ORIGINAL LIST:

People v. Molas, GR 97437-39 (1993)

FACTS:
-Josue Molas (accused-appellant) and Dulcesima Resonable (Dulcesima, victim) were sweethearts and were engaged to be
married. Dulcesima was the daughter of Bernardo and Soledad Resonable, and the sister of Nicolas and Abelardo Resonable
-on Feb 2, 1983, at about 6:00 pm after farm work, Bernardo arrived at their house and found 8-y.o. Abelardo at the doorway of
their house bathed in his own blood. Bernardo carried Abelardo into their house. Abelardo informed his father that Josue Molas
was the person who not only inflicted his injuries but also stabbed Dulcesima and Soledad. Bernardo then looked for Dulcesima,
who he found dead in a dried carabao mud pool 3-arms length from the house, and Soledad, who he found near the bench by the
door of the house. Bernardo ran to the barangay captain and sought help from authorities. Abelardo was brought to the Provincial
hospital but died the next day.
-dawn of Feb 3, Josue Molas, with blood-stained clothes, surrendered to Patrolman Geronimo Vallega, together with the hunting
knife I used in killing the mother, the daughter and the boy. Patrolman Vallega then lodged Molas in jail. Molas was transferred to
Valencia Police Station later.
-next morning, after being informed of his Constitutional rights, refused to give any statement to the police. Eventually, Molas
freely and voluntarily related the whole story, as taken down by Patrolman Fetalvero. The following are contained in Molas
sworn statement: In our arrival to their house at sitio Inas, Barangay Dobdob, from Kabangogan, * this Soledad Resonable
lighted a gas lamp in their store and said, "maayo kay naabot na ta walay makaboot nako ug patyon nako ang akong anak." [It's
good that you have arrived, no one can stop me if I kill my own daughter] at the same time went near Dulcesima, her daughter
and grabbed her hair and boxed her to the different parts of her body. Because of faith and sympathy, I stopped Solidad by
holding her hands to prevent her boxing Dulcesima, but on my intervention, Soledad boxed me hitting my head and arms. Due to
blocks I made she was tired and again went back to Dulcesima and again boxed her to the different parts of her body. Because I
was hurt on the part of Dulcisima, my wife-to-be and no other means to prevent Solidad, I was able to grab the weapon on my
waist and stabbed Solidad hitting her first on the breast, then on the back after which I saw Abelardo, Dulcisima's younger brother
at my back holding and boxing my buttock. I stabbed him on the breast and followed again at the back causing him to fall down
on the ground, leaving therein the weapon I used causing incised wound on my right little finger and ran away but Dulcisima
stopped me by holding my left hand and said, "puslang nabuhat sa akong ginikanan, patya lamang ko ug layhan ka mag onong
ta sa kamatayon." [How could you do this to my parent, kill me also so we'll all die together]. Hearing such words, I responded,
"papatay ka diay kanako," [You'll kill me after all?] I went back where Abelardo was and pulled the penetrated weapon and
stabbed Dulcisima who at that time was following me hitting her breast and caused her life to end. When I saw Solidad her
mother walking towards the seat of their store and sat down, I followed her and slashed her neck and stabbed her stomach and
immediately ran home. The said confession was signed before Judge Tayrosa of the MTC fo Valencia after it was translated to
Cebuano. Molas did not object to any of the contents of his affidavit as translated. He signed the document willingly.
-3 separate information for murder were filed against Molas, to which he pleaded not guilty.
-for the defense, only Molas was presented. In essence, he testified that at about 6 pm on Feb 2, he saw his fianc lifeless beside
the dried mud pool 3 fathoms away from the store/house. He hugged Dulcesima but she was dead so he ran to the store. There,
he saw Soledad wounded in the neck and bathed with blood. He also saw Abelardo under a table with a hunting knife in his back
which he pulled from Abelardo. He shouted for help then suddenly a voice from behind the store said Dont shout, Bay, if you
dont want to die! 3 unidentified men started chasing him afterwards. During the said flight he stumbled, causing the injury in his
hands. He informed his mother regarding what happened, and with his blood-stained clothes, he proceeded to the police station.
While he was being investigated, Patrolman Vallaga arrived and informed Patrolman Renzal that Abelardo tagged him as the
killer. He also alleged, though unsubstantiated, that Patrolman Quitoy manhandled him. He denied knowing the contents of the
affidavit because it was written in English and was not translated to him.
-RTC: GUILTY
ISSUES
1. WON the court erred in giving credence to Abelardos dying declaration
2. WON his extrajudicial admission was validly admitted by the court
HELD
1. NO. Correct in giving credence to it as a dying declaration.
Ratio. To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (1) concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b) that at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) that he was a competent
witness; and (d) that his declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the
declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427).
Reasoning. Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas who inflicted his injuries and also stabbed his mother and sister was
given to his father, while he (Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding from stab wounds in his colon and spinal cord, as a result of
which he expired a few hours later. It was indubitably a dying declaration. All of the circumstances required were present when
Abelardo made his dying declaration.
2. YES
Ratio. While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made without the advice and assistance of counsel, hence,
inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused established through the testimonies of the
persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused (People vs. Carido, 167 SCRA 462; People vs. Feliciano,
58 SCRA 383; People vs. Fontanosa, 20 SCRA 249).

Reasoning. The Valencia Police Station investigator, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, testifying before the trial court on October 16,
1984, quoted the admissions of the accused. The trial court, which observed his deportment on the witness stand, found him
credible.
- the trial court did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of the accused. Even if that confession were disregard, there was
more that enough evidence to support his conviction. His act of giving himself up to the police of Pamplona with the murder
weapon, his blood-stained clothing at the time of the surrender only hours after the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration, and the
testimonies of the policemen in the police stations in Pamplona and Valencia to whom he admitted his guilt constitute an
unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was he who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima and Soledad Resonable.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment convicting Josue Molas for the murders of Dulcesima Resonable, Soledad
Resonable and Abelardo Resonable and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of said murders is
AFFIRMED, with modification of the death indemnity which is hereby increased to P50,000.00 for each case. SO ORDERED.
People v. Baloloy, GR 140740 (2002)
FACTS: The dead body of 11-year-old Genelyn Camacho was found by the accused-appellant in a nearby creek, whilehe was
catching some frogs. Those who arrived at the scene also found a black rope. During the wake, Brgy.Captain Ceniza asked
the visitors if any one of them owned the black rope found on the crime scene. The accused-appellant claimed it was
his.The Brgy. Captain took the accused-appellant and asked him why his rope was found on the scene.
Theaccused-appellant then confessed that he was the one who raped and killed Genelyn. When she announced thisto everyone
at the wake, they became unruly so she turned over the accused-appellant to the police for his own protection.On the day of
the trial, after Judge Dicon read the affidavit of Brgy. Captain Ceniza, he asked the accused- appellant if he was
indeed guilty of the crime charged. The accused-appellant replied that he was demonizedwhen he committed the crime. He was
convicted of the crime of rape with homicide based on his extrajudicial confession to Brgy. Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon
and sentenced to death.
ISSUE: Whether the accused's extrajudicial confession to Brgy. Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon violated his right
against self-incrimination.
HELD: NO, as far as his confession to Ceniza is concerned. When the accused admitted ownership of the rope
and confessed the commission of the crime to Ceniza, he did so voluntarily, free of coercion or control from the
authorities. He also confessed before he was arrested or placed under investigation. What is prohibited by
theConstitution is the compulsory disclosure of information that would incriminate the accused while he is
in thecustody of the authorities.As for his confession to Judge Dicon, it was deemed inadmissible as evidence because Judge
Dicon failed toinform him of his rights before he made the confession. Moreover, it was done without the assistance of counsel.It
was held that the rights of the accused become operative once custodial investigation starts, which actually begins from the time
the accused is arrested or voluntarily surrenders to the police. The accused was already inthe custody of the police at the time he
made his confession to Judge Dicon. Furthermore, even if no complaint was yet filed against the accused at that time, the
judge should still have honored the rights of the accused under the Bill of Rights.However, his confession to the
judge is not entirely useless as those who witnessed the confession may still testify to this verbal admission by the
accused
People v. Buntag, GR 123070 (2004)
FACTS: Before February 8, 1992, Berno Georg Otte,[3] a German national and a tourist, checked in at the Alona Ville Beach
Resort located in Panglao, Bohol. The resort manager, Herma Clarabal Bonga,[4] assigned Otte to Room No. 9[5] and gave the
latter his room key. On February 8, 1992, Otte took his dinner at the resorts restaurant. Bonga talked to him regarding the disco
which was about to unfold that night in lower Tawala near the Catibo Chapel. At about 10:00 p.m., Bonga went to the disco party
where she saw Otte seated at one of the tables.[7] She noticed that he had some companions whom she failed to recognize.[8]
Isidro A. Mihangos, a 19-year-old student, and Benigno Ninoy Guigue were also at the disco. At around 2:00 a.m. of February 9,
1992, Mihangos and Guigue decided to call it a night and walked home, with their respective bicycles at their sides. [9] At the
crossing to the Alona Beach, they saw a man lying on the road but did not recognize him. They walked past the prostrate
man. When they were about twenty-five meters[10] away from the body by the road, they met Casiano Buntag and Diego Bongo,
their barriomates.[11]Suddenly, Buntag and Bongo jointly and simultaneously lunged at them. Afraid for their lives, Mihangos and
Guigue fled and sought refuge in the house of Guigues uncle, Aquilino Bongo.[12] In the process, they left their bicycles
behind. Aquilino Bongo then accompanied Mihangos and Guigue to where they left their bicycles. Mihangos and Guigue
retrieved their bicycles, but Buntag and Bongo were no longer there. At around 5:30 a.m. of February 9, 1992, the police station
of Panglao, Bohol, received a report by radio call about a man, believed to be dead, lying at the side of the crossroad near the
Alona Beach.[13] PO1 Yolando E. Hormachuelos, together with PO1 Mauro Sumaylo and PO1 Dominie Ragusta,[14] proceeded
to the crime scene. They were accompanied by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Julita L. Cogo, who confirmed that the man died
due to a stab wound.[15] The policemen found a hunting knife about one meter away from the body.[16] Constancio Geoivencal
took pictures of the cadaver. Hormachuelos took custody of the knife.[17] In the course of their investigation, the policemen
learned that Mihangos and Guigue had seen the dead body by the road. Hormachuelos fetched Mihangos and Guigue from their
houses and brought them to the road where the body of Otte was found. Mihangos and Guigue narrated how they found the body
at around 2:00 a.m. that day, as well as their encounter with Bongo and Buntag. At about 1:00 p.m. that day, Hormachuelos took
appellant Bongo to the police station and investigated him without the assistance of counsel. Bongo admitted that he took Ottes
key to Room No. 9 and hid it near their house. He then drew a sketch showing the place where he hid the key, at the back of their
house. Bongo also admitted that he was with appellant Casiano Buntag. The policemen went to Bongos house and recovered the

