EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Setting, measuring and

monitoring targets for
reducing disaster risk
Recommendations for post-2015
international policy frameworks

Tom Mitchell
Debarati Guha-Sapir
Julia Hall
Emma Lovell
Robert Muir-Wood
Alastair Norris
Lucy Scott
Pascaline Wallemacq

October 2014

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Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399

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Executive summary
Introduction
In many regions, disaster risk is continuing to increase
(UNISDR, 2013c), mostly because greater numbers of
vulnerable people and assets are located in exposed
areas. It is vital to start reversing these trends. Over
the next 18 months, there will be negotiation and
hopefully agreement of three major international
policy frameworks, each with a key interest in reducing
disaster risk and minimising disaster losses. These are
1) the post-2015 framework on disaster risk reduction
(DRR); 2) the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
a way of prioritising development actions; and 3)
an international agreement on climate change to
establish global action on tackling climate change
beyond 2020. If well integrated, these frameworks
should be able to provide a unique opportunity to
deliver a coherent strategy and implementation plan to
address the drivers of disaster risk.
A key way of linking these frameworks, particularly
the SDGs and the post-2015 framework on DRR,
lies in establishing common global goals, targets and
indicators in relation to reducing disaster risks and
losses. Such measures can provide a focus for action, a
way of tracking progress and an opportunity to gauge
the effectiveness of investments. A single set of targets
and indicators spanning the SDGs and the post-2015
framework on DRR would clarify priorities, increase
logic and coherence and minimise the amount of work
required to develop monitoring and reporting capacity.

Hence, we consider the options available. The

report investigates a set of possible components for
this common target and indicator set, drawing on
different evidence to establish potential numerical
targets. It considers the data challenges of establishing
such targets and how to improve the collection
of data on disasters and disaster risk. It ends with
ten recommendations on how post-2015 policy
frameworks can support the development of a global
monitoring system to track changing disaster risk and
disaster losses. The international agreement on climate
change has different, though linked targets to the
SDGs and post-2015 framework on DRR and this
report does not consider these. However, reducing the
impact of climate change will be key to ensure that,
even with the successful achievement of predetermined
DRR targets, disaster risk does not continue to
increase in the future.

Observations on disaster losses since 1980

The report focuses on three dimensions of disaster
losses: mortality, national economic losses and
livelihood losses, assessed as disaster-induced
impoverishment. Based on existing international
records of disaster losses collected by the Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)
and by analysing a number of household survey
datasets, we can establish the following observations
at global scale:

Figure A: Global trends in disaster events and death tolls, 1980-2013

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Number of disasters and number of deaths (thousands)

SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM WWW.EMDAT.BE

Number of disasters
Number of deaths (thousands)

Number of disasters (poisson regression)

Number of deaths (poisson regression)

setting, measuring and monitoring targets for reducing disaster risk

Figure B: Global disaster-related mortality rate (per million

global population), 1980-2013)
SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM WWW.EMDAT.BE
NOTE: THE 'X' AXIS HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO 2030 TO HIGHLIGHT THE PERIOD COVERED BY 2015 AGREEMENTS AND TO ACCENTUATE THE LIKELIHOOD OF
ANNUAL VARIATIONS CONTINUING.

100
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Deaths per 1 million population

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0
Observed global death rate

Disaster deaths
Disaster deaths, the most commonly reported aspect
of disaster events, are key motivators of national
and international action on DRR. Taking 34 years
of data on absolute disaster deaths (not adjusted for
population growth or for the severity of particular
hazard events) and applying a Poisson regression
highlights that the number of disaster events that
have occurred in the past few years has increased
compared with two decades ago; the associated
total number of annual global deaths from disasters
has also increased slightly, because of three high
mortality years (2004, 2008, 2010) (see Figure A).
Using these data, adjusting them for population
growth and projecting 15 years into the future suggests
a decrease in disaster-related deaths (per million
population globally). The death rate in 1980 was
14.3 deaths per million people; the figure for 2030
would be 8.1 if the trend is extended (see Figure B,
using a Poisson regression model). Inevitably given
the volatility of the data there is a wide range of
uncertainty in how any such statistical forecast can
be projected. The high variability in disaster deaths in
the observed years also makes it difficult to establish
any clear trend, and one or two major disasters in the
next 15 years, resulting in large numbers of deaths,
would challenge any attempts to achieve a reduction
in disaster deaths. The global data also hide very
significant differences between countries at different
levels of economic development. Using the same
technique for projecting disaster deaths, the mortality
rate in the Philippines for example, would increase by
nearly 50% between 1980 and 2030 (22.9 per million
in 2030), whereas in the US the decrease would be

