STAGES OF MODERNIZATION

IN LATIN AMERICA
Gino Germani
Harvard University

The Total Transition and

Its Component Processes
Modern-industrial society as a generic category is defined here in terms of secularization, that is: (a)
change in the predominant normative structure regulating social action and in the related internalized
attitudes and propensities (an extension of"action by
choice" over "action by prescription"); (b) growing
specialization of institutions and emergence of specialized and autonomous value systems in relation to
each institutional sphere; (c) growing institutionalization of change (over institutionalization of tradition).
The minimum universal requirement for the existence
of any modern-industrial society consists in the secularization of scientific knowledge, technology, and
economy, in such a way as to lead to the ever-increasing use of high energy and to the maximization of
efficiency in the production of goods and services
(Germani, 1960).

not accompanied by high energy use or increasing

technological efficiency. In the Industrial Revolution,
instead, the association was an historical fact to be
explained in terms of a unique and very long historical process which, once it had taken place, originated
a new cultural complex: modern-industrial society.
The process leading to the emergence of the first
historical case of this new type of society must be
distinguished from the great variety of forms of transition which occurred later in the process of its diffusion, adaptation, and transformation, first in some
Western societies, then in the rest of the world.

These traits may be regarded as a basic (although

generic) core of any industrial society, and also as
universal requirements for its existence and maintenance. However, beyond the institutional setting
required for the attainment of an increasing use of
high energy and an increasing efficiency in productive
technology, allowance must be made for a wide range
of structural variations, that is, for many divergent
types of industrial societies. Whether future evolution
will bring increasing homogenization or increasing
diversity is a question still open to discussion (Feldmann and Moore, 1962; Aron, 1965; Bendix, 1967).

The concern here is not with the great transition

prior to the emergence of the first historical instance
of industrial society, but with the many transitions
produced by the universal diffusion of the new
modern4ndustrial complex. From the point of view
of its empirical or historical occurrence, each of these
processes is a concrete totality. The complexity of
the process and the variations it has assumed under
different historical, cultural, social and economic conditions require that its analysis be conducted in terms
of various component processes. In this sense I shall
distinguish here three main component processes:
economic development, social modernization, and
political modernization. These distinctions are currently employed but the definitions implicitly or
explicitly used are not always clear, and in any case
are far from uniform among social scientists. For this
reason, some indication will be given as to the meanings assigned to the distinctions in the present context.

Although a certain degree of secularization (which

again may vary under different historical and sociocultural conditions) is a necessary condition for high
energy use and high efficiency in the production of
goods and services, it is not a sufficient one. There are
various instances of secularization not followed or

For the same analytic purposes each of the three

main processes should be perceived as composed of a
series of partial processes. In the present monograph, however, though mention will be made of
some components, this series of distinctions will not
be pursued further.

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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The main processes and their component subprocesses are interrelated, as is shown by the statistical correlations usually observed among them. But
such correlations are far from perfect, and should be
interpreted as no more than the expression of a
tendency for certain indicators to be associated. What
can be inferred from historical experience is that the
various subprocesses may occur at different rates and
in different sequences. Differences in the point of
departure of the transition and in the various internal
and international conditions under which the transition takes place may be responsible for such variations in rates and sequences.
Economic development and social and political
modernization are defined here as processes of structural change, with the total transition being conceived
as a cumulative process, into which at any given.
moment the results of its previous course become
incorporated as determining factors in the further
course of transition. In each process the definition is
based on the application of the basic principles characterizing the modern-industrial complex.

Economic development is tentatively defined as a

structural transformation of the economy, through
which the mechanisms functionally required for selfsustained growth are permanently incorporated into
it. The ideal type of a developed economy may be
characterized by the following traits: (a) use of highenergy and high-efficiency technology in all branches
of economic activities (including primary); (b) existence of appropriate mechanisms (institutional and
human resources) for the permanent creation and/or
absorption of technological and organizational innovations. Such mechanisms should ensure the continuous rise of new dynamic sectors, to compensate or to
replace those whose dynamic role in the economy is
decreasing, or which have reached their maximum
possibilities; (c) proper diversification of production;
(3) predominance of industrial over primary production; (e) adequate mix of capital and consumer goods
industries (a different mix according to the situation
of the individual country and its stage of development); (f) higher ratio of capital investment to
national product; (g) high per capita productivity; (h)
predominance of capital-intensive over labor-intensive
activities; (i) greater independence from foreign trade
(in terms of its proportion to the GNP at given population levels, of its strategic importance to the maintenance of growth and its diversification as regards
types of goods and number of countries); (j) more
egalitarian distribution of the GNP, both in terms of

sociooccupational strata, sectorial activities, and geographical areas. ~ The process of economic development is defined as the transition towards an economic
structure described by the traits mentioned above in
the model.
A distinction should be made between economic
expansion and economic development. The first may
be defined as a process exhibiting steady growth in
per capita GNP over a relatively long period of time,
but lacking some of the strategic traits required for
self-sustained growth, that is, some of the structural
components of economic development enumerated in
the preceding paragraph.
This does not mean that economic expansion does
not involve structural change. In fact, it is also a process of structural change, but this change is not sufficient for self-sustained development. Economic
expansion may (and such is indeed the more frequent
case) take place on the basis of the modernization
and expansion of some specialized primary production, its integration into the international market, the
accompanying commercial and financial expansion
with all its further repercussions on the economy, and
its modernizing effects in other sectors of the society.
Economic expansion may eventually originate, or be
transformed into, a process of economic development. It may constitute at least one of its preconditions. While there is no agreement about considering
it a necessary precondition, it is not a sufficient precondition. The reorientation of the economy and the
introduction of the structural changes required for
economic development cannot be assumed to be
automatically induced by a certain degree of economic expansion. Only under certain conditions may
economic expansion become a step in the process of
economic development.
The concept of political development is even more
controversial than that of economic development.
Three major traits may be singled out: (a) the rational
organization of the State (in Weberian terms), including high efficiency in performing the expanding and
increasingly diversified, specialized, and centralized
functions of the State in an industrial society; (b) the
capacity of originating and absorbing structural
changes in the economic, political, and social spheres,
while maintaining a minimum of integration; (c)
political participation by all or the great majority of
the adult population. Other components which are
usually included may be conceived as consequences
or aspects of the three traits enumerated. This is the

STAGES OF MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

case, for instance, of nationhood, which could be considered one aspect of total participation; or stability,
here subsumed in the capacity of leading and absorbing change, without disrupti:ag the social system.

