CITY OF MANILA VS IAC

FACTS:
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto.
Domingo and father of the litigating minors, died on June 4, 1971 and buried
on June 6, 1971 in Lot. No. 159, Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery whichlot
was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6,1971
to June 6, 2021. Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by
a receipt which appears to be regular on its face. The burial record for Block
No. 149 of Manila North Cemetery in which subject Lot. 159is situated does
not reflect the term of duration of the lease there over in favor of the St.
Domingo.On January 25, 1978, the subject Lot No. 159 of Block 194 in which
the mortal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo were laid to rest was
made ready for exhumation in accordance with Administrative Order No. 5,
Series of 1975, dated March 6, 1975. On the basis of such certification, the
authorities of the North Cemetery then headed by defendant Joseph Helmuth
authorized the exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains
of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo., placed the bones and skull in a bag
or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery.
Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so
when the Sto. Domingos went to said lot on All Souls Day they were shocked
and dismayed that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore
bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Irene Sto.
Domingo was told about the lease of the lot to another lessee and that she
can look for the bones of her deceased husband in the warehouse of the
cemetery where the exhumed remains from the different burial lots of the
North Cemetery are being kept until they are retrieved by interested parties.
What she was advised to do was simply unacceptable; hence, the bereaved
widow came to court for relief even before she could formally present her
claims and demands to the city government and to the other defendants
named in the present complaint. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
complainants. The decision was appealed to the CA which rendered a
decision modifying the decision appealed from. Petitioners alleged in their
petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use
or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW

City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is apolitical subdivision in
the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability
which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees.
Further Section 4, Article I of the Revised Charter of Manila exempts the city
from liability for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce
the provision of its charter or any other laws, or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board or any other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. They allege that the
Revised Charter of Manila being a special law cannot be defeated by the
Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code being a general law. Private
respondents on the other hand maintain that the City of Manila entered into a
contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with
private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can
be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.
ISSUE:
WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental,
or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila.
HELD:
Private respondents' are right. Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a
political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised byand through its city government in conformity
with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and
contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public,
governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and
proprietary on the other.
Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the
state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative,
judicial, public and political.

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Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and
advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private
and corporate.
In McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal
corporation proper has ... a public character as regards the state at large
insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it
is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community. In
connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire
property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary
capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public
use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates
the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works
for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all
other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to
proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be
held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto. The Court further
stressed that Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts
and in tort.... The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer
must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant
in the course or line of his employment, by which another who is free from
contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions
herein stated, fall within tile operation of this rule of law, and are liable
accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of
liability co-exist. ... The court added that while the following are corporate or
proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterworks, slaughter houses,
markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries and fisheries.
Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among
others, are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary
character. Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special
law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which
was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27,1903 and
January 7, 1904.

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW

The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City
Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves,
niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the
same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the
cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and
guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the
North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5,s. 1975. With the acts of
dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the
class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private
character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in
favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts
have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract
executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them.
Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to
damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract. As
regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No.159,
Block No. 195 of the North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6,1971
to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy
treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city government ,there is
nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the
trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt
is in itself a contract of lease.
GANZON VS CA
FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension
order by Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition for prohibition with
the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders. Ganzon
was faced with 10 administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of
authority and grave misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the
President) has the authority to suspend and remove local officials.
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RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation
authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to
proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of
disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.
In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to
suspend/remove) it was not because that the President cannot exercise it on
account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the
Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary
of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the
Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to
say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a
remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him
spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.
GREATER BALANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. MUNICIPALITY
OF BALANGA, BATAAN
G.R. No. 83987 December 27, 1994
Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the
public market in the Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is
registered in the name of Greater Balanga Development, Corp., owned
and controlled by the Camacho family. The lot was part of Lot 261-B,
formerly registered in the name of Aurora Banzon Camacho, which was
later subdivided into certain lots, some of which were sold, others

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW

donated. Five buyers of the lot filed a civil case against Camacho for
partition and delivery of titles.
Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of
the Mayor of Balanga but failed to mention the existence of the civil case
for partition and delivery of titles. The permit was granted the privilege of
a real estate dealer/privately-owned market operator. However, the
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed Resolution No. 12 s-88, annulling the
Mayor's permit issued to Petitioner, on the ground that the issue as to the
ownership of the lot caused anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among
the stallholders and traders in the lot, and advising the Mayor to revoke
the permit to operate a public market. The Mayor then revoked the
permit through EO No. 1 s-88.
Petitioner filed this petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction or restraining order and to reinstate the Mayor's
permit and to curtail the municipality's collection of market and entrance
fees from the lot occupants. He alleges that: 1) it didn't violate any law,
thus, there's no reason for revocation of the permit; 2) Respondents failed
to observe due process in the revocation; 3) the collection of market fees
is illegal.
On the other hand, Respondents assert that the Mayor as the local chief
executive has the power to issue, deny or revoke permits. They claim that
the revocation was due to the violation by Petitioner of Section 3A-06(b)
of the Balanga Revenue Code when it: 1) made false statement in the
application form, failing to disclose that the lot was subject to adverse
claims for which a civil case was filed; 2) failed to apply for 2 separate
permits for the 2 lines of business (real estate and public market).