nearly 60% for the same period (0.8 per million in

2030). Comparing two short time periods using disaster
loss data at country level, however, is not reliable
statistically, as a major disaster event in the past three
decades can greatly influence the variability of the data.
This is particularly the case for countries where the
total number of disaster events on record is very small.
Economic losses
Economic losses from disasters are widely considered
to be increasingly rapidly, because more assets are
exposed to hazards. Data on global economic disaster
losses since 1980, in US dollars based on 2013 US
dollar values adjusted by unit of gross domestic
product (GDP), show an increase to the present day.
When projecting the trend forward to 2030, potential
economic losses would be 161% higher in 2030 than
they were in 1980 (see Figure C). We cannot draw
strong conclusions from these economic loss data,
however, as it is not easy to disentangle the impact of
US dollar inflation, exchange rates and losses arising
as a result of the disaster event itself. It should also
be noted that only 36% of events recorded for the
period 1980-2013 in the CRED database contain
data on economic losses. Further, a small number
of mega-disasters, dominating the level of global
economic losses in any one year, greatly influence the
historic record of economic losses. In the future, more
reports on direct and indirect economic damages,
using a standardised assessment method even for
small events, would be desirable. Modelling could
also help provide estimates of economic losses where
data are missing. Further work is required to produce
a reliable record of economic disaster losses, adjusted
for inflation and for country GDP.

Figure C: Global economic losses related to gross world product

(%), 1980-2013
SOURCE: DRAWING ON HTTP://DATA.WORLDBANK.ORG AND WWW.EMDAT.BE

Economic damages (US$/GWP) %

NOTE: THE 'X' AXIS HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO 2030 TO HIGHLIGHT THE PERIOD COVERED BY 2015 AGREEMENTS AND TO ACCENTUATE THE LIKELIHOOD OF
ANNUAL VARIATIONS CONTINUING.

0.6
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Observed

Links between disasters and poverty

impoverishment are significant and, in some contexts

and over certain periods of time, can exceed those
related to escapes from poverty (see Figure D, showing
an illustrative sample of districts within the countries
listed, where comparable data are available, showing high
impoverishment rates). Disasters are commonly cited as
a major driver of impoverishment and are a significant
obstacle to escaping poverty. Their impact on poverty
and human development can vary according to both the
characteristic of the hazard (e.g. whether it is rapid- or
slow-onset and the recurrence time between events) and
the degree of resilience at household and community level
(itself a function of assets and endowments). The balance

Disasters, climate change and development are

inextricably linked: not only do disasters
disproportionately affect the poorest and most
marginalised people, but also they exacerbate
vulnerabilities and social inequalities and harm
economic growth. Natural disasters can reverse
years of development gains, and threaten efforts to
eliminate poverty by 2030. Consequently, any strategy
for eradicating extreme poverty must include efforts to
prevent impoverishment (the descent below the poverty
line of people currently living out of poverty). Rates of

Figure D: Households escaping from and falling into poverty

- selected data to highlight impoverishment potential over
particular periods of time
SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM SHEPHERD ET AL. (2014).
NOTE: CALCULATIONS USE NATIONAL POVERTY LINES.

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% of households

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Escaped from poverty

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setting, measuring and monitoring targets for reducing disaster risk

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Districts within countries selected unless

specified as being nationally representative

TABLE A: RATES OF IMPOVERISHMENT ACROSS DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS, MATCHED WITH

DISASTERS IN THESE PERIODS
Country

Years/
period of time

Annual rate of
impoverishment (%)

Ethiopia (rural)

1990-1994

1999-2004

3.6

Drought September 1999 affecting 4.9 million people.

Drought 2003 affecting 12.6 million people.

2004-2009

Drought start of 2009 affecting 6.2 million people.

2004-2007

4.7

Drought July 2004 affecting 2.3 million people.

Drought December 2005 affecting 3.5 million people.

2007-2010

4.7

Drought July 2008 affecting 3.8 million people.

2008-2010

2010-2012

4.5

Kenya (rural)

South Africa

Information on main disasters (www.emdat.be)

Floods 2011 affecting 200,000 people.

Floods October 2012 affecting 125,000 people.

