Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio vs.

Heirs of
Teresa Sevilla de Leon
FACTS:
Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot
with an area of 828 square meters located in San
Miguel, Bulacan. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed
the spouses Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to
construct a house on the said property and stay
therein without any rentals therefor.
In November 1978, De Leon, then already a
widow, died intestate. In deference to her
wishes, her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to
continue staying in the property. In March 1995,
Florencio died intestate, but his heirs, the
respondents, remained in the property. On April
26, 1995, the heirs of De Leon, through counsel,
sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, demanding
that they vacate the property within ninety (90)
days from receipt thereof. The latter refused and
failed to vacate the property.
De Leon's heirs contends the following: a).
Defendants possession of the premises was
merely on the tolerance of the late Teresa de
Leon. b). The alleged Deed of Donation does not
exist, is patently a falsified document and can
never be the source of any right whatsoever.
At their very first answer to the complaint,
Florencio's heirs contend that the plaintiffs had
no cause of action against them, as Teresa de
Leon had executed a Deed of Donation on
October 1, 1976 over the said parcel of land in
favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio.
The latter accepted the donation, as shown by
his signature above his typewritten name on
page one of the deed.
Florencio's heirs argue further that: a).
Defendants do not have only a better right of
possession over the questioned parcel of land
and they do not have only the absolute and
lawful possession of the same but they have the
absolute and lawful ownership of the same not
only against the plaintiffs but against the whole
world. b). Defendants are entitled to their
counterclaim.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners, as heirs of

Rosendo Florencio, who appears to be the donee
under the unregistered Deed of Donation, have a
better right to the physical or material
possession of the property over the respondents,
the heirs of Teresa de Leon, the registered owner
of the property.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation
results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee, and is
perfected from the moment the donor is made
aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided
that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited
by law from accepting the donation. Once the
donation is accepted, it is generally considered
irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute
owner of the property, except on account of
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply
with the charge imposed in the donation, or
ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and
the donee. It must be made in the same deed or
in a separate public document, and the donees
acceptance must come to the knowledge of the
donor. In order that the donation of an
immovable property may be valid, it must be
made in a public document. Registration of the
deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in
the Assessors Office is not necessary for it to be
considered valid and official. Registration does
not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title
over a particular parcel of land. The necessity of
registration comes into play only when the rights
of third persons are affected. Furthermore, the
heirs are bound by the deed of contracts
executed by their predecessors-in-interest.

Espino vs. Vicente

FACTS:
The crux of the controversy in this case arose
from the execution by Emerenciana and
Marcelina Espino on January 9, 1997 of a
document, denominated as "Pagkakaloob,"
purportedly donating two lots to respondent

Emma Vicente, the wife of Ricardo Vicente,

nephew of Emerenciana.

Consent in contracts presupposed the following

requisites:

It appears that sometime in December 1996,

Emma convinced Marcelina and Emerenciana
that she could facilitate the registration and
titling in their name of the house and lot where
they are staying. Emma allegedly asked
Emerenciana and Marcelina who are both
illliterate to sign a document to be used in titling
the property in their name.

(1) It should be intelligent, or with an exact

notion of the matter to which it refers;
(2) it should be free; and
(3) it should be spontaneous.

Subsequently, Emerenciana and Marcelina

learned that the document they signed was a
Deed of Donation or a "Pagkakaloob," of the
house and lot in favor of Emma, including the
20 square-meter portion that was earlier sold to
Marissa. As a consequence, when Emma filed an
application for free patent with the DENRPENRO Office of Malolos, Bulacan on January
13, 1997, Marissa delos Santos filed an
opposition with the DENR-PENRO and the
Register of Deeds. On the other hand,
Emerenciana and Marcelina executed a Deed of
Revocation of Donation or "Kasulatan ng
Pagpapawalang Bisa sa Kasulatan ng
Pagkakaloob".

It is evident that fraud attended the act of

respondent Emma when she procured the
signatures of Marcelino and Emerciana. There is
fraud when through insidious words or
machinations of one of the contracting parties,
the other is induces into a contract which
without them, he would have agreed to. When
one of the parties is unable to read, or if the
contract is in a language not understood by him,
and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person
enforcing the contract must show that the terms
thereof have been fully explained to the former.

