Sharpening The Strategic Focus of Livelihoods Programming in The Darfur Region
Sharpening The Strategic Focus of Livelihoods Programming in The Darfur Region
Sharpening The Strategic Focus of Livelihoods Programming in The Darfur Region
Summary ..............................................................................................4
1. Background.......................................................................................6
2. Purpose and outputs.........................................................................7
3. Workshop process ............................................................................8
4. Understanding and analysing livelihoods........................................12
5. Review of current livelihoods programming ....................................16
6. Future strategic directions for livelihoods programming..................19
7. Conclusions and Next Steps ...........................................................24
Annexes
1. Workshop agenda (includes working group activities)
2. Local resource teams in each workshop
3. Livelihood Groups in North Darfur – El Fasher Workshop
4. Livelihood Groups in West Darfur (excluding Zalingei corridor) – Geneina
Workshop
5. Livelihood Groups in South Darfur – Nyala Workshop
6. Livelihood Groups in Zalingei Corridor, West Darfur (Zalingei Workshop held in
Nyala)
Boxes
1. Understanding livelihoods in conflict settings by building a shared analysis using the
livelihoods conceptual framework
2. How conflict destroys livelihoods, and how adaptation of livelihoods in turns fuels
conflict: an example from those recently displaced in South Darfur due to tribal conflict
3. Key points emerging from the workshop analyses on pastoralist livelihoods
2
Acronyms
3
Summary
It is well known in the Darfur region that peoples’ livelihoods have been devastated as a
result of the conflict, both as a result of the direct asset-stripping of conflict affected
households, but also as a result of the continuous erosion of the livelihood asset base of all
groups in Darfur – even those who have not been directly affected by conflict.
Growing recognition among the national and international humanitarian community of the
importance of supporting livelihoods in the current context has been offset by the ever
present and increasing operational challenges they are facing. Early in 2007 the need for a
strategic review of livelihoods programming was articulated by local actors to
UNOCHA/RCO. In response to this OCHA/RCO organized a series of four State level
workshops, which brought together more than 180 local and international actors, from
government, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, members of universities and civil
society.
The objectives were to collaboratively develop a shared and common understanding of the
impact of conflict on livelihoods, and based on this to develop a more strategic approach for
support of livelihoods through humanitarian assistance, as well as a series of more specific
recommendations on livelihoods programming. This process was facilitated by a small team
from Tufts University, who has been engaged in livelihoods analysis in Darfur since 2004,
supported by two independent consultants with considerable Darfur experience. The Tufts
team designed a participatory process to develop a comprehensive livelihoods analysis, and
using this undertake a programming review and make strategic recommendations.
The success of this novel approach was the result of consistent group work that focused on
locally specific livelihood groups and used the livelihoods conceptual framework adapted for
conflict settings throughout the two days; and also the commitment to a carefully designed
participatory process where local experts served as resource people within each working
group.
The results of the participatory analysis were remarkably consistent across the four
workshops and confirmed some of the findings of former studies, but it also contributed
significant detail and analysis on more recent developments within the different areas. The
livelihoods conceptual framework helped to distinguish how conflict has impacted on all
components of the framework: goals, strategies, processes, institutions and policies (PIPs)
and assets, and helped to identify protection risks and mechanisms through which
livelihoods fuel conflict. Important common themes that emerged included:
• Conflict and insecurity are continuing to destroy livelihoods, and the adaptations that
particular livelihood groups make, in turn fuel the conflict.
• The continued disruption of markets and trade, particularly impacting those who are still
able to engage in some of their pre-conflict livelihood strategies, namely pastoralists and
resident farmers.
• The breakdown and failures in local governance, particularly in relation to competition
over natural resources and local conflict resolution.
4
• Acceleration of environmental degradation, particularly in areas of high population
concentrations as a result of displacement, but also as a result of the breakdown in natural
resource governance and the impact of conflict in constraining livelihoods.
• The inequitable distribution of humanitarian livelihoods programming, with some groups,
particularly pastoralists widely neglected.
A review of current livelihoods programming found that there are examples of good practice
where interventions are responding to critical livelihood needs, and are serving to promote
interactions, even dialogue, between different livelihood groups. But it was noted that even
the most successful initiatives will only contribute a part of people’s overall subsistence
needs, thus leaving a gap that must be met by other humanitarian means such as food aid.
And livelihoods programming is still quite limited.
The review also showed the importance of understanding the totality of people’s livelihoods
in order to identify appropriate interventions or actions. Although much of the current
livelihoods programming focuses on supporting or replacing assets, more attention should
be paid to context specific processes, institutions and policies (PIPs). In reviewing the
breadth of humanitarian livelihoods programmes, five issues of more overarching or
strategic relevance became apparent, including:
1) The need for comprehensive livelihoods analysis to inform integrated humanitarian
programming that encompasses interventions of saving lives and livelihoods as well as
interventions to address the wider mediating factors (PIPs) (and wider processes including
peace-building).
2) More strategic coordination and collaboration on livelihoods assessments, analysis and
programming
3) The importance of promoting Sustainable Resource Management (SRM)
4) Renewed efforts to promote partnerships and strengthening local capacities (to
implement more integrated programming and promote dialogue)
5) A strategic focus to include marginalized livelihood groups, particularly pastoralists
These workshops clearly demonstrated that this type of collaboration and participatory
analysis represents a powerful way forward to develop new and stronger partnerships,
building the capacities of all participants, and generating a wealth of lessons learned, new
ideas and commitments for addressing the livelihoods crisis in Darfur and building
foundations for peace.
In order to build on this understanding and commitment and take many of these ideas
forward, broad dissemination and awareness raising of the workshop findings and
recommendations will be needed. This should be targeted not only at practitioners and
policy makers within the humanitarian community, but also at the development, academic
and political actors. Understanding the livelihoods of Darfurians is fundamental to effectively
intervening on multi-faceted levels to support livelihoods. A second key step will be for
interested, multi-sectoral groups to operationalise these strategic priorities in the form of a
plan that will both guide and support livelihoods programming.
5
1. Background
In the Darfur region the links between conflict and people’s livelihoods are well understood/
documented. As summarized recently, “Conflict and peoples’ livelihoods are inextricably
linked. Livelihoods are integral to the causes of the conflict and the impact it has had, and
therefore will be central to any lasting solutions to the conflict. Moves to find a peaceful
solution must take account of livelihoods, while efforts to support livelihoods must consider
the political economy of conflict and the implications for livelihoods and livelihood
interventions”1. Perhaps what is less well understood are the adjustments different livelihood
groups have made in their livelihood strategies, their motivations for doing so as a result of
the conflict, the multiple contextual factors influencing these strategies, and the
consequence that these can have in fuelling the conflict. This is not a static situation; it
requires continuous local analysis, understanding and knowledge.
As the conflict in Darfur enters its fifth year, how to support, protect and promote the
livelihoods of different groups has become an ever more pressing issue. In the early years
of the conflict the international humanitarian response prioritised immediate life-saving
interventions, although some agencies undertook livelihoods assessments with a view to
introducing livelihoods programming2. More recently this interest has expanded with a wider
range of agencies paying more attention to how livelihoods can be supported. Over the
same time period, the humanitarian community has also begun to respond to environmental
concerns within Darfur, which are key to effectively supporting livelihoods in Darfur.
Meanwhile the conflict itself has become more entrenched with deteriorating and
unpredictable insecurity in many parts of Darfur, and targeted attacks on humanitarian
assets and in some cases humanitarian personnel. One of the consequences has been the
significant contracting of humanitarian space. This is the challenging environment in which
livelihood support is currently being considered and provided
1
Young, H., A. M. Osman, et al. (2005). Darfur - Livelihoods Under Siege. Medford, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University.pviii
2
These included the International Committee of the Red Cross, Concern International and Oxfam GB
3
These included:
• Bromwich, B., A. A. Adam, et al. (2007). Darfur: Relief in a vulnerable environment. Teddington, Middlesex, UK, Tear Fund.
• Buchanan Smith, M. and S. Jaspars (2006). Conflict, camps and coercion: the ongoing livelihoods crisis in Darfur. Final report to WFP Sudan.
• Young, H., A. M. Osman, et al. (2005). Darfur - Livelihoods Under Siege. Medford, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University.
6
livelihoods, to provide the reflective space, conceptual frameworks and other resources for
these explorations to take place. Recognising the daily logistical, security and other
challenges that aid workers are facing in Darfur, there is a real value in providing the space,
facilitation and opportunity for those same people to step back and to be able to think more
analytically and strategically.
In early July these two-day workshops were held in Al Fashir (for North Darfur), Geneina (for
West Darfur), Nyala (for South Darfur), and was planned for Zalingei (for the Zalingei
corridor) although this was relocated to Nyala for security reasons. In total, there were over
180 participants drawn from international and local NGOs, UN agencies, the Red Cross
movement, the Darfur state governments, academics from Darfur universities, and from
donor governments. The workshops were organised and hosted by UNOCHA/RCO (UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance/ Resident Coordinators Office),
logistically supported by DAI (Development Alternatives) and DSI, and facilitated by a Tufts
University team4. In each location the facilitation team worked closely with a small team of
local resource persons who provided invaluable guidance in identifying livelihood groups in
each area and in supporting the workshop discussions. Members of the Resource Teams in
each location are listed in Annex 2. The workshops were funded by DFID (Department for
International Development) and USAID/OTI (US Agency for International Development,
Office for Transition Initiatives).
Designed to be highly practical and output-oriented, the specific outputs of the workshop
were identified at the outset as:
1. A shared understanding and preliminary analysis using the livelihoods conceptual
framework of how conflict has affected livelihoods in the four regions represented at the
workshops (North Darfur; South Darfur; West Darfur – Geneina and border areas; West
Darfur – Zalingei corridor). This includes identifying gaps in our understanding.
2. A review of effective and feasible approaches for livelihoods programming including
assessment, analysis, response and monitoring.
3. An action plan to advance a more strategic approach.
These outputs were achieved for each of the four workshops and are reported upon in more
detail below as well as in the annexes. First the report describes the workshop approach,
4
Led by Helen Young of Tufts University, the team comprised Abdal Monim Osman of Tufts University, Margie Buchanan-Smith
(independent) and Brendan Bromwich (independent, formerly of Tear Fund).
7
which was designed to be participatory and intended to integrate livelihoods, conflict,
protection and natural resource management (guided by the Tufts/FIC humanitarian
livelihoods framework (Box 1)). The key findings emerging from this analysis are presented
in Section 4, followed by a review of current livelihoods programming in Section 5. The final
section presents the conclusions and next steps.
3. Workshop process
In order to achieve the workshop purpose, the process was designed to be as participatory
as possible. Workshop discussions took place in small working groups with facilitated
summary discussions in plenary. The conventional approach of formal presentations
followed by discussion was deliberately avoided. The aim was to engage all stakeholders as
active resource persons in developing the analyses, and especially to draw upon the wealth
of local knowledge and expertise of the Darfurian participants5. This worked well and greatly
enriched the discussions and ensured that workshop outputs were owned by the
participants.
