9/11 Families Sue Saudi Arabia
9/11 Families Sue Saudi Arabia
9/11 Families Sue Saudi Arabia
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x
CHERYL SCHNEIDER, Individually and
as surviving spouse and the Executrix of the
ESTATE OF IAN SCHNEIDER, Deceased; Jonathan C. Reiter Law Firm,
PLLC
NANCY DIMINO, Individually and
as surviving spouse and as the Executrix of
the ESTATE OF STEPHEN DIMINO, Deceased;
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Plaintiffs,
v.
Defendant.
X
COMPLAINT
1. Plaintiffs are the surviving spouses, children, parents, siblings and estate
representatives of the victims murdered in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States (the "September 11th Attacks") and individuals who suffered personal injuries in the
2. Plaintiffs bring this action against the defendant Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under
the 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), which Congress enacted over a
Presidential veto
to provide civil litigants with the broadest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution
of the United States, to seek relief against...foreign countries, wherever acting and
wherever they may be found, that have provided material support, directly or indirectly,
to foreign organizations or persons that engage in terrorist activities against the United
States...
28 U.S.C. 2333 note; as a result, JASTA establishes federal court jurisdiction over the tortious
acts of a foreign state anywhere in the world that cause injury and death in a terrorist attack in
3. Plaintiffs seek such relief against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the attributable
acts of the Kingdom's governmental Ministries and bodies, alter-egos, and officers, employees
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and agents acting within the scope of their office, employment or agency by knowingly
providing material support and resources to the al Qaeda terrorist organization and facilitating
the September 11th Attacks, in that, as set forth in detail herein, they:
a. raised, laundered and paid substantial financial support to al Qaeda to fund its
budget and terrorist activities, including the preparation and execution of the September llth
Attacks;
and taught their hijackers the skills they used to carry out the September llth Attacks;
c. provided critical logistical support and resources to al Qaeda around the world,
funding safe houses, furnishing false passport and travel documents, transferring al Qaeda
money, weapons and equipment across international borders and other assistance, all of which
d. actively supported al Qaeda in its final preparations for the September 11th
Attacks through a network of the Kingdom's officers, employees and/or agents who met with
and aided the hijackers, providing them with money, cover, advice, contacts, transportation,
assistance with language and U.S. culture, identification, access to pilot training and other
4. The defendant Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a foreign state within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. 1603(a), and "Saudi Arabia" as used hereinafter refers to the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, its government Ministries and other bodies (including but not limited to its Ministry of
Islamic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Embassies throughout
the world), its alter-egos, and its officials, employees, or agents not only in the United States but
throughout the world, while acting within the scope of their office, employment, or agency.
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U.S.C. 1330 and JASTA's 28 U.S.C. 1605B, in that, as set forth in detail below, this action:
seeks money damages against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for injury and death caused by the
September 11th Attacks, which constitute an act of "international terrorism" in the United States
as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2331; alleges that the September 11th Attacks and the resulting injuries
and deaths were caused by a tortious act or acts of Saudi Arabia, by providing material support
and resources to and facilitating the al Qaeda leaders, planners and hijackers responsible for the
September 11th Attacks, and that such act or acts constitute more than mere negligence, and
28 U.S.C. 1330 and 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(5), in that, as set forth in detail below, this action seeks
money damages against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for injury and death occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and/or
one or more of its officials or employees acting within the scope of their office or employment.
1391(f)(1), as a substantial part of the events giving rise to this litigation occurred within this
8. The plaintiffs who are the estate representatives of a decedent are listed as such in
the caption, have been duly appointed by a court prior to the commencement of this action and
have the legal authority to bring this action to recover the damages set forth herein, including
wrongful death damages on behalf of all legally entitled beneficiaries of the decedent and
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9. For years prior to and on September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia established, owned,
and these organizations are referred to hereinafter as "Saudi Arabia's charity organizations" and,
as further described herein, each of these organizations (i) were so closely related to Saudi
Arabia that they must be considered as part of Saudi Arabia, and/or (ii) were government agents
of Saudi Arabia and/or (iii) were alter-egos of Saudi Arabia, because Saudi Arabia: established,
controlled, operated and regulated each organization through its King, Council of Ministers, the
Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, the Council of Senior Ulema, Ministry of Islamic Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other Ministries and bodies and Saudi Arabia's Embassies
throughout the world; maintained significant, repeated and extensive control of the day-to-day
operations of each organization; provided each organization with virtually all of its funding and
determined how its funds were distributed; established guidelines, plans and policies that each
organization was required to follow; appointed Saudi Arabia officials and employees to the lead
positions within each organization; staffed each organization with Saudi Arabia's officials and
employees; hired, fired and directed each organization's officers and employees; required each
organization to obtain its approval for ordinary business decisions, including purchases, the
locations of its operations and offices, banking, budgeting and grant decisions; used each
organization's personnel and property as its own; ignored the separate legal status, if any, of each
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organization; treated each organization as a part of Saudi Arabia; used each organization to
perform its core governmental functions, including foreign affairs and the advancement of Saudi
Arabia's state religion of Wahhabism throughout the world; and operated, controlled and used
each organization in such a manner that it would work a fraud or injustice to regard the
I.
Saudi Arabia's knowledge of
al Qaeda and its terrorist agenda against
the United States prior to September 11, 2001
10. In 1986-89, Saudi Arabia's MWL, IIRO, WAMY, BIF, SRC and AHIF
collaborated with Osama Bin Laden to open offices in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a means to
establish al Qaeda and provide material support and resources for its terrorist operations, and a
top ranking Saudi Arabia official together with other officials, employees and agents of Saudi
SRC Director-Pakistan Wael Jelaidan, a close friend and schoolmate of Osama Bin
Laden, who along with the SRC's Aqeel Abdulaziz al Aqeel, founded the AHIF in
Pakistan in 1988 as a division of the SRC and in 1989 took charge of the MWL/IIRO
office in Pakistan;
MWL's Mohamed Khalifa, Osama Bin Laden's brother-in-law, who established the
offices of the MWL and IIRO in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1986 using funds provided by
Osama Bin Laden, pursuant to the instructions of Abdullah Naseef, then MWL's
Secretary General;
WAMY's Adel Batterjee, a close friend of Osama Bin Laden who in 1988-89 established
the operations of the WAMY and BIF (then called Lajnat al Bir al Islamiyah, or LBI) in
Pakistan;
a top ranking Saudi Arabia official who controlled the Afghan Jihad Support Committee
and used it to provide funding for al Qaeda through the various charities, in conjunction
with a 1988 speech of Osama Bin Laden in Saudi Arabia that solicited contributions to
that Committee;
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MWL's Naseef, who met at MWL's office in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1988 with Osama
Bin Laden and discussed how the MWL could provide operational support for al Qaeda,
including but not limited to using MWL's offices as a base for al Qaeda operations and
providing covert assistance to al Qaeda operatives to cross international borders;
and with the material support and resources provided by Saudi Arabia's officials, employees and
agents, and its MWL, IIRO, WAMY, BIF, SRC and AHIF, Osama Bin Laden, Wael Jelaidan,
Mohamed Khalifa, Abdullah Naseef, Adel Batterjee and others founded al Qaeda in Pakistan in
11. At all relevant times mentioned herein, Saudi Arabia: adopted an extremist
version of Islam, Wahhabism, as the state religion; declared that its propagation was a core
function of the state; and, sought to advance it around the world through Saudi Arabia's Ministry
of Islamic Affairs, Embassies, Saudi Arabia's charity organizations and other government
agents.
12. As detailed herein, Saudi Arabia knew from at least the early 1990s that al Qaeda
had begun to pursue and carry out terrorist attacks against the United States, and used
Wahhabism to justify its campaign of anti-American violence, but Saudi Arabia's charitable
organizations and Saudi Arabia's officials, employees and agents continued to provide material
support and resources for al Qaeda through and including September 11, 2001.
13. From 1988 to 1990, Saudi Arabia knew that Osama Bin Laden made public
speeches at his family's mosque in Jeddah and other locations in Saudi Arabia where he declared
that the United States was the primary target of al Qaeda; as an example, in 1990 he stated that:
The Americans won't stop their support of Jews in Palestine until we give them a
lot of blows. They won't stop until we do jihad against them.
14. For years prior to September 11, 2001, as further detailed herein, Saudi Arabia,
including but not limited to its Embassies, its Ministry of Islamic Affairs, its Ministry of the
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Interior and Saudi Arabia's charity organizations, had a relationship and communications with
Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda's operatives, associates and activities throughout the world.
15. For at least a decade prior to and on September 11, 2001, as detailed herein, Saudi
Arabia knew that numerous officials, employees and agents of Saudi Arabia were al Qaeda
operatives or sympathizers who actively supported al Qaeda's terrorist agenda against the United
States.
16. For years prior to and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia's passport
offices and authorities applied a secret marker/indicator to the passports of persons who had
known ties to al Qaeda, and this marker/indicator was found in the passports of at least three of
the 19 hijackers responsible for the September 11th Attacks, including Nawaf al Hazmi and
Khalid al Mihdhar, and others who assisted them, including Omar al Bayoumi, a Saudi Arabia
employee and agent who aided the hijackers in 2000-2001 in California, as detailed herein, and
information about this marker/indicator was not known by United States consular officers,
17. For at least a decade prior to and on September 11, 2001, as detailed herein, Saudi
Arabia had knowledge of the violent goals of al Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden to wage
terrorist attacks against the United States and its citizens and that al Qaeda had engaged in
numerous terrorist attacks and attempted attacks against United States targets.
18. For at least a decade prior to and on September 11, 2001, support for al Qaeda's
terrorist agenda against the United States was pervasive among officials and employees of Saudi
Arabia, and Saudi Arabia was duplicitous: it presented a public face to the United States and
other Western countries of a nation fighting al Qaeda and terrorism while at the same time, as
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detailed herein, Saudi government actors gave al Qaeda substantial material support and
resources.
