05 - Managing Environment Risks
05 - Managing Environment Risks
05 - Managing Environment Risks
1
2
The best way to view environmental risk is as another type of business risk.
Organisations should recognize the fact that by tackling environmental problems, there
may not be any immediate improvement in the bottomline. In fact, huge costs may be
incurred. However, it is wrong to assume that investments made to improve
environmental performance never pay off.
Environmental laws: A global perspective
The UN Conference on Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972 drew attention to the magnitude
and scope of the environmental challenges the world faced. The conference came up with the idea of
sustainable development meaning development and environmental protection could go together. The UN
Environment program aimed to act as a catalyst for research, technology and education in the area of
environmental management. The Rio declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 was a result of
UN efforts.
In 1997, 180 countries signed the Kyoto protocol. 38 industrialised countries agreed to cut their
emissions of greenhouse gases by 5.2 percent (below 1990 levels) over the next 15 years. Cutting
greenhouse emissions is the key to reducing global warming which can result in violent storms, expanding
deserts, melting ice caps and rising sea levels. Losses caused by global warming are estimated to be $5
trillion. Despite the Kyoto protocol, tensions continue about how environmental costs must be shared
between developed and developing nations. The US recently withdrew from the pact, on the grounds that
developing countries were not shouldering a fair share of the burden.
In a meeting in Marrakesh (Morocco) in November 2001, members of the Kyoto protocol came to
an agreement on various issues penalties for failure to meet targets, procedure for buying and selling the
right to emit greenhouse gases and a system for reporting emissions by each country during a year.
Differences among countries still persist on whether the rules would be legally binding. A compromise
wording at Marrakesh has postponed a decision on the legal implications of the agreement. The Kyoto
protocol can come into legal force only if at least 55 countries, which accounted for 55% of the carbon
dioxide emission in 1990, ratify it. The EU hopes to ratify it by 2002, but the resistance of Russia and Japan
is a matter of concern.
In the US, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) enacted in 1970, immediately followed
by the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), set the tone for the regulation of
environmental issues. Federal agencies were asked to prepare formal environmental impact statements of
all major Federal actions. The US adopted the polluter pays principle, which required any party found
guilty of violating environmental norms to pay for clean up. Important statutes in the US include the Clean
Air Act of 1970, Clean Water Act of 1987 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980. CERCLA holds the current owner of the land liable for clean up of
hazardous waste even in cases where a previous occupant is responsible for dumping it. Standard US
liability insurance policies exclude the clean-up costs associated with hazardous waste.
In Europe, Objective 17 of the EC policy statement confirmed the polluter pays principle, in
1977. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 included various provisions for environmental protection. The EU
believes that precautionary measures should be taken even there is no conclusive scientific evidence of the
negative impact of an industrial activity on the environment.
Environmental protection began to gain attention in Japan in the early 1970s. The country has
subsequently enacted various laws to deal with air and water pollution and hazardous waste. Many of the
pollution control measures in Japan are enforced not through law but by voluntary agreement. Experts feel
that it is not the legal mechanisms, but the anxiety of many Japanese companies to protect their reputation,
which acts as an effective safeguard.
Most companies fail to get the best returns from their environmental investments
due to poor cost benefit analysis. They undertake grandiose projects which do not yield
commensurate benefits. They would be better off if they concentrated on liabilities which
are small today but may escalate in future and where efficient solutions to the problem
are available. Sometimes, companies close plants in a hurry without considering the
implications. Regulators may intervene and demand expensive clean up operations,
because there is no need to worry about people losing their jobs. (They might not have
done so if the plants were operational and there were fears of job losses. In some cases,
companies have even reopened their plants, in view of such possibilities). Very often,
managers are committed to improved environmental standards but do not involve nearby
stakeholders before taking major decisions. Due to poor communication and a failure to
take the local community along, they run into problems, even after making heavy
investments to improve their environmental management practices.
The Sandoz Spill3
Environmental disasters can bring the companies involved into disrepute, invite the intervention of
regulatory authorities and dramatically increase the cost of doing business. A good example is the fire in a
warehouse (at Basle) of the famous Swiss company, Sandoz (which later merged with Ciba Giegy to form
Novartis). On November 1, 1986 shortly after midnight, fire swept through the warehouse, which stored
chemicals used in the manufacture of fertilizers. Soon, flames engulfed the building, which held 820 tons of
insecticides, 12 tons of a fungicide,(containing 1.9 tons of mercury) and 312 tons of other substances,
including solvents and dyes. The cause of the fire remained a mystery.
In a desperate attempt to prevent the fire from spreading to a nearby warehouse, which stored
more explosive chemicals, firefighters poured hundreds of thousands of gallons of water on the flames. The
polluted liquid flowed first into a catchment area and then spilled into the Rhine 1,000 ft. away. For
Western Europe, the Sandoz spill was the worst environmental accident since a 1976 explosion in Seveso,
Italy, at a plant owned by HoffmannLa Roche, another Swiss chemical company.
In West Germany, leading politicians began to demand that all plants near the Rhine be
immediately inspected for ensuring adherence to safety codes. Leading representatives of the West German
chemical industry met in Bonn to present a catalog of safety measures to pre-empt a rash of legislation
regulating the storage and production of chemicals. The Union of Environment and Nature Conservation
(BUND), a leading West German environmentalist group, demanded that the chemical industry stop its
image-improving advertising campaigns, and instead spend the money for environmental protection. Exchancellor, Willy Brandt of West Germany called the fire Bhopal on the Rhine. Many Germans called the
incident Chernobale, combining the name of the French city, Bale and Chernobyl in the Soviet Union.
West German Environment Minister Walter Wallmann charged Sandoz with failing to meet safety
requirements. He cited a 1981 confidential report from Zurich Insurance Co. that had warned about the
danger posed by the chemicals and inflammable materials stored at the Sandoz plant. Sandoz maintained it
had received Zurich Insurances written report only a few days prior to the accident and had already put in
place many safety improvements that had been outlined verbally. While acknowledging that the warehouse
lacked both an automatic alarm system and sprinklers, Sandoz claimed the warehouse had been declared
safe only four days earlier by a fire-protection expert.
After the incident, Sandoz faced several lawsuits from different affected parties. The Dutch and
West German fishermens unions threatened to sue the company for the large losses in their catch. At a
meeting of environment ministers of four countries along the Rhine, Switzerland agreed to abide by the
polluter must pay prnciple. Sandoz invested SF 130 million at its warehouses to improve safety. It also
paid SF 130 million in damages. Fortunately for Sandoz, most of this amount was covered by insurance.
develop regularly new operational techniques for minimising any adverse impact on the environment.
This box item draws heavily from the Harvard Business School Case Alberta-Pacific Forest
Industries Inc. No. 9-794-099, 1994, prepared by Forest L Reinhardt.
Kanzaki and Oji Paper merged in 1983 to form New Oji.
productivity records. In 1998, it was named the safest plant in Canada. In April 2001, AP received the ISO
14001 certification for its environmental management systems.
Currently, AP pursues a three-pronged approach to forest management. It grows bigger trees at a
much faster rate compared to natural vegetation in its plantations. Consequently, the pressure on natural
forests is reduced. It studies natural disturbances such as insect infestations and fire that pose a threat to
forests. It also uses ecological benchmarks i.e., it compares its own activities with areas where natural
ecological processes work unhampered.
