Early Buddhism and Its Origins PDF
Early Buddhism and Its Origins PDF
Early Buddhism and Its Origins PDF
by
VlshwcJnath PrascJd Varma
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Dedicated to my ancestors
KANHAIY A PRASAD
and
LALA AMRITA PRASAD
and
RAJAKESHWAR PRASAD (NUNUJI)
CONTEl'TTS
Page
PREFACE xvii
PART ONE
THE PHILOSOPHY & SOCIOLOGY OF
EARLY BUDDHISM
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
Page
2. Upani~adic Idealism and Pantheism 55
3. The Religion of the Upani~ads 57
4. Monism and the Origins of Monas-
ticism 59
5. The Attitude of the Upani~ads and
Buddhism towards.the Vedas 62
0. The Upanisadic and the Buddhistic
Revolt against the Sacrificial system
(800 BC-SOO BC) 66
Chapter S. The Philosophy of the Upani~ads and the
Origins of Buddhism 78
1. The Fundamental Differences Bet-
ween the Upani~adic and the Early
Buddhistic Philosophy 78
2. The Influence of the Upani~ads upon
Buddhism 92
3. Conclusion: The Decline of Vedic
Religion and the Rise of Early
Buddhism 100
SECTION Ill. EXPOSITION AND ANALYSIS OF
EARLY BUDDHISM
Page
support of Buddhist Attavada 150
6. Western Interpreters of Buddhist
Non-Soul Doctrine 154
7. Change in the View of C.A.F. Rhys
Davids regarding the Interpretation
of Anatman 155
8. Conclusion 157
Chapter 8. The Philosophy of Rebirth 159
1. Introduction 159
2. History of the Doctrine of Rebirth
in India 160
3. Sociological Analysis of the Concept
~R~kfu l~
Chapter 9. Early Buddhist Ethics 168
l. Ethics in the Pre-Buddhistic Thought 168
2. Evolution of Buddhist Moral Ideas 172
3. The Sociology of Early Buddhist
Ethics 179
4. Critical Reflections and Conclusion 195
5. The Gospel of Buddha as a Philo-
sophy of Life 202
Chapter 10. Karman, Moral Determinism and Freedom 209
1. Theory of Determinism 209
2. The Concept of Karman in the Vedas,
BrahmaQas and the Upani~ads 212
3. A Sociological Study of the Origin
and Development of the Theory of
Karman 216
4. Modifications of the Individualism of
Karman in the Upani~ads 221
5. The Buddhist Philosophy of Moral
Determinism (Karman) 224
6. Sociolo~ical Implications of Moral
Determinism 231
7. Conclusiqn 236
Chapter 11. The Concept of Nirvii1;tQ 239
I. Conceptual Analysis of NirvaQa 239
2. Nirvana. as the Extinction of Pain 243
Contents
Page
(a) Implication of the Extinction of
Pain 243
(b) Nirvat;la as Bliss 245
(c) NirvaQa and Mysticism 24f1
(d) Mara and Buddha's ParinirvaQa:
An Anthropological Study of the
Nature and Personality of Mara 248
(e) NirvaQa and a Philosophy of Life 250
3. NirvaQa as the Negation of Empiric
Phenomena, 252
4. NirviiQa as Utter Extinction 25:-
S. NirvaQa as the Absolute 25~
6. NirvaQa according to the Aphidhamma 25~
7. Factors for the Silence Regarding
NirvaQic Metaphysics 25~
8. Sociology of NirvaIJa 261
Chapter 12. Early Buddhist Mysticism 26'
Page
2. Anthropological Foundations of
Early Buddhism 385
Chapter 19. Early Buddhism and the Methodology
of Social and Political Research 390
PART THREE
APPENDICES
Pagl
6. Buddha and Marx 46(
1. Introduction 46(
2. Ontology and Dialectics 46i
3. Philosophy of Religion 47~
4. Philosophy of History 473
5. Assessment of the Roles of Buddha and
Marx in History 47~
7. Narendra Deva's Interpretation of Buddhist Phi-
losophy 477
Bibliography 481
Index 48S
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
AB Aitareya BrahmaQa
AN Atiguttara Nikaya
AV Atharvaveda
BAU BrihadaraQyaka Upani~ad
BRU BrihadaraQyaka Upani'iad
BB Bibliotheca Buddhica
BG Bhagavadgita
BS Brahma-Sutra
BST Buddhist Sanskr;t Texts (Darbhanga)
CU Chhiindogya Upani~d
DB Dialogues of Buddha
DN Digha Nikaya
EB Encyclopaedia Britannica
ERE Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics
ESS , Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences
ET 'English Translation
HOS Harvard Oriental Series
IA Indian Antiquary
IC Indian Culture
IHQ Indian Historical Quarterly
JAOS Journal of the Ameri.can Oriental Society
JBRS Journal of the Bihar Research Society
JPTS . Journal of the Pali Text Society
JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
KN Khuddaka Nikaya
MN Majjhima Nikaya
MSS Mahabodhi Society. Sarnath
PTS Pali Text Society
RV ~gveda
SHB Sacred Books of the Buddhists
SBE Sacred Books of the East
SBH Sacred Books of the Hindus
SN Samyutta Nikiiya
XVI Abbreviations
SU Svetasvatara Upani$ad
TB Taittiriya Brahmana
TS Taittiriya Samhita
TU Taittiriya Upani~ad
VS Vedanta Sutra
UP Upani~ad
YS Yogasutra
YV Yajuraveda
ZDMG Zeitschrift flir Deutsche Morgenlandische
Gesellschaft
PREFACE
THE WORLD IS being linked up together in several respects,
both ideologically and technologically. The tremendous release
of industrial and technological forces and energy has sought
to annihilate distance and has helped to build the material
bases of a united world. At the theoretical plane also, the
concept of unity is being strengthened. The electro-magnetic
theory of matter has revealed that behind all diversities
there lies the same energy. This concept of unity behind all
material and phenomenal manifestations shows that the density,
rigidity and hardness of the different elements in nature are
only the external aspects of all-pulsating energy. Spiritual
idealism as well as the various humanistic and humanitarian
movements harp on the concepts of fraternity, co-operative
mutuality and the unity of human beings at the psychic and
spiritual planes. But unfortunately, a contradictory trend has
also made its appearance. There is a crisis of civilization
brought about to-day by imperialistic rapacity and the threa-
tened possibility of nuclear annihilation is indeed alarming.
Hence, it is required that the notions of unity, compassion and
love fostered by early Buddhism be re-studied and imbibed iIi
our lives. The studies of comparative religions, as a whole, can
bring to light the truths hidden therein and can vitalise even
our present life. l
. Apart from accentuating the moral foundations of con.:
temporary civilization, the study of comparative religions,
provides insight into the working of the human mind and thUS'
helps in a genuine appreciation of the dominant forces that
have been operative in world history. Hegel regarded history
as the march of the world-spirit (Welt-Geist) and religion, for
him, was the representation of the absolute mind. Marx, on
. 1 Stanley A. Cook, The Study of Religions (London, Adam & Charles
Black, 1914), pp. 426-27. George Grimm, The Doctrine of the Bllddha:
The Religion of Reason, (Leipzig, 1926). W.L. King, Buddhism and
Christianity (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1962).
xviii Preface
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
t
G~a ma are free from. branches, external forms or solie
.
rial forms but are eXistent only 111 pure essence.
ma~~t ;lthough Vaccagotta is silenced it can be pointed out
-hat even if the answers to the first four and the last four
~ue5tions may not be ethically profitable and that t~ese ques-
(ons may even be unanswerable from the"metaphyslcal stand-
loint, still the fifth and the sixth questions do demand an
~nswer from the ethical standpoint. A discussion of the
question whether the soul is identical with the body or different
from the body does have considerable ethical relevance and
meaningfulness. The hedonism of the Carvakas and the
<,ensationalism of some other materialistic philosophers are
based on the identification of the body and the soul. The Jaina
stress on extreme asceticism and non-injury (ahimsii) is based
on the metaphysical belief that all substances are animated by
souls, the only exceptions being dharma, adlzarma, pudga/a
and iikiisa. Thus the examples of the Carvakas and the Jainas
are enough to point out that the ethical doctrines of the day
were rooted in implicit or explicit metaphysical notions. 1
Hence 1 do 110t think that Gautama was justified in rUling out
the discllssions of the identity or otherwise of the soul and
the body. Ethical distinctions get a firm root only when the
separation of the body and thlf soul is posited. A settled con-
vi.:tion on the immortality cf the soul is a dominant foundation
L)f the belief in the efficacy of moral action because it teaches
that no wicked action would ever remain unpunished and no
good action would lapse unrewarded. Hence it is not sound
from the standpoint of ethical enquiry to rule out discussions of
these avyiikrta problems. They have significant connections
with the analysis of problems of ethics and emancipation. Tht.
refusal to answer them, unfortunately, does give rise to an
,occasional suspicion that either Gautama was an agnostic 2 or
that he did not have any settled metaphysical notions3 or that
from Polynesia, where "noa" and "tabu" express precisely the antagonism
between secular and holy things." J. E. Carpenter, Comparative Religion
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1913, Reprint of 1944), pp. 133-134.
1 The Buddhist would emphatically plead that gnostic illumination
(prajoa) is the only antidote to the dreads, anguishes and inhibitions or
a forlam world.
.J: Personality and Prophecy of Buddha 25
The L~/e,
26
. 'ns oJ/Religion and Early Buddhism 27
The Oflg1
b Is are the projections of man's psychic demands. Modern
sym pological, sociological and psychological researches also
ant.h rosly challenge the notIOn. .. 0 freve
an d h'Istonclty l atton.
'
senou . ' h' h'
They emphasize totemlsm, or letts Ism or ancestor-wors Ip or
ic or the fear of the known and unknown forces of nature
mag . L emn
r the fear of capital (m . ) as t he source 0 f re I"Iglous
.,s vIew
~eliefs and practices. Not divine iJ1umin~~ion or. the awaken~ng
of the super-conscious but fears of vanous kmds are bemg
regarded as the source of religious belief. Religion is now
considered as a "compensation" for the feelings of human
helplessness and providing the need of "dependence" and
support, for man, on something bigger and vaster than himself.
Durkheim regarded God as only the symbolic magnification
and transfiguration of society and in his view the clan i!;
identified with an animal or a plant conceived as the totemic
divinity.l Social scientists have tried to find out elements of
kinship between some of the religious practices and notions of
the savage tribes of New Zealand, Pacific islands and Africa and
the Aruntas in Australia on the one hand, and the old religious
te.nets and legends recorded in the Vedas, Scandinavian mytho-
logy and the wonder tales of ancient Greece and ancient Rome
on the other. Thus the problem of the origins of religions is
one of the main controversial issues of the social sciences.
Religion has been variously defined. Broadly speaking, it can
be defined as a belief in the spiritual value of things. Some
scholars see ,in totem ism the origin of religion and some in
magic. Spencer hit upon ancestor worship as the source of
religion. It is true that primitive religions did not distinguish
between spirituality and superstition but it would be correct to
say that the primitive mind had a belief in something super-
natural or supra-individual. This native apprehension of a
"force", external and superior to man, was later on provided
a more rational and spiritual dimensi'on and got conceptualized
as the brahman of Vedantism. This same "force" has been
ProVided a philosophical dimension in Western idealism in the
~hape of the notion of the Absolute. So far as early Buddhism
IS ~oncerned it does not present the essemial aspects of antique
religions, as illustrated in ancient Egypt, Babylon and Mohen-
s l~, Durkheim. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, (E.T. by J. w.
Wam, london, 1915).
28 Early Buddhism and its Origins
pro bl em f d .h o.
f h world because these are In eete WIt transltonness.
0
41
42 Early Buddhism and its Origins
1 For sceptical notions see lJ.gveda, VIII, 96, 1315; II, 1,5; VIII,
3, 103 ; IV. 24, 10.
'l. The Mahiibhiirata, XII, 218, contains references to heretical teachers
at the courts of ancient kings. According to Pandya, Illtelligent Man's
Guide to Indian Philosophy, p. 123, the atheistical notions rrferred to in
the Mahiibhiirata, produced the doctrines of the Carvakas, the Jainas, the
Siimkhyas and the Buddhists.
. Religion and the Origins of Buddhism 51
'Ihe VedIe .
.' f Pancasikha and lanaka lanadeva in the SiintipaTVtl,
.dIalogue 0 r refers to atheistical views. The Buddhist scriptures
the f o r m e . d
twenty-three prevIous Buddhas who rfrece ed the
fe.fer .to 1 Sakyamuni. 1 Buddha himself claimed to be only an
historICder a of the old norm. H enee It . may b fl Iegltlmate
.. to
exponnt to find the roots of the Buddhist revelation and
auemp . 0 f quest, cntlclsm
gs in the later Ve dIC tra dItIon .. . an d
teachticism.
In 11 d h
Buddha is not on Y Sl ent regar mg t e mOnIstIc . .
scep . b . 1 . dfti
d pantheistic metaphysIcs ut IS a so In I erent, 1 not f
an licitly hostile, to the conception of a monotheistic Godhead.
e;lr:oost all the Semitic religions like Hebraism, Christianity
.and Islam, the Egyptian an.d the Mesopota~ian religions, and
the Aryan religions believe m a supreme deity. But Gautama
Buddha appears to be an atheist. The source of Buddhist
;atheism must be sought in the Vedic traditions of scepticism.
Since the Vedic days there were rationalistic and sceptical
thinkers. In the J!.gveda, II, 12, 5 and VIII, 100, 34, there is
a denial of Indra's existence. II! the J!.gveda X, 117, there is
'Stress on benevolence without the solicitation of the help of
any gods. In the J!.gveda, X, 151, 5, Sraddha Kiirniiyani is ask-
-cd to make men faithful and this is perhaps an indirect indi-
-cation that men were losing faith. Sometimes it has been held
that there is a note of scepticism and doubt in the Nlisadiya
hymn (ko addM veda) and in the famous strain-kasmai
.deviiya havisha Vidhema. There is a note of humour in the
lJgveda IX, 112, and of satire in the J!.gveda, VII, 103. Per-
haps the people who advocated one or other of such views are
called exponents of the Asura views in the Chhiindogya, VIIi,
8,4-5.
A study of the genesis of religious reforms points out that
the founder of a religion is not an isolated genius but he syn-
thesizes and brings to a united focus the inchoate insights that
have been attempting to permeate the intellectual climate for
quite sometime. The great teachers are not the accidental
freaks of history unrelated to the trends and ethos of the age
but can be said to be the explicit crystallizations and authentic
'~Xpressions of the implicit and latent forces that have been
1 Cf. SB., I, 1,6,14: He who sacrifices to the gods does not gain so
great a world as he who sacrifices to the Atman.
~ Deussen, Phil. of the Upani,wds, (Eng. trans. by A.S. Geden, Edin-
burg, T. & T. Clark, 1906) pp. 180-181, thus explains this cosmological
formula:
(i\ rad...:.cbra/lll1on,
(ii) ja-the universe has developed,
(iii) Ii-disappears,
(iv) alla-in brahman, at the time of its origin, the. universe lives and
moves.
3 S. N. Dasgupta, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 430.
4 Cf. the Uktha of the lIIaluil"rrra ceremony described in the Aitareya
Aranvaka, II, I, 3. In the C!rluIlldogya, If, the Udgirtha is identified with
the absolute.
5 According to Oldenberg, ZDMG, Vol. 1,457 fr. and Die Lehre der
Upanis/raden, pp. 37, 348, the real sense of the word Up01li~adis reverence
or worship-upasana. S.N. Dasgupta, Indian Philosophy, I, p. 45 alsO
,d' Religion and Buddhism
Post-V, Ie
. I times in India we find that Samkara, although one of
medleva st teachers of Vedantlc .mOnIsm,
' wors h'Ippe d , as
the grea t e , h d
.-. lIas it the great God Siva as the supreme God ea
tradItIOn ,
4. Monism and the Origins of Monasticism
Brahman also signifies the unity of the mi~roc~s~ and the
coa sm or of the psvchic and the cosmIc prmclples. This
m cro .
s I'S expounded in the discourses of Uddiilaka and receIves
t h e51 .,
its classic statement in the Brihadiira(l)'aka Upa11l:;ad whIch IS
a rart of the Satapatha BrahmmJa. Yiijnavalkya formulates.
the doctrine of the cosm;c Absolute who is also supra-cosmic.
He teaches one of the cardinal tenets of idealism1-the
unknowability of the subject. The practical and moral impli-
cation of this metaphysics of brahman is the exaltation of the
monastic ideal. 2 Yajnavalkya states: "Knowing him, the
Almal/, Brahma1.ls relinquish the desire for posterity, the desire
for possessions, the desire for worldly prosperity and go forth
as mendicants." Thus philosophical idealism and ethical
monasticism are vitally linked up in the teachings of Yajna-
refers to the theistic element involved in the conception of brahman as
antaryamill holding the universe in hisprasasana. Even the Vedic VarulJa,.
Mitra and Aryaman contain elements of being pure benevolent deities.
Indra is also worshipped as a mighty God and saviour according to-
~gvedo, IV, 17, 17 ; X, 112,10; V, 3,9. Saunders, Gotama Buddha, p. 106,
is needlessly critical of the Vedas and pre-Buddhistic teachers for not
having formulated the conception of a supreme, righteous and loving
God. Tn the Chhtindogya, Sanatkumar admits that various entities could
be worshipped symbolically but in the case of the masses these symbols.
could become idols. See Deussen, Philosophy of Upani$ads, pp. 113ff.
1 Yiijnavalkya's statement, 'na prelya sanjliii asti' (BAU, II, 4,12) how-
ever, prepares the ground for materialism according to some ancient thin-
kers. Barnett, attempts a compromise by saying that Yiijnavalkya's
eX:res,ion is of a materialist but his argument is that of an idealist.
- Oldenberg, Buddha, p. 49 ..... the dualism of impermanence and
;~rmanence Whi~h influences all thought in this age, here impo~es from
fi e first on the Idea of deliverance and on the ethical postulates which
ow. from it, this negative character: morality is not a form of active-
Partlclpaf . t h'
'" I IOn In e world but a complete severance of self from the-
nor d " Th
ho' e examples of Krishna, Buddhna, Samkara and others would.
fUI7e~'er? .sho~ that the Indian ethical ideal has always also insisted on a
alth participatIon in temporal activities for the uplift of the veil of sorrow.
g'Q/~ugh renunciation and isolation have been no less lauded. Lakasan-
.....0 and sarvalokiinukampii have also been regarded as vital formulas.
