of
the opportunity to be heard.14 The records of this case show that Atty. Buffe has been
amply heard with respect to her actions. She was notified, and she even responded to
our November 11, 2008 directive for the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to
report on Atty. Buffe’s appearances before Branch 81; she expressly manifested that
these appearances were part of the Branch records. Her legal positions on these
appearances have also been expressed before this Court; first, in her original letter-
query, and subsequently, in her Manifestation. Thus, no due process consideration
needs to deter us from considering the legal consequences of her appearances in her
previous Branch within a year from her resignation.

The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713

Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of
public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the
private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public
official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the
following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by
the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her
official functions.

The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public
official or employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except
for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be
undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this
exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the
office the public officer or employee used to work with.

The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public
trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in
government transactions between a former government official or employee and his or
her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the
observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve
the public.15

Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not
the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule on the
"outside employment" that an incumbent court official or court employee may
undertake in addition to his official duties:

Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all
of the following requirements:

(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the
courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is
not incompatible with the performance of the court personnel’s duties and
responsibilities;

(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however,
that court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in
law schools, review or continuing education centers or similar institutions;

(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose
confidential information acquired while performing officials duties;

(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of
government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.

Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside
employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel
shall not accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]

In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the
practice of law is covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3
specifically mentions any outside employment requiring the practice of law. In
Cayetano v. Monsod,16 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of
court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill.17 Under both provisions, a common objective is to avoid any
conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly use
confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity
with court personnel still with the previous office.

After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its
subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty.
Buffe’s situation falls under Section 7.

Atty. Buffe’s Situation

A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe’s admission that she
immediately engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of
prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. We find it noteworthy, too, that
she is aware of this provision and only objects to its application to her situation; she
perceives it to be unfair that she cannot practice before her old office – Branch 81 – for
a year immediately after resignation, as she believes that her only limitation is in
matters where a conflict of interest exists between her appearance as counsel and her
former duties as Clerk of Court. She believes that Section 7 (b)(2) gives preferential
treatment to incumbent public officials and employees as against those already
separated from government employment.

Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets
Section 7 (b)(2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law.
We reiterate what we have explained above, that the general rule under Section 7 (b)(2)
is to bar public officials and employees from the practice of their professions; it is
unlawful under this general rule for clerks of court to practice their profession. By way
of exception, they can practice their profession if the Constitution or the law allows
them, but no conflict of interest must exist between their current duties and the
practice of their profession. As we also mentioned above, no chance exists for lawyers
in the Judiciary to practice their profession, as they are in fact expressly prohibited by
Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from doing so. Under
both the general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffe’s basic premise is
misplaced.

As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law
immediately after her separation from the service and without any period limitation
that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court’s
limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before the office
where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or
separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or
employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only
with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one year.
The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the
Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists. This
analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe’s basic premises.

A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe’s approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her awareness of the
law and her readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the
law. We find it disturbing that she first violated the law before making any inquiry. She
also justifies her position by referring to the practice of other government lawyers
known to her who, after separation from their judicial employment, immediately
engaged in the private practice of law and appeared as private counsels before the RTC
branches where they were previously employed. Again we find this a cavalier attitude
on Atty. Buffe’s part and, to our mind, only emphasizes her own willful or intentional
disregard of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.

By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES

xxx

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

As indicated by the use of the mandatory word "shall," this provision must be strictly
complied with. Atty. Buffe failed to do this, perhaps not with an evil intent, considering
the misgivings she had about Section 7 (b)(2)’s unfairness. Unlawful conduct under
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does not necessarily require the element of criminality,
although the Rule is broad enough to include it.18 Likewise, the presence of evil intent
on the part of the lawyer is not essential to bring his or her act or omission within the
terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful
conduct.19 Thus, we find Atty. Buffe liable under this quoted Rule.
We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyer’s oath and thereby
violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and
unlawfully practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before the RTC
Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]

By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the
models she cited and wanted to replicate – the former court officials who immediately
waded into practice in the very same court they came from. She, like they, disgraced the
dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying and disrespecting the law.20 By her
irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law and in lawyers.21
Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her transparent attempt to cover up her
transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query, which she followed up with
unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the same Section
7 (b)(2) issue, in the hope perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling favorable
to her cause. These are acts whose implications do not promote public confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession.22

Considering Atty. Buffe’s ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the principle of
res ipsa loquitur finds application, making her administratively liable for violation of
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.23 In
several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any
formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of their administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro,24 the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any
further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his
unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the
Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard,
the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his
cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the
proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases.25 The Court
held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of
respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter
under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.26

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy,27 that no evidentiary
hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional
misconduct already established by the facts on record.

We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re: Wenceslao Laureta28
where we punished a lawyer for grave professional misconduct solely based on his
answer to a show-cause order for contempt and without going into a trial-type hearing.
We ruled then that due process is satisfied as long as the opportunity to be heard is
given to the person to be disciplined.29

Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,30 the respondent was disciplined and punished for
contempt for his slurs regarding the Court’s alleged partiality, incompetence and lack
of integrity on the basis of his answer in a show-cause order for contempt. The Court
took note that the respondent did not deny making the negative imputations against
the Court through the media and even acknowledged the correctness of his degrading
statements. Through a per curiam decision, we justified imposing upon him the penalty
of suspension in the following tenor:

The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary
authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the
Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such,
he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct,
pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and
contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.31

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately
exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been
given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded
the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and
Manifestation filed before this Court.

A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as
an attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.32 The appropriate
penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.33

In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors we can apply, save OCAT’s
observation that Atty Buffe’s letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of the
parameters of the prohibition on the practice of the law profession under Section 7 (b)
(2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse, particularly on a
matter as sensitive as practice of the legal profession soon after one’s separation from
the service. If Atty. Buffe is correct in the examples she cited, it is time to ring the bell
and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot allow this practice to
continue.1avvphi1

As we observed earlier,34 Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of
various fora in expressing her misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of
R.A. 6713. She formally lodged a query with the Office of the Court Administrator, and
soon after filed her successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed
these fora to the possibility of embarrassment and confusion through their possibly
differing views on the issue she posed. Although this is not strictly the forum-shopping
that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has done is something that we cannot help
but consider with disfavor because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the
Judiciary that it could have spawned. This is a point against Atty. Buffe that cancels out
the leniency we might have exercised because of the OCAT’s observation about her
ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the prohibition after separation from the
service.

Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine of
₱10,000.00, together with a stern warning to deter her from repeating her
transgression and committing other acts of professional misconduct.35 This penalty
reflects as well the Court’s sentiments on how seriously the retired, resigned or
separated officers and employees of the Judiciary should regard and observe the
prohibition against the practice of law with the office that they used to work with.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of

professional misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (₱10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the
commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

Let this Decision be noted in Atty. Buffe’s record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[ AC. No. 6788, Aug 23, 2007 ]

DIANA RAMOS v. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG +

RESOLUTION
557 Phil. 507

PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension[1] against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for
multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Complaint

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose
R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita
Jovellanos.[2] She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a
receipt for P5,000 only.[3]

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always
told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that
the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.[4]This happened six times and for each
"appearance" in court, respondent charged her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She

personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San
Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against
the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO).[5]

RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE

According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service
from the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district
attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna
and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter. [6]

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against
the Jovellanoses.[7]Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was
not an indigent, he declined.[8]Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult
Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner. [9] Atty. Ungson, however,
did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance
fee agreed upon.[10]Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly
remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might
spend" the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while
she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.[11]

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt

because one of her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously
given the respondent for safekeeping.[12]Because the complainant was a friend, he
agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992. [13]

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.[14] A few months later or in
September 1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the
Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to
prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the
complainant.[15]

Recommendation of the IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the
parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to
the IBP Board of Governors.[16]

The CBD noted that the receipt[17]was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still
with the PAO.[18] It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd
businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons,
the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent
have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to
accommodate a friend's request.[19]It found respondent guilty of violating the
prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving
lawyer's fees other than their salaries.[20]The CBD concluded that respondent violated
the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with
the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years
and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000
which was substantiated by the receipt.[21]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that
respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the
restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in
case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six
months.[22]

The Court's Ruling

We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. [23] More
specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of
their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the
bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. [24]

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service.

For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of

public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function. [25]
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected
to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt
on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from
a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he
accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an
attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt
showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer.
Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was
created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. [27] Section
14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal
assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-
judicial cases.[28]
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. [29] Respondent violated
the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1. - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This undertaking includes the
observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when
he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his
legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of
Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the
private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's
counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting
attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did
he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should
not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an
action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried
and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that never took
place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any
falsehood.[31]

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character
required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office
are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A
government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of
social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice. [32]

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the
benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the
amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in
satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)[33] nor was it given to him for
a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). [34]Nevertheless,
respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to
attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.[35]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer's oath,
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to
complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995,
within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132826 September 3, 2009

ROLANDO SAA, Petitioner,

vs.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE,
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, PASIG CITY and ATTY. FREDDIE A. VENIDA,
Respondents.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Freddie A. Venida on December 27, 1991 in this Court. In his complaint, Saa stated that
Atty. Venida’s act of filing two cases1 against him was oppressive and constituted
unethical practice.2

In a resolution dated February 17, 1992,3 Atty. Venida was required to comment on the
complaint against him. In his belated and partial compliance4 with the February 17,
1992 resolution, Atty. Venida averred that Saa did not specifically allege his supposed
infractions. He asked to be furnished a copy of the complaint. He also prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.

Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint,5 Atty. Venida still did not file his complete
comment within 10 days as required in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Consequently,
we issued the June 14, 1995 resolution6 requiring Atty. Venida to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with
the February 17, 1992 resolution.

Finally, Atty. Venida filed his full comment7 on September 4, 1995 which, without
doubt, was a mere reiteration of his partial comment. Atty. Venida also added that he
was merely performing his duty as counsel of Saa’s adversaries.8

The matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In a report dated August 14, 1997,
Commissioner George S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of merit.9 It found no evidence that the two cases filed by Atty. Venida against Saa were
acts of oppression or unethical practice.10

The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the investigating
commissioner’s report and dismissed the complaint.11 Saa filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.12
Saa now questions the resolution of the IBP in this petition for certiorari.13 He ascribes
grave abuse of discretion to the IBP when it adopted and affirmed the report of the
investigating commissioner dismissing his complaint. According to him, the
investigating commissioner’s report did not at all mention the dismissal of OMB 1-90-
1118 and A.C. P-90-513, even if the existence of both cases was admitted by the parties.
The dismissal of his complaint for disbarment was therefore grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures.