Social modernization is largely conceived of as a

residual category, best illustrated (rather than defined) by a series of component processes: (a) the
social mobilization of an increasing proportion of the
population; 2 (b) urbanization, i.e., increasing demographic concentration in urban areas (often one of
the most typical expressions of mobilization); (c)
other demographic changes, such as decline in death
and birth rates, and subsequent changes in the age
structure; (d) changes in the family structure and in
the internal relations of the nuclear family, as well as
in kinship groups; (e) changes in the local community
of political participation; (f) changes in communications; (g) changes in the stratification system; modification of the stratification profile (first a reduction of
the traditional intermediate strata, then an expansion
of the modern middle strata); modification of the
nature of the cleavages between strata, with the final
emergence of a stratification continuum; increase in
exchange mobility; increase in structural (transitional) mobility; emergence of a form of permanent
mobility by growing participation (based on a mechanism of self-sustained mobility consisting in the continuous occupational upgrading and the continuous
transference of status symbols from top to bottom;
(h) changes in the scope and forms of participation,
particularly extension of civil and social rights to the
lower strata (similar to the extension of political
participation); extension of modern forms of consumption to the same groups, extension of education
and the resulting extension of feelings of participation and increasing identification with the community; (i) other important changes in such institutions
as church, voluntary associations, forms of leisure,
etc.; (j) decrease in differentials (demographic, economic, sociocultural) between strata, social groups,
rural-urban, and regions (while decrease in differentials may affect the great bulk of the population,
some higher cleavage may persist or even increase at
the top of the society, especially with the concentration of power). 3

The distinctive trait of modern society is its permanent incorporation of appropriate mechanisms to
originate and to absorb a continuous flow of change,
while maintaining an appropriate degree of integration. In this respect, one can introduce an analogy
with economic development: social and political

157

modernization is a transformation of the social structure involving mechanisms of self-sustained social and
political change. Given the basic unity of the process
of transition, self-sustained economic growth and
self-sustained political and social change are different
ways of perceiving the same process. Failure to establish such mechanisms for continuous change may lead
to a breakdown of the process of social or political
modernization, in the same way as failure to establish
the corresponding mechanisms in the economic structure is conducive to a breakdown of the process of
economic development. The essential trait defining
modernization is not the fact of continuous change,
but the capacity of originating and absorbing it. 4

Variations in Rates and Sequences

Among the Component Processes
The interrelation between component processes
must be conceived as one of reciprocal causatiorL
They affect one another, and such reciprocal effects
will determine the orientation and rate of the total
transition, and may also produce inhibiting or facilitating effects on any single component process. Processes of economic development (and, under given
conditions, processes of economic expansion) condition processes of social and political modernization
and vice versa. There are minimum degrees (thresholds) of economic development (or economic expansion) which are required for the attainment of given
degrees of social or political modernization, and vice
versa, given minimum degrees of social or political
modernization constituting the requirements for the
attainment of given degrees of economic development
or economic expansion. But a theoretical model
suited for the analysis of such reciprocal relationships, and even an acceptable conceptual scheme, are
still lacking. It may only be suggested that the types
and forms of the interrelations and the various thresholds will vary according to the historical circumstances in which the transition of each nation occurs.
Such historical circumstances cover a considerable
range of factors-cultural, social, economic. They
concern not only the internal conditions of the
society in transition, but also its external conditions,
especially its relations to other societies. This is one
of the reasons for the differences in rates and sequences among the various partial processes of economic development and modernization. This app r o a c h suggests that economic expansion may
generate effects on the social structure similar t o
those induced by economic development. It is in this
sense that economic expansion may have a modernizing effect.

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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The nature and consequences of this interrelationship between component processes are deeply affected by the historical and social circumstances under
which the transition is taking place including sociocultural differences at the takeoff for each nation or
region. One of the main sources of variation in the
paths followed by the total transition is the variations
in rates and sequences in which the component processes take place. The variations themselves should be
explained in terms of the different contextual conditions (economic, cultural, political and social), both
at the national and at the international levels. Taking
the historical experience of Western earlier transition
as a baseline for comparison, we see that there have
been cases of different rates (i.e., acceleration or
deceleration) as well as differences in sequences
(retardations or anticipations). Illustrations of acceleration and anticipation (with regard to the equivalent degree of industrialization) are provided by the
increase in urbanization (strictly defined as demographic concentration in urban areas) or decrease in
mortality rates, which tended to precede rather than
follow or accompany economic development. Less
universal, but often observed in different countries,
are cases of acceleration of social mobilization, of
political participation and diffusion of aspirations,
which in the Western model have tended to occur at a
lower rate and have advanced considerably only after
the economy had reached a higher degree of economic development (especially in terms of structural
change). But contrasting phenomena of slower rates
and retardation are also very common. It must be
noted that acceleration and/or anticipation in certain
processes may well coexist with retardation and/or
deceleration in others.

This lack of synchronization or unevenness is a

well-known aspect of social change in general. One of
the crucial consequences is the coexistence of archaic
and advanced (speaking in relative terms) sectors
within the same countries, the same institutions, the
same social groups and the same individuals. In the
latter case, for instance, modern attitudes and behavior in some fields of social action may coexist with
archaic or less modern attitudes and behavior in other
fields. While generalizations in this respect are very
hard to verify, it may be suggested that basic values
(especially those internalized in the early life of the
individual) may remain unchanged and coexist with
other values and attitudes acquired through contact
with modern environments and influence. Taking an
illustration from the Latin American scene, manifest
acceptance of the modern technology (and even its

actual use) may be accompanied by a persistence of

m o r e archaic value orientations unfavorable to
modern science; or extremely advanced political and
social ideologies may be accompanied by traditional values and behavior in everyday life, in the
family, in interpersonal relations, in personal aspirations, and in the image of one's own life. This phenomenon of coexistence originates particular effects
of fusion of the modern and the traditional. One illustration is the fusion of the emphasis on consumption
characterizing an advanced state of development and
the ideal of leisure and consumption of the traditional feudal way of life. Breakdown of modernization and economic stagnation may be partly explained by the persistence of nonmodern value orientations beneath the surface of accelerated processes
of modernization occurring in different sectors of
society.
An important aspect of the discontinuity and
unevenness in the process of transition is the differentiation of a center and periphery, both within each
nation and, at the international level, among nations.
The relation between advanced and backward areas
(at the internal and international levels), is not always
one of coexistence, but in may cases it may turn into
one of superordination, of hegemony of the center
over the periphery. Dualism may tend to be a selfreinforcing process, and to increase instead of wither
away.
Other factors likely to intervene and condition the
nature, orientation, and rate of the component processes and of the total transition are the following:
(1) The nature and availability of human resources in each country (the country's viability and
the necessary conditions for economic development
according to its resources). These may originate
different types of development and modernization,
such as the expansionist or intrinsic development suggested by Hoselitz (1955), or may impart a particular
dynamics to the economic process, as in the case of
the "economy of the open spaces" in Argentina and
other Latin American countries.
(2) The relative position within the centerperiphery dimension of the country in relation to: (a)
the international stratification according to political
and economic power and consequently according to
the degree of political and/or economic dependence;
(b) the specific (and unchanging) circumstances created by the international situation at the moment and
during transition.

STAGES OF MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

(3) Historical and cultural traits and social structure of the country when initiating the transition,
(i.e., type of society at takeoff. The concept of traditional society has often been used as a residual category including a great variety of social structures and
cultural conditions. A typology of takeoffs would be
necessary.)
(4) The state of knowledge in the natural sciences
and the nature of the available technology at the
initial stages of the transition and their combined
evolution and changes during the transition. (In many
developing countries these changes are originated elsewhere; their exogenous nature will exercise a particular impact on the form of transition in the receiving
country.)
(5) The state of the social sciences, especially in
relation to the process of modernization and economic development. This is dependent not only on
the development of the social sciences, but also on
the degree of accumulation of historical experienceat the international level-at the initial stage and
during transition.
(6) The degree of spontaneity, awareness, deliberation, and planning which characterize the social
actions generating the partial processes of economic
development and social modernization.
(7) The nature and the proportion of the exogenous or endogenous factors determining the transition.
(8) The different types of elites leading or participating in the initiation of the transition and its
further stages.
(9) The changes which took place in societies
which developed and modernized earlier and the
types of advanced industrial societies which have
emerged. These societies (especially the powerful and
hegemonic nations) serve as models of transition and
as such provide alternative goals for modernizing
groups in developing societies and, more generally,
exercise a demonstration effect. This is how the different ideologies of development are originated. Such
ideologies may turn out to be powerful factors i n
shaping the transition.
Some other general observations must be added:
(a) these categories of factors are not clearly separable; there is considerable overlapping among them;

