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PEOPLE v. VERA

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(VERSION 1)
PEOPLE v. TALINGDAN
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias,
Augusto Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, accused-appellants
En Banc
Per Curiam, July 6, 1978
Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art. 3) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission
Facts:
Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag
No certificate or any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution
They lived with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra.
Their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa had deserted her family
home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her.
On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in their house while
Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year
old daughter to go down the house and leave them.
Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa
About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come
back for a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and
Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time.
Just two days before Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a violent
quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the
police.

Accused Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him
to come down; Bernardo ignored him; Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo that someday
he would kill him.
On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house.

Corazon's version:
Friday morning: Corazon was in a creek to wash clothes. She saw her mother Teresa meeting
with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, and Pedro Bides in a
small hut owned by Bernardo.
She heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet. When Teresa noticed Corazon, she
shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him.
Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother go down
the house to go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants.
She noted the long guns the appellants were carrying.
Teresa came back to the house and proceeded to her room. Corazon informed Bernardo, who
was then working on a plow, about the presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no
attention. Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door. He was
suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the batalan.
The four accused climbed the stairs of the batalan and upon seeing that Bernardo was still alive,
Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again.
Bides and Berras did not fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to call for helo, Bides
warned her that he will kill her if she calls for help.
Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers,
the former threatened to kill the latter if she reveals the matter to anyone.
The defendants'' version:
Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her.
Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan; an
illicit relationship never existed between them.
Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing on June 24; he escorted the Mayor in
Bangued from June 22 to June 26.

Tobias, Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan, 250300 meters from the place of the killing.
Issue:
W/N Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder
It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspiracy to kill
her husband because there is no showing of actual cooperation on her part with co-appellants in
their culpable acts that led to his death.
It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval thereof on her
part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator.

Holding:
Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.
Ratio:
Note:

The court believed Corazon's testimony.

It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt;
she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants.
She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also not clear if she helped directly in the planning
and preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she knew it was going to be done and
did not object.
There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the
offense committed.
She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to
have no suspects in mind when the peace officers came into their house later to investigate
Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding the
conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with her coappellants.
These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime.
Male appellants sentenced to death. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa Domogma,
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8
years of prision mayor as maximum.

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(VERSION 2)
PEOPLE v. TALINGDAN

Facts:
Bernardo Bagabag was murdered in his own house in Abra on June 24, 1967 by Talingdan,
Tobias, Berras, Bides and Teresa Domogma, his alleged wife [whom cannot be charged with
parricide because no certificate or proof of marriage could be presented by the prosecution].
The murder was witnessed by Corazon [12], the eldest child of Bernardo and Teresa. She
testified to the crime committed by the accused-appellants.
Story:
Prior to the violent incident, Bernardo and Teresa have had several conflicts in their married life.
She would often withdraw from their house. The longest even for more than 3 weeks. It was
suspected that Teresa is having an illicit affair with Talingdan, a policeman who lives nearby. Two
days before the crime, Teresa was slapped several times by Bernardo after a violent quarrel.
She sought the help of Talingdan who challenged Bernardo to come down, but the latter
refused. Then, Talingdan left after shouting "If I will find you someday, I will kill you." Two days
before the commission of the crime, Corazon overheard her mothers meeting with the other
accused-appellants about their plot to kill her father as one of them said, Shall he elude a
bullet? Corazon was then driven away by her mother saying, You tell your father that we will
kill him. On the night of the murder, Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her
mother talking with the other accused-appellants in their batalan armed with long guns. After
a while, Teresa went inside the room to put her baby to sleep. After eating supper alone,
Corazon told her father about the persons outside but he ignored her. He went to the kitchen
and sat on the floor near the door then he was fired. Talingdan and Tobias fired their guns again.
Bides threatened to kill Corazon if she would ask for help. Corazon confessed to her fathers
relatives the identities of the murderers during his burial. The trial court found them guilty of the
offense and so the five accused appealed to their conviction.

Crime Committed: Murder

[and the sentence of life imprisonment with indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the
deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000]

Contention of the Accused:

According to Teresa, there was no illicit affair between her and Talingdan. She loved her
husband. Contrary to the testimony of Corazon, they never quarreled nor did the former maltreat
her. She never left home for so long. And she was cooking for supper, and not Corazon, on the

night of the murder. She contends that her in-laws used her daughter to testify against her
because they dont want Teresa from the start. She even added that Bernardo had some
enemies during his lifetime. Talingdan said that he escorted the Mayor as a bodyguard, while
the other three accused also claimed that they were at a certain Mrs. Bayongans house during
the night of the murder.