We disagree.
Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
exercise of judgment by reason of passion or personal hostility as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.14 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.15 A decision is
not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because a party affected
disagrees with it.
There was no grave abuse of discretion in this case. There was in fact a dearth of
evidence showing oppressive or unethical behavior on the part of Atty. Venida. Without
convincing proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a desire to file baseless legal
actions, the findings of the IBP stand.
Nonetheless, we strongly disapprove of Atty. Venida’s blatant refusal to comply with
various court directives. As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders
and processes.16 Yet, he disregarded this very important canon of legal ethics when he
filed only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months after being directed to
do so in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Worse, he filed his complete comment only
on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after due date. In both instances, he
managed to delay the resolution of the case, a clear violation of Canon 1217 and Rules
1.0318 and 12.0419 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Yet again, Atty. Venida failed to file a memorandum within the period required in our
May 17, 2004 resolution.20 Despite the 30-day deadline to file his memorandum,21 he
still did not comply. As if taunting authority, he continually ignored our directives for
him to show cause and comply with the May 17, 2004 resolution.22
Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full comments. But
tried to exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the complaint and had
a heavy workload (for his partial comment). He even had the temerity to blame a
strong typhoon for the loss of all his files, the complaint included (for his full
comment). His excuses tax the imagination. Nevertheless, his apologies
notwithstanding, we find his conduct utterly unacceptable for a member of the legal
profession. He must not be allowed to evade accountability for his omissions.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for
violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.23 We reiterate our ruling in Catu
v. Atty. Rellosa:24
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal
ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.1avvphi1
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and comport
himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The charge of oppressive or
unethical behavior against respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of Canons 1
and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as
the lawyer’s oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) year, effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is further
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
455 Phil. 1
EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 4838, July 29, 2003 ]
EMILIO GRANDE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-
1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for
Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled "People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused." During the proceedings, respondent Atty.
Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No.
0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine
National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client.
Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same
will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer,
she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was
prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from
participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal
of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee
bank for the reason: "Account Closed." On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to
respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check.[1] However, his
demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against
her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22,
1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.[2]
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for
disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyer's Oath.[3]
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondent's given address at Carmelo
Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on
the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.[4] However, it was returned unserved
with the notation "Moved".[5] The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted
the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.[6]
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This
was again returned unserved with the notation: "Refused". Thus, the case was referred
to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[7]
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous
found respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath.
Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554
which adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal
check by way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the
assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In
doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client
in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check
amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be
accordingly penalized.[8] Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties
for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good
moral character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter
upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which
puts the lawyer's moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in
the practice of law.[9]
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her
suspension or disbarment,[10] because it is important that members of the legal
brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing
which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-
professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak
well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer's professional and personal conduct must at
all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.[12]
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices
served on her betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the
nobility of the legal profession.[13] Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of
respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw
in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice
because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer.
How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when
she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command
of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:
CANON 1.
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Needless to state, respondent's persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed
at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits
no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.[14] We can not tolerate any
misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon
receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10135

FIRST DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014 ]

EDGARDO AREOLA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:

This refers to the administrative complaint[1] filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.
Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney's oath of office, deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable

Commissioners, Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan
Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He
alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners' Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the
Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her
speech/lecture.[2] Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her
speech:

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang-areglo ay maging
praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na
hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang
pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong
mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."[3]

Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees
should prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know
the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment
for their transcript of stenographic notes.[4]

Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their
pleadings and filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza
undermined his capability, to wit:

(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the
latter was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act
No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latter's criminal case for rape, which was
pending before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda
retorted that he allowed Areola to file the motion for him since there was nobody to
help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for
Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the Complainant and
alleged that the respondent asked for P2,000.00 to represent them.

(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded
Mirador and discredited Areola.[5]

In her unverified Answer[6] dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the
filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as
the latter had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts of
Antipolo City including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously
detained. These actuations show that Areola has a penchant for filing various charges
against anybody who does not accede to his demand.[7] Atty. Mendoza contended that
Areola is not a lawyer but represented himself to his co-detainees as one.[8] She
alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not proper.

After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on
August 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a
waiver on their part. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required
to submit their respective position papers.[9]

On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation.[10] The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he
must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He
however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money
from Areola's co-detainees as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also
uncorroborated, viz:

There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money
from the inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not
the proper party to file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by
the act/s being complained of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were
attached to prove the said charges. Hence, it is simply hearsay in nature.[11]

Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and
their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their
motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the
Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty.
Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the
judiciary.[12] The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.[13]

In a Notice of Resolution[14] dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors

resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution[15] dated November 19, 2011 but
the IBP Board of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution[16] dated May 10,
2013. The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for
final action pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12, Paragraph b[17] of the Revised Rules of
Court.

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained
therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she demanded
money from his co-detainees.

The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed
the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez,
but it is apparent that no document was submitted which would show that they
authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No
affidavit was even executed by the said co-detainees to substantiate the matters Areola
raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areola's statements, especially as regards Atty.
Mendoza's alleged demands of money.

The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola
initiated this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to
acknowledge the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO
clients of Atty. Mendoza.[18] It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with
Philippine laws. However, no matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer.
He is not authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings by himself before the courts.
His familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by cooperating with the
PAO instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other government
authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more intelligent and
better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In his Reply[19], he
made fun of her grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao english[20]. He
also called the PAO as "Pa-Amin Office"[21] which seriously undermines the reputation
of the PAO. While Areola may have been frustrated with the way the PAO is managing
the significant number of cases it deals with, all the more should he exert efforts to
utilize his knowledge to work with the PAO instead of maligning it.

Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the
judge and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission
corresponds to one of Areola's charges against Atty. Mendoza that she told her clients
"Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to
dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.

As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness."

Atty. Mendoza's improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal
system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors[22] according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza's careless remark
is uncalled for.

It must be remembered that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration
of justice. To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his
devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.[23]

In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months
as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza's infraction. Disbarment and
suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof.[24] The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark
"Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark was
inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as
to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.

In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent's length
of service, the respondent's acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of
remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations,
respondent's advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the
Court's determination of the imposable penalty.[25] The Court takes note of Atty.
Mendoza's lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her
main source of livelihood.[26] Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly
baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty.
Mendoza's own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and
reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza
GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule
15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the
penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

674 Phil. 550

EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 6655, October 11, 2011 ]
PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VICTORIANO G.
PASCUA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint[1] of Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla
seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly falsifying
a public document and evading the payment of correct taxes through the use of falsified
documents.

Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent prepared and notarized
two Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with
Sale. The first deed[2] was for a consideration of P250,000 and appears to have been
executed and signed by Lope's surviving spouse, Caridad Tabarrejos, and her children
(complainant, Virginia Caalim-Inong and Marivinia Caalim) in favor of spouses Madki
and Shirley Mipanga. The second deed[3]was for a consideration of P1,000,000 and
appears to have been executed by and for the benefit of the same parties as the first
deed. The two deeds have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book
numbers in the notarial portion.

Complainant avers that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs' signatures were
falsified. She contends that her sister Marivinia does not know how to sign her name
and was confined at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center, Tuguegarao City, at the time
the deeds were allegedly signed by her, as shown by a certification[4]from said
hospital. The certification, dated February 6, 2004 and signed by Dr. Alice Anghad,
Medical Officer IV, attested that Marivinia has been confined at the Psychiatry Ward of
the Cagayan Valley Medical Center since May 3, 1999 after being diagnosed of
"Substance Induced Psychosis" and "Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type."

Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of them and
they came to know of their existence only recently. She further claims that the
Community Tax Certificates[5] (CTCs) in her name and in the names of her mother and
her sister Marivinia were procured only by the vendee Shirley and not by them.
Complainant submits the affidavit[6] executed by Edwin Gawayon, Barangay Treasurer
of C-8, Claveria, Cagayan, on August 3, 2002, attesting that the CTCs were procured at
the instance of Shirley and were paid without the complainant and her co-heirs
personally appearing before him. Gawayon stated that the signatures and thumbmarks
appearing on the CTCs are not genuine and authentic because it can be seen with the
naked eyes that the signatures are similar in all three CTCs.
Lastly, complainant alleges that the two deeds were used by respondent and Shirley to
annul a previously simulated deed of sale[7] dated June 20, 1979 purportedly executed
by Lope in favor of the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. Said deed was likewise a
complete nullity because at that time Shirley Mipanga was only sixteen years old and
still single.

In his comment,[8] respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed
Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Sale (subject deeds), but denies
any irregularity in their execution. He claims that the preparation and notarization of
the subject deeds were made under the following circumstances:

In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad, Virginia and Shirley
Mipanga went to his house and requested him to prepare a deed of sale of a residential
lot located in Claveria, Cagayan. He was informed by the parties that the agreed
purchase price is P1,000,000 and was presented the certificate of title to the property.
Upon finding that the registered owner is "Lope Caalim, married to Caridad
Tabarrejos" and knowing that Lope already died sometime in the 1980s, he asked for,
and was given, the names and personal circumstances of Lope's surviving children. He
asked where Marivinia was, but Caridad told him that Marivinia remained home as she
was not feeling well. As Caridad assured him that they will fetch Marivinia after the
deed of conveyance is prepared, he proceeded to ask the parties to present their CTCs.
Caridad and Pacita, however, told him that they have not secured their CTCs while
Virginia forgot to bring hers. So he instructed them to get CTCs from Claveria.

An hour later, Caridad and Shirley came back with the CTCs of Caridad, Virginia,
complainant and Marivinia. After he finished typing the deed and the details of the
CTCs, Caridad said that she will bring the deed with her to Claveria for her daughters to
sign. He then told them that it was necessary for him to meet them all in one place for
them to acknowledge the deed before him as notary public. It was agreed upon that
they will all meet at the house of the Mipangas between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on
that same day.

Respondent arrived at the Mipanga residence shortly before 12:00 noon. There he saw
Shirley, Caridad, complainant, Pacita and Marivinia with two other persons whom he
later learned were the instrumental witnesses to the execution of the document. Upon
being informed that the parties have already affixed their signatures on the deed, he
examined the document then inquired from the heirs if the signatures appearing
therein were theirs and if they were truly selling the property for P1,000,000. The heirs
answered in the affirmative, thereby ratifying and acknowledging the instrument and
its contents as their own free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, he notarized the
document and then gave the original and two carbon copies to Shirley while leaving
two in his possession.

Respondent adds that Shirley thereafter asked him what steps were needed to effect
registration of the deed and transfer of the title in her and her husband's name. He
replied that all the unpaid land taxes should be paid including the capital gains tax,
documentary stamp taxes and estate tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) which
will then issue the necessary clearance for registration. When asked how much taxes
are payable, he replied that it depends on the assessment of the BIR examiner which
will be based on the zonal value or selling price stated in the deed of sale. He added that
the estate taxes due, with interests and surcharges, would also have to be paid. Since
the consideration for the sale is P1,000,000, the taxes payable was quite enormous.
Shirley asked him who between the vendor and the vendee should pay the taxes, and he
replied that under the law, it is the obligation of the vendors to pay said taxes but it still
depends upon the agreement of the parties. He asked if there was already an agreement
on the matter, but the parties replied in the negative.

Shirley then told the vendors that they should shoulder the payment of taxes. Caridad
and her co-vendors, however, refused and said that a big portion of the P1,000,000
paid to them was already used by them to pay and settle their other obligations. Shirley
then offered to pay one-half of whatever amount the BIR will assess, but Caridad
insisted that another document be prepared stating a reduced selling price of only
P250,000 so that they need not contribute to the payment of taxes since Shirley was
anyway already willing to pay one-half of the taxes based on the selling price stated in
the first deed. This resulted in a heated discussion between the parties, which was,
however, later resolved by an agreement to execute a second deed. The prospect of
preparing an additional deed, however, irritated respondent as it meant additional
work for him. Thus, respondent went home.

Later, the parties visited respondent at his house and pleaded with him to prepare the
second deed with the reduced selling price. Moved by his humane and compassionate
disposition, respondent gave in to the parties' plea.
In the presence of all the heirs, the vendees and the instrumental witnesses, respondent
prepared and notarized the second deed providing for the lower consideration of only
P250,000. He used the same document number, page number and book number in the
notarial portion as the first deed because according to him, the second deed was
intended by the parties to supplant the first.