159

(b) the various factors are not independent, but are

intercorrelated to different degrees; (c) all the factors
operate within an international system which moves
towards greater unification and interdependence.
While analyzing the process in a given national unit, it
must always be remembered that such a process cannot be separated from the global context at the international level; (d) all factors have a dynamic nature.
They change continuously through time, originating
at any given moment different configurations of
circumstances affecting the transition while it is
taking place.
An interesting example of the consequences generated by the variations in rates and sequences is the
modernizing effect of economic expansion: an acceleration of a certain process of social modernization
(often accompanied by retardation in others), in comparison with the rate of economic development (as
defined here). This variation is particularly important
in the case of many Latin American countries, and it
will depend on the extent and nature of the backward, forward and lateral linkages with the rest of the
economy and their repercussions on other sectors of
the social structure (Hirschman, 1958, ch. 6).'
Stages in the Transition
One basic question which has not yet been solved
is the definition of equivalencies in comparing sequences and rates of partial processes in different
transitions. Some independent criterion for comparison is required to define the equivalent or expected
degrees reached by different partial processes. Two
different procedures are usually followed: (a) the
historical experience o f the Western model may be
assumed as a general criterion for comparison (as in
the examples given in the preceding paragraph); (b)
equivalencies based on statistical averages and correlation of the indicators of the various processes in
many countries may be used. Both procedures are
useful, but are theoretically inadequate when used
as a universal model of transition. There is no reason
to believe that the Western model might be repeated;
the contrary is more likely. Statistical procedures are
necessary to discover correlations and associations
between processes, but they cannot explain their
causes, nor the existence of both statistically normal
or deviating cases. Another problem with the statistical definition of equivalencies is that usually it is
obtained in countries where transition has occurred at
different historical periods under divergent international conditions, and which find themselves at
very different levels of transition.

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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The answer to this problem should be a theory of

stages of modernization. This attempt has not been
successful so far. s The differences in rates and sequences of the component processes as well as other
variations produced by the various sources mentioned
above are likely to generate such a variety of paths as
to eliminate or greatly restrict the validity of any
general or universal scheme of succession of fixed
stages. The scheme of succession might be based on a
theory able to integrate many relevant determinant
and contextual factors, and to generate a whole
typology of transitions (with equivalent stages along
divergent paths) applicable to a great variety of
historical processes. The social scientist is confronted
here with a dilemma. On the one hand, he lacks such
a theory. On the other, the use of notions such as
"levels" or "degrees" is very hard to avoid in any
analysis of the transition. These notions are implicit
in it, and unless each case of modernization is considered as a unique instance and all comparisons (even
implicit ones) are discarded, such notions are likely to
be reintroduced in one way or another. That is why
conventional and arbitrary external criteria (like the
Western model or statistical correlations) maintain
their usefulness, despite their obvious theoretical
shortcomings. Another possibility can be suggested as
a partial remedy to the lack of a satisfactory theory. I
am referring to descriptive schemes of succession
regarding a limited group of countries, perhaps a
region, relatively more homogeneous in terms of their
initial cultural and social structure and the historical
conditions under which the transition has occurred
(or is occurring). More valid generalizations could be
formulated for limited geographical-cultural areas and
for specific historical periods. This type of scheme
would be no more than a convenient way of presentng a simplified overview of a series of similar (but
not identical) historical processes. On the other hand
it could have some analytical use in illuminating particular clusters of traits and types of successions. The
use of stages could be linked to the idea that in the
course of the transition the variations in rates and
sequences of the component processes and the impact
of the other determining and contextual factors (at
the internal and international levels) may tend to
crystallize in specific structural configurations. These
in turn are likely to be incorporated into the process
itself and to be transformed into key factors in explaining its further course. This might offer a more
objective basis for the selection of stages in the transition.
Two main criteria may be suggested for the identification of stages: (a) emergence of a configuration of

traits (in the economic, social and political structure)

endowed with a certain degree of stability and durability, and clearly differentiated from the preceding
and the succeeding structural arrangements; (b) the
configuration's causal weight in shaping the further
course of the transition.
From another perspective the stage may be perceived as a turning point in the transition. Any historical process is a continuous flow, and the notion of
a "turning point" is an arbitrary or conventional
device. However, its use may help to restrict a purely
deterministic model of the transition. In this sense a
turning point may be defined as a particular moment
(of variable duration under different conditions) in
which a reorientation may (or may not) occur. Its
actual occurrence as well as its nature-positive or
negative-from the point of view of successful
modernization and economic development, will be
determined by the particular interrelationship of
social and economic processes, that is, by the particular configuration of social and economic structural
traits originated by the previous course of the transition, and the decisions made by the social actors
(individuals and groups in key positions). The breakdown of modernization, economic stagnation or (vice
versa) further progress towards higher degrees of
modernization and economic development could be
explained in terms of such configurations and decisions.
It is understood that configurations or traits not
only regard the internal structure of society, but also
the external and international situation. While the
notion of "decision" is complex and theoretically
imprecise, it is freqtiently used implicitly or explicitly
in the analysis of historical processes and especially
economic and political policies. The meaning of
"decision" must be defined in terms of the range of
choices available to actors. Such a range will vary
under different internal and external conditions (i.e.,
under given configurations of structural traits).
Another important factor is the degree of scientific knowledge and technology (both in the natural
and in the social sciences) available to actors. The
degree of spontaneity, awareness, and planning under
which the transition occurs is likewise important.
Such a degree has been increasing with time, and
from this point of view the situation of the countries
which initiated their transitions earlier must be considered in a different way from that of the presently
developing nations.

STAGES OF MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Elements of a Stage Scheme in
the Current Discussions on
Latin America

Latin America offers the conditions suggested

earlier as capable of ensuring certain limited validity
to a scheme of stages: (a) relatively similar cultural,
social, and economic settings at the beginning of the
transition and (b) similar external and internal historical circumstances during the process. Though there
have been few attempts to present a theory of stages,
most of the historical and theoretical analyses of
modernization tend to assume a succession of stages
valid for the whole region. The perception of Latin
America as a unit is based not only on historical and
sociocultural factors, but also "geopolitical" and
ideological causes: Latin America's common political
status vis avis the international political power structure and the allocation of spheres of influence; the
intellectual tradition contributed in creating the
"field" of Latin American studies, with the result of
pushing it too far, often transforming it into a mere
stereotype and bringing the theoretical productivity
of this generalization to the point of diminishing
returns.
Some contribution to a scheme of stages may be
found in relation to the analysis of partial processes.
The Argentine urbanist Hardoy, for instance, has
suggested a succession of six stages to describe urban
history in Latin America (Beyer, 1967: 57-8): the
precolonial urban culture of the Aztecs and the Incas,
then the Spanish colonial foundational stage shortly
followed by a third state essentially completed by
1580, when the Spaniards and the Portugese established the settlement pattern of the region. The
fourth stage, covering nearly 200 years, was characterized by the consolidation of the urban pattern, along
with the institutions of colonial society. Independence did not bring many changes, but instead a fifth
stage, marked by European immigration and by the
"europeanization" of the main Latin American cities.
Finally, the present stage is characterized by internal
rural-urban migrations and a fast rate of urban
growth. In the same field of urban history another
writer sees two broad stages: the first centrifugal, out
of the towns, and the second centripetal, tending to
urban concentration, especially towards the cosmopolitan city (Morse, 1961-62). The centrifugal phase
is characterized by the hacienda which is usually
recognized as one of the central institutions of traditional society in Latin America, endowed with political, social, military and judicial functions. It has been