, ''''rl;~n ethical life.
60 Early Buddhism and its Origins
1 .8.gveda. X. 90.
2 Cf. R. Mehta, "Asceticism in pre-Buddhist Days", Indian Culture.
Vol. 3. 1936-37, pp. 571-84.
3 O. Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, Vol. IV, p. 104 and Vol. III.
pp. 59,66 points out that the Brahmanic ideal of redemption was esoteric.
scholastic, idealistic and monistic and hence it never passed beyond the
Philosophical circle. But Buddha gave a new tum to the doctrine of
salvation because (i) he severed the scholastic portions from the ethical
parts: (ii) he typified the ideal of salvation in his own person and (iii) he
organiZed the holy life. Hence there appear great differences between the
teachings of Yiijfiavalkya and those of Buddha.
4 The Taittiriyas, Gautama, Baudhiiyana, Apastamba and Vasishtha
advocate marriage. According to Baudhiiyana, II 6,11,26-27,34 originally
?nly one order of the householders existed. The other three orders were
~ntroduced by Kapila, son of Prahliida, who disagreed with the gods
I.e. Brahmins. See B. M. Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhist Philosophy,
PP.246-47.
62 Early Buddhism alld its Origins
1 BAU, I. 4,10 .
2 Chl"jndogya T, 12, This sauva udagiTlw is an invective against Brahma-
nleal external sacrificial ism. According to some interpreters it asserts the
SUpremacy of the spiritual over the materialistic objectIves of life.
3 Munrjaka, T, 27 and 28.
4 Olden!>erg, Buddha, p. 171.
72 Early Buddhism and its Origins
Bhl The description given here is parallel to the one given in the
2
agavadgir
Th a- --:- K iimiitmiinah svargapariilz.
3 p e SUndanka Sutta, Samyutta Nikiiya, I, 168.
'ard ~r ~ different view, H.C. Warren, Buddhism in Translations, (Har-
nlversity Press, 1915), pp. 86-87.
76 Early Buddhism and its Origins
FROM VERY old times the view of there being deep affinities
between the Upani~adic and the Buddhist1 gospels has per-
sisted. Gaudapada held the yiew that the main ideas of the
Upani~ads tallied with those of Buddha. The Sraddhotpiida
Sulra of Avaghosa, has a strong resemblance to the teachings
of the Upani~ads. Sadananda and Kumarila have believed in
the closeness of the relation between. these two powerful streams
of thought. 2 Max Mtiller3, Bloomfield, Rhys Davids, C.A.F.
Rhys Davids and Oldenberg adhere to the view that the gospel
of the Siikyamuni has been deeply influenced by the teachings
of the Upani~ads. Stcherbatsky who interprets the central
conception of Buddhism as a radical pluralism traces the con-
cept Of Dharma, meaning vital essential super-subtle elements,
in .the Kalhopani!jad. 1 Keith regards Buddha as an agnostic
u.
th 1 Dasgupta, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 220-221, says that most of
schools of Vaishnava thought accepted the cosmology of the Samkhya.
p l~ may possibly justify the assumption that "Kapila's doctrine was
p~~8abIY th~istic." Ibid., p. 221. According to Dasgupta, Indian Idealism,
Ofth' the Pancharatra theology is contemporaneous with the development
2 ~h~ought of the sophistical teachers.
prath ndogya, VI, 2, I, tasmiidasatah sajjiiyiita. Cf. the ~gveda, deviinam
3 Aarne y~ge asato sadajiiyata .
. M. Plzzagalli, Ciirvaka Nastika e Lokayatika, Pisa. 1907.
~4 Early Buddhism and its Origin.s-
is that both refused to accept the sacrificial cult. But there is no logical
traln~tion from transcendentalism to rationalism.
K B o;,SSIO, The Way of lVirvQlJa. Poussin, "A Few Words on Sukha,"
I ' : alhak Commemoration }'oillme (Poona, Bhandarkar Research
p.nstltute
393 ~ 1932)
_ ,~p.,5 -56. 5 ' to H.G. Wells, OUlime
Accordmg .of' Hwory,
i
tion D1rval)a Signifies serenity of soul. NirviilJa does not mean extinc-
Dlak' 1~ only means the extinction of future personal aims that necessarily
e
has v l.fe base or pitiful or dreadful. When the first-personal pronoun
ani shed fro m h'IS private
, ,
thoughts, then he has reached the higher
90 Early Buddhism and its Originl
BUDDHIST PESSIMISM
1. Introduction
THE CONCEPT OF Dukkha represents one of the dominant aspects
of Buddhist religion and philosophy. 1 It is a significant expres-
sion of the incongruities, contradictions, frustrations and
unhappiness that meet an individual if he is sensitive and cares
to interpret his experiences. Dukkha is born out of the never-
ceasing tension between the subjective aspirations of the
individual-the uptidiina, and the limitations and inhibitions
imposed by the concrete objective extenal set of situations.
Dukkha is an expression of the gloom, despondency and
privations produced by the impediments to human ideation,
identifications and interests. There is a constant struggle between
the multiplicity of human expectations and desires and the
niggardliness and restrictions of nature in their fulfilment.
Hence human life is full of pain, grief and sorrow. The eternal
enigma and the perpetual threat of death always pervades the-
expressions of philosophical thinkers and poets. In several
cultures the stupendous helplessness and utter extinction
symbolized by death has appeared as a grim reality and a
co~stant source of philosophizing. Marcus Aurelius once defined
philosophy as meditation over death. Confucius, the Chinese
d ~~.A_~. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, p. 157, says that the Buddhist word
u _d a like the Christian word sin is the widest possible concept for the
:~\l e~l. But I feel that there is great difference between the two because
inn e In Christianity sin refers to the debasement or fall from a primordial
in ~ce~ce .and is to be traced to tasting the fruit of the tree of knowledge,
u. dhism dukkha is to be traced not to knowledge but to its precise
op........vSlte '''-
BUddh' " UVlJla. For the difference between the Egyptian, Vedic-
Vol IllStlC and Zoroastrian ideas of sin, Life of Swami Vivekananda,
, ,p. 712.
114 Early Buddhism and its Origins
sage, was also deeply perturbed over the death of his mother
and found solace in the performance of altruistic actions. 1
The Buddhist theory of dukkhaviida is an expression of the
helplessness of man in face of the calamities and severe depri_
vations brought about by natural phenomena like disease, old
age and death. Man's capacities for fulfilment and realization
are limited and when his ambitions and aspirations are not
realized, he undergoes an experience of 'baulked dispositions'.
He begins to question the bases of his existence and seeks to
find a possible explanation of his discouragement, desperation
and miseries in some universally operative law. Buddha saw
an old man, a diseased man and a corpse and the futility of
all earthly endeavours thoroughly gripped his whole being.
He discovered that all living creatures are subjected to this
immediate, compulsive, universally operative, lamentation, des-
pair and suffering. Nothing in the shape of worldly gains could
satisfy him, so great and intense was the force with which the
aspect of nihil and extinction had caught his mind and heart. He
was deeply impressed with the phenomenon of what an
existentialist philosopher like Karl Jaspers would call "founde-
ring". He found out, therefore, a moral and psychological way of
escape for the conquest of this dukklza 2 He did not teach dumb
acceptance of suffering but propounded a way of transcendence
of it by robust ceaseless efforts.
2. Pessimism in Pre-Buddhist Indian Culture
The picture of the cuiture-mentality that we obtain from the
remains of the Mohenjodaro and Huappa civilizations is one
of worldly quests and material satisfactions. There is nothing
to indicate the beginnings of illusionism and pessimism. The
people at these places were a mercantile community and were
interested in architectural perfection, street construction, arts
and crafts, tools and toys. They relished the joys and satis-
factions of the world. Unfortunately, there are no literary
1 Cf. also the utterances and writings of Hesiod, Job (the Book of Job
in the Old Testament), Leopardi, Heine, Schopenhauer (Welt als Wille
und Vorstel/ung) , von Hartmann, Thomas Hardy etc.
2 Otto Pfleiderer, Philosophy of Religion, Vol. IV, p. 8, says that to the
pessimi5tic mood of the Buddhist evil is the true kernel of existence to be
removed by the cessation of the finite.
Buddhist Pessimism 115
m;~Y~~rwe.thesee
Vedic oPtimi~m, see
RV, I, 104, 8 ; I, 114,7-8; I, 136,15.
Vedic prayer; "Sight and light and joy do thou give us, long
V,
the sun as rises"-R X, 14, 8 ; X, 59, 6.
it
116 Early Buddhism and its Origins-
1 Even after death the Vedic people expected life and joy as the rewards.
of merit earned in this world. See E.W. Hopkins, Hindu Ethics, p. <l~.
Buddhist Pessimism 117
1 M. Winte. . .
Ullani~ad d rOltz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. I, p. 264. Tht-
2 Th U eel.ares - brahmano nirvedamayat.
e pam~ad' .
PhiloSophy. Ed IC aUI:ude to life may be partly compared to the Stoic
3 Swami V' ward Calrd, Evolution of Religion, Vol. I, pp. 325. if.
(Udbodhan ~kananda, Vedanta Philosophy At The Harvard University
CCI>tion there' ~e, Ca~cutta, 1929), p. 33, says that in the Vediintic con-
super-sensuo IS t e demal of sensuous optimism and the assertion of real
us OPtimism.
120 Early Buddhism and its Or;<>'
ollis
1 The Dh
khanda S amma-Cakka-Pavaltana Sulta. Cf. also the Maillidllkkfla-
2 M uttant,~ of the Majjllima Nikiiya.
Anatt ahQdukhask alid"na Slltranta of the Majjlrima Nikiiya. Also the
aliulta delivered at Sarnatha.
122 Early Buddhism and its Origins
lor in the depths of the sea, is there any spot where one could
)e saved from the ravages of death. Buddha says:
"If three things were not in the world, my disciples, the Perfect one, the
holy, supreme Buddha, would notlppear in the world, the law and the
doctrine, which the Perfect one pnpounds, would not shine in the world.
What three things are they? Birth and old age and death ?"
1 For the ancient Greek views regarding suffering and evil see James
Adam, The Vitality of Platonism (Cambridge University Press, 1911),
pp. 190ff.
2 S.K. Maitra, Ethics of the Hindus, p. 309, seems wrong in ascribing
th~ theory ~f ontological peSSimism to Buddhism.
C Accordtng to P.L. Narasu, Essence of Buddhism, p. 119, (noted in
B: F.. Rhy.s Davids, Buddhism, p. 171), the imputation of pessimi~m to
.: dhlsm IS due to the claim of Schopenhauer of there being afllnity
tween his system and Buddhism. According to Schopenhauer, ratio or
reason is th f . . . .
suff,. e actor whIch contammates human will and thus results In
bac~rJ~:. He prescribes a derationaIization of humar. will and a t L1rning
mo I the Idea. Buddha, on the other hand, prescribed an elaborate
4r~and P~Ychical diSCipline for the conquest of sufferinl!;.
ntrast Makkhali Gosala.
128 Early Buddhism and its Origins
lAO
n~uttara Nikaya I, 136 ff. and Samyutta Nikiiya 4, 127. The Aligut-
t~ra Nlkaya contrasts the delight of renunciation (pravrajylisukha) to the
i::r
e~szzes of home life (grihasukha), the delight of actionlessness
'S a~myasukha) to the pleasures of the 'senses (kiimasukha) and the
det eter~l1n~te delight (niruplidhi5ukha) to the pleasures of mundane
ermmatlOns (upiidhisukha).
2 Surta N' -
on SUkh~.. 'Pata, Verses 759 ff. Cf. SN, 4, 127. Poussin, "A Few Words
ing to th ' K.B. Pathak Commemoration Volume, points out that accord-
dana Wh~l S~h71. of Asanga, nirvilna is sukha without being sukhasamve-
tude.' T~sed 0 ~I~ukha is both beatitude and the conscisousness of beati-
efiUlhon is found in the Buddhabhumiiils tra.
130 Early Buddhism and its Origins:
1 See Van Hook, Greek Religion; Farnell, Higher Aspects of the Greek
Religion; Harrison Themis, Social Origins of the Greek Religion.
2 O. Pfleiderer, Plli/osophy of Religion, Vol. IV, pp. 236-37, points out
that Buddhism made a principle of the religious nothingness of the world
and hence was able to cross the barriers of race and nation. A.B.
Govinda, The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy,
fJUddhis t Pessimism 135
ANATMAVADA
1. Introduction
1 In the lJ.gveda the word iifman first meant the vital spirit (from- an
to breathe), then it signified the self of the world (RV 1. 164,4) and
finally it connoted the self of man. Besides titman the other terms that
signified the soul in the !J.gveda are manas and asu.
2 In Budd'u 's s~c()'ld discClur.i~ there is a reference to this view. See
Vinaya Texts, pp. 100 if.
3 Chhtindogya, VI, 3, 2.
4 Chhtindogya, VI, 11, 2-3.
141
A1Uil/11aviida
. istic sense and is attributed the capacity of tnnsmigration. 1
anl.m I'ew I have called animistic2 since here the tree is regarded
This v h hI" .
as having the jiva. 3 It appear~ t at t e . popu ar prn~l1~IVe
io of jiva has been given here a literary recogmtlOn.
conce pt n .
it appears that even after the emergence of metaphysical
Thus . .
man, I'sm some place.was ,provided in the Upanisadlc. lIterature
animistic notIOns which, were current among the populace
to d which might have been taken from the tribal population.
~~i) Quasi-Mater~alism : The Upani!?ads. als~ contain refere?ce
to materialstic views. In the Katha, which IS a later poetical
composition, we get the following verse :
yeyamprete vicikitsii manushye astiteyeka niiyamstiti caike.
Etadvidyiimanusishtastvayiiham variiniimesh varastrtiyah. Dev-
airatriipi vicikitsitam purii ... (Katha, 1, 1, 20-21). This Upani-
~adic passage shows that in those days there were two
standpoints regarding the destiny of the soul-one view
maintained that the soul continued to exist as an entity even
after the extinction of the body and the other held that with
physical death there was the disintegration of the soul also.
Here there is the explicit mention of the view that according
to one school of thinkers, after death, the soul ceased to exist.
Thus it i.s held by this school that the soul existed only as long
as the body did. This opinion resembles the belief of the
Susikshita Carvakas (as distinguished from the Dhflrta Carvaka)
that the soul survived so long as the body did. To some extent
the Upani~adic view mentioned here may also be compared to
the view of the principal Semitic religions- Christianity and
Islam, according to which the soul lasted as long as the body but
1 There are animistic notions even in the lJ.gveda. "There seems to be
a belief in the Vedas that the soul could be separated from the body in
states of swoon, and that it could exist after death ... In a hymn of the
RV, (X/58) the soul (manas) of man apparently unconscious is invited to
~me back to him from the trees, herbs, the sky, the sun etc." S.N.
p.a;~~Pta, A History of India" Philosophy (Cambridge, 1922), Vol. I,
s.;~UI:S
,
~or the Dravidian character of animism,
in ~Ionour Bloomfield, pp. 75ff.
of
G.W. Brown's art. in
the vital difference betwe.en the above materialistic view (as men-
tioned in the Ka!hopani~ad) and the Semitic view is that although
the latter repudiates the notion of a beginningless soul, it upholds
t?at at the time of Resurrectio~l the so~ls would miraculously
nse. The dogma of resurrectIOn (Latm resurrectio) is first
foreshadowed in the Old Testament. In the New Testament it
becomes an accepted tenet. The U pani~adic \iiew, although
partly resembling the materialistic standpoint in its advocacy
of the notion that with death there is the disintegration of the
soul, is immensely different from materialism to the extent that
the latter (materialism) would not sponsor the notion of
any tiling like the soul as an entity even during the living state
of the body.
(iv) Radical Pluralism: A peculiar meaning of the word
Dharma which implies that the Upani~adic literature even
sanctions 'soullessness' has been put forward by the Russian
academician Stcherbatsky. According to Stcherbatsky early
Buddhism is a radical pJura1istic philosophy accepting the
reality of seventy-five elements which are called dharma in that
system. Although only the Sarvastivadins explicitly maintain
this doctrine, there is sanction, according to Stcherbatsky, for
this view, even in the early Buddhist literature. He even goes
on to say that this meaning of dharma as element which would
imply the repudiation of a substantialistic soul is contained in
a passage of the Ka!hopani~ad. He says:
"In the Kafhopani$ad, which belongs to this class, a doctrine is
mentioned that is evidently strongly apposed to the monistic view of an
immortal soul (alman), and favours instead a theory of separate elements
(prthag-dharman paSyati). This theory is repudiated with the following
remarks: 'Just as rain-water that has fallen down in a desert is scattered
and lost among the undulations of the ground, just so is he (philosopher)
who maintains the existence of separate elements lost in running after
nothing else but these (separate elements).' Professor H. Jacobi has
shown that unorthodox opinions, opposed to the accepted soul-theory,
are alluded to even in the oldest set of the Upani~ads. These indications
are rnaje in the usual Upani~ad style and [are] anything but precise. What
emerges from the passage of the Karhop. cited above is that there wa~ a
doctrine opposed to the reigning soul-theory, that it maintained the eX(S-
t~nce of subtle elements and separate elements (prthag dharmtin) and ~hat
such a doctrine, in the opinion of the author, did not lead to salvatIon.
Samkara, in his commentary, agrees that Buddhism is alluded to, but,
G See also Hodgson, Resurrection of Human Body, 1853.
143
Aniitmaviida
y bluntly, he int~rprets dharma as meaning here individual soul. As a
vertter of fact, dharma never occurs with this meaning in the Upani~ads.
; : occurrence in the Ka{hop. leaves the impression that it is a catchword
referring to a foreign and new doctrine, some aniitma-dharma theory."1
1
-Afuifrnaviida 147
Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids has perhaps made the most wide-
spr~ad contributions in the field of early Buddhism. In her
earher PUblications like Buddhism and Buddhist Psychology she
puts a negativist interpretation on Buddhist anattii and wrott" ;
~!he anti-atta argument of Buddhism is mainly and consistently
Ire:ted against the notion of a soul, which was not only a
perSistent, encouraging, blissful, transmigrating superpheno-
rnenal being, but was also a being wherein the supreme Atman
~:d~Or\d sou! was immanent, one with it, in essence and as a
I Yor mental factor issuing its fiat. "1
1. Introduction
his arguments. J.W. Hopkins, Hindu Ethics, p. 44 also says: " ... metemP-
sychosis which is also known in a vague form to the ~gveda."
