06 Law On Public Officers
06 Law On Public Officers
06 Law On Public Officers
Public Office
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M A N A L
PUBLIC OFFICE
It is a right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the state to be exercised by him for the benefit of the body politic.
According to Judge Thomas McIntyre Cooley; The officer is distinguished from the employee in the greater
importance, dignity and independence of his position; in being required to take an official oath, and
perhaps to give an official bond; in the liability to be called to account as a public offender for misfeasance
or non-misfeasance in office, and usually, though not necessarily, in the tenure of his position.
Appointment- act of designation by the appointing officer, body or board, to whom that power
has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. The
President may appoint:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Election- a mode of filing a public office, by which the enfranchised citizenry is able to participate
directly in the conduct of the government, through the selection by them of the functionaries who
will represent them therein.
Vacancies- exist when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties
of the office.
Original when an office is created and no one has as yet been chosen to fill it.
Constructive when the incumbent has no legal right to the office such as a de facto officer and
may be legally replaced by another.
Accidental when the incumbent is separated by any mode other than expiration of the term, like
resignation, death, removal or abandonment.
Public Office
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Qualification as an act
The term qualification is interpreted in another sense, to wit, as an act by which the public
functionary formally commences the discharge of his official duties. This is effected by the taking
of an oath or the filing of a bond, or both in the case of certain officers
Failure to Qualify
According to Mechem, Statutes requiring the taking of an oath, like those which require also
the giving of a bond, usually require that it shall be done within a specified time. These
statutes, however, are generally construed to be directory merely and not mandatory, and
mere delay in taking the oath, if it be afterwards taken with the approval of the public
authorities, while it may be ground for a forfeiture while the delay continues, does not amount
ipso facto to a rejection of the office, and when the oath is so taken, the default is waived.
De Facto Officer- refers to an officer holding a colorable right or title to the office accompanied by
possession. The lawful acts of an officer de facto, so far as the rights of thirds persons are concerned, when
done within the scope and by the apparent authority of office, are valid and binding.
De Jure Officer- one who has lawful title to the office but has not been able to take possession of it or has
been ousted therefrom.
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GENERAL PROVISIONS
The salaries of the chairman and members are relatively high and may not be decreased during
continuance in office.
The Commission enjoy fiscal autonomy.
The Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections perform key
functions in the government. In order to protect their integrity, they have been made constitutional
bodies. Because they perform vital functions of government, it is essential that their independence
be protected against outside influences and political pressures. Hence, they enjoy fiscal autonomy;
the salary of Commissioners may not be diminished during their continuance in office; the
Commissioners have a fixed term; and they are removable only by impeachment.
Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management | GR No. 158791, July
22, 2005
The petitioner, via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Department of Budget
and Management to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. CSC claims that the
reason for the withholding was the no report, no release policy. Budget Department, however,
claims that the failure to release the fund in full is because of shortage of funds.
Respecting respondents justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a
shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally
unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that
does not justify non-compliance with the mandate above-quoted Article IX-A, Section 5. If
respondents theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly
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release approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month that there
is a shortfall of revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering
insignificant altogether, such mandate.
The Supreme Court said that the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against
offices vested with fiscal autonomy, without violating Article IX-A, Section 5. The automatic
release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission vested with
fiscal autonomy should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be
imposed. However, petitioners claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress below the
amount appropriated for the previous year, as in the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected.
Article VIII, Section 3, prohibiting the reduction in the appropriation for the Judiciary below the
amount appropriated for the previous year, does not appear in Article IX-A, Section 5. The plain
implication of this omission is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of
Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.
Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Human Rights |
GR No. 155336, November 25, 2004
The Supreme Court said that the Commission on Human Rights, unlike the three Constitutional
Commissions, does not enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided they do not diminish,
increase of modify substantive rights though subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court.
The Constitutional Commissions are independent bodies. Hence, the power of the Supreme
Court over rules issued by quasi-judicial bodies found in Article VIII, Section 5(5) does not apply
to them. The Court, however, in appropriate cases, may exercise judicial review over them.
active management or
control of any business
which, in any way, may be
affected by the functions of
his office, nor shall he be
financially interested,
directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege
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Decisions
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.
Orocio v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 75959, August 31, 1992
Bustamante v. Commission on Audit | 216 SCRA 134 (1992)
Since the Commissions are collegial bodies, the decisions are made by the body and not by
individual members of the body. No individual member may make a decision for the Commission.
Much less may cases be decided by subordinates of the Commission. Not even the Commissions
legal counsel may make a decision for the Commission.
Cua v. Commission on Elections | 156 SCRA 582 (1987)
Estrella v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 160465, May 27, 2004
The Court had ruled that the three (3) members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted
a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is
also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision. This obviously contradicts Section 7,
which says: Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of all its
members and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations.
Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC | GR No. 143398, October 25, 2000
Commissioner Guiani, before his retirement from the COMELEC, might have signed a draft
ponencia in a case. He vacated his office without the final decision or resolution having been
promulgated. The ponencia does not have any value. Before that resolution or decision to
speak of. A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before.
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or
resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Much less could he
be the ponente of the resolution or decision.
The provision of the Constitution is clear that what is required is the majority vote of all the
members, not only of those who participated in the deliberations and voted thereon in order that a
valid decision may be made by the Constitutional Commissions. Under rules of statutory
construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. This ruling abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua v.
Commission on Elections | 156 SCRA 582
Dumayas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001
Two Commissioners who participated in the consideration of the case retired before the
promulgation of the COMELEC decision but after they cast their vote. Four Commissioners were
left. Their votes should be automatically withdrawn. There is no decision until it is promulgated.
The remaining four Commissioners constituted the total membership and constituted a quorum.
Because two Commissioners who had participated in the deliberations had retired prior to the
promulgation of the decision, the Supreme Court said that the votes of the said Commissioners
should merely be considered withdrawn, as if they had not signed the resolution at all, and only
the votes of the remaining Commissioners considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy.
Unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as votes for or against
a party is concerned, there is no reason to declare the decision a nullity. In this case, the
withdrawal of the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four
incumbent commissioners, still constituting a quorum at the time of the promulgation of the
resolution, would still be 3 to 1 and thus, be a vote of the majority, in favor of the respondent.
Alvarez v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 142527, March 1, 2001
As to the need to expedite resolution of cases and the 60-day period for decision, the Supreme
Court said that the Commission on Elections has numerous cases before it where attention to
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minutiae is critical. Considering the Commissions manpower and logistical limitations, it is sensible
to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines
might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material
time. This is not what the framers had intended.
Any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Aratuc v. Commission on Elections | 88 SCRA 251
The Supreme Court held that when it reviews a decision of the Commission on Elections, the Court
exercises extraordinary jurisdiction; thus, the proceeding is limited to issues involving grave abuse
of discretion resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction, and does not ordinarily empower the Court
to review the factual findings of the Commission.
Loong v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 133676, April 14, 1999
The Court reiterated that certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to
invalidate disputed Commission on Elections resolutions such as final orders, rulings and decisions
of the Commission on Elections rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.
Reyes v. Commission on Audit | GR No 125129, March 29, 1999
The Court said that under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments or
final orders of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Rule 65. Even before the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to the Supreme
Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the Constitution. The
judgments and final orders of Commission on Audit, are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. Only when the Commission on Audit acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Mahinay v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 152457, April 30, 2008
In the case of decisions of the Civil Service Commission, however, Supreme Court Revised Circular
1-91, as amended by Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, which took effect on June 1, 1995,
provides that final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable by certiorari to
the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof. From the decision of
the Court of Appeals, the party adversely affected thereby shall file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court held that the proper mode of appeal from the decision of the Civil Service
Commission is a petition for review under Rule 43 filed with the Court of Appeals.
Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 152574, November 17, 2004
Because the petitioner imputed to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of discretion for ruling that
he had no legal standing to contest the disapproval of his appointment, the Supreme Court said
that grave abuse of discretion is a ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to treat
it appropriately as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
grounds alleged shall be deemed reversible errors, not grave abuse of discretion.
Enforcement of Decision
Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals | 212 SCRA 235
It was held that final decisions of the Civil Service Commission are enforceable by a writ of
execution that the Civil Service Commission may itself issue.
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Composition
A Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the same time of their appointment, at least thirty-five (35)
years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the election immediately preceding
their appointment. They shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven (7) years without
reappointment. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity. Brillantes v. Yorac, supra
Gaminde v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 140335, December 13, 2000
The common starting point for appointees to the Commission was on February 2,
1987, the date the 1987 Constitution take. This true even if Article XVIII,
Section 15 provided for an extension of the tenure of the incumbents when the
Constitution took effect. The extension of the tenure did not affect the term.
Thus, in reckoning the seven year term, the starting point is always a February 2.
Through this rotational system the staggering of the terms is preserved. This rule
also applies to all three Commissions.
Nature of Powers
The Commission is an administrative agency, nothing more. As such, it can only
perform powers proper to an administrative agency. It can perform executive
powers, quasi-judicial powers, and quasi-legislative or rule-making powers.
Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124374, December 15, 1999
PD 51 created certain offices and they were promptly filled. After martial law,
Mayor Simon of Quezon City also filled them by appointment. In 1990, however,
PD 51 was declared never to have been published and therefore was not law. To
save the workers therein, the sanggunian passed an ordinance declaring the
personnel absorbed in the department of public order and safety. But since
there were not enough position, Simon made them contractual employees. When
Mathay became Mayor, he also renewed the contracts once but refused to renew
them thereafter. The Commission on Civil Service ordered Mathay to take them
saying that their reappointment was automatic pursuant to the ordinance. The
ordinance was invalid. Ordering the absorption of the personnel is an act of
appointment. The city council has no power to appoint.
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that has been given. Whether or not hearing is required for revocation depends on the
circumstances of a case. Thus, where the case simply involves the rechecking of examination
papers and nothing more than a re-evaluation of documents already in the records of the CSC
according to a standard answer key previously set by it, notice and hearing is not required.
Instead, what would apply in such a case is the rule of res ipsa loquitor.
GSIS v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 87146, December 11, 1991
CSC has automatic review jurisdiction, not original, over personnel cases given by statute
to the jurisdiction of the Merit System Board.
Torregoza v. Civil Service Commission | 211 SCRA 230
In the exercise of its powers to implement RA 6850, which is the law granting civil service eligibility
to employees under provisional or temporary status who have rendered seven (7) years of efficient
service, the Civil Service Commission enjoys wide latitude of discretion, and may not be compelled
by mandamus to issue such eligibility.
Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 115863, March 31, 1995
The Commission cannot validly abolish the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) because it was
created by law, it can only be abolished by Legislature.
Olanda v. Bugayong | GR No. 140917, October 10, 2003 citing Mantala v. Salvador 206 SCRA
264
It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a grievance procedure,
that decisions of lower level officials in cases involving personnel action be appealed to the agency
head, then to the Civil Service Commission. The Regional Trial Court does not have jurisdiction over
such personnel actions.
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Embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters.
PNOC Energy Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Corporation | 201
SCRA 487 (1991)
The Civil Service system under the new Constitution covers only government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charter. Moreover, even if a case arose under the 1973 Constitution
but is to be decided under the 1987 Constitution, the applicable rule is that of the 1987
Constitution. The moment, however, that a corporation ceases to be government controlled, for
instance, if it is privatized, it ceases to fall under the Civil Service.
Philippine National Oil Company Energy Development Corporation v. Leogardo | GR No.
58494, July 5, 1985
The test is the manner of its creation. Corporations created by special charter are subject to the
Civil Service, whereas corporations incorporated under the Corporation Law are not.
Tanay Water District v. Gabaton | GR No. 63742, April 17, 1989
Tanay Water District, created by PD 198, comes under the Civil Service.