SOURCE: DRAWING ON ETHIOPIA: ETHIOPIAN RURAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY; KENYA: TEGEMEO AGRICULTURAL SURVEY; SOUTH AFRICA: NATIONAL INCOME
DYNAMICS STUDY AND WWW.EMDAT.BE

of evidence suggests droughts and extreme rainfall

volatility are the hazards most correlated with an
increase in poverty.
Without the benefit of more detailed research, only
anecdotal comparisons are possible of rates of
impoverishment in a given time period in a country
with major disaster events falling in the same period.
The table above presents an assessment of trends in
impoverishment over time using household panel
surveys undertaken across different periods. It also
gives information on major national covariant
shocks. The aim is not to attribute particular rates
of impoverishment to these events, but rather to
illustrate the context within which countries have
been successful, or more usually unsuccessful, at
reducing their impoverishment rates. This is a small
sample of a longer table included in the main report.
The aim is to give an idea of the possible rate of
reduction of impoverishment.

Specifying targets
As described above, a global dataset of disaster losses
covering 34 years is not a strong basis on which to
establish global disaster mortality targets for 2030,
but it is probably the best we have. Loss data would
need to be available for a much longer period to
enable establishment of a more accurate baseline
and projection although this would also introduce
a problem in that demographics and building stock
would likely have changed significantly over the time
period. Accordingly, until it is possible to produce a
reliable global assessment of the risk of losses across
a range of hazards at country level, the establishment
of targets around disaster losses is as much an art
as it is a science. By looking at global and national
data and considering the scale of mortality risk

reduction some countries have achieved, as well

as the relative blend of hazards (those that offer a
chance of evacuation or not), we propose a global
target of halving disaster deaths by 2030 (normalised
by population exposed).The reductions achievable
around earthquake fatalities (which accounted for
38% of global mortality from disasters between 1980
and 2013) are likely to be much lower than those for
hazards that offer early warning potential storm
surges, tropical cyclones, river floods and tsunamis,
for example. Evacuations are much more effective
than incremental changes in building stock at saving
lives. Relatively radical changes in building types
need to be made, such as from unreinforced masonry
to wood or steel, depending on the specific hazard
involved, in order to make a significant difference.
Additionally, cost and time taken to replace building
stock are key considerations.
Based on an assessment of country-level evidence and
relative trends related to mortality risk and economic
loss risk, and given that even standard building codes
are designed to save lives rather than limit damages,
a proposed target of reducing economic losses from
all disasters by 20% (per unit of GDP) by 2030
could be set. We consider this highly ambitious,
given the background trend in many countries of
increasing exposure of economic assets. For floods,
progress towards this target could be achieved
through improved zoning of new construction as well
as through the development of flood defences. For
earthquakes, progress could be made by replacing
the most dangerous buildings with new earthquakeresistant construction and building in areas of low risk.
Our analyses for Japan show reductions achieved in
casualties have been much larger than those achieved
around economic losses.

It is equally difficult to ascertain a globally

representative figure for rates of impoverishment, given
the relative paucity of household surveys investigating
the role of natural hazards and disasters in any depth.
However, based on the few data points available, it is
clear that preventing all impoverishment resulting from
disasters will not be possible, as the immediate impacts
(hours, days and weeks) following a disaster are very
difficult to mitigate entirely, even in the wealthiest
societies. However, it appears reasonable (based on
case study evidence) to expect to be able to reverse
post-disaster impoverishment after a period of months
or at maximum a year. Accordingly, a target within
the context of poverty eradication could be as follows:
A shock, such as a disaster, does not increase poverty
levels, as measured 12 months after the event. It is
important to note that a target focused on disasters
alone may not be appropriate, as processes of
impoverishment are complex and commonly involve
interconnected factors that are hard to distinguish. This
is a challenging target, since the impact of a disaster
on poverty depends on the type of hazard, the context,
the scale and the nature of the recovery process. More
process-oriented and input targets could focus on
reducing the exposure of poor people to extreme
hazards by x% or be as follows: 100% of post-disaster
recovery plans address the impact of disaster on poverty.

