The Real Truth About Abortion v. Federal Election Commission, 4th Cir. (2012)
The Real Truth About Abortion v. Federal Election Commission, 4th Cir. (2012)
The Real Truth About Abortion v. Federal Election Commission, 4th Cir. (2012)
No. 11-1760
COUNSEL
ARGUED: James Bopp, Jr., THE BOPP LAW FIRM, Terre
Haute, Indiana, for Appellant. Adav Noti, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: Michael Boos, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL
BOOS, Fairfax, Virginia; Richard E. Coleson, Kaylan L. Phillips, BOPP, COLESON & BOSTROM, Terre Haute, Indiana,
for Appellant. Anthony Herman, General Counsel, David
Kolker, Associate General Counsel, Harry J. Summers, Assistant General Counsel, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Washington, D.C.; Neil H. MacBride, United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia; Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Michael S. Raab, Daniel Tenny, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellees. Fred Wertheimer, DEMOCRACY 21, Washington, D.C.; Donald J. Simon, SONOSKY, CHAMBERS,
SACHSE, ENDRESON & PERRY, LLP, Washington, D.C.;
J. Gerald Hebert, Tara Malloy, Paul S. Ryan, THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Amici Supporting Appellees.
OPINION
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. (formerly known as
The Real Truth About Obama, Inc.), a Virginia non-profit
corporation organized under 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code to provide "accurate and truthful information about the
public policy positions of Senator Barack Obama," commenced this action against the Federal Election Commission
10
11
and more vague than the restrictions imposed on the definition of "expressly advocating" by Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 &
n.52, which are codified in subsection (a).
Regulation 100.22 defines "expressly advocating" as the
term is used in 2 U.S.C. 431(17), which in turn defines "independent expenditure" as an expenditure by a person "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate" and not made by or in coordination with
a candidate or political party. (Emphasis added). Subsection
(a) defines "expressly advocating" in the manner stated by the
Supreme Court in Buckley and thus includes communications
that use phrases "which in context can have no other reasonable meaning than to urge the election or defeat" of a candidate," 11 C.F.R. 100.22(a)words such as "vote for,"
"elect," "defeat," or "reject," which are often referred to as the
express advocacy "magic words." See McConnell v. Fed.
Election Commn, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003) (citing Buckley,
424 U.S. at 44 & n.52). Subsection (b), on the other hand,
defines "expressly advocating" more contextually, without
using the "magic words." This subsection, which is the subject of Real Truths challenge, provides in relevant part:
Expressly advocating means any communication that
***
(b) When taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events, such as the proximity to the
election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable
person as containing advocacy of the election or
defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s)
because
(1) The electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and
suggestive of only one meaning; and
12
13
ling opinion further elaborated on the meaning of McConnells "functional equivalent" test. The Chief Justice held that
where an "ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate," it could be regulated in the same manner as express
advocacy. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 470. The Chief
Justice explicitly rejected the argument, raised by Justice
Scalias concurring opinion, that the only permissible test for
express advocacy is a magic words test:
Justice Scalia concludes that "[i]f a permissible test
short of the magic-words test existed, Buckley would
surely have adopted it." We are not so sure. The
question in Buckley was how a particular statutory
provision could be construed to avoid vagueness
concerns, not what the constitutional standard for
clarity was in the abstract, divorced from specific
statutory language. Buckleys intermediate step of
statutory construction on the way to its constitutional
holding does not dictate a constitutional test. The
Buckley Courts "express advocacy restriction was
an endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a first
principle of constitutional law.
Id. at 474 n.7 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Contrary to Real Truths assertions, Citizens United also
supports the Commissions use of a functional equivalent test
in defining "express advocacy." In the course of striking down
FECAs spending prohibitions on certain corporate election
expenditures, the Citizens United majority first considered
whether those regulations applied to the communications at
issue in the case. 130 S. Ct. at 888-96. Using Wisconsin Right
to Lifes "functional equivalent" test, the Court concluded that
one advertisementHillary: The Moviequalified as the
functional equivalent of express advocacy because it was "in
essence . . . a feature-length negative advertisement that urges
viewers to vote against Senator [Hillary] Clinton for Presi-
14
dent." Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 890. But more importantly for our decision, the Court also upheld BCRAs
disclosure requirements for all electioneering communications
including those that are not the functional equivalent of
express advocacy. Id. at 914-16 ("We reject Citizens Uniteds
contention that the disclosure requirements must be limited to
speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy").3
In this portion of the opinion, joined by eight Justices, the
Court explained that because disclosure "is a less restrictive
alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech,"
mandatory disclosure requirements are constitutionally permissible even if ads contain no direct candidate advocacy and
"only pertain to a commercial transaction." Id. at 915. If mandatory disclosure requirements are permissible when applied
to ads that merely mention a federal candidate, then applying
the same burden to ads that go further and are the functional
equivalent of express advocacy cannot automatically be
impermissible.
B
In addition to its overbreadth argument, Real Truth argues
that even if express advocacy is not limited to communications using Buckleys magic words, 100.22(b) is nonetheless
unconstitutionally vague. Here again, however, Real Truths
arguments run counter to an established Supreme Court prece3
15
16
17
18
19
Regardless, however, of whether words might be insufficiently clear when standing alone, we cannot conclude that
they render the statute vague when considered in their context. The complete phrase in which these words appear
"[t]he electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable,
unambiguous, and suggestive of only one meaning"is
essentially a more stringent version of the relevant language
from Wisconsin Right to Lifes "functional equivalent" test,
which requires that a communication be "susceptible of no
[other] reasonable interpretation." If, as the Supreme Court
has held, the test in Wisconsin Right to Life is not vague, then
neither is 100.22(b).