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. National Labor Relations Commission &
Odin Security Agency | GR No. 94825, September 4, 1992
Entities under the civil service system are not completely beyond the reach of the Department of
Labor or labor laws. When a government entity that is under the Civil Service enters into a
contract such as with a security agency or a janitorial agency, it becomes an indirect employer of
the security guards or the janitors. In such a situation, under the Labor Code, the liabilities for
wages are joint and solidary with the contractor. The law on wages in the Labor Code specifically
provides that employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to employees.
Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission | GR Nos. 95237-8, September 13,
1991
Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton | 172 SCRA 253 (1989)
Local Water Districts incorporated are under PD 198 government owned corporations with original,
which means corporations created by special law and not under the Corporation Code of the
Philippines and therefore under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service.
During the 1971 Constitutional Convention debates, when this provision was first introduced,
government-owned corporations came under attack as milking cows of a privileged few enjoying
salaries far higher than their counterparts in the various branches of government. It was pointed
out that the capital of these corporations belongs to the government and that government money
is pumped into them whenever on the brink of disaster and they should therefor come under the
strict surveillance of the civil service system.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 93396,
September 30, 1991
PAGCOR is under the Civil Service since it was created by PD 1869, July 11, 1983.
Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing
Corporation (1990)
National Service Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission | 168 SCRA 122
It was held that the NHC is not embraced in the civil service, and that employer-employee
relationship therein is governed not by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission | GR No. 98107, August 18, 1997
It was held that employment relations in the National Housing Corporation (NHC) are within the
jurisdiction of the NLRC, but the CSC, even if the controversy arose prior to 1987, because, as held
in NASECO v. NLRC, supra, it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision which
governs. In this case, the Supreme Court declared that the phrase with original charter refers to
corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the
Corporation Code.
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It was held that the University of the Philippines, having been created by a special law and having
an original charter, is clearly part of the Civil Service.
Mateo v. Court of Appeals | 247 SCRA 284
It was held that the Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD 198,
is a government-owned corporation with an original charter. Accordingly, its employees fall within
the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees in the said water district.
Prior to June 1, 1995, decisions could be reviewed only by the Supreme Court by certiorari under
Rule 65. Now, however, it is provided (June 1, 1995) in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95,
pursuant to RA No. 7902, that judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The change is
pursuant to Section 7 which says, unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law.
Mathay, Jr. v. Commission on Civil Service, supra
Reyes v. Regional Trial Court | GR No. 108886, May 5, 1995
Rule 65, Section 1 says that certiorari may be resorted to when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. But reconsideration is a speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, a case may
be brought to the Supreme Court only after reconsideration. As a consequence, in the case of
decisions of the COMELEC, only decisions en banc may be brought to the Court by certiorari since
Article IX-C-3 says that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
The kind of decisions of Constitutional Commissions may be elevated to the Supreme Court
through Rule 65 are only grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.
Moreover, the case or matter referred to by the Constitution may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Section 7, Article IX-C are those that relate to the exercise of
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case of COMELEC, these must be cases involving
elective, regional, provincial, and city officials.
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC | 323 SCRA 611
The Supreme Court dispensed with the need for reconsideration since elections were already very
close and there was no more time for another speedy remedy. The case was about exit polls.
Classes of Service
Characterized by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable by
competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications; opportunity for advancement to
higher career positions; and security of tenure.
The positions included in the career service are:
1. Open career positions, where prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required.
2. Closed career positions, such as scientific or highly technical in nature.
3. Career Executive Service, such as undersecretaries, bureau directors, etc.
4. Career officers other than those belonging to the Career Executive Service who are appointed by
the President, such as those in the foreign office.
5. Positions in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, although governed by a separate merit system.
6. Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
7. Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled.
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CAREER SERVICE
1.
Entrance
based on merit
and fitness to
be determined
as far as
practicable by
competitive
examinations,
or based on
highly
technical
qualifications.
2.
Security of
tenure.
3.
Opportunity
for
advancement
to higher
career
positions.
NON-CAREER
SERVICE
1.
Entrance on
bases other
than those of
the usual tests
of merit and
fitness utilized
for the career
service.
2.
Tenure which
is limited to a
period
specified by
law, or which
is coterminous with
that of the
appointing
authority or
subject to his
pleasure, or
which is
limited to the
duration of a
particular
project for
which purpose
employment
was made.
This classification
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lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the
position or office which he occupies.
CLASSES OF NONCOMPETITIVE
POSITIONS
The non-competitive
positions are those which
by their nature are policydetermining, primarily
confidential, or highly
technical.
Early jurisprudence on
this subject established
that it is the nature and
not just the label of the
position which makes it
con-competitive. Thus
much more than
ordinary confidence is
reposed in the occupant
of a position that is
primarily confidential. The
latter phrase denotes not
only confidence in the
aptitude of the appointee
for the duties of the office
but primarily close
intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment
or freedom from
misgivings or betrayals of
personal trust on
confidential matters of
state.
DE LOS SANTOS
V.MALLARE | 87 PHIL
289, 298 (1950)
A policy-determining
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ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position.
The power to appoint is a matter of discretion
PAGCOR v. Rilloraza | GR No. 141141, June 25, 2001
Three important points were underscored:
1. The classification of a particular position as policy-determining, primarily confidential
or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration
that is no conclusive upon the courts the true test being the nature of the position.
2. The exemption provided in this section pertains only to exemption from competitive
examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service.
3. Section 16, PD 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily
confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.
Darangina v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 167472, January 31, 2007
A permanent appointment can issue only to a person who possesses all the requirements for the
position to which he is appointed. An exception to this rule is where, in the absence of appropriate
eligibles, he or she may be appointed to the position merely in a temporary capacity for a period of
twelve (12) months, unless sooner terminated by the appointing authority. Such a temporary
appointment is made not for the benefit of the appointee; rather it seeks to prevent a hiatus in the
discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection
of a permanent appointee.
Thus, the temporary appointee accepts the position with the condition that he shall surrender the
office when called upon to do so by the appointing authority. Such termination of a temporary
appointment may be with or without cause as the appointee serves merely at the pleasure of the
appointing power. Accordingly, the Court held that where a non-eligible holds a temporary
appointment, his replacement by another non-eligible is not prohibited.
