ACXHibiscus-HyundaiDiscovery Report PDF
ACXHibiscus-HyundaiDiscovery Report PDF
ACXHibiscus-HyundaiDiscovery Report PDF
ACX Hibiscus
and
Hyundai Discovery
in the approaches to the eastern Singapore Strait TSS
M A R I N E A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G AT I O N B R A N C H
REPORT NO 15/2013
JUNE 2013
Extract from
The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping
(Accident Reporting and Investigation)
Regulations 2012 Regulation 5:
The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under the Merchant Shipping (Accident
Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012 shall be the prevention of future accidents
through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances. It shall not be the purpose of an
investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve its objective,
to apportion blame.
NOTE
This report is not written with litigation in mind and, pursuant to Regulation 14(14) of the
Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012, shall be
inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purposes is to
attribute or apportion liability or blame.
CONTENTS
Page
Section 2 - ANALYSIS
30
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
Aim 30
The collision
30
Restricted visibility
30
ACX Hibiscus 31
2.4.1 Fatigue 31
2.4.2 Watchkeeping 31
2.4.3 Continuation of the turn to port
32
2.4.4 Response to seeing Hyundai Discovery 33
2.4.5 Passage planning
33
2.4.6 Actions following collision
33
2.4.7 Summary 33
2.5 Hyundai Discovery 34
2.5.1 Fatigue 34
2.5.2 Actions of Hyundai Discoverys chief officer
34
2.5.3 Actions available to the chief officer
34
2.5.4 Knowledge of emergency actions
36
2.5.5 Use of VHF for collision avoidance
36
2.5.6 AIS information and presentation
36
2.5.7 Failure to stop to offer assistance
37
38
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
38
38
39
39
Section 4 - CONCLUSIONS
41
4.1 Safety issues directly contributing to the accident which have resulted in
recommendations
41
4.2 Other safety issues identified during the investigation also leading to
recommendations
42
4.3 Safety issues identified during the investigation which have been addressed
or have not resulted in recommendations
42
Section 5 - action taken
43
43
Section 6 - Recommendations
44
FIGURES
Figure 1
-
Hyundai Discoverys chart with the positions of ACX Hibiscus
and Hyundai Discovery at 0700 superimposed
Figure 2
-
Hyundai Discoverys ECS showing positions of ACX Hibiscus
and Hyundai Discovery at 0744
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
Figure 9
Figure 10
Figure 11
Figure 12
Figure 13
Figure 14
Figure 15
Figure 16a -
Figure 16b -
Figure 17
Figure 18a -
Figure 18b -
Figure 19
Figure 20
TABLE
Table 1
-
ANNEXES
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
Annex D
Annex E
-
Annex F
-
Annex G
-
Annex H
Annex I
-
AIS
ARPA
BCR
Cable
0.1nm or 185.2m
CoC
Certificate of Competency
COLREGS -
CPA
DPA
EBL
ECS
GMDSS
GPS
IMO
kW
kilowatt
LOA
Length Overall
LPG
m - metre(s)
MGN
OOW
PMA
SMS
SOLAS
STCW
-
TCPA
TSS
UK
United Kingdom
UNCLOS
UTC
VDR
VHF
Zodiac
Times: All times used in this report are UTC +8 hours unless otherwise stated
SYNOPSIS
The container ships ACX Hibiscus and Hyundai Discovery collided in the eastern
approaches to the Singapore Strait on 11 December 2011; visibility at the time was
restricted by localised heavy rain. Both vessels officers of the watch took action to avoid
the collision only after they saw the other vessel emerge from the rain shower at close
range. This was too late to be effective. Both vessels were severely damaged; nobody was
injured and no pollution was reported.
The United Kingdom registered Hyundai Discovery was inbound to Singapore and the
Panamanian registered ACX Hibiscus was outbound from Singapore. The bridge watches
on both vessels were being kept by chief officers. ACX Hibiscuss chief officer, unaware
of Hyundai Discoverys course and position, turned his vessel to the north to follow its
planned route. He did not check that it was safe to turn before he began to alter course.
Despite several radio warnings from Hyundai Discoverys chief officer, ACX Hibiscuss chief
officer continued to turn his vessel into Hyundai Discoverys path.