For each workshop and its corresponding geographical area, a group of local resource
people identified a number of different livelihood groups according to the main source of
livelihood for that group and also how they had been impacted by the conflict. This resulted
in a maximum of six groups being identified in any one area, although usually only four or
five of these were explored in each workshop (partly because little was known about some
of the livelihood groups, for example those living as part of armed groups, and they would
have been hard to explore). Table 1 presents the different livelihood groups identified,
explained in more detail in Annexes 3 to 6.
5
Although English was the main language of the workshops, periodically discussions and explanations took place in Arabic to ensure
that all could participate and contribute.
8
Table 1 Livelihood groups identified for each of the four workshops
North West Darfur - South Darfur West Darfur -
Darfur Geneina Zalingei
Livelihood 1. Agro- 1. Pastoralists 1. Pastoralists 1. Pastoralists
groups pastoralists 2. Resident farmers 2. Resident farmers 2. Agro-
explored at 2. Resident 3. IDPs in and around 3. IDPs in and pastoralists
the farmers towns around towns 3. Resident
workshop 3. IDPs in and 4. IDPs in rural areas 4. IDPs in rural farmers
around towns and areas 4. IDPs in and
the urban poor 5. Recently around towns
4. IDPs in rural displaced by tribal
areas conflict
5. People living on
others’ land
Additional 6. Organised 3) Organised armed 6. Organised armed
livelihood armed groups groups groups
groups 4. Foreigners/ asylum
identified seekers occupying the
but not land of others
included in 5. Returnees
the
workshop
discussions
6
Day 1 of the workshop was designed to allow participants to analyse collectively the impact
of conflict on the different livelihood groups. Group work, based on the livelihoods
conceptual framework, was designed to capture the existing knowledge of participants. (See
Box 1). Conflict analysis was integrated as part of this process, to capture the impact of the
conflict on livelihoods, specifically the impact on livelihood assets, strategies and the impact
on policies, institutions and processes (PIPs). Some emerging new PIPs were identified.
The livelihoods conceptual framework was welcomed by participants as a very useful tool
that they can continue to use to deepen their analysis using a shared / common language.
Based on the livelihoods analysis from Day 1 and continuing to use the conceptual
framework, discussions on day 2 shifted to how livelihoods can best be supported from a
humanitarian perspective, again according to the different livelihood groups identified in the
area. This started with a brief review of existing livelihoods programming, to inform more
detailed discussions about how livelihoods programming can become more strategic and
coherent in the future. Discussions were also informed by a recap of the core humanitarian
principles (humanity, impartiality and neutrality) and what they mean, to ensure a principled
approach to humanitarian livelihoods programming.
6
Non-poor urban residents were identified at each workshop, but these groups were not considered in detail except the recognition
that they provide a significant demand for the trade in natural resources so should be acknowledged
9
Box 1 - Understanding livelihoods in conflict settings by building a shared
analysis using the livelihoods conceptual framework
Objectives:
1. Familiarise participants with the livelihoods framework using local knowledge to
illustrate the component parts
2. Explore how the different parts of the framework relate to each other
3. Develop a shared understanding of livelihoods for specific livelihood groups and to
review how conflict affects the different parts of the framework, recognizing that
assets may also represent liabilities (protection threats) and that vulnerability is
frequently a result of the PIPs and particularly new PIPs emerging as a result of
conflict.
Tasks (Steps in the participatory analysis)
Discuss in working groups focusing on a particular livelihood group:
1. What are people currently doing to earn a livelihood? Identifies the livelihood
strategies
2. Why are they doing this? Identifies livelihood goals
3. What do they need in order to do this? Identifies livelihood assets that the household
has access to, plus identifies important policies, institutions and policies of relevance
to this group.
4. How has conflict affected or influenced livelihood strategies, goals, assets and PIPs?
In addition to reviewing the impact of conflict, this exercise reveals new PIPs that
have emerged as a result of conflict and clearly illustrates that vulnerability is
embedded within the PIPs box, hence the importance of PIPs.
OUTCOMES &
INFLUENCE STRATEGIES GOALS
& ACCESS
Back
ed
Fe
Financial
Social
Natural
Human
Physical
Political
13
By using the livelihoods framework, participants explored the linkages between strategies, goals,
assets and PIPs. For example, livelihood strategies are the different ways a household pursues its
prioritized short, medium and long term goals. These goals are in part determined by the assets
available to the household. The assets or resources available to the household may be either directly
owned or otherwise accessed by the household, and include:
• Natural, land, water, forests, (there may be rights of access to grazing land, water points etc)
• Physical, livestock, stores & stocks, equipment.
• Financial, money, debt, credit, claims and investments
• Human, health and nutritional status, adult labour and care-providers, skills and level of
education
• Social, household social networks, social institutions, social exclusion, norms, trust, values and
attitudes
• Political assets including networks and connections with local governance institutions, armed
groups etc.
While assets influence the strategies that households are able to pursue, they are also influenced by
the prevailing policies, institutions and processes. For example, the provision of livestock health
services (an institution) influences the subsequent quality and number of livestock raised, while
taxation (a policy) influences the financial revenues or capital flowing back to the household following
livestock sales. Hence the feedback loop is useful for understanding how the PIPs influence access
to assets, and also the final value or quality of assets.
In a conflict setting livelihood assets may also represent liabilities, and therefore ownership or access
to these assets or forms of capital can potentially be a protection threat or risk For example owning
valuable livestock, or carrying cash, can mean that a household/ community in Darfur is particularly
vulnerable to attack and looting. This process of ‘asset-stripping’ of civilians during wartime and
conflict has been documented elsewhere7 .
Asset-stripping may be direct – systematic attacks are intended to destroy the livelihoods of people.
For example, the tactics of driving people off their land and stealing their assets. In the process of
displacement, previous livelihood strategies become impossible and people lose access to other
assets such as farmland.
7
Keen, D. (1994). The Benefits of Famine: Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989 (Hardcover) Princeton University Press
8
Young, H., A. M. Osman, et al. (2005). Darfur - Livelihoods Under Siege. Medford, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University.
Young, H. and A. M. Osman (2006). Challenges to peace and recovery in Darfur. A Situation Analysis of the Ongoing Conflict and its Continuing Impact on
Livelihoods. Medford, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.
11
4. Understanding and analysing livelihoods
Issues that emerged in this process, common to all the workshops and to the different
livelihood groups, indicate the usefulness of the conceptual framework in deepening the
analysis and ensuring common and shared understanding. These included:
(1) The goals that lie behind and motivate different livelihood strategies are rarely
considered in livelihood assessments, yet have often changed during the course of the
conflict. For both pastoralists and herders, whose livelihood strategies have been blocked
either as a result of restricted livestock migration, or limited or no access to land, then
increased farming became a new goal increasing tension and conflict with settled farmers.
Similarly, for the livelihood group ‘resident farmers living under coercion’ in North Darfur
(Annex 3), pursuing a sustainable livelihood in the current context in the Wadi Barei area is
no longer feasible. Instead, new goals have emerged to do with protecting lives, assets and
as far as possible their rural livelihood systems. This means that some families are paying
‘protection fees’ for their own safety, but have purposely decided to continue living under a
coercive regime in order to maintain ownership of valuable fertile land, fearing they will lose
it if they join the displaced in towns and in camps.
(2) Most livelihood assessments and analyses focus on livelihood strategies sometimes
assets and rarely pay attention to the processes, institutions and policies (PIPs).
Whilst the former are important, understanding the key policies, institutions and processes
was essential for each livelihood group in order to fully capture the vulnerability of
livelihoods as a result of conflict processes which are embedded in the PIPs box. This
covered issues such as markets, the impact of the war economy (e.g.fees at checkpoints),
deteriorating security and the breakdown of governance. A strong analysis of PIPs also
distinguishes the level at which they are relevant (local, national and international), as
described in the list of emerging PIPs below. This more detailed understanding of contextual
PIPs is essential for effective programming response. Without it, programme interventions
may be undermined by factors that have not been well understood resulting in minimal
benefit to the targeted population, and possibly fuelling the conflict.
12
(3) Interactions between livelihood groups, as a result of competing livelihoods, were
readily apparent, particularly where one group sought to control access to the natural
resources in question.
In short, working through the livelihoods conceptual framework helped to distinguish how
conflict has impacted on all components of the framework: goals, strategies, PIPs and
assets, and helped to identify protection risks, and mechanisms through which livelihoods
fuel conflict. This in turn can guide decisions about how best to intervene to support
livelihoods: for example to impact on assets and/ or PIPs, further discussed below. The
feedback loop captures the dynamic nature of livelihoods, including interactions between
project inputs and wider PIPs. Once negative feedback loops are identified, there may be
opportunities for mitigating them. For example, the provision of permanent water points in
rural areas may encourage land occupation and land claims by sedentarized pastoralists
and therefore should be avoided, unless there is the agreement of the original land owners.
How assets have been destroyed in the conflict, particularly in the first two years, is well
known and well-documented. The workshops captured this, but also the continuous erosion
of the asset base since 2003, for all livelihood groups. For example, resident farmers in
West Darfur no longer have access to some of their most productive land, such as wadi
land, where it is being occupied by others. Blocked migratory routes and concentrations of
livestock have increased the incidence of overgrazing, disease and epidemics and resulted
in livestock losses for pastoralists. How social capital as an asset has been eroded was
frequently mentioned for different livelihood groups. For agropastoralists in the Zalingei
corridor this was articulated as deteriorating relationships and loss of trust with other
livelihood groups, which has meant that negotiation is harder and the conflict has become
more entrenched, a pattern that was highlighted for other pastoralist groups as well. IDPs
living in large camps around towns, for example around Nyala, have lost much of their
original social capital from the village. Although new leadership and power structures have
emerged in the camps, some of which may be exploitative, workshop participants have
observed that people have become more individual and less community-orientated.
Particularly interesting and important are the emerging PIPs that are negatively impacting on
livelihoods. Common themes that emerged are as follows:
• Conflict and insecurity are continuing to destroy livelihoods, and the adaptations
in livelihood strategies that particular livelihood groups make, in turn fuel the conflict.
An example of this is provided in Box 2. Other examples include:
o Competition over scarce natural resources, especially firewood, around areas of high
population concentration e.g. around towns and IDP camps. This is an example of how
competing livelihood strategies between IDPs and pastoralists have fuelled violence,
especially gender-based violence.
o Blocked migration routes, in part a result of inter-tribal conflicts and expansion of
farming, has partly encouraged pastoralists to graze their livestock on the fields of resident
farmers before the harvest, in turn fuelling the tension between these two groups.
13
o Some pastoralist groups are becoming increasingly sedentarized as former migration
routes are blocked, resulting in some occupying land belonging to others, thus fuelling
conflict and creating future problems over competing land claims. It emerged during the
workshop that issues around land occupation are poorly understood and require much more
research and exploration.
o The measures needed for sound adaptation to climate change (e.g. improved
community level collaboration over resource management, shelter belts etc) are at odds with
how the crisis is undermining environmental protection activities. For example, intimidation
and gender based violence is currently used by some groups to control access to lucrative
forestry resources (firewood, which is then sold to the groups who have been denied
access).
