Tipler: Omega Point (1989)
Tipler: Omega Point (1989)
Tipler: Omega Point (1989)
by Frank J . Tipler
The idea that religious belief must be firmly based on science, that is,
anchored on experimental tests of basic theological propositions (for
instance, Gods very existence), is not new. It is in the Old Testament:
Then said Elijah unto the people, I, even I only, remain a prophet of
the LORD; but Baals prophets are four hundred and fifty men. . . .Let
them therefore give us two bullocks; and let them choose one bullock
for themselves, and cut it in pieces, and lay it on wood, and put no fire
under: and I will dress the other bullock and lay it on wood, and put no
fire under. . . . And call ye on the name of your gods, and I will call on
Frank J. Tipler is professor of mathematical physics at Tulane University, New
Orleans, Louisiana 701 18. This paper was presented at the Second Pannenberg Sym-
posium, held at the Chicago Center for Religion and Science, Lutheran School of
Theology, 15-17 November 1988. The author thanks Frank Birtel, Wim Drees, Wolfhart
Pannenberg, John Polkinghorne, Robert John Russell, and Michael Zimmerman for
their comments on an earlier version of this paper. This work was supported in part by
the National Science Foundation under grant number PHY-86-03 130.
217
218 Zygon
the name of the LORD: and the God that answereth by fire, let him be
GOD. And all the people answered and said, It is well spoken (1 Kings
18 22-24).
T h e apostle Paul also believed that the existence of God and certain
divine properties were scientific conclusions, inferred from the obser-
vation of the natural world. In Pauls view, so obvious is the existence of
the creator God that even pagans have no excuse for not worshiping
the One who brought the physical universe into being: For the invisi-
ble things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and
Godhead; so that they are without excuse (Rom. 1:20). Thomas
Aquinas, the author of the great medieval synthesis, followed in the
footsteps of Elijah and Paul. Aquinas, who probably knew more about
the physics of his day than any of his contemporaries-we could with
justice call him a great physicist as well as a great theologian-based his
proofs of Gods existence (the Five Ways) firmly on Aristotelian cos-
mology. T h e Five Ways are so intimately integrated with Aristotelian
physical cosmology that the falsification of the physics logically entails
the falsification of the proofs (Kenny 1969). T h e eighteenth-century
English theologian Samuel Clarke also argued, in his famous debate
with Gottfried von Leibniz, that deism and atheism are avoided only if
physics itself shows the presence of G o d i n the physical world: The
notion of the worlds being a great machine, going on without the interpo-
sition of God, as a clock continues to go on without the assistance of a
clockmaker; is the notion of materialism and f a t e , and tends under
pretense of making God a . . . Supra-Mundane Intelligence, to exclude
providence and Gods Government in reality out of the World (Clarke
17 17, 15; Clarkes italics and capitalization).
In other words, if all God did was to conserve matter and energy and
the laws of physics, to be merely the ontological support without which
the universe would collapse into nonexistence, then God qua God
would be superfluous; Gods existence would be merely equivalent to
the physical conservation laws. Wolfhart Pannenberg (198 1) and
others have shown that the recognition of this equivalence in fact was a
major cause of the growth of atheism in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Clarke and Isaac Newton believed that Newtonian cosmol-
ogy actually required God to act continually in the world because they
believed that the conservation laws did not hold; God was required
physically in order to reconstruct the universe periodically. But later
Newtonian physicists showed (or were believed to have shown; see
Earman 1986) that the conservation laws actually held in Newtonian
physics. Laplace had no need of that hypothesis [God] in accounting
for the origin of the Solar System. This utter failure-falsification-of
Frank J. Tipler 2 19
ably distant future the conditions for life will no longer continue on our
planet are hardly comparable to biblical eschatology (Pannenberg
1981, 74).
It is definitely true that the universe will exist for billions of years in
the future. In fact, the evidence that the universe will continue to exist
for five billion more years is at least as strong as the evidence that the
earth has already existed for five billion years. There is simply no way
our extrapolations could be so wrong as to falsify this prediction of
longevity. Furthermore, if the standard cosmological models are
approximately accurate, then the universe, if closed, will continue to
exist at least another 100 billion years (in proper time), and if open or flat
will continue to exist for literally infinite (proper) time. I n either case,
we are seeing the universe in a very early stage in its history. Most of the
physical universe lies in our future, and w e cannot truly understand
the entire physical universe without understanding this future. But we
can study this future reality, in particular the ultimate future which
constitutes the end of time, only if in some way this Final State of the
physical universe makes an imprint on the present. It is, after all,
obvious that w e cannot d o direct experiments on the future in the
present.