AP executives feel that they have made a significant break with prevailing traditions in the
Canadian industry in their approach to forest management and pollution control. They have successfully
involved the public and enlisted the support of powerful local politicians. Some industry observers,
however, remain skeptical. They feel that APs soft approach has weakened its competitive position and
that in the long run, environmentalists may come up with fresh demands.
Product
Redefining
Differentiation
Markets
Managing
Generating Cost
Regulations
Savings
Environmental Risk
Management
Tunas caught without killing dolphins. In many waters, tunas are found below dolphins floating on
the sea.
blunder by projecting the company as a victim of bad publicity. He also reminded the public about their
dependency on oil. Later, Exxon behaved more responsibly and assured the regulatory authorities that it
was willing , and had the financial resources, to support clean up operations.
Following the accident, oil companies, especially Exxon, saw their share prices drop. They faced
hostility from various stakeholders. Politicians and regulators insisted on more stringent pollution control
requirements.
The accident prompted a group of investors to formulate the famous Valdez Principles. Public
companies had to accept these principles before the group allowed its funds to be invested in their
companys shares. (See Box item on Valdez principles). Exxon created more problems for itself when it
appeared reluctant to endorse the Valdez principles. Shareholders became outraged. However, Exxon
ultimately accepted a code of conduct, which included many of the terms laid down in the Valdez
principles.
In 1994, a federal jury in Alaska ruled that it was Exxons carelessness that had caused the
accident and imposed a massive fine of $5 billion.
A chastened Exxon began to actively promote Environment, Health and Safety disclosures. In
1997, Investor Responsibility Research Center identified Exxon as a leader in environmental performance
reporting. The company reported negligible spillage and more than 50% reduction in operating incidents
since the start of the decade. In 1997, Exxon spilled less than a tablespoon of oil for every million gallons
of oil it shipped.
Damage Compensation:
We will take responsibility for any harm we cause to the environment by making every effort to restore the
environment fully and to compensate those persons who are adversely affected.
Disclosure:
We will disclose to our employees and to the public, incidents relating to our operations that cause
environmental, health or safety hazards. We will disclose potential environmental, health or safety hazards
posed by operations and we will not take any action against employees who report any condition that
creates a danger to the environment or poses health or safety hazards.
Environmental Directors And Managers:
At least one member of the board of directors will be a person qualified to represent environmental
interests. We will commit management resources to implement these principles, including the funding of an
office of vice president for environmental affairs or an equivalent executive position, reporting directly to
the CEO to monitor and report upon our implementation efforts.
Assessment And Annual Audit:
We will conduct and make public an annual self-evaluation of our progress on implementing these
principles and on complying with all applicable laws and regulations throughout our worldwide operations.
We will work towards the timely creation of independent environmental audit procedures which we will
complete and make available to the public.
Source: Corporate Responsibility, Tom Canton
10
developed a closed loop system to reuse water. In some greenhouses, flowers were grown
in water and rock wool instead of soil. These measures resulted in uniform growing
conditions and improved the product quality. Thus, environmental performance
improved, even as costs came down.
Cutting costs through better environmental performance
Better environmental performance can improve the usage of resources and cut costs through:
Dow Chemical is another good example of how a company can cut costs and
improve environmental performance at the same time. In its California complex,
hydrochloric acid gas is scrubbed with caustic soda to produce various chemicals. The
earlier practice was to store the waste water in evaporation ponds. Regulators insisted that
these ponds be closed by 1988. Dow responded by redesigning the production process
and decreasing caustic and hydrochloric acid waste by 6,000 tons per year and 80 tons
per year respectively. It invested $250,000 to generate annual savings of over $2.4
million.
Environmental management at Ciba Specialty Chemicals10
In March 1996, the Swiss chemicals giants Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz agreed to merge to form a new entity
called Novartis. After the merger, two companies were spun off - Clariant (which manufactured chemicals)
and Ciba Specialty Chemicals (CSC). CSC which is involved in various businesses like consumer care,
additives, performance polymers, pigments and textile dyes, has launched many initiatives in the area of
environmental management. Its three-pronged approach consists of:
looking at environmental improvement as a cost-cutting tool
helping customers solve their environmental problems.
reducing the possibility of business interruptions and cost increases due to poor environmental
performance.
CSC feels that improved environmental performance is in most cases accompanied by lower
energy consumption, lesser waste and better yields. According to a senior executive, Jean-Luc
Schwitzguebel, We have learned all over the world that environmental issues end up catching with you. It
is expensive to retrofit and hence better from a capital investment point of view to do the thing right the
first time We dont do scenario planning for environmental controls. We look at the whole package with
the appropriate environmental controls and see if it is a profitable investment. If its not, we dont make the
investment.
In 1995,CSC introduced a new line of low salt, LS bireactive dyes used on textile fibres. Higher
reaction rates reduced dye consumption, salt consumption and lowered waste water treatment costs for
customers. By facilitating better colour predictability across fabrics, it improved quality and reduced the
need for rework.
Taking note of the sad events of 1986, (See separate box item on the Sandoz spill) CSC has spent
considerable amount of money and time on accident prevention and preparedness. It has invested heavily in
10
This box item (including the quotes) draws heavily from the Harvard Business Review Case, Ciba
Specialty Chemicals, 1999, 9-799-086.
11
incinerators (to treat liquid waste solvents and other process wastes), wet air oxidation units and charcoal
filters to reduce emissions into the atmosphere. CSC and the local fire brigade also conduct exercises
together to understand their responsibilities in the event of an accident.
After its spin-off from Novartis, CSC has attempted to integrate environmental considerations into
its capital budgeting and cost accounting processes. It has also adopted a more rigorous cost benefit
analysis of environmental performance initiatives. In January 1998, CSC purchased Allied Colloids, a
British firm manufacturing water treatment additives. This was CSCs first attempt to enter a business that
provided environmental management services to customers.
CSC executives feel that better environmental performance and consequently a better image can
improve the work environment and boost productivity. Employees who are proud of their company, are
likely to provide good publicity for the company. This in turn would attract talented scientists and
managers. These benefits, though certain, cannot be quantified.
CSC seems to have succeeded to a great extent in integrating environmental considerations into its
decision-making processes. According to Schwitzguebel: Environment no longer has the same prominence
in our value system. We act responsibly, but there is no need for a lot of song and dance because
environmental considerations are already ingrained in decision-making Our stated goal is to be a leader
in developing acceptable environmental solutions for our customers. We are not saying any more that we
will spend a fortune looking for solutions that are technically beautiful but that no one will want.
In 1991, US regulators asked distillers of coal tar to drastically cut their benzene
emissions. The regulation motivated Aristech Chemical Corporation of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania to develop a method for removing benzene from tar in the first processing
step. This did away with the need for expensive gas blankets. The new pollution control
measures enabled Aristech to save $3.3 million.
