John J. McCarthy v. Mr. Maddigan, Dr. Perry Dr. Walter, Dr. Delmuro, 914 F.2d 1411, 10th Cir. (1990)
John J. McCarthy v. Mr. Maddigan, Dr. Perry Dr. Walter, Dr. Delmuro, 914 F.2d 1411, 10th Cir. (1990)
John J. McCarthy v. Mr. Maddigan, Dr. Perry Dr. Walter, Dr. Delmuro, 914 F.2d 1411, 10th Cir. (1990)
2d 1411
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(1); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant John J. McCarthy appeals the district court's dismissal of his civil
rights claim filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 and the court's denial of his
motion for relief from judgment made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
Appellant alleges that the deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs of
officials of the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, violates his Eighth
Amendment rights, and he seeks damages. The district court dismissed the
claim without prejudice because Mr. McCarthy failed to demonstrate he had
made use of the administrative review process provided by the Bureau of
Prisons, as required by Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664, 666-68 (10th Cir.1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086, 100 S.Ct. 1045, 62 L.Ed.2d 772 (1980). District
Court Order of April 6, 1990. For the reasons cited in its first order, and
because appellant failed to present any new evidence, the district court also
denied appellant's motion for relief from judgment. District Court Order of
April 19, 1990.
The appellants in Brice v. Day argued, as does Mr. McCarthy, that the
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement does not apply where
damages are sought for a violation of a constitutional right. 604 F.2d at 665.
One of the appellants in Brice sought monetary damages and "what other relief
the court deems fair." Id. This court held that "preliminary fact-finding would
be necessary to determine whether there is a possible Bivens cause of action....
Thus, if we assume that the petitions before us could indicate a Bivens cause of
action as the appellants argue, we must ... require an initial administrative
inquiry." Id. at 666. Brice made clear that "this administrative consideration is
not to resolve constitutional issues nor to consider damages," id. at 667, but
simply to develop a factual record to assist the district court in its review.
We also disagree with the Third Circuit's assumption that the courts "may not
take it upon ourselves to impose a judicially-created exhaustion requirement
directed at federal prisoners." 739 at 125. Given that Bivens actions are "a
creation of the judiciary," id. at 124; accord Brice, 604 F.2d at 665, it follows
that the courts may, and indeed must, establish reasonable requirements for
bringing such actions. Furthermore, as the Sixth Circuit recognized in Goar, "
[a]lthough the administrative apparatus could not award money damages ...,
administrative consideration of the possibility of corrective action and a record
would have aided a court in measuring liability and determining the extent of
the damages." 688 F.2d at 29 (emphasis in original).
We further note that in Hessbrook v. Lennon, 777 F.2d 999, 1007 n. 14 (1985),
the Fifth Circuit correctly construed our holding in Brice and declined to adopt
the Third and Sixth Circuits' view on this issue. We agree with the Hessbrook
panel that "a broad exhaustion requirement is particularly appropriate in cases
involving federal prisoner complaints against prison officials relating to their ...
treatment during confinement." 777 F.2d at 1007.