• The continued disruption of markets and trade, particularly impacting those who are
still able to engage in some of their pre-conflict livelihood strategies, namely pastoralists and
resident farmers. Before the conflict the market was one of the most important institutions
through which different livelihood groups interacted; in many parts of rural Darfur this has
just collapsed. The working group considering pastoralists in West Darfur articulated the
disruption very clearly: many rural markets are now closed and there is a corresponding loss
of reciprocal networks between herders and farmers. Although new routes to access
functioning livestock markets have been found, these are risky, usually longer and therefore
much more costly. Access to international markets has thus been affected. The collapse of
rural markets and of long distance trade in grains and other cash crops has negatively
impacted the livelihoods of resident farmers.
• The breakdown in local governance was often mentioned, affecting all livelihood
groups. Two of the most frequently mentioned aspects were, first the lack of services –
agricultural and veterinary – to resident farmers and to pastoralists respectively; and second
the breakdown of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms as the tribal administration has
been severely weakened. This is most evident around land and water resources and the
inability to manage competing claims which means that the most powerful (i.e. those who
are best armed) usually retain the upper hand. There is little or no evidence of sustainable
natural resource management.
9
Brendan Bromwich reminded workshop participants of some of the processes of environmental degradation that have been accelerated during the conflict in Darfur,
described in ‘Relief in a Vulnerable Environment’. He also gave an example of an agency building latrines for IDPs that required 7 substantial logs in North Darfur for
construction when alternative technology could have been used.
14
• International humanitarian action emerged as another PIP influencing livelihoods,
often positively as described in the section below. However, one of the more negative
aspects has been the lack of adherence to the humanitarian principle of impartiality. The
evidence for this is that almost all pastoralist groups have so far been largely ignored by
internationally-funded livelihood support programmes. Not only does this undermine the
reputation of humanitarians as impartial, it also perpetuates the long-term marginalisation of
these groups and their exclusion from any peace negotiations. The frustration and
disillusionment of some pastoralists (particularly the Arab aballa10) means that they are now
harder to access. Some of these points are further discussed in the following section. As
pastoralist livelihoods are poorly understood by many international agencies, box 3 captures
some of the key points that emerged from the analysis of this livelihood group in the four
workshops.
Box 2 How conflict destroys livelihoods, and how adaptation of livelihoods in turns
fuels conflict: an example from those recently displaced in South Darfur due to tribal
conflict
A feature of the shifting pattern of conflict in Darfur is the emergence of widespread and violent
conflict between different ethnic groups since 2006, particularly different Arab groups in South Darfur.
The working group looking at this particular livelihood group in the Nyala workshop identified the
following cycle:
• Pastoralists selling livestock to reduce the risk of attack and looting, which in turn depresses
livestock prices
• Pastoralists using the income generated to purchase arms to protect themselves and their assets
• Armed and violent conflict escalating between competing ethnic groups
• Increasing number of displaced – those who have not been able to protect their livestock herds,
but who also feel unsafe residing in official IDP camps, and are therefore staying in rural areas thus
increasing the burden on host families.
Box 3 Key points emerging from the workshop analyses on pastoralist livelihoods
• Livestock migration is designed to carefully manage limited natural resources – water and
pasture. Where migration is blocked transhumant pastoralism is no longer viable. The past 30 years
has seen increasing pressures on livestock migration routes as a result of increasing numbers of
drought years, the consequent earlier migration southwards (which brings pastoralists into conflict
with farmers), expansion in farming in the central rangelands (in part due to pastoralists migrating
southwards and taking up farming e.g. the Zaghawa in the 70’s and 80’s). Combined with an erosion
of tribal conflict resolution mechanisms, this has generated increased tribal tensions, conflict between
farmers and pastoralists and subsequent closure of routes to some groups (the northern Gizou
pastures have been inaccessible to some groups for more than 10 years).
• The livestock trade has all but collapsed in large part because of the closure of the main long-
distant livestock trade routes to Libya, Egypt and Omdurman. And the forced displacement of rural
farmers has had a negative impact on local rural markets which depended on the mutual trade
between farmers and herders, which has been largely destroyed.
• Livestock sales are almost entirely for local consumption rather than export. As migration routes
have become blocked and as livestock markets have collapsed, many pastoralists are unable to
produce and sell enough livestock to earn an adequate living. They increasingly have to resort to
10
Aballa: camel herding pastoralists
15
farming creating issues of land occupation (see below) and to the sale of natural resources e.g.
firewood to earn a living. As already mentioned, this fuels the conflict with IDPs over the collection
and sale of firewood.
• As livestock movements have become restricted many pastoralists are shifting from large stock
(cattle and camels) to small stock (sheep and goats) which are better suited to more sedentary living
and are less vulnerable to looting.
• More permanent settlements are springing up for pastoralist groups as their movement and
migration patterns are constrained. Sometimes this is on land belonging to others which may result in
long-term issues of competing land claims (especially in West and North Darfur).
• Little unity exists between pastoralist groups and tensions are escalating between many of them,
especially in South Darfur, where there has been more than four inter-tribal conflicts between
pastoralist groups in the past year (see annex 5), but also among the northern Rizeigat in North
Darfur.
• A growing culture of militarization, especially among the Aballa youth who are often armed and
wearing military dress.
• While the international humanitarian community has relatively little contact with pastoralist
groups, the private sector is engaged with this group, meeting their needs, including the shift in
demand towards smaller stock, pharmacies selling livestock drugs and water drilling.
For example, the provision of veterinary services strengthens the physical capital (livestock)
of the participating households, but also is affected by prevailing government policies on
livestock health and pastoralism; the availability of and access to existing animal health
services; the knowledge and skills of available animal health workers; the private sector
supply and demand etc. An intervention that takes into consideration these broader facets
will be far more likely to succeed than an intervention focusing solely on animal disease.
16
For the range of programmes identified, participants went on to consider how their positive
impacts could be built upon or expanded, and how any negative impacts could be mitigated.
Finally participants discussed and identified new and innovative ideas for supporting
livelihoods of these groups. Underpinning these discussions were key points arising from
Day 1, including:
• The conflict/ livelihood cycle and how one fuels the other.
• The risks of livelihood asset-stripping and other protection threats associated with
livelihoods.
• Awareness of the importance of longer term processes such as environmental
degradation caused by population growth and concentration, poor governance and climate
change in informing short term programme design..
.
• Humanitarian principles, particularly the humanitarian imperative and impartiality, and
the importance of comprehensive assessments as the basis for allocating resources
according to need.
All of the workshops found that once a livelihoods analysis had been completed for a
particular livelihood group, the importance of the prevailing PIPs became obvious, and
were readily included as part of more strategic thinking in planning and designing future
intervention strategies. This was made easier by the continuity of the working groups
focusing on one livelihoods group, and continuing to apply the conceptual framework for
reviewing the implications of the intervention i.e. considering its impact on assets, strategies,
goals and PIPs. (Examples from resident farmers in S Darfur).
Generally the livelihoods analysis had been extremely pessimistic, clearly illustrating the
cyclical nature of conflict between competing livelihoods, particularly between pastoralists
and farmers, and the downwards spiral of impoverishment, environmental degradation and
entrenched localised conflict. In some contexts this cycle is recognized by a small number
17
of local and international NGOs who are trying to ensure the impartiality of their livelihoods
programming by engaging with all livelihood groups, in turn indirectly supporting initial or
ongoing dialogue between groups. Dialogue is a first and much-needed step towards
resumption of complementary livelihood strategies, and may ultimately lead to the opening
up of opportunities to pursue previously blocked livelihood strategies, access to markets,
and natural resources. In the Darfur region, it is around livelihoods that competing groups
meet and do business. This is evident in many scenarios. For example, in Zalingei the IDP
women purchase firewood from the Arab groups who control firewood collection, and then
the IDP women resell the firewood in the camps. The IDP women are doing business with
their adversaries. Similarly, groups living under coercion are paying “protection fees” to their
adversaries in order to remain on their land and cultivate. Both of these examples illustrate
the day to day livelihood transactions that people are engaged in, even where the
relationship is essentially coercive.
Examples were given where current humanitarian programming has supported processes of
local dialogue and helped break the livelihoods conflict cycle. For example, overland
humanitarian access to one group in the Jebel Mara region was secured by the
humanitarian agency working with all groups, thus developing relationships with groups that
had previously hindered access, as well as those denied access. Similarly there were
examples of local markets re-opening as a result of very local reconciliation following
humanitarian intervention.
But apart from these very limited and specific examples, understanding among the
international community of competing livelihood issues was felt to be very poor. This may
partly account for the second key finding, which is the inequitable distribution of
livelihoods interventions among livelihoods groups, with far less livelihood support of
pastoralists compared with IDPs or resident farmers. Pastoralists are not a homogenous
group and even within this group there are large differences. For example, the camel
herding Aballa who were reviewed as a group in Zalingei were only receiving two
international interventions (EPI and livestock vaccination) as compared to almost 15
interventions for Zalingei IDPs. This was further reflected in the lack of humanitarian
assessments and actual contact with pastoralist groups11.
.
Agencies who are pioneering some of the most progressive livelihoods programming are
usually focussed on community structures and local governance and on how to strengthen
or repair social capital rather than just asset distribution. Examples include work by KSCS in
the Kebkabiya area. Building on their long-term relationships with local communities,
developed over a 20 year period, they have observed how working to strengthen local
community structures within some of the coerced farming livelihood groups has given the
communities greater confidence to articulate aspects of the exploitative relationships they
11
More recently pastoralist issues are receiving renewed interest to review, understand and address, and in Nyala UNOCHA has just formed a Nomad
Working Group with another already existing in Geneina for several years (although suffereing from a lack of strategic coordination and subsequent
action).
18
endure, but also how strengthening community structures and community cohesion has had
an empowering effect as they negotiate with their coercers. A second example is provided
by CRS in West Darfur. They have pioneered seed vouchers and seed fairs as well as the
local manufacture of tools, avoiding the conventional approach of buying seeds and tools
outside the area and then distributing them. CRS has consciously worked to strengthen
community groups (for example seed fair committees as well as local blacksmith groups)
and to support local markets and local traders. They have also used training programmes,
for example of fuel efficient stoves, as an opportunity to bring together local communities
and to rebuild damaged community relationships.
In conclusion, this brief review has shown that although current livelihoods programming is
fairly limited, there are examples of good practice where interventions are responding to
critical livelihood needs, and promoting interactions, even dialogue, between different
livelihood groups. It is important to note that in a context of ongoing conflict, humanitarian
livelihoods programming will never be able to substitute completely for food distribution
programmes, and that even the most successful initiatives will only contribute a part of
people’s overall subsistence needs, thus leaving a gap that must be met by other
humanitarian means.
