John J. McCarthy v. Mr. Maddigan, Dr. Perry Dr. Walter, Dr. Delmuro, 914 F.2d 1411, 10th Cir. (1990)

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914 F.

2d 1411

John J. McCARTHY, Plaintiff-Appellant,


v.
Mr. MADDIGAN, Dr. Perry; Dr. Walter, Dr. Delmuro,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 90-3112.

United States Court of Appeals,


Tenth Circuit.
Sept. 20, 1990.

John J. McCarthy, pro se.


Before McKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(1); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Appellant John J. McCarthy appeals the district court's dismissal of his civil
rights claim filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 and the court's denial of his
motion for relief from judgment made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
Appellant alleges that the deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs of
officials of the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, violates his Eighth
Amendment rights, and he seeks damages. The district court dismissed the
claim without prejudice because Mr. McCarthy failed to demonstrate he had
made use of the administrative review process provided by the Bureau of
Prisons, as required by Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664, 666-68 (10th Cir.1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086, 100 S.Ct. 1045, 62 L.Ed.2d 772 (1980). District
Court Order of April 6, 1990. For the reasons cited in its first order, and
because appellant failed to present any new evidence, the district court also
denied appellant's motion for relief from judgment. District Court Order of
April 19, 1990.

Appellant argues that the law in this circuit is unsettled as to whether


exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in a Bivens -type action,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29
L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), where a federal prisoner seeks only money damages to
redress an alleged constitutional violation. He urges us to follow certain cases
from the Third and Sixth Circuits rejecting such a requirement.

The appellants in Brice v. Day argued, as does Mr. McCarthy, that the
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement does not apply where
damages are sought for a violation of a constitutional right. 604 F.2d at 665.
One of the appellants in Brice sought monetary damages and "what other relief
the court deems fair." Id. This court held that "preliminary fact-finding would
be necessary to determine whether there is a possible Bivens cause of action....
Thus, if we assume that the petitions before us could indicate a Bivens cause of
action as the appellants argue, we must ... require an initial administrative
inquiry." Id. at 666. Brice made clear that "this administrative consideration is
not to resolve constitutional issues nor to consider damages," id. at 667, but
simply to develop a factual record to assist the district court in its review.

Appellant relies principally on Muhammad v. Carlson, 739 F.2d 122 (3d


Cir.1984), and Goar v. Civiletti, 688 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.1982), both of which hold
that a federal prisoner seeking only money damages in a Bivens -type action
need not first exhaust administrative remedies. Muhammad and Goar, however,
do not state the law in this circuit. Moreover, these cases mischaracterize this
circuit's holding in Brice. According to the Third Circuit, Brice held that a
"federal prisoner seeking damages and other relief for overcrowded conditions
must exhaust administrative remedies." 739 F.2d at 125 n. 1; cf. 688 F.2d at 29.
The rule of Brice, however, is not keyed to the type of relief sought, but to the
need for preliminary fact-finding. Brice does not except cases involving claims
for monetary damages only.

We also disagree with the Third Circuit's assumption that the courts "may not
take it upon ourselves to impose a judicially-created exhaustion requirement
directed at federal prisoners." 739 at 125. Given that Bivens actions are "a
creation of the judiciary," id. at 124; accord Brice, 604 F.2d at 665, it follows
that the courts may, and indeed must, establish reasonable requirements for
bringing such actions. Furthermore, as the Sixth Circuit recognized in Goar, "
[a]lthough the administrative apparatus could not award money damages ...,
administrative consideration of the possibility of corrective action and a record
would have aided a court in measuring liability and determining the extent of
the damages." 688 F.2d at 29 (emphasis in original).

We further note that in Hessbrook v. Lennon, 777 F.2d 999, 1007 n. 14 (1985),
the Fifth Circuit correctly construed our holding in Brice and declined to adopt
the Third and Sixth Circuits' view on this issue. We agree with the Hessbrook
panel that "a broad exhaustion requirement is particularly appropriate in cases
involving federal prisoner complaints against prison officials relating to their ...
treatment during confinement." 777 F.2d at 1007.

We find no merit in the other cases cited by appellant, Appellant's Opening


Brief at 3, nor do they alter our conclusion that preliminary fact-finding is
necessary in this case, as it was in Brice, to determine whether appellant has a
possible Bivens cause of action. See 604 F.2d at 666; cf. Hatcher v. Office of
Comptroller of Currency, 631 F.2d 985, 989 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1980) (citing Brice ).
Furthermore, although appellant alleged in his complaint that he had invoked
the prison grievance procedure prior to filing this suit, he does not challenge on
appeal the district court's finding that he "failed to demonstrate his use of the
[available] administrative remedy process." Order of April 6, 1990, at 1.

Accordingly, we grant permission to proceed in forma pauperis, and the order


of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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