Loading and Unloading of Solid Bulk Cargoes 2010
Loading and Unloading of Solid Bulk Cargoes 2010
Loading and Unloading of Solid Bulk Cargoes 2010
International Limited
INTERNATIONALSAFETYPANEL
SAFETYBRIEFINGPAMPHLETSERIES#13
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International Labour Office (ILO) Convention No. 152 Occupational Safety and Health
in Dockwork (revised)
Ships Lifting Plant (revised)
The International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code (revised))
Classification Societies (revised)
Container Terminal Safety (revised)
Guidance on the Preparation of Emergency Plans (revised)
Safe Cleaning of Freight Containers (revised)
Safe Working on Container Ships
Safe Use of Flexible Intermediate Bulk Containers (FIBCs) (revised)
Safe Working at Ro-Ro Terminals
The International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC) (under revision)
Safety Audit System for Ports
Loading and Unloading of Solid Bulk Cargoes (revised)
The Role of the Independent Marine Surveyor in Assisting Claims
Handling (revised)
Substance Abuse
Safe Use of Textile Slings
Shore Ramps and Walkways (under revision)
Port State Control
Safe Handling of Interlocked Flats (under revision)
Unseen Dangers in Containers (under revision)
Stow it right
Suspension Trauma
Safe Handling of Forest Products
Safe use of Road Vehicle Twistlocks
An Illustrated Guide to Container Type and Size Codes
Safe Handling of Dangerous Bulk Liquids and Gases at the Ship/Shore Interface
Safe Working with Pallets
Safe Handling of Logs from Water in British Columbia
Safe Handling of Tank Containers (joint publication with ITCO)
Safe Operation of Passenger Terminals
Safe Use of Cargo Strapping for Lifting Purposes
Safe Working with Reefer Containers
Container Top Safety (in final preparation)
Safe Lashing of Deck Containers (in final preparation)
Safe Operation of Straddle Carriers (in preparation)
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Semi-Automatic Twistlocks
Fumes in Ships Holds (revised)
Health & Safety Assessments in Ports (revised)
Container Top Safety, Lashing and Other Related Matters (to be replaced by BP#34
and BP#35)
Port & Terminal Accident Statistics (revised)
Safe Handling of Radioactive Materials in Ports and Harbour Areas (revised))
Ship Design Considerations for Stevedore Safety (revised)
Safe Walkways in Port & Terminal Areas
Personal Protective Equipment & Clothing
Back Pain
Lifting Persons at Work for Cargo Handling Purposes in the Port Industry
Whole Body Vibration
Lifting of Containers by Rubber Tyred Gantry Cranes
Lashing of Deck Containers
The International Safety Panel Technical/Operational Advice series consists of the following:
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General Series
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This publication is one of a series developed by the International Safety Panel ("Safety
Panel") of ICHCA International Limited ("ICHCA"). The series is designed to inform those
involved in the cargo-handling field of various practical health and safety issues. ICHCA
aims to encourage port safety, the reduction of accidents in port work and the protection of
port workers' health.
ICHCA prepares its publications according to the information available at the time of
publication. This publication does not constitute professional advice nor is it an exhaustive
summary of the information available on the subject matter to which the
publication refers. The publication should always be read in conjunction with the
relevant national and international legislation and any applicable regulations, standards and
codes of practice. Every effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information but neither
ICHCA nor any member of the Safety Panel is responsible for any loss, damage, costs or
expenses incurred (whether or not in negligence) arising from reliance on or interpretation of
the publication.
The comments set out in this publication are not necessarily the views of ICHCA or any
member of the Safety Panel
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or copied without ICHCA's
prior written permission. For information, contact ICHCA's registered office.
The International Safety Panel is composed of safety and training officers and
directors, transport consultants, representatives from leading safety and training
organisations, enforcement agencies, trade unions, insurance interests, institutions
and leading authorities on the subject area from around the world.
Mike Compton (Chairman), Circlechief AP, UK
John Alexander, UK
Meir Amar, Port of Ashdod, ISRAEL
Paul Auston, Checkmate UK Limited, UK
David Avery, Firefly Limited, UK
Peter Bamford, CANADA
Philip Beesemer, ECT, THE NETHERLANDS
Geoff Beesley, Newcastle Stevedores, AUSTRALIA
Didi Ould Biha, SAMMA, MAURITANIA
Christian Blauert, HHLA, GERMANY
Jan Boermans, DP World, THE NETHERLANDS
Mike Bohlman, Horizon Lines, USA (Deputy Chairman)
Roy Boneham, UK
Bill Brassington, UK
Jim Chubb, BMT Marine & Offshore Surveys Ltd (incorporating BMT Murray Fenton Limited) UK
Daniele Ciulli, Contshipitalia, Italy
Rob Dieda, SSA, USA
Trevor Dixon, WNTI, UK
Steve Durham, Trinity House, UK
Patricia Esquival, OPCSA, SPAIN
Margaret Fitzgerald, IRELAND
Pamela Fry, DP World, CANADA
Kirsty Goodwin, SAMSA, SOUTH AFRICA
Fabian Guerra, Fabian Guerra Associates, EQUADOR
Charles Haine, DP World, DUBAI
Harri Halme, Min. of Social Affairs & Health, Dept for Occupational Health & Safety, FINLAND
Trevor Harris, DP World, DUBAI
Les Heather, Drake International, UK
Geoff Holden, LEEA, UK
Lawrie Holman, DP World, DUBAI
Laurence Jones, TT Club, AUSTRALIA
Larry Keiman, Matrans Holding BV, THE NETHERLANDS
Henrik Kristensen, APM Terminals, THE NETHERLANDS
Fer van de Laar, IAPH, THE NETHERLANDS
Shimon Lior, Israel Ports, Development and Assets, ISRAEL
John Mace, International Group of P&I Clubs, UK
Jerome Marinier, Port of Le Havre, FRANCE
Richard Marks, Royal Haskoning, UK
Joachim Meifort, Hamburger Hafen-u Lagerhaus A-G, GERMANY
Marios Meletiou, ILO, SWITZERLAND
John Miller, Mersey Docks & Harbour Company, UK
Al le Monnier, ILWU, CANADA
Hannu Oja, Kone Cranes and PEMA, FINLAND
Manuel Ortuno, Lloyds Register, GERMANY
Nic Paines, Gordon, Giles & Coy Ltd, UK
Mick Payze, AUSTRALIA
Irfan Rahim, IMO, UK
Peter Rasmussen, BIMCO, DENMARK
Risto Repo, Accident Investigation Bureau of Finland, FINLAND
Raymond van Rooyan, SAPO, SOUTH AFRICA
Ambroise Sarr, Port of Dakar, SENEGAL
The above lists those persons who were members of the Panel when the pamphlet was
published. However, membership does change and a list of current members can always
be obtained from the ICHCA International Secretariat.
