36.

DFA v NLRC
37. Mun of San Fernando v Firme
38. Bureau of Printing v Bureau of Printing
39.Farolan v CTA
40. PTA v Phil GOlf Devt & Equipment
41. City of Angeles v CA
42. Veterans Manpower and Protective Services Inc. V CA
43.Wylie v Rarang
44. Republic v Sandoval
45. Syquia v Almeda Lopez

46. SANDERS V VERIDIANO

47. TAN V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
48. UP V DIZON
49. REPUBLIC V FELICIANO
50. MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO V FIRME
51. MERRITT V GOVTOF THE PHIL ISLANDS
52. RAYO V CFI OF BULACAN
53. FROILAN V PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING
54. USA V GUINTO
55. USA V RUIZ
56. USA V GUINTO
57. REPUBLIC V INDONESIA V VINZON
58. MINISTERIO V CFI CEBU
59. SANDERS V VERIDIANO
60. MERRITT V GOVT OF THE PHIL ISLANDS
61. FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN
62. REPUBLIC V VILLASOR
63. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI V CA
64. NHA V GUIVELONDO
65. UP V DIZON

56. United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, 79470, 80018, 80258,
[February 26, 1990]
57.

Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, [June 26, 2003]

58. Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31635, [August
31, 1971
59.

Sanders v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-46930, [June 10, 1988]

60. Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 11154, [March
21, 1916]
61. Spouses Fontanilla v. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. 55963 & 61045 (Resolution),
[February 27, 1991]
62.

Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-30671, [November 28, 1973]

63. Municipality of Makati v.

(Resolution), [October 1, 1990]

Court

of

Appeals,

G.R.

Nos.

89898-99

64. National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, [June
19, 2003]
65.

University of the Philippines v. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, [August 23, 2012]

66.

Yamashita v Styer

67.

Kuroda v Jalandoni

68.

Reyes v Bagatsing

69.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc of the PH v Health Sec Duque lll

70.

Ichong v Hernandez

71.

Gonzales v Hechanova

72.

Sec of Justice v Lantion

73.

BAYAN MUNA v Romullo

74.

IBP v Zamora

75.

Kulayan v Tan

76-85 PAINSERT AICEL

86.

ADIONG V COMELEC

87.

PAMATONG V COMELEC

88.

OPLE V TORRES

89.

IN RE: MANZANO

90.

YOUNGSTOWN V SAWYER

91.

BOWSHER V SYNAR

92.

SENATE V ERMITA

93.

BIRAOG V PHIL TRUTH COMMISSION

94.

PANGASINAN transpo V. PSC

95.

ABAKADA V ERMITA

96.

ARANETA V DINGLASAN

97.

RODRIGUEZ V CELLA

98.

AMPATUAN V PUNO

99.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA

100. MINERS ASSOC. V FACTORAN

101. VICTORIA MILLING V SSC

36. DFA v NLRC

Facts:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against ADB. Two
summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of
Foreign Affairs ("DFA"). ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well
as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for
borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and
Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines
Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived
its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favour Magnayi.
The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the
matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment."
When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

Issues:
1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has
descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of
its immunity from suit
3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition
4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case

Held:
1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process
of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as
the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy
immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and
commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB
is independent of the municipal law.
"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction,
i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to
the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction,
which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service
contracts with different private companies. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign
immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory,
a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is

recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard
to private act or acts jure gestionis.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for
profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and
institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles
it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign
relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable
it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international
community. When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to
have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly
regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive
department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international
arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:
"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued
to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign
state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State
to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds
that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the
court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to
first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how
the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International
Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the
respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court
a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander
of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent
Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and memorandum
as amicus curiae.

"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs
moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the
said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by
the respondents through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass the
Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the
nature of the acts and transactions involved."

4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has, under
special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the questioned order
or decision is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is a
patent nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the present
case. When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that
assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.

Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is
VACATED for being NULL AND VOID.

37. Mun of San Fernando v Firme

FACTS:

On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and
owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and
owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr.
died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical
injuries.

The heirs of Bania Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras and
Balagot. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner
and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. The case was transferred to branch presided by
Judge Firme. The heirs of Bania Sr. amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its
regular employee Bislig were impleaded as defendants. Judge Firme in its decision rendered the
Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig jointly and severally liable to pa funeral expenses, lot
expected earnings, moral damages and attorneys fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was liable.

RULING:

The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of the State.

The general rule Is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued
(Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.) Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a
special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving
liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent is implied when the government
enters into business contracts and also when the State files a complaint. Municipal corporations
are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should
enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
However, the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on
the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the
defendant is liable.
Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and
be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge
of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that
he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernandos municipal streets. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of
the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to
his office. Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who
was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

38. Bureau of Printing v Bureau of Printing

39.Farolan v CTA
Facts:
S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port of Manila
carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Baging Buhay Trading (Baging
Buhay).The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of theTariff and Customs Code
at 35%ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of
P11,350.00.The Office ofthe Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment upon
hearing the information thatthe shipment consisted of mosquito net made of nylon under Tariff
Heading No. 62.02 of the Tarif fand Customs Code. Upon re-examination, itturns out that the
shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as previouslydeclared. Thus the Collector of
Customs forfeited the shipment in favor ofthegovernment. Private respondent filed a petition on
August 20, 1976 for the release of the questioned goods which the Court denied. On June 2,1986,
64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong Buhay after several motion. The sixteen
remaining bales were missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards released, only
116,950 yards were in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents
demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it
actually lost
Issue:
Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost by
the private respondent.
Held:
Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent
sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper
would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of
Customs be ordered topay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall
on the government, itisobvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against
the state.
On this point, the political doctrine that state may not be sued without its consent,
categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate judicial
personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely taxation. As an
agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which
is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private respondents claim for damages against the
Commissioner of Customs must fails

40. PTA v Phil Golf Devt & Equipment

41. City of Angeles v CA
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; [PD 957 AS AMENDED BY PD 1216] SUBDIVISION DEVELOPERS ARE
LEGALLY BOUND TO DONATE OPEN SPACE TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. Pursuant to the
wording of Sec. 31 of P.D. 957 as amended by P.D. No. 1216, private respondent is under legal
obligation to donate the open space exclusively allocated for parks, playgrounds, and
recreational use to the petitioner. This can be clearly established by referring to the original
provision of Sec. 31 of P.D. 957. It will be noted that under the original provision, it
was optional on the part of the owner or developer to donate the roads and open spaces found
within the project to the city or municipality where the project is located. Elsewise stated, there
was no legal obligation to make the donation. However, said Sec. 31 as amended now states in
its last paragraph that it is no longer optional on the part of the subdivision owner/developer to
donate the open space for parks and playgrounds, rather there is now a legal obligation to
donate the same. Although there is a proviso that the donation of the parks and playgrounds
may be made to the homeowners association of the project with the consent of the city or
municipality concerned, nonetheless, the owner/developer is still obligated under the law to
donate. Such option does not change the mandatory character of the provision. The donation has
to be made regardless of which donee is picked by the owner/developer. The consent
requirement before the same can be donated to the homeowners' association emphasizes this
point. ADEHTS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE PERCENTAGE OF AREA FOR PARKS AND PLAYGROUND IS TO BE BASED ON
THE GROSS AREA OFTHE SUBDIVISION. The language of Section 31 of P.D. 957 as amended by
Section 2 of P.D. 1216 is wanting in clarity and exactitude, but it can be easily inferred that the
phrase "gross area" refers to the entire subdivision area. The said phrase was used four times in
the same section in two sentences, the first of which reads: ". . . For subdivision projects one (1)