Environmental Management in India
Environmental practices in India have improved significantly in recent times. Used to a fairly lax
regulatory environment for a long period of time, many Indian companies had not taken environmental
management seriously in the past. Now, regulations have become more stringent. Moreover, many
companies are looking at environmental management as a means to improve their image and cut costs. A
recent survey of 47 companies conducted by Business Today11 and Tata Energy Research Institute has
revealed that 75% of them have an environmental policy. Many companies have quantifiable targets in
areas such as emissions and some really stand out in their efforts to upgrade environmental performance.
Bayer India believes that the benefits of successful environmental management programs are more
than the costs. The company has invested in incinerators and leased out 30% of its capacity to other
chemical firms. The fees charged by the company have enabled it to recover most of the costs. At Clariant
India, waste reduction has helped to cut waste disposal costs. Better environmental practices have also
reduced water consumption. At Philips Indias Pimpri unit, tubelights were earlier flushed with 70mg of
mercury each to ensure that 15mg stayed in the tube. This increased both environmental hazards and costs.
Philips switched over to argon flushing, reducing both pollution and costs in the process. At Tata Steel,
improved environmental practices have increased profits through lower consumption of raw materials and
better utilisation of waste.
Yet, environmental management in India has still a long way to go. Consider the Uranium
Corporation of India Ltd (UCIL) mines in Jadugoda. Children in 15 adjoining villages have been affected
by radiation while workers are suffering from serious ailments. A study conducted by the Jharkand
Organisation Against Radiation (JOAR) in 1998 revealed that many women, in the region suffered from
miscarriages and stillbirths. 16% of the children born to them died in their infancy. Lack of safeguards at
the mines has exposed 30,000 people in 30 villages to radiation risks. Nuclear waste has been pumped into
waste dumps called tailing ponds. Wind blows the harmful dust around in summer while in the rainy
reason, the river water gets contaminated. In 1994, there were I7 deaths. By 2001, it had gone up to 31.
Many people have been affected by cancer.
11
May 6, 2001.
12
According to the UCIL Chairman and Managing Director, Ramendra Gupta 12, The Pan Parags
(Chewing tobacco) are causing bigger health hazards than uranium mining. You (Journalists) should run
after the manufacturers of these than chasing us. Gupta even cited an Atomic Energy Commission report
as stating that radiation levels within five kilometres of Jaduguda are normal. He also contended that
malnutrition and alcoholism, rather than radioactivity were the causes of illnesses in Jaduguda.
How safe are Indias nuclear facilities has once again become a hot topic of debate. Many of the
facilities are located in densely populated areas. Some do not have adequate cooling systems. According to
a Times of India editorial13, Alarmist as this may sound, a Chernobyl is waiting to happen here Our
nuclear pundits will insist a Chernobyl cannot happen here Such smugness is not seen even in the
developed world which is much more conversant with nuclear technology.
Many Indian companies look at ISO 14001 certification as an end in itself. Most have not
integrated environmental management into their corporate strategy. In some instances, green initiatives
have been launched without a clear understanding of the potential benefits. In the worst cases, companies
flout pollution laws merrily and pay bribes to government inspectors when they visit the premises. Quite
clearly, Indian companies still have a long way to go in the area of environmental management. The costs
they may have to incur in the event of mishaps may turn out to be heavy.
12
13
13
possible. Managers have to use the right mix of risk reduction, risk shifting and collection
of information to put in place an appropriate environmental strategy.
The simplest way to manage environmental risk is to buy an insurance policy.
This shifts the risk to the insurance company. The approach makes sense if the company
feels that the premium being paid is small, compared to the huge risks involved. Another
approach is to set up disaster management cells which can respond quickly when an
accident occurs. A third approach involves setting clear guidelines, for the operating
units, in the form of various documents and manuals. Another approach is to link
promotions of managers with their contribution to risk management.
Behavioral issues need to be carefully examined so that environmental risks are
managed systematically. Reward systems normally favour managers who reduce costs or
increase profits. Environment related expenditures show up immediately in the books of
accounts, but it may take some time for the benefits to be realised. Consequently, there
may be a tendency to underinvest in environmental performance improvement measures.
Inbuilt mechanisms are necessary to check this.
American chemical companies in trouble14
In the late 1980s, the reputation of the U.S chemicals industry reached an all-time low. In 1987, it was
voted the nations most unpopular industry. Many Americans became worried about the impact
of chemicals on human health and demanded tougher regulation of the manufacture and disposal
of chemicals.
Disasters in Union Carbide plants in Bhopal and West Virginia prompted the regulatory authorities
to introduce legislation to reduce the levels of chemical pollution in water, land and air. In 1984, a leak at
Union Carbides pesticide plant at Bhopal in India killed thousands of people. (See case at the end of the
chapter). In August 1985, Union Carbides plant in West Virginia, also sprang a leak, sending 135 people to
hospital. This happened despite an assurance from Warren Anderson, the then chairman of Union Carbide,
that the combination of circumstances that led to the Bhopal tragedy simply could not happen in the US.
Activists also drew attention to Hooker Chemicals Love Canal dump site near Niagara Falls and to the
widespread presence of harmful chemicals in the Hudson river.
As the chemical industry came under attack, Congress passed several stringent laws. In 1976, the
Toxic Substances Control Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act were introduced.
Companies had to keep track of hazardous wastes. The Environmental Protection Agency was empowered
to take appropriate action when required. The Superfund law, introduced in 1980 aimed to pinpoint liability
on generators and handlers of industrial wastes. Under the law, firms could be asked to clean up entire sites.
Due to these stringent regulations, the cost of doing business increased significantly for chemical
companies. According to rough calculations (by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)) the
amount spent in 1988 on environmental and pollution control equipment was about $3 billion or 17% of the
industrys planned capital spending. Chemical companies were not sure whether they could recoup the
money from their insurers.
The major players in the industry then came together to launch a self-regulatory program,
Responsible Care (RC). RC advocated changes in management processes and procedures for better
environmental performance. The program was implemented with the help of the CMA. RC added
regulatory functions to CMAs traditional role as a trade association. After the program was initiated,
environmental performance improved significantly.
In 1999, an investment firm, Innovest Strategic Value Advisors began to recommend the stocks of
companies that had a good record with respect to environment protection. It argued that stock performance
was strongly correlated with environmental performance. Innovest gave top marks to Union Carbide and
Exxon, which had come a long way, since Bhopal and Valdez respectively.
14
14
Concluding Notes
Environmental issues should be analysed as business problems. A rigorous analysis is
necessary to understand which investments generate value for shareholders. While doing
the bare minimum to stay on the right side of the law is not acceptable, pouring a large
amount of money into environmental projects, in the name of discharging social
responsibility, is unwise. As Reinhardt puts it 15: Companies arent in business to solve
the worlds problems nor should they be. After all, they have shareholders who want to
see a return on their investments. Thats why managers need to bring the environment
back into the fold of business problems and determine when it really pays to be green
The truth is, environmental problems do not automatically create opportunities to make
money. At the same time, the opposite stance that it never pays for a company to invest
in improving its environmental performance is also incorrect.
Managers should look at better environmental performance as an opportunity
rather than as a threat. As Porter and Van der Linde 16 put it: Instead of clinging to a
perspective focussed on regulatory compliance, companies need to ask such questions as,
What are we wasting? And how could we enhance customer value?