John Alexander
After obtaining a degree in chemical engineering at Imperial College in London, John
Alexander joined HM Factory Inspectorate in 1957. He worked for the Inspectorate and the
Health and Safety Executive in England and Scotland for over 36 years. For the last eight of
those years he had a national responsibility for matters relating to the inspection of docks
and inland waterways.
Since his retirement from the Health and Safety Executive in 1995, he has continued to work
with the ports industry as a consultant.
He has been a founder member of the ICHCA International Safety Panel since it was set up
in 1990.
Page
Introduction
The ship
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
Hull stresses
Contributory factors
Angle of repose
Cargoes which may liquefy
Moisture content
Flow moisture point
Transportable moisture limit
Stowage factor
Terminal procedures
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
7
8
9
10
10
11
12
General
Information exchange prior to cargo handling
The loading or unloading plan
The ship/shore safety checklist
General loading and unloading procedures
Loading procedures
Unloading procedures
13
Dusty cargoes
13
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
13
13
13
14
10
11
Dust sources
Health hazards from dust
Environmental hazards from dust
Control of dust
16
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
16
17
17
17
General
Cargo products
Fumigation
Asphyxiation
Flammable cargoes
18
10.1
10.2
18
19
General
Hot work
20
Appendix 1
Selected Incidents
21
Appendix 2
References
24
ISBN: 978-1-85330-096-7
First Published: 1998
Revised:
2010
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Every year some six billion tonnes of solid bulk cargoes pass through the
worlds ports. Although the hazardous properties of some of the cargoes are
well known, other cargoes are not dangerous cargoes in the generally
accepted sense. However, this does not mean that there are no hazards
associated with the loading and unloading of such solid bulk cargoes.
Whether or not the cargo itself is recognised as being dangerous, there may
be hazards to the port personnel who carry out the cargo handling operation,
to people nearby, or to the crew of the ship while it is in the port or at sea.
1.2
In the last twenty years there has been increasing concern at the number of
bulk carriers that have been lost at sea and the associated loss of life. In
opening the 68th session of the International Maritime Organizations (IMO)
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) at the end of May 1997, the Secretary
General, Mr William ONeil, reported that 99 bulk carriers had been lost
together with more than 600 lives since 1990. Although the number of losses
has reduced, they still occur and lives continue to be lost. 66 bulk carriers
were lost in the ten years from 2000 to 2009 with the loss of 242 lives. 95% of
these losses were of vessels more than 15 years old and 77% were of
vessels of more than 20 years old. 71% of these losses were to handy sized
vessels
1.3
The IMO Code of Practice for the Safe Loading and Unloading of Bulk
Carriers (the BLU Code) was approved by MSC and adopted by the 20th
Assembly of IMO in November 1997. The IMO Assembly urged IMO member
Governments to implement the Code at the earliest possible opportunity and
to introduce relevant port byelaws. Although the Code is not mandatory, one
region of the world, the European Union, has already made it mandatory. The
Code emphasises the need for co-operation between ship and cargo terminal
personnel to ensure the safety of all who may be affected by their actions.
This is more likely to be achieved if those involved with the handling of solid
bulk cargoes are aware of at least the main hazards associated with the
cargoes and the possible consequences of the hazards to themselves and
others.
1.4
In view of the need for cooperation between ship and shore personnel and
the fact that many shore personnel were not seafarers, it was considered by
IMO that the BLU Code should be supplemented by a manual for terminal
representatives. The manual is intended to explain the need for such
cooperation and draw attention to the possible consequences of some
actions. The BLU Manual on Loading and Unloading of Solid Bulk Carriers
was approved by MSC in May 2005 and circulated as MSC/Circ.1160 before
being published by IMO in 2008. A number of ammendments to the Code and
the Manual were approved by MSC in May 2010 and published as Annex 25
to MSC 87/26 and MSC.1/Circ.1356.
1.5
The BLU Code and the BLU Manual for Terminal Representatives
complement the IMO International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code (the
IMSBC Code), which is replacing the IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid
Bulk Cargoes (the BC Code) which was first published in 1965. The IMSBC is
now in force on a voluntary basis and will become mandatory under SOLAS
1
1.7
A number of incidents associated with the loading and unloading of solid bulk
carriers are described in Appendix 2.
1.8
The production of this booklet has only been possible with the co-operation
and assistance of a number of persons in the shipping and ports industries,
not least the members of the ICHCA International Safety Panel. The
contributions of all concerned are gratefully acknowledged.
2.1
Bulk carriers are ships which are generally built with a single deck, topside
tanks and hopper side tanks in cargo spaces and are intended primarily to
carry dry cargo in bulk. They include such types as ore carriers or
combination carriers. There has been some debate on the interpretation of
the definition of the term bulk carrier in SOLAS. Consequently, IMO adopted
Resolution MSC.277(85) in November 2008 clarifying the term and giving
guidance on its application.
2.2
2.3
Mini bulk carriers. Bulk carriers of less than about 12,000 dwt. These
are often used in the coastal and short sea trades.
