United States v. Frank Lino Diaz, Appeal of Frank L. Diaz, Margarita B. Diaz, Frank Diaz, and Amparo Diaz, 811 F.2d 1412, 11th Cir. (1987)
811 F.
2d 1412
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Frank Lino DIAZ, Defendant.
Appeal of Frank L. DIAZ, Margarita B. Diaz, Frank Diaz, and
Amparo Diaz, Appellants.
No. 86-5122.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
March 6, 1987.
David K. Tucker, Bierman, Sonnett, Shohat & Sale, P.A., Miami, Fla., for
appellants.
Leon B. Kellner, U.S. Atty., Linda Collins-Hertz, Nancy L. Worthington,
Norman A. Moscowitz, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, Fla., for plaintiffappellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida.
Before KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and MORGAN,
Senior Circuit Judge.
MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
This appeal was taken from the district court's denial of bond remission to
appellants. Appellants contend that there should be a remission of bond, and
that Judge King erred in relying solely on the parties' pleadings, thereby
denying said remission without holding an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of
the applicable case law and the facts presented, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing and
consequently denying bond remission.
I. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Frank Lino Diaz (hereinafter referred to as Diaz) was indicted by a federal
grand jury in the Southern District of Florida for tax evasion, perjury, and
attempted bribery of grand jury witnesses. His bond was set at $300,000.00.
This bond was secured by a condominium owned by Diaz and his wife,
Margarita, plus the family residence of Diaz's parents, Frank and Amparo Diaz.
Diaz's attorney informed the United States attorney's office that Diaz would
change his original plea of innocent to guilty provided that he could do this on
Wednesday, June 26, 1985. The U.S. attorney responded that he would accept
the change of plea but that the date would have to be set for Monday, June 24,
1985. On that day, Diaz failed to appear and a Dr. Mora (a personal friend of
Diaz) testified that he had checked Diaz into a hospital for tests, as Diaz had
been complaining of stomach cramps. The court continued the case for
Thursday, June 27, 1985. On Wednesday, June 26, 1985, Mr. Diaz was
allegedly kidnapped. The stipulated facts show that Diaz was parked at an
Exxon station across the street from his law office. The station attendant gave a
statement to the police to the effect that he saw a car pull up alongside Diaz's
jeep and a "Colombian"-looking male forced Diaz into the car at gunpoint. The
alleged kidnappers made no contact with Diaz's family and he remains at large.
Other facts proffered by appellants' counsel are that Diaz did not make any
large cash withdrawals before the kidnapping, neither did he take any clothes
nor his passport. He also had closed his law office and was giving things away,
apparently in contemplation of imprisonment. Finally, one week prior to his
kidnapping, his law office was burglarized. The only items stolen were files
regarding various Colombian clients.
Upon Diaz's failure to appear, Judge King estreated the $300,000.00 bond and
ordered the United States Marshal to place the secured property in the
immediate and exclusive possession of the United States government. On
January 8, 1986, he denied appellants' petition for remission of bond forfeiture
without holding an evidentiary hearing. However, the government agreed not to
sell the property pending this court's decision on appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
5
Appellants raise two issues on appeal. First, they claim that Judge King erred in
not granting an evidentiary hearing thereby denying appellants their day in
court. In the alternative, they request this court to remit the forfeited bond upon
its own initiative. This court feels that appellants must lose on both issues.
A. The Evidentiary Hearing
Appellants have the right to an evidentiary hearing if they can demonstrate any
rational basis for remission of the appearance bond forfeiture judgment. The
determination of whether or not to allow an evidentiary hearing is within the
broad discretionary powers of the district court. United States v. Roher, 706
F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir.1983). The question of the necessity of conducting
evidentiary hearings on bond remission cases has not been specifically dealt
with by this court; therefore, we draw our reasoning from our sister circuits.
One circuit holds that "[w]hen data bearing on relevant factors is proffered, the
holding of an evidentiary hearing is essential to an informed exercise of
discretion based on 'what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the
law'." United States v. Nell, 515 F.2d 1351, 1353-54 (D.C.Cir.1975) (quoting
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 51 S.Ct. 243, 247, 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931)).
However, another circuit has stated that when "the affidavits of the parties
adequately set forth the relevant facts, a full-scale evidentiary hearing is not
required." United States v. Gutierrez, 771 F.2d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir.1985). We
agree that as long as the district court judge has all the necessary facts to make
a just and equitable determination of the case, there is no point in further
belaboring the court system. In this case, appellants admit that all the facts were
contained in their pleadings. Therefore, Judge King's basic denial of an
evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion, as a hearing would produce
no additional facts to aid appellants in meeting their burden of proof.
B. The Central Question Of Remission
7
Although appellant continually stressed in oral argument that his clients' initial
goal on appeal was to receive an evidentiary hearing, this was an unnecessary
tactic. Since all the relevant facts were contained in the pleadings, Judge King
would have made the same decision with or without the hearing. Therefore, it is
clear that the central question is whether Judge King's denial of remission was
an abuse of discretion.
The controlling authority for setting and revoking bond is Fed.R.Crim.P. 46. It
clearly states that once bond is set, "[i]f there is a breach of condition of a bond,
the district court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail." Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(e)(1).