Many companies allow environmental issues to be handled by lawyers and
consultants who tend to focus on compliance rather than innovation. To correct this
situation, environmental strategies must become the direct concern of the general
management. Environmental impact should be incorporated in the overall process of
improving productivity and competitiveness. Managers should be proactive and go
beyond currently regulated areas. They should look for opportunities to improve design,
manufacturing and delivery processes on an ongoing basis.
According to Frank P Popoff, former CEO of Dow Chemical 17: Competitive
advantage must not be gained through non compliance or minimum compliance. Some
companies try to reduce cost this way. But it is deadly. Sooner or later, mandates will
come into place to prevent such an approach and put the company at an enormous
competitive disadvantage. Success truly belongs, I believe, to those companies that not
only comply with environmental standards, whether mandated or self-imposed, but do it
more efficiently and effectively than others. If they conserve energy more efficiently
through internal cycling or on-site disposal, they will ultimately reduce cost.
15
16
17
15
This case draws heavily from the case Environmental risk management at Chevron Corporation,
Harvard Business School, Case No. 9-799-062 prepared by Monica M. Mondelli, Jeniffer L.
Burns and Forest L. Reinhardt.
16
leaking with double-walled fiberglass tanks. This decision was guided by managerial
intuition, not by regulation.
In the early 1990s, oil and natural gas were discovered in the eastern part of New
Guinea, one of the wettest regions in the world. Chevron quickly understood the potential
environmental impact and formed a partnership with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).
Chevron also did not hesitate to spend millions of dollars towards environmental
protection. Today, experts feel that these oil fields almost resemble a national park.
Chevrons views on environment protection
Protecting People and the Environment
Our goal is to be the industry leader in safety and health performance and to be recognized worldwide for
environmental excellence.
We will achieve this goal through:
Safety - Safety is everyones responsibility. Designing, operating and maintaining our facilities to
prevent injury, illness and incidents.
Compliance - Establishing processes to ensure that all of us understand our roles and all operations are
in compliance.
Pollution Prevention - Continually improving our processes to minimize pollution and waste.
Community Outreach - Communicating openly the public regarding possible impact of our business on
them or the environment.
Product Stewardship - Managing potential risks of our products with everyone involved throughout the
products lifecycle.
Conservation - Conserving natural and company resources by continually improving our processes and
measuring our progress.
Advocacy - Working cooperatively with public representatives to base laws and regulations on sound
risk management and cost-benefit principles.
Property Transfer - Assessing and managing environmental liabilities prior to any property transaction.
Transportation - Working with our carriers and distributors to ensure safe distribution of our products.
Emergency Response - Being prepared for any emergency and mitigate any incident quickly.
Chevrons Position on Global Climate Change
In addition to contributing to economic growth, the use of fossil fuels to meet the worlds energy needs has
contributed to an increase in greenhouse gases -- mainly carbon dioxide and methane -- in the earths
atmosphere. Concern is growing that this increase is leading to climate change with adverse effects on the
environment.
We at Chevron recognize the increasing public and government concerns about global climate change and
integrate these concerns into our business decisions. Chevron works proactively with governments and
others to create environmentally, technically and economically sound solutions for responsible growth. We
are:
Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and increasing energy efficiency: Our goal is to reduce
emissions per unit output from operations. We inventory our emissions and use innovative technologies
to continually improve the energy efficiency of and reduce the emissions from our existing operations,
new projects and products.
Investing in research, development and improved technology: We invest in research to:
- Improve understanding of global climate change;
- Identify mitigation strategies;
- Improve the cost-effectiveness of mitigation technology.
We develop and apply cost-effective technologies that reduce carbon emissions during production,
delivery and consumption of our products.
17
Supporting flexible and economically sound policies and mechanisms that protect the environment: We
respect the varied views of partner nations on this complex issue. We assist government policy
development and decision-making on energy issues. We support the development and use of international
mechanisms such as Clean Development Mechanisms and Joint Implementation, which provide flexible,
market-based, economically sound means to reduce emissions.
Commitment to Conservation
Wherever they work, Chevron employees bring with them a commitment to preserve the culture and
environment of the communities they share. Our goal is to be the industry leader in safety and health
performance and to be recognized worldwide for environmental excellence. To succeed, we must be
recognized as an exemplary environmental citizen and be welcomed by the communities where we operate.
At Chevron, were working to put ideas into action to get results. The results of Chevrons policies
are often manifested in many small solutions, such as the way the company monitors wildlife during the
course of its everyday operations. Projects to preserve endangered species and habitats are not token
gestures - they are often extensive and costly - and they demonstrate the companys interest in safeguarding
the future.
In the United States, the company invests more than $1.3 million annually on environmental
grants. Internationally, many of our community programs stress conservation. Focus areas for Chevrons
conservation and environmental contributions are: Conservation and habitat preservation, wildlife
protection and environmental education programs.
Source: Chevron.com
18
Risk modelling
In the mid-1990s, some managers responsible for the construction, maintenance and
operation of Chevrons pipelines, wanted to implement environmental policies more
systematically. Working with a consulting firm, they developed an analytical model to
help them decide which of the many possible environmental projects should be
undertaken just like any other capital project. This led to Chevrons Environment &
Safety (E&S) Risk Management Process. The process works in four phases, identification
of events, risk assessment, identification of alternatives, and decision-making. After
managers identify potential adverse events through structured brainstorming, they
undertake a Qualitative Risk Assessment, thinking about the consequences of each
potential event and the expected likelihood of occurrence. These qualitative estimates of
likelihood and consequences are then plotted on risk matrices that assign a risk value to
each event.
The qualitative risk assessment procedure requires managers to determine a risk
value for four distinct issues: health and safety, environmental, public concern, and
financial effects. Risk values in each case range from one to five, increasing with the
likelihood of occurrence and the severity of the consequences. A risk value of four or five
is an indication that the issue requires immediate attention. At this point, managers
conduct a cost-benefit assessment of the different alternatives available for reducing the
risk.
The Chevron Research and Technology Centre (CRTC) has supplemented the
E&S guidelines by developing a decision-making tool, called DEMA (Decision Making),
in consultation with executives managing upstream and downstream operations. DEMA
helps the managers to undertake cost-benefit analysis and prioritise projects for
execution.
While costs of environmental risk management projects can generally be
measured in monetary terms, this is often not true of the benefits. For example, if a
benefit comes as a reduction in the probability of an adverse event, it is often not clear
what the probability is to start with and by how much it can be reduced by environmental
expenditure. Other investments reduce the magnitude of the damage due to an adverse
event, but again, quantification of the potential damage is difficult, let alone its reduction.
Despite the difficulty in answering such questions, DEMA aims to help managers
to set priorities for environmental risk management using analytical techniques. DEMA
essentially uses a spreadsheet approach. It uses various input sheets and valuation tables
for converting inputs into dollar values. Recap sheets summarize the cost-benefit ratio of
each risk reduction proposal.
For each risk reduction proposal, managers fill an input sheet with information
like the initial project capital cost, the project life (i.e., the most likely length of time
during which the project would yield benefits), the description of the event (e.g., fire,
injuries, business interruption), and the risk reduction proposal being analyzed.