Issue: WON the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid.

Held: NO.
The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi
juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the
municipality. The authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is premised on
a violation by the grantee of any of its conditions for its grant. For
revocation to be justified under the Balanga Revenue Code, there must
be: 1) proof of willful misrepresentation, and 2) deliberate intent to make
a false statement. Good faith is always presumed.
In this case, the application for Mayor's permit requires the applicant
to state the type of business, profession, occupation, privileges
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applied for. Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form. It is
only in the Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's lines of business
appear. Revocation is not justified because Petitioner did not make any
false statement therein.
Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a
ground for revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does
not expressly require two permits for their conduct of two or more
businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each
business. Granting, however, that separate permits are actually
required, the application form does not contain any entry as regards
the number of businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.

The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for
expansion of the Balanga Public Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't
actually maintain a public market on the area. Until expropriation
proceedings
are
instituted
in
court,
the
landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.

Of course, the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to
regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the
conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be
revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]), but the "anxiety, uncertainty,
restiveness" among the stallholders and traders doing business on a
property not owned by the Municipality cannot be a valid ground for
revoking the permit of Petitioner.

Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed
petitioner's right to due process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b)
of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation,
and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation. Moreover,
Respondent Municipality isn't the owner of Lot 261 B-6-A-3, and thus
cannot collect market fees, which only an owner can do.

JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA

Facts:
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes, is the presiding judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40. His salary and
representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn from the
budget of the Supreme Court. Besides that, petitioner also received a
monthly allowance of P944 from the local funds of the Municipality of Naujan
starting 1984.
On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved a
resolution increasing petitioner judges monthly allowance from P944
to P1,600 (an increase of P656) starting May 1993. This supplemental budget
was approved by the municipal government (the Municipal Mayor and
the Sangguniang Bayan) and was also likewise approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and Management of Oriental
Mindoro.
On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a
letter to the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing
them to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to
petitioner judge and to require the immediate refund of the amounts
previously paid to the latter. She reasoned that
the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in addition
to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court.
Petitioner judge appealed the matter to COA Regional Director Gregoria S.
Ong who, however, upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly
provide RATA to its Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the
Supreme Court.
Ruling:

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW

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Yes. Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,

provides:

The NCC No. 67 on the other hand, seeks to prevent the dual collection of
RATA by a national official from the budgets of more than one national
agency. It is in fact an administrative tool of the DBM to prevent the muchabused practice of multiple allowances, thus standardizing the grant of RATA
by national agencies. It was issued primarily to make the grant of RATA to
national officials under the national budget uniform. In other words, it applies
only to the national funds administered by the DBM, not the local funds of
LGUs.

(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants . . ., and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and
effective municipal government, and in this connection shall:

Now, though LBC No. 53 of the DBM may be considered within the ambit of
the President's power of general supervision over LGUs, the SC ruled that
Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof is invalid. RA 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991, clearly provides that provincial, city and municipal
governments may grant allowances to judges as long as their finances allow.
Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from
granting allowances to judges whenever such allowances are (1) also granted
by the national government or (2) similar to the allowances granted by the
national government, violates Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of the Local Government
Code of 1991. As already stated, a circular must conform to the law it seeks
to implement and should not modify or amend it. Moreover, by prohibiting
LGUs from granting allowances similar to the allowances granted by the
national government, Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53 practically prohibits LGUs
from granting allowances to judges and, in effect, totally nullifies their
statutory power to do so. Being unduly restrictive therefore of the statutory
power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and being violative of their
autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution, Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC
No. 53 is hereby declared null and void.

xxx
(xi) When the finances of the municipal government allow, provide for
additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public
elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials
stationed in or assigned to the municipality; (emphasis supplied)
Respondent COA, however, contends that the above section has been
repealed, modified or amended by NCC No. 67, RA 7645 (the General
Appropriations Act of 1993) and LBC No. 53. A review of the two laws,
however, shows that this was not so. Section 36 of RA 7645 merely provided
for the different rates of RATA payable to national government officials or
employees, depending on their position, and stated that these amounts were
payable from the programmed appropriations of the parent agencies to which
the concerned national officials or employees belonged. Furthermore, there
was no other provision in RA 7645 from which a repeal of Section 447(a) (l)
(xi) of RA 7160 could be implied. In the absence, therefore, of any clear
repeal of Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160, it cannot be presume to be such
intention on the part of the legislature.

Lidasan v. Comelec Digest

1.

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW

Facts:
Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang,
Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the
constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12
barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to

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the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries
of the two provinces.
2.

Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon

in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are
parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to

Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by
correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented
unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but
which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato is
unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the
second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title"
of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the
entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA
4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the
House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and,
which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated
in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title
which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del
Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is
there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated
in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur,"
read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive.
For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose
combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
5.

Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of
the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang
in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is
being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns
and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an

enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,

CAYEN CERVANCIA CABIGUEN, MLQU SCHOOL OF LAW

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