161

compared with the Roman villa during the decay of

the Empire (Castillo, 1957: 508). The development
of the hacienda system involved a weakening of the
role of the cities, and the decentralization of the New
World society around the landed estate in a fashion
similar to that of post-Roman Europe. The opposite
stage, towards centralization in cosmopolitan cities,
was a direct expression of the relationship with the
outside world, and most of all of the political, economic and military dependence of the colonial
society on its European metropolitan centers. The
idea of two phases, more than providing a scheme of
succession of stages, suggests a very interesting and
synthetic view of two of the most important forces
operating in colonial times.
In the analyses formulated by economists, both
regarding specific countries and the transition in the
region as a whole, we find broad stages of development. The more popular form is the distinction
between outward and inward growth. These two
forms of growth correspond to those found in an
economy based on international export (outward
growth), and an economy based on industrialization
(inward growth). The turning point when the change
in direction of growth took place in Latin America is
usually given as 1930, the time of the Great Depression. The change from outward to inward expansion
means much more than economic change. The structural change in the economy marked also the beginnings of a series of other changes in the social structure, in politics, in ideology, and in degree and nature
of national identity. However, these distinctions lack
a precise formulation. Furthermore, they are not
designed as a theory of stages, even if this is in fact
their role in the analyses. Often the outward-inward
distinction is interpreted in terms of change in degree
of foreign dependence and national alienation, the
outward phase corresponding to dependence and
to an alienated national consciousness, in contrast to
the inward phase, marked by a growth in the level of
self-determination. The underlying concept in this
approach is that of increasing self-determination:
from a complete absence of it (or absolute dependence) in colonial times to a semicolonial or informal
colonial situation during the phase of outward
expansion (with a very low degree of self-determination), to the third stage of inward development which
involves for the first time a deliberate attempt to lead
the developmental process in terms of national interests. 6 Writers with different ideological leanings,
especially those with extreme left-wing orientations,
do not usually agree on the .degree of self-determi-

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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

nation in the last inward stage. For them, imperialistic hegemony and national alienation are linked to
the power structure prevailing in Latin American
nations. They consider that true national liberation
can only come through revolutionary change, and
that inward development under the leadership of the
national bourgeoisie is doomed to failure. They have
no faith in the bourgeoisie and in its ability to lead a
process of autonomous national development.
In this search for schemes of stages in Latin America, other valuable though indirect contributions may
b e found. For instance, the drastic change introduced
in the social structure of Latin America by the rise
and growth of the middle sectors could be interpreted
in terms of stages: the first characterized by the hegemony of semifeudal and semicapitalist oligarchic
elites, closely linked to the primary export economy;
and a second, more advanced stage in which the participation of the new middle strata introduces a
powerful component of modernization and may
become a factor for further economic and political
development. The rise of the middle classes is seen as
an aspect of a series of changes which have occurred
since the second half of the nineteenth century, in
the expansion of the primary export economy, foreign investment, foreign immigration, better and
more rational organization of the State, improvements in communication, transportation, education,
and living standards. The growth of the middle sectors took place in the twentieth century, especially in
its first three decades, although the new-and more
decisive-wave of industrialization after 1930 contributed to its further expansion (Johnson, 1958:
Introduction). Though the role of these sectors in the
process of modernization has become highly controversial in recent years, their appearance involves a
major change in the process itself, through a relatively
stable modification of the structure of the society.
In the foregoing discussion I have only considered
partial schemes of stages as well as some of the more
common implicit assumptions about stages' succession in Latin America. There are very few explicit
comprehensive schemes. I know of only two, and of
these one is still unpublished. Although the main
purpose of both is to analyze the political process,
they may be considered comprehensive insofar as
both take into account social and economic changes.
The first one was presented some years ago by
Kalman Silvert and the present writer. It was based
on an analysis of the process of political mobilization
and the successive expansion of political partici-

pation. This process was perceived as an aspect of

social mobilization and social integration and closely
related to the underlying total transition. In the
present monograph, the political stages have been
maintained (with various modifications), but the
economic and social components have been added,
according to the theoretical approach suggested earlier (Germani, t961; Germani and Silvert, 1961a,
1961b). Another attempt has been presented by
H~lio Jaguaribe. 7 He distinguished three main stages:
the Colonial, the Semicolonial and the Transitional.
In this scheme we find an excellent presentation of
the idea of increasing self-determination. Its more
important variable is the degree of dependence and
the corresponding degree of national autonomy. In
the first stage, which does not end with the collapse
of the Spanish or Portuguese colonial regime but with
the beginnings of the expansion of the primary export economy as a result of the industrial revolution
in mid-nineteenth century, the degree of dependence
is at its highest point. In the Semicolonial stage the
dependence continues, though in a different form,
while the internal transformation of the society originates an "initial capacity for self-induced growth."
This capacity is further reinforced with the breakdown of the primary export economy after 1930,
during the third transitional stage, which is also characterized by the rise of new groups and classes and
the appearance of new tensions.
Finally, an important contribution to the idea of
common stages may be found in the discussions
among historians on the possibilities of a comparative
history of the Western Hemisphere. During the consideration of the "History of America" program, 8
Charles C. Griffin in reporting the discussion on the
national period of American history (both Latin and
non-Latin) stated that, "strange as it may seem,"
there was "considerable agreement on the important
problem of periodization." Griffin (1964) suggested a
common framework, distinguishing four periods: (a)
the break with the Old World (1770-1820); (b) the
development of new nations (1790s to I860s); (c) the
adjustment to industrial and financial capitalism
(1860s) to World War One; (d)the reaction of America to the impact of twentieth-century tensions in
Western civilization (1941 to present).
In this brief review I have omitted references to
the application of stages to single nations, as well as
to the more abstract and general formulations such
as, for instance, the "folk-urban" model developed by
Redfield. 9

STAGES OF MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

A Tentative Scheme of Stages

of Modernization in Latin America
The table presented in this monograph does not
pretend to offer a "'theory of stages." Its purpose is
more modest: it is an attempt to provide a simplified
overview of the Transition, which may be useful in
illustrating some of the main characteristics of the
process. The table can be regarded as no more than a
highly condensed summary of the social history of
Latin America. Because of this condensation and its
level of generality, it does not represent any of the
specific historical processes which have occurred (and
are occurring) in Latin American countries. By
emphasizing these "deviations" it may be used as a
tool for comparison, and as a means for emphasizing
both specific and common traits (if any) in the process of modernization in Latin American countries. By
classifying its empirical content in terms of the three
main processes of the total transition (and by specifying roughly, some of its corresponding subprocesses),
it may help to highlight both the synchronic and
asynchronous aspects; cases of acceleration or deceleration of specific subprocesses, or differences in
their sequences have produced fusions or contemporaneity of stages instead of a succession, as indicated
in the scheme (and as actually occurred in some
empirical instances). Finally the scheme may help to
provide at least a provisional answer to the problem
of the implicit use of some type of succession. As
noted earlier, even the mere mention of "more" or
"less" advanced, so frequent in all discussions on the
subject of modernization, involves the implicit
assumption of the idea that some changes usually
precede others, or that a given country is located at a
different point in the (implicit) temporal succession-the assumption of succession. The table constitutes a step toward making such assumptions explicit
by suggesting a more specific definition of the succession.

The table seeks to provide a certain ordering of the

material in terms of the various component processes,
and in terms of turning points and temporal succession. The final portion of the monograph will be devoted to illustrate the type of analysis which could be
attempted on the basis of the suggested framework.
The rise and crystalization of stabilizing effects
mainly in the third (but also in the fourth) stage, wilt
be considered, and a mention will be made of the
interplay of endogenous and exogenous factors.