The review also showed the importance of understanding the totality of people’s livelihoods,
and thus identifying appropriate interventions or actions that influence key PIPs as well as
assets and strategies. In reviewing the breadth of humanitarian livelihoods programmes,
issues of more overarching or strategic relevance become apparent, including for example,
coordination, leadership, and appropriate ways of working, which are reviewed in the final
section.
The participatory analysis completed on Day One was crucial for informing the discussions
on programming, and the more strategic recommendations (shown for each working group
in Annexes 3 to 6). A series of consistent recommendations emerged from all four of the
workshops. These were clustered into five groups or categories as shown below.
19
Specific recommendations related to this include:
a) Emphasis on analysis of the context specific processes, policies and institutions, (PIPs)
including those that operate at local level, state level, nationally and internationally.
b) More market analysis & interventions, to include more market analysis of trade routes
between primary, secondary and tertiary markets; particular commodities (livestock, cereals,
food aid); transport constraints and complementary trading systems (livestock and cereals).
Support of microfinance services for local businesses and traders. Seed vouchers and fairs
(building on CRS experience)
c) In programme design, more emphasis on understanding the links between conflict and
livelihoods, particularly how failing livelihoods drive conflict, which in turn impact on
livelihoods, thus identifying opportunities to break this cycle.
d) An example of integrated livelihoods programming is among IDPs where a range of
complementary interventions are provided e.g. vocational training including business
management skills, related inputs, market analysis and support as appropriate, capacity
building of CBOs and programme committees.
e) Use two sector reviews (water and food security) to pilot the integration of many of the
above key factors into a sector strategy so as to advance these ideas at a practical
operational level and at a coordination level.
20
e) Network for knowledge-sharing, more learning and linking with on-going experiences i.e.
lesson learning and sharing.
12
Darfur: Relief in a vulnerable environment p29 for an explanation of the framework of sustainable resource management and
subsequent chapters for practical recommendations.
13
Integrating environmental issues in the context of Darfur involves the following three steps:
1. Conducting a Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA)
2. Developing a Community Environmental Action Plan (CEAP)
3. As experience based on CEAPs is built up, a Community Environmental Management Plan is developed. From: Bromwich, B., A. A. Adam, et al. (2007).
Darfur: Relief in a vulnerable environment. Teddington, Middlesex, UK, Tear Fund. (pages 49-52).
21
hastily formed and given limited support. Other important local institutions for international
actors to partner with include local NGOs, local university departments, including in
particular the Peace and Development Centers (Zalingei, Nyala, and El Fasher). A strong
cadre of Sudanese professionals are working in Darfur who represent a significant human
resource which could be mobilized more effectively as a community.
a) All workshops called for more assessments, analysis and response to the needs of
pastoralists, including developing capacity to undertake such assessments.
22
b) A participatory community-based review of existing policies and practices on pastoralism
with local and national government and relevant international organizations to ensure it is
linked with appropriate policy change14.
c) Where groups have become ‘hard to reach’ as a result of limited contact e.g. Aballa
Arabs in Zalingei area, existing interventions (livestock health, and EPI) should be used as
an entry point.
d) Improve understanding of customary law as it affects pastoralists.
e) Establish community based organizations among pastoralists to facilitate awareness,
dialogue and participation by NGOs.
f) Complement and facilitate appropriate private sector engagement with pastoralists
g) Examples of possible interventions; revolving fund mechanisms for inputs; livestock
health initiatives and training of community based animal health workers; support of
livestock markets by exploring alternative uses of livestock, e.g. slaughterhouses and
processing plants, food processing vocational training; on migratory routes support of
stopover areas with services; support mobile primary schools, and secondary boarding
schools; provide complementary interventions to farmers and pastoralists, e.g. market
support, that will promote dialogue;
h) Action research needed on; pilot fodder/pasture seed broadcasting; traditional NRM
methods/practices.
14
4. This could also include: A collection and and analysis of all pastoral related interventions and and assessments that have been undertaken
as part of the humanitarian response; A review of pastoralism related development projects within Darfur prior to the crisis; A desk study to
develop lessons learnt from support to pastoralism elsewhere in Sudan and the Sahel (e.g. correspondence with Sahel working group
including their recent study following Niger drought – “Beyond any drought”).
23
7. Conclusions and Next Steps
Evaluations following each of the workshops were unanimous that the objectives were met
in full. Participants praised the participatory analytical process and several called for more
similar initiatives and had suggestions for broadening the outreach, including for example
involving representatives of the livelihood groups themselves. There was wide recognition
from both international and national participants of the value of having strong local experts
and resource people, some of whom have been working as professionals in Darfur for more
than 30 years. Those Sudanese who recently came to Darfur to work with the humanitarian
operations should also be acknowledged as their knowledge and experience of the recent
dynamics of conflict, challenges of humanitarian response and implications for livelihoods
were invaluable.
Apart from these specific examples, other participants requested the detailed outputs and
recommendations from each of the working groups in order to take forward some of what
was learned. In particular, the use of the livelihoods conceptual framework in conflict
situations (a simple but comprehensive analysis tool); adopting the three step environmental
screens for their programmes; and exploring the specific recommendations regarding new
opportunities and gaps were considered valuable tools and programming guides to apply.
24
Key Next Steps
As a follow-up to the wide dissemination of the workshop report, the following steps are
essential:
1) Enhance awareness amongst the broader Sudanese, (especially Darfurian civil society),
humanitarian, donor, related government and academic community of the lessons learned
and recommended priorities which emerged from these workshops.
2) Convene follow-up meetings upon release of the report in each of the four locations
across the three States of key agencies engaged in, or supporting livelihoods programming
in order to review the strategic outputs, and to prioritize and develop a strategy and support
mechanisms to take forward these priorities. Multi-sectoral representation of both UN and
implementing partners, both local and international, reflecting a mix of strategic and
operational expertise will be important for these meetings.
3) Support the integration of these livelihoods programming strategic priorities into various
planning processes including the 2008 UN and Partners Work Plan, agencies strategic
planning, donor strategies, government plans, etc
It is hoped these steps can be taken forward in September/ October following the release of
the workshop report.
25
ANNEXES
CONTENTS
26
ANNEX 1 Workshop agenda
(includes working group activities)
ZALINGEI
WORKSHOP AGENDA
27
Day 2: Wednesday 11th July
28
ANNEX 2 Local resource teams in each workshop
Livelihoods Workshops
Key Resource Persons
29
ANNEX 3 NORTH DARFUR – El Fasher Workshop
LIVELIHOOD GROUPS
1. AGRO-PASTORALISTS - Zaghawa, Meidob, Zayadia, Beni Hussein and Berti .
The Northern Rizeigat in Kutum and Kebkabiya, who are predominantly pastoralists
as few have access to land, were not included in this groups discussions.
3. IDPs LIVING IN AND AROUND TOWNS, and the urban poor. Living in large
camps around Al Fashir. Livelihood options are limited and many are related to the
urban economy.
5. PEOPLE LIVING ON OTHER’S LAND i.e. land that has been vacated in the
displacement process. This group includes; displaced people farming land owned by
others; displaced Mahariya from Kutum in Cuma; Northern Rizeigat who are farming
Fur land near Kebkabiya; people returned from Chad to Dar Zaghawa.
6. Organised armed groups eg militias and bandits (identified but not reviewed by a
working group)
30
North Darfur Livelihood Group 1: Agro-Pastoralists
Several groups spread throughout North Darfur fall into this group, including the Zaghawa, Meidob,
Zayadia, Beni Hussein and some Berti, all of whom have their own homeland or Dar. The Northern
Rizeigat in Kutum and Kebkabiya, who are predominantly pastoralists as few have access to land, were
not included in this group. Combined pressures on pastoralism over the past 30 years have pushed
pastoralists to cultivate. The Zaghawa, Meidob and Zayadia are traditionally Abbala (camel herders),
while also keeping sheep and goats. The Beni Hussein would also keep some cattle. The Berti are
traditionally farmers but keep livestock also.
Processes
Institutions
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Strategies Goals
Access
Feedback Loop
Processes
-Lack of security and
stability
-Stable Market demand
and prices
-Environmental
degradation has forced
changes, resulted in losses
-Aridity of the region -
Variable rain has made
livestock the only viable
activity, particularly in the
very arid areas
31
-Control of geog areas by
different armed groups eg
GOS, SLA, NRF, etc
-Labour migration out
-labour demand
Processes
-Lack of security and stability -People are no longer in the far northeast, changes forced by
-Stable Market demand and prices climate and conflict? (unclear which influence)
-Environmental degradation has forced changes, -Conflict, banditry and insecurity, physical violence
resulted in losses -Biggest impact of the conflict/blocked migratory routes, and
-Aridity of the region - Variable rain has made environmental issues, is on the nomads who, because they are
livestock the only viable activity, particularly in the unable to sell enough livestock to earn a living, are
very arid areas incorporating farming and the selling of natural resources to
-Control of geog areas by different armed groups eg their strategies. They have shifted to become more
GOS, SLA, NRF, etc agropastoralists. True nomadism is no longer an option in some
-Labour migration out areas eg Meidop move within confined areas not traditional
-labour demand migratory routes
-Livestock movements now within limited and controlled areas
rather than the former long migratory routes. This is resulting in
shifts to smaller stock (sheep, goats) vs large stock (cattle,
camels)
-Ltd movement out of area, forced due to rebel group area
control, and voluntary because of desire to retain control over
land and area therefore reduced migration and reduced
remittances
32
Humanitarian Livelihoods Programming
Examples of livelihoods programme inteventions
There has been an emphasis on food, seeds, tools, fodder, grinding mills provision, veterinary services
resuscitation through training of AHWs/paravets, some donkey restocking, some water provision
including shallow wells/handpumps, boreholes, dam rehabilitation, tree plantation, primary health care,
to mention some. Agencies focused on supporting Agropastoralists include: Oxfam, FAO, AHA, CHF,
RI, COOPI, ICRC, UNICEF, PA, ACF, SCF Swedan, DAI, WFP, GAA.
-service support is helping -more short-term focus asset -not focused on biodiversity gaps,
people to stay in place provision that is not adapted to building capacity to multiply
-minimize distress sale of people’s specific needs, based on locally,
livestock what’s locally available, doesn’t -support structure for building
-new market establishment eg address biodiversity gaps, capacity
Kulkul, Birmaza -expired drugs -in vaccines production locally in
-protection by presence Sudan
-information and analysis on land
occupations
-inadequate information on this
livelihood group
33
3. Strategic Planning for Livelihoods programming (FAO,UNDP with FS/L WG)
a) Strengthen the FS/L WG to provided the guidance and play a more strategic coordination role in
the support of livelihoods. Leading this initiative could be FAO, UNDP, Oxfam and ACF.
b) Identifying and engaging local resource persons, new and existing CBOs, local NGOs, and other
institutions in the strategic planning and coordination of livelihoods programming
c) Engaging local authorities in the coordination of support to livelihoods programming
d) Some strategic programming areas to integrate include:
-SRM
-participatory extension approaches
-pastoralists - access to basic social services and extension and awareness raising
34
North Darfur Livelihood Group 2: Resident Farmers
Processes
Institutions
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Strategies Goals
Access
Feedback Loop
35
Social networks markets. Traditional systems weakened by
displacement of nearby populations. Increasing
dependence on aid
Natural Access to land is diminished, some only able to farm
Land one mukhamas now compared to before the conflict;
Water supply Overuse of limited water supplies
Policies Can block access to land
Administrative policies for land access
Institutions Conflict has diminished either access or availability of
Markets each of these
Veterinary services
Basic social services
Processes Insecurity decreases access to land, to water, to
Insecurity services; decreases services delivered to rural areas
Drought Farmer’s are concerned about both too much water and
Floods too little
Predatory grazing Concern over pastoralists entering farm areas too early
and destroying crops, either deliberately or not
Livelihoods Programming
36
North Darfur Livelihood Group 3: IDPs living in and around towns, and
the urban poor.