I shall obtain a hold on this future reality by focusing attention on the
physics relevant to the existence and behavior of life in the far future.
One of Pannenbergs central themes is the importance of eschatology
in the Christian vision (see, for instance, Pannenberg 1967; 1971;
1973; 1977). I shall attempt to provide a physical foundation for
Pannenbergs interpretation of eschatology. I shall make the physical
assumption that the universe must be capable of sustaining life indef-
initely; that is, for infinite time as experienced by life existing in the
physical universe. It will turn out that this assumption imposes rather
stringent requirements on the future. T h e assumption also makes
some predictions about the present, because the physics required to
sustain life in the far future must be in place now, since the most
fundamental laws of physics do not change with time. In this way it can
reasonably be said that the future makes an imprint on the present.
The really fascinating consequence of this assumption, however, is
what it implies if life really does exercise its option to exist forever.
There must exist in this future (but in a precise mathematical sense,
also in the present and past) a Person who is omnipotent, omniscient,
omnipresent, who is simultaneously both transcendent to yet imma-
nent in the physical universe of space, time, and matter. I n the Persons
immanent temporal aspect, the Person is changing (forever growing in
knowledge and power), but in the Persons transcendent eternal aspect,
forever complete and unchanging. How this comes about as a matter of
Frank J . Tipler 221
physics will be described in the next section of this paper, entitled The
Omega Point Theory. Needless to say, the terminology is Teilhard de
Chardins, but the connection is more than a mere two words. I believe
that any model of an evolving God-whether it is Schellings, Alexan-
ders, Bergsons, Whiteheads, o r Teilhards-must have certain key
features in common.
Elijahs challenge remains: Is this God of the Omega Point (assuming
said Person actually exists) the God? It is generally (but not universally)
felt that the God must be the uncreated creator of the physical universe,
a being who not merely exists but who exists necessarily, in the strong
logical sense of necessity (the Persons nonexistence would be a
logical contradiction). Only if God is not in any sense contingent can one
avoid the regress posed in the query, who created God? Furthermore,
it is generally felt (as for example in Findlay 1955) that only the God,
the One who exists necessarily, is worthy of worship. I shall tackle this
thorny question of necessary existence in the third and fourth sections
of this paper. In the former section I shall analyze the notion of
contingency in classical general relativity and in quantum cosmology
and will discuss in what sense modern cosmological models can be said
to sustain themselves in physical existence. In the latter section I shall
use the ideas developed in the former to argue that the universe
necessarily exists-and necessarily sustains itself in existence-if and
only if life and the Omega Point exist therein. If this argument is
accepted, then the Omega Point exists necessarily if he/she exists at all.
This would appear to me to establish the Omega Point as the God, for it
appears pointless to have more than one being with all of the divine
attributes. (I shall be invoking the Identity of Indiscernibles through-
out the fourth section.)
The emphasis in the second section is the physics-the nuts and
bolts-of infinite continued survival, and the emphasis in the fourth
section will be philosophical theology. But the God of the Bible and the
Christian churches is a great deal more than the God of the
philosopher-physicist. The former is a God of hope, love, and mercy, a
God who grants eternal life to each individual human being. I shall
discuss in the fifth section various senses in which the Omega Point can
be regarded as a source of hope for the future. In particular, the
Omega Point probably will resurrect the dead in the sense which
Pannenberg has given this phrase: . . . it is our present life as God sees
it from his eternal present (Pannenberg 1970, 80).
Pannenbergs view of the resurrection has been criticized (I think
wrongly; see Pannenberg 1984)by John Hick as permitting no further
development of character beyond death.. . . T h e content of eternity,
according to Pannenberg, can only be that of our temporal lives.. . .
