United States v. Frederick Springer, 4th Cir. (2013)
United States v. Frederick Springer, 4th Cir. (2013)
United States v. Frederick Springer, 4th Cir. (2013)
No. 12-7687
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Keenan concurred. Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissenting opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Benjamin M. Shultz, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Eric Joseph Brignac, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUB-
OPINION
WYNN, Circuit Judge:
This case involves the governments efforts to civilly commit Frederick Springer under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (the
"Walsh Act"). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of North Carolina found Springer ineligible for civil commitment because the government failed to prove that Springer
suffered from a serious mental illness under the Walsh Act
and, even assuming Springer suffered from a qualifying mental illness, that Springer would have the requisite serious difficulty refraining from sexual misconduct. Because the district
court did not clearly err in concluding that Springer did not
have a serious mental illness, we affirm.
We further note that because we hold that the district court
did not clearly err in concluding that Springer did not have a
serious mental illness, we need not, and thus do not, address
the district courts findings with regard to whether Springer
lacks volitional control, which our good colleague in dissent
relies upon to address policy implications that do not arise
from our holding today. See United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d
456, 463 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that if the government fails
to meet its burden to demonstrate any of three statutory
criteria for sexual dangerousness, an individual may not be
committed under the Walsh Act).
On September 10, 2012, the district court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. United States v.
Springer, No. 5:12-HC-2009-BO, 2012 WL 3957857 (E.D.
N.C. Sept. 10, 2012). The court, finding Dr. Plauds testimony
more persuasive, determined that the government failed to
meet its burden on both the serious mental illness and volitional control prongs. Id. at *2-6. The government appealed.
Springer was released from prison in October 2012 after this
Court denied the governments request to stay his release
pending its appeal.
II.
Before addressing the merits of the governments appeal, it
is first necessary to determine whether certain developments
that occurred after the district court issued its decision preclude us from deciding this matter at the present time. On
December 12, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York found that Springer violated the conditions of his supervised release on the Registration Act conviction by failing to spend at least five evenings at his group
residence, despite being instructed to do so by his probation
officer, and engaging in a consensual intimate relationship
with another adult, who also is a convicted sex offender.
Based on these violations, the district court revoked Springers supervised release and sentenced him to thirteen months
imprisonment. On February 22, 2013, the Bureau of Prisons
again certified Springer as meeting the criteria for civil commitment under the Walsh Act.
As a result of these recent developments, we first consider
whether the present case is moot because, regardless of our
disposition of the case, Springer will remain in the custody of
the Bureau of Prisons until a district court rules on the governments second civil commitment attempt. Additionally, we
address the governments alternative contention that we
should remand the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of the new evidence regarding Springers super-
of Prisons second certification of Springer as sexually dangerous during the pendency of this appeal.
Despite Springers reincarceration for violating the terms of
his supervised release, both parties retained a "concrete interest" in the outcome of the proceedings after Springer was
reincarcerated. Had we affirmed the district courts decision
prior to the governments second certification, Springer would
have been released at the conclusion of his thirteen-month
sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. By
contrast, had we reversed, Springer would have been subject
to indefinite civil commitment at the conclusion of his current
prison term. Thus, Springers reincarceration did not preclude
us from providing "effectual relief" in the present proceedings.
The more difficult question is whether the governments
second certification of Springer mooted the present proceedings. At the outset, we note that we are entering somewhat
uncharted territory: The Walsh Act neither explicitly permits
nor precludes the government from seeking to civilly commit
an individual as sexually dangerous after the government
unsuccessfully attempted to do so previously. And federal
courts have not had occasion to consider a renewed certification of a sex offender under the Walsh Act, let alone whether
a renewed certification during the pendency of the governments appeal of a previous adverse commitment decision
moots the case under appeal.
Even assuming, without deciding, that Springers second
certification rendered this appeal otherwise moot, we are still
entitled to reach the merits of the governments appeal
because the present case falls within the well-established
exception to the mootness doctrine for wrongs "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." This exception applies when
"(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be
fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there
[is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
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currently suffers, or has ever suffered, from a qualifying mental illness, a necessary element for commitment under the
Walsh Act and the basis for the district courts decision to
deny commitment. See infra Part II.B. Thus, Springers postrelease conduct did not inexorably compel the government to
certify Springer as sexually dangerous for a second time.
