En Banc: (G.R. No. 162230. August 12, 2014.)
En Banc: (G.R. No. 162230. August 12, 2014.)
En Banc: (G.R. No. 162230. August 12, 2014.)
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J : p
The petitioners added that the status and applicability of the generally accepted
principles of international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be
uncertain without the Incorporation Clause, and that the clause implied that the
general international law forms part of Philippine law only insofar as they are
expressly adopted; that in its rulings in The Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. 5 and U.S. v.
Guinto 6 the Court has said that international law is deemed part of the
Philippine law as a consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu, 7 the Court
has declared that a treaty, though not yet ratied by the Philippines, was part of
the law of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that by virtue of the
Incorporation Clause, the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnes
obligations arising from the jus cogens norms embodied in the laws of war and
humanity that include the principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes; that
the crimes committed against petitioners are proscribed under international
human rights law as there were undeniable violations of jus cogens norms; that
the need to punish crimes against the laws of humanity has long become jus
cogens norms, and that international legal obligations prevail over national legal
norms; that the Court's invocation of the political doctrine in the instant case is
misplaced; and that the Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to aord
redress and to give justice to the victims of the comfort women system in the
Philippines. 8
Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with
the broader responsibility of states to protect the human rights of their citizens,
especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and
pertain to jus cogens norms; that the claims raised by petitioners are not simple
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private claims that are the usual subject of diplomatic protection; that the crimes
committed against petitioners are shocking to the conscience of humanity; and
that the atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers against petitioners are not
subject to the statute of limitations under international law. 9
Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare:
(1) that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence
committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity and
war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the Philippines is not
bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of
the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of
Foreign Aairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion
in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that
petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
the respondents. CScaDH
Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Aairs and the
Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an
ocial apology, legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan. 10
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that it was
highly improper for the April 28, 2010 decision to lift commentaries from at least
three sources without proper attribution an article published in 2009 in the
Yale Law Journal of International Law; a book published by the Cambridge
University Press in 2005; and an article published in 2006 in the Western
Reserve Journal of International Law and make it appear that such
commentaries supported its arguments for dismissing the petition, when in truth
the plagiarized sources even made a strong case in favour of petitioners' claims.
11
Ruling
The Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for being devoid of merit.
1.
Petitioners did not show that their resort
was timely under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners did not show that their bringing of the special civil action for certiorari
was timely, i.e., within the 60-day period provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 4. When and where position led. The petition shall be led not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely led, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from notice of the denial of said motion.
As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner
receives the assailed judgment, nal order or resolution, or the denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial timely led, whether such motion is
required or not. To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date
of receipt of the assailed judgment, nal order or resolution or the denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the petition; otherwise,
the petition for certiorari must be dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot
be understated, for such dates determine the timeliness of the ling of the
petition for certiorari. As the Court has emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge
Development Corporation: 17
There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for
certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the
judgment or nal order or resolution was received; second, when a
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motion for new trial or reconsideration was led; and third, when notice
of the denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to comply
with this requirement shall be sucient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance will not suce
in a matter involving strict observance with the Rules. (Emphasis
supplied)
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness.
Such a petition is required to be led not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed.
Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was led forty-one (41) days
from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly
relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when
this period commenced to run and whether the motion for
reconsideration itself was led on time since the material dates were not
stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be
led later than fteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not
designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to eect the
proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus eectively prevent the
clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 19
The petition thus mentions the year 1998 only as the time when petitioners
approached the Department of Justice for assistance, but does not specically
state when they received the denial of their request for assistance by the
Executive Department of the Government. This alone warranted the outright
dismissal of the petition.
Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the denial of their request
for assistance in 1998, their ling of the petition only on March 8, 2004 was still
way beyond the 60-day period. Only the most compelling reasons could justify
the Court's acts of disregarding and lifting the strictures of the rule on the period.
As we pointed out in MTM Garment Mfg., Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 21 cACTaI
All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored
or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has
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its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely: to ensure
the eective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system
that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the
settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive
law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants.
