745 F.

2d 856

In re G.L.S., Petitioner.
In the Matter of G.L.S., Appellant.
Nos. 84-1556, 84-1744.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fourth Circuit.
Argued Aug. 7, 1984.
Decided Oct. 3, 1984.

Edward Smith, Jr., Baltimore, Md., for petitioner.

Wilbur D. Preston, Jr., Baltimore, Md., for respondent.
Before RUSSELL, HALL and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges.
CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge:

G.L.S. is a convicted felon, having pled guilty to bank robbery at age nineteen.
After completing his prison sentence and probationary period, he attended and
graduated from college and law school. He was admitted to the Maryland Bar
in 1983 and then applied for admission to practice before the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland. A three-judge panel of that court
held hearings on the application and thereafter recommended to the full court
that the application for admission to the Bar of the district court be denied
without prejudice. The panel ruled that appellant could reapply for admission
after he applied for and exhausted the pardon provisions contained at 28 C.F.R.
1.1, et seq. The full court, with one dissent, approved the recommendation and
denied admission. 586 F.Supp. 375. Appellant has applied for a writ of
mandamus or in the alternative requested a writ of prohibition to the judges of
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland to require them to
admit him to practice. We deny the requested relief.

* On October 9, 1967 G.L.S. and two accomplices robbed the Lovettsville

Branch of Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Hamilton in Lovettsville,
Virginia of $7,000. In January 1968 G.L.S. pled guilty to a charge of armed
bank robbery and was sentenced to ten years. Under the conditions of the

sentence, he could have been released from prison for good behavior at any
time. However, while incarcerated he was a problem and his conduct resulted
in a period of solitary confinement and eventually a transfer to the Atlanta
Federal Penitentiary for security reasons. He was denied parole on a number of
occasions and was released after six and a half years of commitment and placed
on parole. While on parole he attended Morgan State College, married and
received a degree in political science. His parole was terminated thirteen
months prior to the expiration of the ten year sentence. In 1977 he was admitted
to the University of Maryland Law School, having advised the school of his
conviction. On graduation he applied for admission to the Bar of Maryland.
Question 5 on the application stated: "The following constitutes every
residence, address and place (with zip code) where I have lived within the past
ten years." Although incarcerated for four of the last ten years, G.L.S. did not
list any address, residence and place during the four years of his confinement.
3

Question 11 on the character questionnaire stated: "The following is a complete

record of all criminal proceedings (including traffic violations other than an
occasional parking violation) to which I am or ever have been a party." This
question also asked for the date, the court, the nature of the proceedings and the
disposition of any criminal proceeding. In answer to this question the appellant
listed the date as November 1967, the court as "U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland," but listed nothing under the headings of "nature of
proceedings" and "disposition." The application for admission to the Bar of
Maryland was signed by G.L.S. under the following statement: "I do solemnly
declare and affirm under the penalties of perjury that the matters and facts set
forth in the foregoing application are true and correct."

Hearings were held on the application and appellant was eventually admitted to
practice by a four-three vote of the Court of Appeals in Maryland. Having been
admitted to the highest court of his state, he then applied for admission to the
Bar of the United States District Court. Local Rule 2 of this court reads in
pertinent part:

5 shall be requisite for the admission of any person to practice in this court that such
It
person shall make written application and be sponsored by a member of the Bar of
this court and shall satisfy the court that he or she is a member in good standing of
the Bar of any court of the United States, or the highest court of any state, and that
his or her private and professional character is good.
6

After a hearing before a three-judge panel of the district court the panel found:

7... [T]here is at least a rebuttable presumption that an applicant to this bar, who is an

unpardoned convicted felon, is not of good character. Therefore, because we have

doubts concerning this applicant's good character, doubts which we believe must be
resolved in favor of the public, we cannot admit the applicant automatically to
practice before this Court despite the fact that a bare majority of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland found him morally fit to practice law in the state.
8

The court found that it did not have the investigative mechanism necessary to
make a full investigation of the private and professional character of convicted
federal felons and that such a mechanism was available under a pardon petition,
because the Attorney General of the United States must investigate the matter
"as he may deem necessary and appropriate, using the services of, or obtaining
reports from, appropriate officials and agencies of the Government...." 28
C.F.R. Sec. 1.6 (1983). The Attorney General is required to make a
recommendation to the president on the pardon petition and furthermore, files
prepared in connection with such investigation although confidential, may be
made available for inspection "when in the judgment of the Attorney General
their disclosure is required by law or the ends of justice." 28 C.F.R. Sec. 1.5.
The district court found that "[s]uch disclosure likely would be warranted in
cases like the one before this court."There is no question that appellant was
sponsored by a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland and that he was a member in good standing of the Bar of
the highest court of the State of Maryland. The question is whether his private
and professional character is good. All but one of the district judges found there
to be a serious question as to good moral character and their remedy (denying
the application for admission without prejudice) was made in an effort to obtain
additional information through further investigation into the character of G.L.S.
Of the seven judges of the Maryland Court of Appeals, three found appellant
did not possess the good character required for admission to its Bar.