key to Ottes room as indicated by Bongo in his sketch. At 2:00 p.m., Guigue arrived at the police station and gave his statement
to Hormachuelos.[18] At 3:00 p.m., Mihangos gave his statement to SPO1 Proculo Bonao.[19]Hormachuelos then took custody of
Casiano Buntag and brought him to the police station where he was asked about his involvement in the killing of Otte without the
assistance of counsel. However, Buntag opted to keep silent. When apprised that Diego Bongo had implicated him, Buntag, this
time with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Nerio G. Zamora, gave a statement on February 13, 1992 to a police investigator. He
stated that at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992, he was walking back home from the disco place where he caught up with Diego
Bongo and Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach. He saw Bongo poke a knife at Otte. Bongo then ordered him to box Otte but he
refused, and moved back about three meters. Bongo himself then boxed Otte three times on the face. When Otte fell to the
ground, Bongo stabbed him on the chest. Buntag also stated that he then ran back home, but Bongo followed him and cautioned
him not to reveal the incident to anybody or else he would be implicated.[20] Buntag subscribed and swore to the truth of his
statement on February 21, 1992 before Judge Antonio Sarce of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Municipal Health Officer Dr.
Julita Lood-Cogo performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Otte and submitted her Post-Mortem Report which contained the
following findings: Stab wound, anterior chest, right, at the level of the 4th rib, approx. 2 cms. x 1 cm. in size, with a depth of
approx. 12 cms., directed upwards and medially, with a complete fracture of the 4th rib, right, involving a portion of the right lung
and base of the heart. // Cause of death: CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO HEMORRHAGE, SECONDARY TO STAB
WOUND, ANTERIOR CHEST, RIGHT. On March 7, 1992, a criminal complaint for murder was filed against appellants Bongo and
Buntag with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Only appellant Bongo submitted his counter-affidavit on February 27, 1992,
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Antonio Sarce,[22]where he confirmed (a) Buntags account in his sworn statement before
Judge Sarce that they were with Otte at 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992 at the crossing towards Alona Beach Resort, and (b) that
he was armed with a hunting knife. He further stated therein that while at the crossing, Buntag and Otte, who were both drunk,
had an altercation and that he tried to pacify them but in the process, Buntag pulled out his (Bongos) hunting knife from his waist
and stabbed Otte with it. After the requisite preliminary investigation, the MCTC issued a resolution finding probable cause
against the appellants for murder and issued warrants for their arrest. The court found Buntags sworn statement and Bongos
counter-affidavit self-serving.
Issues: (a) whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired to kill the victim Otte and that
they, in fact, killed him; (b) whether or not the appellants are guilty of murder; and, (c) whether or not the appellants are liable for
moral damages to the heirs of the victim.
Held: We agree with the appellants that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence that they conspired to kill Otte and that
they, in fact, stabbed and killed the victim. However, we find and so hold, after an incisive review of the records, that the
prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and
decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.[36] Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the
accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. [37] It is
not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the conspirators as coprincipals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator
is the act of all.[38]
The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive
evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction if the following requisites are
established: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established;
and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[39]
In People v. Delim,[40] we held, thus:
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the
proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one
conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction,
all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the
prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden
of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.[41]
In convicting the appellants of the crime charged, the trial court relied not only on the counter-affidavit of appellant Bongo[42] and
appellant Buntags sworn statement,[43] but also on the other evidence on record, namely, the knife used in killing the victim,
[44] the key to Ottes room,[45] and the collective testimonies of the other witnesses of the prosecution.
The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against the said accused but
is inadmissible against the other accused.[46]The same rule applies if the extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after
the conspiracy has ceased. However, if the declarant/admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial confession during trial and the
other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or admission is admissible against
both accused.[47] The erstwhile extrajudicial confession or admission when repeated during the trial is transposed into judicial
admissions.
In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement of facts by the accused, direct or
implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense with which he
is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths charged.[48] It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances
which, in itself, is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt. [49] A
confession, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.[50]

In this case, appellant Buntag made extrajudicial admissions against his interest in his sworn statement, and not a confession. So
did appellant Bongo in his counter-affidavit.Such admissions in the form of affidavits, made in the Municipal Trial Court in the
course of its preliminary investigation, are high quality evidence.[51] MCTC Judge Antonio Sarce testified on the said sworn
statement and counter-affidavit and was cross-examined.[52] Moreover, some of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of one
appellant are identical with some of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of the other, and vice versa. This corroborates and
confirms their veracity. Such admissions, made without collusion, are akin to interlocking extrajudicial confessions. They are
admissible as circumstantial evidence against the other appellant implicated therein to show the probability of his participation in
the commission of the crime and as corroborative evidence against him.[53] The Court rejects the appellants contention that they
were deprived of their right to cross-examine the other on the latters admissions against the other. Through their common
counsel, they opted not to testify and be cross-examined on their respective statements by the prosecution. They opted to file a
motion to acquit. Besides, they had opportunity to cross-examine Judge Sarce before whom they swore to the truthfulness of
their statements.[54]
In this case, the prosecution adduced the following circumstantial evidence which constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the appellants, indeed, conspired to kill and did kill the victim:
1. Appellant Buntag admitted, in his sworn statement,[55] that, at about 1:00 a.m. on February 9, 1992, he was in the company of
appellant Bongo and the victim Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach, and that appellant Bongo was armed with a hunting
knife. Appellant Buntag identified the victim through the latters picture, as well as the hunting knife used in the killing.
[56] Appellant Bongo, in his counter-affidavit, confirmed the truth of appellant Buntags admissions and also admitted that on the
said date, time and place, he was with appellant Buntag and the victim, and that he was armed with a hunting knife which was
tucked on his waist.
2. The appellants admitted in their respective statements that on the said occasion, Otte died from a stab wound caused by a
hunting knife.
3. Appellant Bongo admitted in his counter-affidavit that he took the key to the victims room and hid it near their house where the
policemen found it.
4. While both appellants were within the periphery of the situs criminis, Mihangos and Guigue sauntered by with their bicycles at
their sides. Suddenly, the appellants jointly and simultaneously lunged at them, causing Mihangos and Guigue to believe that
their lives were in peril, impelling them to run for their lives and seek sanctuary in the house of Guigues uncle, Aquilino Bongo. By
the time Mihangos and Guigue returned to the situs criminis to retrieve their bicycles, the appellants had already left.
5. In his sworn statement, appellant Buntag admitted that after the victim was stabbed, he and appellant Bongo fled from
the situs criminis. This was corroborated by the testimony of Mihangos. The presence of both appellants at the situs criminis and
their flight from the scene are strong indicia of their participation in the commission of the crime and their complicity therein.
[57] Appellant Bongo opted not to testify or adduce evidence to controvert the testimony of Mihangos and the admissions of the
appellant prejudicial to him.
6. The hunting knife of appellant Bongo which was used to kill the victim was left at the scene of the crime where the policemen
recovered it shortly thereafter.
7. The appellants admitted in their respective sworn statements that the victim was stabbed once with a hunting knife. These
admissions were corroborated by Dr. Julita Cogos finding that the victim was stabbed once on the anterior chest area. [58] The
doctor testified that the stab wound could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon.[59]
8. Neither of the appellants brought the victim to the hospital for immediate medical attendance and operation.
9. Although the appellants pointed to the other as the assailant in their respective statements, neither of them reported the
stabbing to the police authorities and claimed that the other killed the victim.
10. Neither of the appellants took the witness stand to deny any involvement in the killing of the victim. The evidence of the
prosecution, thus, stands unrebutted.
The appellants cannot rely on the exculpatory portions of their respective statements as basis for their acquittal of the crime
charged. In the case of appellant Buntag, he avers in his sworn statement that he was ordered by appellant Bongo to box the
victim and when he refused, appellant Bongo himself boxed and stabbed the victim with the hunting knife. When appellant
Buntag fled from the scene and went back home, appellant Bongo followed and warned him not to divulge the incident so that he
would not be implicated.For his part, appellant Bongo turned the tables on appellant Buntag and claimed in his counter-affidavit
that the latter snatched the hunting knife from his waist and stabbed the victim in the heat of their altercation. The stabbing was
so sudden, he insists, that he was unable to stop appellant Buntag from stabbing the victim.
We are not persuaded by the claims of the appellants for the following reasons:
First. Contrary to the claim of appellant Buntag that appellant Bongo boxed the victim, the necropsy report of Dr. Cogo failed to
show that the victims body sustained hematoma, bruises or contusions. The findings of the doctor must prevail as against the
bare statements of the appellants.
Second. Appellant Buntag admitted in his sworn statement that before he and appellant Bongo could leave the situs criminis after
the victim was stabbed, Mihangos and Guigue arrived. The appellants lunged jointly and simultaneously at the two teenagers
which so terrified the latter that they fled for their lives. If, as appellant Buntag claims, he had nothing to do with the stabbing of
the victim, he should have sought the help of the teenagers, brought the victim to the hospital and reported to the police
authorities that it was appellant Bongo who stabbed the victim. Appellant Buntag failed to do so. Neither did appellant Bongo
seek the help of the two teenagers and report the stabbing to the police authorities. Both appellants unexplained omission is
another indication of their conspiracy and complicity in the crime charged.

