Dennis L. Fritz v. Ron Champion Attorney General of The State of Oklahoma, 66 F.3d 338, 10th Cir. (1995)
Dennis L. Fritz v. Ron Champion Attorney General of The State of Oklahoma, 66 F.3d 338, 10th Cir. (1995)
Dennis L. Fritz v. Ron Champion Attorney General of The State of Oklahoma, 66 F.3d 338, 10th Cir. (1995)
3d 338
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner Dennis Leon Fritz appeals from a district court order adopting, in its
entirety, the magistrate judge's recommendation to deny his petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Upon review of the state court record and
consideration of the arguments advanced on this appeal, we affirm the denial of
habeas relief for substantially the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's
thorough and well-reasoned recommendation.
tit. 21, 701.7A & B. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction and
sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353
(Okla.Crim.App.1991), and reaffirmed in state post-conviction proceedings.
Petitioner then commenced this action seeking habeas relief on the following
grounds:
4 Insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, petitioner argues the
(1)
state failed to prove he was physically present at the time and place of the murder.
5
(3) Denial of due process by the state charging petitioner with felony murder
after the statute of limitations had expired on the underlying felony of rape.
Specifically, petitioner argues he was denied due process when forced to
defend against a charge that was not only barred by the statute of limitations,
but also was stale.
(4) Denial of due process as a result of the state's delay in filing charges.
Specifically, petitioner argues he was prejudiced by the delay because by the
time he was charged, he could not recall where he was on the night the murder
occurred.
In our view, the magistrate judge's extensive treatment of the issues obviates
the need for much further explication. However, there is one fundamental
matter that may warrant specific discussion, namely the overall strength of the
state's first-degree murder case against petitioner, which has been called into
question directly, by petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
placing him at the crime scene, and indirectly, insofar as it figures into the
analysis of other claims of constitutional trial error.
20
21
Physical evidence gathered at the crime scene lent substance to the suggestive
circumstances noted above. Semen samples capable of excluding some eighty
percent of the population matched petitioner, although they also matched
Williamson. The state's forensic hair expert found eleven pubic hairs and two
scalp hairs consistent with petitioner's. Unlike the semen samples, the hair
matches could not be explained as equally consistent with Williamson's
presence alone (two pubic hairs and two scalp hairs found at the scene were
consistent with his) and, thus, were especially damning to the defense theory of
the case. Furthermore, while a defense expert discounted some of the pubic
hair matches, he also acknowledged the significance of finding matches with
two different types of hair relating to the same individual.
23
24
25
We also add in response to issue three enumerated above, that expiration of the
statute of limitations on a predicate felony is completely irrelevant to the
continuing viability of a felony-murder charge. See, e.g., Sochor v. State, 619
So.2d 285, 290-91 (Fla.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 638 (1993); State v. White,
477 N.W.2d 24, 25-26 (Neb.1991); Commonwealth v. Munchinski, 585 A.2d
471, 482-83 (Pa.Super.Ct.1990), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 535 (Pa.1991); State
v. Dennison, 801 P.2d 193, 202 (Wash.1990); People v. Morris, 756 P.2d 843,
850 (Cal.1988); People v. Harvin, 259 N.Y.S.2d 883, 885-86
(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1965). Second, Oklahoma's characterization of first-degree murder
as a single crime encompassing alternative theories of deliberate homicide and
felony murder, which permits a "unanimous" conviction by a jury that cannot
agree on either alternative individually, is constitutionally permissible. See
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630-45, 648-52 (1991); Sullivan v. Borg, 1
F.3d 926, 927-29 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 931 (1994); see also
Lewis v. Parsons, No. 91-6009, 1992 U.S.App. LEXIS 14297, at * 8-* 9 (10th
Cir. June 15, 1992)(unpublished order and judgment applying Schad to
Oklahoma murder conviction).
26
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. All outstanding motions are
denied. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the court's General
Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 F.R.D. 470
Williamson was tried separately for the murder, found guilty, and sentenced to
death. See Williamson v. State, 812 P.2d 384 (Okla.Crim.App.1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992)
We need not decide whether the state's case was so overwhelming as to obviate
consideration of petitioner's facially troubling claim that a third party's
videotaped confession to the crime was withheld by the prosecution. The
transcript of petitioner's sentencing hearing clearly shows that counsel had in
fact been given a copy of the videotape, see Sentencing Tr. at 5, 10, which
would explain why the claim was not raised by counsel in the state courts