Canal. The term is generally used to refer to bulk carriers in the range
50,000 to 80,000 dwt; their average is about 65,000 dwt.
Post Panamax bulk carriers. Bulk carriers in the range 50,000 to
92,500 dwt.
Cape-sized bulk carriers. Originally bulk carriers that were too large to
pass through either the Panamas or Suez Canals in the range 80,000
to 180,000 dwt. Since 1975 vessels of up to 150,000 dwt have been
able to transit the Suez Canal. Bulk carriers in the range 80,000 to
120,000 dwt may be referred to asbaby sized bulk carriers.
Very large bulk carriers (VLBCs). Bulk carriers over 180,000 dwt.
These terms are only approximate and different sources quote somewhat
different figures, particularly for handy-sized bulk carriers.
2.4
Combination carriers. Bulk carriers that may carry solid or liquid bulk
cargoes on different voyages but not both on the same voyage. These
may be ore/bulk/oil bulk carriers (OBOs) or ore/oil bulk carriers, (OOs).
Geared bulk carriers. Bulk carriers that have their own shipboard
cranes which can be used to load or unload the cargo when
necessary.
3.1
A solid bulk cargo is defined by IMO as meaning any cargo, other than a
liquid or gas, consisting of a combination of particles, granules or any larger
pieces of material, generally uniform in composition, which is loaded directly
into the cargo spaces of a ship without any intermediate form of containment.
3.2
Many different types of materials and products are carried by sea as solid
bulk cargoes. These range from natural minerals and ores, including coal,
rock phosphate, iron ore and iron ore concentrates, through manufactured
products and scrap metal, to ammonium nitrate and other fertilisers, grain,
pulses, sugar and other agricultural products. The largest quantities carried
are coal, mineral ores and concentrates, grain and other agricultural bulk
products.
3.3
Clarkson Research Services reported that over three billion tonnes of solid
bulk cargo were shipped worldwide during 2008. The cargoes included:
Million
tonnes
Iron ore
Coal
Grain
Agricultural bulk cargoes
Cement
Fertilisers
Bauxite / Alumina
843
797
316
113
105
95
86
As these cargoes had to be handled at both the loading and unloading ports,
the quantities handled at ports were double these figures and totalled over six
billion tonnes.
3.4
Many of the more common solid bulk cargoes carried by sea are listed in
Appendices A, B and C of the IMSBC Code.
Appendix B lists materials which are carried in bulk and are known to
possess chemical hazards that could give rise to a dangerous situation
on board ship. Some of these materials may be transported as
packaged goods and are also classified as dangerous goods in The
International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (the IMDG Code). In
these cases the individual IMDG schedules include a reference to the
IMSBC Code.
4.1
The hazards associated with the transport of solid bulk cargoes may be
considered under three headings:
Other relevant properties. These may include the possibility that the
cargo may decompose or react with atmospheric moisture or oxygen
to produce toxic or flammable gases or to reduce the oxygen content
in a hold or accessway below the respirable level. Other relevant
properties include the ability to liquefy and the angle of repose. These
properties can affect the behaviour of the cargo during a voyage and
so the stability and ultimately the safety of a ship and those aboard
her.
Although this division of hazards can be made, it is not rigid and some
hazards may be included under all three headings.
4.3
The most common hazards associated with the loading and unloading of solid
bulk cargoes are discussed in more detail in sections 5 to 11.
THE SHIP
5.1
Hull stresses
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
Chapter XII requires bulk carriers that were built before 1 July 1999 and are
carrying a solid bulk cargo with a density of 1780 kg/ m3 or more to have
undergone an enhanced programme of inspection or for all their cargo holds
or to have undergone a survey to the same extent as would be required by an
enhanced programme of inspection. Bulk carriers that were built before 1 July
1999 and are carrying cargoes of solid bulk cargoes with a density of more
tham 1,000 kg/ m3 but less than 1,780 kg/ m3 are required to have undergone
an enhanced programme of inspection by the date of their first periodical
5
5.1.6
A solid equilateral triangle, with sides of 500 mm and its apex 300mm below
the deck line that is marked amidships in a contrasting colour to that of the
hull on both sides of a bulk carrier of single side skin construction that was
built before 1 July 1999, indicates that there are restrictions on the distribution
of the cargo between the holds or on the maximum deadweight of the ship
when carrying solid bulk cargo with a density of 1780 kg/ m3 or more.
5.1.7
5.2
Contributory factors
5.2.1 A number of factors relating to the stowage of solid bulk cargoes may be
relevant to the potential over-stressing of the hull of a ship and so relevant to
the safety of seafarers when the ship is at sea.
5.2.2
Terminal staff should be aware of these factors and their significance in order
to understand the possible consequences of their actions when loading or
unloading solid bulk cargo from a bulk carrier.
5.3
Angle of Repose
5.3.1 The angle of repose is the maximum angle between a horizontal plane and
the side of a cone of a free flowing granular material. If such material is
stowed above its angle of repose it will be unstable and likely to move under
the influence of vibration or the motion of a ship. This could lead to instability
and ultimately to the loss of the ship. Appendix 2.2 of the IMSBC Code sets
out test procedures to determine the angle of repose.
5.4
5.4.1
A cargo that may liquefy is a cargo that contains a certain proportion of fine
particles and a certain amount of moisture, usually water, although the cargo
may not appear to be visibly wet. Such a cargo may become a slurry and
behave in the same way as a liquid if it is shipped with a moisture content
above its transportable moisture limit. Appendix 2.1 of the IMSBC Code sets
out test procedures for materials that may liquefy. The test should be carried
out on a representative sample of the cargo in the condition in which it will be
loaded. Normally the test should be made shortly before loading as the
6
Moisture content
5.5.1
5.6
5.6.1
The flow moisture point is the percentage moisture content, on a wet mass
basis, at which a flow state developes under prescribed test conditions in a
representative sample of the material.