Respondent denies complainant's assertions that the two deeds are simulated and
falsified, averring that as stated above, all the parties acknowledged the same before
him. Likewise, he and his clients, the spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga, presented
the subject deeds as exhibits in Civil Case No. 2761-S also pending before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as she was allegedly
under confinement at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center on September 15, 2001,
respondent cites a medical certificate[9] stating that Marivinia was confined in said
hospital from May 3, 1999 to August 10, 1999. He also points out that Marivinia is one
of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2836-S pending before the RTC, Branch 12, Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan, for the annulment of the subject deeds, and nothing in the complaint
states that she is mentally or physically incapacitated. Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs
would have asked the appointment of a guardian for her.

By Resolution[10] dated August 10, 2005, this Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation[11] dated May 3, 2007, Commissioner Jose Roderick
F. Fernando found respondent administratively liable on account of his indispensable
participation in an act designed to defraud the government. He recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months and that his
notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked and that respondent be prohibited
from being commissioned as a notary public for two years.

According to Commissioner Fernando, respondent did not offer any tenable defense to
justify his actions. As a notary, it was his responsibility to ensure that the solemnities of
the act of notarization were followed. As a lawyer, it was likewise incumbent upon him
that the document he drafted and subsequently notarized was neither unlawful nor
fraudulent. Commissioner Fernando ruled that respondent failed on both counts since
he drafted a document that reflected an untruthful consideration that served to reduce
unlawfully the tax due to the government. Then he completed the act by likewise
notarizing and thus converting the document into a public document.

On June 26, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner
Fernando's report and recommendation but imposed a higher penalty on respondent.
Its Resolution No. XVII-2007-285 reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A;" and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent's violation of Notarial Law and for his participation
to a transaction that effectively defrauded the government, Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and SUSPENSION of
his Notarial Commission for two (2) years with Warning that a similar violation in the
future will be dealt with severely.[12]

The above resolution is well taken.

By respondent's own account of the circumstances surrounding the execution and
notarization of the subject deeds of sale, there is a clear basis for disciplining him as a
member of the bar and as notary public.

Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject deeds. He avers that the
true consideration for the transaction is P1,000,000 as allegedly agreed upon by the
parties when they appeared before him for the preparation of the first document as well
as the notarization thereof. He then claimed to have been "moved by his humane and
compassionate disposition" when he acceded to the parties' plea that he prepare and
notarize the second deed with a lower consideration of P250,000 in order to reduce the
corresponding tax liability. However, as noted by Commissioner Fernando, the two
deeds were used by respondent and his client as evidence in a judicial proceeding (Civil
Case No. 2671-S), which only meant that both documents still subsist and hence
contrary to respondent's contention that the second deed reflecting a lower
consideration was intended to supersede the first deed.
As to the charge of falsification, the Court finds that the documents annexed to the
present complaint are insufficient for us to conclude that the subject deeds were indeed
falsified and absolutely simulated. We have previously ruled that a deed of sale that
allegedly states a price lower than the true consideration is nonetheless binding
between the parties and their successors in interest.[13] Complainant, however, firmly
maintains that she and her co-heirs had no participation whatsoever in the execution of
the subject deeds. In any event, the issues of forgery, simulation and fraud raised by the
complainant in this proceeding apparently are still to be resolved in the pending suit
filed by the complainant and her co-heirs for annulment of the said documents (Civil
Case No. 2836-S).

With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state
the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due
on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful
statement in a public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated
an amount much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent
abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His
act clearly violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
reads:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Xxxx

Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.

Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance
of the law, he likewise displayed lack of respect for and made a mockery of the
solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and fraudulent
document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does
not deserve considering its nature and purpose.

In Gonzales v. Ramos,[14] we elucidated on how important and sacrosanct the notarial

act is:
By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent converted the Deed of
Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. Such act is no empty
gesture. The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a
notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a document under his hand
and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of
requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the
solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgement executed before a notary public and appended to a private
instrument. Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are
impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.[15]

Moreover, while respondent's duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the

identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless
incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement or at least
refrain from being a party to its consummation.[16]Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from performing any
notarial act for transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to wit:

SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act
described in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the
appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is
unlawful or immoral;

xxxx
In this case, respondent proceeded to notarize the second deed despite knowledge of its
illegal purpose. His purported desire to accommodate the request of his client will not
absolve respondent who, as a member of the legal profession, should have stood his
ground and not yielded to the importunings of his clients. Respondent should have
been more prudent and remained steadfast in his solemn oath not to commit falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any.[17] As a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the
integrity of the legal profession.[18]

Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice when he gave the second document the same document number, page number
and book number as the first:
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. - x x x
xxxx
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall
also state on the instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the same
is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.
Xxxx
Respondent admitted having given the second deed the same document number, page
number and book number as in the first deed, reasoning that the second deed was
intended to supplant and cancel the first deed. He therefore knowingly violated the
above rule, in furtherance of his client's intention of concealing the actual purchase
price so as to avoid paying the taxes rightly due to the Government.

Even assuming that the second deed was really intended to reflect the true agreement
of the parties and hence superseding the first deed they had executed, respondent
remains liable under the afore-cited Section 2(e) which requires that each instrument
or document, executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before the notary public shall be
given a number corresponding to the one in his register. Said rule is not concerned
with the validity or efficacy of the document or instrument recorded but merely to
ensure the accuracy and integrity of the entries in the notarial register.

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[19] Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds herefore. -

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, of for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Xxxx
In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non-
appearance of one of the signatories was meted the penalties of revocation of his
notarial commission and disqualification from re-appointment for two years. The
notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice of law for one year. Said
penalty was in accord with the cases of Bon v. Ziga,[20]Serzo v. Flores,[21]Zaballero v.
Montalvan[22] and Tabas v. Mangibin.[23] The Court found that by notarizing the
questioned deed, the respondent in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.[24]

In the instant case, we hold that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of
suspension and revocation of his notarial commission for having violated the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. In line withcurrent jurisprudence, and as recommended by
the IBP Board of Governors, the revocation of his notarial commission and
disqualification from re-appointment as notary public for two years is in order.
With respect, however, to his suspension from the practice of law, we hold that the one-
year suspension imposed in Gonzales and the other cases is not applicable considering
that respondent not only failed to faithfully comply with the rules on notarial practice,
he also violated his oath when he prepared and notarized the second deed for the
purpose of avoiding the payment of correct amount of taxes, thus abetting an activity
aimed at defiance of the law. Under these circumstances, we find the two-year
suspension recommended by the IBP Board of Governors as proper and commensurate
to the infraction committed by respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is hereby SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In addition, his present notarial
commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is further WARNED
that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office of
the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office
of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.

279 Phil. 701

EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 1424, October 15, 1991 ]
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR.,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for
Malpractice, for stretching to almost a half a century a litigation arising from the
probate of a will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes which instituted Ismaela Dimagiba
as the sole heir of all the properties.
The letter of the private complainant, Ismaela Dimagiba, received on January 15, 1975
by the Supreme Court, states:
xxx xxx xxx

The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa
Reyes, Mariano Reyes, Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes, filed a case against me with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan in 1946 for annulment of sale and was docketed as
Civil Case No. 108 of said Court. This case was terminated annulling the sale, as per
decision in 1954 in G.R. No. L-5618 and L-5620;

On January 19, 1955, I filed a case for Probate of Will with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, regarding the same property subject of the annulment of sale and was
docketed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc. No. 831-M. Luckily,
the said case was terminated on June 20, 1958, probating the said will. The oppositors
in this case who are the same persons mentioned above appealed this case to the
Higher Court of the Philippines and was decided by the Hon. Supreme Court of the
Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638 and L-23662, affirming the
decision of the Lower Court;

That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties
filed on June 5, 1968 Civil Case No. 3677-M with the CF1 of Bulacan for annulment of
will; this case was filed through their counsel, Atty. Gregorio Centeno.

Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11, 1970 without pronouncement of
costs;

That on August 13, 1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case No. 4078
with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for annulment of the said will; this case was
dismissed by the Court on December 21, 1971;

That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty. Montalvo,
filed another case with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, allegedly for Partition of
the same property mentioned in the probate of will which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4151. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 11,
1972;

That on May 25, 1972, still another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty.
Montalvo, for specific performance, with the CF1 of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4188-M. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated
October 24, 1973. On August 12, 1974, the said case was remanded to the Court of
Appeals, Manila, by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan;

Still on April 5, 1974, I was again surprised to know that there was another case filed by
the same persons mentioned above through Atty. Montalvo with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458. This case is still pending
before said court.

In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through their
counsel, Atty. Montalvo, I am constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the
actuation of said lawyer who is a member of the Philippine Bar attending to cases of
non suit, which cause harassment on my part.

The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc.
No. 831 of the CFI, Bulacan. They can not be ejected from the land holdings because
they claim that the case filed by Atty. Montalvo is still pending in Court.

In all the foregoing [sic] I respectfully submit to this Honorable Court for appropriate
action.

xxx xxx x x x[1]

In the Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated January 27, 1975,
the respondent Montalvo was required to file an Answer within ten days from notice.
[2]
In his Answer dated March 3, 1975, Montalvo claims that the case filed against the
complainant were done
xxx xxx xxx

at the instance of different parties; or by reason of different causes of action and all the
pleadings filed by the undersigned were and/or the result of a very painstaking,
diligent, and careful study and evaluation of the facts and law involved therein such
that even before signing the same, the undersigned has always been of the honest and
sincere belief that its filing is for the interest of justice certainly never for harassment;
(2) that the reason why the parties tenant could not be ejected from their land as stated
by complainant in her complaint is because of the passage of Presidential Decree No.
27 which emancipated the farmers from their bondage and declared them as owners of
the rice and corn land they tilled upon the passage of the decree coupled with the very
acts of the complainant herself; and that (3) the complainant by filing this instant
complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate the undersigned in order to
withdraw as counsel of his clients because she has been thwarted in her erroneous
belief that she owns exclusively all the properties comprising the estate of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes and could not accept and take into account the reality that by
virtue of the final decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not
the sole owner of the present estate of the deceased but only a co-owner with the clients
of the undersigned."[3]
In addition, Montalvo stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the
Supreme Court Decision In G.R. Nos. 5618 and 5620.[4]

As a Rejoinder to the Respondent's Answer, the complainant Dimagiba stated that in

Civil Case No. 3677-M, the plaintiffs are the same parties-oppositors who opposed the
petition for probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Benedicta De los
Reyes in Special Proceeding No. 831. The same case was dismissed by the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan on the ground that the issue raised had been decided by the
Court.[5]

Likewise Civil Case No. 4078-M was also dismissed by Branch 2 of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan presided by Judge Ricardo C. Pronove, Jr., in the order of August
24, 1973 on the ground of res judicata.
xxx xxx xxx
But a closer analysis [sic] it is clear that this action is merely a rehash of the other cases
previously litigated between the plaintiffs and the defendant and already settled by
final judgment."[6]
In fact, in that case, Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., included himself as one of the defendants.
xxx xxx xxx

Finally, the fact that plaintiff's counsel, Jose Montalvo, Jr., had decided to join cause
with the other plaintiffs in this case does not mean that there is no identity of parties
between this case and Civil Case No. 3677-M. Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., is not alleged to
be a real11 party in interest in this case so that his inclusion herein as a party plaintiff
can not produce any legal significance.[7]
This notwithstanding, Montalvo filed another case against Dimagiba which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4458-M of the CFI Bulacan where the plaintiffs and causes
of action were again the same as 3677-M and 4188-M. Again, the CFI Bulacan
dismissed the cases.

On April 16, 1975, the Second Division, following the procedure then obtaining for the
resolution of disciplinary cases against lawyers, referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report, and recommendation.[8]

It was only on May 4, 1990, or almost fifteen years later, that the entire records of Adm.
Case No. 1424 involving Ismaela Dimagiba versus Atty. Jose Montalvo was returned to
the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General through
Solicitor Aurora P. Cortes.

