Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

JULITO SAGALES, G.R. No. 166554

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

RUSTANS COMMERCIAL Promulgated:

CORPORATION,
Respondent. November 27, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

Labor is property, and as such merits protection. The right to make it

available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty. It lies to a large
extent at the foundation of most other forms of property, and of all solid
individual and national prosperity.[1]

The exultation of labor by Mr. Justice Noah Haynes Swayne of the United
States Supreme Court comes to the fore in this petition for review
on certiorari. The employee questions the propriety of his dismissal after he was
caught stealing 1.335 kilos of squid heads worth P50.00. He invokes his almost
thirty-one (31) years of untarnished service and the several awards he received
from the company to temper the penalty of dismissal meted on him.

The Facts

Petitioner Julito Sagales was employed by respondent Rustans Commercial

Corporation from October 1970 until July 26, 2001, when he was terminated. At
the time of his dismissal, he was occupying the position of Chief Cook at the Yum
Yum Tree Coffee Shop located at Rustans Supermarket in Ayala
Avenue, Makati City. He was paid a basic monthly salary of P9,880.00. He was
also receiving service charge of not less than P3,000.00 a month and other benefits
under the law and the existing collective bargaining agreement between respondent
and his labor union.[2]

In the course of his employment, petitioner was a consistent recipient of

numerous citations[3] for his performance. After receiving his latest award
on March 27, 2001, petitioner conveyed to respondent his intention of retiring
on October 31, 2001, after reaching thirty-one (31) years in service. [4] Petitioner,
however, was not allowed to retire with his honor intact.

On June 18, 2001, Security Guard Waldo Magtangob, upon instructions

from Senior Guard Bonifacio Aranas, apprehended petitioner in the act of taking
out from Rustans Supermarket a plastic bag. Upon examination, it was discovered
that the plastic bag contained 1.335 kilos of squid heads worth P50.00. Petitioner
was not able to show any receipt when confronted. Thus, he was brought to the
Security Office of respondent corporation for proper endorsement to the Makati
Headquarters of the Philippine National Police. Subsequently, petitioner was
brought to the Makati Police Criminal Investigation Division where he was
detained. Petitioner was later ordered released pending further investigation.[5]

Respondent alleged that prior to his detention, petitioner called up Agaton

Samson, Rustans Branch Manager, and apologized for the incident. Petitioner even
begged Samson that he would just pay for the squid heads. Samson replied that it is
not within his power to forgive him.[6]
 On June 19, 2001, petitioner underwent inquest proceedings for qualified
theft before Assistant Prosecutor Amado Y. Pineda. Although petitioner admitted
that he was in possession of the plastic bag containing the squid heads, he denied
stealing them because he actually paid for them. As proof, petitioner presented a
receipt. The only fault he committed was his failure to immediately show the
purchase receipt when he was accosted because he misplaced it when he changed
his clothes. He also alleged that the squid heads were already scraps as these were
not intended for cooking. Neither were the squid heads served to customers. He
bought the squid heads so that they could be eaten instead of being thrown away. If
he intended to steal from respondent, he could have stolen other valuable items
instead of scrap.[7]

Assistant Prosecutor Pineda believed the version of petitioner and

recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of evidence. [8] The
recommendation was approved upon review by City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi.[9]

Notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint, respondent, on June 25,

2001, required petitioner to explain in writing within forty-eight (48) hours why he
should not be terminated in view of the June 18, 2001 incident. Respondent also
placed petitioner under preventive suspension.[10]

On June 29, 2001, petitioner was informed that a formal investigation would
be conducted by the Legal Department on July 6, 2001.[11]

Petitioner and his counsel attended the administrative investigation where he

reiterated his defense before the inquest prosecutor. Also in attendance were
Aranas and Magtangob, who testified on the circumstances surrounding the
apprehension of petitioner; Samson, the branch manager to
whom petitioner allegedly apologized for the incident; and Zenaida Castro, cashier,
who testified that the squid heads were not paid.