However, Rule 46(e)(1) combines with 46(e)(2) and 46(e)(4) to give the district
judge virtually unbridled discretion in granting motions to remit bond
forfeiture.1 His decision may only be overturned upon a finding of arbitrary and
capricious abuse of discretion. United States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258, 260 (5th
Cir.1978). Appellate courts are loath to second-guess the district judge as he
was the magistrate with the full benefit of the facts. "We must keep in mind that
the discretion is to be exercised by the district court and not by a court of
review. This court should not substitute its discretion for that of the district
court." United States v. Davis, 202 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir.1953), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 998, 73 S.Ct. 1141, 97 L.Ed. 1404 (1953).
9
Judge King's decision to deny remission was not an abuse of discretion. The
basic reason for this is that Diaz is still at large. This fact is important to our
conclusion for two reasons. First, since Diaz is still missing the appellants
cannot overcome several important hurdles normally used to establish that
justice necessitates remission. The general method of accomplishing this is to
show that the bond forfeiture bears no reasonable relation to several factors:
10 the cost and inconvenience to the government in regaining custody of the
1)
defendant,
11 the amount of delay caused by the defendant's default and the stage of the
2)
proceedings at the time of his disappearance,
12 the willfulness of the defendant's breach of conditions and the prejudice suffered
3)
by the government, and
4) the public interest and necessity of effectuating the appearance of the defendant.
13
14
United States v. Parr, 594 F.2d 440, 444 (5th Cir.1979). 2 In the case at bar, the
fact that Mr. Diaz remains unaccounted for makes any application of these
factors untenable. To begin, there is no way to measure the cost and
inconvenience to the government while Mr. Diaz is not in custody. Likewise,
the delay caused by his default is still increasing. Finally, it is nearly
impossible to determine from the facts whether Diaz was forcibly abducted or
if he willfully staged his own kidnapping. Until he is found, this question
remains a mystery.
15
Additionally, Judge King was correct in following controlling case law which
demands the presence of the defendant. This court has previously held that as
of 1981 no case existed which remitted a forfeited bond while the defendant
was still at large. United States v. Skipper, 633 F.2d 1177, 1180 n. 6 (5th
Cir.1981). The purpose of bond is to secure the presence of the defendant to
answer any charge or charges against him, and to respond to the judgment of
the court, while at the same time bond affords the defendant freedom from
harassment and confinement before he is proven guilty of the offense charged.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 46. "Remission of forfeited bonds while their subjects are still at
large would undermine that purpose." United States v. Skipper, 633 F.2d 1177,
1180 (5th Cir.1981). Appellants cite a post-Skipper case which they claim
allowed remission while the defendant was still unaccounted for. In United
States v. Velez, this court did remit $30,000.00 in forfeited bond money while
Velez was not present. 693 F.2d 1081 (11th Cir.1982). However, this was due
to the fact that the lower court had promised the surety prior to defendant's
disappearance that the bond would be reduced from $60,000.00 to $30,000.00.
Through a mix-up, the lower court ordered the forfeiture of the full $60,000.00
when Velez absconded prior to the second day of his trial. This court found that
since the surety detrimentally relied on the earlier promise of bond reduction,
the district court had abused its discretion in requiring forfeiture of the full
$60,000.00. Accordingly, $30,000.00 was remitted to the surety. However,
since Velez was still at large, the surety forfeited the remaining $30,000.00 in
bond. Id. at 1084. Therefore, this court has never granted remission based on
circumstances surrounding the defendant's disappearance while said defendant
was not accounted for. We agree with the appellee's position that there should
be no evidentiary hearing concerning bond remission in this case until Mr. Diaz
has surfaced, and a determination of where the equities lie is more readily
available.
III. CONCLUSION
16
This court realizes the distress that has been thrust on the appellants by these
events, however, we are obliged to find that there was no abuse of discretion by
the lower court in its dismissal of this request for remission of forfeited bond.
Even though appellants stand to lose their house as a result of this forfeiture, the
"financial plight" of the movant is not within the criterion with which the court
may base its decision on remission. United States v. Bradley, 43 F.R.D. 278,
280 (W.D.Pa.1967). What is important are the circumstances leading to
defendant's breach of contract with the government. Until Mr. Diaz is found or
heard from, there can be no hearing on bond remission.
17
AFFIRMED.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(e)(2):
Setting aside. The court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside in whole or in
part, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if a person released upon
execution of an appearance bond with a surety is subsequently surrendered by
the surety into custody or if it otherwise appears that justice does not require
the forfeiture. (As amended Oct. 12, 1984, Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, Sec. 209(d),
98 Stat.1987.) (Emphasis added).
Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(e)(4):
Remission. After entry of such judgment, the court may remit it in whole or in
part under the conditions applying to the setting aside of forfeiture in paragraph
(2) of this subdivision.
2
Courts have refused to specifically emphasize any of these factors.
Furthermore, although these factors are mentioned most often, they are not the
only factors that may be relevant. United States v. Nell, 515 F.2d 1351, 1353
(D.C.Cir.1975)
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