The input sheet compares two scenarios:
Current, which assumes the proposal is not undertaken and assesses five
factors: (1) The likelihood of the adverse event and its contingent impact on
(2) health and safety, (3) natural resources, (4) public concern, and (5)
financial performance.
19
Modified, which assesses the factors indicated above, but assuming that the
project is undertaken.
In order to assess these five factors for each of the two scenarios, managers use
the information from the qualitative risk ranking matrices incorporated in the preceding
phase of the Risk Management Process. They also estimate the probability of the adverse
event more precisely and the magnitude of the damage to supplement the earlier
qualitative assessments.
Not surprisingly, Chevron has found it far easier to quantify the costs associated
with risk management proposals than the benefits. In general, Chevron attempts to
quantify benefits by estimating the total potential dollar impact of an unfavourable
incident and subtracting the costs incurred.
Chevron has successfully applied DEMA at its Richmond (California) refinery,
one of its largest operations. Both the operating company and CRTC have expressed their
satisfaction at the way DEMA has facilitated a systematic cost-benefit analysis of risk
management investments.
20
21
awarded a license to UC to manufacture and store MIC at the plant. However, it asked the
company to take adequate steps to prevent air, water and soil pollution. UC used its
political connections to get around the Government objections. Production of MIC based
pesticides began in 1997, followed by production of MIC in February 1980.
Until the late 1970s, only diploma engineers and first class science graduates were
hired as operators. New employees typically received three months of theoretical
instruction, followed by on-the-job training. In the early 1980s, as part of cost-cutting
efforts, recruitment standards were lowered. People with high school diplomas were hired
and training was not as comprehensive as in the past. The number of shift operations was
reduced. So, was the number of supervisors.
Due to the hazardous nature of MIC, the standard practice was to manufacture it
only as and when needed. UC was however, concerned about disruptions in production of
MIC due to failures in power and water supply. Consequently, it decided to store MIC in
3 x 15,000 gallon tanks designated as E610, E611, and E619. E610 and E611 were meant
to be filled up to 50-60% of capacity and E619 was kept empty to store the chemical in
the event of leakage from the other tanks. The temperature in these tanks was maintained
at 0-50C. In October 1982, a mixture of MIC, chloroform and hydrochloric acid escaped
from the plant. This was a clear indication of the potential environmental hazards
associated with the plant.
Meanwhile, the changing business scenario in the early 1980s, began to create
problems for UC. There was stiff competition from local small scale units. Moreover, the
country went into a recession and many farmers cut back on consumption of pesticides.
Peak production in 1981 was only 2,704 tons and production in 1983, at 1,657 tonnes,
was only 31.4% of the capacity. Faced with intense competition and inadequate demand,
the plant started making losses. In the first 10 months of 1984, UC made a loss of
approximately Rs. 50 million. The parent company, taking stock of the situation, explored
the possibility of disposing the plant. After failing to locate a buyer, UC decided to
dismantle and ship the plant to another country.
Even as UC was considering closure, conditions at the plant were deteriorating
rapidly. The poor safety practices and the declining profitability prompted many talented
engineers to leave the company in the early 1980s. Consequently, safety practices became
even more lax. When the issue of the plants safety came up for discussion in the MP
Legislative Assembly in December 1982, the Labour Minister assured the House that
there was no danger to Bhopal. The plant manager was equally confident that UCs
technology could not go wrong. These contentions were obviously incorrect, because
investigations revealed later that there had not been a single year, when a major mishap
had not occurred. At least six serious accidents had occurred in the four years prior to the
tragedy. Many employees were also not adequately aware of the dangerous nature of the
chemicals being handled.
22
also expressed concern over the high turnover of trained personnel. In view of the serious
managerial and technical deficiencies at the plant, the inspection team indicated that a
serious accident could not be ruled out. The team wanted the water spray system, to be
strengthened. For strange reasons, the Indian subsidiary failed to implement this
recommendation.
In June 1984, as part of cost-cutting efforts, the refrigeration plant used for
cooling the MIC tanks was shut down so that the refrigerant could be used elsewhere in
the plant. The high temperature alarm was reset at 20 0C. By October 7, 1984, UC was
storing substantial quantities of MIC in the three storage tanks. A few weeks later,
pressure in E610 started falling, which meant that water and contaminants could enter the
tank and react with MIC. Ironically enough, in early November, the local authorities
issued an environmental clearance certificate to the plant. Matters worsened by mid
November 1984, when UC drastically reduced the number of maintenance supervisors to
cut costs. Faulty safety devices remained unrepaired due to manpower shortages. The
refrigeration system19 to keep MIC at 00C had been turned off months earlier to cut costs.
The volatile gas scrubber was not working. Critical instruments installed to indicate
pressure and temperature, high and low level alarms had all been malfunctioning for over
a year. A defective valve aggravated the problem by lowering the pressure in E611.
The accident
On December 2, 1984, workers were asked to clean the pipes that went from the MIC
storage tanks to the vent scrubbers. The operation continued even though the flow of
water was not as desired. Due to the absence of a blocking device, water entered E610,
setting off a violent reaction. Around 11 p.m., one of the operators noticed that pressure
in the tank was rising. By midnight, MIC started leaking from the safety valves of the
tank. The workers were not unduly disturbed and went to the canteen for tea. By the time
they returned, it was too late. The concrete around the tanks began to crack. In a
desperate effort, the operator switched on the vent-gas scrubber and the plant sprinkler
system to neutralise the escaping gases. The scrubber, however, failed. The plant
superintendent arrived shortly afterwards and activated the toxic gas alarm. Five minutes
later it was switched off. An announcement about the leakage was made on the plants
public address system. Many workers ran away from the plant, to escape the gas.
In the early hours of December 3, 1984, 45 tons of MIC escaped into the air. The
gas, which was heavier than air, began to settle down. But a gentle wind moved it over an
area of about 40 sq km. Residents woke up as the gas began to suffocate them. There was
no warning nor any action to facilitate quick evacuation. When victims arrived at
hospitals, the doctors were not sure about how to treat them. Most of the victims were
poor people. By December 5, the death toll had crossed 2,000 and the UC plant had been
closed down and locked. Final estimates of the death toll varied between 2,000 and 5,000.
Hundreds of thousands of people were injured, others blinded and some left with
permanent aches in their hands, legs and chest. The number of permanently disabled was
estimated to be 60,000.
In early 1985, the Indian Government cancelled UCs operating license. The
parent companys chairman, Warren Anderson was detained by officials when he visited
19
MIC becomes gas at normal temperatures. To keep it liquid, it has to be kept cool by refrigerants.
23
India shortly after the incident. He announced that the parent company was ready to fund
a hospital for treating the victims.
Litigation
Shortly after the disaster, Union Carbide (USA) started facing lawsuits, whose value
exceeded the companys net worth. Many American attorneys tried to represent the
victims in the US courts. The Indian Government decided to be the sole representative of
the victims. It filed a case in the court of New York against UC. In February 1985, a
judicial panel ordered all the Bhopal lawsuits to be consolidated in the court of Judge
John F Keenan in Manhattan. The Attorney General of India argued that compensation
had to be according to US standards. Union Carbide however, argued that India was the
appropriate place for trial as most of the documents, litigants, evidence and witnesses
were in India. In May 1986, Judge Keenan accepted this logic and ruled that the dispute
should be resolved in India. Earlier, he had asked UC to provide an interim relief of $510 million on humanitarian grounds. However, the parties involved continued to haggle
over how the payment would be channeled. Finally, in November 1985, it was decided to
route the payment through the Red Cross.