The parties' intention must be clear and that

attendance of vice of consent, like in any other
contract, renders the donation voidable.

Heirs of Juan and Felipe Bonsato vs. CA

Petitioners then filed a petition for annulment of
patent/title and reconveyance of real property
with damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan dated April 14, 1997. The trial
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but when
the respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals, the appellate court reversed the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the lower courts decision and concluding that
the assailed deed of donation enjoys the legal
presumption of due execution and validity.
HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit.
A DONATION is an act of liberality whereby a
person disposes gratuitously a thing or a right in
favour of another, who accepts it. Like any other
contract, an agreement of the parties is essential.

FACTS:
On the first day of December, 1949, Domingo
Bonsato, then already a widower, had been
induced and deceived into signing two notarial
deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of
his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew
Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to
them several parcels of land covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052,
situated in the municipalities of Mabini and
Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations
having been duly accepted in the same act and
documents.
Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations
were mortis causa and void for lack of the
requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan
Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring
that the donations made in their favor were
voluntarily executed in consideration of past
services rendered by them to the late Domingo
Bonsato; that the same were executed freely

without the use of force and violence,

misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed
for the dismissal of the case and for damages in
the sum of P2,000.
The lower court ruled that the deeds of donation
were executed by the donor while the latter was
of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation;
that the deeds were of donation inter vivos
without any condition making their validity or
efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor;
but as the properties donated were
presumptively conjugal, having been acquired
during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and
his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were
only valid as to an undivided one-half share in
the three parcels of land described therein.
In the Court of Appeals, majority of the justices
declared that the aforesaid donations to be null
and void, because they were donations mortis
causa and were executed without the
testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and
ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to
surrender the possession of the properties in
litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two
justices, however, dissented, claiming that the
said donations should be considered as
donations inter vivos.
HELD:
Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the
documents in question embody valid donations,
or else legacies void for failure to observe the
formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the
widespread use of the term "donations mortis
causa," it is well-established at present that the
Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away
from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the
French doctrine that no one may both donate and
retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging
the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the
testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said
donations as an independent legal concept.
ART. 620. Donations which are to become
effective upon the death of the donor partake of
the nature of disposals of property by will and
shall be governed by the rules established for
testamentary successions.

Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations

inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor
of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the
documents should reveal any or all of the
following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive
(Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs.
Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs.
Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the
transferor should survive the transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the
deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed by
the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only
reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the
owner's share of the fruits or produce, a
reservation that would be unnecessary if the
ownership of the donated property remained
with the donor. Most significant is the absence
of stipulation that the donor could revoke the
donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly
declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality
absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa where revocability is
of the essence of the act, to the extent that a
testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his
right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737;
New Civil Code, Art. 828).

Maglasang vs. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan

FACTS:

On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan

executed in favor of her brother, petitioner
Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of
Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot"
covering one-half () portion of the former's
house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.
Four (4) other deeds of donation were
subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan
on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon petitioners
Nicolas, Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C.
Maglasang for two parcels of land. One of the
provisions in the deeds are as follows:
"That for and in consideration of the love and
affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, the
DONOR does hereby, by these presents,
transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the
DONEE the above-described property, together
with the buildings and all improvements existing
thereon, to become effective upon the death of
the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in
the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no further force
and effect."
When Conchita died in May 9, 1995, and upon
learning of the existence of the foregoing
donations, respondents filed an action to annul
the said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents
allege that petitioners, through their sinister
machinations and strategies and taking
advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile
condition, caused the execution of the deeds of
donation, and, that the documents are void for
failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil
Code regarding formalities of wills and
testaments, considering that these are donations
mortis causa. Petitioners deny respondents'
allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan
freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the
preparation of the instruments. The lower court
ruled in favor of the respondents, while the
ISSUE:
Whether the donations to the petitioners are
donations mortis causa or inter vivos.
HELD:
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter
vivos donations as these were made by the late

Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of the

love and affection of the donor" for the donee,
and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate
that the donations were made in consideration of
Cabatingan's death.
Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.
In determining whether a donation is one of
mortis causa, the following characteristics must
be taken into account: (1) It conveys no title or
ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive; (2) That before his death,
the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should
be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations
as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that
intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners
prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to
become effective upon the death of the
DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but
that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the
ownership of the properties to petitioners during
her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly
confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the
Acceptance and Attestation clauses of the Deed
of Donation.
That the donations were made "in consideration
of the love and affection of the donor" does not
qualify the donations as inter vivos because
transfers mortis causa may also be made for the
same reason.
Petition denied.