A review of the record discloses an ample evidentiary basis to support the

decision of the district court.

10

G.L.S. was convicted of armed bank robbery--a very serious federal crime. He
was not a model prisoner, but a problem prisoner. He did not fully answer the
questions as to his address for the past ten years or his criminal record. He
attempted to justify his failure to answer by contending that he did not consider
a federal penitentiary as a residence. The word "place" is also used in the
question and "place" does not require clarification or a legal argument as to the
meaning of "residence".

11

Although G.L.S. has done a commendable job in rehabilitating himself, this

alone does not qualify him as having good private and professional character.

We are mindful that "[t]he practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of right
for one who is qualified by his learning and his moral character," Baird v. State
Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 8, 91 S.Ct. 702, 707, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1971)
(emphasis added). The United States District Court denied admittance at this
time in order that it may receive additional information on the issue of good
character.
12

The United States District Court has the authority to deny an attorney's
application for admission to its bar when it is not satisfied that he possesses
good private and professional character. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1654,1 28 U.S.C. 20712
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 833 authorize the adoption of rules for
conducting court business and this includes reasonable standards for admission
to practice for the court. Local Rule 2 of the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland is in keeping with such authority.

13

The action of the Maryland Court of Appeals in admitting G.L.S. to practice is

entitled to respect in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland but it does not obligate that court to reach the same conclusion.
"Though admission to practice before a federal court is derivative from
membership in a state bar, disbarment by the State does not result in automatic
disbarment by the federal court. Though that state action is entitled to respect, it
is not conclusively binding on the federal courts." In Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,
547, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1224, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968). Ruffalo dealt with the power
of a federal court to impose a different sanction from a state court, but it follows
that a federal court has the authority to impose a greater sanction.

14

If the federal district courts are to have rules regarding the admission to
practice, they have the authority to decide, within the bounds of due process,
who will be admitted to practice. Decisions of state courts are entitled to
deference but are not conclusive. The two judicial systems are autonomous. See
Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281, 77 S.Ct. 1274, 1276, 1 L.Ed.2d
1342 (1957). "The two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the
federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers,
among whom, in the present context, lawyers are included."

15

We do not find Matter of Braverman, 549 F.2d 913 (4th Cir.1976) controlling.
In that case we held that the decision of the United States District Court was
without evidentiary support. In Braverman the offense of the applicant did not
involve moral turpitude or the use of a deadly weapon, and in Braverman the
court did not allow the applicant to pursue a petition for pardon and then
reapply for admission, as has been done in the present case.

16

There is evidence to support the district court's finding that the severity of the
crime, the evidence of prison disciplinary problems and the lack of candor on
the bar application form did not support a finding of good private and
professional character at this time.

II
17

G.L.S. was afforded constitutional due process in the consideration of his

application for admission to practice before the United States District Court.
The record discloses that the judges reviewed the full record of the proceedings
before the Character Committee of the State Bar, the Board of Bar Examiners
and the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The district court conducted its own
hearing and the applicant and his attorney were afforded a full opportunity to
appear and be heard although they were not allowed to call additional witnesses
before the district court panel. The proceeding before the district court did not
require a full blown trial. See Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F.Supp. 182, 195
(E.D.N.Y.1975), aff'd Levin v. Gulotta, 425 U.S. 901, 96 S.Ct. 1489, 47
L.Ed.2d 751 (1976) which states:

18 while we agree that the opportunity to hear and to observe the demeanor of
First,
witnesses is an essential element in the weighing and appraising of testimony, see
Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 94 S.Ct. 2842, 2850, 41 L.Ed.2d 879 (1974), its
importance diminishes when the facts are developed and inferences may be drawn
without reference to credibility. As already pointed out, a disciplinary proceeding is
not a full-blown trial but an inquest--a gathering of facts concerning the conduct of
an attorney, a subject more likely to be illuminated by the evidence of the attorney's
own acts than by what is said or not said by someone else.
19

The order of the district court gives G.L.S. an opportunity to reapply after he
has sought an executive pardon. The pardon petition will serve a dual purpose.
It may result in G.L.S. being granted a pardon, and it will result in an additional
investigation which will be of assistance to the district court if there is a
subsequent application for admission. Because the findings of the district court
are supported by the record and because its denial of admission at this time,
without prejudice to a later application, is not an abuse of discretion, we

20

AFFIRM.

28 U.S.C. 1654:
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own

cases personally or by counsel as, by rules of such courts, respectively, are

permitted to manage and conduct causes therein. (emphasis added.)
2

28 U.S.C. 2071:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from
time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be
consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure as
prescribed by the Supreme Court. (emphasis added)

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 83:

Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time
to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these
rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall upon
their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United States. In
all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice
in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.