19. For many years prior to and on September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia knew of many
attempts by al Qaeda to conduct terrorist attacks directed against the United States, including the
December 1992 attempt by al Qaeda to attack the United States by bombing two hotels in Sanaa,
20. On or shortly after February 26, 1993, Saudi Arabia knew that terrorists affiliated
with al Qaeda exploded a truck bomb in the parking garage of the World Trade Center in New
York City, with the intent to topple one of the towers into the other, resulting in 6 deaths and
21. In or about October 1993, Saudi Arabia knew that al Qaeda was involved in the
attack on U.S. military forces in Somalia that resulted in 18 deaths and numerous injuries to U.S.
soldiers.
22. From at least early in 1995, Saudi Arabia knew of an al Qaeda plan to attack the
United States called the "Bojinka" plot to simultaneously bomb 10 or more commercial aircraft
operated by United States carriers over the Pacific and that al Qaeda did a test run of that plot on
December 11, 1994, when it bombed a Philippine Airlines flight, killing one passenger and
23. From at least 1996 through and on September 11, 2001, the United States shared
with Saudi Arabia specific information about the threat of al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the
United States, including the specific threat of hijacking by al Qaeda of commercial aircraft
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24. Specifically, from the first half of 1996 through and including September 11,
2001, the United States urgently told Saudi Arabia that it needed background and financial
information and other assistance regarding al Qaeda's leader Osama Bin Laden in order to
disrupt or interdict the threat of al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United States and its
nationals.
25. In May 1996, Saudi Arabia knew that Osama Bin Laden had to move al Qaeda's
base of operations from Sudan to Afghanistan and that Osama Bin Laden's flight from Sudan to
Afghanistan received air traffic control services and clearance from Saudi Arabia to overfly its
territory.
26. In August 1996, Saudi Arabia knew that al Qaeda through its leader Osama Bin
Laden declared and publicized a fatwa for jihad urging the use of terrorism to attack the United
27. From 1996 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia knew that
the Taliban rulers in Afghanistan were providing a safe haven for al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden
and their terrorist operations, including the Afghan terrorist training camps and safe houses
described herein.
28. In February 1998, Saudi Arabia knew that al Qaeda through its leader Osama Bin
Laden declared and publicized a second fatwa for jihad urging the use of terrorism to attack the
United States and its nationals in all nations throughout the world.
29. For at least one year prior to and including August 7, 1998, Saudi Arabia's AHIF
knew that al Qaeda was planning to conduct a terrorist attack against the United States
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and had specific information that the planned attack against
the U.S. Embassy in Kenya would be a suicide bombing carried out by crashing a vehicle into
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the Embassy gate and Saudi Arabia's AHIF and IIRO provided material support and resources to
30. On or shortly after August 7, 1998, Saudi Arabia knew that al Qaeda carried out
the twin suicide bombing attacks of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that
31. On or shortly after August 20, 1998, Saudi Arabia knew that President Clinton
issued Executive Order 13099, defining al Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden as terrorists
because of their role in the U.S. Embassy bombings and ordered the U.S. military to conduct a
32. On or shortly after October 8, 1999, Saudi Arabia knew, from public
announcements made by the U.S. government and other sources, that al Qaeda was formally
designated by the U.S. Secretary of State under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. 1189, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and Saudi Arabia subsequently knew
that the designation of al Qaeda as a Foreign Terrorist Organization remained in force from
33. In or shortly after December 1999, Saudi Arabia knew that al Qaeda prepared and
attempted to execute a "millennium" bomb attack on the United States, planned for January 1,
2000 at the Los Angeles International Airport, but was thwarted by U.S. and Canadian
authorities.
34. On or shortly after October 12, 2000, Saudi Arabia knew that al Qaeda bombed
the U.S.S. Cole while it was being refueled in Yemen, resulting in 17 deaths and numerous
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35. From May 2001 to September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia knew that the United States
made urgent requests for assistance from Saudi Arabia concerning an individual in Saudi Arabia
who was in contact with a senior al Qaeda operational coordinator concerning an upcoming al
Qaeda terrorist attack against the United States; a high level U.S. government officer later stated
that had those requests been heeded, the September 11th Attacks could have been avoided.
II.
Saudi Arabia's tortious acts were a
proximate cause of the September 11th Attacks
36. The planning for the September 11th Attacks began in 1996 with initial
discussions among al Qaeda members of the feasibility of hijacking planes and crashing them
into landmarks in the United States and Osama Bin Laden's suggestion that large passenger
aircraft be used as the mode of attack; between 1997 and 1999, al Qaeda reconnaissance teams
travelled to the U.S. to look at potential targets; in November 1999, a "dry run" was conducted
on a U.S. passenger flight to test cockpit security; during 1999 and 2000, the hijackers were
recruited by al Qaeda, mainly in Saudi Arabia, and then indoctrinated and trained at various
terrorist camps in Afghanistan; in January 2000, the first two hijackers arrived in the United
States, and in 2000 and 2001 additional hijackers came to the United States, received flight
training and made their final preparations, and then assembled in September 2001 to conduct the
attacks.
37. On September 11, 2001, the 19 al Qaeda hijackers violently broke into the
cockpits of four commercial airliners and piloted those planes as weapons in a coordinated
terrorist attack on the United States and its citizens, flying two planes into the World Trade
Center Towers in New York and a third plane into the Pentagon in Virginia; the fourth plane
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crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania as the passengers fought with the hijackers over control of
the aircraft and thwarted their plans to destroy the U.S. Capitol or White House.
38. As detailed herein, at each stage of al Qaeda's planning and execution leading up
to the September llth Attacks, Saudi Arabia knowingly provided al Qaeda with support,
financing and resources that were material, substantial and critical to the success of the
39. During the decade prior to and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia was
responsible for substantial funding of al Qaeda that was vital to the operation of that terrorist
organization and its preparations for and realization of the September llth Attacks, including but
a. Saudi Arabia's MWL, IIRO, Rabita Trust, WAMY, BIF, AHIF, SJC, SHC and
German, Swiss and Saudi Arabia government reports, United Nations reports, the statement of al
Qaeda;
c. from 1995 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia, acting
through its employees and agents, including Khalid al Suwailem, a diplomat and senior official
of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Arabia Embassy in Washington, D.C. and Omar
Abdi Mohamed, employed by Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic Affairs with the job title of
"Propagator": fraudulently sought and obtained a visa for Mohamed to enter the United States as
a "religious worker" and intentionally disguised the fact that Mohamed was a Saudi Arabia
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employee; had Mohamed form and operate the Western Somali Relief Agency (WSRA), a
California non-profit corporation in San Diego, California; and, used WSRA in a scheme to send
d. from 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia, acting
through its aforesaid employees and agents of Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic Affairs: (i)
fraudulently obtained and/or maintained 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) charitable status for WSRA from
the Internal Revenue Service, despite the fact that WSRA never performed any charitable acts;
(ii) used WSRA to receive money from various sources affiliated with al Qaeda, including but
not limited to the AHIF, and (iii) had WSRA send over $350,000 to al Qaeda, via Dahab Shil, a
money transfer agency used by al Qaeda, including but not limited to the Dahab Shil office in
e. during the same time period that Saudi Arabia's employees and agents sent over
$350,000 via WSRA to al Qaeda, including through the Dahab Shil office in Karachi, Pakistan,
Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, the mastermind of the September 11th attacks, was located in Karachi
and was handing and sending a total of approximately $400,000 in cash to the hijackers which
f. from 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia, acting
through its employees and agents, including but not limited to Fahad al Thumairy, funded al
Qaeda by sending substantial sums of money from Saudi Arabia through the King Fahad
Mosque, also known as the Ibn Tamiyah Mosque, in Culver City, California, to al Qaeda, or
through various organizations, individuals and/or private businesses, including but not limited to
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g. from 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Fahad al Thumairy: (i) was
an accredited diplomat working at Saudi Arabia's Los Angeles Consulate for Saudi Arabia's
Ministry of Islamic Affairs; (ii) reported to more senior officials of Saudi Arabia's Ministry of
Islamic Affairs at Saudi Arabia's Embassy in Washington, D.C.; (iii) had been selected for his
job in Los Angeles by Saudi Arabia's Head of Islamic Affairs in Washington, D.C.; and (iv) was
an extremist Imam at the King Fahad Mosque, which was founded and funded by Saudi Arabia;
h. from 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia funded al
Qaeda by sending substantial sums of money through the Islamic Center of San Diego, or