Apolinaria Austria-Magat vs. CA

FACTS:
On December 17, 1975, Basilisa Comerciante,
mother of petitioner and one of respondents,
furnished a Deed of Donation to donate her
house and lot to her four children (petitioner and
respondent included), provided that the funeral
expenses will be deducted from the total value
of the lot before it is to be divided among the
children. The children signed to the same deed
in acceptance to the donation. That same day,
they also signed into a notarized document
stating that the property and the document
pertaining to the same will be under the custody
of the original owner (Comerciante) for as long
as she lives. On February 6, 1979, Comerciante
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same
house and lot in favor of the petitioner,
prompting the respondents to file an action
against the petitioner for the annulment of the
deed of sale on September 21, 1983. The lower
court ruled in favor of the respondent (petitioner
herein), but the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court decision.

We affirm the appellate courts decision.

CONTENTIONS:
Trial Court: (1) The donation is a donation
mortis causa based on the provision on the deed
of donation that it would take effect upon the
death of the donor. (2) The provision stating that
the donor reserved the right to revoke the
donation is a feature of a donation mortis causa
which must comply with the formalities of a will
(3) Inasmuch as the donation did not follow the
formalities pertaining to wills, the same is void
and produced no effect whatsoever. Hence, the
sale by the donor of the said property was valid
since she remained to be the absolute owner
thereof during the time of the said transaction.

Appellate Court decision affirmed.

CA: A provision in the deed of donation in

question providing for the irrevocability of the
donation is a characteristic of a donation inter
vivos. By those words, the donor expressly
renounced the right to freely dispose of the
house and lot in question. The right to dispose of
a property is a right essential to full ownership.
Hence, ownership of the house and lot was
already with the donees even during the donors
lifetime.
HELD:

In Cuevas v. Cuevas, we ruled that when the

deed of donation provides that the donor will not
dispose or take away the property donated (thus
making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is
making a donation inter vivos. He parts away
with his naked title but maintains beneficial
ownership while he lives. It remains to be a
donation inter vivos despite an express provision
that the donor continues to be in possession and
enjoyment of the donated property while he is
alive. In the Bonsato case, we held that:
What is most significant [in determining the
type of donation] is the absence of stipulation
that the donor could revoke the donations; on the
contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be
irrevocable, a quality absolutely incompatible
with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where
revocability is of the essence of the act, to the
extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or
restrict his right of revocation.

Sumipat vs. Banga

FACTS:
On January 5, 1983, Lauro Sumipat executed a
document
denominated
"DEED
OF
ABSOLUTE TRANSFER AND/OR QUITCLAIM OVER REAL PROPERTIES" (the
assailed document) in favor of his illegitimate
children (defendants-appellees) covering the
three parcels of land (the properties). On the
document appears the signature of his wife
Placida which indicates that she gave her marital
consent thereto. That time, Lauro was already
very sick and bedridden; that upon defendantappellee Lydias request, their neighbor
Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro
Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his (Lauro
Sumipats) hand in affixing his signature on the
assailed document which she had brought; that
Lydia thereafter left but later returned on the
same day and requested Lauros unlettered wife
Placida to sign on the assailed document, as she
did in haste, even without the latter getting a