Third. Appellant Bongo took the key from the body of the victim and hid it near their house where the policemen found it. The
appellant has not explained why he had the key to the victims room and hid it near their house. He owned the hunting knife used
in stabbing the victim. He knew or should have known that sooner or later, the policemen would trace the knife to him; and yet,
appellant Bongo failed to report the incident to the police authorities and surrender the knife to them.
Fourth. Appellant Bongo denied involvement in the killing and pointed to appellant Buntag as the assailant only after the latter
had executed his own sworn statement pointing to appellant Bongo as the victims assailant. We are convinced that appellant
Bongos denial of any involvement in the killing is but a belated afterthought to escape criminal liability for the victims death.
The trial court convicted the appellants of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced
each of them to reclusion perpetua. We note, however, that the trial court, in its amended decision, made no finding on any
attendant circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder. It bears stressing that under the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
any qualifying circumstance attendant to the commission of a crime must be alleged in the Information and proved by the
prosecution, conformably to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the charges against him.
In this case, the Information alleged that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. The prosecution was burdened
to prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only the crime itself, but also the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.[60] Treachery
cannot be based on speculations and surmises. In order that treachery may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance under
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove that (a) the malefactor employed means, method or
manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and, (b) the means, method or
manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. In this case, there was no eyewitness to the crime.
On the other hand, appellant Buntag, in his sworn statement, claimed that before the victim was stabbed, appellant Bongo and
the victim had an altercation; appellant Bongo, in his counter-affidavit, stated that it was appellant Buntag and the victim who had
an altercation before the victim was killed. There is no evidence that the appellants deliberately or consciously adopted a method
or means of execution to insure the death of the victim.
In fine then, the appellants are guilty only of homicide, punishable under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion
temporal in its full range, which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. There being no modifying circumstance
attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be in its medium period.
The trial court awarded moral damages to the heirs of the victim, although the prosecution failed to present any heir of the victim
as witness. The trial court, likewise, failed to award civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim. The decision of the trial
court shall, thus, be modified accordingly.
People v. Tuniaco, GR 185710 (2010)
FACTS: The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with murder
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City in Criminal Case 8370. Based on the findings of the RTC, in the morning of
June 13, 1992 some police officers from the Lagao Police Sub-Station requested police officer Jaime Tabucon of the Central Police Station of
General Santos City homicide division to take the statement of accused Alex Aleman regarding the slaying of a certain Dondon Cortez. On his
arrival at the sub-station, Tabucon noted the presence of Atty. Ruperto Besinga, Jr. of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) who was conversing
with those taken into custody for the offense. When queried if the suspects would be willing to give their statements, Atty. Besinga said that
they were. Some other police officer first took the statement of accused Jeffrey Datulayta. Officer Tabucon next took the statement of accused
Aleman, whom he observed to be in good physical shape. Before anything else, officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman in Cebuano of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked him if he was willing to give a statement.
Aleman answered in the affirmative. When asked if he had any complaint to make, Aleman said that he had none. When Aleman said that he
had no lawyer, Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was assisting all the suspects in the case. Tabucon warned Aleman that
anything he would say may be used against him later in court. Afterwards, the police officer started taking down Alemans statement. Accused
Aleman said that in the course of a drinking bout with accused Datulayta and Tuniaco at around 9 p.m. on June 6, 1992, Dondon Cortez
threatened to report his drinking companions illegal activities to the police unless they gave him money for his forthcoming marriage.
According to Aleman, Datulayta and Tuniaco had already planned to kill Cortez in Tupi, South Cotabato, for making the same threats and now
they decided to do it. They got Cortez drunk then led him out supposedly to get the money he needed. The three accused brought Cortez to
Apopong near the dump site and, as they were walking, accused Aleman turned on Cortez and stabbed him on the stomach. Accused
Datulayta, on the other hand, drew out his single shot homemade M16 pistol1 and shot Cortez on the head, causing him to fall. Datulayta
handed over the gun to Aleman who fired another shot on Cortezs head. Accused Tuniaco used the same gun to pump some bullets into
Cortezs body. Then they covered him with rice husks. After taking down the statement, Tabucon explained the substance of it to accused
Aleman who then signed it in the presence of Atty. Besinga. On June 15, 1992 the police brought Aleman to the City Prosecutors Office
where he swore to his statement before an assistant city prosecutor. In the afternoon, accused Datulayta and Aleman led Tabucon, the city
prosecutor, and a police inspector, to the dump site where they left their victims body. After some search, the group found a spot covered with
burnt rice husks and a partially burnt body of a man. About a foot from the body, they found the shells of a 5.56 caliber gun and an armalite
rifle. On being arraigned, all three accused, assisted by Atty. Besinga, pleaded not guilty to the murder charge. After the prosecution rested its
case, accused Tuniaco filed a demurrer to evidence which the Court granted, resulting in the dismissal of the case against him. On being rearraigned at his request, accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Homicide. The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of
six years and one day and to payP50,000.00 to the victims family. For some reason, the trial court had Aleman subjected to psychiatric
examination at the Davao Mental Hospital. But, shortly after, the hospital sent word that Aleman had escaped. He was later recaptured. When
trial in the case resumed, Alemans new PAO lawyer raised the defense of insanity. This prompted the court to require the Provincial Jail
Warden to issue a certification regarding Alemans behavior and mental condition while in jail to determine if he was fit to stand trial. The
warden complied, stating that Aleman had been observed to have good mental condition and did not commit any infraction while in jail.
Although the prosecution and defense stipulated that Atty. Besinga assisted accused Aleman during the taking of his extrajudicial confession,
the latter, however, recanted what he said to the police during the trial. He testified that sometime in 1992, some police officers took him from
his aunts house in Purok Palen, Labangal, General Santos City, and brought him to the Lagao police station. He was there asked to admit

