Michael Lacewing

Emotivism

Theories of what morality is fall into two broad families cognitivism and non-
cognitivism. The distinction is now understood by philosophers to depend on
whether one thinks that moral judgements express beliefs or not.

Non-cognitivism claims that ethical language does not try to describe the world
and cannot be true or false. It does not express beliefs, but some other, non-
cognitive mental state. Different non-cognitivist theories disagree on exactly what
this mental state is, but it is usually an attitude or feeling.

EMOTIVISM
Emotivism claims that moral judgements express the feeling or attitude of
approval or disapproval. To say that Murder is wrong is to express ones
disapproval of murder. Ethical language is emotive. So, in one sense, emotivism
claims that morality is subjective. However, there is an important distinction
between emotivism and the theory that is called subjectivism. Subjectivism
claims that moral judgements assert or report approval or disapproval, and there
is a difference between expressing disapproval and asserting it.

One form of subjectivism claims that to say X is wrong is simply to say that it is
generally disapproved of. But this cant be right, because it is not a contradiction
to say Most people approve of X, but X is wrong nonetheless. For example,
racism has been very common historically. We may argue that racism is wrong
even while acknowledging that most people approved of it.

A second form of subjectivism, speaker subjectivism, claims that the meaning of

X is wrong is something like I disapprove of X or again I think X is wrong. This
is a fact about oneself, so the statement can be true or false and is verifiable.
Speaker subjectivism, therefore, is an unusual form of cognitivism: the facts that
make moral judgements true are facts about the individual speakers mind.

Speaker subjectivism entails that we cannot make mistakes about what is right or
wrong. If I say Murder is right, I am simply stating I approve of murder. If I am
sincere, then I do approve of murder, and so murder is, indeed, right (for me, we
might say). But we naturally think that people can make mistakes about morality.
Speaker subjectivism makes no sense of deliberation, trying to figure out what is
right or wrong. Why should I bother to deliberate? Whatever I come to feel will be
right!

By contrast, emotivism claims that moral judgements do not express any kind of
truth or falsehood, because they are not cognitive. It can explain the objections to
subjectivism above. To say that most people approve of racism does not
contradict racism is wrong, because racism is wrong doesnt state something
true or false. And one cannot be infallible in the sense of getting the answer right,
there are no moral truths.

AYERS EMOTIVISM
Ayers verification principle claims that a statement only has meaning if it is either
analytic or empirically verifiable. A statement is analytic if it is true or false just in
virtue of the meanings of the words. A statement is empirically verifiable if
empirical evidence would go towards establishing that the statement is true or
false.

In Language, Truth and Logic, Ch. 6, Ayer also applies the principle to ethical
language. If I say murder is wrong, this is not analytic, nor can any empirical
investigation show this. We can show that murder causes grief and pain, or that it
is often done out of anger. But we cannot demonstrate, in the same way, that it is
wrong. Moral judgements dont state truths or falsehoods, and are therefore
literally meaningless.

Instead, Ayer argued, they express feelings: If I say to someone, You acted
wrongly in stealing that moneyI am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it.
It is as if I had said, You stole that money, in a peculiar tone of horror. But not
only does moral language express our feelings, it also aims to arouse feelings in
others, and so get them to act in certain ways.

In developing his theory, Ayer first distinguishes it from subjectivism. He then

compares it to Moores intuitionism. He agrees with Moore that X is wrong
cannot mean X would cause unhappiness (or any other proposition substituting a
natural property for wrong). The open question argument shows that it is never
a contradiction to say X would cause unhappiness, but it is right to do it
nonetheless. So Ayer agrees that ethical naturalism is wrong.

But he also rejects non-naturalism. As an ethical non-naturalist, of course, Moore

believed that moral judgements are about non-natural properties. While they are
neither analytic nor empirically verifiable, they are nevertheless true or false.
Ayer responds that Moores intuitionism is unsatisfactory. We cant establish the
truth or falsity of a moral claim by appealing to intuition unless we are able to
provide some criterion for deciding between conflicting intuitions. Intuition itself
is no way to verify a claim. Given the verification principle, only an empirical
criterion will do. But there is no empirical test that will establish which intuition
is correct and which is incorrect. And so, Ayer concludes, moral judgements are
not genuinely meaningful, but simply express our feelings of approval or
disapproval and arouse such feelings in others.

Rejecting the verification principle

Ayers theory depends on the verification principle. But the principle faces a
famous objection. According to the verification principle, the principle itself is
meaningless. The claim that a statement only has meaning if it is analytic or can
be verified empirically is not analytic and cannot be verified empirically. But if
the principle of verification is meaningless, then what it claims cannot be true. So
if the principle is true, it is meaningless, and so not true. Obviously, if it is false, it
is false. Either way it is not true. Therefore, it does not give us any reason to
believe that ethical language is meaningless.