1 YV. IV, 15 : "punaratma me agan".
2 AV. VII, 6, 67, 1 : "punaratmu".
3 The Sa/apatha Bruhma~la 1,5,3,4, contains a dubious allusion to the
concept of transmigration.
The Pllilosophy of Rebirth 163
heaven'. (T.W. Rhys Davids, Early Buddhism, p. 55). But if this idea
was 'current' as a motif of the sacrificial ritual, it certainly was not
maintained by the Brahman idealists."
1 Warren, Buddhism in Trat/slat;olls (Harvard Oriental Series), p. 234,
says that in Buddhism there is the concept of rebirth and not of transmi-
gration. According to C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, there is the concept
of a migration of character but not of the soul. Referring to the later
tradition, Louis vallee de la Poussin, The Way of II/irvana, p. 4911 refers to
the Abhidharmakosa, III, 324 where there is mention of transmigration of
karmall alone.
2 Sometimes in the Buddhist scriptures consciousness or vljflana is
regarded as the transmigrating entity. H. Oldenberg, Buddha, points to
the appearance of Miira at the time of the death of Godhika. "When the
venerable Godhika has brought about his own death by opening a vein,
the disciples see a dark cloud of smoke' moving to and fro on all sides
round his corpse. They ask Buddha what the smoke means. "That is
Mara, the wicked one, 0 disciples," says Buddha: 'he is looking for the
noble Godhika's consciousness: where has the noble Godhika's con-
sciousness found its place?' But the noble Godhika has entered into
Nirvana; his consciousness nowhere remains". Quoted from the SamYlIttQ
Nikiiya, Vol. I, in H. OJdenberg, BlIddfta, pp. 266-267. .
3 Cf. The Lallkiil'afiira Slirra, iii, quoted in D. T. Suzuki, Outlines of
Malia),Ulla Buddhism, p. 41 :
"In a combination of causes
The vulgar seek the reality of self.
As truth thy understand not,
From birth to birth they transmigrate."
The Philosophy of Rebirth 165
1 According to the Vedic belief, life and joy after death were regarded
as the reward of virtue, See E, W. Hopkins, Hindu Ethics, p. 42,
The Philoso1?hy of Reqirth 167
and bereft of all personality, does not contain the possibility of ethics."l
1 Mel
I'T\e -:ed, SpinozQ and Budd/ra, p. 243.
~d e\hi arho"Qni~tJd, T, 3, 7 also stresses the combination of knowledge
cs and condemns one who is Qvijndnavdn, amanaska" and a.yuc!,ill.
170 Early Buddhism and its Orjgi1l8
1 Cf. Kaegi, The J!.gveda, p. 18: " ... the hymns strongly prove how
deeply the prominent minds in the people were persuaded that the eternal
ordinances of the rulers of the world were as inviolable in mental and
moral matters as in the realm of nature, and that every wrong act, even
the unconscious, was punished and the sin expiated."
2 E.J. Thomas, The Life of Buddha, p. 173, thus describes the anthro-
polo,ical roots of the notion behind rita; "The possibility of such a
conception must have arisen very early in the formation and growth of
the association of individuals in societies. A member of a tribe must act
it) certain ways supposed to be advantageous to his feHow individuals and
himself, and certain other actions are forbidden." .
a The word Artamanya in the Amarna letters (c. 1380-1350 B.C.) IS
comparable to the Sanskrit Ritamanya. The Mitannian evidence (1475-
1280 B.C.), may be also cited in this connexion ; Artasumara is comparable
to the Sanskrit J!.tosmaro (mindful of right) and Artotomo is parallel to
tho Vedic Rltailhamon. 0
Accordin, to Macdonell, Vedic Mythology, p. 11,26 rta signifies t':':
kinds of order: (i) order in the moral world as truth and right, and (11)
order in the reli,ious world - sacrifice and rite.
I lWasya pantlulmanvttl slJdhu vijanatTva na diao mind/i.
1 Buddhist Ethics
Eary
171
and goddesses like Savita, Dyauh and Prithivi have also moral
attributes applied to them. The fact that during the Vedic
period there was an emphatic and explicit distinction between
good and evil is clearly brought out in the opposed juxtaposi-
tion of bhadra (the noble and good) and durita (the evil or bad).
The Vedas speak of the evils associated with the transgression
of the divine law or the moral immanental law of rta. These
evils are regarded as vrijina. 1 The God VaruJ:.la is regarded as
the forgiver of sins and evil. There is an advanced notion of
ethical evolution involved in the idea that VaruJ:.la knows the
motives of men. The J!.gveda also accepts the distinction
between moral sin and sacrificial sin. The latter refers to a
violation of the exact methodology of the sacrificial mechanism.
while the former involves a reference to the violation of the
laws of human conduct. The Vedas indicate the social aspects.
of morality in the condemnation of sorcery, seduction, adultery,.
witchcraft, and gambling. The concept of dana (gifts) has a
foremost place and in the J!.gveda we find mention of gifts
without involving any mediation of the gods: this forestalls.
the Buddhist ethic of beneficence.
The fundamental theme of the Upani~ads is the all-pervasive-
ness and inclusive immanence of the supreme spirit. The cosmic
self is identical with the psychic essence in its inmost being.
The cosmic brahman is also transcendent. It has been said that
since the human being can realize the identity with the absolute
by cognitive contemplation and since the supreme being is.
beyond the application of the criteria of good and evil, hence
the Upani~ads teach a transcendent supermoralism. But the
Upani~ads stress the ethical path both as a preparatory discip-
line for the acquisition of supreme knowledge and as a natural
consequence of spiritual gnosis. The Mumlakopani$ad points
out that supreme knowledge cannot be attained without
rigorous conformity to the moral path. The Kathopani$ad also
stresses the moral disciplines as a preparation for the attainment
of the liberating knowledge. The Brihadlzra1J.yaka Upani~ad also
st.resses beneficence and asceticism. The Taittiriya Upani$ad
gives us the categorical imperatives of the virtues essential
for a householder. The Chhandogya gives us the ethic of the
. 1 The Atharvaveda, xi. 8, 19 and vi. 26. refers to pilpman or an
unpersonal evil.
178 Early Buddhism and its Origins
r
~enerates false attachments and perversities. Good actions
e two consequences. They eventually !ead to the realization
o the sU!lreme goal of final extinction of all pain, evil and
! Dhammapada,
Ibid., 47-48.
296-301
.
I Ibid, 80.
186 Early Buddhism and its Origin&'
1 Dhammapada, 368-372.
2 Dhammapada, "Miscellaneous," 15.
The Buddhist Ethics 187
Morality has an inner source and impulsion and its efficacy lies
in the purification of intentions. The Buddhist "way" is a
comprehensive code and it preaches a path which leads to the
integration of personality and the attainment of calm, peace
and silence. But although not supernaturalistic in its founda-
tions, there is an element of the a priori in Buddhist ethics_
Samiidhi and nirviilJa are super-intelIectual categories and we
cannot obtain a rational analysis of them. They do involve at
least an initial faith in their certainty before the a~pirant can
take up the path.
But although there is an element of the a priori in Buddhist
ethics because it is oriented to the path of individual perfection
and the attainment of nirviilJa, the eight-fold ethical way is.
calculated to promote the ongoing of the social process and
structure. The adherel)ce to the concepts of right speech, right
actions and right means of livelihood introduces better com-
Dmnity relations not only in the Buddhist Samgha but in the
greater society with which the Bhikshus come in contact. The
modern school of ethical sociology believes in the betterment
of society and the maximization of satisfactions by the rational
realization of human interests. But Buddhist ethics advocates
the realization of social peace and communal fraternity
by recourse to self-abnegation. There is no Fichtetan conception
of the perfection of society or of social justice in early
Buddhism but the concept of right means of livelihood, if
practised on a colIective scale, can provide the basic value
for Solving the social and economic problems of an under-
developed and poor country. In several countries we have
seen the rapacities and plundering activities of industrialists
W?O have brought havoc on society by mercilessly tampering
With the social and natural resources. Hence modern economists
are ad .
. vocattng the concept of conservation. If an extended
Soc~al application is made of the Buddhist notions of right
act.lOn and right means of livelihood, we shall get that incorpo-
ration of the m I I . " . h' h' h
d ream of S . Iora. e ement m economIC aCtiVIty w IC IS t e
S . OCIO oglcal economists like Tawney.
is omelImes it has been said that the Buddhist eight-fold path
d\ PUr~ly introspective and contemplative and is not adequately
'namlc It .
si<>nifi' IS true that the eight-fold path is regarded as
'" cant because it culminates in the attainment of contempla-
188 Early Buddhism and its Origins
~ Dhammapada. x, 137-140.
II. P~~6~~!th. The R~ligion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upanil~'
India r : The doctrme of Ahimsa is one which has never even 1D
CCelved full sanction ..
SuttaN .
'Pilla, "Mettasutta". 148-149.
190 Early Buddhism and its 0 . .
rlgllls
1 Dhammapada, 185.
196 Early Buddhism and its Origin$'
1 Dhammapado, 16.
198 Early Buddhism and its Origins
ti~ ~,ax Weber.' Religious Rejection~ of tne World and their Direc-
Wh ~Sh' Essays
Ie COr
in SOCiology, p. 323 : "It is also in India that the technique
d
MOnk.h respon s to such abnegation has been most highly developed.
tions oOj. as well as the typical ascetic and contemplative manipu)a-
. Were not only fir~t but also most consistently developed in India."
200 Early Buddhism and its Origins
civi1izat~.
1 Dhammapado,21-24.
The Buddhist Ethics 205
1. Theory of Determinism
DETERMINISM IMPLIES not only a check upon and regulation of
the operative efficacy of the human will but it also holds that
the life of man is sUbjected to powerful forces which are almost
beyond his control. These forces not only influence and
condition his life but even determine it. Although determinism
is different from the religious and popular conception of
fatalism which implies the total futility almost of the endeavours
of a man, it (determinism) does also seriously enunciate a
vital domination over the actions and life of man. It does not
absolutely neutralize the spontaneity and freedom of man but
it does emphasize that human efforts and will work in a frame-
work which is mighty and even uncontrollable. Some thinkers
have pleaded for the philosophy of climatological or economic
determinism while others advocate a theological or absolutistic
determinism. 1 In the dominant systems of Indian thought it has
been held that the merits or demerits of the actions performed by
a man and the psychological impulsions behind them accumu-
late, and in cours~ of time they acquire such a vital potency that
they determine the life itself of the man. Determinism serves to
COunter the tendency of explaining the facts in the universe
and history in terms of the random conglomeration of atoms
or an arbitrary fiat of an omnipotent God who dispenses
predestination. It pleads for the acceptance of a law-governed
~.orld and seeks to establish the determination of cosmic and
lstorical operations in tt:rlTIs of mighty laws.~ There is also
in 1 ~.P. Varma. The Political Philosophy 0/ Sri Aurobilldo (Asia Publish-
~ T: use , Bombay. 1960), pp. 92-104.
two ore AlIgllttara Nikiiya. 1V, 77, forbids speculation on four subjects and
Budddl .lhest: are. karma vipiika and lokacintii. Eliot, Hinduism and
IISm (London, Edward Arnold & Co., 1921, 3 Vols. Re-issued by
210 Early Buddhism and its Origins
'Vi ata is the law of effective austere living l and through the
rltivation of the vows in one's life can alone man testify to
'~~s sincere belief in cosmic moral harmony. Thus the idea of
universal order and rhythm at the physical level was substantia-
ted by the law of moral order. The concepts of rta and vrata
.effectively demonstrate the prevalence of the teleological
conception of the world.
The I itualistic cult of the sacrifices was an exemplification at
the religious and practical level of the belief in a universal
moral order of rta and satya. 2 The sacrificers had some specific
,goals to achieve and the external act was regarded as the
phvsical process for the realization of those goals. The belief
was widely prevalent that accuracy in the performance of the
sacrificial deed would necessarily produce the intended
consequ.::nces both here and hereafter. Everybody could obtain
the desired goals if only he stuck to the exact sacrificial
formula. The belief was dominant that the sacrifice is a
powerful instrument which has tremendous potency.3 It was
only a demonstration at the religious level of the conception
that to every action there is necessarily a reaction.4 In the
f!.gveda the germs of the philosophy of moral determinism are
found. 5 It is stated that the person who make s sacrificial gifts
1 In view of the Vedic emphasis on vrala, tapas, brahmacarya ; S.N.
Dasgupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge University Press, 1933), p.9,
seems to be inaccurate when he constantly harps on the "non-moral and
non-ethical" character of the law of karman.
2 A.B. Keith, rhe /?l'ligion ond Philosophy of the Veda and the
Upan(wds, Vol. lI, p. 464, says that there \\as no doctrine of a divine
judgment in the Vedic literature.
3 S.N. Dasgupta, Indian Idealism, p. 3, holds that the later moral theory
-of karman developed from the magical belief in potency of sacrifices to
produce the intended consequences. He says: "The law of karmall was
thli'; rooted in the Indian mind from the earliest days in the tribal belief
m the efficacy of magical operations, incantations and the like, and it
was only extendcd at a latcr stage into the ethical field."
4 In the Babylonian religious conceptions which almost arose in the
-same period as the Vedas, world-events were regarded not as the conse-
quences or natural forces nor due tl) human spontaneous will but, due
to, the decision
. (I" If/stu)
. 0
f gods. S. Langdon,
. "Babylonian Mysteries",
131eV Encyc/ apaed'ta of Religion and Ethics (cd. by James Hastings,
T
Th ols, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908-26), Vol, IX, pp. 70-72,
~e~ volumes have been referred to in an abbreviated form as E.R.E.
Ccording to R.D, Ranade, A Constructive Survey of Upani.wdic
214 Early Buddhism and its Origins-
Ethics, IX, p.813 : "It was only when the personal gods of the R,gveda
had become merged more or less completely into the pantheistic and
impersonal 'one' and 'all' of the Upani~ads that the doctrine of an
automatic principle of retribution arose. The passing of the Vedic gods
left a place for karman."
1 The teachings contained in Kurvannel'eha kormani of the Jshopani~ad
(mantra no. 2), is interpreted in different ways according to the philOSO-
phical predilections of the commentators. Samkara stresses only knowled.ge
(vidyd) , Kumarila emphasizes both vidyd and avidya (karman) , while
Prabhakara exalts karma, as the pathway to salvation.
2 L. Thorndike. A History of Magic and Experimental Science (New
York, 1923.2 Vols.). Vol. II.
n Moral Determinism and FreeJom 217
J(arm a ,
stors prepare some of the fundamental framework for the
ance gen ce of the theory of karm;m, though it cannot be denied
ewer' ..
that the later developments ascnbmg a transcen~ental efficacy
the apiirva and the adrsha or the conceptIOn of God !IS
~:rmiidhyaksha represent furth'er refinements of the old notions.
In the ~gvedic period .we find that. the worship o~ the various
deities is carried out In such passIOnate reverentIal mood that
the notion, that the gods were mere passive spectators and the
sacrificial mechanism had powers of auto-dynamic operation
does not seem convincing. In the Mimansa philosophy, the
autonomous potency of the sacrificial cult was exalted to the
height.
The anthropological ~(Udy of the genesis of the notion of
-karman which traces its roots in primitive magical ideas and
ghost-worship receives some additional substantiation from
the later developments of the theory of karman, where also
significant vestiges of old primitive notions are discovered.
In the philosophy of the Jainas we find the maintenance of belief
in subtle karman-matter which is supposed to pour into the
the soul and stick to that. 'This' process of sticking is aided by
the passions of men.l The karman-matter that adheres to the
soul generates a colouration like white, black etc. This
colouration is termed leshya in Jaina philosophy. This primitive
notion of coiouration by the efficacy of karman, as the
determinant of the character of the soul, that is elaborated in
Jainism, is also mai~tajned in the Dhammapada which says:
kanham dhammam vippahtiya sukkam bhtivetha pandito. 2 This
notion of karman-colouration thus appears to be a part of a
genera! tradition which was accepted both by Jainism and
Buddhism. 3 The Yoga system of Patanjali also accepts this
1 cr. the view of Leibnitz that materia prima clouds and mystifies the
representations of the monads
2 Dh
a t' ammapada (87). It means that a wise man should renounce 'black'
c3Ions and stick to 'white' ones.
,'n Some.primitive notions regarding karman also appear in the Buddhist
~Smologlcal I'
the specu allOns, e.g.: "at the beginning of the recreation of
which world there a' . t he vast VOl'd 0 f the universe
flse In ' . 'Winds born of acts
(Quote!e~p up I~e clouds from which the creative rain will pour".
to the S ~ POUSSID, "Karma", E.R.E. Vol. VII, pp. 673-7S). According
said to ar~ hanga (Jiitaka Jiitaka, No. 522), the lurking deed karman, is
walt long to catch a man and in his last birth gets its opportunity.
218 Early Buddhism and its Origins
say~ that tht" triplet, actioh of mind manokamma) , action of word and
actIOn of body is a contribution of the Buddhist and Jain scriptures. She
(;redils Zarathustra for having taught a similar view in Persia. Cf. the
term Mallllsikiira, The Compelldium 0/ Philosophy (of Anuruddha, E.
trans. of Abhidhallllllatha-Sangaha by S.Z. Aung and edited by C.A.F.
Rhys D4vids. PTS. series, London, 1910), p. 95 n. 1.
1 Mrs. RhyS Davids, "Soul Theory in Buddhism", JRAS., 1903,
~p: 587-591, says that there is apparent contradiction between nihilistic
l~htm~lliSm and the belief in karmall which implies a persistent <;:ontinuity
) .,1 e Individual.
- A.K. Coomaraswamy, Buddha and the Gospel 0/ Buddhism, p. 109.