having taken part in the murder of Cortez. When he refused, they tortured him until he agreed to sign a document admitting his part in the
crime. Accused Aleman also testified that he could not remember having been assisted by Atty. Besinga during the police investigation. He
even denied ever knowing the lawyer. Aleman further denied prior association with accused Tuniaco and Datulayta. He said that he met them
only at the city jail where they were detained for the death of Cortez. On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused
Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The court also
ordered him to pay death indemnity of P70,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Cortez. On appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311, the court rendered judgment on January 21, 2008, affirming the decision of the RTC with the modification
that directed accused Aleman and Datulayta to indemnify the heirs of Cortez, jointly and severally, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Aleman appealed to this
Court.
ISSUE: a) whether or not the prosecution was able to present evidence of corpus delicti; and b) whether or not accused Alemans
extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.
HELD: 1. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime. The evidence of a dead body with a gunshot
wound on its back would be evidence that murder has been committed.2 Corpus delicti has two elements: (a) that a certain result has been
established, for example, that a man has died and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for it.3 The prosecution is burdened to
prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.4The defense claims that
the prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti since it did not bother to present a medical certificate identifying the remains found at the dump
site and an autopsy report showing such remains sustained gunshot and stab wounds that resulted in death; and the shells of the guns used in
killing the victim.But corpus delicti need not be proved by an autopsy report of the dead victims body or even by the testimony of the
physician who examined such body.5 While such report or testimony is useful for understanding the nature of the injuries the victim suffered,
they are not indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of death.6 Nor is the presentation of the murder weapons also indispensable
since the physical existence of such weapons is not an element of the crime of murder.7Here, the police authorities found the remains of
Cortez at the place pointed to by accused Aleman. That physical confirmation, coming after his testimony of the gruesome murder, sufficiently
establishes the corpus delicti of the crime. Of course, that statement must be admissible in evidence.
2. There is no reason for it not to be. Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.8 These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to the
police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman during the custodial investigation. Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused Aleman,
before the taking of his statement, conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty. Besinga did not dispute this claim. Aleman alleges
torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. The appellate court is correct in ruling that such allegation is baseless. It is a settled
rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against
his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, all these will be considered as indicating
voluntariness.9 Here, although Aleman claimed that he bore torture marks on his head, he never brought this to the attention of his counsel, his
relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath. Accused Aleman claims, citing People v. Galit,10 that long questions followed by
monosyllabic answers do not satisfy the requirement that the accused is amply informed of his rights. But this does not apply here. Tabucon
testified that he spoke to Aleman clearly in the language he knew. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a certification that the
investigator sufficiently explained to him his constitutional rights and that he was still willing to give his statement.
Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so he did not fully realize the consequences of a confession. But as the CA said,
no law or jurisprudence requires the police officer to ascertain the educational attainment of the accused. All that is needed is an effective
communication between the interrogator and the suspect to the end that the latter is able to understand his rights.11 This appears to have been
done in this case. Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated Alemans confession and just forced him to
sign it. The confession has details that only the person who committed the crime could have possibly known. 12 What is more, accused
Datulaytas confession corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions, such corroboration is
circumstantial evidence against the person implicated in it.13 The Court notes that, when it modified the award of civil damages to the heirs of
Cortez, the CA made both accused Aleman and Datulayta, jointly and severally liable, for the damages as modified. But the appeal by one or
more of several accused cannot affect those who did not appeal, except if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
them.14 Here accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and the trial court ordered him to pay only P50,000.00 in
civil indemnity to the heirs of Cortez. The CA erred in expanding that liability when he did not appeal from his conviction.15
People v. Andan, GR 116437 (1997)
Facts: On 19 February 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, 20 years of
age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on 21 February 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim
pants and brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when Pablito Andan y Hernandez invited her inside his house. He used the pretext
that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman
was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Andan then punched her in the abdomen, brought
her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, Andan dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and
left her there until dark. Night came and Andan pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a
pigpen bordered on one side by a 6-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Andan stood on a bench beside
the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her
head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body
to the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. At 11:00 a.m. of the following day,

the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck.
Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's
body was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also
found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. Andan's nearby house was also searched by
the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and
learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of Andan's wife, that Andan also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without
a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some
reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house
and allegedly belonged to Andan. The police tried to locate Andan and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag,
Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced Andan in his parents' house. They took him
aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, Andan denied any
knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the
bloodstains found in the pigpen, Andan relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne
and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. Immediately,
the police took Andan to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by the police.
Andan went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags
which were later identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of Andan and the two other suspects
holding the bags. By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the
results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, Andan
approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led Andan to the office of the Chief of Police and
there, Andan broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The
mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for
a lawyer to assist Andan but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the
presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and Andan's own wife and son, Andan confessed his guilt. He
disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from
Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil
entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his confession, Andan
hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media
nationwide. Andan was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and
television reporters came. Andan was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime.
Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was charged with rape with homicide. On arraignment, however, Andan entered a plea
of "not guilty." In a decision dated 4 August 1994, the trial court convicted Andan and sentenced him to death pursuant to
Republic Act 7659. The trial court also ordered Andan to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as
actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Andans confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen may be admitted as evidence against Andan.
Held: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is
inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical
and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a
later judicial determination of what really transpired. When the police arrested Andan, they were no longer engaged in a general
inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, Andan was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents'
house. Andan was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to
inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in
evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from Andan's house. The victim's bags were the fruits of Andan's uncounselled
confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. On the other hand, however, Andan's confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question Andan at all. No police
authority ordered Andan to talk to the mayor. It was Andan himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for
a private meeting. The mayor did not know that Andan was going to confess his guilt to him. When Andan talked with the mayor
as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.
Andan's confessions to the media were properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on
a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television
reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed Andan on 27 February 1994. The interview was recorded on video and
showed that Andan made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. Orlan
Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on 25 February 1994. Andan's confessions to
the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news
reporters when they interviewed Andan. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to
check Andan's confession to the mayor. They did not force Andan to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the
crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did Andan
protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of

the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other
relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of Andan by the news reporters. Thus, Andan's verbal confessions
to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern
itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and
the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the
individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government
has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the
individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
ADDITIONAL:
Dra. dela Llana v. Biong, GR182356, Dec. 4, 2013 (opinion of ordinary witness);
FACTS: On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving a car along North Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was
seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the when the signal light turned
red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck owned by Rebecca Biong and driven by Joel Primero containing gravel and
sand suddenly rammed the car's rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car's rear end collapsed and
its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela
Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries. In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana
began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by.
Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9,
2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that
she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla
required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana's condition did not improve despite three
months of extensive physical therapy. She then consulted other doctors in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally
suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores
operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae. The operation released the impingement of the nerve,
but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery. Dra. dela Llana, on
October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. Thus, on May 8, 2001,
Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the
mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed P150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the
complaint) and an average monthly income of P30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees. At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile
witness. Dra. Dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she
identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that
Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations. Meanwhile, Joel
testified that his truck hit the car because the truck's brakes got stuck. In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was
physically fit and strong when they met several days after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held
that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury to be Joel's reckless driving. The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Who has the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel's negligence and Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury?
2. WON the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay.
3. WON Dra. dela Llana's medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she was not presented as an
expert witness.
4. WON the Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
HELD:
1. In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation
by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence. In the present case, the
burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel's negligence and Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela
Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel's negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have
occurred.
2. The medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary,
is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person
who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence except in very unusual
circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.
3. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of
an ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding: (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a

person. On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess. However, courts do not immediately accord probative value
to an admitted expert testimony, much less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that
the probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert's opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the
assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the
reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded. In the present case, Dra. dela Llana's medical opinion cannot be given
probative value for the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent
to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during
trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her
testimony.
4. Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court shows that Dra. dela Llana did not
present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra.
dela Llana's injury. Her claim that Joel's negligence caused her whiplash injury was not established because of the deficiency of
the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents
cause whiplash injuries. This proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions. We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are only
tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties' pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments. In
sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our
solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana's favor. Her
claim, unsupported by preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.
Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, GR116470, August 7, 2009 (opinion of ordinary witness);
FACTS: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria
San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the
care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan. On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three
children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San
Juan family (conservatively estimated atP50 million in 1997). Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new
family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her violent personality, Lulu stopped
schooling when she reached Grade 5. In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate.
[3] Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of
Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties. During the period of
their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook various projects involving Lulus real
properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou
Subdivision.[4] In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property[5] was under litigation. Thus,
Lulu signed a special power of attorney[6] (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf
when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company
for P18,206,400.[7]Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford
Concrete Aggregates for P58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal. In September 1998, Lulu
sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been
dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal home
and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication. Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely
overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single
fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden.
Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted
with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.[8] Thereafter, the San Juan
family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulus estate from petitioners.[9] However, the demand was ignored. On October
2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship[10] in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She
alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind.
Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same. Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision
belonged to Lulu. Since she and her late husband were the registered owners of the said property, it was allegedly part of their
conjugal partnership. Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus competency had been settled
in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the
properties for her to manage. They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of
executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the scope of their respective authorities
could not be determined in a guardianship proceeding, such matter being the proper subject of an ordinary civil action. Petitioners
also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou Subdivision was among those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the
San Juan family. However, because the sale between Felix and Lulu had taken place in 1974, questions regarding its legality
were already barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they claimed.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and
Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed
inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan family. However, these properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they
lived a luxurious lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while
she was made to ride a tricycle. Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the
alarming state of her health.[11] Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications,