hectare or more, the owner or developer shall reserve thirty per cent (30%) of the gross area for
open space. . . . ." Here, the phrase "30% of the gross area" refers to the total area of the
subdivision, not of the open space. Otherwise, the definition of "open space" would be circular.
Thus, logic dictates that the same basis be applied in the succeeding instances where the phrase
"open space" is used, i.e., "9% of the gross area. . . 7% of gross area. . . 3.5% of gross area. . ."
Moreover, we agree with petitioners that construing the 3.5% to 9% as applying to
the totality of the open space would result in far too small an area being devoted for parks,
playgrounds, etc., thus rendering meaningless and defeating the purpose of the statute. This
becomes clear when viewed in the light of the original requirement of P.D. 953 ("Requiring the
Planting of Trees in Certain Places, etc."). To our mind, it is clear that P.D. 1216 was an attempt to
achieve a happy compromise and a realistic balance between the imperatives of environmental
planning and the need to maintain economic feasibility in subdivision and housing development,
by reducing the required area for parks, playgrounds and recreational uses from thirty percent
(30%) to only 3.5% - 9% of the entire area of the subdivision.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DONEE IS BARRED FROM CONSTRUCTING A BUILDING THEREON;
EXCEPTION. In the case at bar, one of the conditions imposed in the Amended
Deed of Donation is that the donee should build a sports complex on the donated land. Since P.D.
1216 clearly requires that the 3.5% to 9% of the gross area allotted for parks and playgrounds is
"non-buildable", then the obvious question arises whether or not such condition was validly
imposed and is binding on the donee. It is clear that the "non-buildable" character applies only to
the 3.5% to 9% area set by law. If there is any excess land over and above the 3.5% to 9%
required by the decree, which is also used or allocated for parks, playgrounds and recreational
purposes, it is obvious that such excess area is not covered by the non-buildability restriction. In
the instant case, if there be an excess, then the donee would not be barred from developing and
operating a sports complex thereon, and the condition in the amended deed would then be
considered valid and binding. To determine if the over 50,000 square meter area donated
pursuant to the amended deed would yield an excess over the area required by the decree, it is
necessary to determine under which density category the Timog Park subdivision falls. If the
subdivision falls under the low density or open market housing category, with 20 family lots or
below per gross hectare, the developer will need to allot only 3.5% ofgross area for parks and
playgrounds, and since the donated land constitutes "more than five (5) percent of the total land
area of the subdivision, there would therefore be an excess of over 1.5% of gross area which
would not be non-buildable. Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged (and private respondent did
not controvert) that the subdivision in question is a "medium-density or economic housing"
subdivision based on the sizes of the family lots donated in the amended deed, for which
category the decree mandates that not less than 7% of gross area be set aside. Since the
donated land constitutes only a little more than 5% of the gross area of the subdivision, which is
less than the area required to be allocated for non-buildable open space, therefore there is no
"excess land" to speak of. This then means that the condition to build a sports complex on the
donated land is contrary to law and should be considered as not imposed. HCaIDS
4. ID.; ID.; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; DONATION; CONDITIONS MAY BE IMPOSED
THEREON PROVIDED THAT THE SAME IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS,
PUBLIC ORDER OR PUBLIC POLICY. The general law on donations does not prohibit the
imposition of conditions on a donation so long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible. In
regard to donations of open spaces, P.D. 1216 itself requires among other things that the
recreational areas to be donated be based, is aforementioned, on a percentage (3.5%, 7%, or
9%) of the total area of the subdivision depending on whether the subdivision is low-, medium-,
or high-density. It further declares that such open space devoted to parks, playgrounds and
recreational areas are non-alienable public land and non-buildable. However, there is no
prohibition in either P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing conditions on such donation. We hold
that any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The contention of petitioners that the
donation should be unconditional because it is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not

provide that the donation should be unconditional. To rule that it should be so is tantamount to
unlawfully expanding the provisions of the decree.
5. ID., CONTRACTS; VOID OR INEXISTENT; EFFECT OF PARI-DELICTO. Article 1412 of the Civil
Code which provides that: "If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed: "(1) When the fault is on the
part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue ofthe contract,
or demand the performance of the other's undertaking" comes into play here. Both petitioners
and private respondents are in violation of P.D. 957 as amended, for donating and accepting a
donation of open space less than that required by law, and for agreeing to build and operate a
sports complex on the non-buildable open space so donated, and petitioners, for constructing a
drug rehabilitation center on the same non-buildable area. Moreover, since the condition to
construct a sports complex on the donated land has previously been shown to be contrary to law,
therefore, stipulation no. 8of the amended deed cannot be implemented because (1)
no valid stipulation of the amended deed had been breached, and (2) it is highly improbable that
the decree would have allowed the return of the donated land for open space under any
circumstance, considering the non-alienable character of such open space, in the light of the
second Whereas clause of P.D. 1216 which declares that ". . . such open spaces, roads, alleys and
sidewalks in residential subdivisions are for public use and are, therefore, beyond the
commerce of men." Further, as a matter of public policy, private respondent cannot be allowed
to evade its statutory obligation to donate the required open space through the
expediency of invoking petitioners' breach ofthe aforesaid condition. It is a familiar principle that
the courts will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where
they find them. Neither party can recover damages from the other arising from the act contrary
to law, or plead the same as a cause of action or as a defense. Each must bear the
consequences of his own acts.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; A JUDGMENT RESTRAINING A
PARTY FROM DOING A CERTAIN ACT IS ENFORCEABLE AND SHALL REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND
EFFECT EVEN PENDING APPEAL. ". . . When a writof preliminary injunction was sought for by
the appellee [private respondent] to enjoin the appellants [petitioners herein] from further
continuing with the construction of the said center, the latter resisted and took refuge under the
provisions ofPresidential Decree No. 1818 (which prohibits writs of preliminary injunction) to
continue with the construction of the building. Yet, the appellants also presented City Council
Resolution No. 227, which allegedly repealed the previous Resolution authorizing
the City Government to construct a Drug Rehabilitation Center on the donated property, by
'changing the purpose and usage of the Drug Rehabilitation Center to Sports Development and
Youth Center to make it conform to the Sports Complex Project therein.' Under this Resolution No.
227, the appellants claimed that they have abandoned all plans for the construction of the Drug
Rehabilitation Center. Nonetheless, when judgment was finally rendered on February 15, 1989,
the appellants were quick to state that they have not after all abandoned their plans for the
center as they have in fact inaugurated the same on April 15, 1989. In plain and simple terms,
this act is a mockery of our judicial system perperated by the appellants. For them to argue that
the court cannot deal, on their Drug Rehabilitation Center is not only preposterous but also
ridiculous. It is interesting to observe that under the appealed decision the appellants and their
officers, employees and all other persons acting on their behalf were perpetually enjoined to
cease and desist from constructing a Drug Rehabilitation Center on the donated property. Under
Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that: "Section 4 A judgment in an
action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during
the pendency of an appeal." Accordingly, a judgment restraining a party from doing a
certain act is enforceable and shall remain in full force and effect even pending appeal. In the
case at bar, the cease and desist order therefore still stands. Appellants' persistence and
continued construction and, subsequent, operation of the Drug Rehabilitation Center violate the
express terms of the writ ofinjunction lawfully issued by the lower court."

7. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; A PUBLIC OFFICIAL IS LIABLE FOR

DAMAGES CAUSED BY HIS ACTDONE WITH MALICE AND IN BAD FAITH OR BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION. In theory, the costof such demolition, and the
reimbursement of the public funds expended in the construction thereof, should be borne by the
officials of the City of Angeles who ordered and directed such construction. This Court has time
and again ruled that public officials are not immune from damages in their personal capacities
arising from acts done in bad faith. Otherwise stated, a public official may be liable in his
personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in
bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. In the instant case, the public
officials concerned deliberately violated the law and persisted in their violations, going so far as
attempting to deceive the courts by their pretended change of purpose and usage for the center,
and "making a mockery of the judicial system." Indisputably, said public officials acted beyond
the scope of their authority and jurisdiction and with evident bad faith. However, as noted by the
trial court,
the
petitioners
mayor
and
members of the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Angeles City were sued only in theirofficial capacities, hence, they could not be
held personally liable without first giving them their day in court. Prevailing jurisprudence holding
that public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith
are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official and personal capacities.
42. Veterans Manpower and Protective Services Inc. V CA
FACTS:
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions under
Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the 1987
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and
tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one
security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the
Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and
Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V.
Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that all private security agencies/company
security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region
where their main offices are located.... As such membership requirement in PADPAO is
compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies,
unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the
minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at
P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.
Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard
minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on
Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license
to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and likewise recommended the
cancellation of VMPSIs license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of
membership to VMPSI.

VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and
consider VMPSIs application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership
from PADPAO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State
without its consent.
HELD:
Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in
bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which
the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of
their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had
against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court
of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an
implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such
consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. Petition for
review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto.

43.Wylie v Rarang
AT THE NAVAL BASE. In Feb. 1978, M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer and Capt.
James Williams was the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City.
Aurora I. Rarang was employed as a merchandise control guard in the Office of the Provost
Marshal.
THE POD. Wylie, in his capacity as asst. admin. officer, supervised the publication of the Naval
Base stations Plan of the Day (POD), which featured important announcements, necessary
precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of its regular features was
the action line inquiry.
THE CAUSE OF THIS MESS. On Feb. 3, 1978, the POD published, under the NAVSTA Action Line
Inquiry, the ff:
Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/ inspectress are (sic) consuming
for their own benefit things they have confiscated from Base Personnel. The observation is even
more aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY.
This is not to mention Auring who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the
Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the head of the Merchandise
Control Division is aware of this malpractice?
Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other personnel are prohibited from appropriating
confiscated items for their own consumption or use. Two locked containers are installed at the
Main Gate area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM evidence custodian controls access
to these containers. Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their meals at their
worksite due to heavy workload. Complaints regarding merchandise control guards procedure or
actions may be made directly at the Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and necessary
action.
Rarang was the Auring referred to here, as she was the only one with that name in the Office of
the Provost Marshall, and Wylies letter of apology for the inadvertent publication was also
conclusive proof of this.
AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES was instituted by Rarang against Wylie, Williams, and the US Naval