222 Zygon
Suppose it is a poor stunted life, devoid ofjoy and nobility, in which the
good possibilities of human existence remain almost entirely unful-
filled? . . . Can Gods good gift of eternal life be simply a consciousness
of this life seen sub specie ueternitutis? Is this the best form of eternity that
omnipotent love can devise?(Hick 1976,225). I shall show in the fifth
section that the type of life enjoyed by resurrected individuals is
entirely at the discretion of the Omega Point, as is their resurrection in
the first place; the human soul is not naturally immortal, for modern
physics shows that it dies with the brain. Thus, except for the conscious
future act of the Omega Point, we would die never to rise again. The
life of the resurrected dead could be as pointless as the scenario
ridiculed by Hick, merely a replay of the original life, or it could be a
life of continued individual becoming, an exploration into the inex-
haustible reality which is the Omega Point (or even into purely sensual
delights, such as pictured in the Garden of the Koran [Smith and
Haddad 19811). It is even possible for the Omega Point to guide each
resurrected person, by means of consultation with each, into the
perfection of the personal creature as a whole (a definition of beatific
vision [see Rahner and Vorgrimler 1983, 421). Which life the resur-
rected dead live is up to the Omega Point; if it is heaven rather than hell
it will be due to the Omega Points personal condescension and
absolutely gratuitous clemency to man (a definition of grace [see
Rahner and Vorgrimler 1983, 1961). I shall give in the fifth section a
reason for expecting such grace.
Let me emphasize again that the Omega Point theory, including the
resurrection theory, is pure physics.2There is nothing supernatural in
the theory, and hence there is no appeal anywhere to faith. The
genealogy of the theory is actually atheistic scientific materialism; the
line of research which led to the Omega Point theory began with the
Marxist John Bernal (Barrow and Tipler 1986,618).The key concepts
of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition are now scientific concepts.
THEOMEGA
POINTTHEORY
In order to investigate whether life can continue to exist forever, I shall
need to define life in physics language. I claim that a living being
is any entity which codes information (in the sense this word is used by
physicists), with the information coded being preserved by natural
selection (for a justification of this definition, see Barrow and Tipler
1986, section 8.2). Thus life is a form of information processing, and
the human mind-and the human soul-is a very complex computer
program. Specifically, a person is defined to be a computer program
which can pass the Turing test (see Hofstadter and Dennett 1981,
69-95 for a detailed discussion of this test).
Frank J . Tipler 223
A N D TEMPORAL
CONTINGENCY EVOLUTION IN
CLASSICAL
GENERAL RELATIVITY
A N D I N QUANTUM
COSMOLOGY
In physical theories before general relativity, it was always assumed
that there was a background spacetime within which the entities of
physics-fields and particles-evolved. This background space was
unchanging. It was not influenced in any way by the physical entities,
and it existed whether o r not there were any physical entities. As
pointed out by Robert Russell (1988), contingency in these theories
came in two forms. First, there was contingency of the nature of the
most basic physical entity, with a resulting contingency in the form of
the evolution equations satisfied by this entity. A pmom, there was no
reason to choose one class of basic physical entities over another-there
was in fact a debate in the nineteenth century over whether the funda-
mental stuff of the universe was particulate atoms or ether fields.
Furthermore, the equations governing the chosen stuff could not be
determined by logical consistency alone. Some input from observation
was required. But there were imposed on these equations certain
general symmetry principles arising from the assumption that the laws
of physics did not change with time o r as one moved from point to
point in space. For example, conservation of energy is a consequence of
the laws of physics being unchanged under time translation (that is, the
Lagrangian from which the evolution equations are derived is
+
unchanged if it is replaced by t a, where a is some constant). Inertia,
or conservation of linear momentum, is a consequence of the laws of
physics being unchanged under space translation (the Lagrangian is
unchanged if all the spatial coordinates x are replaced by x + a). Thus
the conservation laws arejust a property of the evolution equations and
are really just a physical reflection of the eternal and homogeneous
nature of the background space. It is the background spacetime, not so
232 Zygon
(M,g) is the spacetime we get by continuing the time evolution until the
field equations themselves will not allow us to go further. This maximal
(M,g) is the natural candidate for the spacetime that is actualized, but it
is important to keep in mind that this is a physical assumption: all of the
(M,g) are possible worlds, and any one of these possible worlds could
have been the one that really exists.