Exempt from the competitive examination requirement to determine merit and fitness
are positions which are:
1.
Policy determining: where the officer lays down principal or fundamental guidelines
or rules; or formulate a method of action for government or any of its subdivision, such
as department head.
2.
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Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution textually support the Pinero v. Hechanova | 18
SCRA 417 (1966) doctrine that it is the nature of the position which finally determines
whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The
1987 Constitution deleted the phrase in nature. This doctrine is still controlling.
The primary purpose of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in providing for the
declaration of a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical is to exempt these categories from competitive examination as a means for
determining merit and fitness. This is not mean to exclude them from security of
tenure.
The PROXIMITY RULE states that, every appointment implies confidence, but much
more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily
confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in aptitude of the appointee
for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.
The meaning of for cause provided by law is a guarantee both procedural and
substantive due process. Hence, not only must removal or suspension be in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, but also they can only be made on
the basis of a valid cause provided by law. The phrase for cause has acquired a
well-defined meaning in Philippine jurisprudence. It means for reasons which the law
and sound public policy recognize as sufficient for removal, that is, legal cause, and
not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem
sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those
vested with the power of removal, or without cause. Moreover, the cause must relate
to and effect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.
Hernandez v. Villegas | 14 SCRA 544, 548 (1965)
Persons permanently occupying non-competitive positions are covered by the
guarantee of security of tenure. The distinction between competitive and noncompetitive positions is significant only for purposes of appointment. However,
officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so
long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be
justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from
office involves no removal but the expiration of the term of office two different
causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public
Officers.
Larin v. Executive Secretary | 280 SCRA 713
The extent of the Presidents disciplinary authority over presidential appointees who
belong to the career service is limited. Specifically, Section 36, PD 807, as
amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, is emphatic
that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be
removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law.
In other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the
appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an
admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the
recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for cause and in
accordance with procedural due process.
Gloria v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000
The transfer of a permanent employee to another permanent position without the
consent of the employee violate security of tenure.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the
employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step
toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer
14
M A R
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M O N T
would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those
who are in the Civil Service.
Astraquillo v. Manglapus | October 3, 1990
Appointees to the foreign service who do not belong to the Career Corps do not
enjoy security of tenure like the Career Corp. those who are non-career enter
bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career
service and possess tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which
is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purposes
employment was made. Political appointees in the foreign services possess
tenure coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure.
Binamira v. Garrucho | GR No. 92008, July 23, 1990
Binamira was designated by the Secretary of Tourism as Manager of the Tourism
Authority. The law, however, requires that the Manager be appointed by the
President. Binamira did not acquire security of tenure because he did not receive a
valid appointment.
Octot v. Ybanez | GR No. 48643, January 18, 1982
Petitioner was dismissed as notoriously undesirable, pursuant to the summary
procedure found in PD 6 because he had been convicted of libel by the CFI. Later
acquitted by the Court of Appeals, he asked for reinstatement and back wages. He
was instead offered reappointment but with no back wages. The Court held that he
is not entitled to back wages. Dismissal was done in good faith in compliance with
PD 6.
GSIS v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 86083, September 24, 1991
Section 40, PD 807 on Summary Proceedings states that, No formal
investigation is necessary and the respondent may be immediately removed or
dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present: a) when the charge is
serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.
The provision can be saved from invalidation only if it is read to require that:
1. The employee is informed of the charges against him by furnishing him
with a copy of the charges against him.
2. The employee must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of
the matter.
Dimayuga v. Benedicto II | GR No. 144153, January 16, 2002
One who does not have qualifications for a position cannot acquire security of
tenure. Security of tenure in an office is acquired only by one who has the
qualifications for that office.
Pinero v. Hechanova | 18 SCRA 417
It was declared that executive pronouncements, such as PD 1869, can be no more
than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict; otherwise, it
would lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by
executive fiat, the constitutional protection of security of tenure. This rule prevails
even with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of
1987, despite the fact that the phrase in nature was deleted.
The proximity rule enunciated in De los Santos v. Mallare, supra, is still
authoritative, such that the occupant of a particular position could be considered a
confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing
authority was the latters belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the
occupant which ensures freedom of discussion without fear of embarrassment or
misgivings of possible betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of State.
Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the
element of trust between them is no longer predominant, and therefore, cannot be
classified as primarily confidential.
Laurel v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 71562, October 28, 1991
15
M A R
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M O N T
any
Governmentowned or
controlled
corporations or
in any of their
subsidiaries.
The purpose of
the prohibition of
appointment of
lame ducks in
Section 6 is the
extirpation of the
spoils system.
ARTICLE IX-B,
SECTION 7
No elective
official shall be
eligible for
appointment or
designation in
any capacity to
any public office
or position
during his
tenure.
Unless
otherwise
allowed by law
or by the
primary
functions of his
position, no
appointive
official shall
hold any other
office or
employment in
the Government
or any
subdivision,
agency or
instrumentality
thereof,
including
Governmentowned or
controlled
M A R
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M O N T
M A R
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M O N T
recommendatory and does not fix a stringent formula regarding the mode of
choosing among the candidates.
University of the Philippines and Alfredo Torres v. Civil Service Commission | GR
No. 132860, April 3, 2001
The Supreme Court said that the Civil Service Commission is not a co-manager or
surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies, its functions and authority are
limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their compliance with
requirements of the Civil Service Law. On its own, the Commission does not have the
power to terminate employment or to drop members from the rolls.
Oriental Mindoro National College v. Macaraig | GR No. 152017, January 15, 2004
Inasmuch as alleged appointment of the respondent was submitted to the Civil Service
Commission only after two years and twelve days after its issuance, there was no valid
appointment.
A substantive requirement under Section 11 of the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations is that an appointment should be submitted to the Civil
Service Commission within thirty (30) days from issuance; otherwise, it shall be
ineffective.
Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 152574, November 17, 2004
Despite the CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998, which provides that only the
appointing authority has the right to challenge the CSCs disapproval of an appointment,
the Supreme Court said that both the appointing authority and the appointee are the real
parties in interest, and both have legal standing, in a suit assailing a CSC order
disapproving an appointment. The CSCs disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to
the appointing authoritys discretion: thus, the appointing authority has the right to contest
the disapproval, as he stands to be adversely affected when the CSC disapproves an
appointment. Although the appointee has no vested right to the position, it was his
eligibility that was being questioned. He should ,therefore, be granted the opportunity to
prove his eligibility. He has a personal stake in the outcome of the case, which justifies his
challenge to the CSC act which denied his permanent appointment.
Disqualifications
No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any governmentowned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries.
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Flores v. Drilon, supra
For violating this constitutional prohibition, the Supreme Court declared
that the provision in the law creating the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority, which mandated the appointment of the City Mayor of
Olongapo City as the first Administrator of the SBMA, unconstitutional.
M A R
R A N C
M O N T
Security of Tenure
The grounds and the procedure for investigation of charges and the discipline of career service officers and
employees are provided in the Civil Service Law. Non-compliance therewith constitutes a denial of the right
to security of tenure.
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 2(3)
Villaluz v. Zaldivar | 15 SCRA 710
A Presidential appointee is under the direct disciplinary authority of the President.
Palma-Fernandez v. de la Paz | 160 SCRA 751
Unconsented transfer of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary, is a violation of the
security of tenure clause in the Constitution.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals | 183 SCRA 555
Where the appointment of a principal does not refer to any particular school, reassignment does
not offend the constitutional guarantee.
Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban | 193 SCRA 520
It was held that since the appointment of private respondent Yap was that of District Supervisor at
large, she could be assigned to any station as she is not entitled to stay permanently at any
specific station.
Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 112513, August 21, 1997
When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all
legal intents and purposes he is considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the
silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back salaries.
Balitaosan v. Secretary, DECS | GR No. 138238, September 2, 2003
Where the reinstatement is ordered by the Court not as the result of exoneration but merely as an
act of liberality of the Court of Appeals, the claim for back wages for the period during which the
employee was not allowed to work must be denied. The general rule is that a public official is not
entitled to compensation is he has not rendered any service.
Brugada v. Secretary of Education | GR Nos. 142332-43, January 31, 2005
19
M A R
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M O N T
Where the petitioners were no longer pleadings for exoneration from the administrative charges
filed against them, but were merely asking for the payment of back wages computed from the time
they could not teach pursuant to Secretary Carinos dismissal order minus the six months
suspension until their actual reinstatement, the Supreme Court said that the petitioners have no
right to back wages because they were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended. In a host
of cases, the Supreme Court had categorically declared that the payment of back wages during the
period of suspension of a civil servant who is subsequently reinstated is proper only if he is found
innocent of the charges and the suspension is unjustified.
General v. Roco, supra
Security of tenure in the Career Executive Service pertains only to rank, not to the position to
which the employee may be appointed.
De la Llana v. Alba, supra
Valid abolition of office does not violate the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
Ginson v. Municipality of Murcia | 158 SCRA 1
Rama v. Court of Appeals | 148 SCRA 496
Pretended abolition of office is a flimsy excuse to justify dismissal.
Dario v. Mison, supra
Mendoza v. Quisumbing | 186 SCRA 108
Gabriel v. Domingo | 189 SCRA 172
Reorganization of office does not necessarily result in abolition of the office, and does not justify
the replacement of permanent officers and employees.
Cabagnot v. Civil Service Commission | 223 SCRA 59
Where, as a result of the reorganization, employees were effectively demoted by their assignment
to positions lower than those they previously held, there is violation of security of tenure, and the
Civil Service Commission may order their reinstatement.
Under the Rules of Court, a career service officer or employee who has been unlawfully ousted from his
office has one year within which to file an action in court to recover his office, otherwise the right to
recover the same prescribes.
Cristobal v. Melchor | 78 SCRA 175
Where the Supreme Court, on grounds of equity, allowed a suit filed nine years from date of
unlawful dismissal.
Section 40 of the Civil Service Law provides for summary dismissal when the charge is serious and
evidence of guilt is strong; when respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged, and there is
reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge; and when respondent is notoriously
undesirable and is reproduced verbatim in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which took
effect in 1989.
Abalos v. Civil Service Commission | 196 SCRA 81
This provision is deemed repealed by Republic Act 6654, approved May 20, 1988, and published
in the Official Gazette on May 30, 1988.
Section 37(a), PD 807, as amended, provides for appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
only over the Merit System Protection Boards decisions in administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of the penalty of suspension, fine, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal
from office.
Mendez v. Civil Service Commission | 204 SCRA 965
Navarro v. Civil Service Commission | 226 SCRA 522
This provision is not over MSBP decisions exonerating the respondent.
University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission | 228 SCRA 207
Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission | 241 SCRA 317
Appeal to the Civil Service Commission may be made only by the party adversely affected by the
MSBP decision; and the employer is not a party adversely affected.
20
M A R
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M O N T
M A R
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M O N T
for termination of a Government employee, it is not the same as a declaration that the
office is vacant. RA 6715 has effected no express abolition of the positions, neither an
implied abolition (i.e. an irreconcilable inconsistency between the nature, duties and
functions of the petitioners offices under the old rules and those the new law, RA 6715).
Mama, Jr. v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 86517, April 30, 1991
Where a city general hospital is closed for valid reasons but is, few months later, opened
as a maternity and childrens hospital in order not to violate the condition of the donation
of the land that it be used for the hospital, was there an unlawful abolition of office.
Good faith is presumed. In the absence of proof of bad faith and considering that the new
hospital is not exactly the same as the first and considering likewise the desire to preserve
the donated property, there is no unlawful abolition of office.
UP Board of Regents v. Rasul | GR No. 91551, August 16, 1991
The Board of Regents of UP effected a reorganization of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH) transforming it into UP PGH Medical Center. As part of the reorganization, the
position of Director of PGH was transformed into Medical Director of UP PGH Medical
Center. The incumbent Director of PGH was replaced by a Medical Director of UP PGH
Medical Center. The functions of the two offices, however, are found to be substantially the
same. The replacement was not valid because it was tantamount to removal without due
cause.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Secretary | GR Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001
The President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. And this can
include deactivation of offices. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate
the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to
carry out reorganization measures.