The MAIB led a joint investigation into the accident with the Panama Maritime Authority.
The investigation found that both vessels were operating in restricted visibility, but neither
vessels bridge watchkeepers had taken the precautions required by the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (as amended). The Panama Maritime
Authority investigators concluded that the behaviour of ACX Hibiscuss chief officer was
adversely affected by fatigue.
The MAIBs ability to conduct an effective investigation was restricted because access
to primary evidence from ACX Hibiscus, which was outside the MAIBs jurisdiction, was
denied by the vessels owners. The owners subsequently put pressure on the Panama
Maritime Authority not to release critical evidence to the MAIB. As a result, this report has
been obliged to focus on the actions that should be taken to avoid rogue vessels, rather
than deal with the underlying causes of the accident. The obstructive behaviour of ACX
Hibiscuss owners, by influencing a flag state to not comply fully with the International
Maritime Organisations Casualty Investigation Code, has highlighted a significant
weakness in the effectiveness of the Code.
Simulations were conducted to consider what action could have been taken by Hyundai
Discoverys chief officer when confronted by ACX Hibiscus turning towards him. It was
concluded that had Hyundai Discoverys chief officer taken action to turn his vessel hard
to starboard at the time he began calling ACX Hibiscus by VHF radio, Hyundai Discovery
could have passed 0.4nm ahead of ACX Hibiscus.
Hyundai Discoverys managers have delivered training to share the lessons learnt from
this accident with the bridge officers in their fleet. They have been recommended to
further develop their safety management and training systems to improve inter alia, their
watchkeeping officers understanding of collision avoidance methods and conduct in
restricted visibility. The MAIB has also recommended that the Panama Maritime Authority
takes appropriate action with the owners of ACX Hibiscus to address the underlying causes
of ineffective watchkeeping on vessels in their fleet, and to ensure it is compliant with the
mandatory standards of the International Maritime Organizations Casualty Investigation
Code.
Hyundai Discovery
ACX Hibiscus
SHIP PARTICULARS
Vessels name
ACX Hibiscus
Hyundai Discovery
Flag
Panama
UK
Classification society
Lloyds Register
IMO number
9159141
908576
Type
Container ship
Container ship
Registered owner
Manager(s)
Construction
Steel
Steel
Length overall
193.00m
274.67m
Registered length
181.54m
264.95m
Gross tonnage
18,502
64,054
Unknown
Authorised cargo
No
No
VOYAGE PARTICULARS
Port of departure
Singapore
Hong Kong
Port of arrival
Singapore
Type of voyage
International
International
Cargo information
Container
Container
Structural damage
Voyage segment
On passage
On passage
Heavy rain
Heavy rain
21
28
Container carrier
1.2
1.3
Narrative
203
(T
)
Hyundai Discovery
20
10nm
Collision
ACX Hibiscus
04
(T
Traffic separation
scheme
14.5
Figure 1: Hyundai Discoverys chart with the positions of ACX Hibiscus and
Hyundai Discovery at 0700 superimposed
6
At 0730 ACX Hibiscus entered a heavy rain shower and the visibility from her bridge
reduced accordingly. The chief officer acquired the radar targets of several ships
using his Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) system, but did not acquire Hyundai
Discovery.
By 0740 Hyundai Discoverys chief officer had seen and acquired, using ARPA, the
radar targets of four vessels that were out-bound from the Singapore Strait TSS.
The vessels positions were fine on his starboard bow. It was reported that heavy
rain had reduced the visibility on Hyundai Discoverys port side to approximately 5
miles at around this time.
At about 0740 Hyundai Discoverys cadet looked at the AIS information that was
displayed on the Electronic Chart System (ECS) and saw that one of the vessels
was ACX Hibiscus. The cadet told the chief officer that he thought ACX Hibiscus
would pass clear down Hyundai Discoverys port side. At 0741 the master returned
to the bridge; the chief officer mentioned the recent rainfall to the master. The
master instructed the chief officer to inform the on-watch engineer at 0800 that
the main engine should be available to manoeuvre by 0900. At 0744 Hyundai
Discoverys chief officer used the autopilot control to alter course to starboard to a
new heading of 209 (Figure 2). During the turn ACX Hibiscus was lost from sight.