5.7
5.7.1
The transportable moisture limit of a cargo that may liquefy is the maximum
moisture content of the cargo (expressed as a percentage) which is
considered safe for carriage in ships which are not specially constructed or
fitted to carry that cargo above its transportable moisture limit. Cargoes
having a moisture content in excess of their transportable moisture limit may
only be carried in specially constructed cargo ships or in specially fitted cargo
ships. It should be noted that the transportable moisture limit of a granular
material will always be less than its flow moisture point.
5.8
Stowage factor
5.8.1
The stowage factor of a solid bulk cargo is the number equal to the number of
cubic metres which one tonne of the cargo will occupy. A cargo with a
density of 1000 kg/ m3 (the nominal density of water, 62.4 lb/ft3 ) has a
stowage factor of 1 and a cargo with a density of 1780 kg/ m3 (the
approximate density of iron ore, about 111.1 lb/ft3 ) has a stowage factor of
0.56.
TERMINAL PROCEDURES
6.1
General
6.1.1
Although the Master of a ship is primarily responsible for the safety of the ship
and its crew and shore side employers are primarily responsible for the safety
of their employees and others who will be affected by their actions, they
cannot work in isolation. In a port their activities and interests necessarily
overlap and each may be affected by the activities of the other. Therefore, it
is essential that not only are they aware of the potential consequences of
following incorrect practices but also that they liaise closely, so that correct
procedures are followed to ensure safe and efficient cargo handling
operations.
6.1.2
The interaction of stresses imposed on the hull of a ship by bulk cargo and
ballast water at the different stages of cargo handling operations should also
be clearly understood by terminal staff, as well as by the ships officers. It is
essential that the terminal staff appreciate the reasons why it is necessary for
cargo and ballast handling rates to be harmonised. Terminal staff need to
accept that if the handling rates of cargo and ballast get out of step, it may be
necessary for one or the other to be adjusted or temporarily suspended at the
request of either the Master or the terminal supervisor.
6.1.4
Charterers and ship owners should allocate ships to terminals at which the
ship will be capable of being loaded or unloaded safely. All terminal
equipment should be properly maintained and reqularly examined and
certified as appropriate. At loading terminals, loading equipment should be
provided with cargo weighing devices which are regularly calibrated, well
maintained and are accurate to within 1% of the rated quantity required over
the full normal range of loading rates. The weighing devices should be
suitably positioned, preferably where they can be easily read by both ship and
shore personnel. Where practicable the weighing devices should be able to
provide the necessary information continuously. As a minimum, they should
at least be able to provide the information at each step of the loading plan.
6.1.5
All personnel loading and unloading solid bulk cargoes should be trained
appropriately for the work they are to carryout and be aware of the potential
consequences of failure to follow correct procedures for seafarers and
others..
6.1.6
All solid bulk cargo handling operations should be carried out in accordance
with the BLU Code.
6.1.7
6.2
6.2.1
6.2.2
The BLU Code recommends that the necessary basic information that is
needed should be published in port and/or terminal information books.
Appendix 1 of the BLU Code lists the recommended contents of these books,
which include cargo handling rates. The relevant book, or books, should be
given to Masters of ships before they arrive at the port or terminal. If this is not
possible, the books should be given to the Master on arrival.
6.2.3
Before a ship is loaded with a solid bulk cargo, information about the cargo
and its properties will be needed. This will include its relevant chemical or
other special properties and may include its density, stowage factor, angle of
repose, trimming procedures and any additional certificates that may be
necessary. A recommended layout of a form for cargo information in the BLU
Code as Appendix 5 has now bwwn replaced by the form in section 4.2.3 of
the IMSBC Code. If the declared density of the cargo is in the range from
8
Before the ship is loaded it should be confirmed that it is suitable for the
intended cargo, holds the necessary certificates, and complies with the
relevant requirements of chapter XII of SOLAS. The certificates should
remain valid for the expected duration of the voyage and the discharge of the
ship at its destination. If the cargo is to be solid dangerous goods in bulk and
the ship was built on or after 1 September 1984 (1 February 1992 if the ship
is of less than 500 gross tonnes), the certificates should include a document
of compliance. If the cargo is to be grain, the certificates should include a
document of authorisation.
6.2.5
In order to ensure that cargo handling operations are carried out in a safe
controlled manner they need to be properly planned and the procedures
agreed by both the ship and the terminal. This should be by the preparation
and agreement of the loading or unloading plan and the completion of the
ship/shore safety checklist by both parties as required by the BLU Code.
6.2.6
The information exchanged should include the action to be taken in the event
of foreseeable emergencies. This should include the agreed means of
communication, any signal that may need to be given and the action to be
taken on hearing it.
6.3
6.3.1
The ship should prepare a cargo loading or unloading plan to cover all stages
of the loading or unloading and deballasting or ballasting. In many cases this
will involve calculating bending moments and shear forces to ensure that any
permissible maxima are not exceeded at any stage of the cargo handling
operations. The terminal should provide the ship with any necessary
information to enable the plan to be prepared. The plan should be in a form
such as that in Appendix 2 of the BLU Code. A different form may be used
provided it contains all the essential information required by the Code. This is
the information that is enclosed by the heavy line in the form in Appendix 2 of
the Code. Appendix 2 also includes worked examples of the completed form.
The completed plan should be agreed by ship and terminal representatives
and copies of it kept by both parties. Loading plans should be kept for at
least six months. In addition, a copy of the agreed loading or unloading plan,
and any later amendments to it, should be lodged with the appropriate
authority of the port state.
6.3.2
In developing the loading plan the total loading time to be agreed needs to
take into account the safe operational limits of both the ship and the terminal.
At a terminal with the capability of high nominal loading rates, the total time
for loading may need to be extended to allow time for the necessary steps to
be taken to keep the structural stresses in the vessel within permissible limits.
Time should also be allowed for any trimming that may be necessary.