Once we have the maximal (M,g) generated from a given S and its
initial data, there is an infinity of other choices of 3-dimensional man-
ifolds in M which we could picture as generating (M,g). For example,
we could regard the spatial universe and the fields it contains now as S
with its initial data, o r we could regard the universe a thousand years
ago as S with its initial data. Both would give the same (M,g), since the
Einstein equations are deterministic. Everything that has happened
and will happen is contained implicitly in the initial data on S. There is
nothing new under the sun in a deterministic theory like general
relativity. One could even wonder why time exists at all since from an
information standpoint it is quite superfluous (I will suggest an answer
to this question in the next section). None of the infinity of initial data
manifolds (M,g) can be uniquely regarded as generating the whole of
spacetime (M,g). Each contains the same information, and each will
generate the same (M,g), including all the other initial data manifolds.
Even in deterministic theories, relationships between physical
entities are different at different times. For example, two particles
moving under Newtonian gravity are now two meters apart (say) and a
minute later four meters apart. This is true even though given the
initial position and velocities when they were two meters apart it is
determined then that they will be four meters apart a minute later. T h e
question is, will the totality of relationships at one time become the
same (or nearly the same) at some later time? If this happens, then we
have the horror of the Eternal Return. As is well known, it is possible to
prove that the Eternal Return will occur in a Newtonian universe
provided said universe is finite in space and finite in the range of
velocities the particles are allowed to have. It is possible to prove that in
classical general relativity (Tipler 1979; 1980) the Eternal Return can-
not occur. That is, the physical relationships existing now between the
fields will never be repeated, nor will the relationships ever return to
approximately what they now are. What happens is that the Einstein
field equations will not permit the gravitational equivalent of the
range of velocities to be finite: the range simply must eventually
become infinite. Thus history, understood as an unrepeatable tempo-
ral sequence of relationships between physical entities, is real. Hence
the answer to Pannenbergs Second Question to scientists-Are natu-
ral processes to be understood as irreversible?-is yes, if irreversible
Frank J . Tipler 235
It turns out (as one might expect) that the Hartle-Hawking boundary
condition does not satisfy the Teilhard boundary condition. I have a
rough argument that one can construct simple quantized Friedmann
cosmological models in which all classical paths terminate in an Omega
Point, but I do not know yet what the existence of life requires of a wave
function. So at present I can only conjecture, not prove, that a wave
function satisfying the Teilhard boundary condition in its full general-
ity exists mathematically. (This is not unusual; there is also no general
existence proof yet for the Hartle-Hawking boundary condition.) I also
conjecture (for reasons that will be given in the following section) that
the Teilhard boundary condition gives a unique wave function.
Let us suppose that the above conjectures are true. Then it would
mean that the laws of physics and every entity that exists physically
would be generated by the Omega Point and its living properties. For
these properties determine the universal wave function, and the wave
function determines everything else. This determination is not classi-
cal determinism, however, because there is no globally defined time on
the whole of (h,F), and without this globally defined time, the idea of
the past or the present rigidly dictating the future course of events is
meaningless. Nevertheless, time is real. It exists in the classical paths,
and according to the Teilhard boundary condition the structure of
these paths (more precisely, their ultimate future) gives probability
weights-guidance, so to speak, not rigid control-toall paths. T h e
ultimate future guides all presents into itself. As Pannenberg puts it:
[God] exists only in the way in which the future is powerful over the
present, because the future decides what will emerge out of what exists
in the present. . . . Above all, the power of the future does not rob man
of his freedom to transcend every state of affairs. A being presently at
hand, and equipped with omnipotence, would destroy such freedom
by virtue of his overpowering might (Pannenberg 1971, 242). In this
sense, we can say that the Omega Point creates the physical universe.
But there is another sense in which the Omega Point and the totality of
everything that exists physically can be said to create themselves. To
this second sense we now turn.6
THEUNIVERSE EXISTS
NECESSARILY
Suppose it were shown as a matter of physics that the Omega Point
really exists. Then would it still be reasonable to assert the existence of a
God over and above the Omega Point? Not if we could show that the
Omega Point necessarily exists in the strong sense of logical
necessity-that to deny its existence would be a logical contradiction.
Ever since Kant showed that existence is not a predicate and
Gottfried Frege deepened this insight into existence is not a first-level
Frank J . Tipler 241
people which the real universe contains, and which mimics perfectly
the actual time evolution of the actual universe. Again, there is no way
for the people inside this simulated universe to tell that they are merely
simulated, that they are only a sequence of numbers being tossed
around inside a computer and are in fact not real. How d o we know we
ourselves are not merely a simulation inside a gigantic computer?