Base. She prayed for P300K moral damages, exemplary damages, and P50K attorneys fees.
RARANGS ALLEGATIONS: the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and
libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulated in the English language
and read by almost all the U.S. Naval Base personnel.
WYLIE, WILLIAMS, THE NAVAL BASE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS, BASED ON THESE GROUNDS:
1. Wylie and Williams acted in the performance of their official functions as officers of the US
Navy and are immune from suit;
2. The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued without
its consent; and
3. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
MOTION DENIED.
THE TCS DECISION: the acts of Wylie and Williams werent official acts of the US government in
the operation and control of the Base but personal and tortious acts which are exceptions to the
general rule that a sovereign country cant be sued in the court of another country without its
consent. Thus their acts werent imputable against the US government but were done in their
individual and personal capacities. They were ordered to pay Rarang P100K moral and exemplary
damages, and P30K attorneys fees. However, the suit against the US Naval Base was dismissed.
BOTH PARTIES APPEALED. Wylie and Williams asserted that they are immune from suit since the
publication was made in their official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy, and that they did
not intentionally and maliciously cause the publication. Rarang appealed as she wasnt satisfied
with the award.
THE IAC MODIFIED THE TCS DECISION: Rarang was awarded P175K moral damages and P60K
exemplary damages.
WYLIE AND WILLIAMS ARGUMENT in this Petition for Review: they made the publication in the
performance of their official functions as administrative assistant (Wylie) and commanding officer
(Williams) of the US Navy and were, therefore, immune from suit for their official actions.
ISSUE: WON Wylie and Williams are liable for the published article in the POD. Does the grant of
rights, power, and authority to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its
officers from crimes and torts?
HELD: YES and NO respectively.
THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, QUOTING US v. GUINTO: The rule that a state
may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2Even without such affirmation,
we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the
doctrine of incorporation As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based
on the justification given by Justice Holmes that there can be no legal right against the authority
which makes the law on which the right depends! (Kawanakoa v. Polybank) There are other
practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to
be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in
parem, non habet imperium . All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, unduly vex the
peace of nations. (Da Haber v. Queen of Portugal)
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them

in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against
the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded (Garcia v. Chief of Staff). In such a
situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed
without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called the royal prerogative of dishonesty because of the
privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its nonsuability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling
tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does
not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that
the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it
consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state
enters into a contract it itself commences litigationThe above rules are subject to qualification.
Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly
enacted statute. (Rep. v. Purisima) not all contracts entered into by the government will
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and
proprietary acts (US v. Ruiz). As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will
result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. (Lim v.
Brownell)
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, ALSO UNDER US v. GUINTO: In the case of
the US, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with more
specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon to support their position that they are not
suable, the US not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in Baer,
the Court held:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is
appropriate insofar as alien armed forces are concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v.
Bradford, a 1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners
confined by American army authorities, Justice Hilado cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was
explicitly declared: It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly
country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the
civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this
Court relied on Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support excerpts from the works of the
authoritative writers Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the
Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provision should control on such
matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on
the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez
It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the action must be
considered as one against the U.S. Government. The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued:
It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was
raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its
consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover,
this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latters
consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said
governments consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his
country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance
that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.
The above observations do not confer on the US a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its

agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated
from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of
their official functions. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or
private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that
no such waiver may be implied In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts
(jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii... The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their
official functions as officers or agents of the US. However, this is a matter of evidence. The
charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts
are imputable to the US, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are
sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the US itself is not involved. If found
liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS. The POD was published under the direction and authority of the
commanding officer. The administrative assistant, among his other duties, is tasked to prepare
and distribute the POD. The NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry is a regular feature of the POD , which
was to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel should be
brought to his attention for correction or investigation . According to Wylie, the action line
naming Auring was received about 3 weeks prior to the articles publication. It was forwarded
to the Provost Marshal for comment, and the response included a short note stating that if
the article was published, to remove the name. This note was forwarded to the executive officer
and to the commanding officer for approval. The approval of the commanding officer was
forwarded to the office of the Administrative Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A clerk typist in
the office of the Administrative Assistant prepared the smooth copy of the POD and Wylie, the
administrative assistant signed the smooth copy of the POD but failed to notice the reference to
Auring in the action line inquiry.
As the article implied that Rarang was consuming and appropriating confiscated items, she was
investigated by her supervisor. Before the article came out, she had been the recipient of
commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties.
PART OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. Wylie and Williams actively participated in screening the features
and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that US officials in the
performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that they may
not be held liable for the questioned publication.
BUT: TAKE NOTE THAT THEY WERE SUED IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES for their alleged
tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. And our laws and, we presume, those of the US dont
allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty, and these arent covered by the
immunity agreement.
CHAVEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN on the law on immunity from suit of public officials is applicable

here: the general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed
to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or
where there is showing of bad faith A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. In the case of PCGG v. Pea, Chief
Justice Teehankee added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section
4(a) of Exec. Order No. I as follows:
First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission,
The cited section provides the Commissions members immunity from suit thus: No civil
action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in
the discharge of the task contemplated by this order. No absolute immunity like that sought by
Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood
that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable
magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the States exercise of police power
was immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the
members of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the
official discharge of the functions of their office.
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Where the petitioner exceeds
his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith, or maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG
commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit
in derogation of the latters constitutional rights and liberties, there can be no question that a
complaint for damages does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The
actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be
taken against public officers or private citizens alike.
ARGUMENT: that Williams as commanding officer is far removed in the chain of command from
the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything
which goes wrong on the base.
WHILE THIS IS TRUE AS A GEN. RULE, FOR THIS CASE NO. The records show that the offensive
publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. Art. 2176
prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a persons act or omission constituting fault or
negligence. Fault or negligence in this Article covers not only acts not punishable by law
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent. Moreover, Art.
2219(7) provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other
form of defamation. In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from
the guilty party moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or
exemplary damages .
ULTRA VIRES ACT CANT BE PART OF OFFICIAL DUTY. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in
the POD is a defamation against Rarangs character and reputation. Wylie himself admitted that
the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name if the article
was published, but they were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication
without deleting the name. Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty.
It was a tortious act which ridiculed Rarang, and as a result she suffered besmirched reputation,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was
baseless and false. Wylie and Williams alone, in their personal capacities, are liable for the
damages they caused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the
IAC are AFFIRMED.

44. Republic v Sandoval

Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of Authority
Facts:

The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre (background: Wiki),
together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted the petition, seeking the reversal
and setting aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8, 1988) in
"Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case
against the Republic of the Philippines

May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in their
personal and official capacity, holding them liable, if at all, would not result in
financial responsibility of the government

Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration

In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they
called "genuine agrarian reform"

The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems
and demands such as:

giving lands for free to farmers

zero retention of lands by landlords

stop amortizations of land payments

Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on
January 15, 1987

On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez

Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then
President Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meeting

Tension mounted the next day

The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and
prevented the employees from going inside their offices

On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's
group decided to march to Malacanang to air their demands

On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng
Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML)

Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infliltrated by
CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection was impending

Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola

The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm

From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place;
"pandemonium broke loose"

After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo)

39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group
of marchers

Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor physical
injuries

The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident on February 27,
1987 as follows

The march did not have any permit

The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by law

The security men assigned to protect the government units were in civilian attire
(prohibited by law)

There was unnecessary firing by the police and military

The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law

It is not clear who started the firing

The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the
crowd; the water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because:

there was no order to use them

they were incorrectly prepositioned

they were out of range of the marchers

The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed

individuals shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers

The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the Western
Police District (WPD) and Integrated National Police (INP) who were armed be prosecuted
for violation of par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985

Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended

It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the rally without
permit and for inciting sedition

Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers for their failure to
make effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in
Mendiola:

Gen. Ramon E. Montao

Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim

Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres

Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz

Col. Cezar Nazareno

Maj. Filemon Gasmin

Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded victims to
be compensated by the government

It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages
from the government
No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims

On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the

Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved
in the Mendiola incident

Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot
be sued without its consent

Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit

Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no such waiver

Motion for Reconsideration was also denied

Issues:
1.

Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not this is a
suit against the State with its consent)

Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the
government to indemnify the heirs and victims, and by public addresses made by
President Aquino, the State has consented to be sued

2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State

Holding:
1. No.

This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

2. No.
Ratio:
1. Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its consent

The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that liability
automatically attaches to the State

The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve only as
cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State immediately

President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are not
tantamount to a waiver by the State

2. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:

1. When the Republic is sued by name;
2. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
3. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that
the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government

Although the military officers and personnel were discharging their official
functions during the incident, their functions ceased to be official the
moment they exceeded their authority

There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms.

Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but they fired at the
crowd instead

No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.