6.3.3
Once the loading or unloading plan has been agreed, it is important that the
cargo handling operations are carried out in accordance with the plan and
that any deviation from it that may later be found to be necessary is agreed in
advance by both parties. In particular the cargo handling rates and ballast
9
6.4.1
A ship/shore safety check list should be completed jointly by the Master and
the terminal representative before cargo handling operations begin. This will
formally confirm that appropriate consideration has been given to the most
important matters that may affect the safety of the cargo handling operation.
The checklist at Appendix 3 of the BLU Code contains 21 items. These may
be supplemented by any additional items that may be considered necessary.
The checklist is accompanied by helpful guidelines for its completion in
Appendix 4 of the Code.
6.4.2
The checklist should be completed jointly by the ship and terminal staff. This
will help them to be aware of any potential problems and, if the problems
cannot be eliminated, to plan for them in advance.
6.4.3
6.4.4
When all questions on the checklist have been satisfactorily completed, the
checklist should be signed by authorised representatives of the ship and
shore and copies retained by both parties.
6.5
6.5.1
6.5.2
At all times the cargo handling and ballast pumping rates should be kept
within the agreed rates specified in the loading or unloading plan.
6.5.3
6.5.4
6.5.5
Personnel on the ship and terminal should be alert at all times to hazards to
themselves and others that may arise during cargo handling operations.
Hazards may include the fall of cargo in a hold or from grabs, conveyors and
other cargo handling equipment, slipping on cargo spillage, dust, and any
chemical hazards of the cargo. People should never stand below cargo
handling operations and whenever practicable there should be no access to
the working side of the main deck during cargo handling operations. Those
10
No hot work should be carried out on the ship at any time while it is at the
berth without the permission of the Master and the terminal representative.
Permission from the port authority or other local authority may also be
necessary (see section 10.2).
6.5.7
6.6
Loading procedures
6.6.1
The agreed loading pland should include the nominal loading rate, the
number of pours and the total time for loading, allowing for any pauses that
may be necessary to keep stresses on the ship within the relevant limits and
for any trimming pours that may be necessary. It is recommended that
loading of each hold should should be by at least two pours plus two trim
pours.
6.6.2
Care should be taken to ensure that excessive stresses are not imposed on
the tank top of a hold and associated structure of a ship. This is particularly
likely with high density cargo and cargo loaded by large grabs. Special care
should be taken at the beginning of the loading of each hold. Damage may
well result if high free-fall drops are permitted, particularly drops of large
lumps. In addition, large clouds of dust are likely to be produced. In order to
reduce stresses on the vessel it is recommended that the loading consist of at
least two pours per hold and, when trimming is necessary, two trim pours.
6.6.3
The quantity of cargo that has been loaded into a hold and the rate of loading
should be checked periodically in order to ensure that the loading plan is
being followed and to avoid over-stressing the ship.
6.6.4
Both the ships officer and the terminal representative in control of the loading
operation should be aware of the quantity of cargo that may be on the
conveyor belts of the loading system if a stop signal is given by the ship. This
may be particularly relevant during the final pour into a hold and any trimming
operations carried out by the loading system.
6.6.5
Care should be taken to ensure that ballast water being discharged does not
flood the quay or an adjacent craft.
6.6.6
The terminal representative should advise the Master of any change to the
agreed loading rate.
6.6.7
6.6.8
When required, the loaded cargo should be trimmed in accordance with the
IMSBC Code or the International Grain Code as appropriate. Conveyor
system run-off should be allowed for when trimming operations are carried
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Topping off of the cargo in a hold may be needed. Before this is done, it may
be necessary for a further draught survey to be made and for bending
moment and stress calculations to be carried out by a ships officer. It is
essential that sufficient time for these important operations to be carried out is
allowed by the terminal. If it is not, the ship may be overloaded and the
Master refuse to sail until remedial action has been taken.
6.7
Unloading procedures
6.7.1
The quantity of cargo that has been unloaded should be checked periodically
to ensure that the unloading plan is being followed in order to avoid overstressing the ship.
6.7.2
The terminal representative should advise the Master of any change to the
agreed unloading rate.
6.7.3
The Master of the ship should inform the terminal representative of any
obstacles in the holds that may be encountered during unloading. These may
include tank covers or container fittings on the tank top of a multi purpose
ship.
6.7.4
If grabs are used for unloading, care should be taken to avoid damage to the
ship. The coamings, frames, bulkheads and tank top are the areas most
frequently damaged. Particular care needs to be taken to avoid damage to
the tank top by the grab during the later stages of unloading.
6.7.5
6.7.6
Cargo residues should only be left in holds with the agreement of the Master,
for example when the ship is to carry a further cargo of the same commodity.
Increasing problems are being experienced by ships in disposing of residues
of cargoes left in holds without causing pollution.
6.7.7
6.7.8
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7.1
A number of the materials that are listed in Appendix B of the IMSBC Code do
not present significant hazards when transported in packaged form but
present hazards requiring special precautions to be taken when they are
transported in bulk. These precautions are included in the individual
schedules in Appendix B of the IMSBC Code. Similar precautions are also
likely to be required in connection with any bulk storage of the materials at
ports. Such materials, are often referred to as materials hazardous only in
bulk (MHB). They include coal, unslaked lime, petroleum coke, woodchips
and sawdust.
DUSTY CARGOES
8.1
Dust sources
8.1.1
Whenever pieces of solid bulk cargo move against each other, abrasion is
likely to result in the formation of dust. The production of at least some dust
is therefore almost inevitable when solid bulk cargoes are handled. This dust
is most likely to enter the atmosphere when cargo drops from one height to
another. Examples of when this may occur include the dropping of cargo
from the side of a hopper, from one conveyor to another, into a hold from a
grab, spout or the back of a truck when it is tipped, or when a wall of residual
material collapses from a bulkhead or between the frames of a ship.