through various organizations, individuals and/or private businesses, including but not limited to
i. Saudi Arabia hired and paid employees and agents, including Omar al-Bayoumi
and Osama Basnan, who Saudi Arabia knew were al Qaeda operatives and/or sympathizers and
who provided al Qaeda with substantial assistance to prepare for the September llth Attacks;
j. Bayoumi was employed by Saudi Arabia from the 1970s, and starting in 1995
through and including September 11, 2001, he was assigned by Saudi Arabia to work in San
Diego and was compensated by Saudi Arabia through various "ghost jobs" that Bayoumi never
actually performed;
k. in 2000, Bayoumi had a ghost job as a "Senior DSS Programmer" and Saudi
Arabia was paying him $3,000 per month when, as detailed herein, he was instructed by two
officials from Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic Affairs to provide substantial assistance for
two al Qaeda hijackers in California, and Saudi Arabia paid Bayoumi an additional $4,000 per
month, categorized as "Other Allowances," that was tied to his work to assist those hijackers and
raised his total compensation to $7,000 per month from April 2000 through September 2001,
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after which that additional monthly payment ended and his compensation reverted to $3,000 per
month;
1. Basnan, who also provided material support and services to the hijackers in
California, as detailed herein, received approximately $75,000 in a series of transfers from the
Riggs Bank account of the Saudi Arabia Embassy in Washington, D.C. from 1998 through
September 2001, including $25,000 paid by the Embassy to Basnan and his wife in 1998 that
was reimbursed to the Embassy by Yasin Kadi, a known al Qaeda financial operative, who wired
the Embassy $25,000 in May 1998 from his Swiss bank account;
m. from the late 1990s through and including September 11, 2001, Ahmed al
Dubayan and Mohamed Jaber Hassan Fakihi, working for Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic
Affairs in Germany and acting in the course and scope of their jobs for Saudi Arabia as Head of
its Islamic Affairs Office at the Saudi Arabia Embassy in Bonn and/or Berlin, provided
substantial funds of approximately $800,000 from the Saudi Embassy to support al Qaeda in
n. in addition, Dubayan, Fakihi and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs arranged for the
AHIF, with the approval and direct involvement of AHIF's General Director, Aqeel Abdulaziz al
Aqeel, to provide funds in excess of $1,000,000 to support al Qaeda through the al Nur Mosque;
o. the funds were paid by Saudi Arabia's Embassy and the AHIF to the al Nur
Mosque at the specific instructions of al Qaeda operatives and Osama Bin Laden; that Mosque
was frequented by members of the Hamburg al Qaeda cell led by Mohamed Atta that
coordinated and carried out the September 11th Attacks; and, U.S. authorities concluded that
Fakihi was "more than just a sympathizer of bin Laden" and was "organizationally involved"
with al Qaeda;
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p. from 1996 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia funded al
businesses there, including but not limited to al Qaeda financial operative Mamoun Darkazanli,
Darkazanli Import Export and Abdelfatah Zammar, and those funds underwrote the recruitment
by Mamoun Darkazanli, Abdelfatah Zammar and Mohamed Zammar at the al Quds Mosque in
Hamburg, Germany of the Hamburg al Qaeda cell members that participated in the September
11th Attacks, including hijackers Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah and Marwan al Shehhi and other al
Qaeda operatives who helped carry out the September 11th Attacks, including Ramzi bin al-
Shibh;
q. starting in 2000 through and including September 11, 2001, AHIF collected over
$1,000,000 for al Qaeda from donors in Saudi Arabia and instructed AHIF's employee and/or
agent Abdulaziz Abdulrahman al Baddah to send those funds to al Qaeda via the Dahab Shil
r. from 1988 through and including September 11, 2001, senior managers of Saudi
Arabia's IIRO, through its office in Pakistan, laundered and diverted IIRO funds to al Qaeda and
used false distribution lists of orphan beneficiaries in Afghanistan as a subterfuge to direct funds
to al Qaeda, as confirmed by Jamal al Fadl, an al Qaeda defector, and senior officials at the
headquarters offices of the MWL and IIRO were aware that IIRO funds were being diverted to al
s. the IIRO's funding of al Qaeda was further confirmed by a 2001 Ernst & Young
accounting investigation, which reviewed IIRO records from 1996-2001 and detailed numerous
serious discrepancies in IIRO's financial statements and accounts, including but not limited to
that: over half of the funds transferred from IIRO's headquarters could not be accounted for;
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over $3 million of expenditures could not be explained; about $250,000 purportedly spent on aid
to Afghan orphans went missing; signatures on financial documents were faked or forged;
invoices for construction were falsified; and, funds were sent to fictitious companies created by
IIRO directors;
t. from 1993 through 1998, Saudi Arabia's IIRO funded al Qaeda by sending
approximately $500,000 from the IIRO to the IIRO's endowment arm, Sana-Bell, administered
by the IIRO's Suliman al Ali, for a purported real estate project in Fort Washington, MD,
managed by Soliman Biheiri, and all or the large majority of that money, along with
contributions made by Osama Bin Laden's mother and sisters, Abdullah Bin Laden, Osama Bin
Laden's nephew, Yasin Kadi, an al Qaeda operative, and others, altogether totaling
approximately $2 million, went missing, and Biheiri's accountant told the FBI that funds were
businesses to al Qaeda, and Biheiri was tried in the Eastern District of Virginia and convicted on
federal charges for passport fraud and making false official statements to obstruct a terrorism
investigation;
u. from 2000 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia's WAMY
funded al Qaeda by sending over $50,000 to WAMY's account in Canada which was channeled
individuals and/or private businesses to al Qaeda, and less than 25% of the funding for BIF's
established by al Qaeda operatives Wael Jelaidan, Yasin Kadi and Shafiq Ayadi, who were later
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designated by the United States as Specially Designated Global Terrorists because of their
activities to support al Qaeda for the decade prior to the September 11th Attacks;
w. from 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia created the
SJRC and appointed Wael Jelaidan, a Saudi Arabia employee since 1985 and former Director of
the MWL, as its Executive Director, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia knew that Jelaidan was an
x. Jelaidan proceeded to use his position as SJRC Executive Director in Albania and
Kosovo to provide financial and logistical support to al Qaeda through businesses in Albania that
were owned and operated by (i) Yasin Kadi, a known al Qaeda financial operative, (ii) Abdelatif
Saleh, a known al Qaeda operative and financial supporter with ties to Osama Bin Laden and (iii)
Jelaidan himself;
ordered to leave the country because of his links to a 1998 al Qaeda terrorist plot against the U.S.
Embassy in Albania, yet after his expulsion Saudi Arabia continued to retain Jelaidan as SJRC's
Executive Director, and Jelaidan was invited to join top ranking Saudi Arabia officials on Saudi
through a front company named Maram, in Istanbul, Turkey, ostensibly a trading company, that
was founded, owned and run by al Qaeda, through its operatives Mahmdou Salim (also a BIF
aa. in or around February 2000, Saudi Arabia's AHIF sent approximately $150,000 to
al Qaeda through a money laundering scheme whereby funds were received by the AHIF in its
U.S. bank account and then withdrawn from that account and illegally carried out of the U.S. in
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the form of cash and traveler's checks by Soliman al Buthe, a senior member of the Saudi
government for the city of Riyadh, an AHIF officer and President of AH1F in the U.S., and then
bb. in the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia's MWL sent its employee and agent Mohamed
Khalifa, Osama Bin Laden's brother-in-law, to found a MWL/IIRO office in the Philippines and
thereafter in or around 1994, money from Saudi Arabia's IIRO through its Philippines' office
was used to fund an al Qaeda affiliated terrorist cell headed by Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 World
Trade Center bomber, to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States, including the 1995
Bojinka plot and its test run, the December 1994 Philippine Airlines bombing, which were
cc. following the September 11th Attacks, the United States formally declared in
Exec. Order No. 13224 (as issued in 2001 and updated in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008) that
all or portions of four of Saudi Arabia's charity organizations, namely the AHIF, IIRO, Rabita
Trust and BIF, and numerous employees of Saudi Arabia's charity organizations, including Wael
Jelaidan (MWL, IIRO, SRC, SJRC, Rabita Trust), Abdelhamid al Mujil (IIRO), Soliman al
Buthe (AHIF), Aqeel al Aqeel (AHIF), Adel Batterjee (WAMY, BIF), Enaam Arnaout (MWL,
WAMY, BIF) were Specially Designated Global Terrorists, based on the material support and
resources they provided to al Qaeda prior to the September 11th Attacks; and
dd. prior to and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia funded al Qaeda in
additional ways, as will be determined through further investigation, disclosures and discovery of
Saudi Arabia.
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40. Each of the 19 hijackers and others involved in supporting the September 11th
Attacks were indoctrinated and given their terrorist training necessary to prepare for and execute
the September llth Attacks at one or more al Qaeda terrorist training camps located in
"Al Farouq 2" (hijackers Abdelaziz al Omari, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Haznawi,
Ahmed al Nami, Fayez Banihammad, Hamza al Ghamdi, Hani Hanjour, Mohand Shehri,
Salem al Hazmi, Sayid al Ghamdi, Wail al Shehri and Walid al Shehri);
"Tarnak Farms" (hijackers Ziad Jarrah, Mohamed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi).
41. Those Afghan terrorist training camps provided training to the 19 hijackers in
various skills that they used to execute the September 11th Attacks, including aircraft hijacking,
discipline, hand-to-hand combat, weaponry (including the use of knives and blades to murder),
hostage taking, religious indoctrination, English language skills and U.S. culture.