Meanwhile, in June 1985, negotiations between UC and the Indian Law Ministry
had broken down. UC had made an offer to pay $230 million spread over a period of 20
years. The Indian Government felt it was too little, but a UC spokesperson maintained
that the amount was substantial. As the dispute continued, UCs other operations like
batteries, continued to be profitable.
In September 1986, the litigation resumed in a Bhopal District Court. UC argued
that the factory was managed by Indians. No US citizen had been employed there for at
least two years before the disaster. UC also alleged that sabotage was responsible for the
disaster and that there was a conspiracy among employees and government investigators
to conceal evidence after the incident. Towards the end of 1987, UC offered to pay $500
million in installments and settle the case. The Indian Government, which had earlier
made a damage claim of $3.1 billion, reduced it to $615 million. On December 17, 1997,
when settlement talks appeared to break down, a district court judge passed an order
asking UC to pay Rs. 350 crores as interim relief. UC challenged this order in the
Madhya Pradesh High Court, which upheld UCs liability. It however reduced the
compensation payable to Rs. 250 crores. Later, the issue came to the Supreme Court,
which on February 14, 1989 directed the company to pay $470 million as full and final
settlement.
The parent company had earlier set aside $250 million for damages. Its insurance
cover was estimated to be $200 million. So, paying the settlement effectively meant a
charge of $0.50 per share, against the previous years earnings of $1.59. Predictably
enough, UC accepted the judgement as fair and reasonable. The settlement was well
below the $3 billion demanded by the victims lawyers. Consequently, the Union Carbide
stock rose by $2 to $31 1/8 on the day of the announcement.
Most observers felt that the compensation was grossly inadequate. The relief
worked out to only Rs. 10,000 per victim on an average. In contrast, $40,000 had been
spent on each otter affected by the Valdez oil spill in the Alaska, which involved the
global oil company, Exxon. The Supreme Court presumably ordered both sides to accept
the settlement because it felt the victims needed immediate relief. But unfortunately, even
24
this meagre relief was not handed over promptly to the victims by the concerned
authorities.
On September 9, 1993, the parent company sold its 50.9% stake in UC to the
Calcutta based McLeod Russel at a price of Rs. 175 per share. The victims continued to
face harassment from the claims commissioners. By 1993, the claims courts had settled
only 5% of the claims.
Concluding Notes
Looking back, it is clear that UC did not have any systematic process in place to handle
disasters in the event of their occurrence. Inadequate safety procedures became even
more lax when the plant started making losses and attention shifted to cost-cutting. The
factors which together contributed to the disaster were:
Sustained erosion of good maintenance procedures due to all around costcutting, since the plant was making a loss.
20
Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Could it have happened in a Developed Country? Australian Disaster
Conference, 1999.
25
Following the Bhopal incident, the general reputation of American MNCs came
under a cloud. Even developing countries like Brazil announced that environmental
norms would be tightened. MNCs began to do a basic rethinking of the costs and risks of
investments around the world.
Many developing countries also began to realise the urgent need for conducting
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) to identify potential environmental problems,
develop appropriate mitigation measures to identify environmental issues needing further
study, to involve the public in decisions with an impact on the environment and to
understand the roles and responsibilities of the different parties involved.
Anthony J. Parisi21 summarised the risk management lessons from the Bhopal
tragedy: Tighten standards where necessary, improve warning systems and emergency
response plans, choose costlier but less hazardous processes, when possible, do things on
a small scale and isolate the danger whenever feasible. But in the end, it may well be to
recognise that industrial catastrophes are no longer distant improbabilities.
21
26
More often than not, the level of preparedness of individuals and corporations to
deal with natural disasters is inadequate. Most homes and businesses do not equip
themselves properly to deal with natural disasters because of a human tendency to believe
that it will not happen to us. Moreover, natural disasters are once in a lifetime events.
Because of the rarity of the events, people do not consider them seriously enough.
Organizations are also reluctant to spend because there are no guaranteed returns.
Consider a measure such as reinforcing the foundation of a building to make it more
earthquake resistant. Large investments may be required and will yield long-term benefits
only over the entire life of the building. The investment will be clearly unattractive if a
27
short time horizon of two to three years is considered while doing the cost-benefit
analysis.
The initiative taken by the Dutch authorities to minimise the threat from floods, is
a good example of long-term thinking. On February 1, 1953, a severe storm battered the
coast of Holland, causing extensive damage in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland.
Severe flooding resulted. A group of statisticians, scientists and engineers, appointed by
the Government recommended that the dykes needed to be atleast five meters tall to deal
with an event that was expected to happen only once in 10,000 years. Quite clearly,
strong vision and proactive thinking are necessary to look at the long-term rather than the
short-term benefits of investments aimed at mitigating natural disasters.
28
29
30
or adequately addressed. The report concluded that the project would not perform as
planned and recommended that the bank withdraw from the project
The World Bank (Bank) continued funding, but asked the Indian Government to
meet various requirements covering the environment and resettlement of villagers. But
the Government could not meet the deadlines and decided it would give up the funding
rather than try to meet the Banks demands. On March 30, 1993, it formally requested the
Bank to cancel the final instalment of $170 million. Around half the money spent on the
project till then had come from the Bank.
Over 80,000 hectares of land in Gujarat would be lost to the canal network if the
project was completed.
Over 42,000 adivasis would be displaced by the Shoolpaneshwar Wildlife
sanctuary in Gujarat, planned to compensate the forests and wildlife lost to the
reservoir.
The dam would dry up the river downstream destroying the livelihood of at least
10,000 fish worker families. It would also severely affect the water supply to over
700,000 people in 210 villages and to at least five towns.
Afforestation schemes supposed to compensate for the trees lost to the reservoir
had taken over large areas of adivasi land. The adivasis had been cultivating this
land for generations but received no compensation.
Large numbers of people were dependent on the forests and agricultural land,
which were taken over for resettlement sites. About 10,000-15,000 tribals
depended on the 3,707 acres of forest land released for resettlement of people
affected by the project in February 1994. No measures had been taken to
compensate these people.
31
A number of holding ponds between the reservoir and the main canal were
impounded by rock-filled dykes, displacing around 900 families from five adivasi
villages in Gujarat between 1983 and 1991.
As no proper land surveys had been done in MP, the authorities had no idea about
the number of people who would be affected by being resettled on islands or
inaccessible peninsulas.
23
24
32
NCCL president, VK Saxena argued that the NBA was an unregistered body and was
involved in anti-national and seditious activities. It pointed out that NBA had been
criticizing the Supreme Court verdict of October 18, 2000. Patkar had called the
judgment an inhuman crime and conspiracy of the state. NCCL attached documentary
evidence to show how NBA, had collected millions of rupees through its 30 support
groups in India and much more in 10 other countries, for its campaign. The litigation
charged that NBA had received donations, totalling approximately $1 million, from
Enron and other thermal power generation companies.