163

Interaction of Endogenous and

Exogenous Factors in the
Patterning of Stages
The main stages are induced by external events.
The contribution of similar broad characteristics to
all countries at approximately the same chronological
time raises an important issue (even if allowance is
made for large variations in more specific characteristics). Given the different rates of modernization
among the various national units, any given date
would find them in different positions or stages. Even
if the scheme of succession had the precision of a
natural law, the lack of synchronization between
nations (not to speak of asynchronism within
nations) should involve the impossibility of initiating
the same stage at approximately the same date or
within a.relatively short span of time. Homology does
not involve simultaneity. The answer to this apparent
absurdity highlights the importance of exogenous
factors on which periodization is based. These factors
generate in each country-irrespective of their degree
of modernization at that m o m e n t - a series of processes essentially similar in all of them. The common
nature and. the relative simultaneity of this external
impact contributes to giving similar or equivalent
broad characteristics to each stage. Specific structural
configurations emerging at a given stage in each nation are the result of both exogenous and endogenous
factors. The release of similar processes in countries
located at different stages has usually accentuated
their internal discontinuities-the asynchronism between areas, institutions, attitudes and behavior patterns-since the external impact may accelerate some
component processes while leaving unaffected or decelerating others.

The historical meaning of the external impact is

obvious enough, but its role in accentuating homogeneity among nations and discontinuities within
them has often been overlooked. The same may be
said of the role exercised in this double effect by the
interplay between exogenous and endogenous factors.
This effect has increased over time, becoming more
visible in the third and fourth stages. With the increase in international interdependence in all spheres
- a n d especially with the growth of worldwide power
stratification-the exogenous factors have become
more powerful. This may have occurred even if the
internal strength of many nations was becoming

164

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

STAGES IN THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MODERNIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA

EXTER NA L
FACTORS

MA IN
STAGES

ECONOMY

SOCIET Y

POLITICS

Discovery,
conquest,
colonization.

Traditional
society

Isolated regional
economies
-Subsistence economy
predominant.
-Export sector: small
but important in shaping the further course
of dependent development.

Traditional structure
-Stratification: dual system.

Colonial rule

(With some internal differentiation: the local traditional

intermediate strata).

-Hacienda system (as an economic and social unit and as

a center of authority).

-Demography: death and birth

rates high; natural growth:
none or very low; urban concentration: very low.
II
American
and French
revolutions

Beginnings

of
breakdown

Transition towards
dependent economic
expansion.

Subsistence of traditional
order (but release o f disrupting factors)

-Persistence of subsistence economy and

regional isolation
with some beginnings
of a limited internal
market,

-Stratification: little or no

of
traditional
society

-Free trade and in

some cases, first
wave of growth of
primary export.

change in the dual system

but substitution of Spanlards by Creole, rise of a
very small but dynamically important urban
elite. Some exchange mobility caused by revolutions and liberation and
civil wars.
-Persistence of the hacienda
as a basic economic, social
and political institution.
-Local (and regional or provincial) societies: isolation
reinforced by breakdown of
the colonial administration.
-Persistence of the traditional
way of life for more than
90% of the population.
-Some initial attempts at modernization (progressive
urban elites).

-Demography: Little change

Attempts and failure

at establishing a
modern national
state (2, 3, 4).
2 Revolutions and
wars.

-For mal independence

and attempts to organize a modern national state, under the
rule of the urban
elites.

3 Anarchy and caudillismo

-Enlightened urban
elites vs. caudillos
and lower uneducated strata.
I
-Inorganic democracy
as opposed to enlightened aristocracy.
-Centrifugal tendencies. Local peripheral
caudillos and regionalism.

4 Unifyingautocracies
-Emerging unification
under the rule of a
central caudillo.

from Stage I; natural growth: 3)-General traits of subslow; urban concentration:

4)
very slow.
stages 3 & 4:
(a) Formal independence, but no national identification,
except for the elite.

STAGES OF MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

EXTERNAL
FACTORS

MAIN
STAGES

ECONOMY

SOCIET Y

165

POLITICS

(b) Oligarchy (landed

interests and associated sectors) mainraining and increasing economic and
social power: (i) in
most cases through the
caudillos; (ii) in some
cases through direct
political rule (see
substage 5).

Beginnings

of
breakdown

of
traditional
society
(cont'd)

-Beginning of traditional political parties (of "families"

and "notables"):
conservative vs.
3) liberal; federal4) ists vs.
unitarians, etc. (all oligarchic parties with
restricted or no ideological differentiation)
-No political mobilization and participation of the masses,
except traditional
participation under
popular caudillos or
the clientele system.

III

Impact o f
the Industrial Revolu t io rL
-Technological innovations in
transportation, communication,
production.
-Advanced
industrialization of
powerful
countries.

Dual
society
and
outward
expansion

Primary export economy

and outward dependent
expansion.
-Different degrees of
modernization of primary production (agriculture, cattle-breeding,
mines).
-Evolution of the traditional paternalistic
hacienda towards
forms of modern
enterprise.
-Gradual extension of
the internal markeL

-Mass European emigration.

-Economic expansion
(increase in GNP).

-European
capital
investment
overseas.

-(In some countries:

first wave of industrialization-closely
linked to primary
production).

Limited modernizing
of economic expansiorL
-First wave of limited
social modernization
(rate and extent depending, in each country,
on the type of economic
expansion). Resulting
dualism.

-Primate cities (foci of

limited modernization).
-Urban cl~anges:
Appearance of a modem
middle strata; decrease of
intermediate traditional
strata.
First wave (in some countries) in the formation of
an urban modern
proletariat
-Beginnings of social mobization, and modern participation (large variations
among countries from
slow to fast rates; from

National organization
and middle classes
participation crise~
[4, 5,6).
(i) General traits.
-Rational-bureaucratic organization of
the State. Centralization and increasing
control of national
territory.
-Professionalization of
the army

(ii) Variable traits.

-Characteristics of
the political regime
and level and nature
of participation:
three possibilities
according to extent of
social modernization
(varying cases of slow
transition from 4 to 5
and 6 ; or sudden
leaps, overpassing intermediate stages

166

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

EXTERNAL
FACTORS

MAIN
STAGES

Ideologies
Political &
economic
liberalism.

Dual
society
and
outward
expansion
(cont'd)

Models
Western
Foreign
Influence
Western
European
(mostly
British).

ECONOMY

-Dual economies
Strong internal cleavages: (i) urban-rural;
(it) center-periphery.
Foreign Capital;
foreign immigration
(few countries);
alliance foreign
landed interest.
-British influence.
-Investment in social
overhead capital (railroads, communication,
and primate cities
urban services; education and health in
more advanced
countries)

SOCIETY

small to large proportion

of population).
Demography.
-In most countries: persistence of traditional h~gh
fertility and beginnings of
decline in death rate.
Slight increase in rate of
growth.
-In some countries: faster
advance into the demographic transition; higher
decline in mortality followed by decline in
fertility.

POLITICS

including directly to
substage 7 c or d).

-Modern political participation inexistent or

effectively impeded.
-Military interventions
as quasi-institutionalized mechanism for
political succession.
(type a)

-In some countries: mass

foreign immigration.
-Increase in urban concentration and high
urbanization (in countries
of foreign immigration).

Duality
-Coexistence of modern
and (modified) traditional
patterns (at the geographical, social, cultural and
psychological levels).

Continuation of the
unifying autocracy
pattern (interrupted
by crises of succession,
attempts at democratization-relapse into
autocracy).