[12] she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they
unanimously opined that in view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be
able to care for herself and self-administer her medications. In a decision dated September 25, 2001,[13] the RTC concluded
that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of
Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1
million bond. Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million bond was grossly insufficient to secure
Lulus P50-million estate against fraudulent loss or dissipation.[14] The motion, however, was denied.[15] On July 2, 2002,
petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA).[16] The appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 75760. On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC
(in the petition for guardianship) in toto.[17] It held that respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu, because of
her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering
the extent of her estate. With regard to the respondents appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, since Lulu did not
trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal guardian. Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC
was bound to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted. Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470.[18] Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St.,
Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003,
Lulu was abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police. The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping
Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently
contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating
her.[19] On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus[20] in the CA alleging that petitioners abducted
Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal. On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition
for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. [21] Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a resolution dated July 12, 2005.[22] Aggrieved, they filed this petition for
review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No. 166470.
Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians[23] regarding her mental state were inadmissible in evidence as
they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She
should have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be
allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code,[24] legitimate brothers and sisters, whether halfblood or full-blood are required to support each other fully.
Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a quo. She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in
Recovery.com, a psychosocial rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent
and destructive behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by Boy Negro and imaginary pets she
called Michael and Madonna.[25] The November 21, 2005 medical report[26] stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with
psychosis but claimed significant improvements in her behavior.
HELD: We find the petition to be without merit. Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give
his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.[27] Lulu's attending physicians spoke and
interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was
below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence. Furthermore, where the sanity of
a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.[28] The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing
the person's state of mental sanity will suffice.[30] Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally
when she testified before the RTC. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,[31] persons who, though of sound mind but
by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property
without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both
found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind.
Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in
the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a
petition for review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this
case.[32] We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA. Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse
the trial and appellate courts finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu.[33] We
therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and
manage her estate as well.[34] Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.[35]Respondent, as the judicial
guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have
custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.[36]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED. Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulus legal
guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the
estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper
complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan
Hernandezs estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.

Agustin v. CA, GR162571, June 15, 2005 (expert opinion-Dr. C de Ungria);

FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin,
for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The babys birth certificate was purportedly
signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for
Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also
denied having fathered the child. On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police.
Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then
sued Arnel for support. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action. The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition. Petitioner
refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he
purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law.
According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a
separate suit under Article 283 in relation to Article 265 of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule 105 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES: W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search?
HELD: In People v. Yatar,[27] we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which
included DNA test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the reasons for its admissibility in
the context of our own Rules of Evidence: Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in
all living organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a
persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin
tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals
have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print
or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant
are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the
victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the
appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system,
so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of
persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically
valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion
over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one
such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In
that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel Kawit
Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself,
violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We
addressed this as follows: The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the
realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs,[28] hair,[29] and other bodily substances.[30] We have also declared as

constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery,
[31] expulsion of morphine from ones mouth[32] and the tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.
[33] In Jimenez v. Caizares,[34] we even authorized the examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by
her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were,
to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling
in Yatar,[35] are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v. Torres,[36] where we struck down the proposed
national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said: In no uncertain terms, we also
underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific
and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, [37] and the infringement of privacy of
communication[38] where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as
already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal
case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case,
petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same. DNA paternity testing first came
to prominence in the United States, where it yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA
rapidly found widespread general acceptance.[39] Several cases decided by various State Supreme Courts reflect the total
assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of procedure and evidence. For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized
by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, GR132164, Oct. 19, 2004 (character evidence-administrative case; relevance);
Nature: petition for review on certiorari of CA decision
Doctrine: When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the reputation
shown should be that which existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose,[1] or at the time
of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.[2] This is because a person of
derogatory character or reputation can still change or reform himself.
FACTS:
-2 separate complaints for sexual harassment and various malfeasances were filed against Dr. Belagan, the Superintendent of
DECS.
1st (MAGDALENAs): She was applying for a permit to operate a pre-school and during the inspection of the pre-school, Belagan
placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheeks. Magdalena kept mum about the incident but when she followed up
her application, Belagan replied, Mag-date muna tayo. She only told her husband about the incident when he asked for the
status of their application. Belagan forwarded their application, with a recommendation for the approval of the pre-school. When
Magdalena found out that some DECS employees were suing Belagan, she decided to complain to DECS secretary Gloria.
Belagan was placed under suspension.
2nd (LIGAYA ANNAWI): She alleged in her complaint that on four separate occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed
her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her
back. Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers salaries; (2) failing to release the pay
differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully refusing to release the teachers uniforms, proportionate allowances and
productivity pay; and (4) failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and regulations.
DECS joint investigation: Belagan denied sexual harassment accusations. Presented evidence against admin acts.
*DECS Sec: GUILTY of 4 counts of sexual indignities or harassments committed against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of sexual
advances or indignities against Magdalena; DISMISSED from service. Absolved of admin malfeasance and dereliction of duty.
Appealed to CSC
*CSC: affirm DECS Sec BUT dismissed complaint of Ligaya. Transgression against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct.
MR (raised that he has never been charged of any offense in his 37 years of service while Magdalena was charged with 22
offenses before MTC Baguio and 23 complaints before brgy captains of Brgy Silang and Hillside in Baguio. (in general, these
charges concern grave threats or slander) STILL DENIED. Appealed before CA.
*CA: dismissed Magdalenas complaint, reversed CSC Resolutions.
Why? Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for
trouble, she is not one whom any male would attempt to steal a kiss.
ISSUE: WON complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible
HELD

Preliminary matters:
GR: Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and
are not reviewable by this Court. This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts.
X: when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or a quasi-judicial body, like petitioner herein.
Rules on character evidence (R130.51.a.3): the provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. Even if it
is applicable to admin cases, only character evidence that would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged
may be proved. Character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.
>>>IN THIS CASE: no evidence bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What were presented were charges for grave oral defamation,
grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her.
Rules of evidence for establishing lack of credibility of the witness: Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth
in the testimony given. It refers to a persons integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. A witness may be discredited by
evidence attacking his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity.
SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by
contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has
made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except
that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.
>>>Magdalena testified so shes considered a witness. Her character/reputation is a proper subject of inquiry. HOWEVER
(1) the charges and complaints happened way back in the 70s and 80s while the act complained of happened in 1994, thus, the
said charges are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation.
*evidence of ones character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question. In other words,
what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period
remote from the commencement of the suit.
It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again.
Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.
(2) no evidence of conviction of the offenses charged.
The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested
or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility.
This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge
against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a
crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may
not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct. Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our
Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such
evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be involved, and because the witness
may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts. As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain
or rebut each of the charges against her listed by respondent.
(3) CSC resolution was supported by substantial evidence. Magdalenas testimony was given weight by CSC plus corroborated
by affidavit of Ngabit re: complaint by Magdalena.
ON ALLEGED MOTIVE (TO PRESSURE BELAGAN TO ISSUE PERMIT): none. Permit was already issued when complaint was
filed.
ON Penalty:
*Misconduct: intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government
official. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer.
>grave misconduct: the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest.
>>Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights
of others.
>>> This is apparently present in respondents case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand for a date, an
unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondents act clearly constitutes grave
misconduct, punishable by dismissal.
***SC Considered length of service (37 years) + analogous cases: suspension for 1 year w/o pay
Disposition: Granted. Affirm CSC resolution. Suspend Belagan.
People v. Noel Lee, GR139070, May 29, 2002 (character evidence of victim, criminal case);
FACTS: Joseph Marquez and his mother, Herminia, were in the living room watching television when suddenly, Noel Lee shot
Joseph twice through their living room window. This was all witnessed by Herminia who eventually dragged her sons body and
shouted for help. Joseph was brought to the hospital but expired thereat. Noel Lee is a well-known figure in their neighborhood
and has several criminal cases pending against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and
attempted murder in 1989. He has known Joseph since childhood and their houses are only two blocks apart. Joseph had a bad

reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days before his death, on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant
caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away. As proof of the victims bad reputation, Noel
presented a letter handwritten by his mother, Herminia, addressed to Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City, and sent
through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter, Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation
because he was hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not just
steal but kill her and everyone in their household because of his drug habit. The accused-appellant likewise explained the two
criminal cases filed against him in 1984 and 1989. The information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victims
desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and admitted his crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces of evidence Noel Lee presented are admissible in evidence.
RULING: Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:
Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his
killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is
no connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In
light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad character he could have been killed by any
one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery and
premeditation. In People v. Solimana murder case, the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of
the deceased. Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme Court held:
x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the
commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed
through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has
produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive
action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of
murder.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery and evident premeditation. The
evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room watching television when accused-appellant
peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to
defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his death without risk
to the assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, proof of the
victims bad character is not necessary. The presence of this aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of proving the
victims bad character to establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the
killing of Joseph Marquez to murder.
People v. Concorcio, GR 121201-02, Oct. 19, 2001 (character evidence of accused, criminal case);
FACTS: That on or about May 24, 1987, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and during nighttime, suddenly
attacked, assaulted and stabbed one Jernie Sumagaysay and one Oscar Celis, with the use of said bladed instrument, thereby
afflicting [upon] the latter stabbed (sic) wounds which directly caused his immediate death. Accused-appellants, Edwin Yungot
and Rommel Magpatoc were arrested on September, 19917 and February, 1993,8 respectively. The two (2) other accused
remained at large.
When arraigned on October 21, 1991, Yungot pleaded not guilty to both charges. Immediately, a joint trial for the two counts of murder ensued
against him. On the other hand, subsequent to his arrest in 1993, Magpatoc also pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment.9 An
urgent motion for bail was filed by Magpatoc on March 1, 1993. After the hearing10 on the said motion, the trial court issued an Order dated
June 16, 1993, denying the motion for bail.11 Since the prosecution had already finished presenting its evidence-in-chief against Yungot, and
had rested its case against Yungot at the time of Magpatocs arrest, Magpatoc was given a separate trial whereupon the prosecution presented
its evidence-in-chief against Magpatoc. After the prosecution rested its case against Magpatoc, a joint trial was conducted for the defense,
rebuttal and surrebuttal.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses against Yungot: Delilah Celis Banderado, Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, Romeo Sumagaysay,
SPO4 Leonor Sonza, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, Jonathan Abellana, Jose Lagamon, Jr. and Dr. Jose Pagsaligan. The following witnesses testified
against Magpatoc: Jose Oyson and Jose Lagamon, Jr.,12 SPO4 Leonor Sonza, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, Delilah Celis
Banderado and Dr. Jose Pagsaligan. Notably, except for Jose Oyson, the foregoing witnesses also testified against Yungot. On rebuttal, the
prosecution recalled witnesses Jose Oyson and Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, and in addition, presented Ruth Dionson and Democrito Madiclum as
witnesses. On surrebuttal, Yungots defense counsel presented Lorna Surbito as a witness.
On the other hand, in his defense, Magpatoc presented Allen Ledesma, Noel Cahiwat, Ysmael Cahiwat and himself as witnesses; while
Yungot, along with Bernardo Bajenteng and Leovigildo Bautista testified in court.

The prosecution adduced the following evidence against Yungot during his trial. Prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. testified that he knew
the deceased Oscar Celis, who was his former classmate and the other deceased, Jernie Sumagaysay,13 whom he had met at school. According
to Lagamon, Jr., on May 24, 1987, he had a drinking spree with Oscar Celis, Jernie Sumagaysay and Ben Hur Barol at the Davao
Fiesta.14 Around 9 or 10 p.m.,15 after consuming four (4) or five (5) bottles of beer, Lagamon, Jr. and his companions paid their bill and
proceeded home. While walking along Claveria St., Lagamon, Jr., who was walking alongside Ben Hur Barol some five (5) to six (6) meters
ahead of Oscar Celis and Jernie Sumagaysay, heard a commotion at his back.16 He immediately turned around and saw accused-appellant
Edwin Yungot stab Oscar Celis two (2) or three (3) times at the left side of his chest, while three (3) or four (4) other persons were holding
Celis.17 He also saw "another person" thrust a knife at the right side of the chest of Jernie Sumagaysay while riding at the latters back.18 He
tried to assist his "friend" but the latters assailant threatened to stab him as well.19 His companion, Ben Hur Barol did nothing because he
was in shock. In his estimation, about five (5) to six (6) persons were involved in the stabbing incident, three (3) or four (4) of whom were
armed.20 He was then about a meter away from Celis and Sumagaysay. He further testified that the place was well-lighted. After the incident,
the assailants scampered away. Lagamon, Jr. and Barol flagged down a jeepney and brought Celis to the Davao Doctors Hospital.21 Lagamon,
Jr. did not notice where Jernie Sumagaysay had gone after the latter was stabbed. On cross-examination, he testified that he is a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and that he joined the Philippine Constabulary in 1988; but in 1987, when the stabbing incident occurred, he
was a "bet-taker."22 He insisted that he saw the assailants of Celis and Sumagaysay because the place where the stabbing incident occurred
was well-lighted with fluorescent lamps.23 He could not remember what kind of knife was used by Yungot in stabbing Celis but recalled that
it was about six (6) to seven (7) inches long.24 He was not summoned by the police authorities for an investigation; neither did he report what
he had witnessed to the police authorities.
Jonathan Abellana, who was serving sentence for murder,25 testified that on May 24, 1987, at around 9 p.m., he was at a dance in Roxas St.,
in front of the Holy Child School, and between Roxas and Claveria Sts., with Dodong Lanay, Allen Ledesma, Jun-jun Oyson, Edwin Yungot
and Omi Magpatoc.26 They proceeded to Barrio Fiesta for a drinking spree upon the invitation of a certain Jun. After the group consumed two
(2) cases of beer, Abellana went back to the dance. Later, the rest of the group27 also returned to the dance.
P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), assigned at the Homicide and Arson Section of the San Pedro
Patrol Station, testified that on May 24, 1987, at around 12 midnight, he received information regarding a stabbing incident which took place
at Claveria St. Together with the members of the Mobile Patrol, he went to the San Pedro Hospital and Davao Doctors Hospital, where the
stabbed victims were brought, and conducted an investigation. From the said hospitals, they proceeded to the scene of the crimes and
continued with the investigation. Based on his investigation, P/Cpl. Erispe learned that one (1) of the victims was stabbed near RCBC while
the other victim was able to run towards the Martinez Pawnshop. From the hospital records, he was able to identify the stabbed victims as
Oscar Celis and Jernie Sumagaysay.28
SPO4 Leonor Sonza, of the Criminal Record Branch, Metrodiscom, PNP, brought the Record of Events of the San Pedro Patrol Station, dated
May 24, 1987,29 showing the entry of the stabbing incident involving Celis and Sumagaysay.
Dr. Jose Pagsaligan, Medical Specialist II, Regional Health Office No. XI, Department of Health (DOH), Davao City, performed the autopsy
on the victims cadavers on May 25, 1987 and issued Autopsy Report Nos. N-039-87 and N-040-87, showing the following findings:
"Autopsy Report No. N-039-8730
"POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
" 1. STABBED WOUND 3.5 cm. long, gaping, running medially and slightly upward, edges cleancut, sharp edge
inferiorly, located in the left chest, 10 cm. from the anterior median line, 4 cm. from the left nipple at the level of the 3rd
intercostal space, penetrating the skin and muscles and the heart through and through.
" 2. Contusion-abrasion 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. in diameter below the right eye along the outer canthus of the right eye, 7 cm.
from the anterior median line and 6 cm. from the right ear.
" 3. Contusion-abrasion 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. in diameter, slightly above the right mandible, 2 cm. from the anterior median line
and 10 cm. from the right ear.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: SHOCK SECONDARY TO SEVERE HEMORRHAGE DUE TO STAB WOUND, CHEST,
LEFT."31
"Autopsy Report No. N-040-8732
"POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
" 1. STABBED WOUND 1.5 cm. long, gaping, running medially downward, edges cleancut, sharp edge inferiorly
medially, located in the right side of the chest, 4 cm. from the anterior median line, 12 cm. from the right nipple, penetrating
the skin and muscles in the 2nd intercostal space, right, cutting the pulmonary artery.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: SHOCK SECONDARY TO SEVERE HEMORRHAGE DUE TO STAB WOUND, CHEST,
RIGHT."33
In Dr. Pagsaligans opinion, each stab wound which caused the death of Celis and Sumagaysay was inflicted using a single-bladed
weapon.34 He further opined that the assailants might have used two (2) weapons.35
Delilah Celis Banderado, sister of Oscar Celis, presented the death certificate of Celis36 and testified on the actual expenses amounting to
P13,990.00, which they incurred due to the death of Celis.37 She further testified that at the time of his death, her brother was 24 years old and
had just graduated from an Electrical Engineering course at the University of Mindanao.38
Romeo Sumagaysay, father of Jernie Sumagaysay, proffered the death certificate of Jernie,39 and testified that he incurred P12,000.00 as
funeral and burial expenses arising from the death of Jernie. He also testified that at the time of Jernies death, Jernie was a second year
college student at the University of Mindanao.40
As pointed out earlier, after the prosecution rested its case against Yungot, the other accused, Rommel Magpatoc was arrested and given a
separate trial only insofar as the presentation of the prosecutions evidence-in-chief against him. A joint trial, however, was subsequently
conducted for the defense of both accused-appellants as well as for rebuttal and surrebuttal.
Subsequent to his arrest and arraignment, accused-appellant Rommel Magpatoc filed a motion for bail dated March 1, 1993.41 At the
hearing42 on the said motion, the prosecution presented as witnesses, Jose Oyson and Jose Lagamon, Jr. The defense, however, did not present
any evidence.43

