United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

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760 F.

2d 114

Douglas CURTIS and Deborah Curtis, Denise Curtis, by and


through her next friend, Douglas Curtis, and
Fadhil H. Al Saadi, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Third
Party Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHARLES L. PLATTS, INC., Third Party Defendant.
No. 84-1019.

United States Court of Appeals,


Sixth Circuit.
Argued March 6, 1985.
Decided April 26, 1985.

William A. Roy (argued), Roy, Shecter and Vocht, Birmingham, Mich.,


Gerald R. Goulet, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Stanley Prokop, Christine D. Oldani (argued), Detroit, Mich., for
defendant and third party plaintiff-appellee.
Before CONTIE, Circuit Judge, and PHILLIPS and CELEBREZZE,
Senior Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants, Douglas Curtis, Deborah Curtis, Denise Curtis, and Fadhil


H. Al Saadi, appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment
to defendant-appellee Progressive Casualty Insurance Company. Plaintiffs
sought recovery from Progressive on a liquor liability insurance contract issued
to Mr. Al Saadi.

* The Curtises successfully sued Mr. Al Saadi after they were injured by an

intoxicated driver who had been drinking at an establishment owned by Mr. Al


Saadi. The accident took place on July 10, 1976. In the action under the
Michigan Dram Shop Statute for sale of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person,
Progressive refused to defend the action on behalf of Mr. Al Saadi. Although
Progressive had issued a liquor liability policy to indemnify Mr. Saadi for
liability arising out of operations of his Playmate Lounge on December 22,
1975, Progressive refused to defend the action on the ground that the policy
had been cancelled on June 26, 1976.
3

After a bench trial in Wayne County Circuit Court, the court found against Mr.
Al Saadi and assessed damages of $251,792. Mr. Al Saadi filed for bankruptcy
and assigned his rights under the insurance policy to the Curtises. The Curtises
filed a complaint on August 17, 1982 in State court alleging that Progressive
wrongfully refused to defend the action in derogation of the insurance policy.
Mr. Al Saadi also has sued, seeking damages for an alleged breach of
Progressive's obligation to defend him in the prior litigation. Progressive, an
Ohio corporation, petitioned for removal and the case was removed to the
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

II
4

Mr. Al Saadi obtained his insurance policy with Progressive by means of a


premium financing agreement with Detroit Bank & Trust. He obtained the
policy through his agent Charles Platts, Inc. and a sub-agent, Helen Caldwell.
Platts Company sent the application to Marketfinders, Inc., an insurance agency
that dealt in the market of liquor liability policies. Marketfinders obtained a
source of insurance, billed Platts, and sent it the policy, which was to cover the
period from December 22, 1975 to December 22, 1976. The bank advanced the
premium money to Platts, permitting Mr. Al Saadi to make payments on a
seven month basis. Platts retained a portion to serve as a commission and
forwarded the rest to Marketfinders. The funds were disbursed to Platts on
April 28, 1976.

According to Progressive, the loan agreement between the bank and Mr. Al
Saadi contained a power of attorney authorizing the bank to cancel the policy
on behalf of Mr. Al Saadi if he did not make his loan payments to the bank.
After discovery, no signed agreement to this effect could be located. Instead,
Progressive produced a blank form of a premium finance agreement as a
facsimile purporting to be of the kind used by the bank in insurance premium
financing agreements at the time the loan agreement was executed. Although
Mr. Al Saadi admits signing a premium financing agreement, he denied signing
one like the facsimile with the power of attorney provision.

The district court accepted the blank form as adequate proof of the contents of
the contract. The facsimile used during the court's consideration of
Progressive's motion for summary judgment authorized the bank to cancel the
policy and demand repayment of the unearned portion of the premium if Mr. Al
Saadi failed to make payments within ten days after the due date. The bank was
given power of attorney to cancel and surrender the policy and collect the
unearned portion of the premium.

Progressive contends that Mr. Al Saadi failed to make payments and the bank
exercised its rights as attorney in fact to demand cancellation of the policy at
some time prior to July 10, 1976, the date of the accident. The bank records
show no payments received on the loan other than the original downpayments.
Mr. Al Saadi indicated he made payments to Helen Caldwell, the sub-agent for
Platts. The bank instructed Platts to cancel the policy for nonpayment of
premiums. Progressive presented testimony that Platts sent a notice of
cancellation to Marketfinders and Mr. Al Saadi on June 16, 1976, effective
June 16, 1976. Mr. Al Saadi denies receipt of the notice. Progressive produced
a "cancellation ticket" from Marketfinders, effective June 26, 1976, specifying
nonpayment of premiums as the reason for cancellation. It was dated July 7,
1976 but was stamped received by Progressive on July 19, 1976. Platts repaid
the bank for the unpaid balance of the loan and subsequently received a refund
from Progressive through Marketfinders.