45. Syquia v Almeda Lopez
1. COURTS; JURISDICTIONS; CLAIM OF TITLE AND POSSESSION OF PROPERTY BY PRIVATE CITIZEN;
AGAINST OFFICERS AND AGENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. A private citizen claiming title and
right of possession of a certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as
individuals, officers and agents of the Government who are said to be illegally withholding the
same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the
Government, and the courts may entertain such a suit although the Government itself is not
included as a party-defendant.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IF JUDGMENT WILL INVOLVE FINANCIAL LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT, SUIT CANNOT
PROSPER OR BE ENTERTAINED EXCEPT WITH GOVERNMENT'S CONSENT. But where the
judgment in the suit by the private citizen against the officers and agents of the government
would result not only in the recovery of possession of property in favor of said citizen but also in
a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one
against the Government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be entertained by courts
except with the consent of said government
3. ID.; ID.; SUIT BY CITIZEN AGAINST FOREIGN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT LATTER'S CONSENT;
COURTS LACK OF JURISDICTION. This is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latter's consent but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign
government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of
jurisdiction of the courts of his country.

46. SANDERS V VERIDIANO

FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in
Olongapo city. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens
permanently residing in the Philippines and who were employed as gameroom
attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the
respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent
full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders
disagreed with the hearing officers report of the reinstatement of private respondents to
permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters
contained libellous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for
damages against petitioners.
ISSUE:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did
the acts for which the private respondents sued them for damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being
called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given
the official character of the letters, the petioners were, legally speaking, being sued as
officers of the United States government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless
the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The
private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with
the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction
the alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over
the case.

47. TAN V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

FACTS:
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public
bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting
of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of
timberland, which was turned over by the US Government to the Philippine Government.
Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their application in due form.
The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general memorandum order authorizing Dir.
Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some conditions
stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000
hectares for extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing
Gozon) promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority
delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same
date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the
license was released by the Director of Forestry .
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the
OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tans OTL null
and void (but the same was not granted to Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a
reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
denied the motion.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not petitioners timber license is valid (No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available (No)
RULING:
I
Petitioners timber license was signed and released without authority and is
therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in the general memorandum dated May 30,
1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only
where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public
forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares In the second place, at the
time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more
authority to grant any license. (The license was released to the petitioner onJanuary 6,
1964 while on the other hand, the authority of the Director of Forestry to issue license
was revoked on December 19, 1963).
In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the
license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest
importance is the date of the release or issuance. Before its release, no right is acquired
by the licensee.

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondentsappellees can validly revoke his timber license. "A license is merely a permit or privilege
to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed
of to defeat the proper exercise of police power.

II
Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the
order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President
of the Philippines. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the
orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that
appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.

48. UP V DIZON
FACTS:
University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and
renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its
first and second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to
its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to
collect the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders.
Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the
motion.
The
denial
of
the
said
motion
was
served
upon
Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably,
Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due
course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002,
upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final
and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite
their previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution
having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution
filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on
October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs
depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the UPs funds can be validly garnished?
II. Whether or not the UPs appeal dated June 3, 2002 has been filed out of
time?
HELD: The petition for review is meritorious.
FIRST ISSUE: UPs funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.
POLITICAL LAW: garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered
institution" performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a

government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting

quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers
special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the
purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All
the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the
deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the
disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and
should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government
funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real
property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional
objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court
succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should
first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the
state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is
not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary
judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no
moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.
SECOND ISSUE: Period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon
counsel of record.
REMEDIAL LAW: doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; freshperiod rule; computation of time
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of
P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the
finality of the judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC
declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that a decision that has attained finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as the highest court of
the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been absolute, and
has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b)
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
that render its execution unjust and inequitable.
We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional
power to disregard the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear
violation of the UPs right to due process.

Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of
the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the
counsel of record of the UP. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is
settled that where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such
counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of
Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon
him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party
himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall
only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side."
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective,
such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23,
2002, it would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and
immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In
so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied
the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to
the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the
period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to
task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period
rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling
in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
or motion for reconsideration."
The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution," is impervious to any serious challenge. This is because
there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when
Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal
was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of
15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end
on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or
June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22,
Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall
not run until the next working day."
Petition for review is GRANTED. The CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
49. REPUBLIC V FELICIANO
Facts:

Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of
Feliciano and the rest of the property reverted to the public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set
aside the decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in
possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at
the day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional
evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in
favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was
reopened to allow them to present their evidence.
Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines
cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was
opposed by Feliciano.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Held:
No
Ratio:
A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted.
The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to
Feliciano, hence the government is not being divested of any of its properties.

50. MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO V FIRME

34 Phil 311 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of the State for acts of special
agents
Political Law Non-Suability of the State Waiver of Non-Suability is Not Admission of
Liability
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was
excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre
Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was

proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he
was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his
job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to
earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later
authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the
legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said
suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of
such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals
in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on
the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents.
The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the
sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order
or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official)
so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government
officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government.
The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the
officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in
endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public
interest.

51. MERRITT V GOVT OF THE PHIL ISLANDS

FACTS:
On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by
Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by
Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality
of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and
4 others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The heirs of Bania Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras and
Balagot. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the
petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. The case was transferred to
branch presided by Judge Firme. The heirs of Bania Sr. amended the complaint wherein
the petitioner and its regular employee Bislig were impleaded as defendants. Judge Firme
in its decision rendered the Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig jointly and severally
liable to pa funeral expenses, lot expected earnings, moral damages and attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was liable.

RULING:
The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of the State.
The general rule Is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be
sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.) Express consent may be embodied in a
general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of
money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent
is implied when the government enters into business contracts and also when the State
files a complaint. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity
from suit.
Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because
their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. However, the circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never
be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere
fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable.
Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them
in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck
of the municipality insists that he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of
sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernandos municipal streets.
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office. Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its
regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

52. RAYO V CFI OF BULACAN

FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened
simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden,
precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were
inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the respondent corporation.
Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and
contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety functions
and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to the
management and operation of the Angat Dam.

W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes
the power to be sued for tort.
HELD: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has
allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.
As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the government. Moreover, the charter provision that
it can sue and be sued in any court.

53. FROILAN V PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING

Facts:
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for
P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To
secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel
mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among
them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of
said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission
chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines.
Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the
Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original
contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan

Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do
so.
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ
of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and
appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession
thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue
thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel.
Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff s rights under the contract of sale,
for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had
authority to dispose of said authority to the property, Plaintiff having already
relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of
P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an
action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said
property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case
praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon
may be foreclosed.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the
counterclaim.
Discussions:
When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested
itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary
individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued
when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative
relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from
suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as
plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In
short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and
other defenses he might have against the state.
54. USA V GUINTO
These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of
state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but
has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has
not consented.

FACTS:

1.

USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the
said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award
because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the
invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.
2.

USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force
Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after
investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him
guilty and recommended his dismissal.
3.

USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force
Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified
against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He
then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latters
acts that he lost his job.
4.

USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US
military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat
them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and
claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the
injuries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for
acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our
land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as
accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the
law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act

to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not
been formally impleaded.
When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the
level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with
its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a
blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the
other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely
because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official
functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly
waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver
may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by
the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court
would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO,
except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the
grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was
remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of
the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary
capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental
activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into
the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed
the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about
the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in
terminating Genoves employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.
In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their
official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified
against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they
cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its
consent to be sued.
In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study
of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were
really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the
incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may
assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.
NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND
CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT
ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.

2. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs

Guinto)
Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No
implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)
55. USA V RUIZ
Brief Fact Summary. When Ruizs sentence was vacated because she refused to waive
her rights to impeachment evidence, the government brought appeal on the grounds
that its plea bargaining process was not unconstitutional.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that a defendant
receive exculpatory evidence at trial, a defendant may waive their right to this
information in a plea agreement.
Facts. Federal prosecutors offered respondent, Angela Ruiz, a fast track plea bargain,
after 30kg of marijuana was found in her luggage by immigration agents. Per the terms
of the bargain, the respondent would have gotten a reduced sentence recommendation,
in exchange for waiving the right to receive impeachment information relating to any
informants or other witnesses, as well as to information supporting any affirmative
defense she may raise if she were to go to trial. Ruiz rejected the waiver of her rights,
the offer was withdrawn and she was indicted for unlawful drug possession. At
sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the sentence she would have gotten, had
she taken the plea bargain, on the grounds that it was in violation of her Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to a fair trial. The Court of Appeals ruled for the respondent, and
vacated the sentence, and the government brought appeal.

Issue. Whether, before entering into a plea agreement, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
require federal prosecutors to disclose impeachment information relating to informants
or other witnesses.
Held. Justice Breyer, for the Court, held that although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do
provide that a defendant be given exculpatory impeachment evidence from prosecutors,
a guilty plea under a plea agreement, with a waiver of rights, can be accepted as
knowing and voluntary.
Concurrence. Justice Thomas concurs, noting that the purpose of requiring exculpatory
evidence is so there be no unfair trial to the accused, which does not apply at the plea
bargaining stage.
Discussion. While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are designed to protect the right to a
fair trial, a defendant can knowingly and voluntarily waive those rights in a valid plea
agreement.