At the said hearing, Lagamon, Jr. claimed that he came to know Sumagaysay at the Davao Fiesta where they started drinking at around 8 p.m.,
on May 24, 1987.44 He was with Celis, Sumagaysay and Ben Hur. He reiterated his testimony at Yungots trial that they left Davao Fiesta
between 9 and 10 p.m.; and walked towards RCBC, with himself and Ben Hur about two (2) meters ahead of Celis and Sumagaysay. Upon
hearing footsteps behind them, he turned around and saw Celis being stabbed.45 When asked by the trial judge if he knew the person who
stabbed Celis, Lagamon, Jr. answered that he "could not recognize the person who stabbed Celis because it happened so suddenly."46 But
when asked by the prosecutor if he could identify the assailants if he were to see them again, he answered, "I could recognize them by
face."47 He further recalled that about four (4) persons attacked his companions, two (2) or three (3) of whom were armed with knives. He
also declared that Sumagaysay was stabbed in the same manner that Celis was stabbed, i.e., the assailants left hand was placed on the victims
shoulder, while the formers right hand stabbed the victim.48 He admitted that he could not clearly recognize Sumagaysays assailant because
the incident happened suddenly;49 however, he maintained that Magpatoc was one of those who killed his companions.50 On crossexamination and upon query by the trial court, Lagamon, Jr. pointed to Magpatoc as the person who stabbed Celis,51 contrary to his testimony
during Yungots trial that Yungot was the one who stabbed Celis. When asked if he could recognize the person who attacked Sumagaysay if in
court, he replied, "[h]e is not here."52
The prosecution also presented Jose Oyson as a witness at the hearing on Magpatocs motion for bail.53 Oyson testified that on May 24, 1987,
at about 8:30 p.m., he was drinking at the Davao Fiesta in Claveria St., along with Jun Concorcio, Jun Laos, Edwin Yungot, Omie
Magpatoc,54 Allen Ledesma, Joe Dalman alias Idi, Jun Suaner alias Siquio and Jose Dodong Cahiwat.55 He recounted that Jun Concorcio
pointed at the group of Celis, Sumagaysay and two (2) others, who were laughing at him.56 Corsiga57 told them to "birahan" (to do some
harm to) Celis, Sumagaysay and the two (2) others.58 At about 10 p.m., when Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions left Barrio
Fiesta, Oysons group followed them.59 Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions went towards Land Bank in Claveria St. Celis and
Sumagaysay were walking behind their two (2) companions. Edwin Yungot, Josel Ayala alias Bobong Lanay60 and Omie Magpatoc rushed
towards Celis and Sumagaysay. Edwin Yungot stabbed Oscar Celis.61 Oyson could not ascertain who between Magpatoc and Ayala actually
stabbed Jernie Sumagaysay.62 Yungot, Ayala and Magpatoc were armed with knives.63 One (1) of the stabbed victims fell on the ground
while the other victim was able to run away. Oyson was about seven (7) meters away from the place where the stabbing incident occurred. The
said place was lighted with a fluorescent bulb. After the incident, Oyson and his companions ran away and proceeded to the dance on Roxas
Avenue.64 On cross-examination, Oyson testified that the group which followed Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions from Barrio
Fiesta, included himself, accused-appellants, Edwin Yungot and Omie Magpatoc, Joe Dalman, Allen Ledesma, Josel Ayala, Jun Laos, Edic,
Jun Suaner alias Siquio, and Dodong Cahiwat.65 They were all members of the Looban Young Killer (LYK) gang.66Oyson recalled that three
(3) among his companions on the night of May 24, 1987, were armed with knives, namely, Yungot, Ayala and Magpatoc, because "they were
[walking] ahead" of the group.67 They followed Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions in order to "do harm to them."68
As pointed earlier, the prosecution adopted the foregoing testimonies of Jose Oyson and Jose Lagamon, Jr. during the hearing on Magpatocs
motion for bail, as part of its evidence-in-chief against Magpatoc. In addition to the foregoing testimonies, the prosecution presented anew five
(5) witnesses, namely, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, SPO4 Leonor Sonza, Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, Dr. Jose Pagsaligan and Delilah Celis Banderado,
whom it had earlier presented during Yungots trial. These five (5) witnesses respective testimonies at Magpatocs trial were substantially
identical with their testimonies at Yungots trial.
At Magpatocs trial, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe further testified that while he was at the Davao Doctors Hospital, he was able to talk with the two
(2) companions of the stabbed victim who was brought there. He identified these two (2) companions as Ben Hur and Joe Lagamon.69 At the
San Pedro Hospital, hospital employees gave him two (2) identification cards of Jernie Sumagaysay for safekeeping, which he subsequently
turned over to the desk officer at the station.70
Dr. Jose Pagsaligan, the medical specialist from the Regional Health Office No. XI of the Department of Health (DOH), Davao City, who
performed the autopsy on the two victims cadavers on May 25, 1987, and issued Autopsy Report Nos. N-039-87 and N-040-87, also testified
that because of the trajectory of the wound which Sumagaysay sustained, his assailant was most probably at his back, holding the bladed
weapon.71
Delilah Celis Banderado, sister of Oscar Celis, testified anew on the actual expenses amounting to P13,990.00, which they incurred due to the
death of Celis.
With leave of court, accused-appellants, Yungot and Magpatoc filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence,72which, however, were denied
by the trial court in an Order dated November 10, 1993.73
Subsequently, a joint trial was conducted for the presentation of evidence for the defense. Rommel Magpatoc, in his defense, testified along
with Allen Ledesma, Noel Cahiwat and Ysmael Cahiwat; while Edwin Yungot, also in his defense, presented Bernardo Bajenteng, Leovigildo
Bautista and himself as witnesses.
According to accused-appellant Magpatoc, on May 24, 1987, at about 7:30-8:00 p.m., he went with his girlfriend to the dance held at the back
of the Aldevinco building.74 Together with three (3) others, namely, his girlfriend, Noel Cahiwag and the latters friend, Magpatoc left the
dance at around 11 p.m. and went home.75 He denied having gone to Barrio Fiesta on that night.76
Allen Ledesma, a friend of Magpatoc, testified that on May 24, 1987, at 10 p.m., he was "inside the disco house" at Aldevinco Shopping
Center with Magpatoc and Dodong Abellana.77 At around 10:30 p.m., he went to the Davao Fiesta with Dodong Abellana upon the latters
invitation, leaving behind Rommel Magpatoc, who stayed in the "disco house."78 Ledesma and Abellana joined six (6) others at the Davao
Fiesta. After consuming three (3) bottles of beer, Ledesma left Davao Fiesta with a certain Anak,79 bought some cigarettes and went back to
the "disco house." Among the six (6) persons left behind at the Davao Fiesta were Dodong Cahiwat, a certain Caloy and a certain
Lanay.80 Jose Oyson was later identified as one of the six (6) persons,81 whom Ledesma and Abellana joined at the Davao Fiesta. Likewise,
Edwin Yungot was at the Davao Fiesta when they arrived there.82
Noel Cahiwat testified that on the night of May 24, 1987, he was at the dance held behind the Aldevinco Shopping Center, with Rommel
Magpatoc, Allen Ledesma and several others. At about 9:30 p.m., a certain Jun Driver invited them to drink at the Davao Fiesta. He went to
the Davao Fiesta with Dodong Siquio and another person whose name he could not remember.83 Rommel Magpatoc and the others were left
at the "disco house."84 At 10 p.m., Noel Cahiwat left the Davao Fiesta with a companion and went back to the "dance hall."85 At the "dance
hall," Dodong Lanay told him that Jun Driver stabbed somebody.86 On cross-examination, he admitted that in the evening of May 24, 1987,
Jose Oyson was at the Barrio Fiesta with his group.