Tobias v. Veloso | 100 SCRA 177, 184 | L-40224, September
23, 1980
An officer who is simply given a reprimand is not exonerated.
A reprimand is a public and formal censure or severe reproof,
administered to a person in fault by his superior officer of a
body to which he belongs. Unlike a warning (putting on
guard) or an admonition (a friendly reproof), a reprimand is an
administrative penalty.
Mendiola v. Tancinco | 52 SCRA 66 (1973)
Temporary appointees are not protected by the guarantee of
security of tenure. They may be removed anytime without cause.
M A R
R A N C
M O N T
Thus, abolition of office to escape the taint of unconstitutionality, it must be made under the following
conditions:
1. In good faith;
2. Not for personal or political reasons; and
3. Not in violation of the law.
Partisan political activity, which is the phrase used in previous Constitutions, includes
every form of solicitation of the electors vote in favor of a specific candidate. People v.
De Venecia | 14 SCRA 864, 867 (1965)
However, this provision does not prevent any officer or employee from expressing his
views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of candidates
for public office whom he supports. Section 29, RA 2260
Right to Self-Organization
The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 2(5), ARTICLE III, SECTION 8
Three provisions which serve as bases for the right of Civil Service to unionize
Article III, Section 8: guarantees the right of all, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions.
Article XII, Section 3: guarantees the right of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike
in accordance with law.
23
M A R
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M O N T
Standardization of Compensation
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking
into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their
positions.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 5
Intia v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 131529, April 30, 1999
It was held that the discretion of the Philippine Postal Corporation Board of Directors on matters of
personal compensation is not absolute; the salary structure of its personnel must still strictly conform with
RA 6758, in relation to the General Appropriations Act.
Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas | GR No. 148208, December
15, 2005
It was challenged as a violation of the equal protection clause is the provision in RA 7693 The Central
Bank Act, which creates two classes of employees in the BSP:
1. The BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law
(SSL), which is the exempt class.
2. The rank-and-file (Salary Grade 19 and below, which is the non-exempt class.
The Supreme Court said that while the policy determination argument may support the inequality of
treatment between the BSP rank-and-file employees and those of other Government Financing Institutions
(GFIs) who in their respective charters, are exempt from the provisions of SSL. These rank-and-file
employees of BSP and GFIs are similarly situated. Thus, the classification made in
ARTICLE IX-B,
the Central Bank Act is not based on any substantial distinction vis--vis the
SECTION 8
particular circumstances of each GFI.
No elective or
Double Compensation
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,
double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept
without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of
any kind from any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be
considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 8
appointive public
officer or
employee shall
receive additional,
double, or indirect
compensation,
unless specifically
authorized by law,
nor accept
without the
consent of the
Congress, any
present,
emolument, office,
or title of any kind
from any foreign
government.
Pensions or
gratuities shall
not be considered
as additional,
double, or indirect
compensation.
M A R
R A N C
M O N T
rewarded for the performance of the function entrusted to him, but that should not be the
overriding consideration.
Additional Compensation exists when for one and the same office for which a
compensation has been fixed there is added to such fixed compensation an extra reward in
the form, for instance, of a bonus. This is not allowed in the absence of a law specifically
authorizing such extra reward. Thus, where an officers pay provided by law was a fixed per
diem, the Supreme Court disallowed additional compensation in the form of cost of living
allowances as well as incentive and Christmas bonuses. The Court, however, was careful to
point out that when a per diem or an allowance is given as reimbursement for expenses
incident to the discharge of an officers duties, it is not an additional compensation
prohibited by the Constitution.
Double Compensation more properly refers to two sets of compensation for two different
offices held concurrently by one officer. In the instances when holding a second office is
allowed, when an officer accepts a second office, he can draw the salary attached to such
second only when he is specifically authorized by law to receive double compensation.
M A R
R A N C
M O N T
Oath of Allegiance
All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 4
This is in relation to ARTICLE XI, SECTION 18, which provides that public officers and employees
owe the State ad this Constitution allegiance at all times.
26
R A C
W E
N D Y
J A R A M I
L O
Where exercised
General Rule: A public officer may exercise his powers only within the territorial limits of his
authority and that any act performed outside that area will be null and void.
Illustration:
A judge cannot act outside his judicial district; if he is stationed in Manila, he cannot issue
a habeas corpus to respondent in Pampanga unless it is a warrant of arrest which can be
issued by judges and may be served anywhere in the Philippines.
A mayor does not have jurisdiction outside his municipality as his powers are purely local.
Exception:
Members of the Cabinet such as secretaries may assert their authority anywhere in the
Philippines because they are national officers.
The President of the Philippines retains his status as such even if he is outside the country
and may exercise his powers anywhere.
Diplomats
When exercised
People the Philippines is a republican state. Sovereign resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them. [Constitution, Article II, Section 1]
Constitution the powers of the President of the Philippines are provided mainly in Article VII,
Legislature is in Article VI, Supreme Court in Article VIII, & Constitutional Commission in Article XI.
Statues the powers of local officials are prescribed by the Local Government Code of 1991
[Republic Act 7160], Bureau Directors are in Administrative Code of 1987 [Executive Order No.
292] which is the laws creating their respective offices, or by special charters such as the
Commissioner of Customs by the Tariff and Customs Code of 1982.
The public officer may exercise his authority only during his term of office hence any act performed
by him after such term will be considered invalid.
An appointment extended by the President after his term will therefore be void for lack of authority.
Even if the appointment was made by the President during his term to fill an anticipated vacancy
occurring after his term will still be invalid.
The term may not be fixed, as where it is made dependent upon the completion of a particular task
or attainment of a specified age.
How exercised
General Rule:
Express grants of power to public officers are usually subjected to a strict interpretation and
will be construed as conferring those powers only which are expressly imposed or necessarily
implied.
The authority of the public officer should be strictly construed, consistent with the principle
that representative government is a government of limited powers.