5 Representative democracy with limited participation (political

power monopolized by
the oligarchy).

-Coexistence of modern and

archaic groups and sectors
of the social structure. Coexistence of archaic and
modern traits within the
same institutions, groups
or categories of population,
and individuals.
-Strong differences and contrasts between a center and
periphery within each country. Center: highly urbanized
usually primacy of the capita
city-modern, developed;
periphery: underdeveloped
and archaic. Increasing contrasts between country and
city.

-Marginality: large sectors of

the population in the periphery and (partially) in central
6
areas in a state of social, economic and political marginality. Different degrees and
types of marginality. Internal colonialism.

-Modern limited participation in the central

area, beginning of mass
parties (populistie, with
strong middle-ciass
component).
-Stability or (in some
cases) possible continuation of type a
military intervention, sometimes
changing into intervention in middleclass participation
crisis (type b military intervention).
-Middle-class participation crises (striving for enlarged
participation).
-Oligarchic national
consciousness.

Representative democracy with enlarged participation

(middle-class
regimes-but co-

S T A G E S O F M O D E R N I Z A T I O N IN L A T I N A M E R I C A
E X TERNA L
FACTORS

MAIN
STAGES

ECONOMY

167

SOCIETY

POLITICS

existence and often

alliance with
oligarchy).

Dual
society
and
outward
expansion
(cont'd)

-Increase in modern
enlarged political participation (extension
to first wave of modern urban proletariat
in central areas); rise
of modern mass
parties.
-Ideologies: pr e-World
War One: old populistic parties with national-liberal ideologies. Post:World
Wax One: beginnings
of new populisfic
Iyoxties- emphasis on
social justice.
-Stability, except for
middle-class participation crises.
-Military intervention
becoming ideological and playing essential role in middleclass participation
crises (on both sides).
(Type b military intervention)
-Middle-class national
consciousness.
.

Great Depression
(1930)
World War
Two
(1939)
Meologies
-Liberalism
-Marxism
-Nationalism
-Fascism
Models
-Western
-Eastern
-Chinese

IV
Mass
social
mobilizatiorL

Industrialization and
inward development.
-Breakdown of primary
export international
market.

Increase in rate and extent o f social mobilizatiorL

-Widespread and increasing
urbanization.

-Breakdown of primary
economy.

-Mass internal migrations

(before 1930, some
countries; after 1930,
all countries).

-Decline of terms of
trade.
-Unplanned (sometimes unwanted) industrialization
changing into (after World
War Two) deliberate industrialization.

-Further enlargement of
middle strata (still
urban), importance of
white collars. New
Generation industrial entrepreneurial sector.

-First phase: import substitution and emphasis

on consumer goods (in

-In some countries: new

second-generation urban
proletariat.

Transition to total participation and lowerclass participation

crise
-Political mobilization
of urban lower strata
(rural-urban migration, rise of new proletariat, availability of
emerging sectors).

-New populistic parties:

national-popular move
ments.
-Unionization with
intervention or
leadership of the
State.

168

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

EX TER NA L
FACTOR S

MAIN
STAGES

Foreign
Influence
United States
Cold War

Mass
social
mobilization
(cont'd)

ECONOMY

some countries beginnings

second phase: capital
goods),
-Further extension of the
internal market (predominance of a unified national market with surviving
pockets of subsistence
economies),
-Economic stagnation
(after development of
consumer goods industry and advanced replacement of imports)
-Inflation. New economic
bottlenecks.
-Persistence of latifundia
and problems related to
the land tenure system
(some limited efforts for
an agrarian reform under
representative-democratic
regimes).
-Revolutionary agrarian
reforms connected with
"national-popular"
regimes.
-Problems related to distribution of income;
problems related to
entrepreneurship and
local investment.
-First experiment in
socialist economy.
Ideologies
-Develo pmentalism
-Economic nationalism

SOCIETY

POLITICS

-In others: beginnings of

a modern urban proletafiat.
-Demographic transition
(in some countries decline of the death rate,
persistent or increased
birth rate; in more advanced countries decline of birth rate). In
most countries: population ex plosiorL
-End of foreign European
immigration.
-Some international migration (within Latin
America).
-Internal Colonialism (decrease in relative terms,
increase in absolute
numbers).
-Spread of social mobilization (with varying degrees and extension of
marginality still persisting; coexistence of mass
society and marginality.

-Extension of social rights-minimum wages, social

security, etc. to urban workers (only
partially implemented).
-Predominance of
social justice, national-development
over liberal-national
ideologies.
-Decline of oligarchy
but increaseing ambiguity and absorption of middle
classes (especially
higher bourgeoisie,
but also white
collars) into the
status quo.
-Decline and/or
failure of social
reform attempts
by middle class
regimes.
-Reformist tendencies (and lack of
radicalization)
among participant
urban workers.
-Changing nature of
military intervention (type b). Increasing ideological role of the
army mostly as a
barrier against extension of participation and social
reform. PseudoNasserist and pseudodevelopmental military coups.
-Increasing fragmentation of all relevant
political groups:
church, military,
middle classes, mobilized social strata.
-Appearance of new
radical Left and
Leftist nationalism.

(This column continued on next pageJ

STAGES OF MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

POLITICS

-Participation crises:

(a) representative democracy with total

participation (highly
unstable because of
persistent rigidities
in the system);
(b) open or disguised
military dictatorships
(equally unstable);
(c) national-popular
regimes (alliance of
new industrialists and
urban proletariat, with
some military support);
(d) socialist dictatorships (unlikely in most
advanced countries but
possible given a repetition of the a-b cycle).

greater because of economic development, increasing

social modernity and increasing levels of national consciousness (or at least decreasing alienation), all of
which characterize the stage of inward expansion. On
the other hand, as time elapsed and the lag between
countries within the region tended to widen in certain
aspects of the transition, the generalized effects of
the external impact may have accentuated internal
discontinuities, especially in all those cases in which
such impact induced the acceleration of some component processes, while at the same time blocking or
decelerating others.
The combined effect of exogenous and endogenous factors in the third stage are well known:
economic expansion on the basis of primary export
economy, and inducement of limited modernization
effects in the social and political orders. The extent
of the modernizing effect is a function of three main
variables: (a) the type of primary export economy;
(b) its degree of success in inducing economic expansion (as defined earlier); and (c) the existence of
internal modernizing elites and their effectiveness. It
is the type of primary export economy which largely
determines the variety and extent of the repercussions on the rest of the social structure. But again
these repercussions are limited or expanded, retarded
or accelerated by the action and the orientation of
the elites.
Economic expansion based on a type of primary
production, requiring the mobilization of a small part

169

of the population, or with limited economic backward, lateral, or forward linkages did not exercise a
widely diffused impact on the social structure. Such
was the case of mining or plantation economies or
other economic, foreign-oriented and integrated activities, relatively isolated from the national economy. A typical dual society and economy was likely
to emerge with strong cleavage between archaic and
modernized sectors. Social modernization could affect some aspects of behavior and institutions in some
restricted areas and social groups-usually the higher
and middle strata in urban centers or more often in
primate cities. However, even in these sectors some
basic value orientations would remain unchanged, coexisting with other manifest symptoms of modernization.
In those countries in which the primary export
economy required, or at least indirectly induced, the
participation of large sectors of the population at
both the lower and the intermediate occupational
levels, an enlargement of the internal market and/or
some other spreading effect as well as other processes
of social modernization occurred at an accelerated
rate and in advance of corresponding or equivalent
degrees of economic development.
Where the elites remained very ineffective or unwilling to go beyond their immediate and shortsighted
interests, the modernizing effect was more restricted.
The contrary occurred where elites imbued with
modernizing ideologies were ready to push the process at least up to the extreme point permitted within
the limits of other contextual factors (these limits
being usually determined by the class perspective of
the elites and by the general historical framework in
which their actions took place). As a result different
types and extent of modernization effects could be
expected and perhaps a typology could be constructed wj_th various intermediate types ranging from
relatively encapsulated activities, more or less segregated from the rest of the economy and the society,
to more dynamic activities exercising an impact on a
considerable proportion of the population and affecting a wider range of social segments, groups and instirut ions.
The main external impact in the fourth stage was
the Great Depression which forced industrialization
in all Latin America. Tiffs trend was further reinforced by World War Two, and in the interplay with
internal factors emerged impo'rtant social forces and
new attitudes favorable to inward development
through deliberate industrialization and national plan-