Obviously, we cannot know. But I think it is clear that we ourselves
really exist. Therefore, if it is in fact possible for the physical universe
to be in precise one-to-one correspondence with a simulation, I think
we should invoke the Identity of Indiscernibles and identify the uni-
verse and all of its perfect simulations.
But is it possible for the universe to be in precise one-to-one corre-
spondence with some simulation? I think that it is, if we generalize what
we mean by simulation. I n computer science, a simulation is a program,
which is fundamentally a map from the set of integers into itself. That
is, the instructions in the program tell the computer how to go from the
present state, represented by a sequence of integers, to the subsequent
state, also represented by a sequence of integers. Remember, however,
that we do not really need the physical computer; the initial sequence
of integers and the general rule (instructions o r map) for replacing the
present sequence by the next is all that is required. But the general rule
can itself be represented as a sequence of integers. If time were to exist
globally, and if the most basic things in the physical universe and the
time steps between one instant and the next were discrete, then the
whole of spacetime would definitely be in one-to-one correspondence
with some program. But time may not exist globally (it does not if
standard quantum cosmology is true), and it may be that the substances
of the universe are continuous fields and not discrete objects (in all
current physical theories, the basic substances are continuous fields).
Thus if the actual universe is described by something resembling
current theories, it cannot be in one-to-one correspondence with a
standard computer program, which is based on integer mappings.
There is currently no model of a continuous computer. Turing even
argued that such a thing is meaningless! (There are definitions of
computable continuous functions, but none of the definitions is
really satisfactory.)
Let us be more broad minded about what is to count as a simulation.
Consider the collection of all mathematical concepts. Let us say that a
perfect simulation exists if the physical universe can be put into one-
to-one correspondence with some mutually consistent subcollections of
all mathematical concepts. In this sense of simulation the universe can
certainly be simulated, because simulation then amounts to saying that
the universe can be exhaustively described in a logically consistent way.
Frank J . Tipler 243
Note that described does not require that we or any other finite (or
infinite) intelligent being can actually find the description. It may be
that the actual universe expands into an infinite hierarchy of levels
whenever one tries to describe it exhaustively. In such a case, it would
be impossible to find a Theory of Everything. Nevertheless, it would
still be true that a simulation in the more general sense existed if each
level were in one-to-one correspondence with some mathematical
object, and if all levels were mutually consistent (consistencymeaning
that in the case of disagreement between levels, there is a rule-itself a
mathematical object-for deciding which level is correct). The crucial
point of this generalization is to establish that the actual physical
universe is something in the collection of all mathematical objects. This
follows because the universe has a perfect simulation, and we agree to
identify the universe with its perfect simulation. Thus at the most basic
ontological level the physical universe is a concept.
Of course not all concepts exist physically. But some do. Which ones?
The answer is provided by our earlier analysis of programs. The simula-
tions which are sufficiently complex to contain obseruers-thinking, feeling
beings- subsimulations exist physically. And further, they exist physi-
cally by definition: for this is exactly what we mean by existence;
namely, that thinking and feeling beings think and feel themselves to
exist. Remember, the simulated thinking and feeling of simulated
beings are real. Thus the actual physical universe-the one in which we
are now experiencing our own simulated thoughts and simulated
feelings-exists necessarily, by definition of what is meant by existence.
Physical existence is just a particular relationship between concepts.
Existence is a predicate, but a predicate of certain very, very complex
simulations. It is certainly not a predicate of simple concepts-for
instance 100 thalers.
THEGODOF HOPE
Suppose the Omega Point really exists. Can we mortal human beings
find hope in that fact? I believe we can. For hope fundamentally means
an expectation that in an appropriate sense the future will be better
than the present or the past. Even on the most materialistic level, the
future existence of the Omega Point would assure our civilization of
ever-growing total wealth, continually increasing knowledge, and quite
literal eternal progress. This perpetual meliorism is built into the
definition of life existing forever given in the second section. Such
worldly meliorism would support an orthodox Christian position on
the meaning of the natural world as against, say, the Gnostic view. I n
the orthodox view, the physical universe is basically good, because it
was created by an omnipotent and omniscient deity who is also all good.
Of course, it is a consequence of physics that although our civilization
may continue forever, our species Homo sapiens must inevitably become
extinct, just as every individual human being must inevitably also die.