42. For years prior to and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia's IIRO, AHIF
and MWL provided substantial funding and other material support for the Afghan terrorist
training camps attended by the 19 hijackers in Afghanistan, including but not limited to the
following:
a. Saudi Arabia's IIRO was the principal source of funding and other material
support to establish and operate the Afghan terrorist training camps, as confirmed by:
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i. a 1996 C.I.A. report, which stated that the IIRO funded six terrorist
training camps in Afghanistan;
ii. a 2003 report by the United Nations Security Council, which stated that
"IIRO funds directly supported six Al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan prior to
September 11";
iii. a 2004 U.S. State Department cable, which described the IIRO as "the
principal sponsor of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime",
i.e. from 1996 through and including September 11, 2001;
iv. a 2003 report which stated that an IIRO employee, Abu Nasir, was
informed by his superiors in the 1990s that approximately 40 to 50 percent of IIRO' s
charitable funds was being diverted to finance terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and
Kashmir;
vii. U.S. reports regarding the September 11th Attacks which tied the IIRO to
funding of the Afghan training camps; and
viii. in 2001 through and including September 11, 2001, at least one IIRO
employee was also a trainer at the Afghan terrorist training camps;
b. Saudi Arabia's AHIF provided major funding to establish and operate the Afghan
ii. U.S. reports regarding the September 11th Attacks tied the AHIF to
funding of the Afghan training camps; and
iii. in the 1990s through and including September 11, 2001, a representative
of Saudi Arabia's AHIF in Belgium was a recruiter for al Qaeda Afghan terrorist training
camps;
c. the MWL, IIRO and AHIF paid for transportation for al Qaeda operatives to
d. the MWL, IIRO and AHIF paid for building materials and electrical supplies
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e. the MWL, IIRO and AHIF funded and provided material support for the Afghan
terrorist training camps in additional ways, as will be determined through further investigation,
43. During the decade prior to and including September 11, 2001, and during the
period that al Qaeda was actively planning the September 11th Attacks, Saudi Arabia provided
material logistical support and resources to al Qaeda, including, but not limited to the following:
a. U.S. State Department officials concluded that Osama Bin Laden "used the entire
b. in the late 1990s through and including September 11, 2001, the office and
guesthouse of Saudi Arabia's IIRO in Kandahar, Afghanistan was operated as a way-station and
safe house for al Qaeda operatives travelling to the Afghan terrorist training camps;
c. in or around October 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi
(following al Qaeda's bombings of U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya) and thereafter, the
Director of the AHIF in Afghanistan was instructed by "Riyadh" (the capital city of Saudi Arabia
and location of the headquarters office of Saudi Arabia's AHIF) to open an office at that
Embassy/Ambassador's residence; and, the AHIF operated such an office and provided material
d. in or around October 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi
Arabia's Embassy/Ambassador's residence in Kabul was used as a "guesthouse", i.e. safe house,
by al Qaeda; and, Osama Bin Laden and numerous other al Qaeda operatives, likely including
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e. from 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia provided
funding and military equipment to the Taliban, including through Saudi Arabia's charity
organizations, including but not limited to the AHIF, to support the use of Afghanistan as a safe
f. from 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia facilitated
and provided support and services for the Taliban controlled airline, Afghan Ariana Airlines, to
conduct flights between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia which Saudi Arabia knew were being
conducted as a supply service for al Qaeda to shuttle guns, money and al Qaeda recruits and
operatives to Afghanistan;
g. prior to and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia Embassy diplomats in
Bosnia coordinated financial support from Saudi Arabia's AHIF to al Qaeda operatives;
h. in 1997 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia's AHIF
operated a program in Azerbaijan that provided training for AHIF employees in money
laundering techniques to fund al Qaeda using bank accounts, money transfer companies and cash
couriers and those employees were then deployed to Pakistan and used those money laundering
techniques to receive funds from the AHIF in Saudi Arabia and send those funds to al Qaeda in
i. from 1998 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia's BIF,
assisted al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden with the procurement and transport of materials and
weapons, and the transfer of al Qaeda funds, including via the use of "front companies" in
various countries, including but not limited to Sudan, Turkey and the U.A.E.;
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recruited and indoctrinated its students to join al Qaeda, and at least five of the 19 hijackers
responsible for the September 11th Attacks, together with other al Qaeda operatives who
attended Imam University, were likely recruited as al Qaeda operatives by Saudi Arabia's
k. in or around July 2001, Saudi Arabia's passport office and authorities issued a
passport under a false name to Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, a Pakistani citizen who worked with
and for al Qaeda to plan, carry out and mastermind the September 11th Attacks;
1. from 1996 through and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia assisted
various of its employees and agents who provided material support and resources to al Qaeda for
the September 11th Attacks to obtain fraudulent visas to enter the United States, in violation of
federal law, and failed to advise U.S. officials, including the U.S. Attorney General, that the
employees and agents were working for Saudi Arabia inside the United States, in violation of
Omar Abdi Mohamed, who first entered the U.S. on a fraudulent religious worker visa in
1995, and did not declare that he was actually working for Saudi Arabia, and was
ultimately prosecuted, convicted and deported from the United States in 2006 for those
false statements;
Omar al Bayoumi, who repeatedly entered the U.S. on a student visa for several years
prior to and including 1999-2000, even though he was not attending school, was
collecting salary for a "ghost job" while actually working for Saudi Arabia, and provided
material support and resources for the al Qaeda hijackers, as described herein;
Osama Basnan, who entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in 1996, when he was working for
Saudi Arabia, and provided material support and resources for the al Qaeda hijackers, as
described herein, and did not leave the U.S. until August 2002, after he was convicted for
visa fraud and deported;
including several of the 19 hijackers involved in the September llth Attacks, with new,
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"cleansed" passports to allow them to travel and obtain visas without suspicion, including but not
limited to removing references to travel through Pakistan to the Afghan terrorist training camps;
n. Saudi Arabia's SRC, MWL, IIRO, WAMY and/or AHIF provided Osama Bin
Laden and other al Qaeda operatives with identification cards and visas for travel, including to
o. Saudi Arabia's AHIF provided secret courier services for al Qaeda, including but
not limited to such services provided by AHIF employee and/or agent Abdirashid Aidid, who
P. Saudi Arabia's AHIF faxed coded messages for al Qaeda, including but not
limited to a message sent from AHIF in Albania to an al Qaeda operative in London in 1998
related to an al Qaeda plot in the summer of 1998 to attack the U.S. Embassy in Tirana, Albania;
q. in 1998-99, Saudi Arabia's IIRO and AHIF provided computers and other
in Kandahar, Afghanistan that were used to indoctrinate the Taliban leadership and al Qaeda
s. in 1992-1996, al Qaeda sent operatives to fight in the Bosnian war, including two
of the 19 hijackers, and Saudi Arabia's charity organizations, including the SHC, WAMY, BIF
and AHIF, provided those al Qaeda operatives with employment, identification, food, weapons
and equipment, and the SHC employed various al Qaeda operatives, including Ali Ahmed Ali
Hamad, Abdelsamad al Bahrani, Hassam al Din, Abu Miqdad al Dosari, Abu Abdelmalik al Libi,
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t. from 1992 to 1996, a high ranking Saudi Arabia official, the SHC and IIRO sent
millions of dollars to the Third World Relief organization, an al Qaeda front, with the knowledge
that a substantial portion of such contributions would fund al Qaeda, including the transportation
of al Qaeda operatives to the war in Bosnia, and the purchase of various weapons, including but
u. in 1993, Saudi Arabia's SHC, which at the time was run by a top ranking Saudi
Arabia official, as confirmed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, provided weapons to a
Somali faction who were being trained by al Qaeda and those weapons were used to kill
numerous U.S. servicemen who were providing security for a U.N. humanitarian mission in
Somalia; and,
v. prior to and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia provided logistical
44. Saudi Arabia provided material support and resources for al Qaeda and the 19
hijackers directly linked to the actual planning and execution of the September 11th Attacks,
a. as detailed above, Saudi Arabia was responsible for the financing of the plot
through various schemes that funded al Qaeda at the same time that the 19 hijackers were being
handed or sent money (39c - h, 39q, 43h); paid Saudi Arabia's agents and employees for their
work to assist the hijackers (T39i -1); provided money for the recruitment and support of al
Qaeda's Hamburg cell (39rn - p); bankrolled the Afghan terrorist training camps attended by all
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19 hijackers (40 - 42); and, logistical help used by the hijackers and their support network,
Embassy in Washington, D.C. gave instructions to Saudi diplomat Fahad al Thumairy and Omar
al Bayoumi, another agent and employee working for Saudi Arabia, including for its Embassy in
Washington, D.C., its Consulate in Los Angeles, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of
Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and/or other agencies, to meet with and provide cover,
advice, planning, safe houses and other material support and resources to al Qaeda hijackers
Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, the first of the 19 hijackers to arrive in the United
States;
c. in or around January 2000, Thumairy met in person in Los Angeles with Mihdhar
and Hazmi upon their arrival in the United States, assisted them with transportation and housing,
including arranging an apartment for the hijackers at the Avalon Westside apartments in Los
Angeles, and met with and directed Bayoumi and others, including but not limited to Oualid
Benomrane and Mohdar Abdullah, to provide material support and resources to hijackers
d. from January 2000 through and including September 11, 2001, Bayoumi, acting
in the course and scope of his employment with Saudi Arabia and/or as an agent of Saudi Arabia,
provided money, cover, advice, planning, safe houses and other material support and resources to
al Qaeda hijackers Mihdhar and Hazmi, including: helping them learn English and American
culture and assimilate into the U.S. without drawing attention to themselves; finding them
apartments in San Diego; co-signing their lease and providing money for the rent and security
deposit; lending them his cellphone; assisting them to open bank accounts; introducing them to
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others who could provide them with information and assistance, including but not limited to: (i)
Osama Basnan, a Saudi Arabia employee and agent working for Saudi Arabia, (ii) Yazeed al
Salmi (the nephew of Bayoumi's superior in Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Defense), (iii) Anwar al
Aulaqi, an al Qaeda operative in San Diego and Virginia (later designated by the United States as
a Specially Designated Global Terrorist), who had meetings not only with Mihdhar and Hazmi,
but also with hijacker Hani Hanjour, and provided them with guidance, encouragement and other
material support and resources, and (iv) Osama Nooh and Lafi al Harb, two Saudi Arabia Naval
officers attending U.S. Navy training in San Diego; and, otherwise assisting them with their
e. from January 2000 and thereafter before September 11, 2001, Mohdar Abdullah,
at the direction of Thumairy and/or Bayoumi, provided material support and resources to
hijackers Mihdhar and Hazmi, including but not limited to: assisting them to acclimate and live
in California; providing them with transportation to various locations; helping them obtain social
security numbers and genuine California driver's licenses; aiding them to locate and obtain
phony and illegal California driver's licenses; assisting them to locate and apply to language and