USA v Guinto
These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the
doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the
case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits
against it to which it has not consented.
FACTS:
1.

USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark
Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents
wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his
bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

2.

USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air
Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained
after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in
cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager
suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which
unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.

3.

USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of
the Air Force Office. An information was filed against Bautista and at the trial,
petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed
from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that
it was because of the latters acts that he lost his job.

4.

USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners
(US military officers) for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when
defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them. The
petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but
resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US
Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the
generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part
of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by
the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of
incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states
are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state
although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on
the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines.
Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in
this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the
discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when
the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental
acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions
granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private
persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the
defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the
evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions
were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for
further proceedings.
In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air
Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US

government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a

commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can
claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with
Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of
its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint
against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the
proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in
terminating Genoves employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.
In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the
exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation
and thereafter testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as
agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable
to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a
closer study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if
the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually
exceeded their authority when the incident occurred.The needed inquiry must first
be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of
the parties.
NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL
AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED
ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs
Guinto)
Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions.
No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

Republic of Indonesia v Vinzon

FACTS:
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah,
entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James
Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by
the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a
period of four years. When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the
position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondents
work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in
the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Respondent filed a complaint
claiming that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss assailing that Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign
sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a partydefendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision
that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the
abovementioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

RULING:
The SC GRANTED the petition.
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The mere
entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure
gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. A sovereign State does not
merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a
diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State
may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises,
furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents
and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting
in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent
for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets,
electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian
Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCIONSADAYA vs.

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU

40 scra 464

FACTS: Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot
alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized
representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the
widening of a national road, without paying just compensation and without any
agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands
for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public
Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit.

HOLDING: NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the
recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge
against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded
as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be
validly entertained by the court except with the consent of said Government. In as
much as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such
acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule
of immunity of the State from suit.

NOTE: When the government takes any property for public use, which is condition
upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes
manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. The Court may proceed with
the complaint and determine the compensation to which the petitioner are entitle
(Ministerio vs.CFI, 40 SCRA 464)

Sanders v Veridiano II
FACTS:

Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this
conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent
rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel
explaining the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and
Wyer filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages
against the herein petitioners claiming that the letters contained libellous
imputations against the two. Due to the failure to appear in the court, Moreau
and Sanders were declared in default.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the
acts for which they have been sued for damages.

RULING:

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners
are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their
official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA,
undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters.
The same can be said for Moreau. Given the official character of the abovedescribed letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being sued as
officers of the United States government. There should be no question by now
that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held
ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

Merritt v Govt of the Philippine Islands

34 Phil 311 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of the State for acts of
special
agents
Political Law Non-Suability of the State Waiver of Non-Suability is Not
Admission of Liability
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor who
was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle
Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the
ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt
was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so
that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even
earn at least half of what he used to earn.

In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which
later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by
the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government
of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and
ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver
of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit.
It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It
follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to
their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the
part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is
one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise
of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the
state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided
to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from
the government. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would
involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses,
which would be subversive of the public interest.

SPS Fontanilla v Maliaman

FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held
liable for damages resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses
caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA

maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not
perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and
distinct from the government, because its community services are only incidental
functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an
agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for
actions of their employees.

Facts:
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform
solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government
tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act
of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.
Issue:
whether NIA is performing governmental functions and is thus
exempt form suit for damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who is not
its special agent
Held:
No. The functions of government have been classified into
governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves
the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes
merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The
functions of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere
optional functions of government even though the service rendered caters to the
community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society.
The NIA was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be
true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at
promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA
essentially and purely a government-function corporation. NIA was created for
the purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all
national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump
irrigation projects. Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely
benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only
incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
The NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate
and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but
a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held

liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its
special agent.
Republic v Villasor
Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino
Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final and
executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was
issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of
garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the
same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of
military and civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution
against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and
void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held:
No
Ratio:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune from
suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends.

Municipality of Makati V Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by
private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After
proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the
petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus
the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of
execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which
was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a
motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be
garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement
of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the
case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion,
which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and
petitioner
now
filed
this
petition
for
review.
Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from
garnishment and levy upon execution.
Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge
involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by
respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby
are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the
law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule
that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided
for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees,
and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their
PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this
court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use
already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal
obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's
power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and
justice.

National Housing Authority v Guivelondo

FACTS:

On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent
domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of
Isidro Guivelondo for the purpose of the public use of Socialized housing.
On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating
that they were waiving their objections to NHAs power to expropriate their
properties. Thus an order of execution has been granted and the court already
appointed commissioners to determine the amount for just compensation
On April 17, 2000, the Commissioners submitted their report wherein they
recommended that the just compensation of the subject properties be fixed at
P11,200.00 per square meter wherein a partial judgment has been rendered.
After the report on the just compensation has completed, both parties filed an MR
on the amount for the just compensation stating that it has no adequate basis and
support. Both MR was denied by the court.
While the judgment has been rendered in the RTC and an entry of judgment and
the motion for execution has been issued, NHA filed a petition for certiorari to the
Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition on the ground that the Partial
Judgment and Omnibus Order became final and executory when petitioner failed
to appeal the same.
Wherefore, the Petitioner NHA filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
1)
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED AND COERCED BY THE
COURTS TO EXERCISE OR CONTINUE WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN;
2)
WHETHER OR NOT WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE
ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE IN AN EXPROPRIATION WHEREIN THE EXERCISE OF
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN WILL NOT SERVE PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE

3) WHETHER OR NOT JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IF

ESTOPPEL OR LACHES APPLIES TO GOVERNMENT;
HELD:
The petition was denied and the judgment rendered by the lower court was
affirmed.

RATIO:

On the first issue, the court held that, yes the state can be compelled and
coerced by the court to continue exercise its inherent power of eminent domain,
since the NHA does not exercise its right to appeal in the expropriation
proceedings before the court has rendered the case final and executory. In the
early case of City of Manila v. Ruymann and Metropolitan Water District v. De Los
Angeles, an expropriation proceeding was explained.

Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the

property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or
public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the
taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more
than three commissioners.

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff
to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal
of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if
this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the
action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too,
would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules
expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or
heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the Court of the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would

finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done
by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may
believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of
fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of
the order by taking an appeal there from.

On the second issue, the court held that a socialized housing is always for
the public used and that the public purpose of the socialized housing project is not
in any way diminished by the amount of just compensation that the court has
fixed.

On the third issue, the court ruled that in this case the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be applied to the NHA, although it is public in character, it is
only public in character since it is government-owned, having a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such
government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency,
although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.

Notes:
Important Discussion in the case:

When does the Doctrine of State Immunity not applied in the government
agencies?

1. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law

2. If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled

corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct
from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment.
This is so because when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.

GARNISMENT AS DEFINED BY BLACK LAW DICTIONARY:

Garnishment

A judicial proceeding in which a creditor (or a potential creditor) asks the

court to order a third party who is indebted to or is bailee for the debtor to turn
over to the creditor any of the debtors property (such as wages or bank accounts)
held by that third party.
A person can initiate a garnishment action as means of either prejudgment
seizure or post judgment collection.
In short, it only means whether the Heirs of Guivelendo can file a case to
NHA to compel the latter to give to them the amount of the just compensation as
rendered by the court.

UP v DIzon
FACTS:
University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement
with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction
and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to
pay its first and second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was
not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern
Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern
Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration.
The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon
Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002.
Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS
inDiliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC
denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On
October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of
execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial
became final and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for
execution despite their previous motion having already been granted and despite

the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted
another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already
issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served
notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the
release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the UPs funds can be validly garnished?
II. Whether or not the UPs appeal dated June 3, 2002 has been filed out
of time?
HELD: The petition for review is meritorious.
FIRST ISSUE: UPs funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.
POLITICAL LAW: garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered
institution" performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a
government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of
promoting quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the
UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated
under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as
expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the
UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking
institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should
always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be
subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are
public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real
property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its
institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the
Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A
distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends
on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the

established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state
has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity,
it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The execution of
the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the
COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated
the claim against the UP.
SECOND ISSUE: Period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision
upon counsel of record.
REMEDIAL LAW: doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of
judgments; fresh-period rule; computation of time
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of
P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the
finality of the judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the
RTC declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that a decision that has attained
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by
this Court as the highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a
final judgment has not been absolute, and has admitted several exceptions,
among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the socalled nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision that render its execution unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs
plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional power to disregard
the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of
the UPs right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon
Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was
admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. Verily, the service of the denial of
the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS
in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that where a party has appeared by counsel,

service must be made upon such counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2,
second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any
party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel
or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.
Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one
copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side."
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and
effective, such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would
end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the
RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed
too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against
the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and
that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task
for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the freshperiod rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its
ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration." The retroactive
application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution," is impervious to any serious challenge. This is because
there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when
Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of
appeal was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the
fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP
had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal,
conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last
day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal

holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day."