Factors to consider in developing global and

national disaster risk reduction targets and
tracking progress
In establishing a target and indicator framework across
the SDGs and the post-2015 framework on DRR, we
need to address some fundamental questions:
Is a global aggregate target directly applicable at
country level? If a proposed global target is to halve
disaster deaths by 2030, is it appropriate to adopt this
as a national target also? Based on the data assessed
in the report, we believe it is vital to establish a global
target to guide progress but, given the wide variety
of national risk contexts, it does not make sense to
apply this single common target directly to every
country. Support should be given instead to a process of
national differentiation, shaped by agreed parameters
for establishing national commitments, and registering
these within an international reporting framework.
This increases the likelihood of country ownership.
This process of setting national targets would need to
be independently reviewed, and guidance given based
on the country profile (hazard risk, possible mitigation
methods, economic band, exposure at risk).
Should progress reports on implementing the SDGs and
the post-2015 framework on DRR be synchronous? The
target timeframe and reporting protocol for the SDGs
and the post-2015 framework on DRR need to align
fully to avoid unnecessary duplication or burdening on
reporting capacity at the national level.

setting, measuring and monitoring targets for reducing disaster risk

Do global disaster loss data offer the best way of

tracking progress? Any global, regional or national
trends in disaster losses must be treated with caution,
as accurate data on disaster losses are not available
for many countries. In addition, severe hazard events
and major disasters can be so rare in any one region
that they are not taken into account within the time
sample. A global disaster monitoring system rooted
at the national level, as described below, will need
to tackle these challenges. A common target and
indicator framework should have targets linked to
disaster risk as a way of estimating expected losses.
This is necessary to establish a clear picture of
progress on DRR at national and global level.
How can progress in reducing expected losses be
measured globally and nationally? National disaster
data are often very noisy, meaning they may be
dominated by whether an extreme event has, or more
often has not, occurred within that observation period.
Accordingly, it is not possible to establish a true
statistical average for mortality or economic losses
from only a few decades of national loss data. An
example of this is for Haiti, where earthquakes killed
fewer than 10 people between 1900 and 2009 before
over 220,000 people were killed in a single afternoon
in 2010. Therefore, both in establishing baselines and
in measuring progress on DRR, it is necessary to use
other methods of measuring disaster risk.
One way is to use a catastrophe loss model
containing a synthetic catalogue of tens of
thousands of years of potential events, as widely
used by the insurance industry. However, such
models are complex, do not cover every country
and can be expensive to build. A simpler and more
practical method, available globally, involves
employing proxies for expected disaster casualties
and economic loss. For earthquake, the proxy
method takes the level of ground-shaking hazard
established at one or more consistent annual
probability as shown on a hazard map (such as
the 0.2% or 500-year average return period), and
collects data on the numbers of buildings in each
hazard zone, classified into categories according to
their susceptibility to collapse. Based on identifying
the population expected to be within these collapsed
buildings, it becomes possible to sum across all
zones, multiplying by the probability of the hazard,
to find the expected number of casualties per year.
For hazards with the potential for early warning
and evacuations, such as floods, the method
also uses consistent hazard maps to identify the
population at risk. Based on expected warning
times, and the rigour of the evacuation planning, the
proportion of this population expected to be saved
is calculated. The use of hazard maps and proxies
provides a simpler way of tracking risk-based loss
information. Agreement on the hazards measured
and standardisation of data are critical for the
application of this monitoring framework.

Ten propositions for a global monitoring

framework on disaster risk reduction
The following propositions, based on assessments in
this report, focus on agreeing common targets and
indicators for DRR and establishing national and
global monitoring systems to track progress:
1. A target set on DRR should combine the targets
with a methodology that assesses levels of disaster
risk. Only then can we adequately track progress
on reducing disaster risk. Given the short timeframe
between now and 2030, assessing trends in observed
disaster losses might give a false impression of
success if countries or regions are lucky in avoiding
severe disaster events in the period.
2. Such targets should be included in both the SDGs
and the post-2015 framework on DRR, using
identical language. A single set of goals, targets
and indicators spanning the SDGs and the post2015 framework on DRR would clarify priorities,
increase logic and coherence and minimise the
amount of work required to develop monitoring
and reporting capacity. Such indicators could
monitor inputs and outputs, such as the presence
of plans or legislation, or the number of people
effective early warning systems cover or of school
and health facilities built to hazard-resistant
building codes, linked to the hazard risk in the area.
3. It is important to establish clear, numerical targets
at a global scale to act as eye-catching awarenessraising components of the SDGs and the post2015 framework on DRR, and also to help
direct actions. Space should be created for the
differentiation and self-determination of targets
at national level, however. Differences between
countries in terms of their potential to reduce
risks, as a result of previous actions and exposure
to certain types of hazards, means one-size-fitsall targets like halving disaster deaths are not
appropriate for all. Instead, countries should be
encouraged to establish their own levels, in light
of the global target, and to select from a basket
of indicators, and then to register these as part of
the reporting process. This is likely to promote
greater ownership and relevance. However,
this would necessitate independent review and
guidance based on the country profile (hazard
risk, possible mitigation methods, economic band,
exposure at risk).
4. A disasters data revolution is needed, involving the
systematic collection of data on disaster risk and
losses across countries, to enable the establishment
of national and global trends. This revolution can
happen only if DRR targets and indicators are
included in the SDGs and are treated as part of a
much wider movement to improve the quality and
availability of data on sustainable development.

