2 Sian Vs PNB

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 168882, January 31, 2007

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE NIMFA SIAN,
Represented by its special administratrix, CHARITO J.
SIAN-PARREO, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.
Facts:
Nimfa filed a petition with RTC Negros Occidental [Cadastral
Case:22] for cancellation of mortgage liens annotated on
three titled properties against PNB-Republic Bank [PNB-RB],
now Maybank Philippines, Inc., and RD Negros Occidental. On
23 August 2001, the last day for Maybank to file responsive
pleading, PNB moved for substitution and to dismiss alleging
that: (1) the properties involved were already transferred
from Maybank to PNB by virtue of dacion en pago executed by
them; (2) PNB, having acquired legal interest over the
properties, not Maybank, would be adversely affected by an
unfavorable judgment; and (3) complaint has no verification
and certification against forum shopping.
Nimfa died. On 16 January 2002, the estate opposed PNBs

motions. A day before the scheduled hearing on 8 August
2002, petitioner and PNB filed a Joint Manifestation
submitting the pending incident [the issue of whether PNB
should be permitted to substitute Maybank], for resolution of
RTC without further oral argument. On 15 August 2002, the
RTC granted the petition by denying: (1) PNBs Motion for
Substitution on the ground that it lacks basis [no documents
to support the dacion en pago agreement and/or deed of
assignment]; and (2) Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
there was certification against non-forum shopping in the
petition.
PNB moved to reconsider, but was denied on 29 October 2002.
On 9 July 2003, PNB went to CA via Petition for annulment of
judgment (15 August 2002 RTC Order). On 25 January 2005,
the CA granted the petition ruling that PNB was denied due
process when it based the decision on the pleadings submitted
and without any trial conducted, and without giving the parties
opportunity to present evidence. Petitioner moved to
reconsider, but was denied on 15 August 2002. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not lack of due process is an additional ground for
annulment of judgment. [YES]
Ruling:
Petition is Denied.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court

provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC
may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes as additional ground
therefor denial of due process.[22] So Arcelona v. Court of
Appeals[23] teaches:
It is clear then that to set aside a final and executory

judgment, there are three remedies available to a
litigant: first, a petition for relief from judgment under
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court on grounds of fraud, accident,
mistake and excusable negligence filed within sixty (60)
days from the time petitioner learns of the judgment but
not more than six months from the entry thereof; second,
a direct action to annul for a judgment on the ground of
extrinsic fraud; and third, a direct action for certiorari or
collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its
face or void by virtue of its own
recitals. Thus, Macabingkil did not preclude the setting
aside of a decision that is patently void where mere
inspection of the judgment is enough to demonstrate its
nullity on grounds of want of jurisdiction
or non-compliance with due process of
law. [Emphasis in original]. This doctrine is recognized in
other cases:
x x x There is no question that a final

judgment may be annulled. There are,
however, certain requisites which must be
established before a judgment can be the
subject of an action for annulment. Under the
present procedure, aside form the reliefs
provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2,
Rule 38), there is no other means whereby
the defeated party may procure final and
executory judgment to be set aside with a
view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a)
the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or
for lack of due process of law, or (b) it has
been obtained by fraud x x x . [Emphasis
omitted.]
On the one hand, extrinsic fraud is the ground to

annul a voidable judgment; the declaration of nullity of a
patently void final judgment, on the other, is based on
grounds other than extrinsic fraud. To say, then, that
petitioners can avail themselves only of the ground
of extrinsic fraud and no other is to fail to
appreciate the true meaning and ramifications of
annulment/nullity.[24] (Citations omitted; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The Joint Manifestation of the parties[25] which the trial

court noted in its questioned Order of August 15, 2002,
submitted for resolution without further oral argument the
pending incident, which was PNBs motion for
substitution, not the pending petition for cancellation of
mortgage liens as the trial judge incorrectly read or
understood.[26]
Section 19 of Rule 3 of Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 19. Transfer of interest. In case of any
transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or
against the original party, unless the court upon motion
directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to
be substituted in the action. (Emphasis supplied),
uses the word may to denote that the substitution of parties

on account of transfer of interest from the original party to
another is discretionary. The trial judges denial of PNBs
Motion for Substitution may not, under the circumstances,
thus be seriously assailed.
The trial courts order granting the petition for

cancellation even while the therein respondent Maybank had
not been given the chance to file an Answer and, therefore,
there was yet no joinder of issues, deprived Maybank,
predecessor-in-interest of PNB, of due process of law, thus
rendering said order void.
Thus, in Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen where

the trial court decided a case after it denied the defendants
Motion to Dismiss, this Court held:
xxxx
The short circuiting of the procedural

process denied the petitioner due process of law. It was
not able to allege its defenses in an answer and prove
them in a hearing. . . . Over and above every desideratum
in litigation is fairness. All doubts should be resolved in
favor of fairness.[27]
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners argument that PNB could no longer avail of a

petition for annulment of judgment due to its failure to appeal
the trial courts Order dated August 15, 2002 fails. For, since
the Motion for Substitution of PNB was denied, PNB had no
personality to assail the said order.
The trial courts order being null and void, it may be
assailed at any time either collaterally or in a direct action or
by resisting the same in any action or proceeding whenever it
is invoked, unless barred by laches.[28] That laches had not set
in, there is no doubt.
En passant, one need not be a party to the judgment

sought to be annulled. What is essential is that it can prove his
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud
and collusion and it would be adversely affected
thereby.[29] Even where there was no fraud and collusion,
however, this Court has allowed parties to file petitions for
annulment of judgment to question precisely their
non-inclusion as parties to the original case.[30] E.g.,
in National Housing Authority v. Evangelista[31] where this
Court upheld the annulment of the trial court judgment, at the
instance of a person who was not impleaded in the original
case, this Court held:
Petitioner argues that it should not bear the

consequence of the trial courts denial of its motion to
include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No.
Q-91-10071. True, it was not petitioners fault that
respondent was not made a party to the case. But likewise,
it was not respondents fault that he was not given the
opportunity to present his side of the story. Whatever
prompted the trial court to deny petitioners motion to
include respondent as defendant is not for the Court to
reason why. xxx Be that as it may, the undeniable fact
remains respondent is not a party to Civil Case No.
Q-91-10071 and xxx any portion of the trial court s
judgment xxx cannot be binding on him.[32]

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 168882, January 31, 2007

Nimfa died. On 16 January 2002, the estate opposed PNBs

Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court

It is clear then that to set aside a final and executory

x x x There is no question that a final

On the one hand, extrinsic fraud is the ground to

The Joint Manifestation of the parties[25] which the trial

Section 19 of Rule 3 of Rules of Court which provides:

uses the word may to denote that the substitution of parties

The trial courts order granting the petition for

Thus, in Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen where

The short circuiting of the procedural

Petitioners argument that PNB could no longer avail of a

En passant, one need not be a party to the judgment

Petitioner argues that it should not bear the

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