226 Early Buddhism and its Origil'l3
the Buddhist view about the body, Oldenberg says: " ...... [it is1
the action of his past state, which then assuming a form
realised through his endeavour, has become endowed with a
tangible existence." The conjunction of upadiina and karman
would show that early Buddhism adhered to the organic view
of the universe. J The elimination of upiidiina2 is essential for the
attainment of nirviifJa. The older generation of Pali scholars
was mistaken in maintaining that the exhaustion of karman
would produce nirviifJa. It may be pointed out that this is
interpreting early Buddhism on the lines of lainism. 3 According
to the lains, bondage is regarded as being produced due to the
influx of subtle material karman - particles into the soul and
consequently the samvara (arrest or stoppage) and nirjara
(exhaustion or wearing out) of karma are viewed as leading to
the liberation of the soul. But, according to Buddhism, not the
mere stoppage of physical action but the neutralization of the
psychological clinging to action is essential for nirviifJa. Al-
though Buddha is a great ethical teacher and inculcates the
supremacy of moral living and righteous endeavours it will
be incorrect to interpret him as the promulgator only of the
sanctity of actions. Beyond actions he teaches the supremacy
of knowledge. Although karman has a vital importance in
1 The relation of lIpiidiina and karman has been analysed in the Tathatii
philosophy of Asvaghosha - S.N. Dasgupta, Indian Philosophy, I, p. 133.
2 According to the later Buddhist scholastics, the loss of lIpiidana along
with that of (a) karma, (b) drshti, (c) silavrata and (d) atmaviida follows
from the loss of egoistic feelings.
3.1ames B. Pratt. The Pilgrimage of Buddhism (New York, The
Macmillan Co., 1928), p. 73 : "It is Tanhii, craving, that keeps one on the
wea~y wheel of rebirth and brin gs one back after the death of the body
to birth in a new one. That one's karma was the cause of rebirth was a
Brahmin and Jaina concept; hence the ideal of worklessness as a mea"ns
of salvation, referred to so repeatedly in the Bhagavad-Gitii, and the
altern?t of the Jainas to extinguish acquired karma through ascetic
practices and avoid the acquisition of new karma. Against these concep-
~,ons the Buddha set up his new psycholo3ical theory (if so we may stylt'
It) that reb'Irth was due nCi to karma but to craving; and that by rooting
Out evil d . .. .
r eSlre and the will to hve one could escape from rebIrth,
ceogardless of the karma one had brought with one to this life. This, of
a Urse ' was a muc h more hopeful and moral doctnne, " and one for which
coedrtain
pr uced." amount of empirical evidence based on analogy could be
232 Early Buddhism and its Origins
7. Conclusion
Buddha repudiated the conception of the spiritual self as a
substance but he accepted the supremacy of the law of karlllo.
This law of karma had been accepted since the Vedic times. The
prevalence of the ritualistic cult strengthened the belief in {he
law of karma because the different sacrificial mechanisms and
processes Were supposed to operate with almost a deterministic
certainty so far as the production of the intended result was
concerned. It has been sponsored by some sociologists that the
concept of causality is only a sophisticated version of the .old
primitive belief in the prevalence of the notion of retributIOn .
. I
The theory of karma served several purposes from phiJosoph 1ca
a~d so~iological stan~points ..It inculcated the view of a ~ur~:~
SIVe UDlverse because It promised good re5ults to the SUIt ,. 1
evii to the wicked and the sinner. To impart a popular appea
1 In the lvfafihillla Nikciya, I, 509, and Sclfla Nipiita, 749, nirvat:la is said
to be productive of health and happiness. The Sriima(/yapfwla Sutta
out Iines the benefits of lIirl'ii(w.
~ Ac;:orJing to the Cula-Gopiilaka Sulta of the' ,\1ajjhima Nikaya,
nirrtl1ia is consequent upon the attainment of the status of aupaplitika
der;7 whidl is rcal ized through the cl.'ssation of five al'Gra-bfliigiya-
Sal1w:hll.l. T'lC Abfridfrallllllathasamgaha states that ninlillU is not con-
cern:::.! with mJte,iJI entities and is realized through the knowledge of the
fo:.]r palhs. "rt is c:l!led lIibblillG in that it is departure (lIi-valr) from that
craving which is called valla." - C.A.F. Rhys Davids, BuddhislII, p. 174.
A.K. Coomaraswamy, Buddha and tire Gospel of BlIddt/ism, pp. 124-25 :
" 'To say of a Brother thus set free by insight - He knows not, he
The Concept of Nirviif/a 245
sees not - that were absurd' (Mahiinidana Sutta, 32). In other words, it
is clear that the emancipated individual after death does not cease to know
things as they really are; the doors of perception being clean~ed. be must
Continue to see things as they are."
1 Dasgupta, Indian Philosophy, 1,151.
2 Cullavagga, IX. 1,4.
3 Hindi Trans. of the Digha NikiiY4 by Rahula and Kasyapa, pp. 116.
132-33 .
4 Schopenhauer taught repression of desires and contemplation. If an
lndividual pursues this path' 'he may hope ultimately to enter a blissful
state of existence, free from all desire and from everything tbat we think
~ a.s con>c~ousoess, similar to what Buddhists mean by nirvii(fa." - W.K.
rIght, History.o/ Modern Philosophy. p. 38('
246 Early Buddhism and its Origins
n;Cl~'~'dogya
Pe
~he Ishopani~ad swessed the conquest of delusion and sorrow; the
IV, 14, 3, stated papam karma na Slishyata ; the Muru/aka
,3, stresses karmapravilinatva and the Kalha, VI, 10-11, emphasizes
ti~~~has ~he goal to be realized by the spiritual aspirants. In course of
2 M ese Ideals were preached amongst the people.
antra No 2
3 Hence t. . :
(B.G. Til I IS. ~Id that nirvii(la is not death but "death of death."
ak, Glfa-Rahasya, Hindi Trans. Ed. of 1950, pp. 57~76).
252 Early Buddhism and its Origins
nin'iiIJ a.1 The logical and me\a~ical discussions about nit l'ii~lG
apper also in me Lankiivatara Sutfa according to which
nirvii1}Q is neither of these four factors as conceived by the
heretics; (i) bhavasvabhiiviibhiiva, (ii) lakshanavicitrabhiivablziiva,
(iii) svalakshanabhiiviibhiiviivabodha, and (iv) svasamiinyalcksflG-
nasamtati-prabandha vyuc hheda.
8. Sociology of Nirvii1}Q
The political philosopher or the sociologist is interested in
the problem of nirvii1}a for two reasons. (i) He wants to know
if there was anything specific in the social, economic, political
and cultural background of the country which made possible
the emergence of a concept like nirvii(Ia. If nirviilJa were the
mere goal of an isolated individual, it would not have been a
significant problem for the social scientist. But if it becomes
the goal of aspiration of a large number of persons, the ques-
tion of the possible correlation of the emergence of this concept
with the objective external situational background becomes
relevant.
I think that the factor responsible for the insistence on
suffering and despair in the first Aryan truth proclaimed by
Buddhism is the registration of a philosophical vision and it is
not possible to trace its immediate causal roots in the decline in
the political vitality or economic prosperity of northern India.
Dukhaviida in Buddhism is a philosophical world-view and
does not seem to be the necessary symbolization of physical or
political-economic misery. Nirvii(Ia is the extinction of sujTering
but it refers to phenomena which are not political or economic.
It means the end of misery produced by birth, disease, old age
and the chain of rebirth. These phenomena are bound to recur
even if there is unprecedented political power or economic
prosperity. Hence I think that the roots of the concept of
nirviit;(J should be traced in the tradition of philosophical
and ethical enquiry and not in the decline of political and
economic prosperity.
w I~ is Possible to argue, how.;ver, that although the sufferings
hlch nirvii1}Q wants to put an end to emerge from natural
phenomena which are operative with a deterministic inexorable-
11'1 Suzuk'1, 0 utlines 0/ Mahayana Buddhism, pp. 343-46. N. Datta,
mayana and Mahayana, pp. 193 If.
262 Early Buddhism and its Origins
deep samiidhi :1
(i) purvaniviisiinusmrti - knowledge of past births. This
knowledge is contained in the latakas.
(ii) through the divya caksu, the process of the attainment of
heaven and hell according to one's actions (or sattaviinam
chyuti-utpiida jniina). This knowledge is contained in the
Apadiina.
(iii) Knowledge of the Four Aryan Truths (including the
pratityasamutpiida (dependent origination). In some
versions it is said to b.:: iisral'akshaya jniina. This know-
ledge is contained in the Matikas.
Buddha had gained enlightenment 2 as a result of the practice
)f the severest ascetic discipline and philosophic abstraction 3
md meditation. He had fathomed the depths of human heart
md intellect through elevated attainments (samiipatti) and as
1 result of the dawn of noetic prajnii had brought forth the
;aving truths. In the Brahmajiila Sutta of the Digha Nikiiya
here is the assertion of the eternal dualism of the world and
he soul based upon the remembrance of previous lives in
~ittasamiidhi. There are also logical (/arka)' grounds for the
and cultivate them. From the inspired hymn of the Vedic /nuni
to the Patanjala Yoga-Sutra,l we find reiteration of the belief
in these pliwers. The PuraQas cO:1tain instances of the super-
normal powers of the saints and heroes obtained by the prac-
tice of tremendous askesis. 2 Buddha gains hold over the band
of a thousand latila ascetics of Gaya headed by the three
Kassapa brothers, - Uruvela Kassapa, Nadi Kassapa and
Gaya Kassapa, due to the display of his superior powers.3 He
has the facultIes of clairvoyance and clairaudience. In contests
with the heretical teachers he uses them. The existenee of these
powers is a matter of certain belief for the Buddhist but Buddha
warns the Bhikkhu not to use them.4 The belief in the super-
normal powers or riddhibala 5 is a second mystic element in
early Buddhism.
The Buddhist scriptures refer to a legion of gods and
The four arupa dhycmas are higher than the four rflpa dhyanas
which represent a lower stage of ecstatic contemplation. Buddha
had attained the cessation. of ~onsciousness and thus he
surpassed his two old gUld.es Alara Kalama and Udda~a
Ramaputta who had taught hIm only samiipatti but he was m
quest of the higher mahiipadhiina (the san(jnii- vedayita nirodha).
Another factor proving the mystic element in original
Buddhism is that the various categories like samskiira and
'vijiliina1 are subdivided into a number of processes which
cannot be demonstrated by the logical method alone. (e.g.
vijfuina has 89 subdivisions). They involve mystical experience
for their comprehension
NirviilJa is the culmination of Buddhist mysticism. Its mystic
character is evident from the fact that Buddha refused
to speculate on the proposition about the eschatology of the
Tathagata. 2 Nirval)a is a logically iUCiemonstrable state. We
cannot be absolutely certain as to whether nirvii1)a is an
unqualified extinction into void and notl ingness, or whether
it is only the Advaitic union with the supreme absolute 3
described negatively or whether it is the extinction of mere
empiric phenomena. But this much is clear that it is a logically
indemonstrable state. It call he felt and realised but cannot
be rationally cogitated UPOli. The insistence on a supramundane
nirvii1W as the supreme goal of human life and the prescription of
me am arid measures for the attainment of that reveals in an
abundant measure the mystical character of Buddhism.
1 Elliot, Hinduism and Buddhism, Vol. I, pp. 190ff. ,- there are fifty two
divisions of samsKiira, mostly mental or at least subjective states. This
list includes contact, sensation, perception, thought, reflection, memory,
attention, effort, joy, torpor, stupidity, fear, doubt, lighLess of body or
mind, pity, envy, worry, pride etc. There are eighty nine divisions of
V?iitina (good, bad or indifferent). It is admitted that vijiiiina cannot be
disentangled and sharply distinguished from feeling and sensation.
d ~ According to Schrader, "Vedanta and Samkhya in Primitive Bud-
hlsm", The Indian Historical Quarterly, 1934-35, pp. 543ff., the
~eferences to ariipa brahmaloka in Buddha's system are not directly
f aSed on the pantheistic Vedanta doctrines current at that time. The
o~r b:ahmavihiira exercises, however, indicate Vedantic influence.
i t Sn Ramakrishna, Vivekananda and M. Gandhi put forward a theistsic
h~ser:retation of Buddha's teachings.-The Life of Swami Vivekananda by
astern and Western disciples (Almara, Advaita Ashrama )933),
pp . 170-71.
274 Early Buddhism and its Orl'g'
1118
~ ~f:d"~gveda
I.
Me PriiI)a Vidyii", Kafyiir.a Yogiirika, op.cit.
1 R.V., 1, 179.
2 The Chhtindogya Up., vi, refers to the fast undertaken by Svetaketu.
3 Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, The Basic Conception of Buddhism, p. 6,
~tronglY advocates the pre-Buddhistic origins and development of Yoga.
e: also S.N. Dasgupta, Indian PhilosophY, Vol. I, p. 227.
't In the Upani~adic triple formula of sravana, mana~a and nididhyiisana,
I ~;~be argu~d that the last refers to the intensity of Yogic absorption.
6 S e ~utra IS yoginah prati ca smaryate smtirte caite (B.S., 4, 2, 21).
Prat ee amkara's commentary on the Vedanta Sutra: etena yogah
yuktah (B.S., 2,1, 3).
286 Early Buddhism and its Origins
} AccorJing to the Upani~ads, the technic of tapas is the way for the
attainment of the laka or region of the fathers and does not lead to
eman;ipation. The dCI'ayiilla is the way leading to the realization of
oral/rna'l. In the Mnitriiya~i Upani$ad. 1,2, King Drhadratha even after
rigorous austerities is represented as being far from attaining the liberat-
ing gnosis. Vijiianbhikshu, however, tries to link the Yoga system with the
spiritual knowledge of the Upani~ads.
2 Ch. Up., viii, 15.
3 cr. the Kaushitaki Upani$ad where Pratardana is said to have dis-
covered a n;)vel method of self-control known as alllaram agllihotrarn.
4 Ka/fla Up;, III, 13.
Ii K.U., VI, 18.
G K.U., VI, 16. d
7 The Brihadard!lyaka Upani$ad, II, I, 19 refers to seventy two thous
an
:hannels called hila which lead from the heart to the pericardium.
Yoga and Early Buddhism 287
l!raj1Jii.~
There are differences, however, between adhicitta and
siTa:While si/a is the name of a code of moral rules for tbe
lay adherents as well as for the bhikkhus, adhicitta is a system
of concentration and thus it pertains not to the field of ethics.
but to that of Yoga and mysticism. Buddhaghosa's contribution
in heaving formulated this scheme lies not in the field of original
construction but in that of systematization of a large body of
ideas regarding mental discipline. 2
4. Buddhism and Piitanjala-Yoga
There are some remarkable resemblances between the concep.
tions of Yoga of the Patafijala system and the Buddhistic
thought. s Both accept that through Yoga there is the extinction
of pain. In both the systems the pra::tice of Yoga is defined and
stressed without any reference to a Godhead. Buddha is silent
about a Godhead if not absolutely atheistic. According to
Patafijali, belief in God is one of the alternative paths to the:
attainment of samiidhi. Both the systems, however, accept the
concept of samiidhi. According to Patafijali, through the
practice of Yoga there is a loss of the sense of asmita or egoism.
In Buddhism there is no recognition of any soul substance.'
But it also states that with the perfection in the practice of
1 According to the Sutta Pi{aka, prajlla is allied to vijfiana. The
Abhidharma would comprehend prajlla under the comprehensive category
of samskara. The view that one form of prajlla-divyacakshu, can be
classed under riipa skandha is considered a heretical proposition according
to the Kathavatthu,
2 For the Sautrantika and Vasubandhu's conception of samapatti, see
Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 23.
3 J.H. Woods, The Yoga-System of Pataiijali, Harvard Oriental Series,
Vol. XVII (Harvard University Press, 1914), Indian Reprint of 1967,
pp. XII-XIX points out the historical importance of Yoga texts as form-
ing a bridge between the philosophy of ancient India and the fully
developed Indian Buddhism and the religious thought of to-day in
Eastern Asia. He also says that the Yoga system, together with the
Nyaya, and VaiSeshiska systems, when grafted upon the simple practical
exhortations of practical Buddhism, serves as an introduction to the
logical and metaphysical masterpieces of Mahiiyana. According to Jacobi,
the Yoga-Sutra is definitely influenced by Buddhist Vijlliinaviida and is
probably later than Vasubandhu.
4 In Buddhism the stress is on the purification of mind. In the
Bribmanical schools of Yoga, OIl the other hand, the substantialist
conception of man is always adhered to.
yoga and Early Buddhism 293
yoga, the least clinging to any egoism or any false sense 0'"
attachment is neutralized. l Moreover, there is both ideological
and terminological similarity between the Buddhist ideal of
nirvii[la and Patanjali's view that Yoga is practised for the
nirodha - suppression or ultimate extinction of the mental
states. The ideal of the elimination of sense-impressions is
accepted in both the systems. Both the schools use bhumi to
mark the progress made in religious endeavours. From the
numerical standpoint there is some parallelism between the
Aryan eightfold way and the ashtiinga Yoga of PataiijaJi,
because the number eight is exalted in both.
It has been sometimes stated that the methodology of the
fourfold Aryan truth of suffering - predication, predication of
its origin (samudaya) , cessation (nirodha) and the way to
cessation, have been taken from the contemporary medical
science. According to Vyasa's Bhiisya on Patanjali's Yoga-
Satra~, (Y.S., II, 15), there are four sections of medical science:
(a) disease - roga, (b) the cause of disease - rogahetu,
(c) health - iirogyam and (d) medicinal treatment-bhaishajyam.
Vyasa states that in the philosophy of Yoga also there are four
sections (caturvyiiha): (a) the world - samsiira, (b) the cause
of the world - samsiirahetu, (b) emancipation - moksha and
(d) the path to emancipation - mokshopiiya.
5. SOciological Approach to Yoga
In the early periods of the development of Yoga, it was
resorted to mainly for exhilaration and for the enhancement of
physical and vital powers. from the beginning, Yoga had an
individualistic orientation because it resulted in the production
of mighty individuals who could assert themselves against the
taboos and commands of the community. In the later phases
of its development, Yoga became a tecnnic of intellectual
illumination. The use of Yoga for increasing physical and
vital powers became more and more associated with the
practices of Hathayoga. According to the Upani~ads, th'e
attainment of supreme wisdom is the aim of the spiritual
1. Introduction
LIKE BUDDHISM, the Samkhya is a very important system of
Indian philosophical thought. 1 Rationalistic intellectualism and
dialectical subtlety 2 characterize this system throughout. Accor-
ding to Vivekananda, Kapila is the founder of Indian rationa-
lism. 3 The Samkhya enjoys a very reputable position in Indian
philosophic thought and the Bhagavadgitii calls Kapila to be
a perfect sage. 4 Kapila was regarded as having attained perfec-
tion from his very birth. Modern critics interpret the word
Kapila occurring in the Svetiiivatara Upani$ad 5 as referring to the
world-soul (hiranyagarbha).8 But Samka.ra and Vivekananda take
the word 'Kapila' there as a reference to the founder of the
Samkhya thought7 and from a perusal of the context I agree
with them. Samkara was busy c:emolishing the claim of the
Samkhya to be based upon the scriptures but even he too had
to acknowledge it as a smrti. Biidaraya1;la had also called
old times.