8.2
8.2.1
8.2.2
Even if a dust is not toxic, it may still be harmful tending to clog airways of the
lungs and so be a health hazard. Personal exposure to all dust should be
minimised so far as is reasonably practicable. Unless there is an indication of
the need for a lower value, it is generally accepted that in the absence of a
specific exposure limit for a particular dust, the occupational personal
exposure to dust should be kept below a level of 10 mg/m3 total inhalable
dust and 5 mg/m3 respirable dust, time weighted average over a period of
eight hours. In practice dust levels associated with the handling of solid bulk
cargoes may be many times this figure. Levels of almost 500 mg/m3 have
been measured in the holds of ships.
8.3
8.3.1
Dust may pollute both the aquatic and the atmospheric environment and
increasing public concern and attention is being paid to both. The most
effective controls in both cases are those applied at source. One source of
water pollution may be the sweeping or washing of spilt cargo or cargo
residues from the decks of ships or quays.
8.3.2
Most ports have emergency plans to deal with spillages. Originally these
tended to deal only with oil spills but in ports where solid bulk cargoes are
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8.4
Control of dust
8.4.1
Whilst users of materials often have the option of substituting less dusty or
hazardous materials, this option is seldom available to those in the transport
chain as they generally have to handle the materials that arrive at their
premises or are specified by their customers.
8.4.2
Many solid bulk cargoes are stockpiled in the open air and are exposed to
rain. These can be damped down by water sprays when necessary. This
may be to prevent dispersion by wind during dry weather or to control the
generation of dust when necessary at particular locations, such as transfer
points. However, this option is not available for many solid bulk cargoes
which have to be kept dry to prevent deterioration or damage.
8.4.3
Ideally, all dusty materials should be handled in closed systems to prevent the
escape of dust and to protect the material from the weather if necessary.
Enclosed solid bulk cargo handling systems are widely available and
becoming more flexible. Such systems are not only available for large scale
handling operations but also increasingly available for small scale operations.
Systems may include mobile equipment that can be moved from quay to
quay. However where full enclosure of the plant is not practicable,
considerable reductions in dust levels are possible by identifying the
operations most likely to generate dust and enclosing them as far as is
practicable. If the dust is potentially flammable, enclosures should include
appropriate precautions in connection with the possible generation of static
electricity and other explosion hazards. This may include the provision of
appropriate explosion relief and electrical bonding.
8.4.4
Little dust, apart from potential stripping due to wind, is likely to be produced
by cargo travelling along a conveyor until the conveyor discharges onto
another conveyor or other piece of equipment. The dust generated at the
transfer point can be minimised by keeping the distance of fall as small as
possible and enclosing the transfer point.
8.4.5
8.4.6
Tipping solid bulk cargo directly from a truck into the hold of a ship should be
avoided. Not only will this be likely to generate a considerable quantity of
dust but it is also likely to load only the near side of the ship and result in the
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8.4.8
8.4.9
Once again dust can be reduced by minimising the distance that cargo falls
from a grab when it is opened. This is a matter directly under the control of
management and operators. If the grab discharges into a hopper, the design
of the hopper can include an extraction system to control dust. However, this
will be ineffective unless the grab is opened in the designed location in the
mouth of the hopper. Dust from hoppers can also be reduced by the
incorporation of water spray or baffle systems where appropriate.
8.4.10 Dust control equipment will only work efficiently if it is properly maintained and
cleaned regularly in accordance with the manufacturers instructions. When
working on dust control equipment that has operated in connection with
potentially flammable dust, special attention should be paid to the possible
explosion risks and particular care taken before any hot work is carried out.
8.4.11 If cargo is only unloaded from the centre of a hold, high walls of cargo can be
formed around the area being worked. In due course, these may either
collapse of their own accord or need to be knocked down. In either case
when they fall they are liable to release considerable quantities of dust. So
far as is practicable, cargo should be unloaded evenly across a hold to
minimise the distance of fall of surrounding cargo and the dust generated by
such falling cargo.
8.4.12 An unfortunate factor of the economics of the transport industry is that any
dust extracted during handling at a port is part of the cargo and the property
of the customer and so is normally added back to the cargo. This means that
it causes further problems to everyone else who has to handle the cargo
further along the transport chain. Clearly this is a matter which would benefit
from some new thinking within the industry.
8.4.13 Although it is possible to reduce dust emissions at a number of points, it is not
possible to eliminate them all. From time to time, it will continue to be
necessary for some persons to work in areas where there are high
concentrations of dust. In some cases it is feasible to enclose operators and
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9.1
General
9.1.1
Toxic, or poisonous, and corrosive cargoes are all cargoes which are
hazardous to health. This may be by contact, for example quicklime, by
swallowing (ingestion) or breathing in (inhalation).
9.1.2
9.1.3
9.1.4
9.1.5
9.1.6
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9.2
Cargo products
9.2.1
Some solid bulk cargoes that are non hazardous of themselves, may be liable
to give rise to hazardous substances. Such hazardous substances are
usually gases and may be the result of decomposition or bacteriological
action. They may only be produced slowly but can build up to dangerous
levels in unventilated holds overnight or by the end of a voyage. In such
cases it is particularly important that proper procedures are followed before
there is entry into cargo holds or accessways (see section 11). Examples of
bulk cargoes that may give rise to toxic products that have led to many
fatalities include coal, bark, copra, fishmeal and even some types of wet fish.
9.3
Fumigation
9.3.1
9.4
Asphyxiation
9.4.1
Asphyxiation may occur due to the lack of oxygen in the atmosphere or the
cutting off of the supply of oxygen to a person.
9.4.2
Many people have been killed on board ships after entering unventilated
enclosed spaces that had a reduced oxygen content. The most insidious
cause of reduced oxygen levels is the rusting of the structure of the ship itself.
Another common cause is the oxidation of the cargo using oxygen from the
atmosphere in the hold. Cargoes particularly prone to oxidation include pig
iron, wood chips and bark. Oxygen depletion in holds, accessways and other
enclosed spaces is a particularly insidious hazard and all people who enter
these spaces need to be continually alert to it (see section 11).