Processes
Institutions
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Feedback
Strategies: Goals
Brick-making, receiving and Survival, basic needs, supplement
selling food aid, water selling, food basket, education, income
grass collection, wood generation, social obligations,
collection and selling, wage skills – adaptation, health, social
labours in towns, handcrafts, obligation
masons, farming, markets in
camps, remittances, migration,
brewing, NFI/soap sale, work
for INGOs, government etc
37
industry protection
important money
38
North Darfur Livelihood Group 4: Resident farmers living under
coercion
Processes
Institutions
Assets / Policies
Feedback
PIPs:
Most of the ways in which the conflict has impacted on this group relates to PIPs.
Processes:
• Security has deteriorated particularly affecting women
39
• Increased inter-tribal tension means that this group is denied access to communal areas to gather
natural resources. These have become ‘forbidden areas’ controlled by militias. This is particularly
serious for those who do not have access to wadi land.
Institutions:
• Community management and mobilisation has broken down as community leaders have left these
‘coerced communities’, also negatively affecting law and order
• Access to markets is severely constrained as part of the coercion regime
Policies:
• The coercion regime can be considered as a kind of ‘informal policy’, imposed by one group on
another. As a result, the coerced farmers are having to share a large part of their income/ livelihood
with armed groups – those who are coercing them. It was also noted, however, that the nature of
this coercion regime has been constantly changing during the conflict
Livelihood strategies:
The conflict has also impacted on some of this group’s livelihood strategies. For example, many have
switched from cultivating sorghum to cultivating millet and okra which is less likely to be grazed and
destroyed by camels
Livelihoods programming
40
What should we be doing that’s new/ fills gaps?
• Agencies focused on ‘rule of law’ (eg UNDP) need to engage much more with the situation
facing these coerced farmers and coercion regimes
• The humanitarian community needs to engage more in dialogue with those groups doing the
coercing, for example to understand better their motivations etc
• Efforts should also be made to support dialogue between the coerced and the coercers.
• Coercion regimes and their impact are not well understood outside Darfur. The analysis needs
to be disseminated and shared more widely eg in Khartoum.
41
North Darfur Livelihood Group 5: People living on other people’s land
that has been vacated.
Processes
Institutions
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Strategies Goals
Access
Feedback Loop
42
How conflict has impacted on this group:
Processes
• Insecurity – lack of access to migratory routes
• The security and safety of livestock depend on who you are
• Livestock concentrations for example in Cuma and Malha, as a result of insecurity which leads to
problems of pressures on natural resources.
• Land occupation is not a driver of conflict in all areas e.g. Tawilla
• Increased sense of ownership by occupants who have lived there for a couple of seasons
Institutions
• Small weekly rural markets (10 to 15 km apart) have closed, which means rural farmers and
herders cannot easily access market.
• Traders send agents to collect livestock, and rural dwellers are forced to accept low prices for their
produce. There are high disparities in prices between agents and main markets
• No credit for subsistence farmers – only credits available for farmers that are trading i.e. better-off
• Breaking down of norms and rules for grazing farmers fields; deliberate animal grazing of crops
before harvest
Livelihoods Programming
Examples of livelihoods programme interventions
These groups may be receiving humanitarian services ‘by default’ as they are not differentiated by
humanitarian actors who are broadly targeting entire areas. There is a huge gap in understanding of the
interrelationships between groups, because of insecurity and lack of access by humanitarian actors,
which causes interventions to be very superficial.
43
• Need for specific humanitarian policies to guide the provision of assistance to these groups, based
on a historical understanding of the livelihoods context.
• Establish a forum for exchange of information about this group, and use the livelihoods conceptual
framework, key resource people, and participatory approaches to promote understanding.
44
Livelihoods Programming – NORTH DARFUR
ACTION PLAN (Plenary)
ACTIONS WHO
Assessments & More Informed Analysis
Interagency Assessments – more emphasis on understanding underlying OCHA
power dynamics, markets, etc i.e PIPs
Strengthen current interagency WWW database and existing livelihoods FAO, OCHA, APU (Ag
related documentation, assessments, background literature, etc, link to other Planning Unit)
existing databases (Tufts, Darfurian network, RCO, others)
Community Profiling – cross-sector, build on existing efforts, assess OCHA, HCR, Intersos
capacity to do
Common Framework for assessments – develop and adopt shared guidelines OCHA coordinated
for doing assessments that address livelihoods as defined by conceptual
framework
Comprehensive participatory methodology for assessments for OCHA coordinated –
understanding livelihoods multi-stakeholder platform
45
UNICEF
All agencies should screen existing programmes for negative environmental Operational Agencies
impacts
Creating awareness and ownership in communities of environmental issues,
harmful practices, SRM
Mapping of natural resources (forest, water, landuse, etc) MoA, FNC, NCF, INGOs,
UNEP
Improve inter-sectoral coordination btw forums OCHA to prompt sectoral
leads
Embed SRM in all programmes All Agencies
Engaging GoS and building awareness, capacities, to support livelihoods Sector leads & INGOs
programming eg vocational training, MoA, etc
Awareness and advocacy around GoS resettlement/return plans IOM, sector leads, Oxfam
Pay more attention to pastoralists viz basic social services in programming
Building dialogue into our programming approaches at community level
that promotes problem solving, reconciliation, etc eg related to land issues,
repairing relations,
LEARNING NEEDS TO BE BETTER REFLECTED IN ACTION PLAN
Our efforts to reflect more partnerships btw local research/university
networks, int’l community and int’l research networks
PILOT PROJECTS?
46
ANNEX 4 WEST DARFUR – El Geneina Workshop
LIVELIHOOD GROUPS
4. IDPS IN RURAL AREAS usually living in the same areas as the resident
farmers. Often displaced over short distances, from smaller to larger villages.
often with some access to land and greater livelihood options that IDPs in
town
5. Other groups not discussed: organised armed groups eg militias and bandits;
foreigners/ asylum seekers occupying the land of others; returnees
47
West Darfur Livelihood Group 1: Pastoralists
Processes
Assets / Liabilities Institutions Strategies Goals
Policies
Access
Feedback Loop
48
• A further trend is the sedentarization of pastoralists. Previously these groups would not have had
permanent settlements, but with restrictions on movements more permanent settlements are
common, particularly in the middle of migration routes, as access to the northern and southern part
of the routes have been lost. This is an issue for humanitarians because these people are
occupying other people’s land i.e. this is directly linked to the conflict. To restore this access
requires a series of negotiations with different groups.
• Increasing competition over grazing, water and alternative livelihood options. As pasture is
exhausted pastoralists move on to exploiting the forests, and and cutting trees to feed animals and
sell firewood. The competition over natural resources with IDPs, has lead some groups of
pastoralists to use harassment and rape of IDP women as one means of exerting sole control and
access to firewood resources.,
• Increasing cultivation – partly driven by loss of rural markets for cereals, and also pressures on
pastoralism above. Over time this could lead to a land claim, particularly given the high
productivity of the land which they will not want to relinquish. In addition, the opportunistic
cultivation can erodes the natural environment leading ot loss of browse (shrubs) and grassland.
• The previous trend of purchasing livestock as an investment by agropastoralists is currently
avoided because it is vulnerable to risk. This has contributed to a fall in livestock prices.
• There is little dialogue between groups, as pastoralists are armed and the farmers are not so they
are subordinate. Although there is evidence of some local negotiations and agreements between
farmers and herders (Umm Dokhun, Fora Boranga, Muli in Geneina district).
• There is conflict between pastoralist groups e.g. the Zaghawa and Arab groups, however, despite
this they continue to ‘do business’ together (Zaghawa buy livestock from Arab traders).
• Increase in banditry and looting
Institutions
• Rural markets are now closed, which means that rural herders have lost their natural marketing
partners (farmers) and therefore cannot buy food from local market. Loss of reciprocal networks –
between farmer and herder.
• Access to national and international markets to sell their livestock have also been affected, with the
loss of international markets in the long-term.
• New routes to access livestock markets have emerged, from Geneina to south Darfur, and CAR
avoiding rebel areas. This takes much longer, and therefore adds to the logistical costs.
• There are disputes, tribal conflicts even, between pastoralist groups – and generally little unity
between groups. Some pastoralist groups are more marginalized than others. Increased ethnic
polarization between pastoralists and other groups, which means less dialogue due to increased
tensions.
• There is a crisis in social capital and traditional leadership. There is an increase in self-appointed
leadership or new leadership among IDPs, and divided loyalities when old leaders return. Youth no
longer respect traditional elders, while power rests with the gun.
• Pastoralist groups have become highly politicized, aligned to GoS and later mobilised by GoS as
part of the counter-insurgency.
They lack and want greater political representation
Policies
• Recent government policies to demarcate livestock migration routes have ignored traditional
practices and not sufficiently engaged farmers and herders in meaningful dialogue.
Livelihoods Programming
Examples of current livelihoods programme inteventions
• Water points and community health and hygiene promotion
• Primary health care services
• Supplementary feeding centers for pastoralist community
49
• Community animal health workers
• Agricultural tools & seeds
• Livestock vaccination services
• Food distribution (GFD)
50
West Darfur Livelihood Group 2: Resident farmers
Processes
Assets / Liabilities Institutions Strategies Goals
Policies
Access
Feedback
51
PIPs:
Processes:
• Environmental degradation is negatively affecting both land and water as farmers are forced to
cultivate small areas close to the village
• The resources available to them, especially land, are also negatively impacted by the large
presence of IDPs. Many resident farmers are sharing their land with IDPs
• And there has been some occupation of the resident farmers’ land by other groups
• Labour migration has fallen because of insecurity
Institutions:
• Traditional land and water management systems are in crisis and no longer function as
effectively as before the conflict
• There has been a reduction in markets, in terms of number, size and quality
• Agricultural and veterinary services have broken down
• There has been a deterioration in relationships between resident farmers and those to whom
they would normally rent land as relationships between communities have deteriorated.
