Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684, 2d Cir. (1968)

403 F.
2d 684
TOWNSHIP OF RIVER VALE, et al., Appellants,

v.
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN, et al., Appellees.
No. 34.
No. 39.
Docket 32232.
Docket 32371.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued September 19, 1968.
Decided November 1, 1968.
William Miller, Princeton, N. J. (Gallahue & Perry, New York City), for
appellants.
H. Richard Penn, New York City (Bachner, Tally & Mantell, New York
City), for appellee Uris Buildings Corp.
Arthur J. Prindle, Town Atty., Town of Orangetown, Orangeburg, N. Y.,
for appellee Town of Orangetown.
Marshall Rooney, Pearl River, N. Y., for appellee The Irving Trust Co.
Before WATERMAN, SMITH and HAYS, Circuit Judges.
HAYS, Circuit Judge.
On June 26, 1967, defendant Town of Orangetown, a municipal corporation of

the State of New York, adopted a local law that rezoned part of the town,
including an area contiguous to the New Jersey border, from a residential
district of one acre plots to an "office park" district. At the time the local law
was passed the land that was rezoned was "mostly wooded and slope[d] up
from the Hackensack River to Gilbert Avenue." The zoning ordinance was
enacted with a view to making possible the construction of a large office-
research complex.
2
Plaintiffs are the Township of River Vale, a municipal corporation of the State
of New Jersey, and individual residents of that township.
We need not consider the claims of the individual plaintiffs because their
failure to allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 renders the
complaint jurisdictionally defective as to them. 2A Moore, Federal Practice
8.11 (2d ed. 1968). See Arnold v. Troccoli, 344 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1965); Boyd
v. Clark, 287 F.Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (three-judge court). The dismissal of
the complaint of the individual plaintiffs is affirmed.
Since, as the district court ruled, no claim is stated against defendants The
Irving Trust Company and Uris Building Corporation, the dismissal of the
complaint as to them is also affirmed.
The township alleges that it will be injured by the reduction in revenues which
will result from depreciation in the value of River Vale property because of the
erection of the office complex, and by the necessity for additional expenditures
"to provide for adequate traffic and other related expenses arising from said
rezoning;" it seeks damages in excess of $10,000 and declaratory relief.
Defendants moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 for summary judgment

dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.1 As applied to the township we
reverse that determination.
The township alleges in its complaint that its property "has been and will be
depreciated in value without due process of law" and that its constitutional
rights have been violated. That allegation, although it could and should have
been made more explicit, see 2A Moore, Federal Practice 8.09[1] (2d ed.
1968), is adequate to invoke the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Cf. Miller v. County of Los Angeles, 341 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1965).
The Supreme Court has entertained suits attacking local zoning ordinances on
fourteenth amendment grounds. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594-596, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) the Court accepted
"reasonableness" as the constitutional standard. In Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188, 48 S.Ct. 447, 448, 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928), the
Court held that a zoning restriction "cannot be imposed if it does not bear a
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." And
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114,
121, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), the Court stated that to declare a zoning ordinance
unconstitutional the ordinance would have to be "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare."2 Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of those cases by
alleging that the Orangetown zoning law is "arbitrary and capricious" and has
adversely affected it.
9
Appellees contend that the cited cases are not applicable here because the
claimant is someone other than a resident of Orangetown. However there is no
reason to limit the application of the fourteenth amendment in any such
arbitrary manner.
10
Appellees urge that because the township is a political subdivision of the state
it cannot assert rights under the due process clause, citing several cases from
the Supreme Court and one from this court. None of these cases is in point. In
each of them a municipality was challenging a law of its own state. See
Williams v. Mayor & City Council, 289 U.S. 36, 53 S.Ct. 431, 77 L.Ed. 1015
(1933); Risty v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 270 U.S. 378, 46 S.Ct. 236, 70 L. Ed.
641 (1926); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 43 S.Ct. 534, 67
L.Ed. 937, 29 A.L.R. 1471 (1923); Brooklyn & Richmond Ferry Co. v. United
States, 167 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1948) (challenge by lessee of city); see also
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385, 122 A.L.R.
695 (1939). And the basis for the entire line of cases is the statement by the
Court in Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310, 18 S.Ct. 617, 619, 42 L.Ed.
1047 (1898), that "[a] municipal corporation is, so far as its purely municipal
relations are concerned, simply an agency of the state for conducting the affairs
of government, and as such it is subject to the control of the legislature." Thus,
in Williams v. Mayor & City Council, supra, the Court held, in response to an
argument that a state statute denied the city the equal protection of the laws: "A
municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government,
has no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may
invoke in opposition to the will of its creator." 289 U.S. at 40, 53 S.Ct. at 432
(emphasis added). Here where a municipality challenges the action of a state
other than "its creator" the reasoning of the cited cases is inapplicable.
11
We hold that a municipal corporation like any other corporation is a "person"

within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and is entitled to its
protection.
12
The district court ruled that since plaintiff was not "directly" injured by the
zoning ordinance it could not challenge that ordinance. In Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, supra, the injury to plaintiff's land occurred when the zoning
ordinance restricted it to residential uses although it was substantially more
valuable for use in industry. The crux of the issue was whether the zoning
ordinance arbitrarily diminished the value of plaintiff's land. Here the claim
that reduction in the value of land within the township with resulting reduction
in township revenues alleges a sufficiently direct injury to give the township
standing to sue.
13
The district court considered important for the purpose of determining

jurisdiction the fact that the township was in New Jersey whereas the ordinance
was adopted in New York. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment is confined to persons within the jurisdiction of the enacting state;
the due process clause is not so confined.
14
Of course we express no opinion on the merits of the plaintiff's claim and it

may prove difficult to establish that the challenged zoning ordinance was
arbitrary and capricious. But the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim.
15
We reverse the dismissal by the district court and remand.
Notes:
1
In a supplemental memorandum Judge Ryan noted that because he had

dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, he was without power to grant
summary judgment. He added, however, that if the court had had jurisdiction
he would have granted summary judgment for defendants
While Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead and Nectow v. City of Cambridge were

state court cases, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. was a federal court
case. The jurisdiction of the federal courts inEuclid was not an issue in the
Supreme Court, and was apparently not seriously challenged in the district
court. See 297 F. 307, 310 (N.D.Ohio 1924).

Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684, 2d Cir. (1968)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684, 2d Cir. (1968)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684, 2d Cir. (1968)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

403 F.

TOWNSHIP OF RIVER VALE, et al., Appellants,

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

On June 26, 1967, defendant Town of Orangetown, a municipal corporation of

Defendants moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 for summary judgment

We hold that a municipal corporation like any other corporation is a "person"

The district court considered important for the purpose of determining

Of course we express no opinion on the merits of the plaintiff's claim and it

We reverse the dismissal by the district court and remand.

In a supplemental memorandum Judge Ryan noted that because he had

While Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead and Nectow v. City of Cambridge were

You might also like