170

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ning, Industrialization in the thirties, however, begun

in many cases, not only as an unplanned but also as
an undeliberate and forced process, imposed by the
new conditions created after the Great Depression
and continued by the outbreak of the war. Industrial
growth and a considerable rate of economic development which characterized most Latin American
countries in the forties and the first half of the fifties
seemed to end in stagnation, or at least into a noticeable slowing down in the following years. Though in
the more advanced countries industrialization went
beyond the phase of import substitution in consumer
goods,~O further obstacles appeared which delayed
both industrial development and the development and
modernization of other sectors of the economy.
These obstacles, which in part reflected the new conditions created by the previous industrial growth,
have been related by many observers to persisting
traits crystallized during the third stage, and the incapacity of Latin American societies to introduce the
required structural changes. This again could be interpreted as directly and indirectly determined by a
complex of internal and external factors (Prebisch,
1963).
An important process typical of the fourth stagewidespread and fast rate of urbanization-was the
result of another combination of internal and external factors: on the one hand the population explosion brought about the modernizing effects of the
third stage (introduction of sanitary technology and a
slight improvement on living conditions of the
masses), and on the other hand the primary export
crisis, the persistence of highly unequal distribution
of land in the rural sector, and (to a limited extent)
the new demand for industrial labor. Urbanization
was obviously related to mass internal migrations.
These population movements must be considered an
aspect of another crucial process: social mobilization
(Germani, 1964). As indicated in the table, social
mobilization had been initiated in the third stage (as
one aspect of the modernizing effects), but it tended
to acquire massive proportions in the fourth stage.
The environmental changes mentioned above (population explosion, primary economy crisis, emerging
industrialization) were part of the cause. But the process also required changes in attitudes, and these were
induced by a series of internal and external factors:
changes in the ideological climate (both at the international and at the national level) and widespread
innovations in mass media through the period. As
new sectors of the population became ready for political participation, a different type of participation

crisis appeared, in which the middle strata found

themselves ambivalent and sometimes opposed to the
recently mobilized portions of the lower strata. These
internal developments, and other preexisting internal
factors such as the remnants of archaic power structures and the persisting political-cultural trait of military intervention, coupled with powerful external factors such as the Cold War and the United States'
hegemonic power in the region, tended to shape political development often involving new rigidities and
prolonged stagnation or even relapses into processes
similar to the older pattern of unstable democratic
role, alternating with military or nonmilitary dictatorial or quasi-dictatorial regimes. This was especially evident in some of the more advanced countries.
But here the nature of the instability and of the dictatorships was quite different from that characterizing early stages. In some cases it took a new form
of "national popular regimes" in which political and
social participation was effectively extended to the
lower strata, though in different ways than in the
conventional representative democracy model, while
actual or threatened military intervention operated
most often as a means of demobilization of these
strata.
The Stabilizing Effects of
Modernization as Possible Factors
of Delay for Further Change
Whichever the range and nature of the modernizing effects and their consequences in creating a
relatively advanced sector in the society, one common feature in the structural configuration emerging
during the third stage was that it contained also certain stabilizing effects. The modernizing effects, even
when they were more conspicuous and widespread,

failed to incorporate the appropriate and sufficient

mechanisms for self-sustained change in the economic, social and political orders. A good illustration
of this failure is the tendency to persist within the
framework of primary export economy, even at a
moment when it was both more rational and feasible
to undertake a deliberate attempt to reorient it in
terms of industrialization and diversification of the
primary sector, at a higher technological level. The
feasibility of such reorientation was more pronounced in the larger countries and in those where
the modernizing effects had been stronger. Still, even
in these more favored situations the impulse to industrialize was delayed until the thirties, and it was
generated by an external impact: the spontaneous
protection created by the breakdown of the inter-

STAGES OF MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

national market. Even the impact of World War One
failed to introduce a permanent change in attitudes)
In terms of the analytical framework suggested in a
previous section, during the third stage a turning
point was reached in which two choices were possible: either to shift towards a policy of deliberate
industrialization, reorienting in terms of higher productivity and appropriate diversification of the primary sector, or just to continue with the old path of
outward growth even when such growth had ceased
to be viable.
The explanation for this and other similar failures
may be found in a complex of interrelated endogenous and exogenous factors which could be called
the "syndrome of outward expansion." Though it inchided important dynamic components they were
insufficient to induce change in certain highly strategic features of the social structure, and/or to offset
endogenous and exogenous obstacles. Some of the
modern partial structures introduced in the third
stage tended to operate more as stabilizers than as
dynamic factors. Some of the paradoxical features of
Latin America stem from this fact, since precisely
where the modernizing effects appeared to be
stronger and more widespread, delay and stagnation
tended to affect further progress, after a fairly advanced degree of modernization had been attained,
sometimes at a very fast rate. Though the consequences, in terms of stagnation, became visible only
in the fourth stage, the underlying causes are to be
found in the structural configurations which emerged
in the third stage, in the syndrome of outward expansion. In the fourth stage, on the other hand, new
stabilizing effects were added. One of their common
characteristics was that these effects were really part
of the integrative consequences of social modernization. They are stabilizing insofar as they lead to the
incorporation of new groups into the modern sector,
in terms of cultural patterns, types of consumption
(even if at low level), social relationships, expectations and aspirations, political participation and other
aspects of behavior.
How these stabilizing mechanisms played a role as
obstacles to further modernization is difficult to
analyze. Oversimplifying the issue, they tended to decrease the economic, political and social innovative
potential of the emerging and newly incorporated
groups (both at the middle and lower socioeconomic
level, in urban areas). Sometimes they permitted their
virtual or silent alliance with those vested interests
most concerned with maintaining the status quo. In

171

other cases they tended to transform into an incoherent, fragmented and ambivalent political action,
what could have been a unified force for political,
social and economic change.
It is outside the scope of this paper to attempt
such an analysis, and only a brief mention of three,
among the most important stabilizing effects, will be
made here. First, the urban middle classes have expanded in Latin America beyond the size which could
have been expected on the basis of the level of economic development and some other aspects of social
modernization (this comparison is made taking the
Western experience as a criterion) (Germani, 1968).
Though the rise of the middle strata was usually considered as a favorable factor for modernization, once
these sectors have attained a certain degree of social
and political participation, their reformist propensities are considerably softened as they become
increasingly absorbed into the system. In the European case, these groups had originated in the period
between the two world wars, the most impressive
breakdown of modernization as yet to be observed.
The rise and growth of these strata is one of the
crucial aspects of social modernization. But the fascist episodes did demonstrate that under given circumstances they could operate as powerful obstacles
to further modernization. However, in Latin America
the middle classes have not originated fascist-like
mass
movements, although there were several attempts to manipulate them in such a direction. But
their ambivalence and political inefficiency is nonetheless a reminder of their ambiguous structural position, at least in certain periods during the Transition. 1 ~
A second important illustration of stabilizing
mechanisms is provided by mass internal migration.
Here again we find a process which is not peculiar to
Latin America. It is well known how mass overseas
emigration operated as a safety valve in Europe during the nineteenth century. This latent function of
emigration as a substitute for revolution, was not so
latent, since European political rulers did not fail to
make a deliberate use of it as a means to decrease
lower-class pressures. This important side-effect of
rural-urban migration (or even any internal migration)
is not usually recognized in Latin America. Many,
especially the conservatives, perceive the urban explosion as a threat to the status quo, or as an increased potential for social revolution. But in fact,
emigration from the more backward regions is likely
to operate in selective terms, giving an outlet precisely to the most active and potentially more "dan-