Respondent did not find merit in the explanation of petitioner. Thus,

petitioner was dismissed from service on July 26, 2001.[12] At that time, petitioner
had been under preventive suspension for one (1) month.
 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
respondent. He also prayed for unpaid salaries/wages, overtime pay, as well as
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and service charges.[13]

Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA Dispositions

On July 24, 2002, Labor Arbiter Felipe P. Pati dismissed[14] the complaint.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the complaint for illegal dismissal

should be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[15]
According to the Labor Arbiter, the nature of the responsibility of petitioner was
not that of an ordinary employee. [16] It then went on to categorize petitioner as a
supervisor in a position of responsibility where trust and confidence is inherently
infused.[17] As such, it behooved him to be more knowledgeable if not the most
knowledgeable in company policies on employee purchases of food scrap items in
the kitchen.[18] Per the evidence presented by respondent, petitioner breached
company policy which justified his dismissal.

Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

[19]
On April 10, 2003, the NLRC reversed[20] the Labor Arbiter in the following
tenor:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and
complainants dismissal declared illegal. Further, respondent is hereby ordered to
reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and
other benefits and paid backwages computed from time of dismissal up to the
finality of this decision which as of this date amounts to P269,854.16.

All other claims are denied for want of basis.

SO ORDERED.[21]

The NLRC held that the position of complainant is not supervisory covered by the
trust and confidence rule.[22] On the contrary, petitioner is a mere rank-and-file
employee.[23]The evidence is also wanting that petitioner committed the crime
charged.[24] The NLRC did not believe that petitioner would trade off almost thirty-
one (31) years of service for P50.00 worth of squid heads.[25]
 The NLRC further ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed as respondent
failed to establish a just cause for dismissal. [26] However, the claim for damages
was denied for lack of evidence.[27]

The motion for reconsideration[28] having been denied,[29] respondent brought

the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. [30] On July 12, 2004, the CA rendered the
assailed decision, [31] with the following fallo:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolutions

of April 10, 2003 and July 31, 2003 of public respondent NLRC
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter of July 24,
2002, dismissing private respondents complaint is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.[32]

In reversing the NLRC, the CA opined that the position of petitioner was
supervisory in nature.[33] The CA also held that the evidence presented by
respondent clearly established loss of trust and confidence on petitioner.[34] Lastly,
the CA, although taking note of the long years of service of petitioner and his
numerous awards, refused to award separation pay in his favor. According to the
CA, the award of separation pay cannot be sustained under the social justice theory
because the instant case involves theft of the employers property.[35]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[36] which was denied.[37] Left

with no other recourse, petitioner availed of the present remedy.[38]

Issues

Petitioner in his Memorandum[39] imputes to the CA the following errors, to wit:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE POSITION OF THE PETITIONER BEING AN
ASSISTANT COOK AS A SUPERVISORY POSITION FOR BEING
CONTRADICTORY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE DOCTRINE OF
 TRUST AND CONFIDENCE APPLIES AGAINST THE PETITIONER TO
JUSTIFY HIS DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT FOR BEING
CONTRADICTORY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. [40] (Underscoring
supplied)

For a full resolution of the issues in the instant case, the following questions should
be answered: (1) Is the position of petitioner supervisory in nature which is
covered by the trust and confidence rule? (2) Is the evidence on record sufficient to
conclude that petitioner committed the crime charged? and (3) Assuming that the
answer is in the affirmative, is the penalty of dismissal proper?

Our Ruling

I. The position of petitioner is supervisory in nature which is covered by

the trust and confidence rule.

