United States v. Scher, 4th Cir. (2010)

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4827

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEWARD SCHER, a/k/a DadnNC, a/k/a Carmine4u,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:08-cr-00109-RJC-1)

Submitted:

July 14, 2010

Decided:

July 26, 2010

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Matthew R. Segal,


FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellant.
Edward R. Ryan, United States
Attorney,
Cortney
S.
Escaravage,
Assistant
United
States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Steward Scher appeals his 180-month sentence following
a guilty plea to possession, transportation and distribution of
child

pornography

in

violation

of

18

(a)(2), (a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 2010).

U.S.C.A.

2252(a)(1),

On appeal, Scher contends

that the district court procedurally erred by enhancing his base


offense

level

by

five

levels

pursuant

to

U.S.

Sentencing

Guideline Manual (USSG) 2G2.2(b)(3)(C) (2008).

Scher also

argues that the length of his sentence is unreasonable.

We

affirm.
We

first

sentencing error.

address

Schers

claim

of

procedural

Scher contends, as he did below, that the

USSG 2G2.2(b)(3)(C) enhancement was not applicable in his case


because

the

Government

failed

to

distributed pornography to a minor.


that internet
application
that

both

of
he

chatroom
the
and

communications

enhancement, 1
AmyP12

were

establish

that

Scher

The district court found


with

rejecting
adults

AmyP12
Schers

using

justified
contention

role-playing

chatroom.

AmyP12 conversed with Scher in a chatroom, and Scher


transferred pornographic material to her over the internet.

Distribution to a minor is defined as the knowing


distribution to an individual who is a minor at the time of the
offense.

USSG 2G2.2, cmt. n.1.

A minor is:

(A) an individual who had not attained the age of 18


years; (B) an individual, whether fictitious or not,
who a law enforcement officer represented to a
participant (i) had not attained the age of 18 years,
and (ii) could be provided for the purposes of
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) an
undercover law enforcement officer who represented to
a participant that the officer had not attained the
age of 18 years.
Id.
The Government must prove the facts needed to support
a sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence.
United States v. Milam, 443 F.3d 382, 386 (4th Cir. 2006).
determining
consider

whether

hearsay,

sufficient

sentencing

provided

indicia

of

enhancement

that

reliability

the
to

applies,

information
support

its

In

we

may

bears

accuracy.

United States v. Wilkinson, 590 F.3d 259, 269 (4th Cir. 2010);
see USSG 6A1.3(a), p.s.

When reviewing the district courts

application of the sentencing guidelines, we review questions of


law

de

novo

and

findings

of

fact,

such

as

whether

distributed child pornography to a minor, for clear error.

Scher
See

United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2008).
In United States v. Hansel, 524 F.3d 841 (8th Cir.
2008),

the

Eighth

2G2.2(b)(3)(C)

to

Circuit
facts

addressed
similar
3

the
to

application

those

of

presented

USSG
here.

Using

an

internet

child

pornography

beccajones13

chatroom,
to

and

thirteen-year-old

an
who

Hansel

individual
stated

female.

to

Hansel,

provided

images

who

the

used

Hansel
524

that

F.3d

at

depicting

screen
she

name

was

847.

While

Hansel argued there was no evidence before the district court


from which it could conclude that beccajones13 was actually a
minor, the Eighth Circuit found that the screen name and the
representation

provided

sufficient

evidence

district courts finding to that effect.


We

have

reviewed

the

record

to

support

the

Id.
and

conclude

that

the

district courts finding that AmyP12 was a minor was similarly


supported by a preponderance of the evidence and is not clearly
erroneous.

AmyP12 informed Scher that she was a twelve-year-old

female and sent him two pictures of herself.


consistent

with

female.

Scher

the

physical

continued

appearance

to

send

The pictures were


of

AmyP12

prepubescent

images

of

child

pornography after she informed him that she was twelve years old
and

after

he

received

two

pictures

of

young

girl.

Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err, and this
claim of procedural sentencing error fails.
Scher also argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable, in that it was longer than necessary to achieve
the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) (2006), particularly
in view of the harsh sentencing guideline ranges generated by
4

the guidelines

applicable to child pornography

crimes. 2

See

generally United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 345-48 (4th


Cir. 2010) (discussing nationwide trend of downward departures
and variances in child pornography cases).
Substantive reasonableness examines the totality of the
circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfies
the

standards

set

forth

in

3553(a).

United

States

v.

Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010); see Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

In imposing a variant

sentence, the sentencing court must consider the extent of the


deviation

and

ensure

that

the

justification

is

compelling to support the degree of the variance.


U.S. at 50.

sufficiently
Gall, 552

[A] major departure should be supported by a more

significant justification than a minor one.

Id.

Given that

the district court is in a superior position to find facts and


judge their import under 3553(a) in the individual case, we
must give due deference to the district courts decision that
the 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justify the extent of the

In his reply brief, Scher seeks to recharacterize


his
claim as one of procedural sentencing error,
and claims that
the district court did not address all of his arguments for a
downward variance.
We find no merit to this claim, as the
record confirms the district courts thorough consideration of
Schers arguments.

variance.

Id. at 51.

reasonably

have

The fact that the appellate court might

concluded

that

different

sentence

was

appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district


court.

Id.
We

reasonable.

conclude

that

Schers

sentence

is

substantively

While Scher argues that the district court did not

give sufficient weight to his history and characteristics or to


the sentencing disparities that would result from the imposition
of a within-guideline sentence, it is clear from the record that
the

district

court

meticulously

considered

those

factors

and

properly weighed them against the seriousness of the offense,


including victim impact and the need to protect the public and
deter

criminal

thirty

months

sufficient

but

activity.
below
not

the

The

court

bottom

greater

than

purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).

of

decided
the

that

guideline

necessary

to

sentence

range

was

accomplish

the

And while this sentence is

below the applicable guideline range, we find that the extent of


the

deviation

was

adequately

explained

and

well

within

the

district courts discretion.


Accordingly,
We

dispense

with

oral

we

affirm

argument

the

district

because

the

court
facts

judgment.
and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the


court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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