For as the Omega Point is approached, the temperature will approach
infinity everywhere in the universe, and it is impossible for our type of
Frank J. Tipler 245
eternal depth of time now and which is already present for Gods
eyes-for his creative view! (Pannenberg 1970, 80).
We shall, so to speak, live again in the mind of God. But recall my
discussion of Thomist aetemzitas. There I pointed out that all the infor-
mation contained in the whole of human history, including every detail
of every human life, will be available for analysis by the collectivity of
life in the far future. In principle at least (again ignoring the difficulty
of extracting the relevant information from the overall background
noise), it is possible for life in the far future to construct, using this
information, an exceedingly accurate simulation of these past lives: in
fact, this simulation is just what a sufficiently close scrutiny of our
present lives by the Omega Point would amount to. And I have also
pointed out that a sufficiently perfect simulation of a living being
would be alive! Whether the Omega Point would choose to use His/Her
power to do this simulation, I cannot say. But it seems the physical
capability to carry out the scrutiny would be there.l0 Furthermore, the
drive for total knowledge-which life in the future must seek if it is to
survive at all, and which will be achieved only at the Omega Point-
would seem to require that such an analysis of the past, and hence such
a simulation, would be carried out. If so, then the resurrection of the
dead in Pannenbergs sense would seem inevitable in the eschaton (last
times).
I should emphasize that this simulation of people that have lived in
the past need not be limited to just repeating the past. Once a simula-
tion of a person and his or her world has been formed in a computer of
sufficient capacity, the simulated person can be allowed to develop
further-to think and feel things that the long-dead original person
being simulated never felt and thought. It is not even necessary for any
of the past to be repeated. The Omega Point could simply begin the
simulation with the brain memory of the dead person as it was at the
instant of death (or, say, ten years before or twenty minutes before)
implanted in the simulated body of the dead person, the body being as
it was at age twenty (or any other age). This body and memory collec-
tion could be set in any simulated background environment the Omega
Point wished: a simulated world indistinguishable from the long-
extinct society and physical universe of the revived dead person; or
even a world that never existed, but one as close as logically possible to
the ideal fantasy world of the resurrected dead person. Furthermore,
all possible combinations of resurrected dead can be placed in the same
simulation and allowed to interact. For example, the reader could be
placed in a simulation with all of his or her ancestors and descendents,
each at whatever age (physical and mental, separately) the Omega
Point pleases. The Omega Point itself could interact-speak, for
Frank J . Tipler 247
amount to the same thing). Alternatively, the Omega Point could guide
us to a perfection of our finite natures, whatever perfection
means! Depending on the definition, there could be many perfections.
With sufficient computer power, it should be possible to calculate what
a human action would result in without the simulation actually experi-
encing the action, so the Omega Point would be able to advise us on
possible perfections without our having to go through the trial and
error procedure characteristic of this life. If more than one simulation
of the same individual is made, then all of these options could be
realized simultaneously. Once an individual is perfected, the mem-
ory of this perfect individual could be recorded permanently-
preserved all the way into the Omega Point in its transcendence. The
errors and evil committed by the imperfect individual could be erased
from the universal mind (or also permanently recorded). The per-
fected individual personality would be truly eternal; she would exist
for all future time. Furthermore, when the perfected personality
reached the Omega Point in its transcendence, it would become eternal
in the sense of being beyond time, being truly one with God. The
natural term to describe this perfected immortality is beatific vision.
If the resurrected life is going to be so ~ o n d e r f u l , one
~ might ask
why we must go through our current life, this vale of tears, at all. Why
not start life at the resurrection? The answer was given in the third and
fourth sections: our current life is logically necessary; simulations
indistinguishable from ourselves have to go through it. It is logically
impossible for the Omega Point to rescue us. Even omnipotence is
limited by logic. This is the natural resolution to the Problem of Evil.
In his On the Immortality ofthe Soul, David Hume raised the following
objection to the idea of a general resurrection of the dead: How to
dispose of the infinite number of posthumous existences ought also to
embarrass the religious theory (Hume [1755] in Flew 1964, 187).
Hume summarized the argument in a later interview with the famous
biographer James Boswell: . . . [Hume] added that it was a most
unreasonable fancy that he should exist forever. That immortality, if it
were at all, must be general; that a great proportion of the human race
has hardly any intellectual qualities; that a great proportion dies in
infancy before being possessed of reason; yet all these must be immor-
tal; that a Porter who gets drunk by ten oclock with gin must be
immortal; that the trash of every age must be preserved, and that new
Universes must be created to contain such infinite numbers (Hume
[1776] 1977, 77).