The nature of the job of an employee becomes relevant in termination of

employment by the employer because the rules on termination of managerial and
supervisory employees are different from those on the rank-and-file. Managerial
employees are tasked to perform key and sensitive functions, and thus are bound
by more exacting work ethics.[41] As a consequence, managerial employees are
covered by the trust and confidence rule.[42] The same holds true for supervisory
employees occupying positions of responsibility.[43]

There is no doubt that the position of petitioner as chief cook is supervisory

in nature. A chief cook directs and participates in the preparation and serving of
meals; determines timing and sequence of operations required to meet serving
times; and inspects galley and equipment for cleanliness and proper storage and
preparation of food.[44]Naturally, a chief cook falls under the definition of a
supervisor, i.e., one who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommends managerial actions which would require the
use of independent judgment and is not merely routinary or clerical.[45]

It has not escaped Our attention that petitioner changed his stance as far as
his actual position is concerned. In his position paper, he alleged that at the time of
his dismissal, he was Chief Cook.[46] However, in his memorandum, he now
claimed that he was an Asst. Cook.[47] The ploy is clearly aimed at giving the
impression that petitioner is merely a rank-and-file employee. The change in
nomenclature does not, however, help petitioner, as he would still be covered by
the trust and confidence rule. In Concorde Hotel v. Court of Appeals,[48] the Court
categorically ruled:

Petitioner is correct insofar as it considered the nature of private

respondents position as assistant cook a position of trust and confidence. As
assistant cook, private respondent is charged with the care of food preparation in
the hotels coffee shop. He is also responsible for the custody of food supplies and
must see to it that there is sufficient stock in the hotel kitchen. He should not
permit food or other materials to be taken out from the kitchen without the
necessary order slip or authorization as these are properties of the hotel. Thus, the
nature of private respondents position as assistant cook places upon him the duty
of care and custody of Concordes property.[49] (Emphasis supplied)

Of course, the ruling assumes greater significance if petitioner is the chief

cook. A chief cook naturally performs greater functions and has more
responsibilities than an assistant cook. In eo quod plus sit simper inest et
minimus. The greater always includes the less. Ang malawak ay laging
sumasakop sa maliit.

II. The evidence on record is sufficient to conclude that petitioner committed

the crime charged.

Security of tenure is a paramount right of every employee that is held sacred

by the Constitution.[50] The reason for this is that labor is deemed to be
property[51] within the meaning of constitutional guarantees.[52] Indeed, as it is the
policy of the State to guarantee the right of every worker to security
of tenure as an act of social justice,[53] such right should not be denied on mere
speculation of any similar or unclear nebulous basis.[54] Indeed, the right of every
employee to security of tenure is all the more secured by the Labor Code by
providing that the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except
for a just cause or when authorized by law. Otherwise, an employee who is
illegally dismissed shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.[55]

Necessarily then, the employer bears the burden of proof to show the basis
of the termination of the employee.[56]

In the case at bar, respondent has discharged its onus of proving that
petitioner committed the crime charged. We quote with approval the observation of
the CA in this regard:

On this matter, petitioner presents as evidence the verified statement of

security guard Aranas. Aranas positively saw the private in the act of bringing out
the purloined squid heads. Similarly, the statement of security guard Magtangob
attested to the commission by private respondent of the offense charged. Further,
the verified statement of Samson, store manager of petitioner corporation who is
in charge of all personnel, including employees of the Yum Yum Tree Coffee Shop
of which private respondent was a former assistant cook, attested to the fact of
private respondent seeking apology for the commission of the act. Likewise, the
statement of Zenaida Castro (Castro), cashier of petitioner corporations
supermarket, Makati Branch, Ayala Center, Makati City, confirmed that indeed
the 1.335 kilos of squid heads amounting to fifty pesos (P50.00)per kilo, had not
been paid for.[57]

The contention of petitioner that respondent merely imputed the crime

against him because he was set to retire is difficult, if not impossible, to
believe. Worth noting is the fact that petitioner failed to impute any ill will or
motive on the part of the witnesses against him. As aptly observed by the Labor
Arbiter:

It seems unbelievable to believe that the apprehending officers up to the Manager,