As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to le a special civil action of
certiorari is neither a natural right nor an essential element of due
pr o c es s ; a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, and never issued except in the
exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of
certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
Herein petitioners have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax
the rule and the requirements under current jurisprudence. . . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
2.
Petitioners did not show that the assailed act
was either judicial or quasi-judicial
on the part of respondents.
Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorari that the assailed
act was either judicial or quasi-judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court requires such showing, to wit:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or ocer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may le a veried petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or ocer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certied true copy of the
judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certication of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46.
Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and
judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or
question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by
writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a
certain manner.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
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Del Castillo and Leonen, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
SERENO, C.J., concurring:
ARTICLE 148
No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any
other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by
another High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to
in the preceding Article. (Emphases supplied)
Legal commentators stress that Article 148 should be related to Article 3 of the
1907 Hague Convention IV, 7 which reads:
A belligerent Party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations
shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of
its armed forces. (Emphases supplied)
It is said that the non-absolution clause under Article 148 is a logical consequence
of the grave breaches under Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV. 8 A state is
precluded from absolving other states from liability on the ground that the
individual persons who actually perpetrated the grave breach of the convention
have already been punished. 9 Indeed, it would seem unjust for individuals to be
punished while the state in whose name or on whose instructions they acted is
released from all liability. 10 Article 148 was meant to prevent the defeated state
from being forced into entering into an armistice or peace treaty in which it
would renounce all reparations for grave breaches committed by persons in the
service of the victorious state. 11 Thus, pursuant to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, a state remains responsible and continues to be liable to pay
compensation for the grave breaches committed against protected persons. 12
Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that respondents cannot be found entirely
guilty of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, or a patent and gross
abuse of discretion. Their reliance on the Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951 Peace
Treaty) and the Reparations Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines
and Japan (1956 Reparations Agreement) as bases for declining to espouse
petitioners' claims against Japan was not without reason, especially if the
treaties are analyzed in the light of the events leading to their conclusion.
The subject of reparations for damages suered during the war was discussed
during the occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces. At the time, the initial
reparations policy that had been put forward by the U.S. was to utilize
reparations for rehabilitating the war-devastated countries, particularly countries
in Asia and the Pacic. 13 The plan was also envisioned as a "vital integral means"
for Japan's economic demilitarization. 14 The U.S. supported an "early and just
share of reparations" in favor of the Philippines and pledged that "Japan will be
reduced to the level of a small power and her people will not be permitted to
have in the future a living standard higher than those nations which she has
overrun . . . ." 15 It is said that an interim reparations removal policy was also
adopted with the objective of transferring the industrial capacity of Japan to the
Philippines. 16 Under this policy, Japan's industrial plants and facilities would be
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handed over to the Philippines as war reparations in order to aid its rehabilitation
and agricultural development needs. 17 However, due to the opposition of the
former Soviet Union, the proposals did not materialize. 18
American reparations policy shifted in 1947. 19 As the Cold War developed, the
U.S. initiated the drafting of a peace treaty with Japan. 20 On the issue of
reparations, the U.S. negotiated for a complete waiver of all claims arising from
Japan's war acts. 21 The alleged rationale for this "peace formula" rested on the
U.S. assumption that if Japan were to be lured into the communist inuence, the
strength of the Sino-Soviet camp would signicantly increase, and the resulting
change in the power balance in Asia would be "dangerously formidable". 22
According to the U.S., Japan must be given a chance to recover full economic self-
suciency "by not placing upon her any heavy economic or nancial burdens or
major commercial liabilities". 23 The peace treaty was to be "brief, liberal, and
non-punitive". 24 ITDHSE
The Philippines rejected the U.S. proposal of total waiver of reparations claims
against Japan. 25 While the Philippine government had full appreciation of the
international political reality of the spread of communism in Asia, 26 it remained
rm that Japan should "suciently . . . repair the injuries they inicted in a war
of aggression . . . ." 27 The U.S. tried to persuade the Philippine government. It
pointed out that the problem of reparations was "not merely a matter of justice",
but also a "matter of economics". 28 It argued that they could not see "any
eective way" of demanding reparations from an economically depressed Japan.