Hyundai Discovery
Scale = 1nm
ACX Hibiscus
Figure 2: Hyundai Discoverys ECS showing positions of ACX Hibiscus and Hyundai Discovery at
0744
7
Hyundai Discovery
Scale = 1nm
ACX Hibiscus
Hyundai Discovery
Scale = 1nm
ACX Hibiscus
Hyundai Discovery
ACX Hibiscus
Scale = 1nm
Hyundai Discovery
Scale = 1nm
ACX Hibiscus
10
is zero you must alter course to starboard. At 0754:20 Hyundai Discoverys chief
officer told ACX Hibiscuss third officer to alter course to starboard and create a
minimum CPA of 3 cables. He then asked the visibility is zero, what are you doing?
At 0754:34, ACX Hibiscuss third officer replied that we are altering course to the
north now. The chief officer continued to turn ACX Hibiscus to port, passing a
heading of 017.
At 0755:00 Hyundai Discoverys chief officer called ACX Hibiscus by VHF radio
again. He stated go hard to starboard, to starboard... what are you doing? ACX
Hibiscuss third officer did not reply.
At 0755:13, about 1 minute before the collision, Hyundai Discoverys chief officer
ordered the AB to put the helm control into manual steering and he sounded one
long blast on the ships whistle. At 0755:35 Hyundai Discoverys master arrived on
the bridge and the chief officer reported the situation with ACX Hibiscus to him. ACX
Hibiscus became visible at about 0755:50 at an estimated range of about 2 cables;
the chief officer ordered the helm hard to starboard (Figure 7).
At around the same time, ACX Hibiscuss chief officer saw Hyundai Discovery
become visible on his port bow; he took the steering into manual control, placed the
wheel hard to port and set the engine telegraph to emergency stop.
1.3.5 Collision
At 0756:10 ACX Hibiscuss bow collided with Hyundai Discoverys port side wing
ballast tank adjacent to No. 2 hold. At the time of the collision Hyundai Discovery
was heading 229 at a speed of 18 knots; ACX Hibiscus was heading 321 at a
speed of 14.1 knots (Figure 8).
ACX Hibiscuss starboard bow scraped along Hyundai Discoverys port side. Five
containers fell from Hyundai Discoverys deck either into the sea, or onto ACX
Hibiscuss forward mooring deck. Hyundai Discoverys master placed the rudder
hard over to port in an attempt to separate the sterns of the two ships.
ACX Hibiscuss master was alerted by the impact, and went to the bridge; the ships
electrical power failed and propulsion was lost.
Hyundai Discovery listed to port due to the flooding of the empty No.2 wing ballast
tank. Hyundai Discoverys master called ACX Hibiscus on VHF radio to establish the
condition of the other vessel, but the reply from ACX Hibiscus was unclear.
At 0800 Hyundai Discoverys master sounded the general alarm and the crew all
reported to their muster stations. Several crewmen then assisted in sounding the
ships holds, tanks and void spaces and reported their findings to the chief officer.
Hyundai Discoverys chief officer ballasted No.2 starboard wing tank and the list
reduced. The master contacted the vessels managers, Zodiac Maritime Agencies
Limited (Zodiac), by satellite telephone and reported the collision to the Designated
Person Ashore (DPA). Hyundai Discoverys master reduced to the vessels
manoeuvring speed, which was about 16 knots, and continued on passage to
Singapores outer anchorage.
11
12
Scale = 1nm
ACX Hibiscus
Hyundai Discovery
13
Scale = 1nm
ACX Hibiscus
Hyundai Discovery
ACX Hibiscuss master mustered his crew on the bridge and then instructed them
to sound the tanks and bilges to check where the hull had been breached. ACX
Hibiscus was flooded in the fore peak tank and took on a list to starboard. Water
also flooded into the forward hold. At 0830 the master advised the Malaysian
Coastguard about his ships damaged status by VHF radio. Following this, the
master turned ACX Hibiscus to head west at slow speed with the intention of
beaching the vessel if necessary to prevent it from sinking. At 0920 the master,
satisfied that ACX Hibiscuss condition was stable enough to resume passage,
navigated his vessel back to Singapores outer anchorage at slow speed.