First I shall summarise the leading tenets of the Samkh
a
and then try to trace their historical-philosophical antecedeni
We find the following dominant principles and concepts in th~~
school:
(I) A very clear-cut recognition of the ultimate duality of th
subject and the object. e
(II) Prakrti or objective, super-sensual, unconscious nature.
In the words of B. N. Seal it is 'an undifferentiated manifold
an indeterminate infinite continuum of infinitesimal Reals' ~
GUJ)aratna (14th Cent. A.D.) in his commentary on the Sad-
dada'1Qsamuccaya called the Tarkarahasyadipikii, says that there
are two schools of the Samkhya. (i) Those who maintain that
there are different pradhiina (prakrti) for each purusha. (ii)
They who maintain the existence of only one eternal pradhiina.
(Maulikya Samkhya).
(III) Gw)as 2 - There are the three gU!1as or constituent
forms or powers of prakrti and not its qualities. Sattva is of the
nature of illuminating light, rajas produces action and energy and
tamas is an obstructing element. 3 According to the Samkhya-
Karikii, sattva is of the type of light (prakasa), rajas is the source
of motion (pravrti) and tamas has the character of being heavy
for and against the monism contained there. The vital truth f
all spiritual monism is declared there in powerful language.o}
have the conviction that the Vedas contain the elementary
roots of genuine philosophical ideas. Those scholars who hay
worked upon the origins of the Samkhya system of though~
mainly start with the Upani~ads. Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, for
example, says: "The origin of the Samkhya system of thought
is rather obscure. We find almost nothing regarding the
Siimkhya course of thought in the Samhita literature or the
Brahmat;las." But the learned professor is sadly. mistaken here
because he, too shares the same old prejUdice. It has now been
substantially accepted that the lJ..gveda contains elements of
ontological realism and that may be regarded as the basis of
the Samkhya.
The Vedas recognize the existence of prakrti. Just as the
hylozoistic philosophers of Ionia and the Greek mainland
considered water, air, or fire as the 'arche', so also in the Vedas
one finds that physical elements are posited as the original
constitutive ground Of the entire universe. One of the hymns of
the lJ..gveda states that water was the arche. Ramavatara Sarma
says with regard to the nasadiya hymn : "The arche suggested
by this ancient hymn is already very subtle. It is something
like Anaximander's Apeiron and appears to be the prototype of
the Samkhya conception of Prakrti. This hymn also refers to
salila, tamas, tapas, or water, chaos, and heat as the primal
elements from which the world has evolved. But these appear
to be later evolutions of that one (tad ekam) which breathed
without air (avatam) through its self-sustaining power of
svadha."l But I differ from the view of Prof. Sarma. This
hymn raises the fundamental question as to the breathing of
the ekam and it says that he breathed from out of his cosmic
power. The power of breathing shows that the 'one' was a
living being. Thus it means that the ekam of the Niisadiya
invested with the svadha is a sentient power and hence it cannot
be the origin of the Samkhya prakrti which is inconscient.
Therefore, we should make other attempts to locate the Samkhya
trends of thought in the Vedas.
P 1 ~f.. Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine, Vol. I, (Calcutta, The Arya
t ubhshmg House, 1943), 2nd edition, p. 305 : ..... in the ancient Vedic
~nnUla Earth, type of the more solid states of substance, was accepted as
~ e sYmbolic name of the material principle." Cf. the Prthvi Sukta of
tharvaveda.
ad~ !he Vagambhroi may be compared with the aditio With regard to the
JI/, see S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. p. 82.
302 Early Buddhism and its Origi1l8
summarized! :
(a) Idealism - The atman is the sole reality.
(b) Pantheism - The Universe is real, and yet the iii man
is the sole reality, for the atman is the
entire universe.
(c) Cosmogonism - The atman is regarded as the cause which
produced the universe from itself as the
effect.
(d) Theism - After creating the universe the iitman, as
soul, entered into it. Also, a distinction
is drawn between the atman as the creator
of the universe and the atman entering
into the creation.
(e) Atheism - By the separation of God and the indivi-
dual soul the reality of God was
questioned. The soul was contrasted
with God, was ascribed an independent
existence and even regarded as apart
from God. In this scheme the main
function of Gor! was to create an universe
as a field where the independent souls
could obtain rewards and punishments
for their actions. If the powers necessary
for this purpose could be transferred to
matter itself, God as creator of the
universe becomes superfluous. Hencefor-
ward there remain only souls and
primitive matter. This is the transition
from Vedantism to the Samkhya.
(f Deism - On considerations of practical utility, the
doctrine of a personal God is attached
in the Yoga system to the atheistic
Samkhya in a purely external manner.
Thus the Yoga restores the conception
of God which had been eliminated by
the Samkhya.
1 P. Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upani~ads, pp. 237-39. The first five
stages are also discussed in Paul DeuSsen, "Outlines of Indian PhilosO-
phy", The Indian Antiquary, op. cit., pp. 394-95.
Siimkhya and Early Buddhism 309
But here Keith seems to have deviated from the main point
In the Samkhya the objective nature (prakrti) and the Subjectiv~
selves are at least real entities, and hence there can be grounds
for false connexions. It might have been argued with more
plausibility that in the monistic spiritualistic Upaniadic
doctrine, there is reall) no ground for any saving knowledge.
All phenomenal plurality pertains to the domain of miiYii,
hence there is no real evil or sin from which one could desire
deliverance. But when a rigorous monism can accommodate the
concept of saving knowledge, why cannot the Siimkhya
:lualism do so ? The doctrine of emancipation is no spurious
external creed implanted on the Samkhya. According to the
comprehensive conceptions of the Indian mind, all knowledge,
whether it be of biology or botany, physics or paleontoloy,
medicine or mechanics, is for the salvation of the soul, and
hence the Indian thinkers, generally, start with stressing the
necessity of the deliverance of the human self enchained in the
net of miiya. Hence there is no wonder that the Siimkhya
also should accept the doctrine of emancipation from the ills
of the world.
We shall examine some other inaccurate attempts to trace
the Upani~adic origin ofSamkhyan thoughts. Dr. B.M. Barua1
traces the root of Siimkhyan dualism in the Prasllopani~ad.2
There a question is raised regarding the origination of the prajii
and the answer is that Prajapati produced a pair (mithuna) of
Matter (rayi) and Vital Force (pra"(la) with the object that these
which only believes in a law of movement (pp. 23-24). But the possibility,
according to him, of deriving both Buddhism and Siimkhya from the
Upani~ads, each borrowing from the Upani~ads independently without
the direct influence of the other cannot be denied (p. 24).
1 According to Benimadhava Barua, A History of pre_BuddhistiC
Philosophy, p. 214, there are 4 stages of the development of the Siimkhya,
considered, in general, as a rational theory of the universe. (i) The
Purusha-siikta of the ]J.gveda ascribed to NiirayaIJa, (ii) The Purusha-
vidha BriihamaIJa of the BrihadiiraIJyaka I, 4, (iii) The doctrines .of
Pancasikha as stated in the Santi-Parva of the Mahiibhiirata, and (IV)
ISvarkrishna's ideas.
2 Benim~dhava Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhistic Illdiall Phi/N0P"Y,
pp. 233-34. There seems to be no foundation for the idcntificatl~ns
arrived at by Barua between prii(w and PUrIlSIIll, rayi and prakrti, murta
and vyakta, amiirta and avyakta, and miilra and tanmiilra.
Siimkhya and Early Buddhism 313
ing", "Buddha has converted into religion what his teachers had taught
before as a philosophy". According to E. Senart, "Bouddhisme et Yoga",
Revile de I' llistoire des Religiolls, Vol. 42,1900. pp. 345 If., Buddhism is
dependent on the Samkhya for the practical teaching of the path to
salvation. He, however, also stated that Buddhism is more dependent on
the Yoga than on Samkhya. The views of H. Jacobi R. Pischel and E.
Senart have been quoted in Th. Stcherbatsky, "The 'Dharmas' of the
Buddhists and the Gunas of the Siimkhya", The Indian Historical
Quarterly, Vol. X, 1934. pp. 737-760. See also B.H. Kapadia's English
trans. of Pischel'S book with the title Life and Doctrines 0/ Buddha
(Gujrat University, 1965), pp. 80,82 and 90.
1 Th. Stcherbatsky "The Dharmas of the Buddhists and the GunaS
of the Samkhya", The Indiall Historical Quarterly, Vol. I, 1934, p. 749.
2 Richard Garbe, Die St'imkhya Philosophie, Eine Darstellung des
Indischen Rationalismus Nach den Quellen, Leipzig, Verlag von H.
Haessel, 1894, 2nd edition, p. 10, holds that Samkhya preceded
Buddhism not in the shape of detached ideas but as a complete closed
systems. The View of Garbe is referred to in Th. Stcherbatsky "The
Dharmas of the Buddhists and the Gunas of the Samkhya", op. cit.,
p. 753. A.ecording to Hermann Jacobi, from Kautilya's Arthast'istra it can
be inferred that by the 4th century B.c., the Samkhya and Yoga systems
as weIl as the Purva-Mimansa and the Carvaka Lokayata schools were in
existence. A. B. Keith, The Religioll and Philosophy 0/ the Veda and t/le
Upalli.yads. op. cit., Vol. II. p. 505.
3 WeberJlldische Studiell. 1,436. Referred to in Max Mi.iIler, AncienJ
Sanskrit Literature, p. 52n.
4 Ibid.
Siimkhya and Early Buddhism 319
1 Paul Deussen, Philosophy of the Upaniiads, op. cit., p. 140, says that
pessimism is the latent underlying view of the Upani~ad teaching, in the
sense of being the presumption of deliverance and the later systems of
BUddhism and Siimkhya which are founded upon it, dwell upon this
theme.
320 Early Buddhism and its Origins
leisureless. But the very fact that in the seventh and sixth
centuries B.C. several religious teachers were roaming in the
country and getting large audience for their sermons is a testi-
mony to the fact that the people had relative rest and freedom
and all their energies were not taken up with the drudgeries of
the struggle for economic subsistence. l
Buddhism flourished at a time when a large section of the
people had some amount of leisure at their disposal. Hence it
is that whenever Gautama Buddha would pass through the
village, the people would come out to receive him and the group
of bhikkhus. They would spend considerable time in his services
and arrange for the food of the august religious visitors.2
of the culture of the three civilized tribes, fhe Vangas, the Vagadhas
and the Cheras (Aitareya AralJyaka) upon the Aryans. The place
of this favourable development was between the eastern limit of the
region occupied by the Aryans and the western limit of tract of land
occupied by the Vangas, the Vagadhas and the Cheras The Tharuns
living near Kapilavastu may be a branch of tne Cheras, while the Vagadhas
may be Magadhans.
1 Sec R. Fick, The Social Organization in N.E. India, pp. 34,40,213.
The groups of Brahmins who flock to the court of Janaka, the Videha
King, are, with the exception of Yiijiiavalkya from the West - Kurupaii-
ciiliinam briihmanah (SatapalflO, XIV, 6, I, 1.). O;denberg, Buddha, p. 398,
says that even Yiijiiavalkya was a pupil of Aruni who was a Piiiiciila, E.J.
Thomas, Life of Buddha, 3rd ed., reprint of 1960, p. 174, says that Brah-
manism was probably recent enough in the extreme east of India to have
met with opposition and counter-claims. This would explain the origin of
reform movements in this land against the view taken by Brahmins
regarding their own functions. In the Upani~adic age, there are references
to Gandhara, that is, the north-west portion of India, to Kuru-Palichiila
and tu Videha, but there is no mention of the area extending from modern
Gorakhpur and Chapra to Muzaffarpur.
2 In the Upani~ads, Kekaya, Madra and Giindhiira arc mentioned.
According to the Kaushi/aki UpalliJ'ad, IV, 1, Gargya Biilaki goes to the
Kurus and the Paiiehalas, Kasis and Videhas, Vatsas and Matsyas and
Usinaras.
the political Foundations of Early Buddhism 347
thought. l Thus the hypothesis that climate and the natural and
social environment influence the philosophical, religious
and ethical ideas of teachers should not appear strange. 2 It is
but natural that the peculiarities of the situational context of
eastern India, as distinguished from those of western India
should find expression in some aspects of Buddhistic teachings,~
and have influenced its anti-Brahmanical tendency.' If this
hypothesis of geographical influence is correct then Buddhism
must have been moulded by the riparian influence of the
Gangetic Valley as distinguished from the continental culture of
what Manu has called "Brahmarshidesa." AcCording to tradi-
tion as recorded later on, Vena and Prithu were opposed to
Brahmanism. If the chronological conclusions of Pargiter
(Ancient Indian Historical Tradition), are correct, then it may be
possible to consider Vena and Prithu as precursors of the
Buddhist and Jain movements. It is remarkable that the scene
of the activities of Vena and Prithu is the same eastern India
where Buddhism and Jainism originated. The distinction in the
culture of Eastern India, Western India and specially of Magadh
and the Western Gangetic plains is definitely recognized in the
ancient literature.
2. The Political Background of Buddhism
In the Tell-el-Amarna tablets (1400 :B.C.), Aryan and Sans-
kritic names are found. If these indicate an early migration of
Aryan tribes from India to the north-west regions then that could
1 In the Sela Sutta of lhe SUlla Nipiita, III, 7, 7, Buddha says: "A
king am I, Sela. the king supreme of righteousness. The royal chariot
wheel of righteousness do I set rolling on that wheel that no one turn back
again."
2 In the Brihadiiraflyaka there oc:urs yii hlltel adhiserate manushya
lokameva tiibilirjayali which implies that there must have been a notioD
of universal supremacy (manushyaloka) which could be acquired by
sacrifice (BRU, III, 1,8).
3 In the BrihadariitlYaka there is also reference to the Madra land which
was visited by some of the wandering (carakah) people. The latter, how'
ever, were not yet crystallized into a definite group.
The political Foundations of Early Buddhism 351
1 Ibid. p. 22.
2 Melamed, Spinoza and Buddlra, p. 272.
3 Ibid. p. 302.
354 Early Buddhism and its Origins
1. Introduction
IT IS POSSIBLE to decipher two trends in Indian history and
culture. The one was dominantly sacerdotal, conservative,
dogmatic, hieratic and externalistic. Its spokesmen have been
Brahmins from the times of Vasistha, Bhiiradvaja, Kasyapa,
Yajfiavalkya and Samkara. The other trend was more liberal,
rationalistic al}d critical and stressed inner culture and sub-
jective thinking. Its spokesmen have been the Vedic sceptics,
Gosala, Mahii vira, Buddha and Kabir. There is a tendency to
minimize the radical nature of the Buddhist protest against
traditional sacrificialism and theology. The exact extent of the
Buddhist protest may be a matter of debate but it would be
running counter to the entire historical perspective if the pra-
testant character of the Buddhistic reformation movement is
sought to be denied by interpreting Buddha as a democratizer
of Upanil?adic idealism. It is true that Buddha did not organize
a crusade for the liquidation of the iniquities of the caste
oppressions and slavery but there can be no denial of the fact
that he prepared the foundations of a more liberal and critical
approach in matters of metaphysics and sociology.
Gautama Buddha, the gentle, kind and dignified prophet,
may not have been a protagonist of social revolution in the
radical sense in which a classless millenium is sponsored by
Rousseau, Marx or Kropotkin but in the context of Indian
.society wi th its deep roots in hoary tradition his words of
social wisdom did have a momentous value.
The fact that a leader of unchallenged intellectual preemin-
ence like the late Dr. B. R. Ambedkar found solace in becoming
a Buddhist shows that the ethical and social teachings of the
Dhammapada contain vital meaning even for a trained econo-
356 Early Buddhism and its Origin!
unity of the brahman and the atman and the divinity of man
But it appears utterly surprising that Buddha should remai~
silent about this dominant theme. Even if in his personal talks
he would not have been silent, he is made to remain silent in
the accounts about him tllat we get in the Tripitakas. Some of
the disciples of Buddha 1. ke Sariputta and Moggalayana are
said to be desirous of immortality-an ideal lauded since the
days of the ~gvedic concept of amrtam. 1 Nevertheless, it is
utterly surprising to find that Buddha and his early disciples
keep silent about the theme of brahman, whose knowledge is
supposed to impart immortality according to the Upani~adic
teachers. 2 The Tevijja Sutta of the Digha Nikaya refers to a
controversy between Vasistha Manavaka and Bhiiradvaja
Manavaka about the method for the attainment of brahmasii-
lokya. Failing to convince each other they resort to Buddha.
This shows that the contemporary intellectual opinion felt that
an enlightened person or Buddha should answer such meta-
physical questions. Even in the list of ten indescribable
problems - avyiikrta, this concept of brhaman-identity is cons-
picuous by its absence. Even in the Brahmajiila Sutta which
refers to sixty-two metaphysical views, this doctrine of monistic
idealism is left out. 3 According to some interpreters, the sixty-
two views are not metaphysical conceptions but indicate the
experiences of the progressive degrees of ecstatic enlightenment
of a person on the path of the realization of supreme truth.
According to Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, on the contrary, that
this vital point has been left out, is a crucial instance proving
that cordial relations existed between early Buddhism and
Brahmanism. But to me it appears that Buddha has left out
the discussion of absolutistic idealism perhaps because he did
not know much about it since he did not have much of meta-
physical knowledge.! Some interpreters like Radhakrishnan
would say that if the analysis of the prafityasamufpiida formula
is made then it appears that the logical nexus of avidyii, which
is the starting-point of the series, remains incomplete without
belief in some kind of an Absolute. But to me it seems that if
Buddha had known deeply of the Upani~adic absolutistic
metaphysics then he must have spoken his mind about it. 2 The
later tradition, however, credits Buddha with a full knowledge
of the ancient religions and philosophies. In the eyes of the
orthodox Buddhist believers it may appear preposterous to
assert, as Olden berg and Keith do, that a man of the intellectual
equipments of Buddha hankering after final truth had no
systematic knowledge, perhaps not even a rudimentary one, of
the Upani~adic truths. For the Buddhist believers it is only a
truism to say that Buddha had knowledge of the Upani~ads.