In summary, the following are the litigations that ensued from the probate of the Will
of De los Reyes as found by the Solicitor General involving the same parties and the
same cause of action:

1. Special Proceedings No. 831 instituted on January 15, 1955. The Will was admitted
to probate but was subsequently appealed.
2. CA-G.R. No. 31221-R. This was an appeal of the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 831.
The decision was affirmed.
3. G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the
Supreme Court, upheld the decision in CA-G.R. No. 31221-R, in effect, affirming the
due execution of the Will and the capacity of the Testator as well as the institution of
the complainant.
4. Civil Case No. 3677-M. Filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on June 4,
1968, this was a petition for the nullification of the Will. This was dismissed.
5. Civil Case No. 200 which was redocketed as Civil Case NO. 4078-M. This complaint
dated November 3, 1970 was again dismissed.
6. Civil Case No. 4151-M. This case, filed on February 16, 1972, for the partition of the
property left by the deceased Benedicta De Los Reyes on the ground of the nullity of the
Will, was again dismissed for failure to prosecute.
7. Civil Case No. 4188-M. Filed on May 25, 1972, with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch 2, the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined the descendants of the
collateral relatives of the deceased De los Reyes against herein complainant Dimagiba.
This case was dismissed.
8. Civil Case No. 4458-M. Civil Case No. 4188-M was appealed. But without waiting
for the outcome, Atty. Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458-M on April 5, 1974 which
was a complaint for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title in the name of
Ismaela Dimagiba and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes.
Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various
forms involving the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising
issues long laid to rest by final judgment.
This misbehavior in facie curiae consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's
pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court.[9]
Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client's cause has the duty to know the
entire history of a case, specially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar,
even Atty. Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes has been an over-extended and contentious litigation between
the heirs.
A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly endless channels left dangling
by our legal system in order to wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may
have thought that he could get away with his indiscriminate filing of suits that were
clearly intended to harass lsmaela Dimagiba. When court dockets get clogged and the
administration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be entirely blameless,
yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had taken their privilege so lightly, and in
such mindless fashion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has
violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an
honorable profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by
law as an officer of the Court. We have not countenanced other less significant
infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of
DISBARMENT.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, and consistent with the urgent need to
maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession and to preserve
undiminished, public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the
respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the practice of law. His name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all courts of the country and entered in
the personal record of respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3056
EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 3056, August 16, 1991 ]
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VICENTE C.
RENOMERON, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

PER CURIAM:
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant
Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision,
Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds
of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V
& G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in
its subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the following
offenses:

"1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient
justification, to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of
Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the
corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of
obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested
therein.
"2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
"3. Dishonesty.
"4. Extortion.
"5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with
pending official transaction before him.
"6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
"7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure." (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to
register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V &
G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.

Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny
registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action,
except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain
details about the transactions.

Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron

suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a
certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide him
with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket
money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot
by V & G or GSIS representatives.

On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably
on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory
affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him.

The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to
respondent through his niece.

Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare,
respondent imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up with the
respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987
challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within
twenty-four (24) hours.

On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163
certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale
with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987,
Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:

"x x x since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly
fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which
have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual, Jr., it is only during
the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the
same tenor have been refused or denied registration x x x." (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator,
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land
Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27, 1987 (Consulta No.
1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of
the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & G's 163 deeds of sale with
assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June
4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent
Register of Deeds.

Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed

respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be
taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on
the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.

In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of
directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the
official transactions awaiting his action.

Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear

Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a
formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the
pleadings.

The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of:
(1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and
procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated
requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the
registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material
benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a
public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for
himself in connection with pending official transactions before him.

Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G.

Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty; (2) be
reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and
(3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of
grave misconduct.

"Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence
supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave
misconduct.
"The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for
registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for
expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.
"The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of
the documents involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of
the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration
thereof; that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said
documents in question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator
notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded
from the parties interested the submission of additional requirementls not adverted to
in his previous denial.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that
he neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record remains
uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the
amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original denomination
of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify
or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to
Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.
"x x x We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to
mitigate his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of
applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in
the discharge of his duties." (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm.
Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government
service (pp. 14-19, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA,
Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint
against said respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as
a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official.
The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of
his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court: People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The
lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo,
1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

"A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress
upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an 'officer of the court' on whose
shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair,
speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to
a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth
and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its
prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility - all of
which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as 'moral
character.'
"Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest
order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
crusader." (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789-790; underscoring
supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process
documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d]) and prohibits them
from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by
the functions of their office (Sec. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for
any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 1.03).
"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable"
may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer
must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court
Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a

public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of
the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo
G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred
from the practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-35113. March 25, 1975.]

EUGENIO CUARESMA, Petitioner, v. MARCELO DAQUIS, PHHC, CESAR NAVARRO,
NICANOR GUEVARRA, Sheriff of Quezon City or his Deputy and JUDGE PACIFICO P.
DE CASTRO, Respondents. ATTORNEY MACARIO O. DIRECTO, Respondent.

SYNOPSIS
Respondent attorney made false allegations in a petition for certiorari filed with this
Court. Asked to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him, a
pleading entitled Compliance was filed wherein he attempted to explain such conduct.
He further alleged that at most it was a mistake with no deliberate intent to mislead the
Court. The Court, while harboring the suspicion that such explanation was a mere
afterthought, took into consideration the presumption of good faith. Nonetheless, a
mere disclaimer of intent to misled cannot exculpate Respondent. A penalty of
reprimand was imposed.

SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; MAKING OF FALSE ALLEGATIONS IN
PLEADINGS; PENALTY IMPOSED IN INSTANT CASE. — Where a counsel made false
allegations in a petition filed with the Supreme Court, and when asked to explain,
claimed that he had no intention to mislead the Court, it was held that a mere
disclaimer of intent cannot exculpate him; but in the spirit of charity and forbearance, a
penalty of reprimand would suffice to impress on respondent that in the future he
should be much more careful in the preparations of his pleadings so that the least
doubt as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained.
2. ID.; CONDUCT EXPECTED OF MEMBERS OF THE BAR. — Every member of
the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence
of honorable membership in the profession.

RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
The predicament in which respondent Macario O. Directo, a member of the Philippine
bar, now finds himself is one of his own making. In a petition for certiorari filed with
this Court on behalf of one Eugenio Cuaresma, he included the following categorical
allegations: "4. That your petitioner has no knowledge of the existence of said case
(Civil Case No. 12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch) aforecited between the
respondents Marcelo Daquis, PHHC, and Cesar Navarro, and wherein the respondent
Judge, [gave] due course to the complaint, and the subject matter in litigation; 5. That
on May 26, 1972, the respondent Judge issued an order of demolition, ordering the
respondent Sheriff of Quezon City or his deputy to demolish the house of your
petitioner etc., and on the same day of May 26, 1972, the Sheriff of Quezon City through
his deputy [gave] three (3) days to your petitioner to remove his house or face
demolition, . . .; 6. . . . 7. That your petitioner was not given a day in court to present his
side of the case, in violation of law, and of the dictum of due process of the constitution,
. . ." 1 Thereafter, after receipt of the comments of respondents, it turned out, as set
forth in a resolution of this Court of August 4, 1972, "that petitioner was fully aware of
the existence of said civil case because on December 14, 1971 Atty. Macario Directo, as
counsel of petitioner, addressed to respondent Marcelo Daquis a letter which indicates
that both counsel and petitioner were aware of the existence of the case. It also appears
that, before respondents Marcelo Daquis and Cesar Navarro filed a motion for a writ of
Possession in Civil Case No. Q-12176, petitioner Eugenio Cuaresma, along with the
other occupants of the lot in question, was given thirty (30) days notice to vacate the
premises, which period was even extended for another thirty (30) days, but that,
despite that notice, petitioner Eugenio Cuaresma refused to vacate the lot involved in
the case. It further appears that on May 3, 1972, Atty. Macario Directo, as counsel for
petitioner, filed a motion for intervention in the aforementioned Civil Case No. Q-
12176; and on May 13, 1972, same counsel filed a motion to quash or recall the writ of
execution, and an opposition to the issuance of a writ of demolition. On May 22, 1972,
respondent Judge Pacifico de Castro issued an order denying the motion to intervene
as well as the motion to quash or recall the writ of execution." 2 It was then set forth in
such resolution that there was no truth to the allegation that on May 27, 1972, the date
of the filing of the petition for certiorari in the present case, petitioner had no
knowledge of the existence of Civil Case No. 12176.
Respondent Macario O. Directo was then given ten days to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for deliberately making false
allegations in such petition. Thereafter, on August 16, 1972, came a pleading which he
entitled Compliance. This is his explanation: "What your petitioner honestly meant
when he alleged that he [has] no knowledge of the existence of said Civil Case No.
12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, was from the time the plaintiff Marcelo
Daquis instituted the said case in June 1968 up to and after the time the Court issued
the decision in the year 1970. The plaintiff Marcelo Daquis entered into a conditional
contract of sale of the lot involved in said Civil Case No. 12176 with the PHHC. There
were four (4) purchasers, the plaintiff, two others, and your petitioner. Because of the
requirement of the PHHC that only one of them should enter into the contract, Marcelo
Daquis was chosen by the others to enter into the same. Since this was a sale on
installment basis, by agreement of all the purchasers, duly acknowledged by the PHHC,
the monthly dues of the petitioner and the two others, were remitted to Marcelo
Daquis, who in turn remits the same to the PHHC. In June 1968 plaintiff Marcelo
Daquis instituted Civil Case No. 12176 in the CFI of Quezon City. From June 1968 up to
the time and after the decision was issued by the court, plaintiff Marcelo Daquis never
informed your petitioner of the said case." 3 He reiterated in a later paragraph that all
he wanted to convey was that his knowledge of the aforesaid civil case came only after
the decision was issued. He closed his Compliance with the plea that if there were any
mistake committed, "it had been an honest one, and would say in all sincerity that
there was no deliberate attempt and intent on his part of misleading this Honorable
Court, honestly and totally unaware of any false allegation in the petition." 4
The above explanation lends itself to the suspicion that it was a mere afterthought. It
could very well be that after his attention was called to the misstatements in his
petition, he decided on such a version as a way out. That is more than a bare possibility.
There is the assumption though of good faith. That is in his favor. Moreover, judging
from the awkwardly-worded petition and even his compliance quite indicative of either
carelessness or lack of proficiency in the handling of the English language, it is not
unreasonable to assume that his deficiency in the mode of expression contributed to
the inaccuracy of his statements. While a mere disclaimer of intent certainly cannot
exculpate him, still, in the spirit of charity and forbearance, a penalty of reprimand
would suffice. At least, it would serve to impress on respondent that in the future he
should be much more careful in the preparation of his pleadings so that the least doubt
as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every member of the bar should
realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honorable
membership in the profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Macario O. Directo is reprimanded. Let a copy of this
resolution be spread on his record.
Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

518 Phil. 372

FIRST DIVISION
[ A.C. NO. 6353, February 27, 2006 ]
SPOUSES DAVID AND MARISA WILLIAMS, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. RUDY T.
ENRIQUEZ, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with "unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, and with conduct unbecoming an attorney." The charges are
contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment[1] filed by the spouses
David W. Williams and Marisa B. Williams.
It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
13443[2] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Dumaguete City where
complainants are the defendants. According to the complainant-spouses, Marisa
Williams bought the lot subject of the controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
was then issued in her favor, stating that she is "Filipino, married to David W.
Williams, an American citizen."[3] On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with
falsification of public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete
City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34.[4]
The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:
21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law, Attorney
Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-affidavit (Annex A-1) and in
his comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2). He then knowingly applied this stale
law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa Batacan Williams automatically lost her
Filipino citizenship when she married an American, and was thus prohibited to own
land in the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she
executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.
2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites Article IV,
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she would not lose her
citizenship when she married an American unless she renounced it in a specific act.