Ayer claims that the principle is intended as a definition, not an empirical

hypothesis about meaning. In other words, it is intended to reflect and clarify our
understanding of meaningful uses of words. Ayer accepts that the principle isnt
obviously an accurate criterion of literal meaning, but that is why he provides
arguments in specific cases, such as ethical language, which support it.

But in that case, the verification principle is only as convincing as the arguments
that are intended to show that it is the right definition of meaningful. If we do
not find the arguments convincing, the principle provides no independent support.

STEVENSONS EMOTIVISM
However, emotivism does not depend on the principle of verification nor on
Humes theory of judgements of reason. As Warnock notes, emotivism as a theory
really only developed with the work of Charles Stevenson. Warnock argues that
Stevenson makes three central points.

First, Stevenson develops the distinction between beliefs and attitudes. We can
understand the difference in terms of the idea of direction of fit.

A man goes shopping, taking his shopping list with him. When shopping, he uses his
list to guide what he puts in his basket. At the end of the shop, what is in his
basket should fit his list. If it doesnt, the mistake is with the basket, and the
basket should be changed to fit the list. Now suppose that the man is being
followed by a store detective. She makes a list of each thing that the man puts in
his basket. At the end of the shop, her list should fit his basket. If it doesnt, the
mistake is with her list, and the list should be changed to fit the basket.

The shoppers list is a list of what he wants. Desires have a world-to-mind

direction of fit. We seek to change the world to fit our desires and thereby satisfy
them. They are not true or false, but represent how the world should be. By
contrast, the detectives list is a list of what she believes is in the shoppers
basket. Beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit. We change our beliefs to
fit the world, and thereby have true beliefs. They represent how the world is, not
how we want it to be. Stevenson argues that moral attitudes regard what is to be
done they have a world-to-mind direction of fit and are non-cognitive.

Second, Stevenson develops the distinction between the descriptive and emotive
meanings of words. He argues, quite independent of appeals to the verification
principle or the scope of reason, that moral words have emotive meanings, which
are neither descriptive nor analytic. The central ethical terms right, wrong,
good and bad only have emotive meanings, of expressing approval or
disapproval. But many moral terms (steal, honesty, respect) have both
descriptive and emotive meanings. To be told that someone is honest is to learn
something about them. For instance, they cant be honest while lying frequently!
And whether someone lies frequently is a matter of fact. But the term honest
isnt just a description; it also has an emotive meaning of approval.
Stevensons third claim analyses emotive meaning by connecting meaning to use.
The purpose of moral judgements is not to state facts, but to influence how we
behave through expressions of approval and disapproval. When we say that x is
good, we do not understand the judgement just by noticing that the speaker
approves of x or even by noticing which features of x the speaker approves of. X
is good, and other moral judgements, are used both to express the speakers
attitudes and to influence the attitudes of other people. Moral terms are
dynamic, and the main purpose of making moral judgements is to create an
influence.

One advantage of this theory is that it easily explains how and why it is that moral
judgements motivate us. If moral language were just descriptive, stating how
things are, why would that get us to act in certain ways? We need to care. And
what we care about is captured in our attitudes to the world. Emotivism connects
caring, approving, disapproving, with the very meaning of ethical words.

OBJECTIONS TO EMOTIVISM
Warnock argues that emotivism fails as an account of ethical language. First, being
emotive and influencing peoples attitudes is something that lots of non-ethical
language does as well, e.g. advertising. So we will need to say more to distinguish
morality from advertising.

Second, ethical language doesnt always function to create an influence. We may

express our moral attitudes to others who already agree with them or that we
know to be indifferent to our views so influencing their attitudes is not the
purpose. But this doesnt show that we arent expressing a moral judgement.

Third, ethical language isnt particularly or necessarily emotive. The key moral
terms good, right, wrong and bad may arouse emotions in others or express
ours, but again, this depends on context. We do not think that it is always good to
arouse emotions in others on moral issues, especially by using emotive language.
Moral discussion can be, and sometimes should be, dispassionate.

The emotivist could reply to Warnocks objections by talking about primary and
secondary uses. The purpose of ethical language, says emotivism, is to influence
what people do. Without this, we would have no ethical language or judgements at
all. However, that doesnt mean that it always has to be used for this purpose.
This is normal many types of language can be used in non-standard ways in
different situations. For example, it is possible to use fact-stating language to
insult someone, e.g. You have a big nose. That it is an emotive statement on this
occasion doesnt make the meaning of the sentence emotive it states a factual
claim. Likewise, language which is standardly emotive can be deployed without
the intention to arouse emotion or influence action. Warnock hasnt shown that
ethical language isnt essentially emotive, or that it isnt always emotive.