Fourth and finally, Real Truth argues that 100.22(b) is
vague because the district court and the Commission disagreed as to whether Real Truths "Change" ad was the functional equivalent of express advocacy. But this fact proves
little because cases that fall close to the line will inevitably
arise when applying 100.22(b). This kind of difficulty is
simply inherent in any kind of standards-based test. Cf.
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) ("Close
cases can be imagined under virtually any statute. The problem that poses is [not] addressed . . . by the doctrine of vagueness"); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930)
(holding that the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was not
facially vague because "[w]herever the law draws a line there
will be cases very near each other on opposite sides"). If anything, the disagreement to which Real Truth alludes confirms
the Commissions judgment that "Change" does not meet the
requirements of 100.22(b), since both the Commission and
the district court are rational minds and 100.22 applies only
when reasonable people could not disagree about a communications status.
At bottom, we conclude that 100.22(b) is constitutional,
facially and as applied to Real Truths intended advertisements. The regulation is consistent with the test developed in
Wisconsin Right to Life and is not unduly vague.
20
IV
Finally, Real Truth contends that the Commissions policy
for applying the "major purpose" test in determining whether
an organization is a PAC is unconstitutional because it
"weigh[s] various vague and overbroad factors with undisclosed weight." It maintains that the only permissible methods
of analyzing PAC status are (1) examining an organizations
expenditures to see if campaign-related speech amounts to
50% of all expenditures; or (2) reviewing "the organizations
central purpose revealed by its organic documents."4
The FECA defines a "political committee" or PAC, as we
have called it, as any "committee, club, association, or other
group of persons" that makes more than $1,000 in political
expenditures or receives more than $1,000 in contributions
during a calendar year. 2 U.S.C. 431(4)(a). The terms "expenditures" and "contributions" are in turn defined to encompass any spending or fundraising "for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office." Id.
431(8)(A)(i), 431(9)(A)(i).
In Buckley, the Supreme Court concluded that defining
PACs "only in terms of amounts of annual contributions and
expenditures" might produce vagueness issues. Accordingly,
4
The Commission challenges our right to review this issue, arguing that
the 2007 Federal Register Notice announcing its decision not to adopt a
regulatory definition of "political committee" is not a "final agency action"
under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore not subject to judicial review. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). But we do not take
Real Truths challenge as one limited to the 2007 Notice itself. Rather,
Real Truth cites the 2007 Notice and the 2004 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking because those documents explain the Commissions PAC-status
enforcement policy. What Real Truth objects to is the Commissions decision to adopt a multi-factored standard for determining when an organization qualifies for PAC status. That choice is undoubtedly a "consummation
of the agencys decisionmaking process" that can determine a partys
rights and obligations, namely, the obligations of PAC status. Id. at 17778 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21
the Court limited the applicability of FECAs PAC requirements to organizations controlled by a candidate or whose
"major purpose" is the nomination or election of candidates.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79. An organization that is not controlled
by a candidate must therefore register as a PAC if its contributions or expenditures exceed $1,000 and its "major purpose" is the nomination or election of a federal candidate.
Following Buckley, the Commission adopted a policy of
determining PAC status on a case-by-case basis. See Political
Committee Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595, 559697 (Feb. 7, 2007)
(the "2007 Notice"). Under this approach, the Commission
first considers a groups political activities, such as spending
on a particular electoral or issue-advocacy campaign, see id.
at 5601, and then it evaluates an organizations "major
purpose," as revealed by that groups public statements, fundraising appeals, government filings, and organizational documents, see id.
In March 2004, the Commission published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, among other things, requested comments on whether the Commission should adopt a regulatory
definition of "political committee" or PAC. See Political
Committee Status, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,736, 11,74349 (Mar. 11,
2004). After receiving public comments and holding several
hearings, the Commission issued a Final Rule stating that it
would not alter its existing method of determining PAC status. See Political Committee Status, Definition of Contribution, and Allocation for Separate Segregated Funds and
Nonconnected Committees, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,056, 68,056-63
(Nov. 23, 2004).
When the Commissions decision not to adopt a statutory
definition of a PAC was challenged in court, the court
rejected the plaintiffs request to require the Commission to
commence a new rulemaking. It found, however, that the
Commission had "failed to present a reasoned explanation for
its decision" to regulate 527 organizations through case-by-
22
23
24
indicates that the amount of independent spending is a relevant factor in determining PAC status, but it does not imply
that the Commission may only consider spending. Indeed, the
Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life implicitly endorsed
the Commissions approach when it examined the entire
record to conclude that the plaintiff did not satisfy the "major
purpose" test.
And Real Truths reliance on Leake is similarly misplaced.
In Leake, we described the major purpose test as follows:
Basically, if an organization explicitly states, in its
bylaws or elsewhere, that influencing elections is its
primary objective, or if the organization spends the
majority of its money on supporting or opposing
candidates, that organization is under "fair warning"
that it may fall within the ambit of Buckleys test.
525 F.3d at 289. Like the dicta in Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, this statement suggests that expenditure ratios and organizational documents are important considerations when
determining whether an organization qualifies as a PAC. The
case does not, however, make consideration of any other factors improper. In fact, we specifically declined to determine
whether the very same bright-line, two-factor test urged by
Real Truth was the only permissible manner in which to apply
Buckleys major purpose requirement. Id. at 289 n.6.
Thus, although cases since Buckley have indicated that certain facts may be particularly relevant when assessing an
organizations major purpose, those decisions do not foreclose
the Commission from using a more comprehensive methodology.
Despite Real Truths protestations, we see little risk that the
Commissions existing major purpose test will chill political
expression.5 In the First Amendment context, a statute may be
5
Real Truth does not assert that the major purpose test is unconstitutional as applied to it. Nor could it, since the Commission has never
25
26