The ever-growing numbers of people whom Hume regarded as
trash nevertheless could be preserved forever in our single finite
(classical) universe if computer capacity is created fast enough. By
Frank J . Tipler 249
NOTES
1. A detailed comparison of the Omega Point theory developed below and
Teilhards Point Omega will be found in section 3.11 of my book with John D. Barrow,
The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (1986).
2. To emphasize the scientific nature of the Omega Point theory, let me state here
that I consider myself an atheist. I certainly do not believe in the God of the traditional
Christian metaphysics which I have read, and although the Omega Point theory is a
viable scientific theory ofthe future of the physical universe, there is as yet no confirming
experimental evidence for it. Thus it is premature to accept it. Flew (1984), among
others, has in my opinion made a convincing case for the presumption of atheism.
Nevertheless, I think atheistic scientists should take the Omega Point theory seriously
because we have to have some theory for the future of the physical universe-since it
unquestionably exists-and the Omega Point theory is based on the most beautiful
physical postulate: that total death is not inevitable. All other theories of the future
necessarily postulate the ultimate extinction of everything we could possibly care about. I
once visited a Nazi death camp; there I was reinforced in my conviction that there is
nothing uglier than extermination. We physicists know that a beautiful postulate is more
likely to be correct than an ugly one. Why not adopt the postulate of eternal life, at least as
a working hypothesis?
3. Unfortunately, Aristotle ruined his own idea of the soul by soiling it with Platonic
dualism. This mistake led to Aquinass contradictory notion of substantialform. Both ideas
suggest that the personality survives death naturally (see Flew 1964, 16-21; 1987,71-87).
As Pannenberg has emphasized, the idea of a disembodied soul which can think without a
body is contrary to the Jewish and early Christian tradition. If it were true, what would be
the point of the resurrrection of the flesh? As Plato himself realized, the Platonic soul
suggests reincarnation, not resurrection.
4. I should warn the reader that I have ignored the problem of opacity and the
problem of loss of coherence of the light. Until these are taken into account, I cannot say
exactly how much information can in fact be extracted from the past. But at the most
basic ontological level, all the information from the past (all of human history) remains in
the physical universe and is available for analysis by the Omega Point.
5. I should mention in passing that in general relativity the standard conservation
laws are almost trivially true. In general relativity the conservation law for mass-energy
reads d*T = 0, which follows from the Einstein equations G = 8aT, which can be
regarded as defining the stress energy tensor T, and the fact that any metric g satisfies
d*G = 0. See Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler (1973, chapter 15) for a discussion of this
point. The principle of inertia plays no role in sustaining the universe in existence.
Frank J. Tipler 251
6. I should mention that there is another quantum theory of the Omega Point, due
to John A. Wheeler (1988). Wheelers theory is based on a non-standard version of the
Copenhagen Interpretation, and in his theory the Omega Point quite literally creates
almost everything in the physical universe by backward causation. We ourselves create
some entities in the universe, but our creations are insignificant when compared to the
creations of the Omega Point. On Wheelers theory, however, future evolution stops at
the Plank time, so the properties of the Omega Point which depend on infinity are not
present in Wheelers theory.
7. For more discussion of whether a simulation must be regarded as real if it copies
the real universe sufficiently closely, see Hofstadter and DeGnett (1981, particularly
73-78, 94-99, 287-300).
8. One could use a similar argument for asserting the physical existence of the
maximal evolution from given initial data in the classical general relativity evolution
problem.
9. Incidentally, the non-existence of the Omega Point would not help us. If the
universe were open and expanded forever, then the temperature would go to zero as the
universe expanded. There is not enough energy in the frigid future of such a universe
for Homo sapiens to survive. Also, protons probably decay, and we are made up of atoms,
which require protons.
10. It is interesting that if the universe werehfinite in spatial extent, then this
information about the past would scatter to infinity and never in the whole of the future
be reconcentrated for possible reconstruction.
1 1 . In one of its immanent intermediate temporal states; this qualification is hereaf-
ter omitted for ease of reading.
12. See Hofstadter and Dennett (1981, 379-81) for a very brief discussion of the
extremely important computer concept of levels of implementation.