The Sardar Sarovar Project: A Timeline
1961: Nehru lays the foundation stone for a 49.8 metre high dam.
1979: The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal announces its award. The project is redesigned to be a
massive 138.68 metre high dam.
1985: World Bank sanctions a $450 million loan.
July 1993: Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay, one of the agencies officially appointed for
monitoring and evaluating the Sardar Sarovar resettlement work, concludes that resettlement has been a
disaster, the work on the project must stop and the whole issue must be reviewed thoroughly before the
project is given clearance.
5th August, 1993: The Indian Government appoints a five-member group headed by a Planning
Commission member, to comprehensively review the SSP. This is in direct response to a strong agitation by
the Narmada Bachao Andolan and the tremendous support it receives from all over the country and outside.
7th December, 1993: The Central Ministry of Environment and Forests declares that the project has failed
to meet environmental resettlement requirements and calls for suspension of the project.
31st December, 1993: The Narmada Control Authority endorses the stand of the Ministry. It notes that the
Supreme Court orders for resettling ousted people at least six months in advance of submergence had been
violated. It also calls for stoppage of work.
12th January, 1994: The Prime Minister calls for a stoppage of work due to the violations of the Supreme
Court order.
4th March, 1994: The MP Chief Minister writes to the PM that it is impossible to resettle all the people,
who will be ousted by the project. He also states that Gujarat, where it expects to settle the ousted people
has not been able to provide the land in spite of many promises. He admits that the water yield of the river
has been overestimated by about 17%, and that the state does not have enough money to complete the
project. He asks the PM to intervene and reduce the height of the dam.
April, 1994: The World Bank publishes a Review of Resettlement of its projects worldwide. The Bank,
which has so far defended the project, including its resettlement component, calls it a bad case.
July, 1994: The five-member group, appointed in August 1993, submits its report to the Government of
India. A court order keeps the report sealed. At least 10 people die on the resettlement sites Hareshwar,
Simamli, Suryaghoda- of cholera and other diseases due to polluted and unclean water.
December, 1994: A report by a Maharashtra government committee, consisting of the local Member of
Parliament, and an NGO points out that grave violations have taken place with land being submerged
without people being resettled.
13th December, 1994: The Supreme Court orders that the report of the review committee be made public.
The report concludes among other things that:
The estimate of the total number affected by the project is incomplete, and that an immediate census
must be carried out to estimate the numbers of all the different categories of affected people.
The Rehabilitation & Resettlement master plan must be made ready within six months, including the
provisions for non-submergence categories of affected people.
There is not enough land available to resettle everyone.
The water yield of the river has been overestimated.
January, 1995: The Supreme Court asks the Review Group to study various aspects of the project: (a)
Hydrology (b) The height of the Dam (c) The resettlement aspects (d) The environmental aspects.
33
March, 1995: The World Bank presents its Project Completion Report on the SSP, which states that there
have been severe problems in the resettlement and rehabilitation. It also mentions that the benefits of the
project have been overestimated. Between December 1993 and June 1995, hundreds of families abandon
their resettlement sites due to the miserable conditions there, and return to their original villages.
June, 1995: Arch Vahini, a pro-dam NGO, which has been working jointly with the government to resettle
the people since 1988, circulates a letter admitting the serious problems in the resettlement program since
1993, and resigns from the Government Committee on Resettlement. The new government in the state of
Gujarat launches a new mega-project Kalpasar, which is seen widely as an alternative scheme to the SSP.
February, 1999: The Supreme Court, in an interim order, gives its approval for increasing the dams height
to 88 metres (85 metres and 3 metres of humps).
18th October, 2000: The Supreme Court finally permits the immediate construction of the dam up to a
height of 90 metres and also authorizes construction up to the original height of 138 metres in 5-metre
increments, subject to approval by the Relief and Rehabilitation Subgroup of the NCA.
The alternatives
Opponents of the dam felt that the SSPs promised benefits could be realized without its
massive financial, human, and environmental costs. The Gujarat governments own water
agencies had stated that it was possible to deliver water to Kutch and Saurashtra much
more efficiently than the SSP.
Smaller dams and reservoirs, which did not involve major destruction of the
environment and the displacement of people, were suggested as a better way to tap water
from the rivers. These were not as destructive as large dams and could be built much
faster. However, a series of smaller dams entailed higher costs, greater submergence, far
more displacement, greater evaporation losses and increased maintenance costs. Small
dams were also prone to drought because they depended on tiny catchments. A number of
small dams would not be able to check floods or generate electricity as well as one large
dam could. Overall, it seemed big and small dams served different purposes; neither
could be a substitute for the other.
Other alternatives suggested were the use of underground storage, localized
schemes like rooftop storage and small-scale tanks to collect rainwater, which reduced
waste and improved the efficiency of existing systems and water usage. However, there
had been no serious water conservation campaigns in India except in the state of Andhra
Pradesh
Concluding comments
While the SSP authorities had commissioned and conducted more environmental studies
than any other dam project in India, the studies had serious shortcomings. The studies
seemed to lack quality, impartiality, comprehensiveness and credibility. Many of them
were apparently conducted with the sole purpose of justifying the project. Moreover,
most of the studies were conducted after the clearance of the project in 1987.
The brunt of the NBA activism related to the resettlement and rehabilitation of the
displaced persons. No other project in the country had its rehabilitation and resettlement
schemes subjected to such severe scrutiny. The NWDT, which functioned from 1969 to
1979, prescribed a package of reliefs, which included the path breaking provision of land
for land. In the 1980s and 1990s, highly critical appraisals were given in the hard-hitting
reports of the Tata Institute for Social Sciences and the World Bank. The standing
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Subgroup set up by the central government had
34
periodically visited the affected villages and resettlement colonies and submitted its
reports to the Supreme Court of India.
According to a report (2000) prepared by the World Commission on Dams
(WCD), the investments in dams, over the last century, have totalled over $2 trillion. But
in recent times, these investment decisions have been under scrutiny as the opposition to
large dams has grown, both in intensity and scale. The report mentions that while dams
have contributed to development, in many cases, an unacceptable and often unnecessary
price has been paid by displaced people, by communities downstream, by taxpayers and
by the natural environment. The WCD report notes that dams typically have cost overruns, time over-runs, under-performance in terms of benefits and limited success in their
efforts to counter the adverse impact on ecosystems. The report also mentions that the
social groups, which bear the costs and the ones, which receive the benefits, are not the
same. The report states that alternatives to large dams exist but are rarely explored.
The Commissions most significant recommendation is that before a project is
taken up, it must be shown that there has been a demonstrable acceptance of the key
decisions. Free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous and tribal people, who are
among the affected groups, must guide the projects. Before taking up any new project, the
benefits from the existing infrastructure must be exhausted and outstanding social and
environmental issues should be settled.
35
References:
1. Alan Hall, The Bhopal tragedy has Union Carbide reeling, Business Week,
December 17, 1984, p. 30.
2. Judith K Dobrzynski, William B Glaberson, et al, Union Carbide fights for its life,
Business Week, December 24, 1984, pp. 44-51.
3. Resa W King, William J Powell Jr. and William B Glaberson, Early steps to Carbide
settlement, Business Week, January 28, 1985, p. 22.