9.4.3
The most common material to cause asphyxiation is water but people can
also be drowned in dry materials such as grain and other free-flowing
granular materials into which a person can sink. As far as practicable entry
onto such cargo into which a person can sink should be avoided. Where it is
necessary, the person should wear a harness attached to a life line and be
17
General
10.1.1 Some solid bulk cargoes are flammable and a number, such as sulphur, can
be ignited during cargo handling operations. Common sources of ignition
include sparks produced by a steel blade or bucket striking another metal
object such as a frame in a hold of a ship or an elevator enclosure. Dust
clouds of particles of flammable cargoes may be explosive. Some cargoes,
including coal, may be liable to self heat.
10.1.2 In addition to solid bulk cargoes which are themselves flammable, some
cargoes, such as coal and charcoal, are liable to self heating and even
spontaneous combustion. The risk of this may be increased by the cargo
being wet or by bacteriological action. Wetting or bacteriological action may
also lead to the evolution of flammable decomposition products.
10.1.3 If there is a likelihood of a build up of flammable gases in a hold it is essential
that the hold is fully ventilated before any electrical equipment, other than
appropriately explosion protected electrical equipment, is switched on. This
may mean the ventilation of the hold by natural ventilation rather than by the
use of non explosion protected ventilation equipment.
10.1.4 The movement of some dry solid bulk cargoes can generate static electricity
which can build up to provide a source of ignition. When cargo which can
give rise to flammable dust is to be handled, it is essential that the cargo
handling equipment to be used is designed to ensure that such dangerous
levels of static cannot build up. This many be by electrical boding to prevent
statid discharges.
10.1.5 Dust on electrical equipment can thermally insulate the equipment leading to
the build up of heat. This may raise the temperature of dust deposits on it
above their auto-ignition temperature and result in a fire or explosion.
Consequently, electrical equipment which is necessarily installed in potentially
dusty locations should be constructed to be suitable for such service.
10.1.6 Many items of plant for handling solid bulk cargoes are enclosed. This may
itself lead to dangers and where necessary such plant should be provided
with suitable explosion protection equipment or explosion relief that vents into
a safe place.
10.1.7 When dust explosions occur the major damage is often caused by the
secondary explosion of dust blown up from surrounding floors, equipment and
ledges in a building by the initial primary explosion. Therefore, it is essential
that all installations associated with the loading and unloading of flammable
solid bulk cargoes maintain a high degree of cleanliness to minimise the risk
of secondary explosions.
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Hot work
10.2.1 Hot work is the use of open fires, flames or other work involving the
application of heat by means of tools or equipment. This includes the
unintentional application of heat by the use of power tools or hot rivets, or the
falling of hot particles from cutting or welding operations. These may ignite
flammable materials, including gases or vapours, below or near the work.
10.2.2 Hot work is frequently carried out in connection with maintenance or voyage
repair operations but may also be carried out in connection with cargo
handling operations. An example is the fitting and removal of temporary
guide bars to the edges of hatch covers to prevent the falls of grabs snagging
on cleats.
10.2.3 Although the Master has the primary responsibility for the safety of operations
on his ship, many port and/or terminal authorities have byelaws, other legal
requirements, or rules relating to hot work. Hot work should therefore only be
carried out on ships in a port with the permission of both the Master and the
relevant shore authorities. Such work usually needs to be carried out in
accordance with a permit to work system which specifies the precautions to
be taken.
10.2.4 Before any hot work is carried out it is essential that all flammable material is
removed from the proposed work area. If the hot work includes work on a
bulkhead, the area on the opposite side of the bulkhead or any space
adjacent to it, including spaces above, below or diagonal to it, which may be
affected by the hot work, must also be cleaned. In addition to ensuring that
appropriate fire fighting equipment is available during the work, it is essential
that checks are made after the work has been completed to ensure that no
smouldering material remains at the work site or in any adjacent spaces.
Many fires caused by smouldering residues break out several hours after
those who carried out the work have left.
10.2.5 Particular care should be taken before undertaking hot work on combination
carriers that have previously carried flammable liquid cargoes. Although the
holds may have been certified as being gas free before loading a solid bulk
cargo, residual flammable liquid may remain in pumps and pipelines. If such
a pump is later used to ballast a hold in order to complete the unloading of
solid bulk cargo, the residual flammable liquid will be pumped into the hold
and may give rise to a flammable atmosphere above the apparently
innocuous ballast water. If a combination carrier that last carried a flammable
liquid cargo has more than one ballast pump it is essential that all the pumps
are cleaned and certified gas free before dry bulk cargoes are carried.
10.2.6 The BLU Code requires combination carriers to give the following additional
information to terminals:
the date and place at which the last oil cargo was discharged
advice of the content of slop tanks and whether they are fully inerted
and sealed
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the date, place and name of the authority that issued the last gas free
certificate which includes the pipelines and pumps.
The guidelines for completing the ship/shore safety check list in the Code
include a reminder that the gas free certificate needs to relate to pipelines and
pumps as well as holds.
11 ENTRY INTO HOLDS AND OTHER ENCLOSED SPACES
11.1
11.2
11.3
Despite the well known hazards associated with entry into closed holds and
other enclosed spaces on board ships, accidents continue to occur from time
to time. All too often such accidents result in fatalities. Between November
1997 and October 2009 the Marine Accident Investigators International
Forum was notified of 101 incidents involving enclosed spaces on ships that
resulted in 93 deaths and 96 injuries of which 25 deaths and 20 injuries
related yo access to the hols of ships. In the event of such incidents it is
essential that the instinctive reaction to go to the help of those involved is
resisted until the alarm has been raised and anyone going to help has put on
suitable breathing apparatus. Rescue attempts by persons not wearing
breathing apparatus have often delayed and made more difficult the rescue
of the original victim and resulted in increased numbers of casualties.