Petition for review is GRANTED. The CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

66. YAMASHITA V STYER

Yamashita vs Styer
G.R. No. L-129 December 19, 1945

Summary
At the end of the Second World War, Tomoyuki Yamashita was a Commander in
the Japanese Army serving in the Philippines. His troops were allegedly
responsible for killing, torturing and raping thousands of civilians.
On 3 September 1945, Yamashita surrendered to the United States army. A US
military commission tried him for violations of the laws of war. Yamashita was
charged with having failed to perform his duties as an army commander to control
the operations of his troops, thus permitting them to commit atrocities. He was
convicted and sentenced to death by hanging.
Yamashita appealed at the US Supreme Court, because the military commission
had lacked many procedural and evidential protections. The Supreme Court
denied this appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that even if Yamashita did not know
about the crimes committed by his subordinates, because of his position as a
superior, he should have known. Yamashita was executed on 23 February 1946.
The outcome of this case has been much debated and criticised, because of the
claimed lack of evidence and the should have known criteria as described by the
Supreme Court.
Facts:
Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army group
of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender became a
prisoner of war of the United States of America but was later removed from such
status and placed in confinement as an accused war criminal charged before an
American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General
Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.
Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that he be
reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military
Commission be prohibited from further trying him. He questions, among others,
the jurisdiction of said Military Commission.
Issue/s:
1. Should the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this case?

2. Was the Military Commission validly constituted by respondent, therefore

having jurisdiction over the war crimes?
Ruling: 1. NO. 2. YES.
1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not
sought. It seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his
restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined.
The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter
of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil
courts. Prohibition cannot issue against one not made party respondent. Neither
may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The
Military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although it
may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these
case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.
The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if
the commission be joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford
(pp. 50, 61, ante), . . . an attempt of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over
the United States Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be
considered as a violation of this countrys faith, which this Court should not be the
last to keep and uphold.
2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint
and convene a military commission. This is upon the theory that since the power
to create a military commission is an aspect of waging war, military commanders
have
that
power
unless
expressly
withdrawn
from
them.
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United States
has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military
tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the laws of war
in appropriate cases.

67. KURODA V. JALANDONI

Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
MORAN, C.J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese

Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged
before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and
prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the

Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations

covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law,
national and international.
II.

THE ISSUES
Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality
of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of
the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United
Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs
of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in
the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to

try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and
signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation
of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and
principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and
Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles
therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

68. JOSE B.L. REYES VS RAMON BAGATSING

125 SCRA 553 Political Law Freedom of Speech Primacy of the Constitution
over International Law
FACTS: Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases
Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US
embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then
Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been
intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless
elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies
within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was
his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements
in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that
under our constitution we adhere to generally accepted principles of
international law.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the
Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:

I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats
from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of
the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be
invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds
and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same
time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the
application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger
test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured
that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further,
the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that indeed
the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides, theres also the question of
whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally but, as noted by the SC, that
has not been raised an an issue in this case).

69. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES VS. DUQUE
Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein
petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents
issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the
Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted
by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA
adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health
claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified
the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect
on July 7, 2006.

Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and

Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not
constitutional;

Held: YES
Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and
regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution
reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to
Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established
that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

70. ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic
Act. No. 1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against
the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and
those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it
to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII
and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted
in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is
public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment

of the legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is

there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or
has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims
conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the
due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence
or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate
aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life,
liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection
of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation
must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of
law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects
their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within
the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law
are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not
misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no
treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not
be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

71. GONZALES v. HECHANOVA

9 SCRA 230 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaty vs Executive Agreements

Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive
agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without
complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National
Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the
then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales,
then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the
executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of
rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered
into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his
veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the
status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event
of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time
shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but,
also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification
can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional
set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may
be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may
not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide,
final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the

nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but,
also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

72. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine

Senate ratified the said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated
extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice
Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S
Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he
shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the
request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in
Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United
States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights
claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual
deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to
the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a
source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international
law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the
law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule
of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local
state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for
the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be

made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the
reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by
it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal
law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most
countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with,
but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle
lex posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of
the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may
be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

73. BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO

Bayan Muna vs Romulo
G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to
represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now
deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this
case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive
Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing
the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall

be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes

adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo,
signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant
petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the
ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the
92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note
No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the
non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and
the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03,
hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and
accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and
put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims
to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the RP and US from
frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic
security and defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003,
similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33
other countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former Government
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of
one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the
express consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for
any purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third
country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer
to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the
Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer
of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such

tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express
consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the
[USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of
that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal
has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of
the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one
party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of
this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any
allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status
of the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of
October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally
binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said
agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in
concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio
for contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold
posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the
Agreement.
Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized
international doctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is the
doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,
wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes
falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an
internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations
Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many
similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange
of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed

by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State
repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the
letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its
speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive
agreements have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being
considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through
executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that
of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As former
US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work,
The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments
ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange
of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment.
xxx
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed
as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance
thereof or as consent to be boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally
binding international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing
immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized
principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the
Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from
responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to
the [ICC] x x x.63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as
already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually
abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations
under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys
judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly
and judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement
would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international
concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect.
Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be
prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the
RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities
necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For
perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either
party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of
the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws.
With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of
international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered
criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.
74. IBP VS. ZAMORA
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until
such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking
to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress
may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using
the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence
to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed
forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the
Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use
of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones
in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there
can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of
the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of
the PNP.

75. KULAYAN, et al. v. TAN

JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as Governor of
Sulu, et al. G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012, EN BANC
(Sereno, J.)
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President.
An exercise by another offcial, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires,
and may not be justifed by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code.
FACTS:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres
Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a
water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized
by three armed men who were later confrmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG).
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state
of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the
kidnapping
incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant
to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor
the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters
and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies
to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon
the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and

chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and

other
actions necessary to ensure public safety.
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was
issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to
exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic
and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a
President
HELD:
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive
powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section
1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who
is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article
VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers
under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the
military, making the civilian president the nations supreme military leader.
The
net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that
recent j uri sprudence a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and
administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that
the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to
determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the
actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate
power is his.

Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and
called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another offcial, even if he is the local chief executive,
is ultra vires, and may not be justifed by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local
Government Code.

1. ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers
granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election
laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether
public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELECs
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other
moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places,
public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the
COMELEC providing that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELECs
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in designated
areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly
infringes on the citizens fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III).
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference
and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for
overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses
even the citizens private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing
regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of ones living
room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution
would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but
when this right is joined by a liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must
be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to
inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1
in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars
and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles,
pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the
citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in
the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the
Constitution.

2. Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared

petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated
his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him
since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and
legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international
campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation
of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to
be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative
in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases
such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing
to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens
engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they

create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates,
the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is
onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering
every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would
be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the
factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence
is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question
on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more
qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article
VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2)
registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5)
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

3. Ople v Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one,
it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need
stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January
23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Issue: Petitioner contends:

A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE

SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR
A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION."
Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a
System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom
of thought.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact
business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated
identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights
and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes
no duty cannot stand.
In view of standing
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner
can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to
implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules
of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as
infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal
defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
In view of the need for Legislative Act
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole

purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the
power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is
all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and
more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and
the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be
allowed.
In view of right to privacy
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified
by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the
need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O.
No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas
for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the
Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development
planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation
of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of
A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose
other than the identification of the individual through his PRN .
His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan
availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful
and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes
a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there

are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the
particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the
data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and we hold
that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people
will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard
of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to
track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of
abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of
the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an
annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the
individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing
and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance
public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling
interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and welldefined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.

4. In Re: Rodolfo Manzano

Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas
as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He
petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present
position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are
concerned?
Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency
performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12,Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of
any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its
jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of
individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of
the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery and its
performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive
officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive
action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of
the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence we
can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any
regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice
promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A
member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as
the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving
the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself
to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer
the particular function involved in their implementation.

5. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer

The case of Youngstown (1952) significantly curbed executive power when the Court overturned
President Trumans seizure of steel mills during the Korean War. The Court ruled 6-3 that the Presidents
actions were unconstitutional because they had not been authorized by Congress. By deciding that the
Constitution gives Congress and not the president this authority, the Court affirmed the separation of
powers essential to American government.
In 1952, nearly two years into U.S. involvement into the Korean War, the United Steel Workers
of America clashed with industry managers and threatened to strike for higher wages. Steel was an
integral part of the war effort, and President Truman felt he couldnt risk a halt in production. Rather
than using labor laws passed by Congress to avert a strike, he ordered his secretary of commerce,
Charles Sawyer, to seize and operate the steel mills. Appeased, the union called off the strike, but the

steel companies immediately fought back against the Presidents seizure of their property. The Court
sided with the companies, concluding that nothing in the Constitution authorized the president to seize
property in wartime without approval from Congress. While cases like Schenck and Korematsu point to
the expanded powers of the executive branch during wartime, Youngstown serves as a reminder that
these powers have their limits.
Summary of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952).
The Steel Seizure Case
Facts
The Korean war effort increased the demand for steel. Disputes arose between steel industry management and
labor that culminated in an announcement of a strike by the union. President Truman authorized Secretary of
Commerce Sawyer to take possession of the steel industry and keep the mills operating.
Issue

Does the President of the United States have executive power under the war powers clause of the U.S.
Constitution, or any implied powers gleaned therefrom, to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to seize
the nations steel mills?
Holding and Rule (Black)

No. The President does not have implicit or explicit executive power under the war powers clause of the
U.S. Constitution, or any implied powers gleaned therefrom, to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to
seize the nations steel mills.
The court held that there was no explicit statute or act of Congress which authorized the President to act in such
a manner. The only two statutes which authorized the acquisition of personal and real property were not met
here. Not only were such acts unauthorized, Congress specifically refused to grant such authorization. The court
held that in order for the President to have this authority, it must be found somewhere explicitly in the
Constitution, or implicitly in some historical context or foundation.
The President cannot order policy; he can only suggest it. Congress can approve any proposal for regulation,
policy, settlement of disputes, wages, and working conditions. None of this is delegated to the President. Under
a textual approach to interpreting the Constitution the Presidents powers are curbed in this extension.
Dissent (Vinson, Reed, and Minton)
Many presidents have taken such action before, most notably Lincoln (Civil War, naval blockade, Emancipation
Proclamation), Hayes and Cleveland (authorization of the use of the military to settle strikes) without state or
legislative authority.
Concurrence (Frankfurter)
FDRs actions during the Great Depression resulted in extensions of executive authority, but his authority was
not violative of the Constitution. Three laws had already been enacted by Congress when FDR enacted his
policy, and six others were only enacted after Congress declared war, thereby falling under the war powers.
Concurrence (Jackson)
In determining whether the executive has authority, there are three general circumstances:
1.

When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, the Presidents
authority is at its greatest.

2.

When the President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only
rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority. When this is the case, the test depends on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
3.
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, the
authority of the President is at its lowest.
Justice Jackson stated that this case falls into category three. If the Presidents argument were accepted the
executive branch could exert its authority over any business or industry.
Notes
The most important part of this case is the three part test set forth in Justice Jacksons concurrence. This case is
also cited as Youngstown v. Sawyer and as Youngstown Sheet Tube v. Sawyer.
See Missouri v. Holland for a case brief of a constitutional law opinion in which the Supreme Court held that
Congress has the power under Article II to give effect to a treaty authorized by the President pursuant to the
Executives treaty power, even if such legislation would otherwise be an unconstitutional interference with
states rights.

6. Bowsher v. Synar
Posted on October 22, 2012 | Constitutional Law | Tags: Constitutional Law Case Brief
FACTS
An Act passed by Congress permitted certain levels of budgetary deficit, with the eventual goal of eliminating
the deficit altogether. The act provided that if deficit levels exceeded a particular level, there would be across
the board cuts, which would be recommended by the OMB and CBO directors and evaluated by the
Comptroller General who then made a recommendation to the President. The President would then be required
to create an executive order to make cuts pursuant to the Comptrollers recommendation. If Congress in the
meantime decided to make the appropriate level cuts before the Comptollers recommendation reached the
Presidents desk, those would go in effect instead. The Comptroller is classified as an official of the legislature.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the Comptrollers powers of evaluating the budgetary cuts recommended by the OMB and CBO,
for which the President must execute is an unconstitutional delegation of executive authority to an official
outside the executive branch.
(2) Whether Congress can remove the Comptroller who is assigned to executive tasks by impeachment.
HOLDING/ANALYSIS
(1) Yes, law validated. Congress cannot delegate executive authority to an agent of the legislature. This, in
effect, takes away power for the executive. The Comptrollers role in evaluating the budget cuts recommended
by the OMB and CBO directors would be constitutional, were his recommendations not binding on the
President. The role of the Comptroller, in this instance, is the very essence of executive power. The
executive acts as an executive when he interprets an Act for its execution, then commands the executive branch
to execute the law as he determines.

(2) No, law invalidated. Giving Congress impeachment power of a federal official tasked with the execution of
laws, effectively makes the officer responsive only to Congress. With the threat of job loss looming, the official
is not able to faithfully execute the laws. The impeachment power, therefore, gives Congress executive
authority it should not have by beholding the officer to their will As such, the impeachment power is contrary
to the separation of powers doctrine.

7. Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777) - Digest

Facts:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the
Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials
for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a
letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to
afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they
may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation. Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated
that all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec.
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court
marshal for such attendance.
Issue:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
Ruling:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions
of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry
during question hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House
on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the

Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it had issued, the department heads appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department
heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislatures power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or
affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege. This is the power of the
government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized
only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They
are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be exempted from
this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege
or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the

lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes
that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly,
Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does
not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is
so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is
not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for
a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official
to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his
appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section
1(a) are however valid.

8. BIRAOGO v PHIL TRUTH COMM

TOPIC: POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
respondent.
G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, RR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG,
and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondent.
G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:
FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The
said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and

corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences
gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or
even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information
in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President
to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office
was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the
power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executives
power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted
full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to
ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the
legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and
the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.
9.

Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service Commission

GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940
FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc
(Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting
passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939,
Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses.
PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing
business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was
denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:

 is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation

constitutes undue delegation of powers
HELD:
The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a proper
delegation of legislative power, so called ?Subordinate Legislation?. It is a valid delegation because of the
growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission
is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly
having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner. The Certificate of
Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights and is a mere license or
privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and
hearing, ?to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any Certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances
so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further
proceedings. In addition, the Court ruled that, ?the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by
the rudimentary Requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use
only.
[G.R. No. L-10520 | February 28, 1957]
TAADAvs. CUENCO
FACTS: Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as
members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Respondents allege that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of
jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and
(b) that the petition states no cause of action, because petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate
after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators.
RULING: We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts.
To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter,
either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although
the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. Secondly, although the Senate has, under the
Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very
enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it: The courts are called upon to say, on the one
hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers
possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers
of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing
as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the
particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been
violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative. Again, under the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial
power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and

approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of
any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring
into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass
upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and
paving the way to its eventual destruction.
As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue
before us is political or not.
In short, the term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called
upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate,
10. Abakada Guro Party-list et. al vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 168056) - Digest
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law
took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in
response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new
law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the
President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise
the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an
abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28
(2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services
which cant be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to
customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods.
Petitioners further alleged that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to
republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions
of Congress and they should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that
the law also effectively nullified the Presidents power of control, which includes the authority to set aside
and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax
rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Issue:

Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on
account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation
of legislative power?
Ruling:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and
exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a
complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and
to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use
or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one
which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency
to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon
which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature
has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of
the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence
of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL
connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of
any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is
a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2
4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1
%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must
submit such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as
the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will
is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and

collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by
Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be
done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently
the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V. ERMITA
September 1, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J
>>>THE VAT REFORM LAW (RA 9337) IS ENTIRELY CONSTITUTIONAL
NATURE OF VAT
The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods or
properties and services. Being an indirect tax on expenditure, the seller of goods or services may pass on the
amount of tax paid to the buyer, with the seller acting merely as a tax collector. The burden of VAT is intended
to fall on the immediate buyers and ultimately, the end-consumers.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in existence, albeit in a different
mode. Prior to 1978, the system was a single-stage tax computed under the "cost deduction method" and was
payable only by the original sellers. The single-stage system was subsequently modified, and a mixture of the
"cost deduction method" and "tax credit method" was used to determine the value-added tax payable. Under the
"tax credit method," an entity can credit against or subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the
VAT paid on its purchases, inputs and imports.
It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 273, that the VAT system
was rationalized by imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0% or 10% on all sales using the "tax credit method."
E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law, R.A. No. 8241 or the Improved VAT
Law, R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997, and finally, the presently beleaguered R.A. No. 9337, also
referred to by respondents as the VAT Reform Act.
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and
the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment.

COURTS GENERALLY DENIED THE POWER TO INQUIRE INTO CONGRESS FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH ITS OWN RULES
The cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.
Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said
that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body."
The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege irregularities
committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or deleting provisions in the House and Senate
bills. One of the most basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power to formulate rules for its
proceedings and the discipline of its members. Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own
business expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is also the sole concern of Congress to instill
discipline among the members of its conference committee if it believes that said members violated any of its
rules of proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot apply to questions regarding
only the internal operation of Congress.
BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE (BCC)
All the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to subjects of
the provisions referred to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. The
Court recognized the long-standing legislative practice of giving said conference committee ample latitude for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House. Thus, in the Tolentino case, it was held that:
. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not
found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of
one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an
"amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills
before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to
become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee
acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.
NO AMENDEMENT RULE NOT VIOLATED BY BCC
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

There is no reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three readings
in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek
modification of the compromise bill. . . .
EXTENT OF NO AMENDMENT RULE
The No Amendment Rule must be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either
house of Congress, not to the conference committee report.