There is, however, another objection that emotivism faces. What, exactly, is the
emotion (or class of emotions) that moral judgements express? Can the emotivist
draw a distinction between moral approval and disapproval and, say, aesthetic
approval and disapproval? What makes approval moral or not moral?

Nothing emotivism says places limits on what we can approve or disapprove of. It
identifies moral judgements with a particular type of judgement, one that
expresses approval, etc., rather than a particular content. Any judgement that
expresses approval or disapproval counts as moral. But this cant be right. Morality
is about what is good or bad for human beings generally, given our nature and the
types of problems life throws at us. It must relate in some way to what is good for
people (or more broadly, animals, the environment, God).

Moral argument
One of the most powerful objections to emotivism is that it oversimplifies ethical
discussion. If I say abortion is wrong and you say abortion is right, it seems that
I am just expressing my disapproval of it and you are expressing your approval. Im
just saying Boo! to abortion and youre saying Hurrah! for abortion. I am also
trying to influence your attitudes. But I am not doing so rationally, or by
appealing to facts about what is good or bad. Trying to influence people without
reasoning is just a form of manipulation. Emotivism reduces moral argument to
propaganda.

Ayer responds that moral arguments are not arguments over moral judgements,
but over facts: we do not attempt to show by our arguments that he has the
wrong ethical feeling towards a situation whose nature he has correctly
apprehended. What we attempt to show is that he is mistaken about the facts of
the case. When arguing over animal rights, say, we are constantly drawing facts to
each others attention. I point out how much animals suffer in factory farms. You
point out how much more sophisticated human beings are than animals. I point out
that it is unkind to kill animals for food. You respond that people are not
motivated by unkindness, and indeed, farmers can be very kind to the animals
when alive. And so on. But if we both agree on the facts, but still disagree morally,
there is nothing left to discuss, says Ayer, no further argument can take place.
Moral judgements always presuppose a system of values; but no arguments for
these values can be given.

But if you and I disagree about a moral judgement, and moral judgements have no
truth value, are we right to say that there is a disagreement here at all? Isnt a
disagreement when you think some claim is true and I think it is false?

Stevenson responds that a moral disagreement is a disagreement in attitude. It is a

practical disagreement no one can live both by the attitude that eating meat is
wrong and by the attitude that eating meat is right. Attitudes can be discussed,
because people do not have feelings or make choices in isolation. Any attitude has
implications for other attitudes. If I disapprove of an action, I must also have
similar feelings about similar actions, or my attitudes will not provide consistent
guidance about how to live. Moral disagreement, then, can be about the relations
between different attitudes. For example, deciding whether eating meat is right or
wrong is complicated because there are many attitudes involved, sympathy
towards the animal, attitudes towards death, feelings about the place of human
beings in nature, and so on. It is difficult to work out how these attitudes can all
be acted upon, and that is why people disagree.
We may still object that weighing up which attitudes to give up, which to keep, is
a rational process. Emotivism does not give us an adequate account of
deliberation. If you are unsure about whether something, lying say, is right or
wrong, we can understand that you are trying to work out what your attitude
towards lying should be. But why cant you settle the question of whether lying is
right or wrong by simply noting whatever attitude you already have towards it? If
emotivism is right, it seems that thinking hard about the question is irrational. We
can put the point another way: emotivism doesnt explain how someone can
rationally change their mind on a moral issue. First, they have one attitude, then
they have another. But what reason do they have to change their mind?

Warnock develops the objection in a different way: if moral judgements and

arguments are about influencing peoples attitudes, then a good moral argument
will be one that is effective. That is all. There is no other, e.g. rational, criterion
by which we might judge that it is a good or bad argument. Whatever I appeal to,
to make you change your mind, no matter how irrelevant or far-fetched, if it
makes you change your mind, it is a good argument. This is highly unsatisfactory.

We can take the point deeper still. We think of good arguments in terms of validity
(for deductive arguments) and whether the premises give us a good reason to
believe the conclusion. A valid argument is one in which if the premises are true,
the conclusion has to be true. But according to non-cognitivism, moral judgements
are not true (or false). So consider this argument:

1. It is wrong to murder.
2. If it is wrong to murder, then it is wrong to pay other people to murder for you.
3. Therefore, it is wrong to pay other people to murder for you.

We would normally say that this argument is valid. But according to emotivism,
both (1) and (3) dont state truths at all, they express attitudes. And so the
argument is not valid. So if emotivism is right, there can be no moral arguments.