flight schools; performing surveillance of airport facilities with them; assisting them with visa
issues to maintain their legal status in the United States; and, regularly having meals and various
f. from January 2000 and thereafter before September 11, 2001, Oualid Benomrane,
at the direction of Thumairy and another employee or agent of Saudi Arabia at its Los Angeles
Consulate, and for compensation paid by Saudi Arabia, provided material support and resources
to hijackers Mihdhar and Hazmi, including but not limited to: providing them with transportation
to various locations, assisting them as a translator and helping them to learn English; and,
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Benomrane told U.S. law enforcement authorities that: (i) Thumairy asked him to assist Mihdhar
and Hazmi and told him not to tell anyone about the two men and to keep their presence in
California to himself, (ii) Thumairy told him that the two men were in Los Angeles to visit their
sick father in a local hospital and (iii) the Saudi Consulate had picked up the two men at the Los
g. from January 2000 and thereafter before September 11, 2001, Osama Basnan, a
known al Qaeda supporter acting in the course and scope of his employment with Saudi Arabia
and/or as an agent of Saudi Arabia, met with and had hundreds of phone conversations with
Bayoumi, lived across the street from hijackers Mihdhar and Hazmi in San Diego and met with
and provided material support and resources to them, including putting them in contact with a
h. Basnan was working at the Saudi Arabia Embassy in Washington, D.C. in 1992
when he held an event to honor Omar Abdul Rahman, the "Blind Sheikh," who was an al Qaeda
supporter convicted in 1995 for his role in masterminding a foiled terrorist attack against various
New York City bridges, tunnels and landmarks; in 1998, Basnan and his wife received $25,000
through the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. that was reimbursed to the Embassy by Yasin
Kadi, a known al Qaeda financial operative; from February 1999 through and including May
2002, Basnan's wife was paid $2,000-$3,000 each month via checks from that same Embassy;
prior to September 11, 2001, Basnan spoke of Osama Bin Laden "as if he were a God"; either
Basnan or an associate had phone contacts with the members of al Qaeda's Hamburg cell and
Basnan placed regular calls to members of Osama Bin Laden's family; and, after the September
11th Attacks, Basnan celebrated at a party saying that the hijackers were "heroes" and remarked
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"what a wonderful glorious day it had been" and he later bragged that "that he did more for the
Mohdar Abdullah brought Mihdhar and Hazmi to Los Angeles for private meetings held at the
King Fahad Mosque and a Los Angeles motel with another al Qaeda operative;
j. from June 2000 and thereafter before September 11, 2001, after a trip to Saudi
Arabia by Bayoumi, the nephew of his superior in the Ministry of Defense, Yazid Salmi,
travelled to San Diego, and Bayoumi found Salmi accommodation with hijacker Hazmi, and
Salmi provided money, including $1,900 in traveller's checks, to Hazmi in September 2000;
Qaeda operatives and/or associates and Imam University graduates, were employed and paid by
Saudi Arabia to attend graduate school in Arizona and perform other duties as requested by the
Saudi Arabia Embassy in Washington, D.C., and were acting in the course and scope of their
employment with Saudi Arabia and/or as agents of Saudi Arabia when they travelled on a
commercial airline flight from Phoenix to Washington, D.C. and intentionally attempted on at
least two occasions to gain entry to the airplane's cockpit to test and learn U.S. airline security
1. Shalawi and Qudhaieen were travelling on that flight using tickets paid for by
Saudi Arabia with the ostensible purpose of attending a symposium at Saudi Arabia's Institute of
Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA) with high ranking Saudi Arabia officials,
including Abdullah Naseef, former MWL Secretary-General and Vice-Chairman of the Shura
Council;
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m. in the late 1980s Shalawi attended and received terrorist training at Masadat al
Ansar, then Osama Bin Laden's main training camp; before and after the "dry run," Shalawi
and/or Qudhaieen met with others involved in the planning and execution of the September 11th
Attacks, including (i) hijacker Hani Hanjour, who they met from 1997-1999 at the Saudi Arabia-
funded Tempe Islamic Center in Tempe, AZ; (ii) Thumairy, who they met at the opening of the
King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, CA in 1998; and (iii) several of the muscle hijackers
involved in the September 11th Attacks, who underwent training in the fall and winter of 2000-
2001 at an Afghan terrorist training camp at the same time as Shalawi; as a result of attending
that camp, Shalawi was watchlisted by the United States as a potential terrorist and denied a visa
when he attempted to re-enter the United States in August 2001 (likely as part of an al Qaeda
terrorist operation); and, in 2000-2001 both Shalawi and Qudhaieen continued their work for
n. from 1996 through 1999, a top ranking Saudi Arabia official sent money to a
construction business in Spain that was operated as a ploy to fund al Qaeda's Spanish cell, which
used the money it received to: (i) conduct surveillance and take videotapes of potential terrorist
targets, including the World Trade Center, for al Qaeda in the United States, (ii) send tapes of
those targets to Osama Bin Laden for his review; and (iii) establish a logistical cell in Turkey to
assist the movement of al Qaeda recruits from Europe to Chechnya and Afghanistan, a route
o. it is likely that additional employees and agents of Saudi Arabia provided the 19
hijackers with material support and resources to carry out the September 11th Attacks, including
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ii. Saudi Arabia's pilots, who were uniquely situated to furnish the highly
specialized flight training obtained by the hijackers, as demonstrated by the flight skills
the hijackers used to carry out the September 11th Attacks, including Fahad Bakalka, a
Saudi Arabia pilot who flew for the Royal Family, Osama Bin Laden and Saudi Arabia's
National Commercial Bank and was a friend of two of the 19 hijackers, and Mohamed
Tahsin, who also flew for Saudi Arabia's National Commercial Bank and was
investigated by the FBI for being a financial associate of one of the 19 hijackers;
iii. Sayid Rageah, a WAMY employee and fund raiser for al Qaeda who was
the Imam at a mosque in Maryland visited by the hijackers on September 10, 2001;
iv. from 1999 through and including September 11, 2001, Abdullah Bin
Laden, nephew of Osama Bin Laden, was Saudi Arabia's Administrative Officer at its
United States Embassy and Head of WAMY's branch office in the United States, and
maintained a close business and personal relationship with Mohamed Harunani, a
WAMY contractor (Abdullah Bin Laden was listed as the emergency contact for
Harunani's children and they frequently called and sent messages to each other), and
Harunani was in contact with several of the al Qaeda hijackers and operatives from the
Hamburg cell, including Mohamed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi;
p. the AHIF's Director in Belgium, Tarek Maroufi, was hired by the AHIF in
January 2001 despite his known history as an al Qaeda operative who served a prison sentence
for a prior terrorist attack in Belgium, and Maroufi organized the September 9, 2001 murder of
Ahmad Shah Massoud, the commander of the Northern Alliance, an opposition force fighting the
Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, by recruiting the assassins and providing them with fake
Belgian passports, and Massoud's assassination was arranged to reduce the risk of an attack
from Northern Alliance forces that al Qaeda expected would follow from the September 11th
Attacks;
Attacks, Saudi Arabia's officers, employees and agents repeatedly lied about their key contacts
and information concerning the material assistance they provided to the hijackers and al Qaeda,
including:
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i. Thumairy falsely stated that: he did not recognize Bayoumi's name and
had never seen Bayoumi in Los Angeles (but they had met on several occasions there and
exchanged numerous phone calls); he did not know Abdullah or Benomrane (despite
meeting with them and asking them to help the two hijackers); neither he, the King Fahad
Mosque nor the Saudi Consulate rented more than one apartment at the Avalon Westside
apartments in Los Angeles (where they actually had extensive additional rentals and
where Thumairy arranged for the hijackers to stay upon their arrival);
ii. Bayoumi falsely stated that: he had only a random several minute
encounter with the hijackers at a Los Angeles restaurant (when witnesses said he had
lunch with them); after leaving the restaurant he tried to visit the King Fahad Mosque but
couldn't find it and returned home without ever visiting it (but a witness confirmed that
Bayoumi visited the mosque before and after going to the restaurant); he didn't know
where the hijackers stayed immediately following their arrival in San Diego (although
Bayoumi himself filled out an application form for the hijackers' apartment which stated
that the hijackers had been living with him since their arrival); following his initial
contacts with the hijackers, Bayoumi could recall only one occasion when he saw one of
the hijackers and it was by chance and from a distance (while Bayoumi lived next door to
the hijackers and a witness stated that he saw Bayoumi with the hijackers at their
apartment on numerous occasions); he did not tell Mohdar to provide assistance to the
hijackers (while Mohdar told authorities that Bayoumi asked him to drive the hijackers
around San Diego and help them enroll in classes); he did not have any relationship with
Basnan (but investigators concluded they were extremely close, with over 700 phone
calls exchanged between them); no one told him to help the hijackers (while Thumairy
and a superior in Washington, D.C. gave Bayoumi such instructions and Bayoumi's
phone records confirm those contacts);
iii. Basnan was found by the authorities to have an "utter lack of credibility
on virtually every material subject," and falsely claimed not to know Bayoumi (despite
their numerous contacts and phone calls); denied knowing Omar Bakarbashat, a friend
and supporter of the hijackers (despite the fact that Bakarbashat was Basnan's brother-in-
law); and, denied ever seeing the hijackers or saying that he did (yet boasted to a witness
that he provided more support to the hijackers than Bayoumi and lived across the street
from them for several months);
iv. Saleh al Hussayen faked a seizure during his interview with the
authorities, was taken to the hospital, where doctors found him in good health, and
thereafter Hussayen quickly fled the United States;
v. Omar Abdi Mohamed falsely stated that the WSRA "charity" was an
entity in name only, had never received funds and had no money (yet over $350,000 was
received into and sent out from WSRA's bank account) and failed to reveal that he had
been employed by Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic Affairs for 10 years;
vi. Qudhaieen falsely stated that: he never got near the cockpit on the dry run
flight (while witnesses saw him try to enter and rattle the cockpit door on at least two
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occasions); he did not know Thumairy (but later recanted and admitted that he knew
Thumairy); and,
vii. Shalawi said he was enrolled and present at Arizona State University
during the entire 2000-2001 academic year (but did not tell the authorities that he went to
an al Qaeda Afghan terrorist training camp in the fall of 2000);
r. several of the 19 hijackers and others who assisted in the September llth Attacks
were provided employment by Saudi Arabia, despite Saudi Arabia's knowledge that they were
i. Hani Hanjour, a hijacker who worked for the IIRO from 1989-1991 in
Pakistan and Afghanistan and likely received payments from Saudi Arabia to attend
schools in the United States at various times starting in 1992, including from December
2000 through and including September 11, 2001;
ii. Mohand Shehri, a hijacker who worked for the IIRO in logistics, moving
goods from Peshawar, Pakistan to Kabul, Afghanistan, starting in 1999, and;
iii. Wail al Shehri, a hijacker who worked for Saudi Arabia as a teacher on a
Saudi Arabia military base from 1999 through 2001, during which time he trained at al
Qaeda camps in Afghanistan;
vi. Fahad al Thumairy, a Saudi Arabia diplomat at its Los Angeles consulate,
who provided material assistance to the hijackers and was denied entry to the United
States after the September 11th Attacks because of his ties to terrorism;
vii. Osama Basnan, a Saudi Arabia employee and/or agent and frequent
contact of Bayoumi who was a known al Qaeda associate and/or operative;
viii. Hamdan Shalawi, a Saudi Arabia employee and al Qaeda operative who
attended Osama Bin Laden's main terrorist training camp in Afghanistan the late 1980s;
and,
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s. prior to and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia provided material
support and resources directly linked to the actual planning and execution of the September 11th
Attacks in additional ways, as will be determined through further investigation, disclosures and
III.