responsive answer to her query on what it was

all about.
After Lauro Sumipats death on January 30,
1984, his wife Placida and defendants-appellees
jointly administered the properties 50% of the
produce of which went to plaintiff-appellant. As
plaintiff-appellants share in the produce of the
properties dwindled until she no longer received
any and learning that the titles to the properties
in question were already transferred/made in
favor of the defendants-appellees, she filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of titles,
contracts, partition, recovery of ownership now
the subject of the present appeal.
Defendant-appellee
Lydia
disclaims
participation in the execution of the assailed
document, she claiming to have acquired
knowledge of its existence only on January 10,
1983 or five days after its execution when Lauro
Sumipat gave the same to her.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendantappellees, because it found that the subject
properties are conjugal having been acquired
during the marriage of Lauro Sumipat and
Placida Tabotabo (Placida). However, because
Placida failed to question the genuineness and
due execution of the deed and even admitted
having affixed her signature thereon, the trial
court declared that the entirety of the subject
properties, and not just Lauro Sumipats
conjugal share, were validly transferred to the
defendants, the petitioners herein.
On appeal, the appellate court held that since
Placida was unlettered, the appellees, the
petitioners herein, as the parties interested in
enforcing the deed, have the burden of proving
that the terms thereof were fully explained to
her. This they failed to do.
ISSUE:
Whether the questioned deed by its terms or
under the surrounding circumstances has validly
transferred title to the disputed properties to the
petitioners.
HELD:
Art. 749 of the Civil Code states that:

"In order that the donation of the immovable

may be valid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed
of donation or in a separate public document,
but it shall not take effect unless it is done
during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in
both instruments."
Title to immovable property does not pass from
the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of
donation until and unless it has been accepted in
a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very
same instrument of donation. If the acceptance
does not appear in the same document, it must
be made in another. Where the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal
notice of the acceptance, made in a separate
instrument, is either not given to the donor or
else not noted in the deed of donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and
void.20
In this case, the donees acceptance of the
donation is not manifested either in the deed
itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed
as an instrument of donation is patently void.

Apolonia Ocampo vs. Fidela Ocampo

FACTS:
Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo have
ten children, including the petitioners and
respondents to this case. In the celebration of
their marriage, they acquired several properties,
all of which are owned in common by their
children. However, the residential/commercial
lot in Nabua, Camarines Sur is ostensibly owned
by Fidela Ocampo, although the latter

acknowledges that the same is co-owned by her

and her siblings.
Aside from the first complaint that they have
filed before the trial court, petitioners also filed
a supplemental complaint where they allege that
Fidela Ocampo cancelled the first TCT of the lot
in Nabua and issued a new one in the form of
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of Belen
Ocampo-Barrito and her spouse Vicente Barrito.
Both the donor of the donee are notoriously
aware that the lot is still under dispute in the
petitioners' first complaint, nevertheless, the two
still pursued the donation. Petitioners also allege
that the transfer of ownership from Fidela to
Belen, daughter of another defendant Felicidad,
is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to
deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share
therein, knowing as they do that the same are a
co-ownership of the original parties plaintiffs
and defendants herein.
Defendants, on the other hand, allege that Fidela
has been the absolute owner of the property
since 1949, and that its title is free from all
encumbrances and adverse claims. In 1984,
Fidela conveyed the property to Belen via a
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos and since
September 13, 1987, Belen has been the
absolute owner of the same property.
In its decision, the Appellate Court said that
other than the Acknowledgment of Coownership executed by Respondent Fidela
Ocampo, no documentary evidence was offered
to establish petitioners claim of co-ownership.
It also said that respondents were able to give
clear proof of their ownership of the property:
the Transfer Certificate of Title and the
corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of
Fidela, and later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito.
ISSUE:
Where a deed of donation inter vivos entered in
bad faith deprives the heirs of their hereditary
shares, is said deed valid?
HELD:
The Petition has no merit.

Belen presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos

executed on January 13, 1984, between herself
as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the
immediate source of the formers claim of sole
ownership of the property.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership
results in an effective transfer of title to the
property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners
stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement of Coownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor
of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact
that at the time of the execution of the
Acknowledgement -- assuming that its
authenticity and due execution were proven -the property had already been donated to Belen.
The Deed of Donation, which is the prior
document, is clearly inconsistent with the
document relied upon by petitioners. We agree
with the RTCs ratiocination:
"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela
Ll. Ocampo herself made a written
acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all
the properties disputed with plaintiffs in this
case, the same cannot be considered as a
declaration against Fidelas interest since the
alleged acknowledgement was written and
executed on 24 December 1985 when she was
no longer the owner of the property as the year
previous, on 13 January 1984, she had already
donated all her properties to defendant Belen
Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she had no
more properties with which she can have an
interest to declare against."