1.4
- around 2 cables
Weather
Wind
Temperature - 29C
Tidal flow
A picture taken soon after the collision shows the typical conditions at the time
(Figure 9).
1.5
Damage
14
15
16
1.6
ACX Hibiscus
Bridge watches were taken by the chief officer and the two deck officers
17
1.6.3 Navigation
ACX Hibiscuss primary means of navigation was with approved paper charts
(Figure 13).
19
1.7
Hyundai Discovery
20
AIS unit
21
22
The advance of a ship for a given alteration of course is the distance that a ship moves in the direction of its
original line of advance, measured from the point where the rudder is put over.
The transfer of a ship for a given alteration of course is the distance that the ship moves at right angles to the
direction of its original line of advance, measured from the point where the rudder is put over.
ECS
23
24
The results of a crash stop test were also posted on the bridge (Figure 20). The
diagram showed that from full speed (100 RPM), astern propulsion would be started
in 6 minutes and 38 seconds. Full astern propulsion would be achieved after 6
minutes and 47 seconds with the vessel brought to a stop after 9 minutes and 29
seconds.
25
26
1.8
27
1.9
28
The ships particulars and manoeuvring data used in the simulation are shown at Annex H.
The table below indicates the likely outcomes of turning to starboard or port, and
making a crash stop.
Action taken
Time prior to collision
2:40
Collision
2:10
Collision
1:10
Collision
Collision
Collision
Table 1: 6The likely outcomes of Hyundai Discovery turning to starboard or port, and
making a crash stop
Bow Crossing Range (BCR) is the radars ARPA calculated distance that one vessel would pass ahead of the
other.
29
Section 2 - ANALYSIS
2.1
Aim
The purpose of the analysis is to determine the contributory causes and
circumstances of the accident as a basis for making recommendations to prevent
similar accidents occurring in the future.
2.2
The collision
ACX Hibiscuss chief officer altered his vessels course to port, in restricted visibility,
into the path of Hyundai Discovery. The chief officer was told by the third officer that
some radar targets could not be seen because of clutter. He was further alerted
by the VHF radio calls from Hyundai Discoverys chief officer asking him to alter
course back to starboard. Despite these warnings, the chief officer on ACX Hibiscus
continued to turn his vessel.
Hyundai Discoverys chief officer noticed ACX Hibiscus alter course soon after it
began to turn, about 4 minutes before the collision occurred. This gave him little
opportunity to assimilate this unexpected manoeuvre and take avoiding action.
2.3
Restricted visibility
Both vessels had either entered, or were near to, areas of restricted visibility caused
by heavy rain before the collision; ACX Hibiscus for at least 25 minutes and Hyundai
Discovery for around 15 minutes. Immediately prior to the collision, the visibility
had significantly reduced in the heavy rain and was reported to be as little as 2
cables. Consequently, both vessels were considered to be affected by restricted
visibility as defined by the COLREGS. Neither vessel was in sight of the other, and
consequently Rule 19 of the COLREGS - Conduct of Vessels in Restricted Visibility applied to both ACX Hibiscus and Hyundai Discovery.
Rule 19 requires that vessels proceed at a safe speed, and that their engines are
ready for immediate manoeuvring. This rule also states that all available means are
used to establish whether a risk of collision exists. In addition, Rule 35 required that
the whistle be sounded.
ACX Hibiscuss chief officer did not call the master to report the restricted visibility.
Hyundai Discoverys master was aware of the reduced visibility as he had been
on the bridge intermittently prior to the collision. The master reduced speed, but
only to arrive at the pilot station on time. Neither vessels bridge teams reduced to
manoeuvring speed, enhanced their ability to keep a lookout (either by eye or radar),
transferred from autopilot to manual steering, or made the required sound signal.
Both vessels bridge teams would have been much better prepared to respond to the
traffic situation which they faced had they taken effective action to comply with the
COLREGS.