Saudi Arabia's domination and control of its charitable organizations
45. As set forth herein, at all relevant times prior to and on September 11, 2001, Saudi
Arabia used its charitable organizations to perform core governmental functions, and those
46. At all relevant times prior to and on September 11, 2001, the MWL, IIRO and
Rabita Trust were each part of Saudi Arabia, alter-egos of Saudi Arabia and/or agents of Saudi
Arabia, and it would work a fraud or injustice to regard them as legal entities separate from
a. in pleadings filed before this Court, the MWL and IIRO asserted they were
immune from suit because of their status as a foreign sovereign, namely Saudi Arabia;
b. the MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust were founded by Saudi Arabia, and were
closely related organizations with shared employees, bank accounts and offices and their daily
operations were overseen by MWL's Secretary General, who was appointed and directed by
Saudi Arabia;
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appointment named by Royal Decree and served as the President of the IIRO, appointed the
Secretary General of the IIRO, and had the power to hire and fire IIRO employees;
d. the Rabita Trust was part of the MWL and the MWL ran the operations of the
Rabita Trust on a day-to-day basis and had the power to hire and fire Rabita Trust employees;
e. MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust received directions from and sought the approval of
Saudi Arabia's King, Minister of Islamic Affairs and other senior officials of Saudi Arabia
regarding all aspects of their operations, including but not limited to personnel, finances, bank
i. the approval of the King was obtained for fund raising campaigns;
ii. the MWL sought approval from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs to make
trips to foreign countries;
iii. Saudi Embassy officials provided the IIRO with strict instructions
regarding making statements to the press;
iv. the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs directed the MWL to provide
project aid, including for Burmese refugees in 1999;
f. the existence of the MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust was subject to the ongoing
approval of Saudi Arabia and could be terminated at any time by Saudi Arabia;
confirmed under oath that he was appointed to his position by Royal Decree of Saudi Arabia and
that the MWL was "sponsored and financially supported by the Saudi Government";
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i. the annual budget of the MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust was funded almost
exclusively by Saudi Arabia and, for example, MWL's financial records for 2000-01 show that
J. the policies followed by MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust were determined by a
Constitutive Council chaired by the Grand Mufti appointed by the King of Saudi Arabia;
k. the highest officers of the MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust responsible for their
operations simultaneously held other positions as officials with Saudi Arabia, and reported to
higher ranking officials of Saudi Arabia, including but not limited to:
ii. MWL's Jurisprudence Council member was the Head of Saudi Arabia's
Shura Council;
iv. Rabita Trust's Secretary General was the Executive Director of Saudi
Arabia's SJRC;
1. employees of the MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust were simultaneously employed by
Saudi Arabia in another capacity, often as employees of a Saudi Arabia Embassy or other Saudi
Arabia agency, and reported on a day-to-day basis to more senior employees and officers of
Saudi Arabia;
m. lower level employees of the MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust reported on a day-to-
day basis to more senior MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust employees and officers who
simultaneously worked for Saudi Arabia in another capacity, often as employees of a Saudi
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Arabia Embassy or other Saudi Arabia agency, and who in turn reported on a day-to-day basis to
n. MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust officials and employees received Saudi Arabia
diplomatic passports and traveled in the name of and as representatives of Saudi Arabia;
o. the employees and officers of the MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust considered
themselves to be employees and officers of Saudi Arabia subject to the exclusive control of
Saudi Arabia;
p. an MWL employee and Director of IIRO in Canada, testified in 1999 that the
MWL "is a fully government funded organization" and that "[i]n other words,Iwork for the
government of Saudi Arabia" and "am an employee of that government...."; that "the IIRO is the
relief branch of that organization [the MWL] which means that we are controlled in all of our
activities and plans by the government of Saudi Arabia..."; and, that the MWL and IIRO "has to
abide by the policy of the Government of Saudi Arabia..." and that "[i]f anybody deviates from
that, he would be fired; he would not work at all with IIRO or with the [MWL]...";
q. Saudi Arabia gave the employees of the MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust the same
protections and privileges that it provided to its own employees working abroad;
r. Saudi Arabia's Embassies paid the salaries of MWL and IIRO employees and/or
had the MWL and IIRO pay the salaries of the employees of Saudi Arabia's embassies;
s. the MWL, IIRO and Rabita Trust shared offices that were provided by Saudi
Arabia, at locations chosen by Saudi Arabia, including but not limited to offices located inside
Saudi Arabia's embassies around the world, and, as an example, an MWL office in Pakistan
operated from the Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs office at the Saudi Embassy;
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t. Saudi Arabia's Embassy bank accounts held the funds of the MWL and IIRO,
commingled Saudi Arabia's Embassy funds with the funds of the MWL and IIRO and used
Saudi Arabia Embassy bank accounts to receive and disburse MWL and IIRO funds;
u. Saudi Arabia's Embassies made purchasing decisions for the MWL and IIRO;
v. Saudi Arabia's Embassies provided the MWL and IIRO with supplies and
equipment and/or had the MWL and IIRO provide Saudi embassies with supplies and
equipment;
grant funding applications made by third parties to the MWL and IIRO;
x. Saudi Arabia's Embassy officials mediated disputes between the MWL and IIRO
behalf of the MWL and IIRO and their employees, including allowing the MWL and IIRO to
maintain their presence in foreign countries, legal disputes and obtaining diplomatic license
plates;
z. Saudi Arabia authorized the MWL to provide loans to Saudi Arabia's Embassy
staff;
aa. the MWL had official Saudi Arabia clearance to view classified Saudi Arabia
bb. such additional facts as set forth herein or that may be determined through further
47. At all relevant times prior to and on September 11, 2001, WAMY and BIF were
each part of Saudi Arabia, alter-egos of Saudi Arabia and/or agents of Saudi Arabia, and it would
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work a fraud or injustice to regard them as legal entities separate from Saudi Arabia, as
a. from its inception in 1972, WAMY was established and operated by Saudi Arabia
b. BIF was established as a part of WAMY in 1987 and WAMY funded the
operations of BIF and had the power to hire and fire BIF employees;
c. the day-to-day operations of WAMY and BIF were subject to the control and
direction of Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Embassies and top ranking officials;
d. the existence of WAMY and BIF were subject to the ongoing approval of Saudi
e. the annual budget of WAMY and BIF was funded by Saudi Arabia, and Mutaz
Saleh Abu Unuq, Financial Director of WAMY, confirmed in a 2003 affidavit that he reviewed
WAMY's finances from 1994 through and including September 11, 2001, and stated that Saudi
Arabia funded "a large portion" of WAMY's budget, including but not limited to grants to
WAMY from the Saudi Arabia Ministry of Finance upon the recommendation of the Saudi
f. WAMY and BIF were governed by WAMY's President and that position was
held by Saudi Arabia's Minister of Islamic Affairs, including from 1999 through and including
September 11, 2001, when Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al Ash-Shaikh, simultaneously acted for Saudi
g. Saudi Arabia's Minister of Islamic Affairs and WAMY's President Saleh bin
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WAMY's General Assembly, who, together with WAMY's President, directed WAMY and BIF;
i. WAMY and BIF received directions from and sought the approval of Saudi
Arabia's King, Minister of Islamic Affairs and other senior officials of Saudi Arabia regarding
all aspects of their operations, including but not limited to finances, personnel, donations,
iii. WAMY's annual report was submitted to and reviewed by a top ranking
official of Saudi Arabia;
j. all of the officers of WAMY and BIF were appointed by Saudi Arabia and many
of those officers hold other positions as officials with Saudi Arabia, including but not limited to
Dr. Maneh el Johani, WAMY's Secretary General from 1987 through and including September
11, 2001, who also served as a member of Saudi Arabia's Shura Council and head of its Islamic
Affairs Committee and Abdullah Naseef, WAMY's vice-chairman and Vice-Chairman of the
Shura Council (who, as set forth herein, met with and assisted Osama Bin Laden to establish al
Qaeda);
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Saudi Arabia in another capacity, as employees of a Saudi Arabia Embassy or other Saudi Arabia
agency, and reported on a day-to-day basis to more senior employees and officers of Saudi
Arabia, for example, Abdullah bin Laden, Osama Bin Laden's nephew and Saudi Arabia's
Administrative Officer of its United States Embassy for nearly a decade, was at the same time
1. lower level employees of WAMY and BIF reported on a day-to-day basis to more
senior WAMY and BIF employees and officers who simultaneously worked for Saudi Arabia in
another capacity, as employees of a Saudi Arabia Embassy or other Saudi Arabia agency, and
who in turn reported on a day-to-day basis to even more senior employees and officers of Saudi
Arabia;
employees and officers of Saudi Arabia subject to the exclusive control of Saudi Arabia;
o. Saudi Arabia gave the employees of WAMY and BIF the same protections and
q. the offices of WAMY and BIF were provided by Saudi Arabia, at locations
chosen by Saudi Arabia, including but not limited to offices inside Saudi Arabia's embassies
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r. Saudi Arabia's Embassy bank accounts held the funds of the WAMY,
commingled Saudi Arabia's Embassy funds with the funds of the WAMY and used Saudi Arabia
s. Saudi Arabia's Embassies provided WAMY and BIF with supplies, services and
equipment and/or had WAMY and BIF provide Saudi Arabia's embassies with supplies, services
t. such additional facts as set forth herein or that may be determined through further
48. At all relevant times prior to and on September 11, 2001, the AHIF was part of
Saudi Arabia, an alter-ego of Saudi Arabia and/or an agent of Saudi Arabia, and it would work a
fraud or injustice to regard it as a legal entity separate from Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by the
following:
a. in 1988-89, Wael Jelaidan, then the Director of Saudi Arabia's SRC's Pakistan
office, directed an SRC employee, Aqeel Abdulaziz al Aqeel, to create the AHIF in Quetta,
Pakistan as a division of Saudi Arabia's SRC, and the AHIF was established as a division of the
SRC; in 1992 the AHIF established its headquarters office in Saudi Arabia's capital, Riyadh,
under the official patronage of a top ranking Saudi Arabia official and Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al