Unfortunately we do not have any accurate old biography of
Buddha. It is possible to say that Buddha may have had some
general ideas about the Upani~adic doctrine ahhough he might
not have known them formally and systematically. To try to
show that he had knowledge of that idealism through circuitous
processes does not appear convincing. Hence I do not agree
with the view that the absence of the discussion of the problems
of absolutistic metaphysics is an indication of the cordial
relations between the early Buddhists and the Brahmins. It only
shows that Buddha dio not have any deep training in problems
of metaphysics and cosmology. But although the early Buddhist
literature gives no explicit criticism of the absolutistic philo-
sophy of the Upani~ads and is silent about the word brahman,
we find the Buddha consulted on the growing social claims of the Brah-
mins, shows that these claims were a burning question of the day. His
own positions tracing the origin of social divisions or 'classes' to some
primitive norm or standard (dltarnrna) arising through division of labour,
and recognising only an aristocracy of intellect and virtue, must have
appealed strongly to those who were dissatisfied with the Brahmins'
assumptions." According to B. M. Barua, the pre-Buddha-Mahavira
sophistic movement originated with Uddalaka Aruni. Cf. the case of
Ushasta CakrayaQu. Ridiculing the attitude of Brahmins, Buddha,
Majjlzima Nikiiya (Hindi Translation p. 397), refers to "the andfla-ve(1lI
paramparti."
1 Aggmifla Surra, (Diglza Niktiya Dialogues 0/ Buddha, Va. II) p. 78 ;
"On the contrary, brahminees, the wives of brahmins, are known to be
fertile, are seen to be with child, bringing forth and nursing children. And
yet it is these very womb-born brahmins who say that ... brahmins are
The Social Foundations of Early Buddhism 367
genuine children of Brahmil, born from his mouth; his offspring, his
creation, and his heirs! By this they make a travesty of the nature of
Brahma."
1 R.S. Copleston, Buddlrism : Primitil'e and Present (London, Longmans
Green & Co., 1882), pp. 228-29, stresses the fact that according to the
BlIddhal'amsa all the previous Buddhas had been either Brahmins or
Kshattriyas. Hence he says: "It is therefore an exaggeration to describe
Gotama as a champion of equality against caste tyranny. On the other
hand, both his system and his teaching were indirectly opposed to it. All
castes (of well-born men) were equally admissible to the Community; it
is not clear that any outcast would have been admitted. The idea of caste
being a claim to status within the Community is repudiated; all such
distinctions are merged in the Community as the rivers in the sea. And
as regards the dominion of caste outside the Community, his teaching
was calculated to undermine it."
2 Aggaiilia Suttanla, Digha Nikiiya (Dialogues of Buddha, Vol. II),
p. 89: "Now it occurred, Vasettha, to some of those beings, as follows:
Evil deeds, sirs, have become manifest among us, inasmuch as stealing,
censure, lying, punishment can be noticed, and banishment. Let us now
Put away from us evil and immoral customs. And they put away from
them such customs. They put away (b'ihcllti) evil, immoral customs,
Vasettha, is what is meant by Brahmins, and thus was it that Brahmins
became the earliest standing phrase [for those who did so]. They.
making leaf huts in woodland spots. meditated therein."
368 Early Buddhism and its Origins
of the south are distinguished from the rest of the population. (ii) The
Namboodiri Brahmins worship cobras and the brahman as a solar deity.
(iii) The Brahmins used the sacred thread of cotton. But cotton spinning
and weaving was not prevalent according to the Veda.
1 E. J. Rapson, Ancient India, p. 55 : "The interesting fact, that the
Brahmanical religion did not include all the tribes of Aryan descent, is
gathered from the account given in the Ttindya Briihmar.za of certain
sacrifices (in lIrtityastomas) which were performed on the admission of
such Aryans into the Brahmana community. The description of these
non-Brahmanical Aryans-'they pursue neither agriculture nor commerce.,
their laws are in a constant state of confusion; they speak tht. same
language as those who have received Brahmanical consecration, but call
what is easily spoken hard to pronounce' (trans. in Weber: Ind. Lit.,
p. 67) - show that they were freebooters speaking the Prakrt or
dialects allied to Sanskrit."
2 Ambattha (Digha Nikiiya) , MadhuraSutta (Majjhima Nikdya) , ViiseUha
Sutta (Sutta Niptita) and Svetaketu Jataka. According to the Jatakas,
instances of intermarriage are also there. From the Jatakas, it appears
that the terms vaisya and sudra were only generic ideal-types and that the
actual components of the social structure were a large number of 'sub-
castes,' and professional groups.
3 L. Barnett, Antiquities of India, p. 7 : "Society (the Vedic) showed the
same contrasts and discrepancies as in modern times. The rich rode on
horses and in chariots, and lived in lordly ease, while the poor struggled
to wrest a meagre livelihood from the capricious powers of Nature."
The Social Foundations of Early Buddhism 372
cal prejudices and was interested in addressing his sermons tc
the Kshatriya youths of good family status (kulaputra). It is nol
possible to be certain about the caste origin of teachers like
puena Kassapa, Makkhali Gosala, Ajita Kesakambala, Pra-
kruddha Katyayana and Sanjaya Belatthaputta. But both
Buddha and Mahavira belonged to the Kshatriya clans of
eastern India. Hence they could not act as the conscious
exponents of the interests of the proletariat and the agricul-
tural laborers who formed the numerous assemblage of the
Shudras.
It is true that Gautama Buddha as a spiritual and ethical
teacher was not a declared champion of the suppressed sections.
But he did indirectly foster the cause of social democracy and
egalitarianism by his outspoken condemnation of the Brahmani-
cal and Kshatriya claims to superiority. In the fa'mous Ambattha
Sutta he says that some of the Brahmins are descended from a
slave-girl and among some of the Kshatriyas there was the
prevalence of brother-sister marriage. In other words, Buddha
condemns some Brahmins and Kshatriyas as mongrels or varna-
samkaras. Gautamll states:
"Then the Blessed One thought thus: 'This Ambattha is very set on
humbling the Sakyas with his charge of servile origin. What if I were to
ask him as to his own lineage.' And he said to him:
'And what family do you then, Ambattha, belong to ?'
'Yes, but if one were to follow up your ancient name and lineage,
Ambattha, on the father's and the mother's side, it would appear that the
Sakyas were once your masters, and that you are the offspring of one of
their slave girls. But the Sakyas trace their line back to Okkaka the
king.
'Long ago, Ambattha, King Okkaka, wanting to divert the succession
in favour of the son of his favourite queen, banished his elder children-
Okkamukha, Karanda, Hatthinika, and Sinipura - from the land. And
being thus banished they took up their dwelling on the slopes of the
. Himalaya, on the borders of a lake where a- mighty oak tree grew. And
through fear of injuring the purity of their line they intermarried with
their sisters.
'Now Okkaka the king asked the ministers at his court: "Where, Sirs,
are the children now?"
'There is a spot, Sirs, on the slopes of the Himalaya, on the borders of
a lake, where there grows a mighty oak (sako). There do they dwell. And
lest they should injure the purity of their line they have married their own
(sakahi) sisters.'
374 Early Buddhism and its Origins
'Then did Okkaka the king burst forth in admiration: "Hearts of oak
(sakya) are those young fellows! Right well they hold their own (para-
masakya) !"
'That is the reason, Ambattha, why they are known as Sakyas. Now
Okkaka had a slave girl called Disa. She gave birth to a black baby. And
no sooner was it born than the little black thing said, "Wash me, mother
Bathe me, mother. Set me free, mother, of this dirt. So shall I be of USe t~
you."
'Now just as now. Amhattha, people call devils "devils," so then they
called devils "black fellows" (kanhe). And they said: "This fellow
spoke as soon as he was born. 'Tis a black thing (kanha) that is born, a
devil has been born !" And that is the origin, Ambattha, of the Kanhaya-
nas. He was the ancestor of the Kanhayanas. And thus, is it, AmbaUha,
that if one were to follow up your ancient name and lineage, on the
father's and on the mother's side. it would appear that the Sakyas were
once your masters, and that you are the offspring of one of their slave
girlS."l
1 Buddhist melfa is parallel to the Biblical agape (or caritas that f5,
charity).
376 Early Buddhism and its Origins
1 Like Buddha, Thomas More in his Utopia also stressed the cultivation
of altruism. Auguste Comte stated that in antiquity the practice of
altruism was limited (0 the family, the tribe and the polis; in the medi-
eval period it received a further extension while the good of humanity
demands that in the modern scientific age it is universally practised.
I Cf. Samyutta, VII, 1,9 :
"Ask not of race, but ask of conduct,
From the stick is born the sacred fire;
The wise ascetic though lowly born
Is noble in his modest self-control."
3 Dhammapada (Nalanda Ed. of the Tripitakas) Nos. 396-401. Malt
Muller's E.T.
The Social Foundations of Early Buddhism '377
ridicules the claims of Brahmanical superiority as unfounded
and illogical.
A third important technic for social integration on Buddhist
lines would be not to give any place to caste in associations,
groUPS and organizations. Casteconsciousness generates some-
times dysfunctional stresses. Though the factor of caste as the
determinant of status-sequence was rampant in the contempo-
rary social universe, Buddha ignored it completely for entrance
into the Samgha. 1 The Samgha was a religious association
built for the solidification of efforts in quest of the higher life
of spiritual freedom and emancipation. Its dominant purpose
was the achievement of moral and spiritual certainty. Hence,
other considerations became irrelevant. It included persons of
different caste origins like the Brahmin Kassapa, the Kshatriya
Ananda and the barber Upali. The allegiance and loyalty to
the Samgha took absolute precedence over other sectional
loyalties.
5. The Sociology of Buddhist Monachism
A religious movement, regardless of the nature and signi-
ficance of the original truth either revealed to or intuitively
perceived by the founder, in the process of its historical growth,
partly assumes the character of a community.2 The Samgha
was not merely an association oriented to the specificity 01
functional performance but was almost a deliberate exercise
in total living. In other words, from the moment the Bhikkhu
joined the S~mgha he could lead a full life under the guidance
of the Samgha and through the friendship and companionship
of other fellow-members. Hence so far as the Bhikkhu was
concerned, he could lead an organic and full life in the Samgha
from the moment he jowed it to the time of his death. The
Bhikkhu could spend the rainy season at a certain place, he
could wander in the different parts of the country, at times he
eould be absorbed in quiet contemplation in a cave or on the
bank of a river or near a place where dead bodies were crema
1 Vinaya Pi{aka, II, 239: "As the rivers lose their individual distinctions
after falling into !hp. ocean, so thl." monks lose all their distinctions as
regards socia: status after joining the monastic order."
~ J. Wach, "Expression in Fellowship", Tile Comparatil'e Study 0/
Religions (New York, Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 142.
378 Early Buddhism and its Origins
1. Introduction
IF WE EXAMINE the Vedic literature and the Tripitakas with a
critical eye, we shall find that along with some of the loftiest
conceptions of mysticism, metaphysics and ethics they also
contain the records of concessions to the primitive ideas,
magic,! rites and practices of the common mass of people. 2
This should not appear surprising, it is only an evidence
of the catholic, assimilative and comprehensive character of
Hinduism. Even today, along with the sublime ethics of
karmayoga, there is a place in popular Hinduism for vene-
ration for the small-pox, the cow, the serpent and the dog. 3
Hence for a thorough sociological and philosophical stu1y of
religions we can neglect neither the higher theoretical and
doctrinal speculations of the philosophers or the rites, ceremo-
nies, cults, practices and myths of the vast number of
inhabitants. 4 Only thus can the intermixture of the exalted
phiJosophico-ethical ideas and the crude and barbaric notions
of the masses can be adequately studied.
The Upani~ads inculcate, in some passages, monistic
limbs complete. SB, X, 1,5,4, states that the pious can dispense with
food due to the good consequences produced by the sacrifice.
1 Melamed, Spinoza and Buddha, p. 256: "Desire and action are the
two sources of evil which bind man to this world of finiteness, manifold-
ness, illusion and misery, and pursue the soul from existence to existence.
When Buddha formulated his doctrines, he took over bodily this popular
view."
2 According to Hiriyanna, Indian Philosophy, p. 136, the references in
the Buddhist literature to other worlds and their inhabitants are due to
two factors: (a) people upheld those beliefs and (b) Buddha's beliefs in
the doctrine of Karma with its definite eschatological reference. According
to A.B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, p. 26. the Buddha himself was a great
divinity in the eyes of his followers in a "barbarous age."
3 According to the Cullavagga, Kakudha Koliyaputra was born in a
manomaya loka. (Manomaya Kaya, acc. to Nalanda ed. pp. 283.284),
4 B.C. Law, The Buddhist Conception of Spirits. The Ptirtijika I, 10,14;
II, 6,4 and the Pettavatthu. A.B. Keith. Religion and Philosophy oflhe
Veda, II, pp. 414-15: "there is no reasonable doubt that some of the
The Anthropological Foundations of Early Buddhism 389
.t
Buddhist ghosts are transmutations of tree and water spirits Que to the
growing animism which treated the spirit as merely living in, and not
having its life in the tree or the waters. But it is worth noting that in many
cases the Buddhist ghosts are to die and go to hell in a certain period
(Petavatthu. i. 10. 12; ii. 7, 12.) : it is natural to see in this the record of
the condition before final damnation of the preta."
1 The Majjhima Nikiiya, "Mahiitafllulsamkhaya Sutta" (No. 38). The
gandharva is 'exciting impulse' and is called pratisandhivijli4na in the
Abhidhamma. Gandharva=antartibhavasattvah gandham bhukte.-Narada,
"Samsara or Buddhist Philosophy of Birth and Death, "Indian Historical
Quarterly," Vol. III, 1927, pp. 561-70.
CHAPTER 19
'Thought from Lore to Science 3rd ed. are absolutely inadequate but they
do indicate a new trend.
I Oswald Spengler; The Decline of the West (Alfred A. Knopf), Vol. I.
P.18.
2 P. A. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories (New York,
Harper & Co . 1928). pp.497-98.
396 Early Buddhism and its Origins
BUDDHIST NIHILISM
nothing more; for this is really declaring Him to be the same negatively
as above. The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal principle,
as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the same
abstraction. "I
Even if one were not to accept any kind of naive corporeal
materialistic realism, one cannot help feeling that Advaitic
mysticism lands one into an abstract forced unity and when
the concrete intellect cannot lay claim to any mystic vision of
the transcendent it comes to beware of the formidable reality
of the brahman.
There is a further sense in which mystical absolutism may
directly foster the development of nihilism. By positing the
total loss of all sensation and empirical cognition in the super-
conscioss state, a mystical metaphysics necessarily prepares the
ground for the denial of all empirical phenomena. The logical
criticism of all empirical categories makes the worldly pheno-
mena appear divested of all solidity. 2 Thus both the affirmation
of the supernal absolute and the rigorous denial of all empirical
particularities appear to be very near nullity and so the
concrete intellect finds itself completely forlorn and hence at
last it may seek shelter in nihilism. This nihilism applies only
to the particularities of the phenomenal world. Both in the
mysticism of Eckhart and the highest jhiina (concentration) of
Buddha there are such negafivistic implications so far as the
mundane sphere is concerned. 3
Thus, in a sense, both agnosticism and mysticism generate
nihilism. Agnosticism fails to satisfy the realist. It can never be
an abiding attitude. On the other hand, the concrete intellect
does not find satisfaction in mysticism either, and may not feel
enamoured of the technics of Yoga for the development of a
transcendent vision. Similarly, it is also unbelievable that after
1 Hegel, Logic (E.T. by Wallace), p. 161.
2 Physical science demonstrates the presence of a harmonious rhythm
in the cosmos but idealistic philosophy denies the absoluteness of the
World. Even a modern neo-Hegelian like F.H. Bradley criticized the
reality of the world and showed that the various categories are infested
with contradictions. The concrete intellect feels bewildered when the
reality of the world is sought to be challenged alld in despair it lands
himself in nihilism.
3 George Grimm, "Christian Mysticism in the Light of the Buddha'~
Doctrine", Buddhistic Studies (ed. by B.C. Law, Calcutta, Thacker-:
& Co., 1931), pp.776-777.
414 Early Buddhism and its Origins
entity.1
Nagarjuna argues for the sunyata of all entities and cate-
gories 2 from the fact of their dependent origination-pratitya_
samutpada. This dependence or conditional character imparts
an element of contingency and thus makes the essences
(svabhava) unascertainable. In a contingent universe nothing
certain can be predicated. 3 The context of the phenomenal
universe is constituted by hypostatised relations which lack any
fundamental essentiality and substantiality. Pratyaya or ante-
cedent determination being only a cluster of momentary
dharmas, it is the height of anthropomorphic vanity and
egoism to search for any absolute self-essence. Eternal
nothingness is the primal stark fact in existence.' While the
Sarvastivadins (or the Vaibhiisikas) had accepted seventy-five
1 M. Anesaki, "Buddhist Docetism", Encyclopaedia 0/ Religion and
Ethics, Vol.IV, (pp. 835-840), p. 838.
2 In expounding the Miidhyamika philosophy, Y. Sogen, Systems of
Buddhistic Thought, pp. 195-97, refers to three kinds of sunyatii; (i)
samaskrta sunyatii or the ever-changing state of the phenomenal world,
(ii) asamaskrta sunyatii or absolute unrestrictedness of the noumenal side
of the universe and (iii) iilamba sunyatii or transcendental truth. Sogen
further says: "we may. only grasp the absolute reality or transcen-
dental truth if we earnestly cultivate our mind and body." Poussin,
Journal 0/ Royal Asiatic Society, 1910, p. 129 and A.B. Keith, Buddhist
Philosophy in India and Ceylon, pp. 240-245, emphasize the distinction
between the sunya of Nagarjuna (as interpreted by Candrakirti, as
distinct from the interpretations of other Buddhists like Bhiivaviveka). and
the vyiivahiirika sattd as posited by Samkara.