Any doubt on this matter shall be resolved in favor of the public and against the exercise if the
authority claimed.
27
W E
N D Y
J A R A M I
L O
Exception: However, the fact that a particular power has not been expressly conferred does not
necessarily mean it is not possessed by the officer claiming it.
Angara v. Electoral Commission the power of the Electoral Commission to hear and decide
certain election cases carries with it the implied power to adopt rules of procedure to be observed
in the conduct of these cases.
Malayan Integrated Industries Corp. vs. Court of Appeals where the approval of the
reclamation contract was signed by the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, and not
by the Presidents own hand, the Executive Secretarys action is presumed to be valid and to have
been regularly performed in behalf of the President.
Effect of Exercise
General Rule: As long as the public officer is authorized, his acts will be regarded as valid. Such
acts will produce legal effects and be considered binding upon the government itself as the
principal of the public officer.
Doctrine of qualified political agency under this doctrine, department secretaries may exercise
powers delegated to them by the President subject to the latters power of control. Each head of a
department is, and must be, the Presidents alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.
Doctrine of necessary implication all powers necessary to the exercise of the power expressly
granted are deemed impliedly granted as well.
R A C
Exception: Acts not authorized or valid an unauthorized action may still be considered valid
if it is subsequently ratified by the government. The government then assumes whatever liabilities
arise from the act of the previously un-authorized public officer. However only voidable acts may
be ratified, an absolute invalid act cannot be validated by ratification.
Kinds of Duties
Discretionary may be performed or a question may be decided in one of two or more ways,
either of which would still be lawful or right and where it is left to the will or judgment of the
performer to determine in which way it will be performed.
28
Inhibitions
B U
T A M A N T
A N N E
M U R
P H
INHIBITIONS
Inhibition - restraint upon the public officer against the doing of certain acts which may be
legally be done by others. Crime is therefore excluded.
Inhibition v. Disqualification
Disqualification denotes the lack of a needed eligibility for certain office. Thus, a Senator or
member of the House of Representative is, subject to certain exceptions, inhibited from
holding another office or employment in the government concurrently with his seat in the
legislature, although he may do so if he forfeits such seat. By contrast, he is disqualified
from appointment during his term to any office created or improved while he was a
member of the legislature, and this is so even if he should be willing to give up his position
as legislator.
Inhibitions are prescribed either by the Constitution or by statute and may general or
specific in their application.
Constitutional Inhibitions
The President and Vice-President shall not receive during their tenure any other
emolument from the Government or any other source.
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or on any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries. They
shall avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any office or employment
in the Government.
No Senator or Member of the House Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies. Neither
shall be, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including any GOCCs, or its subsidiaries, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall be, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any GOCCs, or its subsidiaries.
No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position no appointive official shall hold any other officer or
employment in the Government.
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional or indirect
compensation, unless specially authorized by law nor accept without the consent of
Congress any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect
compensation.
29
Inhibitions
B U
T A M A N T
M U R
P H
No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may
be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial
institution to the President, Vice-President, the Members of the House of Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to
any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure.
Constitutional Disqualification
A N N E
E
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed as the member of Constitutional
Commission, the office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including GOCCs and their subsidiaries.
No Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected.
The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency preforming quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Appointees to the Constitutional Commissions must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. No
candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the government.
Other Inhibitions
Inhibitions
B U
T A M A N T
A N N E
M U R
P H
It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee directly or indirectly,
to:
Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of the local
government unit for unpaid taxes or assessment, or by virtue if a legal process
at he instance of the said LGU;
Be a surety for any person contracting or doing business with the LGU for
which a surety is required and possess or use any public property for private
purposes.
All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives. Sangguniang members may practice their professsions, engge in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours provided that Sangguniang
members who are also member of the bar shall not:
Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a LGU or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
Use property and personnel of the government except when the Sangguniang
member concerned is defending the interest of the government.
Civil servants shall not strike against the Government as a means for securing changes
in the terms and conditions of employment.
Prohibited acts and transactions for public official under R.A. No, 6713, otherwise
known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Other Disqualifications
All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any
branch or instrumentality thereof, made in favor of a relative, within the third degree of
consanguinity or affinity, of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief
of the bureau or office, or of the person exercising immediate supervision over him, are
prohibited. This restriction shall however not apply to persons employed in a
confidential capacity; teachers; physicians; members of the AFP; and to those who
after their appointment to a position in a bureau or office, contracts marriage with
someone in the same bureau or office, in which event the employment or retention
therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.
31
M A Y
U G
L O I
S E
A N
Purpose of Compensation
Salary is not an essential element of public office. There is such thing as an honorary office to
which no compensation is attached and where the incumbent is prepared and willing to serve
gratis.
Sources of Salary
Statute- Presidential Decree 1606 provides for the salaries of justices of the
Sandiganbayan
The Constitution may sometimes provide for the initial salary of public officer and allow
the legislature to change it later, subject to certain limitations. Thus, it is also provided
in the Constitution that the salaries of the foregoing constitutional officers shall be
fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their nature or continuance in office.
Where the salary is granted by the statute, it may be withdrawn by the statute. The
rule is that one does not have a vested right to a salary which unless protected by the
constitution, may be subjected to any change deemed fit by the legislature which
granted it in the first place. Thus, even if the salaries may be increased, it may also be
reduced and, in fact, altogether be abolished in the discretion of the law-making body.
Limitations
The Salaries of the President and the Vice President shall be determined by law and
shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until, after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such
increase was approved
The salary of Chief of Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased.
The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions
shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure.
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The Salaries of the Ombudsman and his deputies, which shall be the same as those
provided for the Chairmen and Members, respectively of the Constitutional
Commissions shall not be decreased during their term of office.
Right to Salary
Based on the right to the office itself and accrues from the date of actual commencement
of the discharge of official duties.
Department of Budget and Management is vested with the authority to review the salaries
of government personnel
Back Salaries are also payable to an officer illegally dismissed or otherwise unjustly
deprived of his office, the right to recover accruing from the date of deprivation.