30
2.4
ACX Hibiscus
2.4.1 Fatigue
The PMAs investigation report stated that the chief officer on ACX Hibiscus had
worked for 19 of the previous 24 hours. His working pattern prior to the previous 24
hours was not reported. However, in its report, the PMA concluded that the chief
officer was fatigued, and that this adversely affected his performance to the extent
that it was causal to the accident.
The master left the chief officer on the bridge at 0700. From the information
available, it can only be assumed that he either did not realise that the chief officers
performance might be adversely affected by fatigue, or that he expected the chief
officer to continue working effectively despite being fatigued.
If the master had properly considered the effect of the chief officers recent working
hours, he should have realised that the chief officer might have difficulty keeping an
effective bridge watch in congested waters and restricted visibility. This should have
prompted the master either to remain on the bridge until the end of the chief officers
watch, or call a better rested officer to take the watch instead.
Displaying decreased vigilance, failing to observe warning signs, and not
appreciating the gravity of the situation have all been associated with fatigue. In
light of what is known of the Chief Officers actions and his working pattern prior to
the accident, it is considered likely that the chief officers ability to keep an effective
bridge watch was adversely affected by fatigue. Both the chief officer and master
should have recognised that this ill-equipped him for keeping a watch in an area
affected by high traffic density and restricted visibility. The watchkeeping routine
should have been adapted to avoid taking such a risk.
2.4.2 Watchkeeping
ACX Hibiscuss chief officer was qualified as a master, he had been a watchkeeper
for 15 years, and chief officer for the last 4 years with his current employer. He was
considered to be an appropriately trained and experienced officer.
The chief officer was not aware of Hyundai Discoverys presence because the
vessels contact was not showing on the radar display and visibility was severely
reduced. The third officer later reported that the radar display was obscured by
clutter, so it is considered that the chief officer either did not adjust, or incorrectly
adjusted, the rain clutter control to reduce the effect of the interference caused by
the rain on his radar equipment.
ACX Hibiscuss AIS unit should also have indicated the presence of vessels closest
to it, including Hyundai Discovery. Consequently, it is also concluded that the chief
officer either did not use, or misinterpreted, the AIS information that was available to
him.
The chief officer started the turn to port as his vessel approached the alter course
position that was marked on the chart. Despite the restricted visibility, he did not
make an adequate check that it was safe to turn across the traffic that was heading
towards Singapore. The chief officer should have realised that ACX Hibiscus would
31
cross the paths of the south-west bound traffic once her course had been altered to
the north. This should have emphasised the importance of checking that it was safe
to turn to port.
There were no navigational restrictions or other pressures reported which obliged
the chief officer to make the course alteration at that precise moment. It is possible
that the chief officer wanted the ship to be steady on its new course before he
handed over the watch to the third officer. However, this did not justify the risk of
making a course alteration without adequately checking that it was safe to do so.
It is difficult to imagine that an experienced chief officer would have deliberately
initiated an alteration of course into Hyundai Discoverys path. It is therefore
concluded that the chief officer was not aware of Hyundai Discoverys position and
course, or the hazardous situation that was developing.
The chief officer had insufficient situational awareness due to his ineffective use
of the navigational aids that were available to him. Notwithstanding the potential
effect of fatigue on the chief officer, the standard of watchkeeping on ACX Hibiscus
at the time of the accident was far below the standard that should be expected of a
qualified watchkeeper. Due to the limited evidence available to the MAIB, it has not
been possible to examine the underlying reasons for these failings.
2.4.3 Continuation of the turn to port
The third officer arrived on ACX Hibiscuss bridge to take over the watch from the
chief officer as the vessel started to turn. When he responded to the initial VHF
radio call from Hyundai Discoverys chief officer, potentially without appreciating
the significance of the message, the third officers response to the question why
are you altering course to port? was that ACX Hibiscus was turning to the north.
It is considered likely that in this response the third officer was relaying information
passed to him by the chief officer.
It was reported that the third officer looked at the radar display and found that radar
targets were not seen due to clutter, and that he informed the chief officer about the
situation. Although it was not clear from the information provided to the MAIB, this
conclusion could only have been drawn by the third officer if he had adjusted the
clutter control and subsequently observed radar targets. These probably included
Hyundai Discovery. However, the chief officer continued to turn ACX Hibiscus to
port.