29 In a last eort to convince the Philippines to accept a no-reparations peace
arrangement, the U.S. emphasized the usually "intimate" relations between both
countries. 30
The U.S. was unsuccessful; the Philippines maintained an irrevocable stance on
the matter of reparations. 31 Former Undersecretary of Foreign Aairs Felino Neri
criticized the American peace policy and remarked: "Reparations is rst a matter
of justice and the realities of economics are, in our view, a secondary
consideration. In our case, reparations from Japan is a matter of absolute
necessity." 32 The Philippines' condemnation of the American peace formula
intensied when the U.S. government made available its draft of the treaty,
which provided for the absolute abandonment of reparations claims on the
ground that Japan lacked the "capacity to make payments" in any form. 33 The
Philippines refused such claims. 34 It repeatedly declared that Japan was solvent,
and that the Philippines would never withdraw its claims. 35
At the height of the developing Cold War, the U.S. and the U.K. initiated a
conference on the Japanese peace treaty. 36 During the discussions, the
Philippines, through then Foreign Aairs Secretary Carlos P. Romulo, expressed
that it had yet to be satised with the reparations provisions of the proposed
treaty. 37 Secretary Romulo voiced out a reservation on an "inexible restriction"
on the form of reparations payment, asserting that the Philippines could not
accept that reparations be made only through the "services" of the Japanese
people in the processing of raw materials that would be supplied by the injured
countries. 38 However, the reservation was neither accepted nor recorded. 39
Faced with the dilemma of supporting its allies in winning over Japan at the
expense of fully satisfying security and reparations claims, the Philippines
reluctantly signed the 1951 Peace Treaty. 40
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The decision of the Philippine government to eventually sign the peace treaty
was met with strong resistance. The opposition insisted that the reparations
issue was the foremost aspect of the country's peace settlement with Japan. 41
They also demanded the inclusion in the peace treaty of a more categorical
statement of Japan's guilt and reparations obligation. 42 The government
defended its decision to sign the peace treaty on the basis of its "security rst
policy". 43 It explained that security threats of the aggressive communist
expansion impelled it to act swiftly in the ratication of the peace treaty. 44 The
opposition countered that the Philippines was suciently safeguarded by its
Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S. 45
The negotiations for reparations dragged on for almost ve years after the
signing of the 1951 Peace Treaty. 46 From the initial demand of USD 8 billion, the
nal reparations agreed upon amounted to a mere USD 550 million, 47 which
was to be paid in the form of capital goods, cash, and services. 48 A note sent by
President Magsaysay to the Senate reads as follows:
Considering the losses and suering the Philippines sustained as a result
of the Pacic War, these terms do not come up to the generally-
accepted concept of reparations as compensation for damage
done and injury suered.
Judged, however, from the point of view of the requirements of our
national interest and viewed in the light of the practical realities posed by
the political and economic situation obtaining in both countries as well as
in their part of the world, I subscribe to the conclusion reached by the
Philippine Panel of Negotiators that this settlement is the best that
can be obtained under the circumstances . . . . 49
After a heated debate, the 1951 Peace Treaty and the 1956 Reparations
Agreement were ratied on 16 July 1956. The pertinent provision of the 1951
Peace Treaty is reproduced below:
ARTICLE 14
(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied
Powers for the damage and suering caused by it during
the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the
resources of Japan are not presently sucient if it is to
maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparations
for all such damage and suering and at the same time meet its
other obligations. aDSHIC
Therefore,
2. . . .
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied
Powers waive all reparation claims of the Allied Powers, other
claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out
of any actions taken by Japan and nationals in the course
of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied
Powers for direct military costs of occupation. (Emphases
supplied)
On the other hand, the relevant provisions of the 1956 Reparations Agreement
are quoted as follows:
ARTICLE 1
Japan, by way of reparations, shall supply the Republic of the
Philippines with the services of the Japanese people and the
products of Japan in the form of capital goods, the total value of
which will be so much in yen as shall be equivalent to ve hundred fty
million United States dollars ($550,000,000) at present computed at
one hundred ninety-eight billion yen (Y198,000,000,000), within the period
and in the manner hereinafter prescribed.