13. Strictly speaking, I d o not know the Omega Point (in its immanence) has a
human-type mind at the highest level of implementation. Probably not; a human-type
mind is a manifestation of an extremely low level of information processing: a mere ten
to 1,000 gigaflops (Barrow and Tipler 1986, 136). Nevertheless, the Omega Point is still a
Person (at all times in our future), because a being with its level of computer capacity
could easily create a Turing-test-passing subprogram to speak for it. Our resurrected
selves probably will interact with such a program; it is beyond human capacity to deal
directly with the highest level of implementation possessed by the state of the Omega
Point at the time we are resurrected. For lack of a better term, I shall refer to the total
universal information processing system in existence at any given universal time as the
universal mind.
14. The version of eternal life discussed here is not attractive to everyone. What is
happening is that an exact replica of ourselves is being simulated in the computer minds
of the far future. Flew, for example, considers it ridiculous to call this resurrection, and
he puts forward the Replica Objection: No replica however perfect, whether pro-
duced by God or man, whether in our Universe or another, could ever be-in that
primary, forensic sense-the same person as its original.. . . To punish or to reward a
replica, reconstituted on Judgement Day, for the sins or the virtues of the old Antony
Flew dead and cremated, perhaps long years before, is as inept and as unfair as it would
be to reward or to punish one identical twin for what was in fact done by the other (Flew
1976, 12, 9). Flew is wrong about our legal system. It does in fact equate identical
computer programs. If I duplicated a word processing program and used it without
paying a royalty to the programmer, I would be taken to court. A claim that the program
I used is not the original, it is merely a replica would not be accepted as a defense. I could
also be sued for using without permission an organism whose genome has been patented.
Identical twins are not identical persons. The programs which are their minds differ
enormously; the memories coded in their neurons differ from each other in at least as
many ways as they differ from the memories of other human beings. They are correctly
regarded as different persons. But two beings who are identical both in their genes and in
their mind programs are the same person, and it is appropriate to regard them as equally
responsible legally. I am surprised that an empiricist philosopher like Flew would make
252 Zygon
the claim that entities which cannot be empirically distinguished, even in principle, are
nevertheless to be regarded to be utterly different. Any scientist would think that two
physically indistinguishable systems are to be regarded as the same, both physically and
legally. Flew cites a number of passages from traditional religious authorities in support
of the Replica Objection, but except where these men have been clearly infected by
Platonic dualism, I think these very passages support the idea that replica resurrection is
what is expected in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. See for example my interpre-
tation above of 1 Cor. 15, which Flew thinks implies a Platonic soul.
15. This depends in a crucial way on the fact that there will be an actual infinity (xo)of
information processed between any finite time and the Omega Point. It is an example of
what Bertrand Russell (193 1, 358) has termed the Tristram Shandy paradox. Tristram
Shandy took two years to write the history of the first two days of his life and complained
that at that rate, material would accumulate faster than he could write it down. Russell
showed that even if Tristram Shandy lived forever no part of his biography would have
remained unwritten. In the case of the Omega Point, which literally does live forever, all
beings that have ever lived and will live from now to the end of time can be resurrected
and remembered, even though the time needed to do the resurrecting will increase
exponentially, a much worse case than Tristram Shandy faced. It is important that at any
given time on a classical trajectory, there is only a finite number of possible beings which
could exist. If this were not true, then the number of beings that would have to be
resurrected between now and the Final State might be the power set of xo, which is higher
order of infinity than xo, and thus resurrecting all possible beings via the brute force
method might be impossible because only xo bits can be recorded between now and the
Final State.
16. One could also worry about the morality of such brute-force resurrection; not
only are the dead being resurrected, but also people who never lived! However, the
central claim of the Many Worlds physics in the third section and the Many Worlds
metaphysics in the fourth section is that all people and all histories who could exist in fact
do. Theyjust do not exist on our classical trajectory, and so we have no record of them. S o
the resurrected dead would probably not care which classical trajectory they are resur-
rected in-their own trajectory or another o n e - s o long as they are resurrected. If
getting the resurrected in the right trajectory is important, then some information from
the past light cone of each trajectory is needed-in this case the sleeping metaphor of
Dan. 12:2 and the seed metaphor of 1 Cor. 15 become very accurate pictures of the
resurrection.
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