2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring that her "act
of marrying" her husband was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship. He also
doggedly attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution supports his position, not
Marisa's (Annex A-4).[5]
Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who knows that the
false charge (that Marisa Williams is an American) "will not prevail in the end."[6]
In his "Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss,"[7] respondent enumerated matters
which to his mind were evidence of the acts of falsification of complainant Marisa
Williams. He insisted that the complaint for disbarment was a mere tactic to divert
attention from the criminal charges against the complainants, and that the charges
against him were bereft of any factual basis.
On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8] Forthwith, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled the case for mandatory conference/hearing.
However, only the respondent appeared. The parties were then directed to submit their
verified position papers.
In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had maliciously and
knowingly filed fabricated cases against them and that his acts were forms of attempted
extortion. They also adopted their joint complaint-affidavit by way of incorporation,
along with their other pleadings.
For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no longer a
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her marriage to David Williams.
In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala ruled that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
should be suspended for six (6) months. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
adopted the foregoing recommendation in its Resolution No. XVII-2005-114 dated
October 22, 2005, with the modification that respondent be "reprimanded, with a
warning and advice to study each and every opinion he may give to his clients."
The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his actuations. As found
by the Investigating Commissioner:
There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa Bacatan-Williams
has renounced her Filipino citizenship except her Certificate of Marriage, which does
not show that she has automatically acquired her husband's citizenship upon her
marriage to him. The cases cited by respondent are not applicable in this case as it is
clear that they refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.

The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives: (a) elevate
the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve the administration of justice, and (c)
to enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively (In re:
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line with these objectives of
the Integrated Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal developments. To do
this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the law and jurisprudence.
He must acquaint himself at least with the newly promulgated laws, the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of the Court of Appeals.
There are other executive orders, administrative circulars, regulations and other rules
promulgated by other competent authorities engaged in the administration of justice.
The lawyer's life is one of continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and
knowledge of the law and related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due to
obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility.)[9]
As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence.
[10] Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[11] As a retired judge, respondent
should have known that it is his duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings
of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a client.[12] In this case, the
law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution,[13] the most basic law
of the land.[14] Implicit in a lawyer's mandate to protect a client's interest to the best of
his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal
developments, and participate in continuing legal education programs.[15] Thus, in
championing the interest of clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be
guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyer's oath, but should likewise
espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latter's cause be dismissed on a
technical ground.[16] Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural laws.
[17]
We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating Commissioner. It
must be stressed that the power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great
caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment
or suspension be imposed as a penalty.[18] Pursuant to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline's Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,[19] and considering further
that this is respondent's first infraction, we find that the penalty of reprimand as
recommended by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, will suffice.
We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties repeatedly invoked
their arguments in their pending cases below. Thus, we find it unnecessary to rule over
such arguments, which have yet to be determined on the merits in the courts a quo.
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 9684, March 16, 2016 ]

MARY ROSE A. BOTO, COMPLAINANT, VS. SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY

PROSECUTOR VINCENT L. VILLENA, CITY PROSECUTOR ARCHIMEDES V.
MANABAT AND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR PATRICK NOEL P. DE DIOS,
RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Subject of this resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration,[1] dated October 22, 2013,
filed by respondent Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Vincent L. Villena (Villena)
seeking reconsideration by this Court of its September 18, 2013 Decision,[2] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Vincent L. Villena is found liable for
Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos, payable within 30 days from receipt of this resolution with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

Assistant City Prosecutor Patrick Noel P. De Dios, for his negligence, is

REPRIMANDED with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall
be dealt with more severely.

City Prosecutor Archimedes V. Manabat is admonished to be more careful and

circumspect in the review of the actions of his assistants.

SO ORDERED.[3]
As stated in the September 18, 2013 decision, this administrative matter stemmed from
an information for Libel against complainant Mary Rose A. Boto (Boto) filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch LXXIV, Taguig City (MeTC). The information was
prepared by Assistant City Prosecutor Patrick Noel P. de Dios (de Dios), the
investigating prosecutor; and approved by City Prosecutor Archimedes Manabat
(Manabat). Villena was the trial prosecutor assigned to the MeTC.

In her Affidavit-Complaint,[4] Boto charged respondents Villena, Manabat and de Dios

with gross ignorance of the law for filing the information and for opposing the motion
to quash despite the knowledge that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
In his motion for reconsideration, Villena prays that the Court "RECONSIDER its
Decision, and to:
a. RELIEVE respondent Villena from any liability, or

b. DOWNGRADE, COMMUTE or MITIGATE the penalty that was imposed upon him
from Fine to Reprimand or Admonition."[5]
In advocacy of his plea, respondent Villena wrote:

3. The Decision of this Honorable Court's Third Division is grounded on the following
factual findings:
a. Respondent Villena should have initiated the move for the dismissal of the case
instead of opposing it; and
b. The prosecution of the case was considerably delayed.
4. I wish to emphasize to this Honorable Court that I come before it, through this MR,
NOT to give excuses. Rather, I wish for the Court to see that, while my actions appeared
to have fallen short of its expectations, it was not my intention to prejudice the accused
(complainant Boto) or anyone for that matter.

5. First, I humbly believe that I was not solely to be blamed. Neither should I be blamed
for the delay in the resolution of the complainant's Motion to Quash. Its resolution was
not something that I could decide or control, it was for the Lower Court's.

6. And second, while it is true that I did not immediately oppose the Motion to Quash
the first time the Lower Court ordered me to do so, I honestly [b]elieved then that the
Lower Court would have already realized the "error" when its attention was called to it.

7. Admittedly, I was on a wrong assumption that the Lower Court should dismiss the
case even without my comment. I was also wrong to have acted in deference to the
Lower Court's decision not to dismiss the case outright after it already determined
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
8. At any rate, I must admit that I committed a mistake in not categorically taking side
with the motion to quash when I was asked again by the Honorable Lower Court to file
my comment. Perhaps, I was just cautious then not to appear earnestly rallying for the
dismissal of the case, and be accused by the private complainants of compromising
their cases.

9. Verily, the Comment that I filed was in fact short, simple and imprecise. It was a sort
of a "pro-forma comment" that was crafted merely in general terms.

10. WITH THIS, I come before this Honorable Court to plead for compassion. I feel
that the penalty is not commensurate to-the infraction the Court thought I had done
which, to my mind, did not distinguish my lapses to one incited by ill-motive or
corrupted by malice in my actions.

11. I apologize that I have to explain in this MR, notwithstanding my apology. It is

because this is the first time that I have been charged with misdeed. In my long years of
practice as a lawyer and a prosecutor, I have done my job in the best way I can. The
records of the Office of the Bar Confidant and even the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines can bear truth to this sworn declaration. Furthermore, it has never been a
predisposition (in the performance of my prosecutorial work) to intentionally or
unintentionally prejudice anyone's cause. Not one before this case has come forward to
accuse me of delaying their cases or jeopardizing their cases with incompetency and
inefficiency. In our Office, I continue to hold this year the highest disposal rate.

12. To this Honorable Court, I hope that you will not be unselfish of your compassion. I
just truly believe that I should not bear alone the whole uneventful incident. If I had to,
I hope that the Court would take into mind as well that this is my first offense and
again, there was no bad faith or malice on my part.

[Emphases Supplied]
From his motion for reconsideration, Villena appears contrite to what he considers as
an act short of what was expected of him. He does not deny what he did and he is not
proffering any excuses therefor. All Villena is asking is compassion from the Court as
he deems that the penalty imposed is not commensurate to the infraction the Court
thought he did and, to his mind, did not distinguish his lapses from one incited by ill
motive or corrupted by malice. In other words, he stresses that there was no malice or
bad faith on his part.

Villena, who has an unblemished career, has been truly remorseful and apologetic for
his opposition to the motion to dismiss, which resistance he deemed as "pro-forma
comment." The Court is of the considered view that because the penalty imposed would
remain in his record, it would affect his promotion or application for a higher office.
Accordingly, the Court favors the grant of the motion and reduces the penalty from
payment of Fine in the amount of P10,000.00 to Reprimand, the same penalty
imposed on his co-respondents. There is no need to stem the growth of his promising
professional career.
"Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.
While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows
how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose."[6]
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Vincent L. Villena is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The penalty imposed upon him is reduced from paying a fine
of P10,000.00 to REPRIMAND.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ GR No. 71305, Nov 24, 1986 ]
MANUEL SOLIMAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN +
DECISION
230 Phil. 45

CRUZ, BAN
Once before we cautioned against improvident prosecutions and rash convictions,
suggesting deliberate care and judicious study "before the finger is pointed and the
stone is cast."[1] Once again we have to express the same admonition as we face yet
another case in which an innocent man has been denied the sleep of the just because of
an unseeming haste to condemn him.

The petitioner in this case was accused of qualified theft for having allegedly conspired
with his co-workers in the Malacañang garage to steal 1,000 liters of premium gasoline
on July 20, 1981.[2] All his co-accused were acquitted with the exception of Bernardo
Cube, the driver of the truck where the stolen fuel was carried, who had escaped and
could not be tried.[3] The petitioner alone, of the five charged, was held guilty and
sentenced by the Sandiganbayan to a penalty of 4 months and 21 days of arresto mayor
to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, plus civil indemnity and costs.
[4]

According to the prosecution, a requisition was made on that day by the Malacañang
garage for 9,000 liters of premium gasoline which was filled by the Pandacan depot of
Petrophil. At Malacañang, however, the entire amount was not transferred to the
underground tanks as there were retained in the delivery truck 1,000 liters which the
accused were intending to sell to a private gasoline station at a discounted price.
However, the plan was foiled. A team which had placed the accused under surveillance
because of previous reports of gasoline pilferage in the Malacañang garage prevented
the sale. The driver was arrested and, upon questioning, implicated his other co-
accused, including the petitioner herein, in a sworn statement.[5]

What was the basis of the lone conviction of petitioner Soliman?

In finding the petitioner guilty, the Sandiganbayan relied heavily on the supposed
confession of Cube, who was at large and never tried.[6] What is strange is that Cube's
statement was considered at all by the respondent court even if, to begin with, it had
not been formally and specifically offered in evidence by the prosecution.[7] Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court clearly states:
"Sec. 35. Offer of Evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified."
At that, even if so offered, its admissibility would have been questionable in view of its
non-compliance with Article IV, Section 20, of the 1973 Constitution as interpreted by
this Court in Morales v. Enrile,[8] affirmed later in People v. Galit[9] and only recently
in People v. Sison[10] and People v. Poyos.[11] Furthermore, insofar as it implicated
Soliman, the statement should have been barred altogether as pure hearsay since the
petitioner did not have the chance to confront and cross-examine his accuser.[12]

As for the petitioner's own supposed confession, the record shows that during his
interrogation on July 21, 1981, he was manhandled by his investigators, Sgt. Solito
Alicunan and Sgt. Pambid, the latter being drunk at that time. Soliman thereafter went
to the Philippine General Hospital where he obtained a medical certificate of his
injuries and was later confined at the Singian Memorial Hospital.[13] The testimonial
and documentary evidence presented by the petitioner on this matter, which was not
rebutted, clearly invalidates the said confession for violation of the Bill of Rights and
the consistent jurisprudence of this Court on the rights of a suspect undergoing
custodial investigation.[14]

On the strength of these considerations alone, we could write finis to this case and set
the petitioner free. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to devote a little more time to
the decision on appeal, to stress the need for more thoughtfulness before an accused
may be convicted.