The VHF radio calls from Hyundai Discovery did not alert ACX Hibiscuss chief
officer to the imminent danger that he faced, and did not prompt him to consider the
situation further or stop him from continuing his vessels turn to port.
The reason why the information, and manner, of the report from the third officer
and the VHF radio call from Hyundai Discovery did not convince ACX Hibiscuss
chief officer to reconsider his vessels manoeuvre was not examined in the PMAs
investigation report.
32
33
2.5
Hyundai Discovery
2.5.1 Fatigue
There was no evidence that Hyundai Discoverys chief officer was fatigued at the
time of the accident, and fatigue is not considered to have had any effect on his
actions.
2.5.2 Actions of Hyundai Discoverys chief officer
The chief officer identified that ACX Hibiscus was turning to port within a minute
of the turn starting; he then had around 4 minutes to react before the two vessels
collided. The turn was executed quickly and was a significant alteration of course.
There was no warning that ACX Hibiscus was about to alter course, and the chief
officer had a very limited time to respond to what was a surprising and hazardous
situation. This was compounded by the effect of the restricted visibility; that neither
vessel was making sound signals; and that Hyundai Discoverys chief officer had to
rely on his radar and AIS to determine what was happening.
The chief officers response to the situation was to use the VHF radio to alert ACX
Hibiscuss chief officer, question his actions, and ask him to reverse the turn to port
and turn to starboard instead. However, the chief officer was unable to alert ACX
Hibiscuss chief officer to the danger he was in, or persuade him to change his
actions.
After Hyundai Discoverys chief officers final VHF radio transmission to ACX
Hibiscus, there was just over a minute left until the collision occurred. By this
time, the actions of Hyundai Discovery alone were very unlikely to be sufficient to
avoid collision (see Section 1.9). It was only during the final minute that Hyundai
Discoverys chief officer switched the helm control to manual steering and sounded
the whistle. The helm was put hard to starboard just 20 seconds before the collision.
The chief officers decision to use the VHF radio to try and persuade ACX
Hibiscuss chief officer to reverse his actions was an understandable reaction in
the circumstances, as the most effective way of avoiding the collision was for ACX
Hibiscus to alter course to starboard. If the bridge team on ACX Hibiscus had been
more alert, it might have been successful. However, the VHF calls were contrary
to the instructions in Zodiacs SMS, offered no guarantee of success, and wasted
valuable time. Time can appear to pass very quickly in a stressful situation, and
every minute is vital when manoeuvring a vessel the size of Hyundai Discovery.
This accident should be an important reminder to all bridge watchkeeping officers,
as required by COLREGs Rule 8, that action to avoid collision should be substantial
and taken in good time.
2.5.3 Actions available to the chief officer
Hyundai Discoverys chief officer was quick to notice ACX Hibiscuss turn to port.
He called ACX Hibiscus by VHF radio at 0753:15, and again at 0753:30, around 2
minutes 40 seconds before the collision. This time was considered to mark the point
at which the chief officer had assessed the situation and decided what action to
take.
34
Results obtained from the ship simulator trials were used to determine what actions
would have been the most effective, and the latest time at which action could have
been taken to avoid the collision. The emergency actions available to the chief
officer were to turn hard to starboard, turn hard to port or initiate a crash stop. There
were no navigational hazards to restrict the range of emergency options, and each
could have been completed without causing a collision with a vessel other than ACX
Hibiscus.
Crash stop
The simulator results showed that, due to the time lag built into the ships engine
control system, a crash stop would not have altered Hyundai Discoverys speed
significantly. This option would not have prevented the collision.
Had the engine been ready to go astern immediately (if the engine was operating
at a speed below which it could be quickly stopped or reversed without causing
damage), it is possible that this option could have been more effective.
Rudder hard to port
It could be argued that an alteration to port by Hyundai Discovery would have been
permissible under Rule 2 of the COLREGS. It was estimated from the simulation that
if the chief officer placed the rudder hard to port at 0753:30 (2 minutes 40 seconds)
before the collision, Hyundai Discovery would have passed 3.5 cables ahead of ACX
Hibiscus. Delaying by another 30 seconds would have reduced the bow crossing
range to 1.5 cables.