Contention of the People:

The sworn statement of the 13-year old Corazon was true. She knew the accused because they
live nearby their place. Besides, the accused-appellants testimonies are indefensible and futile.
Moreover, her mother claimed to have no suspect in mind during the investigation in their house
although she was in conspiracy with the other four accused.

Ruling:
The court affirmed the decision held by the trial court with costs. There are two aggravating
circumstances present, treachery and evident premeditation, with no mitigating circumstances to
offset the accused-appellants. Talingdan, Tobias, Berras, and Bides are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and are sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with
law. Teresa Domogma is guilty as accessory to the same murder, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision
mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law.

What about Teresas conviction?

Teresa was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known
to her. After Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These
subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the
crime" which makes her liable as an accessory --- paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code. [Please check Art 19 on your PRC and write it down if you wish. I strongly
recommend it so.]

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VINO v. PEOPLE

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CHING v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G. R. No. 164317 February 6, 2006
Lessons Applicable: Corp. Officers or employees, through whose act, default or omission the
corp. commits a crime, are themselves individually guilty of the crime (Corporate Law)
FACTS:
Sept-Oct 1980: PBMI, through Ching, Senior VP of Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (PBMI),
applied with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) for the issuance of commercial
letters of credit to finance its importation of assorted goods.
RCBC approved the application, and irrevocable letters of credit were issued in favor of Ching.
The goods were purchased and delivered in trust to PBMI.
Ching signed 13 trust receipts as surety, acknowledging delivery of the goods.
Under the receipts, Ching agreed to hold the goods in trust for RCBC, with authority to sell but
not by way of conditional sale, pledge or otherwise.
In case such goods were sold, to turn over the proceeds thereof as soon as received, to apply
against the relative acceptances and payment of other indebtedness to respondent bank.
In case the goods remained unsold within the specified period, the goods were to be returned to
RCBC without any need of demand. (Goods, manufactured products or proceeds thereof,
whether in the form of money or bills, receivables, or accounts separate and capable of
identification - RCBCs property)
When the trust receipts matured, Ching failed to return the goods to RCBC, or to return their
value amounting toP6,940,280.66 despite demands.
RCBC filed a criminal complaint for estafa against petitioner in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila.
December 8, 1995: no probable cause to charge petitioner with violating P.D. No. 115, as
petitioners liability was only civil, not criminal, having signed the trust receipts as surety.
RCBC appealed the resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ) via petition for review.
On July 13, 1999: reversed the assailed resolution of the City Prosecutor

execution of said receipts is enough to indict the Ching as the official responsible for violation of
P.D. No. 115
April 22, 2004: CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit and on procedural grounds
Ching filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the CA
ISSUE:
W/N Ching should be held criminally liable.

HELD:
YES. DENIED for lack of merit
There is no dispute that it was the Ching executed the 13 trust receipts.
law points to him as the official responsible for the offense.
Since a corporation CANNOT be proceeded against criminally because it CANNOT commit
crime in which personal violence or malicious intent is required, criminal action is limited to the
corporate agents guilty of an act amounting to a crime and never against the corporation itself
execution by Ching of receipts is enough to indict him as the official responsible for violation of
PD 115.
RCBC is estopped to still contend that PD 115 covers only goods which are ultimately destined
for sale and not goods, like those imported by PBM, for use in manufacture.
Moreover, PD 115 explicitly allows the prosecution of corporate officers without prejudice to the
civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense thus, the civil liability imposed on respondent in
RCBC vs. Court of Appeals case is clearly separate and distinct from his criminal liability under
PD 115.
Chings being a Senior Vice-President of the Philippine Blooming Mills does not exculpate him
from any liability.
The crime defined in P.D. No. 115 is malum prohibitum but is classified as estafa under
paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, or estafa with abuse of confidence. It
may be committed by a corporation or other juridical entity or by natural persons. However, the
penalty for the crime is imprisonment for the periods provided in said Article 315.
The law specifically makes the officers, employees or other officers or persons responsible for
the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities of such corporation and/or board of directors,
officers, or other officials or employees responsible for the offense .