BILLS WHICH MUST EXCLUSIVELY ORIGINATE IN THE HOUSE

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the move
for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House
bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC
provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes. Is the
introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value-added tax, which is the only kind of
tax being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House?
YES. In the Tolentino case:
. . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the
House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At
this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To
insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power
not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality
of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected
at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby
made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive

cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in
the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means "what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another.
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and
exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the
authority to make a complete law complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be
applicable and to determine the expediency of its enactment. Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may
be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the
power involved is purely legislative in nature that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative
department. It is the nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which
determines the validity of its delegation.
EXCEPTIONS:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid
only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard
is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency
to apply it.
NO DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE PRESIDENT IN THIS CASE
In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6 which
reads as follows:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise
the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
xxx

The case is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.

No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the
word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
SECRETARY OF FINANCE AS AGENT OF LEGISLATURE; PRESIDENTS POWER OF CONTROL NOT
APPLICABLE
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In
such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent
of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect.
The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and
implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much
broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other
pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in
such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the
President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
NO VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLE OF REPUBLICANISM
As to the argument of petitioners that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to the
principle of republicanism, the same deserves scant consideration. Congress did not delegate the power to tax
but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from
Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so
in such a manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.
NEW TAX NOT OPPRESSIVE
The principle of fiscal adequacy as a characteristic of a sound tax system was originally stated by Adam Smith
in his Canons of Taxation (1776). It simply means that sources of revenues must be adequate to meet
government expenditures and their variations. The dire need for revenue cannot be ignored. Our country is in a
quagmire of financial woe. During the Bicameral Conference Committee hearing, then Finance Secretary
Purisima bluntly depicted the country's gloomy state of economic affairs.
. . . policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the
political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.
NO DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
Petitioners argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated,

or limited without due process of law.

The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due process clause. A
VAT-registered person's entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. The distinction
between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested rights in
statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights, which were created by the law of the state,
although it may not take away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.
The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been
established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the
amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State's power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of
unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping
of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.
UNIFORMITY AND EQUITABILITY OF TAXATION
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same
class everywhere with all people at all times.
In this case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and
services. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC,
provide for a rate of 10% (or 12%) on sale of goods and properties, importation of goods, and sale of services
and use or lease of properties. These same sections also provide for a 0% rate on certain sales and transaction.
Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will bear the 70% limitation on
the creditable input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax paid on purchase of capital goods or the 5% final
withholding tax by the government. It must be stressed that the rule of uniform taxation does not deprive
Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the particular class.
R.A. No. 9337 is also equitable. The law is equipped with a threshold margin. The VAT rate of 0% or 10% (or
12%) does not apply to sales of goods or services with gross annual sales or receipts not exceeding

P1,500,000.00. Also, basic marine and agricultural food products in their original state are still not subject to the
tax, thus ensuring that prices at the grassroots level will remain accessible.
R.A. No. 9337 puts a premium on businesses with low profit margins, and unduly favors those with high profit
margins. Congress was not oblivious to this. Thus, to equalize the weighty burden the law entails, the law
imposed a 3% percentage tax on VAT-exempt persons under Section 109(v), i.e., transactions with gross annual
sales and/or receipts not exceeding P1.5 Million. This acts as a equalizer because in effect, bigger businesses
that qualify for VAT coverage and VAT-exempt taxpayers stand on equal-footing.
Moreover, Congress provided mitigating measures to cushion the impact of the imposition of the tax on those
previously exempt. Excise taxes on petroleum products and natural gas were reduced. Percentage tax on
domestic carriers was removed. Power producers are now exempt from paying franchise tax.
Aside from these, Congress also increased the income tax rates of corporations, in order to distribute the burden
of taxation. Domestic, foreign, and non-resident corporations are now subject to a 35% income tax rate, from a
previous 32%. Intercorporate dividends of non-resident foreign corporations are still subject to 15% final
withholding tax but the tax credit allowed on the corporation's domicile was increased to 20%. The Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is not exempt from income taxes anymore. Even the sale by
an artist of his works or services performed for the production of such works was not spared.
All these were designed to ease, as well as spread out, the burden of taxation, which would otherwise rest
largely on the consumers.
PROGRESSIVITY OF TAXATION
Progressive taxation is built on the principle of the taxpayer's ability to pay. Taxation is progressive when its
rate goes up depending on the resources of the person affected. The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation.
By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system
inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same
regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small.
The disparity lies in the income earned by a person or profit margin marked by a business, such that the higher
the income or profit margin, the smaller the portion of the income or profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, the
lower the income or profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats away. At the end of the day, it is really
the lower income group or businesses with low-profit margins that is always hardest hit.
Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the VAT. What it
simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to
avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law
minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No.
7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4
amending 103 of the NIRC).

11. Araneta v Dinglasan

G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.:
Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency
Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate
rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.
2.

EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under
prosecution in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition.

3.

EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to
compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the
exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation
of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4.

EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to
June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector,
and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

5.

Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in
1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the
respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect
YES.
1.
The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met
during the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special
session after it.
2.
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated
December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for
the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for

election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No.
671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the
language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to
the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by
the war.
12 RODRIGUEZ V GELLLA

G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953

Paras, C.J.:
Facts:
1. Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on November 10,
1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, while
EO 546 set aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by
typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
2.

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671,
declaring (in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war between the United States
and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to
invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in
section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in
section 1."

3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President.
HB 727 may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress to formally declare
the termination of the emergency powers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative

NO.
1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has since liberation
repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and
many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have
long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President.

2. CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National
Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet
been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers
delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be
repealed by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his
veto.

3. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in
respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly.
Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in
force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the
Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations.
4. The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary
to enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to
hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and
legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would
necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
5. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of
legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They
had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by
a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not
create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish
patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.
13. AMPATUAN V PUNO
Facts:

On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Three
days later, she also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to
the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term transfer used in AO
273 was amended to delegate, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy
Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the Presidents proclamation and orders encroached on the
ARMMs autonomy as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and to
seize the regional governments powers. They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring
a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical
violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an
invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs
273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under the
Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the
PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

Held:

1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of
the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged
complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM ViceGovernor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated
post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting
Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner SahaliGenerale, Acting
ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of
the ARMM.

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.
And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power
that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the
same.

3. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power
vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power,
it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such

determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents
judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis,
then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of
calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters
considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the
courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary
to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might
be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the
President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting
technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of
the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great
loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual
basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it
follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports
also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men
sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to
take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and
dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places
and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual
bases, the Court must respect the Presidents actions.(Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)

14. EASTERN SHIPPING v POEA

G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 [Non delegation of legislative power; subordinate legislation]
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against the
Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which
stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no
authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ...
"The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate
legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in'
the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature

such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed
to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

15. Miners Association vs Factoran Jr.

Facts: The petition seeks a ruling from this court on the validity of two Administrative Orders 57 and 82 issued
by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of
Executive Orders 279 and 211. This petition arose from the fact that the 1987 Constitution provided for a
different system of exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural resources. Unlike the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions that allow the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through license,
concession or lease, the 1987 Constitution provides for the full control and supervision by the state of the
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural resources. Pres. Cory Aquino promulgated EO
211, which prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals in accordance to the 1987 Constitution. In addition, Pres. Aquino also
promulgated EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production or
production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources and
prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance
by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. In line with
EO 279, the DENR Secretary issued AO 57 Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under EO
279 and AO 82 Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
through negotiation. Petitioner, Miners Association of the Philippines, mainly contend that the DENR Secretary
issued both AOs 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power because these are inconsistent with the
provisions of EO 279.

Issue: whether AO Nos. 57 and 82, which are promulgated by the DENR, are valid and constitutional

Held: AO Nos. 57 and 82 are both constitutional and valid. This is due to the fact that EO 279, in effect, gave
the Secretary of Natural Resources the authority to conclude joint venture, co-production, or production sharing
agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources. Furthermore, the
constitutionality of these administrative orders goes to show that the utilization of inalienable lands of public
domain is not merely done through license, concession or lease since the options are now also open to the
State through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing
agreements.
1. VICTORIA MILLING V SSC
G.R. No. L-16704

Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all Employers in
computing premiums to include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the
cash value of other media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling
Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the
circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime
pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium
contributions. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the
Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of
publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that
Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the
Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of
general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act
1161 empowering the Social Security Commission.
Held:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an
administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a
valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing
law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced
by a penal sanction provided therein. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left
to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and
regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law. Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of
what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that
such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.
The Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.