Eugenio Cagaoan vs. Felix Cagaoan

FACTS:
On November 3, 1915, Gregorio Cagaoan
executed a deed of gift of four parcels of land
situated in the municipality of Tayug, Province
of Pangasinan, in favor of his son Felix Cagaoan
and on October 26, 1918, he executed a similar
deed in favor of his other son Eugenio Cagaoan
for a parcel of land which, apparently, is the
same as that described as parcel No. 4 in the
deed of gift executed in favor of Felix. Both of

the deeds of gift are free from formal defects and

were duly accepted by the donees.
Eugenio was able to take possession of the
donation he received, but he was not able to
register the same. On the other hand, Felix was
able to register his part.
HELD:
The case seems to use to be analogous to one
where the same real property has been sold by
the same vendor to two difference vendees. In
such cases, under article 1473 of the Civil Code,
the property goes to the vendee who first records
his title in the registry of property. If the sale is
not recorded by either vendee, the property goes
to the one who first takes possession of its in
good, faith, and in the absence of both record
and possession, to the one who present oldest
title, provided there is good faith. (It follows the
rule of double sales.)

Barretto vs. City of Manila

FACTS:
Enrique Ma. Barretto donates his lot in front of
Malacanang Palace to the City of Manila, on the
condition that "no structures shall be erected
upon the land and that it will not be devoted to
any purpose other than the beautifying of the
vicinity, and for this purpose the city should
acquire such of the adjoining land as may be
necessary to form with mine a public square
with gardens and walks." The Ayuntamiento and
the Corregimiento of the City declared its
acceptance over Barretto's offer, both requesting
for its documents and necessary deeds of
conveyance. Barretto thereafter sent to the
Ayuntamiento the necessary documents, and
until the month of February, 1903, appears to
have had the idea that a formal transfer of the
plot had been executed by him; in fact, it had not
been.
However, the city entered into possession of the
land, building a railing separating it from the
adjoining property, and ever since that time the
ground has been used as part of the public street,
increasing the width thereof opposite the exit

from the Palace and substantially improving the

appearance of the locality. Barretto brought the
action to recover possession of the land on
account of the failure of the city to comply with
the conditions of the donation.
HELD:
Although a formal conveyance of the property
appears to have never been made, yet the taking
possession of the land by the city upon the terms
contained in the offer and acceptance give effect
to the latter.
The whole negotiation must be taken into
consideration in order to determine what was in
the minds of the parties at the time. The
plaintiff's proposition was unmistakable. If the
city designed to reject any part of it while
accepting the rest, such rejection should have
been in express terms. Not only do we fail to
find any such rejection, but in the letter of June
19 there appears to be in its concluding words an
express recognition of the terms imposed, when
it is provided that the deed of cession shall be
drawn "with the restrictions indicated by you."
This is a reference to the restrictions in the letter
of the plaintiff and operates of necessity as an
acceptance of them.

Moreo-Lentfer vs. Wolff

FACTS:
On March 6, 1992, petitioners and respondent
engaged the notarial services of Atty. Rodrigo
C. Dimayacyac for: (1) the sale of a beach house
owned by petitioner Cross in Sabang, Puerto
Galera, Oriental Mindoro, and (2) the
assignment of Cross' contract of lease on the
land where the house stood. The sale of the
beach house and the assignment of the lease
right would be in the name of petitioner Victoria
Moreo-Lentfer, but the total consideration of
220,000 Deutschmarks (DM) would be paid by
respondent Hans Jurgen Wolff. A promissory
note was executed by said respondent in favor of
petitioner Cross.