Mr. Samson, were all telling a lie as what complainant wants to portray when he
alleged in his pleadings that he mentioned to the apprehending officers [that] he
has a receipt for [the squid heads] and that he never apologized. This is
understandable on his part because complainant wants no loophole in his
version. And an easy way out is to fabricate his allegations.[58]

We stress that the quantum of proof required for the application of the loss
of trust and confidence rule is not proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient
that there must only be some basis for the loss of trust and confidence or that
there is reasonable ground to believe, if not to entertain the moral conviction,
that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that his
participation in the misconduct rendered him absolutely unworthy of trust
and confidence.[59]

It is also of no moment that the criminal complaint for qualified theft against
petitioner was dismissed. It is well settled that the conviction of an employee in a
criminal case is not indispensable to the exercise of the employers disciplinary
authority.[60]

III. The penalty of dismissal is too harsh under the circumstances.

The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve
its purpose cannot be denied.[61] The only condition is that the exercise of
management prerogatives should not be done in bad faith[62] or with abuse of
discretion.[63] Truly, while the employer has the inherent right to discipline,
including that of dismissing its employees, this prerogative is subject to the
regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.[64]

In this regard, it is a hornbook doctrine that infractions committed by an

employee should merit only the corresponding penalty demanded by the
circumstance. The penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct or
omission imputed to the employee and must be imposed in connection with the
disciplinary authority of the employer.[65]

For example, in Farrol v. Court of Appeals,[66] the employee, who was

a district manager of a bank, incurred a shortage of P50,985.37. He was dismissed
although the funds were used to pay the retirement benefits of five employees of
the bank. The employee was also able to return the amount, leaving a balance of
only P6,995.37 of the shortage. The bank argued that under its rules, the penalty
for the infraction of the employee is dismissal. The Court disagreed and held that
the penalty of dismissal is too harsh. The Court took note that it is the first
infraction of the employee and that he has rendered twenty-four (24) long years of
service to the bank. In the words of Mme. Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, the dismissal imposed on petitioner is unduly harsh and grossly
disproportionate to the infraction which led to the termination of his
services. A lighter penalty would have been more just, if not humane.[67]
 So too did the Court pronounce in Felix v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[68] Gutierrez v. Singer Sewing Machine Company,[69] Associated
Labor Unions-TUCP v. National Labor Relations Commission,[70] Dela Cruz v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[71] Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company v. Tolentino,[72] Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[73] Permex, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[74] VH Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
[75]
A Prime Security Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
[76]
and St. Michaels Institute v. Santos.[77]

In the case at bar, petitioner deserves compassion more than condemnation. At the
end of the day, it is undisputed that: (1) petitioner has worked for respondent for
almost thirty-one (31) years; (2) his tireless and faithful service is attested by the
numerous awards[78] he has received from respondent; (3) the incident on June 18,
2001 was his first offense in his long years of service; (4) the value of the squid
heads worth P50.00 is negligible; (5) respondent practically did not lose anything
as the squid heads were considered scrap goods and usually thrown away in the
wastebasket; (6) the ignominy and shame undergone by petitioner in being
imprisoned, however momentary, is punishment in itself; and (7) petitioner was
preventively suspended for one month, which is already a commensurate
punishment for the infraction committed. Truly, petitioner has more than paid his
due.

In any case, it would be useless to order the reinstatement of petitioner, considering

that he would have been retired by now. Thus, in lieu of reinstatement, it is but
proper to award petitioner separation pay computed at one-month salary for every
year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one whole year.
[79]
In the computation of separation pay, the period where backwages are awarded
must be included.[80]

Word of caution.
We do not condone dishonesty. After all, honesty is the best policy. However,
punishment should be commensurate with the offense committed. The supreme
penalty of dismissal is the death penalty to the working man. Thus, care should be
exercised by employers in imposing dismissal to erring employees. The penalty of
dismissal should be availed of as a last resort.