Ash-Shaikh, who was later appointed as Deputy and then Minister of Islamic Affairs;
b. AHIF was governed by AHIF's Chairman and that position was held by Saudi
Arabia's Minister of Islamic Affairs, including from 1999 through and including September 11,
2001, when Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al Ash-Shaikh simultaneously held positions for Saudi Arabia
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General Director and senior management; according to the affidavit testimony of AHIF's
Financial and Administrative Manager, Khalid bin Obaid Azzahri, "[AHIF] operates under the
supervision of the Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs, who appoints its Board of Directors and
September 11, 2001, Aqeel Abdulaziz al Aqeel, confirmed that "we work under the supervision
of Saudi government" and U.S. government investigations showed that at least two Saudi Arabia
e. the annual budget of AHIF was funded by Saudi Arabia, and AHIF's General
Director Al Aqeel acknowledged that more than 95% of AHIF's funding came directly from
Saudi Arabia;
f. the day-to-day operations of AHIF were subject to the control and direction of
g. the existence of AHIF was subject to the ongoing approval of Saudi Arabia and
could be terminated at any time by Saudi Arabia, and in or around June 2004 Saudi Arabia made
the decision to terminate AHIF and Saudi Arabia retained the assets of AHIF as its own;
h. AHIF received directions from and sought the approval of Saudi Arabia's King,
Minister of Islamic Affairs, Ministry of Islamic Affairs, the Islamic Affairs Bureaus within Saudi
Arabia's Embassies and other officials of Saudi Arabia regarding all aspects of their operations,
including but not limited to personnel decisions, finances, bank accounts, funding, travel and
project decisions;
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i. many of AHIF's officers and employees held other positions as officials with
Saudi Arabia, including its Chairman, its accountant at AHIF's headquarters, Abdulaziz al
Shoumar, and AHIF's officer and President of its U.S. branch, Soliman al Buthe, and reported on
AHIF employees and officers who simultaneously worked for Saudi Arabia in another capacity,
often as employees of a Saudi Arabia Embassy or other Saudi Arabia agency, and who in turn
reported on a day-to-day basis to even more senior employees and officers of Saudi Arabia;
k. offices of the AHIF were provided by Saudi Arabia, at locations chosen by Saudi
Arabia, including but not limited to offices inside Saudi Arabia's embassies around the world
and at Saudi Arabia's embassies and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, where the AHIF's
1. Saudi Arabia's embassies provided AHIF with supplies, services and equipment
and/or had AHIF provide Saudi Arabia's embassies with supplies, services and equipment;
n. after Saudi Arabia withdrew its Ambassador from the Saudi Arabia Embassy in
Kabul, Afghanistan, the Director of the AHIF in Afghanistan was instructed to take possession of
that Embassy, and the AHIF occupied that Embassy, as described herein;
o. Saudi Arabia Embassy officials offered to conceal AHIF documents from law
P. such additional facts as set forth herein or that may be determined through further
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49. At all relevant times prior to and on September 11, 2001, the SHC was part of
Saudi Arabia, an alter-ego of Saudi Arabia and/or an agent of Saudi Arabia, and it would work a
fraud or injustice to regard it as a legal entity separate from Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by the
following:
a. in a pleading previously filed before this Court, the SHC specifically asserted that
it was immune from suit because of its status as a foreign sovereign, namely Saudi Arabia;
Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Dr. Mutlib bin Abdullah al Nafissa, the SHC "is an arm of the Saudi
Arabian government" and "[a]ctions taken by the SHC properly are viewed as actions of the
the Executive Office of the SHC, the SHC was created by a decision of the President of the
Council of Ministers of Saudi Arabia, has been continuously headed by Prince (now King)
Salman, and SHC's Executive Committee and Supreme Commission of the SHC include Saudi
Arabia officials;
d. the Director of the SHC was a Saudi Arabia employee and member of the Saudi
e. Saudi Arabia provided all of the funding to operate the SHC; all of the fund
raising of the SHC was sanctioned by Saudi Arabia; and, Saudi Arabia was the largest source of
f. the existence of the SHC was subject to the ongoing approval of Saudi Arabia and
g. Saudi Arabia decided the recipients and amounts of grants made by the SHC;
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members of the civil service of Saudi Arabia and deemed themselves employees of Saudi Arabia
i. the SHC was staffed with civil servant employees of Saudi Arabia detailed from
other Saudi Arabia ministries and administrative organs, and such employees were paid by their
respective ministries and administrative organs, rather than by the SHC; and
j. such additional facts as set forth herein or that may be determined through further
50. At all relevant times prior to and on September 11, 2001, the SJRC was part of
Saudi Arabia, an alter-ego of Saudi Arabia and/or an agent of Saudi Arabia, and it would work a
fraud or injustice to regard it as a legal entity separate from Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by the
following:
a. in a pleading previously filed before this Court, the SJRC specifically asserted
that it was immune from suit because of its status as a foreign sovereign, namely Saudi Arabia;
that the SJRC was created in 1999 pursuant to a High Order issued by the King of Saudi Arabia
upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers of Saudi Arabia and has "always
Arabia";
c. the SJRC and its component organizations, the MWL, IIRO, WAMY, AHIF and
SRC, was directed and controlled by Saudi Arabia's Minister of Interior together with other high
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e. the existence of the SJRC was subject to the ongoing approval of Saudi Arabia
deemed themselves employees of Saudi Arabia bound to follow policies and dictates set by
g. such additional facts as set forth herein or that may be determined through further
51. At all relevant times prior to and on September 11, 2001, the SRC was part of
Saudi Arabia, an alter-ego of Saudi Arabia and/or an agent of Saudi Arabia, and it would work a
fraud or injustice to regard it as a legal entity separate from Saudi Arabia, as evidenced by the
following:
a. in a pleading previously filed before this Court, the SRC specifically asserted that
it was immune from suit because of its status as a foreign sovereign, namely Saudi Arabia;
testified that he was appointed by Royal Order of Saudi Arabia's King, that he holds "Excellency
level status within the Saudi Arabian Government", and that Saudi Arabia "sponsors and
c. the SRC requires that the directors of the SRC include members of Saudi Arabia's
Council of Ministers;
e. the existence of the SRC was subject to the ongoing approval of Saudi Arabia and
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themselves employees of Saudi Arabia bound to follow policies and dictates set by Saudi Arabia;
and
g- such additional facts as set forth herein or that may be determined through further
52. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth
herein.
53. This action is brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2333(a) for the injuries and deaths
2331 that violated federal and state laws against murder, kidnapping, assault and aircraft
hijacking, including but not limited to 18 U.S.C. 2332b (prohibiting terrorist acts of kidnapping,
assault and murder) and 49 U.S.C. 46502 (prohibiting aircraft hijacking), and at the time those
acts were committed, planned and authorized, al Qaeda was designated as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1189.
55. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), (d), Saudi Arabia aided and abetted al Qaeda
through numerous acts detailed herein by knowingly providing it with substantial assistance to
56. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), (d), Saudi Arabia conspired with al Qaeda and
others to provide it with substantial material support and resources, with the shared
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understanding, knowledge and intent that said support and resources would be used by al Qaeda
57. The others in the conspiracy currently known to plaintiffs are named herein, and
include Saudi Arabia's officials, employees and agents, Saudi Arabia's charity organizations,
Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda operatives; the names of additional persons involved in the
terrorism, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2331(1)(A), in violation of federal and state criminal laws, or
that would have been a criminal violation if committed within the United States or any state,
2(a) because Saudi Arabia intentionally aided, abetted and counseled the commission of a
criminal act or acts of international terrorism by al Qaeda, including its hijackers and other
operatives, by providing the terrorist organization with material support, resources and funding
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with the knowledge that al Qaeda would use such assistance to prepare for and commit such a
conspired with al Qaeda and others to provide it with substantial material support and resources
with the shared understanding, knowledge and intent that said support and resources would be
used by al Qaeda to prepare for and carry out a criminal act or acts of international terrorism.
and prior to September 11, 2001, it provided material support or resources for al Qaeda and/or
conspired with al Qaeda and others to provide material support or resources for al Qaeda, with
the knowledge or intent that they would be used in preparation for, or in carrying out a violation
of the statutes specified in 18 U.S.C. 2339A, including 18 U.S.C. 2332b (prohibiting terrorist
acts of kidnapping, assault and murder) and 49 U.S.C. 46502 (prohibiting aircraft hijacking).
and prior to September 11, 2001, it concealed or disguised the nature, location, source, or
ownership of al Qaeda's material support or resources and/or conspired with Saudi Arabia's
employees and agents, Saudi Arabia's charity organizations, al Qaeda, al Qaeda operatives and
sympathizers and others, known and unknown, to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source
or ownership of al Qaeda's material support or resources, with the knowledge or intent that they
would be used in preparation for, or in carrying out a violation of the statutes specified in 18
U.S.C. 2339A, including 18 U.S.C. 2332b (prohibiting terrorist acts of kidnapping, assault and
and prior to September 11, 2001, it knowingly provided material support or resources to al
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Qaeda, and/or Saudi Arabia conspired to knowingly provide material support or resources to al
Qaeda with Saudi Arabia's employees and agents, Saudi Arabia's charity organizations, al
Qaeda, al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers and/or others, known and unknown, with the
knowledge that al Qaeda was a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, has engaged or
and prior to September 11, 2001, as detailed within, it provided or collected funds for al Qaeda
and/or conspired with Saudi Arabia's employees and agents, Saudi Arabia's charity
organizations, al Qaeda, al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers and others, known and unknown,
to provide or collect funds for al Qaeda, with the intention that such funds be used, or with the
knowledge that such funds were to be used, in full or in part, to carry out an act or acts of
international terrorism.