ARTICLE 2
ARTICLE 6
1. In the discharge of the reparations obligation under Article 1 of the
present Agreement, the Government of Japan shall, through procedures
to be determined under Article 11, make payments to cover the
obligations incurred by the Mission under Reparations Contracts and the
expenses for the supply of services and products referred to in Article 5,
paragraph 4 of the present Agreement. These payments shall be made in
Japanese yen. AICDSa
In the light of the foregoing context, I vote to dismiss the petition for failure to
establish that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in declining to
espouse the claims of petitioners. The dismissal thereof should not, however, be
taken as a denitive ruling on the merits of the claims of petitioners, in the
event that they bring the same to an appropriate forum or through a proper
recourse. Neither should it be taken to mean that we should forget the suering
that our people, especially petitioners, bore in the Second World War, or the
unfortunate story of our attempts to get the reparation that was due us, and
learn. From such understanding, we must forge the elements that will make the
Philippine state strong, able to protect its people and safeguard their well-being
under the aegis of the Constitution. Justice demands no less.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 419-429.
2. Id. at 435-529.
8. Supra note 1.
9. Id. at 426-427.
10. Id. at 427-428.
17. G.R. No. 146068, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 399, 403-404.
18. G.R. No. 141947, July 5, 2001, 360 SCRA 521, 527-528.
21. G.R. No. 152336, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 55, 66.
22. Buyco v. Baraquia, G.R. No. 177486, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 699, 703-
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704.
26. Philippine Leisure and Retirement Authority v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 156303,
December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 85, 99-100.
27. G.R. No. 141849, February 13, 2007, 515 SCRA 577.
28. At 589.
SERENO, C.J., concurring:
2. See: E.O. 292 Administrative Code of the Philippines, Book IV, Title III, Chap. 12,
Sec. 34, pars. 10 & 11.
3. Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 11; Art. XIII, Secs. 1 & 18 (3).
4. Vinuya v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010, 619 SCRA 533.
5. Id. at 560.
6. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (hereinafter
"Geneva Convention I"); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (hereinafter "Geneva Convention II");
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (hereinafter "Geneva Convention III"); and Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12
August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (hereinafter "Geneva Convention IV").
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
21. OHNO, supra, at 37-38 (citing United States Memorandum to the Government on
the Far Eastern Commission, in Royal Institute of International Aairs,
Documents on International Aairs, 1947-1949, 615-616 [1952]); Yang Zhihui,
supra note 13, at 376.
22. OHNO, supra, at 38; See also DULLES, supra note 19, at 40-42; Yang Zhihui, supra
note 13, at 376.
23. OHNO, supra, at 37 (citing John Foster Dulles, "Peace May Be Won", U.S.A.
Department of State, DSB, Vol. 24 No. 605, at 255 [1951]); See DULLES, supra
note 19, at 19-21.
24. OHNO, supra (citing U.S.A., Department of State, "An Estimate of Conditions in
Asia and the Pacic at the Close of the War in the Far East and the Objectives
and Policies of the United States", Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vol. VI, at 556-580
[1969]); See DULLES, supra note 19, at 19-21.
25. OHNO, supra, at 40; Yang Zhihui, supra note 13, at 376.
28. OHNO, supra, at 42 (citing Truman's Envoy has long conference on Jap pact with
EQ, the Manila Times, February 12, 1951, 1-2).
29. OHNO, supra.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 42-43; See also DULLES, supra note 19, at 48; Yang Zhihui, supra note 13,
at 376.
32. OHNO, supra, at 43 (citing Neri assails Dulles stand, the Manila Times, 3 March
1951, 1, 12).
33. Id.; See also DULLES, supra note 19, at 48.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 52.
39. Id. at 54-55 (citing Acheson's Speech, delivered on September 8, 1951, in U.S.
Dep't. of State Publications, Record of Proceedings of the Conference for the
Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, 175-177 [1951]).
40. Id. at 55-56.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 80.