Indeed, the immortal words of Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando
ring true then as they do now: where a penalty less punitive would suffice,
whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not be visited with a
consequence so severe. It is not only because of the laws concern for the
workingman. There is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings
untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-earner.[81]

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is
granted separation pay and backwages in lieu of reinstatement.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

AT T E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 US) 36, 127.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[3]
(1) Sikap Awards in recognition of his exemplary job performance for the years 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1992,
1993 and 1994; (2) Sikap Awards Service Award in 1991 for having rendered twenty five (25) years of loyal service
to the company; (3) Sikap Awards Service Award for having rendered twenty five (25) years of loyal service; (4)
Several Certificates of Recognition for being named to the EVP-GM list, a roster of employees who have posted a
perfect record of attendance and punctuality in reporting to work for several years; and (5) Sikap Loyalty Award for
having rendered thirty (30) years of loyal service, making him one of the elite employees of his company.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[5]
Id. at 302-303.
[6]
Id. at 303-304.
[7]
Id. at 45-46.
[8]
Id. at 46.
[9]
Id. at 50.
[10]
Id. at 203.
[11]
Id. at 204.
[12]
Id. at 207.
[13]
Id. at 69-75.
[14]
Id. at 84-94. NLRC Case No. NCR-S-30-09-04047-01.
[15]
Id. at 94.
[16]
Id. at 91.
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id. at 95-104.
[20]
Id. at 116-123. NLRC CA 033170-02. Penned by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo, with Commissioner Lourdes C.
Javier, concurring.
[21]
Id. at 123.
[22]
Id. at 121.
[23]
Id. at 122.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Id.
[26]
Id.
[27]
Id. at 123.
[28]
Id. at 124-129.
[29]
Id. at 133-134.
[30]
Id. at 138-156.
[31]
Id. at 25-33. CA-G.R. SP No. 80131. Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices
Cancio C. Garcia (a retired member of this Court) and Remedios Salazar-Fernando, concurring.
[32]
Rollo, p. 32.
[33]
Id. at 29.
[34]
Id. at 30.
[35]
Id. at 32.
[36]
Id. at 35-41.
[37]
Id. at 52-53.
[38]
Id. at 8-20.
[39]
Id. at 283-295.
[40]
Id. at 287.
[41]
Gonzales v. National Relations Labor Commission, G.R. No. 131653, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 195.
[42]
Caingat v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 154308, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 142; Sulpicio
Lines, Inc. v. Gulde, G.R. No. 149930, February 22, 2002, 377 SCRA 525; Sanchez v. National Labor Relations
Commission,G.R. No. 124348, August 19, 1999, 312 SCRA 727.
[43]
Cruz v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 165586, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 340; Coca-Cola Bottlers,
Phils., Inc. v. Kapisanan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Coca-Cola-FFW, G.R. No. 148205, February 28, 2005, 452
SCRA 480; Tan v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 128290, November 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 169,
183; Filipro, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-70546, October 16, 1986, 145 SCRA
123; Lamsam Trading, Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. L-73245, September 30, 1986, 144 SCRA 571.
[44]
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_Cook> (visited October 20, 2008).
[45]
A.D. Gothong Manufacturing Corporation Employees Union-ALU v. Confesor, G.R. No. 113638, November 16,
1999, 318 SCRA 58.
[46]
Rollo, p. 69.
[47]
Id. at 285.
[48]
G.R. No. 144089, August 9, 2001, 362 SCRA 583.
[49]
Concorde Hotel v. Court of Appeals, id. at 591.
[50]
CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. XIII, Sec. 3 on Social Justice and Human Rights.
[51]
Id., Art. III, Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights partly provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law x x x.
[52]
Philippine Movie Pictures Workers Association v. Premiere Productions, Inc., 92 Phil. 843 (1953).
[53]
Rance v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-68147, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 279.
[54]
Asia World Recruitment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 113363, August 24, 1999, 313
SCRA 1; Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
95449, August 18, 1997, 277 SCRA 506; Tolentino v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R No. L-75380, July
31, 1987, 152 SCRA 717.
[55]
Labor Code, Art. 279.
[56]
De Jesus v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 151158, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 489,
498; Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 119509, February 11, 1999, 303 SCRA 38; Agoy
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 112096, January 30, 1996, 252 SCRA 588; Gesulgon v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA 561.
[57]
Rollo, p. 30.
[58]
Id. at 92-93.
[59]
Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 145800, January 22, 2003, 395 SCRA
720; Gonzales v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 41.
[60]
Starlite Plastic Industrial Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78491, March 16,
1989, 171 SCRA 315, 324, citing Sea Land Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
68212, May 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 544.
[61]
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 125038, November 6, 1997, 281 SCRA 509; Almodiel v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
100641, June 14, 1993, 223 SCRA 341; Yuco Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, G.R.
No. 75656, May 28, 1990, 185 SCRA 727; San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) v. Ople, G.R. No.
53515, February 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 25; Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. L-76959, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 713.
[62]
Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 117652, April 27, 2000, 331 SCRA 82; Caltex
Refinery Employees Association (CREA) v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division), 316 Phil. 335
(1995); Maya Farms Employees Organization v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
106256, December 28, 1994, 239 SCRA 508; Garcia v. Manila Times, G.R. No. 99390, July 5, 1991, 224 SCRA
399; Union Carbide Labor Union v. Union Carbide Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 41314, November 13, 1992, 215
SCRA 554; National Federation of Labor Unions v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
90739, October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA 346; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. Laplana, G.R. No.
76645, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA 485; Cruz v. Medina, G.R. No. 73053, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 565; San
Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union (PTGWO) v. Ople, supra note 61.
[63]
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 106516, September 21, 1999,
314 SCRA 740; Palomares v. National Labor Relations Commission (5th Division), G.R. No. 120064, August 15,
1997, 277 SCRA 439, 449; Union Carbide Labor Union v. Union Carbide Philippines, supra note 62, at
558; Employees Association of the Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 82976, July 26, 1991, 199 SCRA 628.
[64]
Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 485 (1940).
[65]
Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division), supra
note 62, at 343; Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
102958, June 25, 1993, 223 SCRA 656.
[66]
G.R. No. 133259, February 10, 2000, 325 SCRA 331.
[67]
Farrol v. Court of Appeals, id. at 340.
[68]
G.R. No. 148256, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 465; Gutierrez v. Singer Sewing Machine Company, G.R. No.
140982, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 512; Associated Labor Unions-TUCP v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 120450, February 10, 1999, 302 SCRA 708.
[69]
Supra.
[70]
Supra at 715-716.
[71]
G.R. No. 119536, February 17, 1997, 268 SCRA 458, 471.
[72]
G.R. No. 143171, September 21, 2004, 438 SCRA 555.
[73]
Supra note 61.
[74]
G.R. No. 125031, January 24, 2000, 323 SCRA 121.
[75]
G.R. No. 130957, January 19, 2000, 322 SCRA 417.
[76]
G.R. No. 107320, January 19, 2000, 322 SCRA 283.
[77]
G.R. No. 145280, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA 383.
[78]
See note 3.
[79]
Farrol v. Court of Appeals, supra note 66, at 340, citing Jardine Davies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 76272, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 289, citing in turn, Mabeza v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 118506, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 670; Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 120482, January 27, 1997, 266 SCRA 713; Bustamante v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 111651, November 28, 1996, 265 SCRA 61; Presidential Decree 442, Art. 283,
otherwise known as The Labor Code of the Philippines.
[80]
Id., citing Jardine Davies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, citing in turn, Guatson
International Travel and Tours, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 100322, March 9, 1994, 230
SCRA 815, 824.
[81]
Almira v. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. L-34974, July 25, 1974, 58 SCRA 120, 131.