According to respondent, however, the Lentfer

spouses were his confidants who held in trust for
him, a time deposit account in the amount of
DM 200,0004 at Solid Bank Corporation.
Apprised of his interest to own a house along a
beach, the Lentfer couple urged him to buy
petitioner Cross' beach house and lease rights in
Puerto Galera. Respondent agreed and through a
bank-to-bank transaction, he paid Cross the
amount of DM 221,7005 as total consideration
for the sale and assignment of the lease rights.
However, Cross, Moreo-Lentfer and Atty.
Dimayacyac surreptitiously executed a deed of
sale whereby the beach house was made to
appear as sold to Moreo-Lentfer for only
P100,000. The assignment of the lease right was
likewise made in favor of Moreo-Lentfer.
Upon learning of this, respondent filed a
Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. R-4219
with the lower court for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of property with damages and
prayer for a writ of attachment.
The lower court dismissed the respondent's
complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's decision.
HELD:
Petitioner Moreo-Lentfer's claim of either cash
or property donation rings hollow. A donation is
a simple act of liberality where a person gives
freely of a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it.16 But when a large amount of money
is involved, equivalent to P3,297,800, based on
the exchange rate in the year 1992, we are
constrained to take the petitioners' claim of
liberality of the donor with more than a grain of
salt.
Petitioners could not brush aside the fact that a
donation must comply with the mandatory
formal requirements set forth by law for its
validity. Since the subject of donation is the
purchase money, Art. 748 of the New Civil
Code is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of
money equivalent to P3,297,800 as well as its
acceptance should have been in writing. It was
not. Hence, the donation is invalid for noncompliance with the formal requisites prescribed
by law.

Petition denied.

Seventh Day Adventist Conference Church of

Southern Philippines vs. Northeastern Mindanao
Mission of Seventh Day Adventist
FACTS:
Spouses Felix Cosio and Felisa Cuysona donate
a parcel of land to South Philippine [Union]
Mission of Seventh Day Adventist Church, and
was received by Liberato Rayos, an elder of the
Seventh Day Adventist Church, on behalf of the
donee.
However, twenty years later, the spouses sold
the same land to the Seventh Day Adventist
Church of Northeastern Mindanao Mission.
Claiming to be the alleged donees successorsin-interest, petitioners asserted ownership over
the property. This was opposed by respondents
who argued that at the time of the donation,
SPUM-SDA Bayugan could not legally be a
donee because, not having been incorporated
yet, it had no juridical personality. Neither were
petitioners members of the local church then,
hence, the donation could not have been made
particularly to them.
ISSUE:
Should the Seventh Day Adventist Church of
Northeastern Mindanao Mission's ownership of
the lot be upheld?
HELD:
We answer in the affirmative.
Donation is undeniably one of the modes of
acquiring ownership of real property. Likewise,
ownership of a property may be transferred by
tradition as a consequence of a sale.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person
disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor
of another person who accepts it. The donation
could not have been made in favor of an entity
yet inexistent at the time it was made. Nor could
it have been accepted as there was yet no one to
accept it.

The deed of donation was not in favor of any

informal group of SDA members but a supposed
SPUM-SDA Bayugan (the local church) which,
at the time, had neither juridical personality nor
capacity to accept such gift.
(With questions regarding de facto corporation
and law of sales.)
Petition Denied.

Calicdan vs. Cendaa

FACTS:
On August 25, 1947, Fermina Calicdan executed
a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she
conveyed the land to respondent Silverio
Cendaa,4 who immediately entered into
possession of the land, built a fence around the
land and constructed a two-storey residential
house thereon sometime in 1949, where he
resided until his death in 1998.
On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal
guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint
for "Recovery of Ownership, Possession and
Damages" against the respondent, alleging that
the donation was void; that respondent took
advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the
land; and that she merely tolerated respondents
possession of the land as well as the construction
of his house thereon.
In his "Answer with Motion to Dismiss",
respondent alleged, by way of affirmative
defenses, that the land was donated to him by
Fermina in 1947; and that he had been publicly,
peacefully, continuously, and adversely in
possession of the land for a period of 45 years.
Moreover, he argued that the complaint was
barred by prior judgment in the special
proceedings for the "Inventory of Properties of
Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where the court
decreed the exclusion of the land from the
inventory of properties of the petitioner.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner,

while the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid
HELD:
The trial court found the donation of the land
void because Fermina was not the owner
thereof, considering that it was inherited by
Sixto from his parents. Thus, the land was not
part of the conjugal property of the spouses
Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the
Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when
Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a
right of usufruct only over the estate of the
deceased spouse. Consequently, respondent,
who derived his rights from Fermina, only
acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only
right which the latter could convey.
After a review of the evidence on record, we
find that the Court of Appeals ruling that the
donation was valid was not supported by
convincing proof. Respondent himself admitted
during the cross examination that he had no
personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan
in fact purchased the subject land from
Felomino Bautista.
In People v. Guittap, we held that:
Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of
Court, a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his own personal knowledge,
i.e., which are derived from his own perception;
otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay.
Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of
what the witness knows himself but of what he
has heard from others." The hearsay rule bars
the testimony of a witness who merely recites
what someone else has told him, whether orally
or in writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held
that when evidence is based on what was
supposedly told the witness, the same is without
any evidentiary weight for being patently
hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule
that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as
evidence.

