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People Vs SandiganbayanandAmante (FullCase)

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167304

August 25, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution2of
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent
to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a
disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental
Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash
advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a
demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two
hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation
report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent
Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on
September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds
against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas'
Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating
Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a
high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the
offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of
SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received by
reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with
deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash
advances of P71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a
MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION 4 dated November 18, 2004 stating
that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an
incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected
balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers
were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a
position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall
have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the
cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial of the case and not in
a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said
court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249.

According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to
the salary grade of city local officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The
dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT
NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION
2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's
appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically
nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)
(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first,
enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the
rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the
Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a
public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but
his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code; and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the
general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to cite a
decision9 of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution
or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished
by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.1avvphi1
In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to
(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their
commission of other offenses in relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case
of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance of his official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had
thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan,
et al.,12 thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. x x x
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took
effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission
of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was
on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A.
8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or
employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the
general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was
instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No.
1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and
below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated
by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other
city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army
and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of
higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section
4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically including the
public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof,
regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases
involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only
because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they are
committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction would
fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606
as amended, it should be emphasized that the general qualification that the public official must belong to grade '27' is
a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would
fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her office is
included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is
not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the
principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve a violation
of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant
case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g),
since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that
accused must be a public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could
exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office with salary grade 26, then she is not
covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.1avvphi1
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the
Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to
(g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or
confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the said case.

In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25
and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said
public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or
felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section
in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Section
4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in
relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are
committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense
charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the
accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive
to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is
held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.17Thus, in the case of Lacson v.
Executive Secretary,18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court
ruled:x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it
held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and
that "accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack
to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant
might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante
for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her
office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the
application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there
would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently
exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of the
said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said
offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
committed in relation to [an accuseds] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds
office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x."
In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an element
of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had
no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. x x x20

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the
public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same
section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical
or special legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.23
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

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