A claim for back salaries cannot stand by itself. It must be coupled with a claim for
reinstatement and it is subject to the prescriptive period of one year.
A public officer is not legally bound by a pledge made by him while still a candidate that, if
elected, he will not collect his salary or will donate it back to the government or give it to
some other beneficiary. Such pledge can be no more than a campaign ploy and is therefore
not enforceable of law. However, having collected the salary, he nay thereafter comply
with his election pledge without any legal inhibition because such salary has become his
private property which he may dispose of freely.
Benefits
Insurance
Retirement
Philhealth
Leaves
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The Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.
Kinds of Duties
Liability in General- The rules governing the liability of public officers in general are laid
down in :
A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his
official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence.
Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects to perform a duty within a
period fixed by law or regulation, or within a reasonable period if none is fixed,
shall be liable for damages to the private party concerned without prejudice to
such other liability as may be prescribed by law.
A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the
wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, or misfeasance of his
subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific
act or misconduct complained of.
Sec. 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers No subordinate officer or employee
shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties.
However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary
to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under orders or
instructions of his superiors.
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan- If the order is illegal, if it is patently legal and the
subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there
would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.
Incumbent presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court put it, a suit against the President would not only
engender disrespect and disregard for the authority that he represents but would also
result in delay or inaction on important matters of government because of the time
and effort that the President would devote to his defense.
Estrada v. Desierto- crimes against him are criminal in character. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the state and the official who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Legislators
Members of the legislature, both national and local, act as a body and discharge duties
owing to the public in general.
As a rule they cannot be held liable individually or collectively, for the performance or
non-performance of their duties.
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan- SC affirmed the authority of the Sandiganbayan to
issue orders of preventive suspension even against members of the Legislature,
independently of the power of congress to discipline its members
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Judges
Shall not be liable for their acts except only when they act without jurisdiction as the
law will not protect them from exercising powers do not belong to them
Fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith
Haw Tay v. Singayao- twin evils of corruption and ignorance of the law; dismissal of
judges, the administrative cases must be deliberated upon and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc.
If the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P
10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter maybe decided by Division (SC
Reso. Feb 23, 1993, as amended Bar Matter No. 209)
Judge to be administratively liable:
Preponderance of evidence
Acted in their official capacity in the honest belief that they had such power
Ministerial Officers- acts without authority, or in disregard of the occasion, time and manner
prescribed by law for the performance of the duty, or w/o necessary care and diligence can be
held liable for nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance.
General Rule: Superior officers cannot be held liable for the acts of their subordinates
as otherwise competent persons may not be willing to join the public service for fear of
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imputation to them of the shortcomings of others. Reason dictates that the faults of
subordinates should be considered their own responsibility and not visited upon the
innocent superior.
Superior officer maybe held liable:
Where, being charged with the duty of employing or retaining his subordinates,
he negligently or willfully employs or retains unfit or improper persons; or
Where, being charged with the duty to see that they are appointed and
qualified in a proper manner, he negligently or willfully fails to require of them
the due conformity to the prescribed regulations; or
Personal Liability
Where the wrong, whether contractual or tortious, is committed by the public officer
without authority or with malice or in bad faith.
Bad faith not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn
duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
Tabuena v. Court of Appeals- A public officer, by virtue of his office alone, is not
immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad
faith (Art. 27 NCC; 43 AM., Jur. 86, 89-90)
Salcedo v. Court of Appeals- If the public officers act in ultra vires and tainted with
bad faith, he may himself be held answerable in his individual capacity.
Remedies Against Public Officers- civil, criminal and administrative cases can be pursued
separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively.
OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case or in
a civil suit for damages arising from felony. This applies to all public officials and
employees in the executive, legislative and judicial branch of the Government.
General Rule: Dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily follow the
dismissal of a criminal case, the former requiring as it does, only preponderance of
evidence while the latter requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
Civil and Administrative cases preponderance of evidence
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Expiration of term
One can claim the term of office only when he has a right to the office (Paredes v.
Abad).
Term- definite period of time prescribed by law by which an officer may hold an office
A term may not be a fixed number of years (happening of a certain event, loss of
confidence, accomplishment of purpose, etc.).
In case of ambiguity regarding the exact duration of the term, the shortest period shall
be preferred.
Tenure- represents the actual period of incumbency of the public officer.
Where two offices are incompatible, they cannot be held simultaneously by the same
person.
Incompatibility is based on the nature and relation of the two offices (prosecutor and
judge; treasurer and auditor; Senator/Congressman and any Government position)
The acceptance of the incompatible office automatically vacates the first.
Removal- forcible and permanent separation of the incumbent from office before the
expiration of his term.
General rule: all officers appointed by the President are removable by him.
Except: Members of SC, Constitutional Commissions, Ombudsman (Impeachment);
Judges of inferior courts (SC)
Resignation- formal method of renunciation coupled with the physical act of relinquishment
of office, and subject to the approval by the superior authorities (Estrada v Desierto).
Forfeiture- divests the incumbents title to his office as a result of a positive act, either
culpable or innocent.
Any person holding a public appointive office shall be considered resigned upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Recall- method of removal employed directly by the people themselves through the exercise
of their suffrages.
Abolition of Office
The power to create includes the power to destroy; hence, except where the office was
created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that
brought it into existence.
Death
Where the office is occupied by a single incumbent, the office will cease to function
until a successor is able to take over.
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The death of only one member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod will not prevent the
body from functioning.
Impeachment- A national inquest into the conduct of public men. It is a necessary safeguard
to ensure that public officers have the moral fitness and integrity to fulfill their mandate. The
provisions on impeachment are enshrined in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Under the Constitution only the following public officers may be impeached: The
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. This list of officers is exclusive.
The grounds for impeachment are: culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. These
grounds are exclusive and offenses not falling within these parameters shall not be
sufficient for impeachment purposes.
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
The process begins at the House of Representatives, which has the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
A verified complaint must be filed by either a Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit
its
report
to
the
House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
In the committee hearings, a vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
If however, the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
The Senate has the sole power of sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation.
When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote.
No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
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