Livelihoods programming
Examples of livelihood programme interventions:
Impacting on assets
• Distribution of seeds & tools (for field crops as well as vegetables)
• Distribution of tree seedlings
• Distribution of treadle pumps for small-scale irrigation
• Restocking
• Provision of fodder
• Provision of water – intended for humans but used by animals
• Promoting income generating activities
• Distribution (and training in) fuel efficient stoves
Impacting on PIPs
• Agricultural extension
• Animal health services (vaccination, de-worming etc)
• Firewood patrols
• Promoting dialogue between communities
• Support to markets by running seed fairs, and by purchasing tools from local blacksmith
groups
52
Do differently, to avoid/ mitigate negative impacts
• Rather than rehabilitating motorised irrigation pumps, which are vulnerable to being attacked
and destroyed, the focus should shift to rehabilitating shallow wells and treadle pumps which
are less likely to be destroyed
• In future water sources should be provided for animals separately from the current provision
of water sources for humans, in the interests of health and hygiene
• Training (eg in fuel efficient stoves and in environmental awareness) should be seen as an
opportunity to bring communities together and to build community relations (building on
CRS’s experience)
• Rather than firewood patrols, there should be more investment and attention paid to
supporting dialogue between communities who are experiencing harassment in collecting
firewood, and those who are doing the harassing to negotiate access. Wherever protection
payments are being paid, ways of discouraging this should be sought.
53
West Darfur Livelihood Group 3: IDPs in and around town
Processes
Assets / Liabilities Institutions
Policies
Feedback
54
- Social impact assessments – Hafirs badly sited could contribute to conflict rather than mitigate
it.
- Brickworks fill with water causing malaria, bilharzia and death by drowning – so community
environmental management plans should be implemented – CEMPS
- Promote alternative building technology to reduce resource use – UN-HABITAT coordinating
ENTEC agenda
What is innovative?
- Community relationship building cash for work programmes by ACTED
What innovation is needed? Where are the gaps?
- CEMPS – Community environmental management plans to address local environmental
issues in camps.
- Engage youth in camps – 18 – 25 yr olds
- Education in camps, especially women
55
West Darfur Livelihood Group 4: IDPs in rural areas
Processes
Institutions Strategies Goals
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Access
Feedback Loop
56
1. Information sharing between organizations (lessons learned, successes and failures):
• Comprehensive needs based assessments
• Monitoring and evaluation (impact analysis)
• Information/ sensitization campaigns at community level
• Local capacity development
2. While still addressing asset accumulation, also focus more on PIPs (impact livelihoods e.g
community peace making
• Inter agency coordination (duplication and over lap and competition)
• Build organization capacity to conduct assessment and analysis
• Promote community ownership of programs and activities
57
ANNEX 5 SOUTH DARFUR – Nyala Workshop
LIVELIHOOD GROUPS
3. IDPS IN AND AROUND TOWNS Most are living in large camps around Nyala.
Livelihood options are limited and many are related to the urban economy
4. IDPS IN RURAL AREAS usually living in the same area as resident farmers,
often with some access to land and greater livelihood options that IDPs in town
6. Other identified groups not discussed: Organised armed groups eg militias and
bandits
The Fur Makdumiya (kingdom) extends from the Jebel Marra area in North Darfur
southwards, and covers Kass, Nyala and Shearia – the northern section of south Darfur. The
Baggara (cattle herders) cover the central belt running from east to west, the northern part of
which is farmland, and include the Southern Rizeigat (Ed Daein locality); Habbaniya (Burum
locality); Fellata (inhabitants of Tulus); Ma’aliya (Adila locality); Turjum who share the land
with the Fur in Bulbul west of Nyala (Fur Makdumiya of Nyala). Although these tribes
represent the majority in the areas inhabited by them, they co-exist with other tribes e.g.
Zaghawa have a large presence in Adila locality. Farmers are increasingly common in the
southern part of the Baggara belt which borders the forest area/swamp in the southern part of
south Darfur.
The northeren Rizeigat traditionally practice a nomadic lifestyle moving north to south and
vice versa, although during the fighting with Turjam they moved their livestock to the foot of
Jebel Marra.
Details of recent tribal fighting in South Darfur are given under livelihoods group 5.
58
Figure 1 1928 Tribal Map of South Darfur showing the tribal homelands
59
South Darfur Livelihood Group 1: Pastoralists
Processes
Assets / Liabilities Institutions Strategies Goals
Policies
Access
Feedback Loop
PIPs:
Processes
• Fall in livestock prices as supply has outstripped demand
Institutions
60
• Politicization of native/ tribal administration (division of loyalities – previously commitments were
to their people, now allegiances are to the government or the rebels; manipulation by GOS playing
on fears of threatened livelihoods)
• Growing culture of weapons and militarization of youth through their military dress, increasing
arms, display of arms, promoted also by women in their songs (hakamat.
• The Commercial or private sector is reaching pastoralists through the provision of new livestock
species, pharmacies and market opportunities. There is also commercial water drilling.
• Marginalization from humanitarian assistance, which focuses on IDPs and residents.
• Breakdown of traditional conflict resolution processes and also local justice systems (no
forgiveness)
• Trade routes, and exchange relationships between farmers and pastoralists eroded if not destroyed
by displacement
Policies
• Exclusion from international peace processes
Livelihoods Programming
Examples of livelihoods programme inteventions
• Livestock vaccination and training of animal health workers
• Health care
• Agricultural inputs
• General food distribution
• Support of processing and trading of animal products
• Rehabilitation of water yards
• Water, sanitation and hygiene
• Mobile veterinary clinics (technical guidance)
• Migratory routes – support for secure stopover areas with services, and efforts to demarcate routes.
• Support of community based womens groups, handicraft activities
• The private sector has supported slaughter houses, new breeds of dairy cattle, pharmacies and
veterinary clinics.
61
Gaps and opportunities
• Develop an overarching understanding of the humanitarian needs of pastoralists and pastoralism,
based on an understanding of the impact of conflict on livelihoods (using the livelihoods
conceptual framework). This should be participatory and community based.
• The needs of pastoralists should be more clearly analysed and responded to, e.g.through the
UNOCHA pastorlists working group. This group should identify and address humanitarian needs,
link up and feed into other coordination bodies and network with regional and national pastoralist
initiatives.
• Facillitate local dialogue with neighbouring groups wherever possible.
• Improve access to cash through IGAs and access to local microfinance services.
• Improved vocational training e.g. in relation to food processing.
• Support mobile primary schools, and secondary boarding schools intended for more mobile
pastoralists.
• Improve understanding of customary law as it affects pastoralists.
Camel migrations require extremely wide migration routes, of up to 30 km wide, whereas the
demarcated routes tend to be 500 km, but they are narrower when they approach villages and widen in
other more open areas. They therefore do not respect the newly demarcated routes
62
South Darfur Livelihood Group 2: Resident Farmers
Processes
Institutions Strategies Goals
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Access
Feedback Loop
63
Humanitarian Livelihoods Programming
Intervention Focus of the Intervention Remarks
Asset PIPs
Hunger gap coverage * * • Interventions are focused more on the
Seeds Protection * assets than the PIPs.
Food distribution * • Good coordination and collaboration
Seeds and tools * on food distribution.
Seedlings, * • Poor coordination on seed
Chicken distribution * distribution.
(IGA) • Assessments need to be focused on
Water bore hole * the impact e.g. the seeds distribution.
Education * • No shared/Week understanding of
Agricultural In put * livelihoods and information.
Health Intervention (HPH) * • Need to include natural resource
Protection (ICRC) * * management as part of interventions
Family integration * e.g pasture and range.
Farmers training * • Community participation needs to be
strengthened.
• Need to understand impact of
interventions e.g food aid on the market
Gaps
• Impact of interventions on markets.
• The dependency notion.
3. Capacity building of the Food Security and Livelihoods Forum to promote a shared
understanding of livelihoods. This should be done by external body.
64
South Darfur Livelihood Group 3: IDPs in & around town
Processes
Institutions
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Feedback
65
How conflict has impacted on this group:
Assets:
• Generally, this group has lost almost all its assets in the process of displacement ie land,
livestock, homes and financial assets
• They have continued to suffer from a lack of capital
• Their social assets have been massively affected eg social capital has been disrupted as
different members of their original communities have gone to different IDP camps, and as
people have become more self-oriented rather than community-oriented. Power structures
have changed as new leaders have emerged in the camps and as youth and women have
become more organised into community groups. IDPs have also adapted their behaviour and
coping mechanisms to a more urban environment, for example sending girls and women out to
work
• Most of this group were originally farmers, but their agricultural skills are no longer utilised.
Instead they are having to learn new urban skills
• The pressure on natural resources around the camps which have become massive
concentrations of population, has seriously increased.
• Their political assets have changed related to the emergency of new leaders and development
of leadership skills
PIPs:
Processes:
• Significantly, this whole group of IDPs has changed from being producers to becoming
consumers
• Limited natural resources around IDP camps means that there has been serious environmental
degradation, in turn forcing IDPs to travel further to get firewood, in turn exposing them to
increased insecurity and harassment
• There is also rising tension between IDPs and the host urban population as they compete for
resources and for employment
Institutions:
• Markets have become flooded with food aid and NFIs causing prices to fall so that IDPs have
to sell larger quantities to earn cash
• There has also been a collapse in trade in local grain as this group is no longer producing
• Health services and health and hygiene awareness has generally improved for this group as a
result of the provision of basic services
Policies:
• Government has shown poor commitment to the needs and welfare of this group through their
policies
• Instead, IDPs have become very dependent on the policies and principles governing the
provision of international humanitarian assistance
Livelihoods programming
Impacting on assets
• Skills training eg handicrafts, knitting, sewing, food processing
• The provision of capital
• Provision of fuel-efficient stoves
• Provision of poultry
• Grinding mills
• Seeds, tools and pumps for group farms
• Tools for carpentry and blacksmithing
• Restocking donkeys
• Restocking goats for household milk consumption
66
• Donkey carts & wheel barrows
• NGO employment
• Distribution of food aid and NFIs
Impacting on PIPs
• Provision of vet services
• Educational and vocational training eg literacy, welding, life skills etc
• Protection through firewood patrols and provision of raw materials for handicrafts (so IDPs do
not have to travel far out of camps)
67
Future strategic direction for livelihoods programming for IDPs in and around towns
The context
Basic services for IDPs are fairly well met by the international humanitarian community. Their greatest
need is for a higher and more reliable cash income. They face many constraints in developing their
livelihoods, including insecurity and a high dependence on the urban economy. In many ways they are
living in an ‘open prison’.
Strategic implications
• The provision of basic services to IDPs, including food aid, has to continue. But it must be
accompanied by a greater emphasis on how to increase the cash income of IDPs.
• There needs to be ongoing provision of capital and skills to IDPs so that they are better able to
engage in the urban economy
• IDPs should be strongly involved in decision-making and in management of all livelihoods
programming.
• There also need to be better needs assessments and sharpened planning of interventions to ensure
impartiality and viable programming
• More attention must also be paid to the PIPs which constrain IDPs’ livelihood options, which in
turn means doing more advocacy, both with local authorities and with donors as explained in ‘what
should be doing that’s new’ above.
• International humanitarian agencies also need to engage more with local institutions in their work
with IDPs, not least to build IDP relationships with such local institutions.