Rationale:
Officers or employees are vested with the authority and responsibility to devise means
necessary to ensure compliance with the law and, if they fail to do so, are held criminally
accountable; thus, they have a responsible share in the violations of the law.
If the crime is committed by a corporation or other juridical entity, the directors, officers,
employees or other officers thereof responsible for the offense shall be charged and penalized
for the crime, precisely because of the nature of the crime and the penalty therefor.
A corporation cannot be arrested and imprisoned; hence, cannot be penalized for a crime
punishable by imprisonment. However, a corporation may be charged and prosecuted for a
crime if the imposable penalty is fine. Even if the statute prescribes both fine and imprisonment
as penalty, a corporation may be prosecuted and, if found guilty, may be fined.
When a criminal statute designates an act of a corporation or a crime and prescribes
punishment therefor, it creates a criminal offense which, otherwise, would not exist and such can
be committed only by the corporation. But when a penal statute does not expressly apply to
corporations, it does not create an offense for which a corporation may be punished.
On the other hand, if the State, by statute, defines a crime that may be committed by a
corporation but prescribes the penalty therefor to be suffered by the officers, directors, or
employees of such corporation or other persons responsible for the offense, only such
individuals will suffer such penalty.
Corporate officers or employees, through whose act, default or omission the corporation
commits a crime, are themselves individually guilty of the crime. The principle applies whether
or not the crime requires the consciousness of wrongdoing. It applies to those corporate agents
who themselves commit the crime and to those, who, by virtue of their managerial positions or
other similar relation to the corporation, could be deemed responsible for its commission, if by
virtue of their relationship to the corporation, they had the power to prevent the act. Benefit is
not an operative fact.
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WEST COAST LIFE INSURANCE CO. VS. GEO HURD,
JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
March 30, 1914G.R. No. L-8527
Facts:

Petitioner is a foreign life-insurance corporation, duly organized under and by virtue of the laws
of the State of California, doing business regularly and legally in the Philippine Islands pursuant
to its laws.
The assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila filed an information in a criminal action in
the Court of First Instance of that city against the plaintiff, said corporation, and also against
John Northcott and Manuel C.Grey, charging said corporation and said individuals with the
crime of libel.The defendant in his official capacity as judge of the court of First Instance signed
and issued a process directed to the plaintiff and the other accused in said criminal action,
summoning them to appear before him to answer the charges filed.
However, the plaintiff, together with the other persons named as accused in said process filed
with the clerk of the court a motion to quash said summons and the service thereof, on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the said company, there being no authority in the
court for the issuance of the process, the order under which it was issued being void.
Plaintiffs argue that under the laws of the Philippine Islands, to proceed against a corporation,
as such, criminally, to bring it into court for the purpose of making it amenable to the criminal
laws. The plaintiff, further attacking said process, alleges that the process is a mixture of civil
and criminal process, that it is not properly signed, that it does not direct or require an arrest;
that it is an order to appear and answer on a date certain without restraint of the person, and
that it is not in the form required by law.The court denied the motion and proceeded to hear the
case.

Issue:
Whether or not he court may, of itself and on its own motion,create not only a process but a
procedure by which the process may be made effective.
Held:
While having the inherent powers which usually go with courts of general jurisdiction, they have
only such authority in criminal matters as is expressly conferred upon them by statute or which it
is necessary to imply from such authority in order to carry out fully and adequately the express
authority conferred. The Courts of First Instance do not have authority to create new procedure
and new processes in criminal law. The exercise of such power verges too closely on legislation.
Even though it be admitted that there are various penal laws in the Philippine Islands which
corporation as such may violate, still the courts are not authorized to go to the extent of creating
special procedure and special processes for the purpose of carrying out those penal statutes,
when the legislature itself has neglected to do so.

To bring a corporation into court criminally requires many additions to the present criminal
procedure. While it may be said to be the duty of courts to see to it that criminals are punished,
it is no less their duty to follow prescribed forms of procedure and to go out upon unauthorized
ways or actin an unauthorized manner.
There are many cases cited by counsel for the defendant which show that corporations have
been proceeded against criminally by indictment and otherwise and have been punished as
malefactors by the courts. Of this, of course, there can be no doubt; but it is clear that, in those
cases, the statute, by express words or by necessary intendment, included corporations within
the persons who could offend against the criminal laws; and the legislature, at the same time
established a procedure applicable to corporations.
It is adjudged that the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila be and it is enjoined and
prohibited from proceeding further in the criminal case so far as said proceedings relate to the
said West Coast Life InsuranceCompany, a corporation, the plaintiff in the case.