This is why it is so vital to include DRR in the

SDGs. Without such data, no country can truly
know if it is becoming more or less resilient to the
impacts of hazards. Disaster risk data can be used
to monitor progress over time, whereas disaster
loss data improve our understanding of the risk
and how best to provide mitigation measures, as
well as feeding hazard maps and models.
5. A monitoring methodology for tracking national
progress on DRR must focus on the use of
detailed disaster risk information, including highresolution data on national building inventories,
population data (including by socioeconomic
group), mapped hazard data and DRR plans. This
makes it possible to measure levels of disaster
risk using the real experience of disaster losses to
validate findings. Although there has been some
progress, there will be a need for investment in
setting up a technical support programme to
address the challenge outlined here.
6. Upgrades to poverty data should involve
modules on shocks. Where countries start more
comprehensive and regular monitoring of poverty
dynamics, potentially by extending household
surveys, these or other data collection methods
should incorporate modules or questions on the
impact of disaster events on income poverty and
other dimensions of human development, such as
health or school attendance.
7. To increase simplicity, logic and integration, the
SDGs and the post-2015 framework on DRR
should include DRR targets with the same start
and end points (e.g. targets set from 2015 to
2030), with synchronous reporting periods.
Any mismatch of timeframes or irregularity of
reporting periods will increase the workload for
countries, stretching their capacity to monitor
progress across a range of targets.
8. Tracking progress on disaster losses and risks
requires the normalisation of data for key
variables, like population or GDP, to allow
for comparisons between time periods. It also
requires the establishment of a baseline against
which progress can be assessed. As records of
losses from only a few decades typically undersample the impact of the most extreme disasters,
the baseline should be based principally on
the assessed level of risk (of losses) in that
country, based on the use of proxies indicative of
casualties and economic losses. The methodology
to define the baseline must be consistent with how
progress is measured.
9. The institutional architecture for delivering a
global monitoring system needs to involve multiple
groups at different scales, each serving a distinct
function. While the responsibility for monitoring
progress on DRR lies with national governments,

a facilitating body at international level, such

as the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
(UNISDR), is needed to collect data and help
strengthen national and local monitoring capacity.
Such a body would need to involve national
statistical offices and other relevant governmental
bodies in order to be able to collect the required
data, including census data. This could be
supported by regional technical agencies, with
data also drawn from the scientific community to
establish risk profiles, from technology companies
(satellite data to approximate building coverage,
for example) and from other groups on disaster
losses. The institutional architecture should span
the post-2015 framework on DRR and the SDGs
so as not to create duplication.
10. While governments will continue to self-report
progress, it is vital that independent groups at
all levels can contribute to the overall framework
for monitoring progress on DRR. This will help
with transparency and accuracy. The original
framework for monitoring progress on the post2015 framework on DRR the Hyogo Framework
for Action (HFA) monitor has suffered from being
a self-reporting platform, with global and regional
institutions unable to check claims or accurately
compare reports between countries. An independent
international technical group has an important
role to play in helping guide standards (e.g. in
definitions1 or methods for risk assessment), assess
data quality and transparency and support other
potential processes of accountability, including
country-to-country peer review.

1.

The Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR) programme is currently leading a working group on definitions.

Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Risk

Management Solutions (RMS), and Centre for
Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)
Catholic University of Louvain, 2014. This work
is licensed under a Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial Licence (CC BY-NC 3.0).
Readers are encouraged to reproduce material
from this report for their own publications, as
long as they are not being sold commercially. As
copyright holder ODI, RMS, and CRED request due
acknowledgement. For online use we ask readers
to link to the original resource on the ODI website.
The views present in this report are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily represent the
views of ODI, RMS or CRED.

This material has been funded by

UK Aid from the UK Government,
however the views expressed
do not necessarily reflect the UK
Governments official policies.