Declarador V Guibaton
Declarador V Guibaton
Declarador V Guibaton
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being charged. Being a minor, 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense
charged, he is entitled to a special mitigating circumstance of minority, and is sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) month of reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs of Yvonne Declarador, a civil
indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for
moral damages, Forty-Three Thousand Pesos (P43,000.00) for funeral expenses, attorneys fee of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and unearned income of One Million Three
Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P1,370,000.70).
The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank Bansales) and his teacher-in-charge at the
Cabug-Cabug National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable in
case of insolvency, as the crime was established to have been committed inside the classroom of
Cabug-Cabug National High School and during school hours.
Pursuant to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the sentence is suspended and the Child in
conflict with the law (CICL), Frank Bansales is ordered committed to the Regional
Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.
Furnish copies of this decision the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Private Prosecutors,
the DSWD Capiz Provincial Office, Roxas City, the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth,
Concordia, Guimaras, the accused and his counsel, Atty. Ramcez John Honrado.
SO ORDERED. 4
On June 2, 2003, the RTC set a preliminary conference for 10:00 a.m. of June 10, 2003 with the
Public Prosecutor, the Social Welfare Officer of the court, and the Officer-in-Charge of the
Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth, considering that the accused would turn 18 on June 3,
2003. 5
Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assailing that portion of the decision of the trial courts decision
suspending the sentence of the accused and committing him to the rehabilitation center.
Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as well as A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC (otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), the benefit
of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense punishable
by death, 6 reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v.
Ondo, 7 petitioner avers that since Bansales was charged with murder punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence.
In his Comment, Bansales avers that petitioner has no standing to file the petition, considering
that the offense charged is a public crime brought in the name of the People of the Philippines;
only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition in court assailing
the order of the RTC which suspended the service of his sentence. He further avers that Section
32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles the accused to an automatic suspension of sentence and
allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center; hence, the court did not abuse its
discretion in suspending the sentence of the accused.
In reply, petitioner maintains that he has sufficient personality to file the petition.
The OSG, for its part, posits that respondents sentence cannot be suspended since he was
charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It insists that the
entitlement of a juvenile to a suspended sentence does not depend upon the sentence actually
imposed by the trial court but upon the imposable penalty for the crime charged as provided for
by law.
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether petitioner has standing to file the
petition; (2) whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition
with this Court; and (3) whether respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of
respondent Bansales and his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for the Youth.
The petition is granted.
On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner. Being the surviving spouse of the deceased and the
offended party, he has sufficient personality to file the instant special civil action for certiorari. 8
This is in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order
to promote their object. 9 Moreover, the OSG has filed its comment on the petition and has joined
the petitioner in his plea for the nullification of the assailed portion of the RTC decision.
On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify an
order of the RTC should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 10 A
direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of certiorari may be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. 11 This is an established policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
this Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Courts docket. 12
However, in Fortich v. Corona, 13 the Court held that considering the nature and importance of
the issues raised and in the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the Court
may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before it. 14 Moreover, this Court
has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
interests of justice so require.
In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and the
application of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The charge against respondent Bansales was murder with the qualifying circumstance of either
evident premeditation or abuse of superior strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the crime is
reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court found him guilty of murder.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has
once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment
the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.
Thus, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended
sentence. "Punishable" is defined as "deserving of, or capable, or liable to punishment; liable to
be punished; may be punished; liable to punishment." 15 The word "punishable" does not mean
"must be punished," but "liable to be punished" as specified. 16 In U.S. v. Villalon, 17 the Court
defined punishable as "deserving of, or liable for, punishment." Thus, the term refers to the
possible, not to the actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which
is imposed.
The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty
therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty
imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile. 18 Despite the
disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the
sentence meted against him. By this act, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the
law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in
that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been
deleted from Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to
maintain the other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the
imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to
death or death, are disqualified from having their sentences suspended.
Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because
enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform
system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the
passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the
subject and to have enacted the new act with reference thereto. 19 Statutes in pari materia should
be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy. 20
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the respondent
Judge suspending the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Records, p. 1.
Id. at 235-236.
Id. at 243.
Under Republic Act No. 9346 (An act prohibiting the imposition of death
penalty in the Philippines), the imposition of the death penalty has been
prohibited.
7
Narciso v. Sta. Romana Cruz, 385 Phil. 208, 222 (2000); Perez v. Hagonoy Rural
Bank, Inc., 384 Phil. 322, 335 (2000).
10
11
People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 67787, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 415, 424.
12
Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. 154599,
January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 562, 572.
13
14
Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, 438 Phil. 417, 438
(2002).
15
People v. Superior Court of the City and Country of San Francisco, 116 Cal.
App. 412, 2P.2d 843 (1931).
16
17
18
19
20
Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA
420, 427.
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