The Court of Appeals thus erred in ruling based

on respondents bare hearsay testimony as
evidence of the donation made by Fermina.

Shoppers' Paradise Realty and Development

Corporation vs. Roque
FACTS:
On 23 December 1993, petitioner Shoppers
Paradise Realty & Development Corporation,
represented by its president, Veredigno Atienza,
entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr.
Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of
land. Simultaneously, petitioner and Dr. Roque
likewise entered into a memorandum of
agreement for the construction, development and
operation of a commercial building complex on
the property. Conformably with the agreement,
petitioner issued a check for another
P250,000.00 "downpayment" to Dr. Roque.
The contract of lease and the memorandum of
agreement, both notarized, were to be annotated
on TCT No. 30591 within sixty (60) days from
23 December 1993 or until 23 February 1994.
The annotations, however, were never made
because of the untimely demise of Dr. Felipe C.
Roque. The death of Dr. Roque on 10 February
1994 constrained petitioner to deal with
respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving
children of the late Dr. Roque, but the
negotiations broke down due to some
disagreements. Respondent then filed a case for
annulment of the contract of lease and the
memorandum of agreement, with a prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Efren P. Roque alleged that he had long been the
absolute owner of the subject property by virtue
of a deed of donation inter vivos executed in his
favor by his parents, Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa
Roque, on 26 December 1978, and that the late
Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter into
the assailed agreements with petitioner. The
donation was made in a public instrument duly
acknowledged by the donor-spouses before a
notary public and duly accepted on the same day

by respondent before the notary public in the

same instrument of donation. The title to the
property, however, remained in the name of Dr.
Felipe C. Roque, and it was only transferred to
and in the name of respondent sixteen years
later, or on 11 May 1994.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of the
respondent, explaining that "(o)rdinarily, a deed
of donation need not be registered in order to be
valid between the parties. Registration, however,
is important in binding third persons. Thus,
when Felipe Roque entered into a leased
contract with defendant corporation, plaintiff
Efren Roque (could) no longer assert the
unregistered deed of donation and say that his
father, Felipe, was no longer the owner of the
subject property at the time the lease on the
subject property was agreed upon."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court, explaining that
petitioner was not a lessee in good faith having
had prior knowledge of the donation in favor of
respondent, and that such actual knowledge had
the effect of registration insofar as petitioner
was concerned.
HELD:
The existence, albeit unregistered, of the
donation in favor of respondent is undisputed.
The trial court and the appellate court have not
erred in holding that the non-registration of a
deed of donation does not affect its validity. As
being itself a mode of acquiring ownership,
donation results in an effective transfer of title
over the property from the donor to the donee.3
In donations of immovable property, the law
requires for its validity that it should be
contained in a public document, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy.4 The
Civil Code provides, however, that "titles of
ownership, or other rights over immovable
property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property (now
Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall not
prejudice third persons."5 It is enough, between
the parties to a donation of an immovable
property, that the donation be made in a public
document but, in order to bind third persons, the

donation must be registered in the registry of

Property (Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).6
Consistently, Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act), as so amended by Section 51
of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), states:
"SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings
by registered owner.- An owner of registered
land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or
otherwise deal with the same in accordance with
existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds,
mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments
as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage,
lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a
will purporting to convey or affect registered
land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the
land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority
to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
"The act of registration shall be the operative act
to convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned, and in all cases under
this Decree, the registration shall be made in the
office of the Register of Deeds for the province
or city where the land lies."
Petition denied.

Secretary of Education vs. Heirs of Dulay, Sr.