• Much greater attention needs to be paid to the issue of environmental degradation and therefore to
promoting sustainable resource management. Ideas for doing so are presented in the section on ‘do
differently’ above.
• Although we are still in the midst of a humanitarian crisis (ie there is not yet a successful political
peace agreement so recovery is not yet feasible), the issue of return has already started to be
discussed. The starting point has to be the Deng Guiding Principles on IDPs which implies IDPs
have a choice about whether to return, when and where. These should guide any discussions and
interventions around return. Humanitarian agencies need to deepen their understanding and
analysis of the different interests around return. Where spontaneous return is happening, they need
to monitor and be aware of it, and support it on a case by case basis.
Action plan
• A livelihoods forum to be established to promote continued use of the livelihoods conceptual
framework, and strategic analysis and programming for livelihoods support. Action: OCHA,
FAOor UNDP to lead
• An inter-agency livelihoods assessment to be carried out in IDP camps around Nyala.
• Greater attention to be paid to sustainable resource management in and around urban areas. Action:
this is the responsibility of all operational agencies working with IDPs. It needs to be supported by
UNEP which may be able to mobilise the strong resources and expertise on sustainable resource
management that exists within Darfur
• High-level advocacy with local authorities to be carried out, to ease the barriers IDPs face in
engaging with the urban economy. Action: OCHA, UNDP
• Advocacy with donors to ensure funding is available for livelihoods programming. Action: all
operational agencies, but especially UNDP in relation to the UN workplan
68
South Darfur Livelihood Group 4: IDPs in rural areas
Processes
Institutions
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Feedback
69
Livelihoods Programming
• Agriculture: vegetable gardens, seeds, tools, donkey distribution, vet services, carts
• Food distribution: - bartered/ sold for assets, education etc.
• Vocational skill training: carpentry, sewing, blacksmithing, welding, handicrafts, grass mats
(shagania), business training,
• Facilitation of artisans: Tools, raw materials, space to work, market access
• Cash interventions: Cash for work, cash grants, vouchers
• Asset provision: Grinding mills, sewing machines, NFI distribution, food processing machines
• Support to natural resources: Seedlings distributed, fuel efficient stoves, community nurseries.
70
Ways Of Working
8. Capacity built for shared conceptual, contextual analysis & project
coordination
• Guidance notes and training materials needed
9. Capacity for project design built – integration of:
• Livelihood framework
• Negative impact assessment
• Guidance notes and training materials needed
71
South Darfur Livelihood Group 5: Those recently displaced by tribal
conflict
Processes
Institutions Strategies Goals
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Access
Feedback Loop
72
them. Others who still have livestock and
can access land for farming have continued
their former livelihood as best they can, but
there have been no markets to sell to
The Zaghawa in particular have tended not
to move to camps.
Daily labour breaking stones, making lime,
agricultural labour
• Some have half their family in camps and half seasonally moving to farm
• Traditional systems of reciprocity and hospitality are overstretched and unable to support the more
vulnerable eg. widows, aged, orphans,
• Women headed HH fall into two categories:
• Those with access to land & livestock from their husbands which they can take
over and work on together with her own family relatives
• -Those with nothing who are forced to work as daily labour in the camps
• More widows and orphans has placed pressure on weak GoS services
Livelihoods Programming
Examples of livelihoods programme inteventions
In response to nomads needs agencies have provided NFIs, veterinary services including CAHW
training, some range seed broadcasting, water supply and the GoS has engaged in reconciliations. In
support of the Agropastoralists, response has included seeds and tools, NFIs, water supply, food
distribution for seed protection and also reconciliation conferences (GoS).
73
reconciliation conflict (+ and – impacts) and the coordination mechanism
reconciliation (strategic goal, cross-sectoral
linkages, inclusive to local
institutions)
More understanding of assets as Change donors’ expectations
liabilities through a communication strategy
Promote dialogue with the GoS Improving linkages between local
and others on free access of goods and regional institutions, (local
and services influencing PIPs)
Promoting awareness and
developing alternative opportunities
for youth and women
1. Promote the livelihood conceptual framework as a tool for sector integration (OCHA)
• Develop a strategy beyond the two sector reviews to do this
2. Understand the GoS Resettlement Plans, their implications to livelihood related issues
including the PIPs (OCHA & UNMIS/Civil Affairs)
• Need to understand content of plans, what’s been said and planned, what the status of their
advancement, what the implications are.
• Need to inform agencies
• Undertake advocacy where needed
3. Develop a shared understanding of land issues, conflict drivers and reconciliation, the
historical context, assets as liabilities, livelihoods, environmental implications, impacts of PIPs for
programming, and ensuring the inclusion of local resources
-Apply the 3 basic steps of environmental assessment, identification of negative impacts, and
mitigation.
4. Develop more strategic coordination around WRM, NRM, Agric inputs, alternative
technologies, environmental issues, and considering PIPs in all these.
5. Promote development of regional and sector strategies linking the local and regional
levels
6. Empowering local level institutions including youth and women. Increase their involvement
in community initiatives and promote alternative opportunities
Use two sector reviews (water and food security) to pilot the integration of many of the above key
activities into a sector strategy so as to advance these ideas at a practical operational level and at a
coordination level.
1. Feedback by OCHA to the water and food security working group meetings
2. A “like-minded” small group of agencies meets to define the strategic shift and raise/promote
common understanding of related issues to livelihoods using the livelihoods conceptual framework
(LCP)
3. Identify locally available resources including institutions, key resource persons, etc to inform on
key issues relevant to the strategic shift to deepen understanding
4. Develop agreed-upon milestones:
-water resource management
-natural resource management
-agricultural inputs
-alternative technologies
-environmental issues
5. Promote cross-sectoral coordination
6. Secure buy-in at all levels (sector, regional, national, etc)
74
7. Eventually the above steps would culminate in the development of sector strategies that address
livelihoods, protection and the environment in a more integrated approach
75
ANNEX 6 ZALINGEI CORRIDOR - WEST DARFUR
LIVELIHOOD GROUPS
4. IDPs IN AND AROUND TOWNS Most are living in large IDP camps around
Zalingei, Garsilla, Dillige, Bindisi). This also includes the Hottiya and other groups
that were displaced in 2006. Livelihood options are limited, and many are related to
the urban economy
5. Other identified groups not discussed: Organised armed groups eg militias and
bandits
76
Zalingei corridor Livelihood Group 1: Pastoralists (the Abbala – camel
herders)
Processes
Institutions Strategies Goals
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Access
Feedback Loop
Livelihoods Programming
Examples of livelihoods programme inteventions
• UN agencies; Animal health; In-puts for nomadic education.
• GOS; Nomadic education up to class four; EPI
• NGOs; Agricultural in puts (solidarity); Vaccination and animal health (ICRC)
• The Private sector; Veterinary stores
• Herders Union and organizations; Animal health
77
Do more of, to enhance positive impacts
• EPI as an example of building human capital & expand to other areas of education
• Community animal health services & para-vet training
78
Zalingei corridor Livelihood Group 2: Agropastoralists
Processes
Institutions Strategies Goals
Assets / Liabilities
Policies
Access
Feedback Loop
Assets
• Asset stripping –trees, stock, stores, water sources
• Loss of social cohesion (loss of trust, poor relationships with other groups leading to entrenched
conflict, hard to negotiate)
• Increased numbers of cattle by raiding / appropriation leading to more cattle disease and pressure
on natural resources.
PIPs:
• Markets down because of high purchase costs and low sales prices leading to a loss of income.
• Veterinary services reduced
• Native administration weakened and undermined:
• increases market costs as guarantor system is undermined,
• conflict resolution mechanisms weakened (Judiya, rakuba)
• environmental governance weakened leading to environmental degradation.
79
Livelihoods Programming
Current livelihood interventions
Livelihood Positive impact Negative inpact Mitigation
interventions
Veterinary services *** Population and quality of Potential pressure on
herd rangeland
Agricultural inputs * Food security Conflict over land tenure, Assessment of context
potential loss of local including negative
strains, impacts
Food distribution*** Food security, nutrition, dependency Assessment
less conflict
Water supply *** Health, productivity, less Range, forestry depletion, Assessment of negative
conflict conflict over land impacts in project design
– design according to
findings
Range management ## SRM Land tenure, conflict risks Assessment of social
context.
Primary health ** Human assets, less
conflict
Peace building workshops Social assets, Institutions,
### processes, Policy
Health promotion * Water & sanitation related
health benefits
Microfinance / milling * Petty trade, assets,
markets, reduced
dependency
Skills to IDPs *# Human assets –
adaptation, useful post
conflict
NFI * Basic needs, shelter,
trade, less conflict
High level peace talks ### Security, reconciliation
governance
Stars * indicate importance in current context
Hashes # indicate importance for longer term processes
80
• Range management work
3. Ways of working
A. Network for knowledge sharing
B. Improved contextual, livelihood and negative impact assessments integrated into
project design
C. Capacity building for project design
D. To involve universities, cpd, civil soc, working groups, INGOs, UNOCHA, FAO,
UNEP, universities, CBOS civil soc
81
Zalingei corridor Livelihood Group 3: Resident farmers
Processes
Assets / Liabilities Institutions Strategies Goals
Policies
Access
Feedback Loop
82
How conflict has impacted on this group
83
Livelihoods Programming
1. Strategic coordination and collaboration for more integrated, longer term programming
(FAO with FS/L forum members)
A. More focus/dedicated discussion on key livelihood issues and strategic recommendations
and actions
B. Monitoring and coordinating livelihood assessments to gap areas
C. Briefing and orientation of FS/L forum on livelihood workshop outcomes and tools
D. Cross-sectoral integration/coordination through:
i. -internal organization discussions
ii. -discuss at inter-agency coordination meetings (UNCT, IAMG)
iii. -discuss between sectoral coordination forums
84
3. Strategic shift from “provisioning” to more local procurement and production focused on
seeds and tools, market analysis, local market resuscitation, rebuilding economic
relationships (FAO and partners-DRC, JMRDP, Solidarity, Mercycorps)
A. Good market analysis maximizing use of local experts from a livelihoods perspective,
particularly examining the PIPs
B. Using CBOs and farming committees to spread messages, a longer-term vision and
planning, and build their capacities to do so
C. Better “farmer driven” linkages with local university, ARC, JMRDP
D. Pilot above approaches in selected geographic areas based on security into/within an area,
access, existing linkages with the communities, etc
4. Promoting forums for dialoguefor community planning around strategic issues; using
local knowledge and building networks; and rebuilding relationships between groups.
A. Sharing approaches with the humanitarian community on dialogue promotion
forums/mechanisms. These must be participatory, community led forums)
B. Dialogue in forums must inform programming approaches resulting in concrete
responsive activities in order to maintain interest and commitment of the forum m
85
Zalingei corridor Livelihood Group 4: IDPs in large concentrations
around towns
Processes
Assets / Liabilities Institutions Strategies Goals
Policies
Access
Feedback Loop
PIPs:
Processes
• Insecurity and continuing hostilities
• Lost access to original farmland due to land occupation
• Damage to the environment caused by firewood collection.