The respondent court, relying on the said defective statements, has indulged in certain
conjectures that in its view have established the petitioner's guilt. Noting that the
petitioner had gone to the Pandacan depot on the day in question and that he later rode
with Cube in the delivery truck that brought the gasoline to Malacañang, the
Sandiganbayan makes a sinister conclusion. It determines from these facts (which
were not denied by the petitioner) that he really conspired with Cube and was actually
the one who induced the latter to commit the theft.[15]

The conclusion, it seems to us, is far-fetched. In effect, the petitioner is held guilty
because of his presence in the Pandacan depot and later in the delivery truck that
carried the pilfered gasoline.

The Sandiganbayan asks why the petitioner was in the Pandacan depot on the day in
question, as if such presence were a crime. The petitioner explained that he was there
because he was actually ordered by his superior, Vicente Miciano, to follow up the
requisition their office had made.[16] If so, asks the Sandiganbayan, why was this
person not presented as a defense witness?
We do not see how the non-presentation of Mr. Miciano to corroborate the petitioner
could point to his guilt, considering that the accused enjoyed the constitutional
presumption of innocence.[17] If at all, it was the prosecution that had to introduce
evidence to disprove the petitioner's testimony and not the other way around. It did
not.

The Sandiganbayan also wonders why the petitioner rode with Cube in the delivery
truck on the way to Malacañang, implying that he did so to persuade the driver to steal
the 1,000 liters of gasoline. Why, it asks, did he not take a taxi or some other
transportation, considering especially the danger in riding in a truck loaded with
gasoline?[18] These questions are unworthy of the respondent court.

Obviously, the petitioner took the ride in the truck because it was going back anyway to
Malacañang where he was also bound. Unlike the Sandiganbayan, he did not
apprehend any danger in riding in the truck because, as the Solicitor General put it, "we
have yet to see gasoline tankers explode on the road."[19] Moreover, the petitioner is a
mere clerk and could not be expected to splurge in the luxury of a taxi ride, more so
since, anyway, the truck ride was available for free, and immediately.[20] After all, he
had to go back to his office as soon as he could, to report to his superior the result of his
follow-up.

As for the circumstance that the truck driver Cube called the petitioner Maning when
they were not supposed to know each other,[21] we feel that this is hardly proof of
conspiracy between the two, especially if it is considered that the nickname is a likely
and common derivative of Manuel.

The above defects in the decision of the Sandiganbayan were stressed by the Solicitor
General, who has asked for the petitioner's acquittal.[22] While his office ordinarily
sustains the respondent court as a matter of policy, he has seen fit to deviate from this
policy because he is convinced that the petitioner is innocent. So is this Court.

For adhering to the ethical canon that the primary duty of a public prosecutor is not to
convict but to see that justice is done, the Solicitor General deserves the commendation
of the Court. It is truly to his credit that while a conviction could have been another
feather in his cap, he did not seek it at the expense of the petitioner's honor and liberty.

We repeat our counsel against ill-considered convictions based only, as in this case, on
unfounded surmises or, in other cases, prejudgments and prejudices. Although these
errors may at times be corrected and undone on appeal, the stigma of a criminal
conviction, even if ultimately reversed, is never quite washed away and remains to soil
the innocent man's name to his dying day.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and the petitioner is ACQUITTED,

without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez,

Jr., Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

DIVISION

[ GR No. 109870, Dec 01, 1995 ]

EDILBERTO M. CUENCA v. CA +
RESOLUTION
321 Phil. 64

FRANCISCO, J.:
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment[1] affirming his
conviction for violation of the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was
denied by this Court in a Resolution dated February 9, 1994,[2] petitioner filed on July
6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL"[3] setting forth, in relation to the
motion for new trial:

"6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and
excusible (sic) negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of:

(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner;

(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of Ultra Corporation
(the Corporation that employed petitioner), which actually exercised control over the
affairs of Ultra; and

(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time and explain why
he was unable to do so earlier."

The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution,[4] among other things, granted the
substitution but denied the motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition
having been already denied on February 9, 1994."

Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT

ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL",[5] and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND
MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994.[6] The Court thereafter required the
Solicitor General to comment on said motion and manifestation within ten (10) days
from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.[7]

In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court,[8] the
Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial,
proceeding from the same impression that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's
brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest which may ultimately
exonerate petitioner from criminal liability. The full text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's
"Affidavit"[9] reads:
"RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the residence at Urdaneta Village,
Makati, Metro Manila, after being duly sworn and (sic) state that:

"1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was the President and Chief Executive
Officer of Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).

"2. During that period, I controlled an effective majority of the voting shares of stock
of CDCP.

"3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP together with its affiliated companies,
organized a number of wholly-owned service corporations. One of these was Ultra
International Trading Corporation, whose purpose was to serve and supply the needs
of CDCP and its other subsidiaries with lower value goods and using Ultra's financial
resources.

"4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees of CDCP, and received the
instructions directly from me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.

"5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca was appointed
President and Chief Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I instructed Ultra through my
brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to purchase for CDCP various steel materials. These
materials were received by CDCP and are covered by the trust receipts which are the
subject of this case.

"6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and consciously omitted payment to
Ultra for the delivery of the said steel materials. As a nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto
M. Cuenca merely acted as agent for CDCP. As such, CDCP provided him with the
guarantees needed to persuade China Bank to issue the said trust receipts. On the
basis of such guarantees, along with informal assurances issued by CDCP to China
Bank that the transactions of Ultra were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP and
CDCP Mining Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities, among which
included the trust receipts subject of this case.
"7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to cause the payment of said
trust receipts because the common Treasurer and controller of both CDCP and Ultra,
Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted under my control and I did not allow her to make the
appropriate payments.

"8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the amounts corresponding to the
materials covered by the trust receipts subject of this case.

"9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust receipts were (sic) served in 1984, Mr.
Edilberto Cuenca was no longer president of Ultra Corporation and could not have
possibly cause (sic) Ultra Corporation to pay.

"10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept personal responsibility for the trust
receipts subject of this case and to exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of the criminal
charges which he has asked this Honorable Court to review.

"11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil obligations arising from the subject
trust receipts.

(Sgd.)

RODOLFO M. CUENCA
Affiant"

And the Solicitor General had this to say:

"Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.

"However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own
interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the
culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged
confession of guilt should be given a hard look by the Court.

"The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due
execution of his brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.

"Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors

who represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to
seek conviction of the accused but to see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6
states:

`Canon 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge
of their official tasks.
`Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible
and is cause for disciplinary action.' (Italics supplied.)

"The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a sovereign `whose
obligation to govern impartially is compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein,
published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Italics supplied.)"[10]

Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago,
this Court ruled that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of
which being:

"The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme
Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are involved therein", the rule
now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like
"Helmuth, Jr. v. People"[11] and " People v. Amparado".[12]

In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition
of the Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the
basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as
newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of
conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein
petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under
the circumstances considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a new
trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially commended for
displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor
General's finest hour, indeed.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be
RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of petitioner's
evidence.
SO ORDERED.

493 Phil. 172

EN BANC
[ A.C. NO. 4018, March 08, 2005 ]
OMAR P. ALI, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment[1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for
having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of
Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case
earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially
investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged
respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,[2] Ambobae
Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola
Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad
Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the
records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.[3]

The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating
officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case
but that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore,
premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against
respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.[4]
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report
dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated
respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents.
He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance
of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused.
As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent's dismissal from
service.

On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order

No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering
respondent's dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned
said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition[5] claiming that the Office of the President did not have
the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that
respondents[6] in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that
respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach
of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative
complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure on the
part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the questioned order."[7] Respondent thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15
November 1994.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us,
seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious
that respondent had "proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an
attorney"[8] and that he poses a "serious threat to the integrity of the legal
profession."[9]

In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his
issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both
law[10] and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the
basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli
Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion,
hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.

Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal
complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad
Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in
said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating
prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said
dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of
Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainant's
allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.

Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,[11] this Court referred this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit.
On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order
relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order
provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of
evidence vis-à-vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president
of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this
case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action.[12]
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving
Commissioner Fernandez's recommendation for the transfer of venue of this
administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate
the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and
recommendation.[13] The IBP Resolution states:

Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao
Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to
conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline,
wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido,
President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this
case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP
Board of Governors.[14]

In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter[15] informed

the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel[16] had sent
notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent
consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the
transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the
IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandez's Order
dated 23 February 1996.

Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato

Chapter to comment on respondent's motion.[17] Complying with this directive, the
panel expressed no opposition to respondent's motion for the transmittal of the records
of this case to IBP Marawi City.[18] On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez
ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondent's
evidence.[19] This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said
resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the
transmittal of the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is
directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report
the same to the Board of Governors.[20]
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October
1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be
stricken from the records.[21] Respondent insists that the investigating panel
constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation
of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of
23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this
case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the
investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due
process.

Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches.

According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato
Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted
by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself.
He also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when
he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City
Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is
possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City
would only entail a duplication of the process which had already been completed by
IBP Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP
Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the
investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly
received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP
Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy
of the panel's order dated 4 August 1997.[24] Attached to said order was Registry
Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry
receipt was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib A. Bubong."

On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman

of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval
of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30
June 2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the
Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct
an investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days
from receipt of notice.[25]
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father,
Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12
June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting
the withdrawal of this case.[26]

Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct
the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and
authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of
this case.[27] This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order
dated 19 July 2002.[28] According to Atty. Castillo
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the
report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of
respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to
make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of
Cotabato City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga
del Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission
on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and
conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the
President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein
respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:

a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In
the Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is
good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of
manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by
the way, was filed against respondent's relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office
of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial
evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was
rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent
by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very
strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present
case.

In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or
disturbing the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.[29]
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty.
Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from the
practice of law which should be imposed on respondent whereas Atty. Castillo
concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year
suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which
the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.
[30]

The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be
disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds.[31] Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he
committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his
misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.[32]

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the

disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service
because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we
declared
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress
upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose
shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair,
speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to
a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth
and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its
prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which,
throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.[34]
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,[35] this Court found
sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while
she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher
Education. As we had explained in that case
… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she
must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is
a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a
lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and
employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his
relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.
Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public
office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-
conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than
the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter, requesting for
the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as
proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same."[37] As we have previously explained in the
case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:[38]
… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne
out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding
for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is
a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve
no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.
[39]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision
be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same
be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[Adm. Case No. 3701. March 28, 1995.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Complainant, v. ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO,
Respondent.
DECISION
BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National
Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the
Asset Management Group of complainant bank, with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service."
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in
which respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in
arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of
Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his
subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of
the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose out
of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of
complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.

Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed
by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave
misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later
disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant's Asset
Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses
Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the
couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses
as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo,
Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.

In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel

for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC
decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the
trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he
never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo,
Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually
handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a
general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein.
They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers,
who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting
staff. Each one of them handles their own cases independently and individually
receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.

In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was
previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No.
94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum
shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy
"through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully
substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the
Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the
attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of
the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer,
and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty.
Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the
application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted
being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was
working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm to be true, it is in
itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the
client's secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other
lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to
devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank
since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a
convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional services. In sum, the IBP
saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he
expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3
years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994,
submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained
in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent
also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for
Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid
pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to
emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting
interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95
SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who
participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta
later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court,
citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 [1968]) ruled:
"The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him,
that even if respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence
acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information
regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the forcible
entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling incident
which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's remarks in
Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
'Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause.'

"Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former
client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their
previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the
other side in the forcible entry case. In the same case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this
Tribunal further said:
'Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been said
in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts
in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice."

The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to
respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank,
respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his
former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an
employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S.

CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 154297-300 February 15, 2008

PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, MAXIMO B. USITA, JR. and WILFREDO C. ANDRES,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, SPECIAL DIVISION, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari alleging that the Sandiganbayan, Special Division,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Resolutions dated May 28, 2002 and June 11, 2002 retaining petitioners,
Atty. Maximo B. Usita, Jr. and Atty. Wilfredo C. Andres of the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO), as counsels de oficio of then accused President Joseph Estrada and his son, Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada.

The facts are as follows:

On March 15 and 18, 2002, Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of
PAO personally appeared before respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan1 to
request the relief of the appearance of PAO as de oficio counsel for accused President
Joseph Estrada and Jose Estrada in their criminal cases before the Sandigabayan.
However, the request was denied.

On May 8, 2002, the Chief Public Attorney filed an Urgent and Ex-Parte Motion to be
Relieved as Court-Appointed Counsel with the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan,
praying that she be relieved of her duties and responsibilities as counsel de oficio for
the said accused on the ground that she had a swelling workload consisting of
administrative matters and that the accused are not indigent persons; hence, they are
not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO.

On May 9, 2002, respondent Court found the reasons of the Chief Public Attorney to be
plausible and relieved the Chief Public Attorney as counsel de oficio of former
President Joseph Estrada and Mayor Jose Estrada.

On May 14, 2002, the remaining eight PAO lawyers filed an Ex-Parte Motion To Be
Relieved As Court-Appointed Counsels with respondent Court on the ground that the
accused, former President Joseph Estrada and Jose Estrada, are not indigents;
therefore, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO.

On May 28, 2002, respondent Court issued a Resolution denying the motion, but
retaining two of the eight PAO lawyers, namely, the petitioners Atty. Usita, Jr. and Atty.
Andres. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
. . . There being no compelling and sufficient reasons to abandon the Court’s previous
rulings, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. While it is true that a similar motion
filed by the PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida Rueda-Acosta was granted per Court’s
Resolution of May 9, 2002, the rationalization advanced by Atty. Rueda was found
meritorious by the Court in that there was unexpected upsurge in her administrative
workload as head of the office including the administration and supervision of more or
less 1,000 PAO lawyers and 700 staff nationwide and many other functions which
require her immediate attention and undivided time.

Nonetheless, considering that there are eight (8) de oficio counsels from the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO), the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, deems it
proper to reduce their number and retain only two (2) of them, namely: Atty. Wilfredo
C. Andres and Atty. Maximo B. Usita to continue their duties and responsibilities as
counsels de oficio for accused Joseph and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada.2

The retained lawyers of PAO joined the four Court-appointed counsels from the private
sector, namely, Prospero Crescini, Justice Manuel Pamaran, Irene Jurado and Noel
Malaya.

On June 4, 2002, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 28, 2002.

In a Resolution dated June 10, 2002, respondent denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It appearing that the ground raised by the movants PAO lawyers are mere
rehashes/reiterations of their previous arguments which the Court finds to be not valid
justification for them to be relieved, either temporarily or permanently of their duties
and responsibilities as counsels de oficio in these cases, the instant motion in hereby
DENIED.3
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by respondent in
rendering the Resolutions dated May 28, 2002 and June 10, 2002.

On September 21, 2004, PAO filed a Manifestation and Compliance which informed
the Court that petitioners Atty. Usita and Atty. Andres were appointed as Assistant City
Prosecutors of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office sometime in August 2002, and that
PAO is left as the lone petitioner in this case.

The issue is whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the subject Resolutions retaining two PAO
lawyers to act as counsels de oficio for the accused who are not indigent persons.

PAO contends that it is undeniable that in retaining its two PAO lawyers as counsels de
oficio of former President Estrada and Jose Estrada, respondent Court relied upon the
provisions of Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio.—The Court, considering the gravity of the

offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de
oficio such members of the bar in good standing, who, by reason of their experience
and ability, can competently defend the accused.

PAO, however, submits that the power of respondent to appoint and retain PAO
lawyers as counsels de oficio is limited by Sec. 20 of Letter of Implementation (LOI)
No. 20 dated December 31, 1972 and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1725 dated
September 26, 1980, thus:

LOI No. 20

Sec. 20. The Citizens Legal Assistance Office shall represent, free of charge, indigent
persons mentioned in Republic Act No. 6035, or the immediate members of their
family, in all civil, administrative, and criminal cases where after due investigation the
interest of justice will be served thereby, except agrarian reform cases as defined by
Republic Act 3844, as amended, which shall be handled by the Bureau of Agrarian
Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and such cases as are now
handled by the Department of Labor.

PD No. 1725

WHEREAS, the Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office as the law office of the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines for indigent and low-income persons, performs a vital
role in the implementation of the legal aid program of the State, in upholding the rule
of law, in the protection and safeguarding of the institutional and statutory rights of the
citizenry, and in the efficient and speedy administration of justice.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 renamed the Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office
as the Public Attorney’s Office and retained its powers and functions. Section 14,
Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the said Code provides:

Sec. 14. Public Attorney’s Office (PAO).— The Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office (CLAO)
is renamed Public Attorney’s Office (PAO). It shall exercise the powers and functions as
are now provided by law for the Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office or may hereafter be
provided by law.

In the implementation of the foregoing provisions of law, PAO issued Memorandum

Circular No. 5, Series of 1997, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of
2001, and subsequently by Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 2002, defining who
are indigent persons qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO, thus:

Section 3. Indigency Test. – Taking into consideration recent surveys on the amount
needed by an average Filipino to 1) buy its food consumption basket and b) pay for its
household and personal expenses, the following shall be considered indigent persons:

1. Those residing in Metro Manila whose family income does not exceed P14,000.00 a
month;
2. Those residing in other cities whose family income does not exceed P13,000.00 a
month;

3. Those residing in all other places whose family income does not exceed P12,000.00 a
month.

The term "family income" as herein employed shall be understood to refer to the gross
income of the litigant and that of his or her spouse, but shall not include the income of
the other members of the family.

PAO states that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities attached to the records of the
cases of the accused show that they were not qualified to avail themselves of the
services of PAO, since they could afford the services of private counsels of their own
choice. It noted that the wife of former President Estrada had an income exceeding
P14,000.

PAO argues that the only exception when it can appear on behalf of a non-indigent
client is when there is no available lawyer to assist such client in a particular stage of
the case, that is, during arraignment or during the taking of the direct testimony of any
prosecution witness subject to cross-examination by the private counsel on record. The
appearance of PAO is only provisional in those instances.

PAO asserts that the sole reliance of respondent on Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is improper. Respondent should have not only considered
the character of PAO lawyers as members of the Bar, but especially their mandate to
serve only indigent persons. In so doing, the contradiction in the exercise of PAO’s
duties and responsibilities could have been avoided.

PAO asserts that while its lawyers are also aware of their duties under Rule 14.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,4 PAO lawyers are limited by their mandate as
government lawyers.
Hence, PAO submits that the subject Resolutions of respondent are not in accordance
with the mandate of PAO and affect the rendition of effective legal service to a large
number of its deserving clients.

In defense, respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, represented by the

Office of the Special Prosecutor, stated that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion
since it did not act in an arbitrary, capricious and whimsical manner in issuing the
subject Resolutions.

It explained that it was facing a crisis when respondent issued the subject Resolutions.
At that time, the accused, former President Joseph Estrada, relieved the services of his
counsels on nationwide television. Subsequently, the counsels of record of co-accused
Jose Estrada withdrew, and both accused were adamant against hiring the services of
new counsels because they allegedly did not believe in and trust the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan had the duty to decide the cases, but could not proceed with the
trial since the accused were not assisted by counsel.

Respondent stated that, bound by its duty to protect the constitutional right of the
accused to be heard by himself and counsel, it exercised its prerogative under Sec. 7,
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,5 and appointed Chief Public
Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta of the PAO and eight other PAO lawyers, including
petitioners, to act as counsels de oficio for the said accused. As noted earlier, the Chief
Public Attorney and six PAO lawyers were later relieved from such duty, but
respondent retained two PAO lawyers as counsels de oficio for the accused.

Considering the attendant situation at the time of the issuance of the subject
Resolutions, respondent asserts that it did not act in an arbitrary, despotic, capricious
or whimsical manner in issuing the subject Resolutions. In appointing the PAO lawyers
to act as counsels for the said accused, respondent merely acted within the prerogative
granted to it by the Rules of Court in order to protect the constitutional right of the
accused to be heard by himself and counsel. Respondent also merely required
petitioners to perform their duty as members of the Bar and officers of the court to
assist the court in the efficient administration of justice.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.6

The Court holds that respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the
subject Resolutions as the issuance is not characterized by caprice or arbitrariness. At
the time of PAO’s appointment, the accused did not want to avail themselves of any
counsel; hence, respondent exercised a judgment call to protect the constitutional right
of the accused to be heard by themselves and counsel during the trial of the cases.

Subsequently, respondent reduced the number of PAO lawyers directed to represent

the accused, in view of the engagement of new counsels de parte, but retained two of
the eight PAO lawyers obviously to meet such possible exigency as the accused again
relieving some or all of their private counsels.

In any event, since these cases of the accused in the Sandiganbayan have been finally
resolved, this petition seeking that PAO, the only remaining petitioner, be relieved as
counsel de oficio therein has become moot.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 122855 : March 31, 2005]

METRO ILOILO WATER DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

Former SECOND DIVISION, Manila, HON. SEVERINO C. AGUILAR, Presiding Judge,
Branch 35, RTC, Iloilo, EMMA NAVA, RUFINO SITACA, JR., REXES URSUA,
CARMEN PANGANTIHON, BENITO GO, REBECCA BERLIN, and / or CHIT BERLIN,
LUIS CARREON, CHARLES KANA-AN and GERRY LUZURIAGA, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition 1 dated November 9, 1995 filed by the Metro Iloilo Water
District assailing the Decision2 of the Court of appeals dated June 19, 1995 which
affirmed the trial court's Order3 dismissing the petitions for injunction filed by
petitioner against private respondents.

Petitioner is a water district organized under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
198 (P.D. 198), as amended. It was granted by the Local Water Utilities Administration
Conditional Certificate of Conformance No. 714 on January 12, 1979. Its service areas
encompass the entire territorial areas of Iloilo City and the Municipalities of Ma-asin,
Cabanatuan, Santa Barbara and Pavia.

Sometime between April and May of 1993, petitioner filed nine (9) individual yet
identical petitions for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and / or
temporary restraining order5 against herein private respondents the pertinent portions
of which read:

4. 'That pursuant to the provisions of section 31 (a) of P.D. 198, as amended, the
petitioner as a Water District was authorized to adopt laws and regulations governing
the drilling, maintenance and operation of wells within its boundaries for purposes
other than single family domestic use on overlying land, with then provision that any
well operated in violation of such regulations shall be deemed an interference with the
waters of the district;

5. 'That by virtue of said authorization, the Board of Directors for the petitioner
promulgated its "Rules Governing Ground Water Pumping and spring Development
Within the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Metro Iloilo Water District," Section 3 of
which provides as follows:

"Ground Water Pumping and Spring Development. Except when the use of water is for
single family domestic use, no person, natural or juridical shall abstract or withdraw
ground water and appropriate the waters from springs within the jurisdiction of the
District without first securing a water permit from the Council and no person shall
engage in the business of drilling wells either as test wells or production wells for the
purpose of abstracting or withdrawing ground water without first registering as well as
driller with the Council; Provided, that the person drilling his own well or through the
services of a qualified well driller shall comply with the standards and requirements
established herein in addition to those established by the Council for the exploitation of
ground water resources."

