De Alva - Dissenting - Opinion On Jacinto v. People
De Alva - Dissenting - Opinion On Jacinto v. People
De Alva - Dissenting - Opinion On Jacinto v. People
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Promulgated:
July 13, 2009
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - X
DISSENTING OPINION
DE ALVA, J.:
Given the records of this case, the ruling of the majority of the
decision that only impossible crime was committed stems from the factual
impossibility of committing the crime where all the requisites of impossible
crimes are laid down in the Intod decision.1
In its petition for certiorari petition for review on certiorari filed by the
petitioner, Gemma T. Jacinto, seeking the reversal of the Decisions2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16,
2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and
its Resolution dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration3. I vote to deny the petition and affirmsaffirm to the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
1 Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52
2 Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III, with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama,
Jr. and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 70-77.
3 Id. at 86.
following circumstances under Article 3106 isare present: (1) the theft is
committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave
abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
This representation is strongly be certain that the crime committed by
the accused is at least crime of theft.
From the records of the case, I find that the prosecution sufficiently
established the commission of the crime of qualified theft. (1) the taking of
personal property as shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for
Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer
and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) the said property belonged to
another the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for
purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain this is
presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that
the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law;
(4) it was done without the owner's consent petitioner hid the fact that she
had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not
6 Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation,
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of
fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
remitting the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use
of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things the
check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was
known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave
abuse of confidence petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection
of payments from customers.
7 Joel Yongcon and Julieto Laojan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
209373, July 30, 2014
Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se,10 mens rea has
been defined before as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent,"11 and "essential for criminal liability." 12 It follows that the
statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the
mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has
comfortably held that "a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement
infringes on constitutionally protected rights."13 The criminal statute must
also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist
in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be
an actus reus.
In Valenzuela v. People14, Itit has been said that it is from the actus
reus and the mens rea that the felony is produced. As a postulate in the
craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that
the language of the law expressly provide when the felony is produced.
Without such a provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental
question whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the
9 People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1925); cited in AQUINO, supra note 29, at 39.
See also Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 364 Phil. 890, 905 (1999).
10 See Padilla v. Dizon, A.C. No. 3086, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 127, 135.
11 People v. Moreno, 356 Phil. 231, 248 (1998) citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 5th ed., p. 889.
12 Jariol, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, Nos. L-52095-52116, 13 August 1990, 188
SCRA 475, 490.
13 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) cited in Separate Opinion, J.
Tinga, Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259, 29 July 2004, 435
SCRA 371, 400.
14 Valenzuela y Natividad v. People, G.R. No. 160188, [June 21, 2007], 552
PHIL 381-419
undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary is assigned
the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal Code
does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory definition of any
felony, a conclusive passage or term is fixed which shows when the felony is
produced by the acts of execution.
For all the reasons above, I vote to deny the petition.
MIGUIEL A. DE ALVA
Associate Justice