FACTS:
On August 3, 1981, the spouses Rufino Dulay,
Sr. and Ignacia Vicente Dulay executed a deed
of donation over a 10,000-square-meter portion
of their property in favor of the Ministry of
Education and Culture.
The property was subdivided. On April 13,
1983, a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued
in the name of the Ministry of Education and
Culture, represented by Laurencio C. Ramel, the
Superintendent of Schools of Isabela. However,
the property was not used for school purposes
and remained idle.
Sometime in 1988, the DECS, through its
Secretary, started construction of the Rizal

National High School building on a parcel of

land it acquired from Alejandro Feliciano. The
school site was about 2 kilometers away from
the land donated by the spouses Dulay.
In a letter to the DECS Secretary dated August
19, 1994, the spouses Dulay requested that the
property be returned to them considering that the
land was never used since 1981, or a period of
more than 13 years. On August 28, 1994, the
Barangay Council of Rizal, Santiago City issued
Resolution No. 397 recognizing the right of the
donors to redeem the subject parcel of land
because of the DECS failure to utilize it for the
intended purpose. It further resolved that the
Rizal National High School no longer needed
the donated land "considering its distance from
the main campus and [the] failure to utilize the
property for a long period of time."
On August 31, 1997, the heirs of Dulay, Sr.,
herein respondents, filed a complaint for the
revocation of the deed of donation and
cancellation of the title, alleging that (1) there
was a condition in the deed of donation: that the
DECS, as donee, utilize the subject property for
school purposes, that is, the construction of a
building to house the Rizal National High
School, (2) the DECS did not fulfill the
condition and that the land remained idle up to
the present, and (3) the donation inter vivos was
inofficious, since the late Rufino Dulay, Sr.
donated more than what he could give by will.
Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), interposed the following
defenses: (a) the DECS complied with said
condition because the land was being used by
the school as its technology and home
economics laboratory; (b) the donation was not
inofficious for the donors were the owners of
five other parcels of land, all located at Rizal,
Santiago City; (c) the DECS acquired the
disputed property by virtue of purchase made on
December 8, 1997 by the barangay of Rizal,
Santiago City in the amount of P18,000.00 as
certified by its former Barangay Captain, Jesus
San Juan;11 and (d) the action of the
respondents had prescribed. The OSG also
claimed that students planted a portion of the
land with rice, mahogany seedlings, and fruit-

bearing trees; the produce would then be sold

and the proceeds used for the construction of a
school building on the subject property.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or nor the DECS had complied with
the condition imposed on the the deed of
donation.
(2) Whether the respondents' right to seek the
revocation of the deed of donation is already
barred by prescription and laches.
HELD:
The contention of petitioners has no merit.
As gleaned from the CA decision, petitioners
failed to prove that the donated property was
used for school purposes as indicated in the deed
of donation:
We find it difficult to sustain that the defendantappellants have complied with the condition of
donation. It is not amiss to state that other than
the bare allegation of the defendant-appellants,
there is nothing in the records that could
concretely prove that the condition of donation
has been complied with by the defendantappellants. In the same breadth, the planting of
palay on the land donated can hardly be
considered and could not have been the "school
purposes" referred to and intended by the donors
when they had donated the land in question.
Also, the posture of the defendant-appellants
that the land donated is being used as technology
and home economics laboratory of the Rizal
National High School is far from being the truth
considering that not only is the said school
located two kilometers away from the land
donated but also there was not even a single
classroom built on the land donated that would
reasonably indicate that, indeed, classes have
been conducted therein. These observations,
together with the unrebutted ocular inspection
report made by the trial court which revealed
that the land donated remains idle and without
any improvement thereon for more than a
decade since the time of the donation, give Us
no other alternative but to conclude that the
defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to
comply with what is incumbent upon them in the
deed of donation.

The right to seek the revocation of donation had

not yet prescribed when respondents filed their
complaint
Anent the second issue, we reject the contention
of the OSG that respondents cause of action is
already barred by prescription under Article 764
of the New Civil Code, or four years from the
non-compliance with the condition in the deed
of donation. Since such failure to comply with
the condition of utilizing the property for school
purposes became manifest sometime in 1988
when the DECS utilized another property for the
construction of the school building, the fouryear prescriptive period did not commence on
such date. Petitioner was given more than
enough time to comply with the condition, and it
cannot be allowed to use this fact to its
advantage. It must be stressed that the donation
is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was
burdened with the obligation to utilize the land
donated for school purposes. Under Article 733
of the New Civil Code, a donation with an
onerous cause is essentially a contract and is
thus governed by the rules on contract.