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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

gerous" (from a conservative perspective) individuals

among the rural population. 13 It may be argued that
this revolutionary potential is transferred to the
major urban centers, that is, to the very site of political power in the nation. In the new setting they
should become far more dangerous to the stability o f
the social system. The real process, however, is rather
different, since in the urban society new stabilizing
mechanisms are set in motion.
The recently incorporated urban sectors may become available for political participation and originate new political forces often threatening the social
and political status quo. But the experience o f the
post-World War Two period is that these urban sectors are easily satisfied with partial reforms involving
modest improvements in their o w n standard o f living
and level of participation in political affairs or the
unions. Though these advancements seem threatening
to the less enlightened of the conservatives, they
operate as integrative factors, in a similar fashion to
that which occurred with the middle strata during the
third stage. On the other hand many observers coincide in suggesting other similar stabilizing mechanisms. For instance, the transfer to the city usually
involves an amelioration of living conditions, as experienced b y people coming from very depressed
areas. This m a y be true even in the case of urban
unemployment or poverty. In other cases urban marginality, especially through the transfer of rural
patterns into the city, operates as a neutralizer of
political mobilization.
Finally, a third powerful stabilizing mechanism is
social mobility. Though the urban migrant has less
mobility opportunities than the city-born, still whatever mobility he achieved is far superior to the situ-

ation in the place of origin (Mangin, 1967; Morse,

1966; on the political effects see Sociologie du Travail, 1961). It remains to be seen how long these
mechanisms will remain in effective operation. It is
possible that they will wither away with time. But
until now they involved an absorption of the revolutionary potential in the recently mobilized lower sectors of the population.
The reason why all these stabilizing mechanisms
may become obstacles for further change, is that at
the level of modernization reached b y Latin America
such changes are not likely to be accepted by hegemonic groups within the national society (and
abroad) without a powerful pressure from those
who would benefit most b y the changes themselves.
But if these groups potentially interested in social
reform are channelled into p e t t y sectorial improvements, the cause of reform itself is seriously jeopardized, at least temporarily. The contradictory effects
of partial modernization may be more clearly perceived now. On the one hand these effects are considered positive, since they involve a real advance and
an amelioration o f the quality of life for some sectors
o f the population. On the other hand, however, bec a u s e this degree of social modernization was
achieved before other crucial and necessary changes
were introduced, they turned out to operate as obstacles for further progress. A particular sequence
among component processes delays the whole transition.
A detailed analysis of the structural configuration
emerging during the present stage of mass social
mobilization should help to identify the nature o f the
obstacles, old and new, and the meaning o f turning
points and possible choices which present generations
are confronting in Latin America.

NOTES
1. Some of the elements included in this def'mition are highly controversial. For instance, a number of economists challenge
the idea of the predominance of industrial over primary production as a universal requirement for development. See for instance
Peter T. Bauer and Basil S. Yamey (1957, ch. 15). For an illustration of the opposite view (which is also the most accepted one),
see W. W. Rostow (1960). The common opinion among Latin American social scientists is in favor of industrialization as a
condition sine qua non of development. Most of them insist also on the key role of production goods industries as a necessary
higher stage of industrialization. The "Latin American Thesis" is best expressed by Prebisch (1963). Statistical evidence
overwhelmingly confirms the causal association between industrialization and economic development. See H. B. Chenery
(1960).
2. The concept used here differs from the one currently employed. See G. Germani (1964).
3. On the idea of self-sustained mobility in modern industrial society, see G. Germani (1966).
4. Since the notion of institutionalization of change is often considered synonymous with nonconflictive change, two
essential qualifications must be added: (a) by definition, changes occurring at early and at intermediate phases of the transition

S T A G E S O F M O D E R N I Z A T I O N IN L A T I N A M E R I C A

173

are usually disruptive of the social order. Not only disintegration of the old structures may take place at a rapid rate, but the
building of the new order will be characterized by deep cleavages and conflicts (often revolutionary conflicts) between groups.
This has been the experience of the past, and it is even more true of the presently developing countries. For an analysis of the
conflicts generated by one of the aspects of the transition, social mobilization, see G. Germani (1964). Even in the more
advanced societies, though change is institutionalized in terms of the surface value system of the society (that is, change is
legitimized), in fact all existing modern societies include at least some set of institutions, or sector of the social structure in
which change is likely to be highly conflictive, in some cases to the point of causing important disruption of the social order and
a high degree of disintegration. Though some of the conflict areas are peculiar to specific types of modern industrial structures,
and even to specific cultural national settings, it is possible that the general (universal) framework of the modern industrial order
per se, includes intrinsic and unavoidable structural tensions, which under given circumstances may have a tremendous
conflictual potential. See G. Germani (1960).
5. An excellent historical analysis on the use of stage theories in economic history is provided by Bert F. Hoselitz (1960).
See also W. W. Rostow (1960). On stages of social evolution a whole library could be quoted, starting from theories of progress,
to nineteenth-century evolutionism, to its present-day revival under the form on neoevolutionism.
6. The distinction between the stage of outward and the stage of inward development is usually made by ECLA economists.
The idea of increasing self-determination of Latin American countries-in the stage of inward development-underlies the
theories of many Latin American social scientists, as well as some of the ideologies of the United States Left.
7. Included in the notes of a lecture course at Harvard University (1965), circulated in dittoed form.
8. It was a project initiated by Arthur P. Whitaker in 1947, sponsored by regional and international institutions and widely
discussed at scientific meetings. See A. P. Whitaker (1964).
9. For an excellent review of theories of social change on Latin America, see Juan F. Marsal (1967).
10. A sequence of three phases could be observed in the process of industrialization: from a high predominance of
manufacturers concentrated in food, beverage, tobacco, a minor proportion in textile, and a very small sector of other
industries, to the most advanced (within the region) with a marked expansion of metallurgical, chemical and other industries.
See ECLA (1966).
11. The idea of the "great delay" in industrialization was introduced to explain the Argentine economic stagnation in the
fourth stage. However, it could be extended to other major Latin American countries as well. See Guido Di Tella and Manuel
Zymelman (1967). Though in some countries the modernizing effects involved some degree of industrialization, previous to the
Great Depression it still remained well below what could have been possible. For instance the development of transport
infrastructure which elsewhere provided a great incentive for industrial expansion failed to do so in Latin America. See ECLA
(1966: 6-9).
12. On the reaction against the "middle-class myth" see the excellent analysis prepared by ECLA (1963). For an early
evaluation of the potential threat of the rising middle classes to political modernization in Latin America, see Germani (1950).
Indications on the causes of the failure in establishing a classic fascist regime based on the middle class in Argentina, see
Germani (1967-68).
13. Unfortunately empirical evidence relevant to this suggestion is not available, since most studies on internal migrants did
not consider the problem of selection at the place of origin.

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