86
Institutions
• Improved access to basic services
• Opportunities for urban casual labour employment
• Failure of markets; local and national
• Loss of confidence in the AU and Fur Sheikhs refused to allow the AU to accompany women
collecting firewood – no firewood patrols since.
Policies
• Following the Darfur Peace Accord the conflict became increasingly internalised within Darfur,
rather than between national and local interests.
• Government interference in tribal affairs
Livelihoods Programming
87
• Currently fruit producers provide women petty traders with fruit to sell, butthen keep a large share
of the profit. Women therefore need access to capital loans/ credit so that they can purchase the
fruit outright.
88
ANNEX 7 ENVIRONMENT IN DARFUR
The environment in Darfur is undergoing a process of change driven by changes in population, climate
and human activity. These environmental changes have been accelerated over about 40 years, and have
had significant links with changes in livelihoods and conflict. These processes of change are due to
carry on for coming decades so need to inform our livelihood programming. The data here are used in
Tearfund’s report “Darfur: relief in a vulnerable environment” (D:RIVE) and are from the references
given here.
http://www.tearfund.org/webdocs/website/Campaigning/Policy%20and%20research/Relief%20in%20a
%20vulnerable%20envirionment%20final.pdf
1. CONTEXT
Population
Table 1 Population growth in Darfur1
Year Population Density
People per km2
1956 1,080,000 3
1973 1,340,000 4
1983 3,500,000 10
1993 5,600,000 15
2003 6,480,000 18
Population densities are higher in the richer ground – such as wadis. This growth in population has
caused stress on farm and rangeland, so yields have dropped and carrying capacities have reduced. The
woodfuel defecit map on p16 of D:RIVE shows the balance of population demand with one form of
natural resources.
Governance
Traditional environmental management structures have been weakening over decades leading up to the
current conflict. Darfur has suffered from underinvestment in addressing the problems of population
growth and environmental degradation.
Conflict
The conflict has worsened problems of environmental degradation by
• causing concentrations in population and demand
• destruction of environmental assets and resources as a feature of violence
• destroying or at least severely damaging traditional environmental management systems, such
as long distance migration of cattle
• a short term “emergency” perspective on environmental management – the current crisis is
humanitarian but after four years is not rightly described as an emergency - if emergency
implies a lack of time for appropriate detailed analysis in planning our response...
Climate change
Climate change brings lower and more variable rainfall and shorter growing periods. This means an
increase in frequency of droughts and failed harvests.
1
Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Conflict in Darfur (Khartoum, December 2004) p35
www.steinergraphics.com/pdf/darfur_screen.pdf#search=%22environmental%20degradation%20source%20c
onflict%20darfur%22
89
Areas that are susceptible to the impacts of climate change are those that are:
• Marginal environments – such as the Sahel (low-lying floodplains, island states, polar regions
etc)
• Areas dependant on natural resources for livelihoods
• Areas with extensive poverty due to the inability to diversify and adapt
2
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/999/76/
90
natural resources undermines livelihoods for others or yourselves either now or in the future – this
increases poverty and conflict.
On this basis external support is preferable to depletion of the environment. So sustainable resource
management is a priority for programming – paying for tree planting is more useful than purchasing
timber.
Sustainable resource management means:
• Using resources at the same rate (or slower) than they are being replaced.
• Using resources in a manner that doesn’t undermine their future availability.
3
Women’s commission for Refugee women and children: Finding Trees in the desert:
Firewood collection and alternatives in Darfur March 2006
www.womenscommission.org/pdf/df_fuel.pdf p1.
91
Change in length of growing period as a result of climate change4
2000 – 2020 2000 - 2050
4
Thornton PK, Jones PG, Owiyo TM, Kruska RL, Herrero M, Kristjanson P, Notenbaert A, Bekele N and
Omolo A, with contributions from Orindi V, Otiende B, Ochieng A, Bhadwal S, Anantram K, Nair S, Kumar V,
and Kulkar U (2006). Mapping Climate Vulnerability and Poverty in Africa. Report to the Department of
International Development, ILRI, PO Box 30709, Nairobi 00100, Kenya, p51, 48: www.napa-
pana.org/extranapa/UserFiles/File/Mapping_Vuln_Africa.pdf
92
ANNEX 8 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
93
Rahman m
[email protected]
37. Ajaweed Samia Ibrahim Researcher [email protected]
Abdalla
38. UNMIS POC Cate Steains Protection Head [email protected]
39. Planning Dept, Mohammed Zakaria DG of Dept Mohamedharoun12@yah
MoP oo.com
40. Relief Int’l Jamila Karimova Health Coordinator [email protected]
41. AHA Mesfin Zeleke Programme Officer [email protected]
42. AHA Abdulkarim Adam Logistics Officer [email protected]
GENEINA
# Organisation Name Position Contacts
1. World Relief Dr. Mesfin Ops Manager [email protected]
Abebe 0914108913
2. ACTED Benedict Moran Interim Area [email protected]
Coord
3. Islamic Relief Nermin Silajdzic Camp Nermin.Silajdzic@islamic-
Coordinator relief.org.sd
4. CONCERN Brent Potts ACD [email protected]
Programme
5. CONCERN Abdullah Area [email protected]
Ahmed Coordinator
6. WFP Mariko IM Coordinator [email protected]
Kawabata
7. WFP Ayii Akol Prog.Officer [email protected]
8. CRS Bill Schmitt Area Coord [email protected]
9. CRS Giballa Ahmed Ag Recovery [email protected]
TLeader
10 FAO Mtendere Area Coord [email protected]
Mphatso
11 FAO Abdulrahamn M Livestock [email protected]
Nour Officer
12 CDA Taj Banan Coordinator [email protected]
13 OCHA Mohamed Field [email protected]
Gimish Coordinator
14 Medair Rebekka Projects [email protected]
Meisner Coordinator
15 Medair Ivor Morgan Country [email protected]
94
Director
16 Medair Judith Public Health [email protected]
Buitennuis
17 FAR Jackson Michael Acting Prog. [email protected]
Coord.
18 UNDP Betsy Lippman Livelihoods [email protected]
Consultant
19 UNHCR Jorunn Field Officer [email protected]
Brandvoll Protection
20 UNHCR Yahaya Adam Field Asst [email protected]
Protection
21 UNHCR Joyce Nduru Community [email protected]
Services Asst
22 UNHCR Mandy Owusu Prog. Officer [email protected]
23 Intersos Cesare Furmi Coordinator [email protected]
24 Save the Jackline Kaku Community [email protected]
Children Dev.Coord
25 Save the Rihab Ismail Coord. Dev. [email protected]
Children Officer
26 SRC Osman Ahmed Food Security [email protected]
Hussein Officer
27 MOA Khatir Ismael MoA Advisor
NYALA
# Organisation Name Position Contacts
1. ACF Hanibal Abiy FS Coordinator [email protected]
sions-acf.org
2. ACF Loreto Palmaera FS Officer S.D. [email protected]
ons-acf.org
3. ACF Jeff Berthier FS Officer N.D [email protected]
sions-acf.org
4. GFO Mohm El Tahir Prog Director Greatfamily_organisation
Asil @yahoo.com
5. OTI Jeanne Briggs Darfur Regional Head [email protected]
6. DFID Sam Grout-Smith Hum Prog Mgr S-Grout-
[email protected]
7. DFID Arvind Mungur [email protected]
8. OCHA Omer Sa’ad Field Officer [email protected]
0915074292
9. Rehiad El Ibrahim Abdalla Director 0912437333/ 0918093137
Hursan Ibrahim
10. IIRO Ibrahim Abdel [email protected]
Ghadir 0122471600
11. IOM Mohammed Elnour VMU Assistant [email protected]
0915524151
95
12. ZOA Okumu Nakitari Depty Prog Manager [email protected]
m
96
44. OCHA Idriss Yousif Field Officer [email protected]
45. UNDP Hussein Bagadi ROL Officer [email protected]
g
0912846121
ZALINGEI
# Organisation Name Position Contacts
1. OCHA Abdallah Eltelaib National Field Officer, [email protected]
Zalingei 0122587286
2. DRC Awatif Babaker Mapping/livelihoods
3. DRC Abubaker Galli Food Sec/livelihoods 0911249070
4. DRC Kartine Siig Mapping/social [email protected]
programs
5. Mercy Corps Essayas Tatek Livelihoods etatek@mercycorpsfiel
Coordinator d.org
6. Mercy Corps Mohammed Musa Program Coordinator 0915057749
7. FAO Abdalla Adam Ismail Head of Office [email protected]
om
0912396253
8. FAO Eisa Elnour Hassab [email protected]
o.uk
0912396711
9. UNIDO Maaike Cotterink Energy and mmcotterink@hotmail.
environment program com
0918714094
10. ECHO Mohammed Bakheit Program Coordinator Mohammed.bakheit@e
chosudan-nyala.org
11. JMRDP Mohamed Ahmed Research manager 0914512803
Ahmed Ibrahim
12. UNDP(RCO) Olivier Mukarji Olivier.mukarji@undp.
org
13. Agricultural Elhadi Abdel Coordinator
services Rahman
14. SUDO Zaynelabedeen Adam Ag Officer
15. Zalingei locality Suliman Ali Ahmed Acting commissioner
16. Min of Ag Elhadi Al Eldain West Darfur 0121037616
17. Forestry Unit Moatasim Forest Officer 0121447569
Mohammed Ali
Hamed
18. DAI Umelhassan Yousef Umelhasssan_yousef@
dai.com
0911135176
19. Peace Centre Abdelsalam Gumaa Acting Director Gumacentrepeace22@y
ahoo.com
0915153401
20. UNIFEM Mary Okumu [email protected]
m
21. NCA David Boyes Assistant Head of davidboyes@ncasudan.
Programmes org
97
26. IRC Abdallah Adam 0911375424
Mohammed
27. IRC Mobark Omar [email protected]
Eldekhiry 0912881375
28. IRC Bashir Mohammed Bashirbrham12@yahoo
Ibrahim .com
29. PDNO Ali Ebrahim Abdalla 0911390956
30. UNMIS Saeed Hussein RRR Officer [email protected]
31. SSO Nyala Elfadel Mukhtar SSO Director [email protected]
0912165380
32. SSO El Fasher Jamal Ahmed SSO [email protected]
Khameis 0912165380
33. Ayya Fayez Hamid Coordinator 0122345308
34. NOCD Nyala A. Alsulig [email protected]
0120906545
35. Aid Hand Sala Aldeen Hassa [email protected]
m
36. Univ of Zal Dr. Yousif Ahmed 0121593214
Shrafeldin
37. Univ of Zal Elameen Elzenbeir Ag Engineer [email protected].
Jobartallah uk
0121308912
38. Univ of Zal Abuelgasim Abdalla Dean of Faculty of [email protected]
Adam Forestry m
39. Univ of Zal Heytham Elhag Ag Extension Unit Heitham18268847@ya
Mohammed Musa hoo.com
0122745368
40. Univ of Zal Izeldin Adam Izeldinbabiker959@yah
Babiker oo.com
0912917974
98