11.4
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1.1
Between 1978 and July 1998, 425 bulk carriers were lost at sea together with
more than 1698 lives. Often there were no survivors so the exact cause of
the loss is not known but it is widely believed that the factors leading to many
of the losses included failure of the hull resulting from corrosion, damage
and/or over-stressing.
1.2
A 22 year old 145,000 tonne OBO loading iron ore at a terminal accidentally
overfilled a hold causing the ship to break her back and sink at the berth. As
a result the berth, which was one of only three at the terminal, was blocked
for several weeks. The overloading of the hold is believed to have been due
to a communication failure.
1.3
An 80,000 tonne bulk carrier loaded iron ore in a port with limited water
alongside and limited air draught under the loaders. The cargo was loaded in
alternate holds at a rate of up to 4,000 t/hr. When the ship was a quarter full
and a pour into No 1 hold had been in progress for some 45 minutes, the
intended simultaneous deballasting was delayed by a faulty valve. The Chief
Officer assisted in releasing the valve and on leaving the pipe tunnel 30
minutes later was surprised to find cargo still being loaded into No 1 hold. It
was found that the loading gauge had stopped working and the shore did not
know how much ore had been loaded. A rough draught survey indicated that
some 2000 tonnes more than intended had been loaded into No 1 hold. As
excessive negative trim and the limited air draught prevented loading No 9
hold, loading of No 7 hold was started and the aft tanks ballasted until the
loader could move to No 9 hold. When the ship was fully loaded on an even
keel, the additional weight in No 1 hold was counterbalanced by the cargo in
No 9 hold and reduced loads in Nos 3, 5, and 7 holds but the ship had a
severe hog and the calculated at sea bending moment was 104% of
allowable. As the ship cleared the berth, the centre double bottom and wing
tanks were ballasted bringing the stresses to just within sea limits but the
tropical marks were still submerged. As the ship sailed in this condition, it
was fortunate that the weather was favourable throughout the voyage so that
a decision as to whether to be overloaded or over-stressed did not have to be
made. Clearly the shore should have stopped loading when the loading
gauge ceased working. The incident also underlines the need to adhere
strictly to an agreed loading plan and for efficient communication between
ship and shore personnel to be maintained throughout cargo handling.
[Mars report 97011]
1.4
A bulk carrier of some 40,000 tonnes, which was to pass through the Panama
Canal during her loaded voyage, was loaded with coal at a terminal. However
the quantity of coal loaded was such that the ships loaded draught was more
than that permitted by the Canal Authority. The loading terminal had no
discharge facilities to rectify the situation. The ship was therefore delayed for
three days awaiting the arrival of a crane barge which was able to lighten her.
1.5
A 20 year old 127,000 tonne bulk carrier loaded 120,000 tonnes of iron ore.
Shortly after sailing the ship sought shelter at an anchorage and spent two
weeks carrying out repairs which were reported to include the welding of
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Fumigation
2.1
2.2
A cargo of grain was being loaded into the hold of a ship from trucks via two
mobile conveyors. A pesticide in a solvent carrier was applied to the grain on
the conveyors. After only a quarter of an hour, three stevedores trimming the
cargo in the hold were taken ill and taken to hospital. In this case it was the
solvent carrier, rather than the pesticide, that was believed to be the cause of
the illness. All three men involved had been wearing positive powered air
filtering helmets but the filters provided no protection against the solvent
vapours.
Asphyxiation
3.1
Two dock workers were killed when they went down an access hatch to go
into a hold of copra. Later tests indicated that the oxygen content was some
10%, well below the minimum level necessary to sustain life, let alone the
normal level of 20.8% in air. A carbon dioxide level of 8% and a carbon
monoxide level of 3000 parts per million were also measured.
3.2
Five stevedores entered the hold of a bulk carrier before the hatches were
opened. Much of the cargo of maize in the hold had started to germinate
during the voyage depleting the oxygen in the hold. All five died due to the
oxygen deficiency.
3.3
4.1
4.2
After carrying a cargo of light crude oil, a 35,000 tonne OBO cleaned its tanks
and loaded a cargo of coal. On arrival at the discharge port it was necessary
to moor with the opposite side of the ship to the berth than usual. This
resulted in the cleats on the hatch covers being on the berth side of the ship
and being liable to foul on the falls of the unloading grab. Therefore,
temporary bars were welded to the edge of the nearside hatch covers to keep
the falls of the grab clear of the cleats. Before discharge of the coal could be
completed it was necessary to ballast Nos 2 and 6 holds to reduce the air
draught of the ship. When discharge was complete shore contractors were
instructed to cut off the temporary bars to allow the hatch covers to be closed
and the ship to sail. Permission for the hot work was obtained from the port
authority and, on condition that the hatches were closed, from the Master.
When the contractor was removing the bar from No 6 hold an explosion
occurred in the hold which inverted the 40 tonne hatch cover and killed two
men. Tests in No 2 hold later confirmed the presence of a flammable
atmosphere above the ballast water. It is believed that when the tanks were
cleaned and the pipelines stripped, the same one of the two cargo pumps
was used for all the operations but that the other pump was used to ballast
the two holds during discharge, so pumping the residual crude oil in the
second pumps associated pipeline into the two holds with the ballast water.
When pipelines on ships are cleaned, it is essential that all associated pumps
are also cleaned.
4.3
Fire broke out in a ship in a port during the unloading of a cargo of ammonium
nitrate in paper bags. Fire fighting action was unsuccessful and the ship was
abandoned. An explosion took place some 75 minutes later. The fire spread
to another ship which was also carrying ammonium nitrate. Some 600
persons were killed. Although this incident involved packaged ammonium
nitrate, ammonium nitrate is often carried in bulk. The incident occurred over
60 years ago but is still a salutary reminder of the hazards associated with the
transport and handling of solid bulk dangerous cargoes.
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