3 Stcherbatsky, Nirva(la, p. 52, institutes a comparison between Nagii-
rjuna's method and that of Nicolas Cusanus and G. :Bruno who insist
upon the negative method of cognising the' absolute. Thus Stcherbutsky
imparts a positive interpretation to Nagarjuna's sunyatd. He says that
Nagarjuna made a transition from original Buddhist pluralism to
monism. I, on the other hand, repudiate the modern attempt to make
Nagarjuna a positivist. In his enthusiasm, Stcharbatsky criticizes Keith
and Wallesar who say that Nagarjuna denies the reality of the empirical
phenomenality of the world and stops at negation and he (Stcherbatsky)
goes to the extent of saying that Nagarjuna believes in a direct intuition
of Dharmakaya or brahman or the One-without a second (Nirvii(la.
pp. 52-54).
4 anirodhamanutpiidamanucchedamaSiisvatam
anekiirlhamananarthamaniigar11amanirgamam (MK, VI, 1.)
Atmetyapi prajfiiipitam aniitmetyapi dditam
Buddhairnatmii na ciinatmii kaScidityapi desitam (MK, XVIlI, 6.)
Buddhist Nihilism 4lJ
infra atomic sUbtile elements, the Madhyamikas took the fatal
last step and the dharmas were shown. to be unreal, illusory
and non-existent. Hence while the Saf"vastivadinsdevelopect
the realistic implications of pratityasamufpiida as i,n.ter-relar
tionism, the Madhyamikas interpreted interdependence to imply
the negation of intrinsic reality.1
Summarizing the position of the Buddhist sunyavoda of
Nagarjuna and his various followers the Sarvadadanasamgrahll
says:
"The venerated Buddha then having taught that of the illusorily
superposed (silver etc.). the basis, the connexion between them, the act of
vision. and the videns, if one or more be unreal, it will perforce ensue that
all are unreal, all being equally objects of negation; the Miidhyamikas
excellently wise explain as follows, viz., the doctrine of Buddha terminatell
in that of total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slOw pro-
gression like the intensive steps of a mendicant, through the position of
momentary flux and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory
assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of reality."2
3 Criticism of the Positive Interpretation of Madhyamikn
Philosophy
Thl.! older orthodox view about Sunyaviida has been that it is
a nihilistic system and it promulgates the conception of total
non-existence. But with the discovery of the Chinese, Japanese
and Tibetan Buddhist sources, a re-interpretation of the Mad-
hyamika system has been made and it is now being imparted
a positive connotation. It is being stated now that the Sunya
of Nagarjuna is a concept akin to the concepts of Tathato and
Tathiigatagarbha (as found in the Lankovatorasutra) and all of
them either state or imply an Absolute. A second factor respon-
sible for the positive interpretation of the Miidhyamika system
has been the unfortunate reading of Begelian and Bradleyian
notions in the dialectic of Nagarjuna. 3 .
I am a conservative in the matter of the interpretation of the
1 But Th. Stcherbatsky seems to be going off the track when he says that
sunyatti-pratityasamutptida is advayavtida or monism. While there are
monistic and absolutistic elements in the school or vijfitinavtida, I a~here
to the nihilistic emphasiS in Niigiirjuna's teachings and am opposed "to
interpolate" elements of monistic idealism in Niigiirjuna's philosophy.
2 Cowell. Sarvadadanasamgraha (English translation), p. 22.
iI Stcherbatsky, Nirvtif)a, p.52.
418 Early Buddhism and its Origins
)iterature l and this shows the keenness of his intellect and his
firm attachment to moral idealism. These six pieces are ethical
in tone. An analysis of them would show that they are norma-
tive injunctions to strengthen the social bonds of people and
the moral fabric of character. They are not ritualistic or credal
in orientation. Asokan inscriptions are resonant with moral and
humanist teachings and are singularly free from the superstitious
accretions of later Buddhology.
Ai. a Buddhist, Asoka followed the path of non-violence in
practical life-aniirambho priiniiniim avihisii bhutiiniim. It is
true that Buddha never appreciated the extreme obsession of
the Jainas with non-violence, but, nevertheless, he bitterly
denounced the bloody sacrifices of the day. In Pillar Edict, V.
Asoka advocates a moderate and practical view of non-vio-
lence. 2 In Rock Edict I, he says that no animal should be sacri-
ficed here (iha). The word iha, according to some interpreters,
refers only to Pataliputra while according to others it contains
an injunction forbidding violent sacrifices in entire kingdom.
If this latter interpretation is correct thenit is a great illustra-
tion of the use of political power to implement a species of
social and moral reform that was so dear to the moral
personality of Buddha.
A third influence of Asoka On the Buddhistic movement was
felt in the great advance of the tide of evangelk;al propaganda. 3
"Carolingian systems of emissaries and judicial censorship" and to
Cromwell's estate of -saints.
1 The literarY pieces referred to by Asoka are the fallowing:
(i) Vinayo-somukasa
(ii) Aliya-Vasoni=Ariya-Vamsa (Anguttara Nikiiya, n,27i
(iii) Aniigata-bhaYiins (Anguttara, III, 103)
(iv) Muni-gathii=Muni-sutta (Suaa Nipiita)
(v) Moneya-sute=Niilaka-sutta (Sulfa Nipiila)
(vi) Upatiso-posina = Rathavinita sulfa (Majjhima Nikiiya I, 146-51).
(vii) Laghulovada-Rohuloviido-sutta (Majjhima Nikiiya) See D.R.
Bhandarkar, Asoka (1925 edition), p. 86.
2 V.A. Smith, The Oxford History of India (1941), pp. 102-103, "The
fifth Pillar Edict expresses the emperor's matured views on the subject of
ahimsii, or abstention from injury to or slaughter of animals. He
indicates his disapproval of the practice of castration or caponing,
and pUblishes many rules for the protection of living creatures."
3 According to the Census of India, 1911, Vol. I, p. 125, there were
10,700,000 Buddhists in India including Burma, of which all but one-thkd
of a million were in Burma.
430 Early Buddhism and its Origins
the final step in his Yogic system. 1 He was not explicit with
regard to any ultimate being which, possibly, is intuited in the
state of samiidhi. Mystics all the world over testify to the
realisation of some universal truth in the state of suprarational
consciousness. But Buddha gives no hint that he accepted the
possibility of the cognition or' realization of an ultimate existent
in the state of Yogic samiidhi. He has explicitly denied the
primal creative agency of a personal God. It seems (hat his
Yoga is comparable to the Yoga contemplated in the atheistic
Samkhya which teaches that meditation results only in a discri-
mination between "Matter and Purusha."2
3. Psychology
Dayananda dismissed the Vedantic theories of the soul, which
maintain it to be either one in essence with brahman, or only
partially different from brahman. He advocated the eternal
difference of soul and God and pointed out that even in the
state of Mukti, the soul retains its distinction from Brahman,
due to its possessing the "powers of the internal organs". He
believed in a theory of return from Mukti - which may be
considered a new contribution to eschatological thought.
Unlike the Samkhya-Yoga and Mimamsa, Dayananda believed
in the soul as being of atomic size. He ruthlessly did away with
the Jaina conception of a soul which views it as equal in size to
the structure of the body.
Buddha did not believe in a separate psychic ego. He denied
the concept of a spiritual human soul. Instead of the extreme
standpoints of annihilation (ucchedaviida) and the permanent
continuity of the soul (siisvataviida) he advocated a via media
- the procession of a stream-of-consciousness-states (vijiiiina-
1 E. J. Thomas, The Life of Buddha, p. 173, says that it is this "way of
escape fram pain, with the attaining of a permanent state of repose
which, as a course of moral and spiritual training to be followed by the
individual, constitutes Buddhism as a religion."
2 The Yoga of Buddha may have also some resemblances with the pre-
Buddhistic religious system of China because there too, belief in ethical
life was maintained without reference to any supreme Deity. Stressing
the difference of the Buddhistic system of salvation from the Jaina or
Brahmanical, E. W. Hopkins, The Relicion of India, p. 298 ff. says that
knowledge is wisdom to the Brahmin, asceticism is wisdom to the Jaina,
while purity and love is the first wisdom to the Buddhist.
Buddha and Dayiinanda 437
into existence after having previously been non-existent and having come
into existence pass away .....
1 T.L. Vasvani in his The Torch-Bearer points out that Dayananda was
a greater person than Anstotie, Schopenhauer and Tolstoy because he
(Dayiinanda) was a tapasvi and practised the moral norms while the latter
were only thinkers and artists. Dayiinanda's life is an exemplification of
immense will-power directed to the practice of vairiigya, brahmacarya and
tapasya. Vasvani points out that in the tapasyii of his life, Dayiinanda
was greater than Martin Luther.
2 K.P. Jayaswal. "Swami Dayananda and Hindu Social Revaluation".
Dayananda Commemoration Volume, ed. by H.B, Sarda, Ajmer, 1933, pp.
161-63, p. 162, "Dayananda emphasized, on the other hand, the tradi-
tional conservative regard for the Vedas and the Vedic culture, hut he did
not have the limitation of Sankara and rose above it and pronounced
440 Early Buddhism and its Origins
that the theory of caste was false, un-Vedic and un-Hindu. Such a thing
which was the negation of the laws of Manu and contradiction of the
accepted view of the Pllrllsha slik(a, would not have been accepted by
Hindu society, unless it came from a national type as Swami
Dayananda ... who could consume the cause of ihjustice with the fire of
his speech like the Buddha, and who could be irresistible in polemics like
Sankara."
Dr. Jayaswal is not fully correct because Dayananda interpreted Manu
and Purusha Slikla to support GII!lakarmOl'iida. He did not accept the
traditional interpretation which brings the Pllrt/sha-Siikta and the
Manllsmrli m support of a hereditary caste system.
1 E.W. Hopkins, The Religiuns of [lidia, pp. 298 ff. says: "And at the
same time the old caste-system oppressed and insulted them. It is evident
that the till!es were ripe for a more human religion and a new distribu-
tion of socia) privileges"
Buddha and Dayananda 441
1 K.P. Jayaswal, op. cit, p. 163: "He wisely, like the Buddha, composed
in the most popular vernacular Hindi - the present day imperial
Magadhi..." This is another national contribution of Dayananda. He
challenged the Brahmanical monopoly of Vedic wisdom and as an intel-
lectual democrat opened its gates to all.
Buddha nda Dayiinanda 443
1 Sri Aurobindo him~elf has paid the most eloquent tributes to Buddha,
"Thus it was possible for the Buddha to attain the state of nirviiIJa and
yet act puissantly in the world, impersonal in his inner consciousness, in
his action the most powerful 'personality that we know of as having lived
and produced results in the world." (The Life Divine, Vol. I, p. 36). I
may point out that synthetic was also the type of Sri Krishna. He was a
great Yogi and philosopher but at the same time he was a puissant
worker for the political salvation of the Panda vas and the Yadavas.
Buddha and Sri Aurobindo 445
Buddha and Sri Aurobindo, both, have attempted the cons-
truction of a philosophy of life. Both are creative thinkers but
they are not primarily scholastic academicians. nleir thought
maintains a living contact with the dynamism of life. They
want that the philosophical and ethical propositions should be
concretely realised in life. Buddha placed before his disciples
the supreme goal of nirviil)a in which there is attained the
extinction of all lower particularizations and attractions. Sri
Aurobindo has placed before us the ideal of the divinization of
the cosmos which will mean a fusion of matter and spirit. In
their emphasis on the transcendence of the gratifications of the
lower ego, Buddha and Sri Aurobindo remind u(; of the tradi-
tions of the great saints of humanity. But in their endeavours
to put their teachings in the framework of a philosophical archi-
tectonic, they also remind us of the traditions of the German
idealists. Hence it can be said that both these thinkers repre-
'sent in their personality and teachings a picture of Christ and
Hegd combined - emotional detachment, a deep concern for
the sorrows and afflictions of tormented humanity and a philo-
sophic mind which is out to make a theoretical scheme provid-
ing for the explanation of the cosmos and of life.
It is true that of all spiritual thinkers, Buddha and Sri
Aurobindo are perhaps the most fundamentally different in their
attitudes. Hence thIS comparative study attempted here is mostly
a study of contrasts rather than of common elements. But
there is one dominant common point and that is the emphaSIS
on ethical discipline. Both maintain that spiritual pursuits
require discipline, inner strength and a firm will. However, Sri
Aurobindo would not sanction the rigorous asceticism associated
with early Buddhism. His emphasis is more on the cultivation
Of a divine-mindedness than on the negative cult of restraint.
2. Methodology of Superior Knowledge: Rationalism and
Intuitionism
Both Buddha and Sri Aurobindo are partly rationalists and
partly intuitionists. Buddha was a rationalist to the extent that
he attempted to shatter the foundations of Brahmin orthodoxy
by resorting to the faculty of critical reason. He attempted to
destroy the unfounded superstitions of the people. But so far
as the concrete realization of the supreme truth was concerned,
446 Early Buddhism and its Origins
--
456 Early Buddhism and its Origins
1 The Life Divine, Vol. II, p. 234 note no. 1, or p. 435 note no. I.
American ed.).
458 Early Buddhism and its Origins
step and regarded the suprarational truth, which Buddhism kept behind
the veil as realisable by cancellation of the constructions of consciousness
but beyond the scope of the reason's discovery."l
1. Introduction
To THE PRAGMATIC intellect, a comparative study of Buddha,
the typification of the supernal enlightenment and calm of the
supramental Nirvanic status and Marx, the promulgator of the
proletarian creed of economic epicureanism and revolutionary
conquest of political power will not appeal. To the devout
Buddhist, Buddha, the incarnation of bodhicit, or the truth-
consciousness of the ~gvedic seer, should not be compared
with the profane Red German intellectual of the 19th century.
To the Marxist, Buddha was the enemy of the proletarian classs
because he was the initiator of the pessimistic philosophy of
cosmic illusionism 1 and suffering. Still some of the fundamental
points of similarity and differences between these two creative
thinkers will be presented here.
Buddhism has exercised potent influence on the creative
thought of the East. Christian ethics and philanthropic doc-
trines, the asceticism of the Alexandrian Therapeutae and the
Essenes, the mysticism of Plotinus and the sacred path of the
Gnostics. bear at least partial Buddhistic traces. Korea, Japan,
Tibet, China, Siam, Burma, and Ceylon owe their religion to
the Sakyamuni. The advaita Vedanta of Samkara is said to be
inspired by the sunyiidvayaviida of the Madhyamikas and
vijiiiiniidvayaviida of the Y ogacaras. The philosophy of Schopen-
bauer and Hartmann owe some debt to the Buddhistic insistence
on trshnii and dukkha. The American New Humanistic
philosophy bears some resemblances to Buddhism, and Babbit
3. Philosophy of Religion
Marxists say that the great religions of the world arise in
consonance with the demands of contemporary economic condi-
tions. Engels calls Christian:ty to be a religion of the slaves and
the oppressed. l The main reason for this is the pragmatism
and the materialistic positivism of the Marxists. But Buddha
always claimed that the truths he preached were revealed to
him in a supernormal state. They were not due to speculative
cogitation or keen dialectical ratiocination on philosophical
topics but were born of dirc!ct super-rational intuitive per.:ep-
tions. Swami Vivekananda has vigorously asserted the thesis
that all great religions arise in the superconscious state Hence
the idealistic school will maintain that the economic origin of
religion is a myth. Buddha was an adept in the art and practice
of self-introspective meditation (sallayana) of the Pali scriptures.
But Marx held the view that religion was a recognition of the
infra-rational espect of man and is the opium of the people.
Lenin, like Hobbes, held that religion is born of fear. The views
of Buddha are in direct opposition to them. Recent researches
into the origins of the ancient religions reveal its primitive
unsophisticated roots. Totemism, fetishism, ancestor-worship,
plant-worship in certain religions, (cf. the sacredness of the tulsi
plant, the dhatura, etc.), zoomorphism and zoolatry practised in
the Egyptian and Indus civjJizations, worship of nature-spirits and
deification of powerful objects of nature do show that religion
in its origins is definitely a repudiation of the rational faculty.
But there is the other side of the picture also. Religion also,
sometimes, registers the immanent wish to transcend the sense of
the finitude of man. It often indicates a mystic consciousness. It
vindicates the inherent urge of man to comprehend the
Absolute. Hence one finds in the lJ.gveda the deification of the
Aditi - the infinite. In the Pi!akas one finds the concept of
iinantyiiyatana (infinity). The great prophets and the enlightened
mystics of the world give their unequivocal opinion that religion
is the search for the infinite. This search is present in the
lJ.gveda and the older Upani~ads. Hegel has regarded religioll
as the representation of the Absolute. Kant had recognised
the place of the Transcendental Infinite in religion. Buddha,
1 F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, p. 98.
Buddha and Marx 473
would accept the origin of religion to be in the natural trend of
the human mind to transcend the limitations of sorrow and
death. One finds this tendency also in the ancient forms of
Egyptian mysticism. Maspero has pointed out that the ancient
temples of Baby!onia were supposed to be the cosmoS in
miniature. Thus they were aHemps to transcend the limitations
imposed on man.
But there is an element of truth in the analysis of Marx with
regard to the support rendered to political rulers and dominant
social classes by religious groups. At times religion, certainly,
has been misused. David and Solomon, the 'chosen sons of
Jehovah', utilized the Jewish religion for practical political
ends. Constantine and Charlemagne sought support from
Christianity. The Orthodox Church of Russia was always a
great bulwark of the autocratic Czarist regime. Austria maintain-
ed her reactionary despotism in Italy and Germany in the first
half of the 19th century and in this game she received, to
some extent, the support of religion. As a keen student of history,
Marx, drew pointed attention to the role of religions as an
ideological buttress of political and economic power-holders.
4. Philosophy of History
Buddha and Marx differ radically in their historical philosophy.
Marx has overrated the role of the economic factor in human
history. Buddha, whose whole life of renunciation was an
emphatic challenge to all kinds of materialistic pomp and
exaggerated worship of Mammon, could never accept economics
as the supreme determinant of human movements. Renunciation
or sannyiisa repudiates the pre-eminent value of economics in
human life.