This option would have been counter-intuitive to the chief officer as it would have
been contrary to Rule 19 of the COLREGS and would possibly have placed the ship
in greater danger if ACX Hibiscus had turned to starboard as Hyundai Discoverys
chief officer requested. Also, there was greater traffic density in this direction, which
could have created additional risks.
Rudder hard to starboard
Turning Hyundai Discovery to starboard complied with all the applicable COLREGs,
took the ship away from the majority of traffic, and separated it from any further
actions taken by ACX Hibiscus. Had a hard turn to starboard been initiated 2
minutes and 40 seconds before the collision, it was estimated that Hyundai
Discovery would have passed 4 cables ahead of ACX Hibiscus. A delay of a further
30 seconds would have halved this range to 2 cables.
A turn to starboard was considered to be the most effective action to avoid the
collision. It generated the greatest passing distance, ensured that Hyundai Discovery
was not affected by the actions of ACX Hibiscus, and complied with the COLREGS.
If the chief officer had turned hard to starboard at the same time as he called ACX
Hibiscus by VHF radio, it is likely that Hyundai Discovery would have passed around
4 cables ahead of ACX Hibiscus. Hyundai Discovery was not constrained by traffic
or navigational hazards, and the chief officer could have continued to turn the vessel
short round or, once ahead of ACX Hibiscus, turned to port and regained his original
track.
35
this made the information that was displayed on it hard to understand. Using the
information was further complicated by the need to compare the targets displayed
on the AIS unit with those on the radar screens, which were located in a different
part of the bridge. It was not possible for Hyundai Discoverys radars to display the
AIS data on their screens due to their age and design.
AIS information was also displayed on an ECS display at the communications desk
in the port aft part of the bridge. The ECS was not approved for navigation, and
the masters and companys instructions stated that AIS should not be used for
collision avoidance. The system was provided to help improve the watchkeepers
situational awareness, and it offered a clear visual representation of each vessels
name, course and speed. Zodiacs most recent navigation audit report on the vessel
made no mention that the ECS was available, nor how the AIS data on it ought to
be used. However, it was evident during the investigation that the AIS data that were
presented on the ECS display were being used to good effect by the watchkeepers.
The advantage of AIS is that, provided the information from the target vessel is
input correctly, it immediately indicates that a vessel is turning by showing regularly
updated heading information. This is in contrast to ARPA target information, which
can take several minutes to present reliable target data to the operator. In cases
such as this one, where a target is continually turning, the target information may
never be accurate as it is constantly being re-calculated.
Combining AIS data with an ECS, or radar, can enhance a bridge teams awareness
of a situation by providing quick and obvious identification of a targets name,
heading and immediate notification that it is turning. While it cannot be wholly relied
on due to possible input errors, there are potential benefits for the cautious use of
AIS data when evaluating the intentions of other vessels.
2.5.7 Failure to stop to offer assistance
Following the collision, Hyundai Discoverys master reduced his vessels speed
and continued on his passage to Singapore. The master attempted to contact ACX
Hibiscus by VHF radio more than once, but he did not receive a clear reply.
ACX Hibiscus was sufficiently badly damaged for its master to consider beaching
the vessel. It was fortunate that the damage was not as serious as first thought and
that no immediate assistance was required. It was conceivable, given the severity of
the impact, that ACX Hibiscus was sinking and that the crew might need to abandon
ship. Hyundai Discovery would have been the closest ship to offer immediate
assistance as required by UNCLOS. Despite this obligation, the master continued
on to his next port without confirming whether the crew of ACX Hibiscus needed
assistance. Hyundai Discoverys master later overheard ACX Hibiscuss master
inform the local coastguard that his vessels condition had stabilised. Hyundai
Discoverys master was unable to explain why he did not offer assistance, despite
his knowledge of this requirement and his own companys instructions.
Although ACX Hibiscus was in an apparently worse condition, its master also made
little attempt to contact Hyundai Discovery, either to exchange details or to offer
assistance.
This accident serves as a reminder of a masters obligation to offer assistance to
any other vessels that his vessel is in collision with.