6. 'That the respondent has abstracted or withdrawn ground water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the petitioner at _________________________ Iloilo City, without
first securing a Water Permit from the National Water Resources Council nor had its
well driller registered as such with said council, and sold said water so extracted to
commercial and other consumers in Iloilo City, within petitioner's service area;

7. 'That the unauthorized extraction or withdrawal of ground water by the respondent

without the necessary permit therefore is in violation of the rules and regulations
prescribed by the Board of Directors of the petitioner as above-mentioned duly
approved by the National Water Resources Council and constitutes interference with or
deterioration of water quality or the natural flow of surface or ground water supply
which maybe used or useful for any purpose of the petitioner for which the petitioner
as a Water District may commence, maintain, intervene in, defend and compromise
actions or proceedings under Section 31 (a) of P.D. 198, as amended;

8. 'That the act of the respondent in continuing to extract or withdraw ground water
without a Water Permit therefor, is in violation of Art. XIII of P.D. 1067 of the Water
Code of the Philippines, and unless such act is restrained, will definitely cause great
loss upon the petitioner as a Water District'.6

In their respective answers, private respondents uniformly invoked the lack of

jurisdiction of the trial court, contending that the cases were within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council (Water Council) under
Presidential Decree No. 1067, otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines
(Water Code). In addition, private respondents Emma Nava7 and Rebecca Berlin8
denied having extracted or withdrawn water from the ground, much less sold the
same.9 Private respondent Carmen Pangantihon likewise denied having constructed
any waterworks system in her area but admitted that she had constructed her own deep
well, unaware that she needed to get a permit to do the same.10 Private respondent
Rufino Sitaca maintained the petitioner's source of water are reservoirs from rivers and
are thus not affected by his well. Moreover, he claimed that his water permit
application was deemed approved, and thus he is entitled to use the water from his
well.11

Private respondent Benito Go admitted that he extracted water from the ground, which
he claimed to be his private property, and used the water for his lumberyard and
domestic purposes.12 Additionally, he alleged the petitioner's rules and regulations
were not published in the Official Gazette and hence petitioner had no cause of
action.13 Private respondent Charles Kana-an asserted that he had complied with the
requirements for the approval of his water permit application. He claimed that he was
extracting and selling water with petitioner's knowledge, and without damage and
injury to the latter.14 Meanwhile, private respondent Gerry Luzuriaga claimed that he
was not the real party in interest, but Shoemart, Inc. which has the control and
possession of the property where the alleged withdrawal of ground water was taking
place.15

The trial court dismissed the petitions in its Order16 dated March 17, 1994, ruling that
the controversy was within the original jurisdiction of the Water Council, involving, as
it did, the appropriation, exploitation, and utilization of water, and factual issues which
were within the Water Council's competence. In addition, the trial court held that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the doctrine of "primary
administrative jurisdiction." Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration17 was thereafter
denied on April 29, 1994.18

A petition19 dated May 27, 1994 seeking a review of the trial court's order of dismissal
was filed before this Court but the same was referred to the Court of Appeals for
consideration and adjudication on the merits in the Resolution20 dated July 11, 1994.

Petitioner sought the review of the order of the trial court dismissing the petitions and
denying its motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the trial court failed to
adhere to this Court's rulings in Amistoso v. Ong21 and Santos v. Court of Appeals,22
which upheld the regular court's jurisdiction over disputes which involve not the
settlement of water rights but the enjoyment of the right to water use for which a
permit had already been granted.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that the trial court did not err in
dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction as it was the Water Council which had
jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court ratiocinated:

The controversy in this case arose from the fact that the petitioner Iloilo Water District
was granted water rights in Iloilo City and the respondents also extracted or withdrew
ground water within the same jurisdiction.

While at first impression this case involves a violation of the petitioner's enjoyment of a
right to water use, the fact is that it actually involves also a dispute over the
appropriation, utilization, exploitation development, control, conversation and
protection of waters because the respondents have allegedly engaged in the extraction
or withdrawal of ground water without a permit from the NWRC within the territorial
jurisdiction of the petitioner. Therefore, Art. 88 of P.D. No. 1067 giving the NWRC
original jurisdiction over the cases is applicable.

The NWRC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disputes relating to appropriation,
utilization and control of water while the Regional Trial Court only has appellate
jurisdiction over the case. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court in Abe-abe v.
Manta, 90 SCRA 524 which was reiterated in Tanjay Water District v. Gabanton, 172
SCRA 253.

The cases of Santos v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 170 and Amistoso v. Ong, 130 SCRA
288 are not applicable to the case at bar for here, what is involved is not only the
alleged violation of the grantee's right but a question of whether or not the respondents
have equal right to the appropriation, utilization and exploitation of water rights."23

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration24 dated July 11,
1995 in its Resolution of September 29, 1995.25

Petitioner now contends that the extraction or withdrawal of ground water as well as
the sale thereof within its territorial jurisdiction is a violation of its rights as a water
district.26 Being a violation thereof, the regular courts have jurisdiction over the
dispute. On the other hand, private respondents unanimously maintain that it is the
Water Council which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Thus, the sole
issue in this petition, as presented by petitioner, is:

DID THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITIONS?27

Petitioner anchors its claim on Section 31 (now 32) of PD 198, as amended, which
reads:

Sec. 32. Protection of waters and Facilities of District. - A district shall have the right
to :

(a) Commence, maintain, intervene in, defend and compromise actions or proceedings
to prevent interference with or deterioration of water quality or the natural flow of any
surface, stream or ground water supply which may be used or useful for any purpose of
the district or be a common benefit to the lands or its inhabitants. The ground water
within a district is necessary to the performance of the district's powers and such
districts hereby authorized to adopt rules and regulations subject to the approval of the
National Water Resources Council governing the drilling, maintenance and operation
of wells within its boundaries for purposes other than a singled family domestic use on
overlying land. Any well operated on violation of such regulations shall be deemed in
interference with the waters of the district.

(c) Prohibit any person, firm or corporation from vending, selling, or otherwise
disposing of water for public purposes within the service area of the district where
district facilities are available to provide such service, or fix terms and conditions by
permit for such sale or disposition of water.

By virtue of the above provisions, petitioner states that as a water district, it has the
right to prevent interference with the water of the district; and to enforce such right, it
is given remedies of commencing, maintaining, or intervening in, defending or entering
into appropriate actions or proceedings.
In asserting the jurisdiction of the regular courts over its petitions and the propriety of
its filing of the petitions before the trial court, petitioner invokes the ruling of the Court
in Amistoso v. Ong,28 as reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals,29 that where the
issue involved is not the settlement of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a
right to water use for which a permit was already granted, the regular court has
jurisdiction and not the Water Council.

Petitioner insists that there is no occasion to invoke the original jurisdiction of the
Water Council in this case since there is no question of appropriation, exploitation,
utilization, development, control, conservation, and protection of water. The only
dispute, according to petitioner, pertains to the act of private respondents in extracting
ground water from the territory of petitioner as a water district and selling the same
within its service area, or more succinctly, private respondents' interference with the
granted right of petitioner over ground water within its territorial jurisdiction.30

Private respondents, for their part, staunchly invoke Article 88 of the Water Code,
which grants original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to the appropriation,
utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters to
the Water Council.31

Relying on the cases of Abe-abe v. Manta32 and Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton,33
private respondents maintain that the Water Council is exclusively vested with original
jurisdiction to settle water disputes under the Water Code. They claim that the
Amistoso and Santos cases do not apply to the instant case since in Amistoso, the issue
was the prevention of the flow of water through an irrigation canal, and in Santos, the
issue referred to the prevention of the enjoyment of a water right. In contrast, the issue
in the instant case is the right to appropriate water which petitioner and some of the
private respondents profess to have.

We find merit in the petition.

The petitions file before the trial court were for the issuance of an injunction order for
respondents to cease and desist from extracting or withdrawing water from petitioner's
well and from selling the same within its service areas.34 The petitions contained
factual allegations in support of the prayer for injunction, to wit:
1. the grant to petitioner of a Conditional Certificate of Conformance by the Local
Water Utilities Administration over areas from which water was allegedly extracted or
withdrawn by private respondents, by virtue of which its Board of Directors
promulgated rules governing ground water pumping within its service areas;

2. abstraction or withdrawal of water within the territorial jurisdiction of petitioner by

private respondents without first securing a permit from the Water Council, or
registering their well drillers, and sale of said water so extracted to commercial and
other consumers within petitioner's service areas;

3. that the unauthorized extraction or withdrawal of ground water by private

respondents without the necessary permit was in violation of petitioner's prescribed
rules, and constitutes interference for which petitioner may commence, maintain,
intervene in, defend and compromise actions or proceedings under Sec. 31 of P.D. No.
198;

4. that the extraction or withdrawal of ground water without the corresponding permit
was a violation of Art. 13 of the Water Code; andcralawlibrary

5. that great damage and prejudice will be suffered by petitioner if private respondents'
extraction and withdrawal of ground water, as well as the selling thereof be allowed to
continue.

In essence, the petitions focus on the violations incurred by private respondents by

virtue of their alleged unauthorized extraction and withdrawal of ground water within
petitioner's service area, visa-a-vis petitioner's vested rights as a water district. At issue
is whether or not private respondents' extraction and sale of ground water within
petitioner's service area violated petitioner's rights as a water district. It is at once
obvious that the petitions raise a judicial question.

A judicial question is raised when the determination of the questions involves the
exercise of a judicial function, i.e., the question involves the determination of what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in
controversy. As opposed to a moot question or one properly decided by the executive or
legislative branch, a judicial question is properly addressed to the courts.35

The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws
and jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents' actions violate
petitioner's rights as a water district and justify an injunction. This issue does not so
much provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge and expertise of the Water
Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. While initially it may appear that there
is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council, i.e.,
the appropriation of water which the Water Code defines as "the acquisition of rights
over the use of waters or the taking or diverting of waters from a natural source in the
manner and for any purpose allowed by law," in reality the matter is at most merely
collateral to the main thrust of the petitions.

The petitions having raised a judicial question, it follows that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the basis of which the petitions were
dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, does not even come to play.36

Notably too, private respondents themselves do not dispute petitioner's rights as a

water district. The cases of Abe-Abe v. Manta37 and Tanjay Water District v.
Gabaton38 invoked by private respondents are thus inapplicable. In Abe-Abe v. Manta,
both petitioners and respondent had no established right emanating from any grant by
any governmental agency to the use, appropriation and exploitation of water, while in
Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton, petitioner Tanjay sought to enjoin the Municipality
of Pamplona and its officials from interfering in the management of the Tanjay
Waterworks System.

On the other hand, in the analogous case of Amistoso v. Ong39, petitioner had an
approved Water Rights Grant from the Department of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications. The trial court was not asked to grant petitioner the right to use
but to compel private respondents to recognize that right. Thus, we declared that the
trial court's jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the settlement
of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit
was already granted.40
In like manner, the present petition calls for the issuance of an injunction order to
prevent private respondents from extracting and selling ground water within
petitioner's service area in violation of the latter's water permit. There is no dispute
regarding petitioner's right to ground water within its service area. It is petitioner's
enjoyment of its rights as a water district which it seeks to assert against private
respondents.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1995 is SET ASIDE
and the case is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings, with
costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.