Indeed, the Walsh Act does not require that the government
seek to civilly commit any individual.
Moreover, were we to adopt a general rule of vacatur in
Walsh Act cases involving multiple certifications, the government could strategically file successive certifications until it
finds a court amenable to commitment, without facing any
preclusive effect from a previous courts denial of commitment. But vacatur should not be used to allow the government
to hold an individual while it shops for a court more amenable
to committing him under the Walsh Act. See Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, 13C Federal
Practice & Procedure 3533.10.1 (3d ed. 2008) (stating that
vacatur should be denied when "the loser is acting strategically for the purpose of winning a chance to relitigate in a
more favorable forum"). Consequently, even if mootness precluded us from reaching the merits, it would still be inappropriate for us to vacate the district courts decision.
More significantly, were we to agree with the dissents recommended outcome, we would be infringing on Springers
right to due process. We have held that because of the significant liberty interests at stake, civil commitment proceedings
under the Walsh Act implicate the Due Process Clause.
United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, 450 (4th Cir. 2012). It
is well-established that the Fifth Amendment requires that
when the government confines an individual, be it civilly or
criminally, the individual is entitled to a timely, final determination of the validity of his confinement. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Timms, 664 F.3d at 45055.
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The Walsh Act does not specifically provide for how soon
after certification an individual must be given the opportunity
to fully challenge his confinement. However, the Supreme
Court has held that individuals confined under other federal
civil commitment statutes "can be held only for a reasonable
period of time" before being given the opportunity to fully
litigate their commitment. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
733 (1972). We previously have indicatedand now
holdthat an individual cannot be certified indefinitely for
civil commitment under the Walsh Act, without any final
judicial determination regarding the validity of his confinement. See United States v. Broncheau, 645 F.3d 676, 687 n.10
(4th Cir. 2011); id. at 687-88 (Wynn, J., concurring).
Under the dissents approach, the government could appeal
an unsuccessful attempt to civilly commit an individual under
the Walsh Act and, during the pendency of that appeal, again
certify the individual as sexually dangerous to moot the case
and have the district courts decision denying civil commitment vacated. Consequently, the district courts initial decision would lack preclusive effect in the second commitment
proceeding, making it easier for the government to prevail.
Notably, because the Walsh Act does not address successive
certifications, there is no statutory limitation on the number of
times the government may certify an individual or requirement that successive commitment efforts rely on new or different facts or legal theories.1 Thus, if the district court
rejected the governments second attempt to commit the individual, the government could appeal and, during that appeal,
file another certification of the individual, once again restarting the commitment process without any preclusive decision
on the books. All the while, the individual would be confined.
1
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See 18 U.S.C. 4248(a) ("A certificate filed under this subsection shall stay the release of the person pending completion of
procedures contained in this section.").
Consequently, the dissents approach could potentially
allow the government to effectively indefinitely hold an individual without providing him with a timely and meaningful
opportunity to fully litigate his confinement simply by repeatedly certifying the individual while it appeals adverse district
court rulings. Moreover, the dissents approach would allow
the government to detain an individual until it is successful in
one of its repeated attempts to convince a district court that
an individual should be civilly committed. Such a result
plainly contravenes the Due Process demands of the Fifth
Amendment, which require that an individual be able to fully
and fairly litigate the validity of his detention within a "reasonable time."2 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 733.
The preclusive effect of the district courts judgment,
affirmed on appeal, prevents the government from attempting
to commit Springer based on nothing more than the same evidence originally found inadequate by the district court. When
the government presents additional evidence in the second
certification proceeding, the district court will be in a position
to consider that new evidence and the impact that it has on the
2
Springers situation is illustrative. The government first certified him
as sexually dangerous on January 9, 2012, and certified him for a second
time on February 22, 2013. Given that it took us more than fifteen months
to issue an opinion on the governments first attempt to civilly commit
Springer, were we to follow the dissents approach, he would not receive
a final determination regarding his civil commitment until June 2014,
nearly two-and-a-half years after he was initially certified and confined as
sexually dangerous. And that assumes the government does not certify
Springer for a third time, were the district court again to refuse to commit
him. Although not a question that is at issue in this appeal, whether an
individuals commitment status can remain in limbo for such a lengthy
period of time without running afoul of the Due Process Clause remains
an open question. See Broncheau, 645 F.3d at 687 n.10; id. at 687-88
(Wynn, J., concurring)
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The government also suggests that the district courts decision that
Springer does not suffer from pedophilia was clearly erroneous because
Springer testified that he believes he used to suffer from pedophilia. But
the government offers no support, nor can we find any, for the governments position that the district court must credit Springers self-diagnosis.