37
3.2
38
most importantly, ACX Hibiscuss VDR. In contrast, the MAIB showed the PMAs
representative a replay of the AIS data showing ACX Hibiscuss track taken from
Hyundai Discovery.
Regrettably, it must be concluded that the decision to deny the MAIB access to
evidence from ACX Hibiscus has limited the safety issues that can be learned from
this investigation.
3.3
3.4
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40
Section 4 - CONCLUSIONS
4.1
1.
ACX Hibiscuss chief officer altered course to port, in restricted visibility, into
Hyundai Discoverys path. Despite warnings from his own third officer and the VHF
radio, the chief officer on ACX Hibiscus continued to turn his vessel. [2.2]
2.
Hyundai Discoverys chief officer noticed that ACX Hibiscus began to turn about 4
minutes before the collision occurred. This gave him little opportunity to assimilate
this unexpected manoeuvre and take avoiding action. [2.2]
3.
Neither vessels bridge teams complied fully with the applicable COLREGS for
restricted visibility. Both vessels bridge teams would have been much better
prepared to respond to the traffic situation which they faced had they taken effective
action to comply with the COLREGS. [2.3]
4.
ACX Hibiscuss chief officer had worked for 19 of the 24 hours before the accident.
The PMAs investigation report concluded that the chief officers performance was
adversely affected by fatigue, and that this was causal to the accident. [2.4.1]
5.
Neither ACX Hibiscuss master nor the chief officer recognised that the effects
of fatigue made the chief officer unsuited to keeping a watch in an area affected
by high traffic density and restricted visibility. The watchkeeping routine on ACX
Hibiscus should have been adapted to avoid taking such a risk. [2.4.1]
6.
7.
The reasons why ACX Hibiscuss chief officer started to turn his vessel to port
without checking that it was safe to turn across the opposite traffic route, and
continued to turn despite warnings, were not examined in the PMAs investigation
report. [ 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 3.3]
8.
ACX Hibiscuss chief officer took action to avoid collision only when Hyundai
Discovery became visible. By that time, it was too late to avoid a collision. [2.4.4]
9.
ACX Hibiscuss masters lack of oversight of the passage plan meant that
appropriate bridge resources were not provided during an entirely foreseeable
combination of hazardous circumstances. [2.4.5]
10.
This accident demonstrates that using VHF radio calls to try and avoid a collision
offers no guarantee of success, and can waste valuable time. Action to avoid
collision should be substantial and made in good time. [2.5.2]
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42
4.2
1.
That ACX Hibiscuss owners were able to apply pressure to PMA, which resulted in
much key evidence being withheld from the lead investigating state, has highlighted
a fundamental weakness in that administrations application of the IMO Casualty
Investigation Code. [3.4]
4.3
1.
Simulations undertaken by the MAIB showed that, when ACX Hibiscus turned to
port, the most effective action that Hyundai Discoverys chief officer could have
taken was to turn his vessel to starboard. Had he done this at around the same time
as he called ACX Hibiscus by VHF radio, it is likely that Hyundai Discovery would
have passed around 4 cables ahead of the other vessel. [2.5.3]
2.
Zodiacs bridge officers would benefit from training and practice in how best to
manoeuvre their ships in close quarter situations to take action to avoid collision, or
other emergency situations. [ 2.5.4]
3.
The lessons learnt from this accident should serve as a timely reminder of the risks
of using VHF radio for collision avoidance. [2.5.5]
4.
Following the accident, neither vessels master took appropriate action to offer
assistance to the other vessel as required by UNCLOS. This accident serves as a
reminder of a masters obligation to offer assistance to any other vessels that his
vessel is in collision with. [2.5.7]
5.
The PMA, despite agreeing that the UK would act as the lead investigating state,
allowed the owners of ACX Hibiscus to deny the MAIB access to critical evidence.
[3.2]
6.
Due to a lack of access to critical evidence, this report has been obliged to focus
on the actions that should be taken to avoid rogue vessels, rather than deal with the
underlying causes of the accident. [3.3]
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Section 6 - Recommendations
The Panama Maritime Authority is recommended to:
2013/125
Take such measures as are necessary to ensure it is fully compliant with the
IMO Casualty Investigation Code Mandatory sections, specifically Chapter 11.
2013/126
44