4. William B Glaberson, William J Powell Jr. and Patrick Houston, Indians Bhopal suit
could change all the rules, Business Week, April 22, 1985, p. 22.
5. William B Glaberson, Carbide talks peace but girds for war, Business Week, April
29, 1985, pp. 20-21.
6. Marilyn A Harris, Resa W King and Rebecca Aikmau, The threat thats stirring
Carbides survival instincts, Business Week, September 16, 1986.
7. Frederick Painton, et al, Red flows the Rhine, Time, November 24, 1986,
pp. 28-30.
8. American chemical companies: Cleaned up or cleaned out, The Economist,
December 12, 1987, pp. 65-66.
9. Bhopals victims still wait, The Economist, May 14, 1988, pp. 30-31.
10. Absolutely liable, The Economist, July 23, 1988, p. 63.
11. Joseph A Avila and Bradley W Whitehead, What is Environmental strategy? An
interview with Dow Chemical CEO, Frank P Popoff and Vice President,
Environment, Health and Safety, David T Buzzela, The McKinsey Quarterly, 1993
Number 4, pp. 53-68.
12. Molly Moore, Indian dam project: Boom or failure? LA Times, September 19, 1993,
p. 62.
13. Darryl DMonte, India: a dam too far, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 28,
1993, p. 62.
14. Patric McCully, Sardar Sarovar Project: An Overview, International Rivers
Network, May 30, 1994.
15. Exercising the other option, The Economic Times, October 8, 1994.
16. Forest L Reinhardt, Alberta-Pacific Industries Inc. Harvard Business School Case
No. 9-794-099, 1994.
17. Michael E Porter and Claas Van Der Linde, Green and Competitive: Ending the
stalemate, Harvard Business Review, September-October 1995, pp. 120-133.
18. Susan J Colby, Tony Kingsley and Bradley W Whitehead, Debunking the myths of
environmental management, The McKinsey Quarterly, 1995, Number 2,
pp. 132-143.
19. C Shivkumar, Opening the flood gates, Business Standard, May 8, 1997, p. 4.
20. A flood of fiascoes, Economist.com, April 17, 1997.
21. Andreas Merkl and Harry Robinson, Environmental risk management: Take it back
from the lawyers and engineers, The McKinsey Quarterly, 1997, Number 3,
pp. 150-163.
22. Arundhati Roy, The greater common god, Outlook, May 24, 1999.
23. Arundhati Roy, The greater common god II, Outlook, July 5, 1999.
36
24. Karol Nielsen, Green management may lift stock values, Chemical Week, July
7-14, 1999, pp. 75-76.
25. Ravi S Jha, Inter-state dispute on oustees rehab refuses to die down, The Times of
India, July 24, 1999.
26. Devangshu Datta, The trouble with Indian dams, Business Standard, August 4,
1999, p. 6.
27. A Mohandas Moes, The real lesson of Narmada, The Economic Times, October 23,
1999.
28. The dry facts about dams, Economist.com, November 18, 1999.
29. William K Reilly, Private enterprises and public obligations, Achieving Sustainable
Development, California Management Review, Summer 1999, Vol. 41, Issue 4,
pp. 17-26.
30. Monica M Mondelli, Jennifer L Burns and Forest L Reinhardt, Environmental Risk
Management at Chevron Corporation, Harvard Business School Case Study No.
9-799-062, 1999.
31. Forest L Reinhardt, Ciba Specialty Chemicals, Harvard Business School Case
Study No. 9-799-086, 1999.
32. J P Gupta, Bhopal Gas Tragedy: Could it have happened in a Developed Country?
Paper presented at the Australian Disaster Conference, 1999.
33. If no big dam, what? Down to Earth, January 15, 2000.
34. SSP no use for Saurashtra, admits CM, Indian Express, February 27, 2000.
35. Narmada threatens to go on a fast, The Times of India, September 2000.
36. Margot Higgins, Indian Supreme Court gives approval to controversial dam project,
KRTBN, October 19, 2000.
37. Shekhar Singh, The karma of dams, Indian Express, October 23, 2000.
38. Arundhati Roy, The people vs. the god of big dams, The Times of India, October
26, 2000.
39. Gajanan Khergamekar, Medhas anti-dam tirade courting trouble! The Times of
India, November 15, 2000.
40. Uday Turaga, A meandering tale, Technology in Society, Volume 22, Number 2,
2000, pp. 237-253.
41. Ranjit Bhushan Seismic shock, Outlook, February 5, 2001, pp. 32-42.
42. Shantanu Guha Roy and Ranjit Bhushan, From Scratch, Outlook, February 12,
2001, pp. 16-23.
43. Forest L Reinhardt, Down to Earth, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 2000.
44. The Green Brigade, Business Today, May 6, 2001, pp. 64-67.
45. R Chandrasekhar, A balanced approach helps, Business Today, May 6, 2001,
p. 69.
46. Abir Pal, Protecting by saving the earth, Business Today, May 6, 2001, p. 70.
47. Roop Karnani, It does make things better, Business Today, May 6, 2001, p. 76.
48. R. Sridharan, We also make green steel, Business Today, May 6, 2001, p. 77.
49. Maggie Black, The day of judgement, New Internationalist, July 2001.
50. Maggie Black, Resettled by registered mail, New Internationalist, July 2001.
51. Maggie Black, They only hold pen, New Internationalist, July 2001.
52. Himanshu Thakkar, Large dams under microscope, Indiatogether.com, July 2001.
53. Narmada: The facts, New Internationalist, July 2001.
37
54. Venu Govind, A interview with Medha Patkar, Indiatogether.com, August 7, 2001.
55. Sumit Mitra, Arundhati Roy Case: Diva of contempt, India Today, August 20,
2001, p. 50.
56. Kanhaiah Bhelari, Hiroshima in Jharkhand, The Week, September 2, 2001,
pp. 18-20.
57. High-risk Radiation, Times of India, October 5, 2001, p. 12.
58. Accord emerges on Kyoto protocol, The Economic Times, November 11, 2001,
p. 4.
58. Randall Rothenberg, Jared Diamond, The Thought Leader Interview, Strategy +
Business, Issue 24, Third Quarter 2001, pp. 87-95.
59. Forest Reinhardt, Tensions in the environment, Financial Times Mastering Risk,
Volume I, 2001, pp. 255-259.
60. Howard Kunreuther, Seeking succour from the rising costs of catastrophe,
Financial Times Mastering Risk, Volume I, 2001, pp. 260-264.
61. Ian I Mitroff, The essentials of crisis management, Financial Times Mastering Risk,
Volume I, 2001, pp. 265-268.
62. Paul Embrechts, Difficult calls in judging risk extremes, Financial Times
Mastering Risk, Volume I, 2001, pp. 269-274.
63. Rony F Knight and Deborah J Pretty, Day of judgement: Catastrophe and the
share price, Financial Times Mastering Risk, Volume I, 2001, pp. 275-279.
64. Prasenjit Maiti, Till the rivers all run dry, Electronic Green Journal, Issue 14,
Spring 2001.
65. pan-uk.org/default.htm
66. home.earthlink.net
67. geocities.com
68. Geeta and Arwind, At the end of the line, narmada.org