The Hegelian dialectic unduly exaggerates the role of'imper-
sonal forces' and points out that great men are the products
and not the creators of the time-force. But in the Santi Parva
of the Mahiibhiirata, Bhisma formulates the, theory that the
great man is the creator of the time~force. Krishna calls himself
to be the Zeit-geist (kiilosmi). The Marxists adopt the Hegelian
standpoint and would argue that if there would have been no
Luther, somebody else would have produced the Reformation. It
is true that in the making of an indiVidual, Buddha accepts the
enormous power wielded by the past samskiira. But he accepts
474 Early Buddhism and its Origins
1 The European scholars h(Jld that the Vedic seers did not have the
belief in Mukti.
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Hebraism, 51 Huxley, T.H., 411
Hedonism, 19 Hylozoism, 299, 387
Hegel, G.W.F ,6, 31,80, 102, 154,
234, 402n, 434n, 445, 468-9; his
Philosophy 0/ History, 31; on
religion, 31,472; his Phenomeno- Idea of the Good (Plato), 121
logy, 421n Idealism, 20, 132, 308
Hegelian metaphysics, Marxist Ideal o/tlre Karmayogin, 452
critique of, 458 Ikshvaku, 366
Heiler, Fr., 152n, 247n Immanent teleology, 438
Heine, 114 Indian Idealism (by Dasgupta).
Hellenic culture, 455 213n
Hellenic religion, 52n, lei Indian monasticism, 60
Heraclitus, 468 Indian pessimism, 130
Herder, 404 Indian Philosophical Schools, 92
Heredity (concept 00, 182 Indian Sophistic Movement, 103
Hertel, J., 56 Individualism, 118
Hertzler, 403 Individualism, in Greece, 167
Hesiod, 114, 134 Individualism, of Karman, in the
Heterodox (doctrine in Samkhya Upani~ads, 221-2
and Buddhism), 318 Indra (in ~gveda), 51, 81-2
Hetuvidyd, 20 Indriytit;li, 324
Hillebrandt, Alfred, 4240 Indus Valley Civilization, 49, 1(11;
Hlnayana, 275,430 and the Ve"ic civilization, 332~
Hinduism, 90,159; and Buddhism, 359
209 Intuitionist, Buddha as, 446
Hindu religion, 116n Ionic philosophers, 387
HiraQyagarbha, 82, 106, 362 Islam, 26, 51-2, 141, JS9, 437, 476
Hiriyanna, M., 96, 105, 268n Islamic Caliphate, 359
Hitler, 470 Ishiina, 82
Hiuen-Tsang's Siddhi, 477 Ishtapiirra, 214
Hobbes, 15, 472; and Lenin, 472 IsllOpaniiad, 215, 251
Hobhouse, L.T., 396 Israelite religion, ]01
Hocart, A.M., 73, 87 Iti- Vutraka, 90
Hoemle,97
Holmes, Ed., 228n, 458n; Radha-
krishnan's debt to, 458r.
Holy Roman Church, 359 Jacobi, 55, 8J, 85n, 86, 94,323
Homer, gods and fate, 134 James, William, 35, 202
Homeric religion, 52n Janaka, 9, 51, 56, 73, 202, 335~
Hook, Van, 67, 1340 346
Hopkins, E.W., 5n, 66n, 116n, Jainism, 50,62,97,133
161-2, 166,224,226, 436n, 440n Jainism, and Buddhism,I7
Horner, I.B., 93, 134 Jainas, 85,94
Hulztsch, E., 425n Jaina and Mimansa Philosophy ..
Hume, (David), 15 140
Hume, Robert E., 96n, 313n. 314n, James II, 359
Index 497
James, William, 386 Kapila, 61 n, 83, 295-6, 470
Janamejaya, 364 Kappina, 374
Jartihani, 95 Karman, 95-6,107, 209,211,215;
JaramaraIJa, 405 and Vedas and Upani~ads, 212;
Jaratkiirava, 96, 105 Buddha's theory of, 220; ethical
Jaspers, 114, 124 doctrine of, 218; individualism
J(W, 405 of, in Upani~ads, 221; sociologi-
Jiitakas, 205; theme of self-sacri- cal study of theory of, 215,219;
fice, 190 Upani~adic and Buddhistic
Jayaswal, K.P.,: his views on emphasis on, 218; three-fold
Buddhist Samghas, 13; on Daya- specifications, 224
nanda,439,442 Karmavada, 210-2, 214
Jehova, 26,352,473 Karma-Mimiinsii,20
Jeremiah, 424 Karshnyiiyat;la, 366
Jesus Christ, 26, 83 KaruQii,350
Jetavana, 338 KasiIJa, 291
Jevons, 35, 386n Kassapa Brothers, 76, 202-3
Jewish,6 Kasyapa, 78n
Jews, 424 Katha Upani~ad, 10, 64,78,92,98,
Jira, 14O 120, 142, 177; on reference to
Jivaka, 338 soul,I46
Jliiina (Buddhist scheme of), 82, Kathiivatfhll, 292n
131 Kaundinya, 12
Job,114 Kausika Sulra, 67n, 386n, 387n
John the Baptist, 83 Kaushitaki,65
Jiiatiluini, 95 Kautilya, 203,333, 358, 364n, 391
Judaism, 52, 159 Kautsa, 50
Jumna, 347n Kaya, manomaya, 388
Keith, A.B., 19, 48, 56,60, 67n, 78-
9, 81, 105, 116, 131, 136n, 149,
Kabir, 354, 368 168n, 171n, 189n, 191, 361, 3870
Kacciina, 374 388n, 416n
Kacciiyana, Prakuddha, 1056 Kelsen,41n
Kaikeya,9 Kena Upani.~ad, 63
Kaiser, 474 Kern, 126
Kakudha Koliyaputra, 388n Kesakambala, 105
Kala, 347n Kharosthi, 368
Kiiliisoka, 426 Kharvela, 132
Kalsi,17ll Kierkegaard, 207
Kiimandaka, 391 Kingship, patrimonial, 433
KiimiiYani, Sraddhii (in the ~g Kirstie J., 67n
veda),51 Kosala, 337, 352n
Kanishka, 359 Krishna, 366
Kant, 15,41, 80, 143, 398, 467-8; Kropotkin, and Buddha, 355
and Buddha, 15 Kshattriyas, 69, 73, 242, 372-3
Kantian rationalism, IS Kumiirila, 78
Kantian transcendentalism, 66n, Kllladallta Sutla, 74, 740, 76,76n,
472 101
498 Index
Lakkhana Sutla (D.N.), 350 Mahiisukhaviidins, 421
Lalita-Vistara, 20 Mahiivagga, 365
Lamaism and Tibetan Theocracy, Mabiivijita, 76n
353 Mahiivira, 10, 16,28,62, 105,220
Lamktivattirasutra.417 Mahiiyana, 154, 223, 252, 256-7,
Lang, A., 41 275
Lanman, C.R., 168n Mahiiyanism, 25, 242
Lao-Tse,28 Mahendra, 430
Law. B.C., 388n Mahidhara, 101
Leibnitz. 137,217 Mahidiisa Aitareya, 15
Leopardi,114 Majjhima Nikiiya, 74, 123, 146,
Leshya, (in Jaina Philosophy), 217 211, 227, 229,236,245,332
Liebenthal, 322n; The Life Divine Makhali Gosala, 82, 105, 125, 226;
(Aurobindo), 454n, 459n, 4600- see also Gosala
463n Malayo-Polynesian, 347
Lincoln, 207, 402n Manda/a, 42, 49
Locke, 151n Mandeans, 354
Loka, 152 Manu,69,348
Lokiiyata, 52n Marx, 31, 41, 218; and Buddha,
Lokottara, 14 470-75; ontology and dialectics,
Lopamudra and Agastya hymn 467-71; philosophy of history.
(R.V.),281 473-4; and Buddha on religion,
Lowie, R.H., 23n 472-3; his role in history, 474-6;
Luther, 6, 75, 83, 108, 473; and compared with Buddha, 466, 470;
Dayiinanda, 439n contrasted with Buddha, 467; &
Lutheranism, 75 Engels,468; & Lenin, 468
Marxist view of religion, 29
Maspero, 473
Materialism, 106, 142, 169; in
Macculloch,221n Kathopani~ad, 141
Macdonell,A. A., 16, 69, 170 Materialistic accidentalism, 210
Macedon, 340 Mathva,346
Mach,403 Maurya, Chandragupta, 132
Maclver,403,403n Max Muller, 52,63, 78, 183, 185;
Mackay, 280 quotes from Burnouf, 358
Mackenzie, 214 Max Weber (see Weber)
Maddakuchchi Mrigadiiva, 338 Miiyii,48
Madhyamika, 417-20 Mazzini, 470
Mtidhyamika Karika, (Madhya- Meditative abstraction in practice,
maka-karika),419 49
Magadha, 74 Mediterranean, 455
Maitra, S.K., 127, 228 Mehta, R.,61
Mababhiirata, 50, 169, 240, 306, Melamed, 19n, 20n, 68, 123,123n,
325n 155,168, 169n,178,250; Spinoza
Mahiinaman, 12 and Buddha, 18n, 20n, 353n
Mahapadiina Sutta, D.N., 78 Melanesian, 57
Mahaparinirvana Sutra, 12, 145: Mesopotamian, 51; temples, 422
atmadipa and atmasarana, in, 149 Metta Sutta, 375
Index 499
Microcosm and Macrocosm, 59 Narendra Deva: as a Marxist, 478;
Milinda-Panha, 164,227, 239,241, merits of his Buddhist interpreta-
461 tions, 478; demerits of his
Mirniinsakas, 85, 212 Buddhist interpretations, 478-9;
Moderate reformism of the Upa- Naturalists, 72, lOS
ni~ads, 72 Ntisadiya Siikta, 42, 51, 57
Moggalliina, 365 Nazareans, 354
MohenjodarO,49, 114-5, 161 Nebular hypothesis, of Kant, 404
Monasticism, 59, 61-121, 283 Neo-Babylonian empire, 332
Mongolia, 353 Neo-Platonist, 48, 275
Mongoloids, 101 Neo-Vediintism,411
Monism, 59, 61-2 Neo-Vitalism, 471
Monier-Williams, 28n, 337, 365n Neurath, Otto, 411
Monistic, Idealism (in the Upa- Neutralism, 471
ni~ads), 17, 81, 307; Metaphysics, New Testament, 142
50 Nietzscbean, 330
Monotheism, 352 Niggantha Nataputta, 82
Moral determinism, 209-10 Nihilism, Buddhist, 411-22
Moral way (eight-fold, concept of), Nihilist, 34
117 Nirodha (of Avidyi), 16
More, T., 316n Nirukta, 50
Mughals, 470 NirvafJa, 13, 16, 20, 33, 125, 180;
Muhammad, 26 concept of, 89-91, 237, 262-3;
Mujavanta (MuJavadbhyo), 347n through samtidhi and praJiili, 16;
Mun4aka, 61-3, 71n, 163 its interpretation, 89, 240; in
Munr/aka Upani$ad, 11, 65n, 70-2, Tripitakas, 90; in Buddhist
72n, 82,102,121,177,204,282 literature, 252; meaning of nega-
Muni,22-49 tion of, 253; and BrahamaQas,
Myth, of Prometheus, 168; of 255; positivist concept of, 246;
Heraclitus, 168; of Flood in the happiness in Dhammapada, 247;
Bible, 168 and mysticism, 248; and philo-
Mysticism, 49, 102, 132 sophy of life, 250
Nishiids, 356
Noesis, S3
Nominalistic, theory of society.
Nabonidus, 349n 468
Naciketii, 92, 385 Northrop, F.S.C., 247n, 390
Niigiirjuna, 264, 325, 328, 386, 422 Nyaya 20, 139n
457,459; his Madhyamika Ktirikti, Nytiya-Mafijari, 52
419 Nyaya-Siitra, 325
Naiyayikas, 8':; Nyaya-Vaiseshika, 140,212
Naiyayika realists, 420
Nama (concept), 86
Ntima-Riipa (Skamdha), 86,144
Nanak,368 Obermiller, E, 247n
Napoleon, 6, 470,474 Objective determinism, 474
Narada, 63-4 Okkaka (King), 373n
Narasu, P.L., 127n, 370n Oldenberg, H., 12, 20n, 48, 52, 55-7,
500 Index
Ucchedaviidtl, 436
Taboo,57 Udayna, 418n
Tadvanam (in KelUJ Upani,ad), 82 Udgitha, 58
Tagore, R.N., 131n (SddhanIJ) Uddaka Ramaputta, 10, 16, 289
Taittriya Brahmaoa, 55, 61n Uddalaka, 15, 56, 59, 61, 70,
Taittrlya Upani,ad, 64, 86, 98, 120, 73, 93, 103, 202, 313, 414n, 415n
177,215 UNESCO, 407
Tandya BrahmQ{fa, 3720 Universalism, 123
Tantravllrtika. 78n, Upt1diina, 113,2301, 447
Tapas, 10-11,22-3,48, 61, 72, 107, Upaddna Skamdha, 104
214 Upili,371
Tapasvi.61 Upanipds, 10, 12, 29, 37, 48, SO,
TarktJrahosya-Dipikll, 52 58,64, 65, 86, 88, 105; on dialec-
Tevijja Sulla, 71, 74, 82 tic, 15; and despotic imperial-
Tathiigata, 89, 104 ism, 178; and destiny of know-
Tathata, 417 ledge, SO; and early Buddhism,
Tawney, 187 91; and human self, 98; and
504 Index
idealism, 29; two layers of of Vedic Religion, ]44n: views
religious thought in, 58; inter- on Buddha, 53, ] 54; on Buddha
pretation of, 57n; pessimistic as a religious leader, 1S4; on
interpretation of, 120; philOsophy inner meaning of Gospel of
of, '8-UO; as a gospel of Buddha, ]55; OD rebirth, ]66; OD
spiritual monism, 80; and life Western Indologists, 219; views
of meditation, 94; idealism of on Deussen and Olden berg, 57
and SAmkhya, 316 Varul)a, 49, 171,212
Upanipdic cosmogony, 71 Yiisettha Sutfa, 372n
Upanipdic absolutism, 266 Vasishtha, 355
Upanifadic idealism, 55 Vasisbtba Manavaka, 360
Upanipdic religion, 49; religious Vasubandhu, 330; his YimJatika,
absolutism in, 62 477
Upani$adic Vedanta, 20 Vatsiputriyas, 86, 149
Upanipdic revolt against sacrifi- Vedanta, 63, 20S
cial system, 66 Vedanta Philosophy, 119
Upani~dic theory of Absolute, 10, VedAntic Monism, 59
79,102,106 "Vedintificatiou" of Buddhism,
Upaplidllka,4p6 . 145, 419
Ushasta Cakrayal)a, 366n Vedintism, 27
Utopia, 376n Vedas, 48, 63-4; on evil, 177; and
Uttinapad, 281 moral injunctions, 170; on Pra-
Uttara, ]34 kriti, 301; stress on }.tita, 170;
Uttarimanussa, 7 on manas, atman, 139
Vedic civilization, 49, 67, ) 15
Vedic God, 115
Vedic people, 116
Vaccagotta, ]8-9 Vedic prayer, 115
Vagadhas,346n Vedic optimism, 115j Upani",d's
Yagambhro i ,30ln attack on, )0
Vaibbiisikas. 416 Vedic Religion, 41, 49j its true
Vaisali, Council of, 381 nature and decline, 100
VaiSeshika, 20 Vedic Scepticism as root of Bud-
YaiSviinara YidyiJ, 71 dhism, SO
Ya;tiJ"a Sutra, 383n Vedic Sambitis, 117
Vagira,84n Vedic tradition of Quest, 51
Vamadeva, 28 Vena, 348
Vappa,12 Vidudabha, 374
Varma, V.P., 2090; OD the origin Vidyaraoya,418
of Religion, 30; on religion and Vijilanabhikshu, 391
political principle. 3]; his theory YijnanavadQ,345n,417n
of evolution of social and politi- VisakbA, 374, 381
cal categories, 391-2; on in6u- Vitalistic Buddhism, 461
ence of economic forces, 32; on Yimutti,16
Critique of Marxism, 32; on Yiftllya Pi(aka. 377n
origion of Buddhism, 33; on Vipaasi,7
monistic views in 1'ripiiakas, 140; Virocana,83
on Vedic relicioD, 41; OD decline Vishistadvaitavlda,58,416
Index $05
Viilmu Pur4rJ,a, J35n Yiidavas, 4440
Viswakarma, 82 Yadri ch4,2.10
Vivekaoaoda, II 3, 119, ISS, 178, Yajda, 48,55, 103, 341
3630, 454, 456, 412; Karma- YiijiJa'valkya, 13, 22, 350, SO, 60-2,
Yoga, 453 93, 96, 102-3, 135, 202, 219-20,
Voltaire, 31 251; his views on cardinal
Vriitya. 3450 tenets of idealism, 59
Vyasa's Bhiishyam (Y.S.), 293 Yas.a.374
Yiiska,50
Yiiyiivaras, 12
Yajurveda, 49, SS, 101, liS, 162,
Wach. J., 3770 215; on moral evolUtionism, 170
Waddel,1240 Yoga, 49, 107, 279--94; the theory
Wallesar, 256 of, 99: Yoga, its significance, 270;
Ward, Lester, 404 Buddhism and Samlchya, on
Warreo, 750, 125, 1250, 164 Yoga, 270; and Indian thought,
Webb, 410 282; and Vriityas, 284; on Vedic
Weber, Albrecht, 372 literature, 280; in Upanj~ads,
Weber, Max, 23, 41, 1990, 332, 285; Yogic practices in Pataii-
3410,3700,371,424,4750 jali's systrm, 286; Halha Yoga
Wells, H.G., 11, 110, 80n, 205 and Upani~dic Yoga, 286; Yoga,
Westermarck, 173; 00 moral evolu- aod Buddhism in Svetasvataro.
tion, 176 287; in rQfUiriya Sombilli, 287
Whitehead, 471 Yogi, 115.462
Wilsoo, H.H., 301, (E.T. of Q.gveda)
4340
Wiodelband, lOOn (00 methodo-
logy of history of philosophy) Zarathustra, 225 (See also Zoroas-
Windisch, Ernest, 55, 161 ter)
Winternitz, M., 74,119,3870 Zeno, 20, 414
Wright, W.K., 2450 Zoaniecki. 396
Wyclitre, 83 Zoon,'387
Zoroaster, 7, 28, 139,225
Zoroastrianism, 352
Xenophanes, 20