Rosario vs. Carandang
Rosario vs. Carandang
Rosario vs. Carandang
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7076
Plaintiffs also insist that their action falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance because their claim for damages amounts to P2,500. This argument is
untenable. In the first place, settled is the rule that justice of the peace courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer cases, regardless of the
amount claimed therein as damages (Lao Seng Hian, et al. vs. Honorable Natividad
Almeda Lopez, et al., 83 Phil., 617; 46 Off. Gaz., [11] 70). In the second place, it
appears from the allegations of the complaint that only the amount of P2,000 is
claimed to have been suffered by appellants as damages as a result of defendants'
illegal possession and destruction of the land in question (par. 8 of the complaint,
Rec. on App., p. 4), the additional claim of P500 being allegedly for "additional
expenses, besides the damages stated above", meaning expenses incurred due to
the filing of this case. Considering that the expenses for the filing of the suit, viz,
costs and attorneys' fees, are excluded from the jurisdictional amount that confer
jurisdiction upon courts, the additional amount of P500 claimed by appellants in
their complaint would not take their case out of the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace no other factor than the amount sought to be recovered in the complaint.
Under their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the lower
Court erred in denying their motion for reconsideration and in refusing to
admit their amended complaint. Again we find this assignment of error to be
without merit. While it is true that the under the liberal provisions of our Rules of
Court, amendments to pleading are favored and liberally allowed in the furtherance
of justice, it is obvious that when it appears from the very face of the
complaint that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
case, an amendment of the complaint cannot be allowed so to confer
jurisdiction upon the Court. In Alvarez, et al. vs. Commonwealth of the Phil., et
al., 65 Phil., 302, this Court held:
Under this section (Sec. 101 of the Code of Civ. Pro. the amendment of a
pleading, after a demurrer is sustained, is not an absolute right of the
pleader; the amendment rests rather in the sound discretion of the court.
Generally when a demurrer is sustained, the party who presented the
defective pleading is afforded an opportunity to amend it under conditions
which the court may fix; and this should be done when it appears clearly that
the defect is remediable by amendments (Molina vs. La Electricista, 6 Phil.,
519; Serrano vs. Serrano, 9 Phil., 142; Segovia vs. Provincial Board of Albay,
13 Phil., 331; Balderrama vs.Compaia General de Tabacos, 13 Phil., 609;
Macapinlac vs. Gutierrez Repide, 43 Phil., 770). But when it is evident that the
court has no jurisdiction over the person at the subject matter that the
pleading is so fatally defective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or
that to permit such amendment would radically alter the theory and the
nature of the action, then the court may refuse the amendment of the
defective pleading and order the dismissal of the case (49 C.J., sec. 563, p.
457; San Joaquin etc., Canal, etc., Co.vs. Stanislaus Country, 155 Cal., 21;
Bell. vs. California Bank, 153 cal., 234; Ridgway vs. Pogan, 2 Cal. Unrep. Cas.,
718; Schlecht vs. Schlecht, 277 F. 1065; Beal vs. United Properties Co., 46
Cal. A., 287; Bemartini vs. Marini, 45 Cal. A., 418; Lentz vs. Clough, 39 Cal. A.,
430; Burki vs. Pleasanton School District., 18 Cal. A., 493;
Patterson vs. Steele, 93 Neb., 209; Cox vs. Georgia R., etc. Co., 139 Ga., 532;
Peo vs. McHatton, 7 III., 731; Higgins vs. Degney, 25 Misc., 248; 55 N.Y.S., 59;
Wood vs. Anderson, 25 Pa., 407). Section 101 authorizing the amendment of
a defective pleading should be liberally construed and the courts, whenever
possible, should incline in favor of the amendment; but when it appears
patent that the pleading is not susceptible of amendment upon the grounds
above set out, the appellate courts should not hold that the former have
abused their discretion in not permitting the amendment and in dismissing
the case.
Appellants' original complaint, as we have already determined, is one for forcible
entry and detainer, over which the Court below has no jurisdiction. Not
having acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the original
complaint, the lower court has neither the power nor the jurisdiction to
act on the motion for the admission of the amended complaint, much less
to allow such amendment, since it is elementary that the court must first
acquire jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein. Wherefore,
the Court below did not err in refusing to admit plaintiffs-appellants' amended
complaint.
The case might be different had the amendments been made before an answer or a
motion to dismiss had been filed, since the original complaint was then amendable,
and the amendment could supersede the original pleading, as of right, without
leave of court being required, and without the Court taking cognizance at all of the
original complaint.
In view of the foregoing, the orders appealed from are affirmed, without prejudice to
appellants' filing another case for reivindicacion. Costs against appellants.
Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
Labrador and Concepcion.