Ysmael Cahiwat, barangay captain of 33-B Poblacion, Davao City, testified to prove the good moral character of accused-appellant Magpatoc.
He stated that Magpatoc had been active in community activities and had demonstrated leadership in the youth activities for the "IKP" chapel.
According to Cahiwat, at the time of Magpatocs arrest, the latter was an elected Sangguniang Kabataan member.
On the other hand, in his defense, Edwin Yungot testified that in the evening of May 24, 1987, he operated the "radio phono" at the benefit
dance held at the back of the Aldevinco Center.87 He operated the said "radio phono," without anybodys assistance, until the benefit dance
ended at 1 a.m. of the following day. He confirmed that Magpatoc was at the benefit dance and that Magpatoc left when the dance ended at 1
a.m.88
Bernardo Bajenteng, a neighbor of Yungot and former president of the Pag-asa Youth Movement, corroborated Yungots testimony that on
May 24, 1987, he (Yungot) operated the sound system from 8 p.m. until 1 a.m. of the following day.89 However, according to Bajenteng,
Yungot was assisted by the son of the owner of the sound system. Furthermore, Bajenteng insisted, on cross-examination, that Yungot did not
leave the benefit dance from 8 p.m. until 1 a.m. of the following day, except at one instance, that is, at about 9 p.m., Yungot left, but after five
minutes, he returned back to the dance.90 Bajenteng acted as the emcee at the dance.
Leovigildo Bautista,91 a youth organizer associated with the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), issued a certification
confirming that Yungot was a bonafide member of the Pag-asa Youth Movement.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Jose Oyson, who refuted Yungots testimony that he was the operator of the "phonograph system" used
at the benefit dance held on the night of May 24, 1987; and declared that it was Ruth Dionson, granddaughter of the owner of the "phonograph
system," who operated the said system.92 Oyson further claimed that Yungot and Magpatoc were at the Davao Fiesta in the evening of May
24, 1987.93 He maintained that he saw Yungot, Magpatoc and Ayala stab Celis and Sumagaysay.94 On cross-examination, he asserted that at
7:30 p.m., on May 24, 1987, he left the dance and went to the Davao Barrio Fiesta with accused-appellants, Edwin Yungot and Rommel
Magpatoc, Jossel Ayala, Jun Laos, Allen Ledesma, Jun Suaner, Edi (Edic in footnote 65), Jose Dalman and Dodong Cajiwat.95 After three (3)
hours, all of them left the Barrio Fiesta, and returned to the dance after the stabbing incident had occurred.96
Still on rebuttal, Ruth Dionson disputed Yungots testimony that he operated the sound system at the benefit dance held on May 24, 1987, and
claimed she operated the said sound system with her aunt, Melanie Guinagao.97
The prosecution also recalled Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla who testified that a week after May 24, 1987, as investigator, he went to the house of
Yungot but failed to find Yungot.
On April 17, 1995, the trial court promulgated its joint decision dated March 28, 1995, finding both Yungot and Magpatoc guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder in both Criminal Cases Nos. 15,377-87 and 15,378-87, imposing upon them two terms of reclusion perpetua, and
the payment of actual, compensatory and moral damages, and costs.
HELD: Accused-appellant Edwin Yungots arguments, in fine, revolve on the matter of credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In particular,
Yungot cites several instances of inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. For instance, on direct examination
at Yungots trial, Lagamon, Jr. claimed that Yungot stabbed Celis. However, during the hearing on Magpatocs motion for bail at Magpatocs
trial, Lagamon, Jr. asserted on both direct and cross-examinations that he could not recognize the person who stabbed Celis because the
incident happened suddenly; but immediately thereafter, he declared that he could recognize Celis assailants only by face,100 and in open
court pointed at accused-appellant Rommel Magpatoc as the person who stabbed Celis.101Yungot argues that the "[s]aid inconsistencies in the
testimony of Jose Lagamon, Jr. should not have been overlooked by the trial court, for it not only puts to doubt the identity of the assailant[s]
in the crime[s] but likewise casts doubt as to the credibility of the said witness, the very foundation of the crime for which ... [he] stand[s] to
lose his liberty."102
The argument is plainly unmeritorious. Well-settled to the point of being elementary is the rule of procedure that in rendering its judgment, the
court must consider only such evidence, duly presented during the trial, for or against any party to the action, and made the sole basis of the
decision therein.103 Thus, Lagamon, Jr.s testimony in the separate trial of Magpatoc cannot, at this stage, be used by Yungot to exculpate
himself. Under Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, "xxx xxx. [e]ither party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a
witness who is deceased, out of, or cannot, with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in
another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the
opportunity to cross-examine him. Thus, the only instance when Lagamon, Jr.s testimony at the separate trial of Magpatoc could have been
utilized as part of Yungots evidence was if the said witness was deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, which was not proved at all in this case. The trial court found Lagamon, Jr.s testimony to be "clear,
straightforward, convincing and rigning (sic) with sincerity." The above findings of the trial court are fully supported by the records as
shown by the transcripts of Lagamon, Jr.
Even assuming arguendo that Lagamon, Jr.s testimony at Magpatocs trial could be considered as part of Yungots evidence, we have
previously ruled that "[c]ourts are not bound to accept or reject the whole of the testimony of a witness. They may believe one part and
disbelieve the other part of the testimony. If there are conflicts in the testimony which cannot be so reconciled as to admit every witness
swearing the truth, the Court adopts that testimony which it believes to be true, taking into consideration the general character of the witness,
his manner and demeanor on the stand while testifying, the consistency or inconsistency of his statements, their probability or improbability,
his ability and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence and means of knowledge, his motive to speak the truth or swear a
falsehood."107 As it were, the trial court aptly found the testimony of Lagamon, Jr. to be clear, straightforward, convincing and ringing with
sincerity. Nonetheless, even if we were to consider Lagamon, Jr.s entire testimony as unreliable, unworthy of belief and undeserving of
credence because of some inconsistency in his testimony, particularly regarding the identity of Celis assailant, Yungots active participation in
the crimes charged was positively asserted by another eyewitness for the prosecution, Jose Oyson. In other words, Yungots conviction was
based not only on Lagamon, Jr.s testimony but also on the testimony of another eyewitness, Jose Oyson. Furthermore, the following
circumstances, duly established by the evidence for the prosecution, which Yungots defense of alibi could not surmount, proved that Yungot
was one of those who participated in the killing of Celis and Sumagaysay and is, therefore, guilty beyond reasonable doubt:
"1. Yungot was positively identified by his companions on the night of May 24, 1987, Jonathan Abellana and Jose Oyson, as one of
those who were drinking with them at the Davao Barrio Fiesta; and by Jose Lagamon, Jr. who was also drinking at the Davao Barrio
Fiesta with Celis and Sumagaysay.

2. Yungot and his companions left the Davao Barrio Fiesta after three hours.
3. Celis, Sumagaysay, Lagamon, Jr. and Barol left the Davao Barrio Fiesta and walked towards Claveria St.
4. Yungot was one of the five or six persons involved in the stabbing incident, three or four of whom were armed.
5. Celis and Sumagaysay each died of a stab wound inflicted using a single-bladed weapon.
6. Immediately after the commission of the crimes, Yungot and Magpatoc resorted to flight.
7. Prosecution witnesses Jose Oyson, Jose Lagamon, Jr. and Jonathan Abellana were not shown to have any cause to testify falsely
against Yungot."
The inconsistencies between the testimony of Lagamon, Jr. and Jose Oysons testimony, particularly, the manner how Celis and Sumagaysay
were attacked,109 and the number of persons involved in the stabbing incident,110 as further pointed out by Yungot, are more apparent than
real, if not altogether immaterial and insignificant. Concededly, some inconsistencies may be noted; they are, however, not so material and
substantial as to affect the credibility of the said witnesses; thus there is no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the trial court in this
regard.
We now tackle the issue of whether treachery and conspiracy attended the commission of the crimes. Yungots allegation that the trial court
erred in appreciating the presence of treachery and conspiracy, is not supported by the records. Indeed, the foregoing requisites were
evidently present in the case at bar. Accused-appellant Yungots attack, coming from behind, on the unarmed Oscar Celis, was
sudden, unprovoked, unexpected and deliberate. To ensure or afford impunity, three (3) other persons were holding Celis while
he was being stabbed by Yungot. Clearly, under these circumstances, Celis was in no position and without any means to defend
himself. The attack was done in a manner which directly and specially insured the execution of the act without any risk to Yungot
arising from the defense which Celis might have made. Thus, as correctly held by the trial court, treachery was present in this
case, qualifying the crime to murder.
After a careful and thorough review of the evidence on record, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, the Court notes that
these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and insignificant details and slight variations. The alleged
inconsistencies bear no materiality to the commission of the crimes imputed against accused-appellants. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, "xxx xxx. [t]hese [seeming] discrepancies may be attributed to the fact that the witnesses were called to relate
the incident almost five years after it transpired. It is not unusual for a witness to a startling occurrence, not to vividly and exactly
remember minute details of the occurrence, such as [the] number and location of the wounds inflicted on the victim[s] especially,
when he was called to testify only after a lapse of almost five years. xxx xxx."122 Trivial incongruities within a testimony and
between testimonies likewise do not impair the credibility of the witness/witnesses. Minor lapses are to be expected when a
person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. In fact, the discordance in the testimonies of witnesses
on minor matters heightens their credibility and shows that their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed, especially where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. Moreover, accused-appellant
Magpatoc bewails the supposed failure of prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. to promptly report the crimes to the authorities; and assails
the delay of prosecution witness Jose Oyson in testifying before the trial court.
The contention is untenable.
This Court has already taken judicial notice of the actuality that witnesses in this country are usually reluctant to volunteer information about a
criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations.124 The initial reluctance to volunteer information
about a criminal case and/or the unwillingness to be involved in a criminal investigation due to fear of reprisal are common and have been
judicially declared to have no effect on credibility.125
Finally, Magpatoc alleges that the trial court erred in disregarding evidence of his good moral character. The allegation has no merit. In People
vs. Cerelegia,126 we ruled that "xxx xxx. [i]t is true that the good moral character of an accused having reference to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged may be proven by him. But an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character
and exemplary conduct if the Court believes he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The affirmance or reversal of his
conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond peradventure of
doubt."127 After reviewing the evidence in this case, we are convinced that the prosecution has satisfactorily overcome the presumption of
innocence accorded to every accused and that accused-appellants, Yungot and Magpatoc are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged; thus, evidence of good moral character will not prevail.
Regarding accused-appellants mutual defense of alibi, we rule that the trial court correctly rejected their alibi since it was not physically
impossible for both accused-appellants to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. We have ruled, time and again, that alibi is
the weakest of all defenses and cannot stand against strong and positive identification, as in this case.128