Jurisdiction in this case is based on diversity of citizenship. Michigan Law


controls. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed.
1188 (1938). The proceedings in the district court centered around the
notification requirements under Michigan law for cancellation of an insurance
policy. Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 500.1511, Mich.Stat.Ann. Sec. 24.11511
provides that a premium finance company may not cancel an insurance contract
it finances unless it provides the insured not less than ten days' written notice
before requesting cancellation by the insurer. This ten day period affords the
insured the opportunity to cure the default. Similarly, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann.
Sec. 500.3020, Mich.Stat.Ann. Sec. 24.13020 provides that the insured may
cancel a policy at any time. Where the insurer cancels the policy, however, ten
days written notice is required.

Appellants moved for summary judgment asserting that there had been no
effective cancellation because the required notices had not been sent.
Progressive moved for summary judgment as well, arguing the policy was
effectively cancelled because Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 500.1501(b),
Mich.Stat.Ann. Sec. 24.11501(b) exempted banks acting as premium finance
companies from the notice requirements. Alternatively, it argued that the policy

was cancelled at the request of Mr. Al Saadi or his agent pursuant to


Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 500.3020, Mich.Stat.Ann. Sec. 24.13020 and
therefore that notice requirements were irrelevant.
10

The district court conducted hearings on the motions. It found that the bank had
never received payments from Mr. Al Saadi other than the original down
payments. The court, accepting the facsimile as adequate proof of the contents
of the contract signed, held the bank had properly exercised the power of
attorney to cancel the policy. It held that cancellation was effective upon
issuance of the cancellation ticket by Marketfinders on July 7, 1976. It held that
Mr. Al Saadi cancelled the policy by not making the required payments.
Therefore it held the cancellation was effective upon notice to Marketfinders,
the authorized agent of Progressive. The court held further that notification of
cancellation by the bank was not required because banks are exempt from the
notice requirements of Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 500.1511, Mich.Stat.Ann.
Sec. 24.11511. The court also held that the insurance company was not
required to send notice of cancellation to Mr. Al Saadi because "an insurer need
not provide an insured with notice when the cancellation is effectuated by the
insured or his attorney-in-fact."

III
11

Appellants contend that the issues raised in this case were not appropriate for
summary judgment disposition. They stress that although they moved for
summary judgment in the district court, their motion concerned only the
adequacy of the notices actually given. The disposition of other issues
addressed in the district court below, they maintain, was achieved only by
making findings of fact where material facts were controverted.

12

In order to prevail, Progressive had to show that there was a premium finance
agreement that contained the provision granting power of attorney to the bank.
Exemption from the notification provisions of Michigan law depended on the
bank's execution of the power of attorney. A signed copy of the agreement was
not available, however, and the court relied on a facsimile produced by the
bank. Mr. Al Saadi denied executing the document produced. This created a
genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment under Rule 56(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

13

Progressive emphasizes that Mr. Al Saadi admitted signing a premium


financing agreement with the bank. He expressly denied signing one containing
the power of attorney provision exemplified by the blank form offered by
Progressive. Moreover, appellants note that a witness, Raymond Johnson,

testified to terms in the original agreement requiring Platts to reimburse the


bank for unpaid premiums. These terms were not present in the facsimile
agreement. There is an issue of material fact regarding whether the bank had
power of attorney.
14

Without the express provision according power of attorney to the bank, Mr. Al
Saadi cannot be deemed implicitly to have authorized cancellation of the policy
by nonpayment of installments. Where an insurance company cancels a policy
without the request of the insured, it is subject to the notification requirements
of Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 500.3020, Mich.Stat.Ann. Sec. 24.13020.
Because Mr. Al Saadi denied ever receiving notification of cancellation, the
policy may not have been cancelled properly under Michigan law. Summary
judgment therefore was inappropriate.

15

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. No costs are taxed.


The parties will bear their own costs on this appeal.

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