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the district court did not. Rather, the district court credited Dr.
Plauds diagnosis that Springer never suffered from
pedophilia. Springer, 2012 WL 3957857, at *2 ("Although
both of the governments experts diagnosed Mr. Springer with
pedophilia, the Court credits the testimony of Dr. Plaud . . .
that there is insufficient evidence to support a diagnosis of
pedophilia . . . ."). And the district court noted that pedophilia
tends to be a life-long condition only to emphasize that the
lack of evidence of any offenses against prepubescent children since 2000 casts doubts on Dr. Graneys and Dr. Hastings diagnoses that Springer suffers from pedophilia. Id.
Third, the government contends that the district court
improperly credited Springers testimony that he is no longer
sexually attracted to prepubescent children because Springer
has a history of lying and his "self-assessments . . . are colored by mental illness." Appellants Br. at 16. We give great
deference, however, to a district courts determinations
regarding the credibility of a witness, Hall, 664 F.3d 462, and
find no precedent for the governments position that the district court must acknowledge a witnesss history of lying in its
opinion. Further, we note that the district court reasonably
found that the credibility of Springers testimony was bolstered by the fact that the government produced no evidence
that Springer has engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct
with a prepubescent minor since 2000. Springer, 2012 WL
3957857, at *2-3.
Finally, the government maintains that the district court
improperly credited Dr. Plauds determination that Springer
does not suffer from pedophilia because Dr. Plaud failed to
consider certain conflicting pieces of evidence. Most significantly, the government says Dr. Plaud failed to account for
Springers nine-month abuse of a seven year old in 1996 and
1997. Although the failure to consider substantial conflicting
evidence can constitute clear error, Wooden, 693 F.3d at 45152, here the record shows that Dr. Plaud did consider Springers molestation of the seven year old in rendering his opin-
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As stated earlier, because we hold that the district court did not clearly
err in concluding that Springer did not have a serious mental illness, we
need not, and thus do not, address the district courts findings with regard
to the volitional control prong. Hall, 664 F.3d at 463.
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government will have to prove anew at Springers next commitment hearing that he meets the requirements for civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act.
By ruling on the merits of this appeal, we are in dereliction
of our duty "to decide actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions
upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in
issue in the case before [us]." Oil Workers v. Missouri, 361
U.S. 363, 367 (1960). Therefore, I would dismiss this appeal
as moot and vacate the judgment of the district court, see
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), leaving for another day the question of whether Springer should
be committed following his actual release.*
II.
Even if this case were somehow not mooted, I would at
least remand it and afford the district court an opportunity to
revisit its decision near the close of Springers most recent
reincarceration resulting from his most recent misconduct.
Springers latest violations are material to the district courts
determination as to his future dangerousness. A central premise of the trial courts ruling was that Springer is not likely to
reoffend because he credibly testified that "he has matured,"
"he knows his actions were wrong," and he "knows . . . that
he needs help." J.A. 464-65. The court also noted that "upon
his release from custody, Mr. Springer will have a system of
checks in place [through supervised release] that may reinforce his own ability to control his sexual impulses." J.A. 466.
*Though the governments recertification of Springer was one of the
developments that led to the mooting of this case, vacatur is still justified
because the government did not procure mootness through its own "unilateral action." U.S. Bancorp Mtg. Co. v. Bonner Mall Pship, 513 U.S. 18,
23, 25 (1994). Rather, mootness arose when, "by the vagaries of circumstance," id. at 25, the government was moved to take action in response
to Springers violations.
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