65. Saudi Arabia's conduct amounted to a violation of relevant state criminal laws on
facilitating, aiding and abetting a crime, and conspiracy, including but not limited to those cited
support, resources and funding with the knowledge that al Qaeda would use such assistance to
resources and funds to al Qaeda to engage in a crime, provided al Qaeda with the means or
opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aided al Qaeda to commit the
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c. conspired with Saudi Arabia's employees and agents, Saudi Arabia's charity
organizations, al Qaeda, al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers and others known and unknown,
to violate relevant state criminal laws on facilitating and aiding and abetting a crime and
committing an act or acts of terrorism, including assault, hijacking, kidnapping and murder.
known and foreseeable outcomes of injury and death resulting from providing substantial
b. were committed primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
and also transcended national boundaries in terms of the means by which they were
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, and the locales in which
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or, to affect the conduct of a government
67. The aforesaid acts of Saudi Arabia were not mere negligence, but each act
individually and/or in combination with one or more acts, constituted conduct that was
intentional, reckless, willful and/or grossly negligent and each of those acts individually and/or
in combination with one or more of those acts was a proximate cause of the September 11th
68. The September 11th Attacks could not have occurred absent the knowing and
substantial assistance provided to al Qaeda by Saudi Arabia and those attacks and resulting
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injuries and deaths were a natural, probable and reasonably foreseeable consequence of Saudi
Arabia's conduct.
69. As a result, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is liable to plaintiffs for all damages
resulting from the injuries and deaths in the September 11th Attacks.
70. Plaintiffs, the surviving family members of each decedent, the decedents and their
Estates have suffered and will continue to suffer past and future damages as a result of the
injuries and deaths sustained in the September 11th Attacks, including but not limited to:
personal injury damages, wrongful death damages, survival damages, economic damages,
pecuniary loss, non-economic damages, pain and suffering, torture, imprisonment, kidnapping,
fear of impending death, physical trauma, mental anguish, mental distress, grief, loss of
enjoyment of life, loss of earnings, financial support, services, companionship, care, guidance,
consortium, solatium, burial costs, medical and other expenses and other provable damages
allowed by law.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that judgment(s) for relief in the form of an award or
awards of monetary damages for personal injury, wrongful death, all recoverable losses under 28
U.S.C. 2333 and other appropriate relief be entered on their first cause of action in favor of the
plaintiffs individually and as estate representatives and against the defendant Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, with separate awards for each plaintiff, where appropriate, plus interest, costs, punitive
damages, treble damages, attorney's fees, and such other relief as the Court deems just and
proper.
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71. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth
herein.
72. On March 10, 2004, a class action complaint seeking damages for a class defined
as the spouses, children, parents, siblings and legal representatives of those individuals killed in
the September 11th Attacks (excluding the 19 hijackers) was timely filed against the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia under the caption, O'Neill v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, et al, 04-CV-01922 (GBD),
and the O'Neill case currently remains pending before this Court.
73. O'Neill asserted state tort law claims against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for
causing the deaths of plaintiffs' decedents in the September 11th Attacks, including claims for
wrongful death, survival, aiding and abetting, conspiracy and negligence, including intentional,
knowing, reckless, willful, wanton, grossly negligent and/or negligent tortious acts and
omissions.
74. Plaintiffs herein include members of the class defined in O'Neill, but to date no
75. This cause of action is brought before that determination and plaintiffs present
these state tort law claims to assert and protect their rights to pursue such claims, for example, in
the event that the O'Neill class is not certified by this Court.
76. Pursuant to the doctrine first declared by the Supreme Court in American Pipe &
Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), the time for plaintiffs who are members of the
O 'Neill class to bring their state law claims has been tolled from the date the O'Neill action was
77. For years prior to and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia: participated
and associated with al Qaeda in its terrorist agenda as set forth herein; provided al Qaeda and its
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hijackers with substantial material support, financing and resources; knew that it was assisting a
terrorist organization that had conducted and was actively planning attacks against the United
States; and committed tortious acts and omissions that were intentional, knowing, reckless,
78. Saudi Arabia's conduct was a proximate cause of the deaths, injuries and resulting
damages suffered by plaintiffs, as it furnished the essential support networks, cover and funding
used by al Qaeda to successfully plan and execute the September llth Attacks.
79. Saudi Arabia tortiously aided and abetted al Qaeda by providing substantial
assistance in the form of funding, support and resources to al Qaeda and its hijackers with the
knowledge that they planned to use such assistance to prepare for and conduct terrorist attacks
against the United States and its citizens and/or with reckless disregard of the known probable
risk that such assistance would be used for those terrorist purposes.
80. Saudi Arabia tortiously conspired with al Qaeda and others to provide al Qaeda
and its hijackers with substantial material support and resources, with the shared agreement,
understanding, knowledge and intent that said support and resources would be used by al Qaeda
to plan and carry out terrorist acts against the United States.
81. For years prior to and including September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia knew that its
officers, employees and agents and Saudi Arabia's charitable organizations were engaging in
illegal and/or criminal activity by using Saudi Arabia's offices, equipment and other resources to
provide substantial material support and resources to al Qaeda and, that Saudi Arabia's officers,
employees and agents, including but not limited to Adel Batterjee, Wael Jelaidan. Soliman al
Buthe, Aqeel al Aqeel, Abdelhamid al Mujil, Enaam Arnaout, Fahad al Thumairy, Omar al
Bayoumi, Omar Abdi Mohamed, Osama Basnan, Hamdan Shalawi, Mohamed al Qudhaieen,
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Mohamed al Fakihi and others were al Qaeda operatives or sympathizers who were using their
82. Despite such knowledge, Saudi Arabia intentionally and/or recklessly failed to
properly supervise its officers, employees and agents and Saudi Arabia's charitable organizations
to stop them from using Saudi Arabia's offices, equipment and other resources to provide
substantial assistance to al Qaeda despite the known and/or foreseeable risk that such assistance
was being used by al Qaeda to prepare and conduct a terrorist attack against the United States
83. Moreover, Saudi Arabia intentionally and/or recklessly selected, hired and
retained as its officers, employees and agents various individuals, including Adel Batterjee, Wael
Jelaidan. Soliman al Buthe, Aqeel al Aqeel, Abdelhamid al Mujil, Enaam Arnaout, Fahad al
Thumairy, Omar al Bayoumi, Omar Abdi Mohamed, Osama Basnan, Hamdan Shalawi,
Mohamed Qudhaieen, Mohamed Fakihi and others, who Saudi Arabia knew were al Qaeda
operatives or sympathizers, despite the known and/or foreseeable risk that those employees and
agents would use and/or were using their government positions to provide substantial assistance
to al Qaeda to prepare and conduct a terrorist attack against the United States and its citizens.
84. The aforesaid intentional, criminal, knowing, reckless, willful, wanton, grossly
negligent and/or negligent acts and/or omissions of Saudi Arabia were individually and/or in
combination with one or more of those acts and/or omissions a proximate, substantial cause of
the September 11th Attacks and the plaintiffs' injuries, deaths and resulting damages.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that judgment(s) for relief in the form of an award or
awards of monetary damages for personal injury, wrongful death and other appropriate relief be
entered on their second cause of action in favor of the plaintiffs individually and as estate
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representatives and against the defendant Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with separate awards for
each plaintiff, where appropriate, plus interest, costs, punitive damages, treble damages,
attorney's fees, and such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
85. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth
herein.
86. O'Neill asserted claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act against the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia for causing the deaths of plaintiffs' decedents in the September 11th Attacks based
on violations of international law resulting in injury and death in the September 11th Attacks.
87. Plaintiffs herein include members of the class defined in O'Neill, but to date no
88. This cause of action is brought before that determination and plaintiffs present
these Alien Tort Claims Act claims to assert and protect their rights to pursue such claims, for
example, in the event that the O'Neill class is not certified by this Court.
89. The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350, allows aliens to sue for torts
committed in violation of the law of nations, international law or a treaty of the United States.
90. The conduct of Saudi Arabia as detailed herein to provide substantial material
support, resources and sponsorship for al Qaeda and its acts of international terrorism resulting in
the September llth Attacks constitutes a clear violation of the law of nations and international
law, which includes international legal norms prohibiting crimes against humanity, mass murder,
genocide, torture, extrajudicial killing, air piracy, financing of terrorism, and terrorism, which
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can be found in and derived from, among other things, the following conventions, agreements,
(1) Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279;
(2) Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1945);
(3) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277;
(4) Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
(5) Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking),
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105;
(6) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997,
2149 U.N.T.S. 284 (entered into force May 23, 2001);
(7) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9,
1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 229 (entered into force Apr. 10, 2002);
(8) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999);
(9) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001);
(10) Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3;
(11) Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609;
(12) Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of S.C. Res.808, May 3,
1993, U.N. Doc. 8/25704, adopted unanimously by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3217th mtg., 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993);
(13) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against International
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532
(1977), implemented in 18 U.S.C. 1121;
(14) The General Assembly Resolutions on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism,
G.A. Res. 40/61 (1985) and G.A. Res. 42/159 (1987); and
(15) The Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, arts. 14-22 (piracy), 13 U.S.T.
2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
91. Saudi Arabia's conduct was a substantial cause of the September 11th Attacks and
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that judgment(s) for relief in the form of an award or
awards of monetary damages for personal injury, wrongful death and other appropriate relief be
entered on their third cause of action in favor of the plaintiffs individually and as estate
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representatives and against the defendant Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with separate awards for
each plaintiff, where appropriate, plus interest, costs, punitive damages, treble damages,
attorney's fees, and such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Speiser Krause
Frank Granito, Esq.
800 Westchester Avenue, Suite S-608
Rye Brook, New York 10573
(914) 220-5333
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