Online Security

This site has no rating

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113079. April 20, 2001]

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTORS AND SERVICES
CORPORATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 114923. April 20, 2001]

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTORS
AND SERVICES CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The propriety of building a state-of-the-art gasoline service station along Benigno

Aquino, Jr. Avenue in Paraaque, Metro Manila is the bone of contention in these
consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert
that the construction of such a modern edifice is a necessity dictated by the emerging
economic landscapes. Respondents say otherwise.
The factual antecedents of the case are matters of record or are otherwise
uncontroverted.
Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged in the business of
importing crude oil, refining the same and selling various petroleum products through a
network of service stations throughout the country.
Private respondent Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns and
operates a Caltex service station at the corner of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay
City.
On June 30,1983, Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU)
an application for authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Paraaque, Metro
Manila, to Imelda Marcos Avenue of the same municipality. The application, which was
docketed as BEU Case No. 83-09-1319, was initially rejected by the BEU because Shells
old site had been closed for five (5) years such that the relocation of the same to a new site
would amount to a new construction of a gasoline outlet, which construction was then the
subject of a moratorium. Subsequently, however, BEU relaxed its position and gave due
course to the application.
PDSC filed an opposition to the application on the grounds that: 1.] there are adequate
service stations attending to the motorists requirements in the trading area covered by the
application; 2.] ruinous competition will result from the establishment of the proposed new
service station; and 3.] there is a decline not an increase in the volume of sales in the area.
Two other companies, namely Petrophil and Caltex, also opposed the application on the
ground that Shell failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements.
In a Resolution dated March 6, 1984, the BEU dismissed the application on
jurisdictional grounds and for lack of full title of the lessor over the proposed site. However,
on May 7, 1984, the BEU reinstated the same application and thereafter conducted a
hearing thereon.
On June 3, 1986, the BEU rendered a decision denying Shells application on a finding
that there was no necessity for an additional petroleum products retail outlet in Imelda
Marcos Avenue, Paraaque. Dissatisfied, Shell appealed to the Office of Energy Affairs
(OEA).
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1987, Executive Order No. 172 was issued creating the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) and transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of
the BEU.
On May 9, 1988, the OEA rendered a decision denying the appeal of Shell and
affirming the BEU decision. Shell moved for reconsideration and prayed for a new hearing
or the remand of the case for further proceedings. In a supplement to said motion, Shell
submitted a new feasibility study to justify its application.
The OEA issued an order on July 11, 1988, remanding the case to the ERB for further
evaluation and consideration, noting therein that the updated survey conducted by Shell
cited new developments such as the accessibility of Imelda Marcos Avenue, now Benigno
Aquino, Jr. Avenue, to Paraaque residents along Sucat Road and the population growth in
the trading area.
After the records of BEU Case No. 83-09-1319 was remanded to the ERB, Shell filed
on March 3, 1989 an amended application, intended for the same purpose as its original
application, which was docketed as ERB Case No. 89-57. This amended application was
likewise opposed by PDSC.
On September 17, 1991, the ERB rendered a Decision allowing Shell to establish the
service station in Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for authority to relocate a Shell service
station from Tambo to Benigno Aquino Avenue, Paraaque, Metro Manila is hereby approved.
Applicant is hereby directed to:
 1. Start the construction and operation of the retail outlet at the actual approved site
appearing in the vicinity map previously submitted to the Board within one (1) year,
from the finality of this Decision and thereafter submit a sworn document of
compliance therewith;
2. Submit photographs showing the left side, right side and front view of the retail outlet
within fifteen (15) days from completion of the construction work;
3. Submit to the Board a report on the total volume of petroleum products sold each
month during the first six (6) months of the operation of the station. The report shall
be submitted in the form of an affidavit within ten (10) days after the end of the six-
month period;
4. Inform the Board in writing and the general public through a notice posted
conspicuously within the premises of the station of the (a) intention of applicant or its
dealer to stop operation of the retail outlet for a period longer than ninety (90) days;
or (b) notice of shutdown of operation of the retail outlet that will likely extend beyond
thirty (30) days. Such notice must be given fifteen (15) days before the actual cessation
of operations in the case of (a) and in the case of (b) within the first five (5) days of
an unplanned stoppage of operations.
SO ORDERED.
PDSC filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision. The motion was,
however, denied by ERB in an Order dated February 14, 1992.
Aggrieved, PDSC elevated its cause on April 1, 1992 to the Court of Appeals, where
the same was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27661.
Thereafter, in a Decision dated November 8, 1993,1 the appellate courts Tenth Division
reversed the ERB judgment thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision dated September 17, 1991, as well as the Order dated
February 14, 1992, both of the respondent Energy Regulatory Board in ERB Case No. 89-57, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Correspondingly, the application of respondent Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation to construct and operate the petroleum retail outlet in question is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
6 April 1994.2 Dissatisfied, both Shell and ERB elevated the matter to this Court by way
of these petitions, which were ordered consolidated by the Court in a Resolution dated July
25,1994.3
It appears, however, from the record that even as the proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No.
27661 were pending in the appellate court, Caltex filed on January 24, 1992 a similar
application for the construction of a service station in the same area with the ERB, docketed
as ERB Case No. 87-393. This application was likewise opposed by respondent PDSC,
citing the same grounds it raised in opposing Shells application in ERB Case No. 89-57.
In the aforesaid case, petitioner ERB thereafter rendered a Decision dated June 19,
1992 approving the application of Caltex. This ERB Decision was challenged by PDSC,
again on the same grounds it raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 27661, in a petition for review filed
with the Court of Appeals, where the same was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29099.
Subsequently, the appellate courts Sixteenth Division dismissed PDSCs petition in a
Decision dated May 14, 1993.4
As grounds for the petition in the instant case, ERB asserts that
(1) THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE ERB BASED ITS DECISION IS NEITHER
STALE NOR IRRELEVANT AND THE SAME JUSTIFIES THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROPOSED PETROLEUM OUTLET.
(2) THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY APPLICANT SHELL REGARDING
VEHICLE VOLUME AND FUEL DEMAND SUPPORTS THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PROPOSED OUTLET.
(3) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SERVICE STATION WILL NOT LEAD TO
RUINOUS COMPETITION.
For its part, Shell avers that
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS
OF FACTS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD WHOSE
FINDINGS WERE BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
FEASIBILITY STUDY SUPPORTING PETITIONERS APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCT A
SERVICE STATION BEFORE THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD HAS BECOME
IRRELEVANT FOR HAVING BEEN PRESENTED IN EVIDENCE ABOUT TWO (2) YEARS
AFTER IT WAS PREPARED.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN PASSING
JUDGMENT AND MAKING PRONOUNCEMENTS ON PURELY ECONOMIC AND POLICY
ISSUES ON PETROLEUM BUSINESS WHICH ARE WITHIN THE REALM OF THE
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD WHICH HAS A RECOGNIZED EXPERTISE IN OIL
ECONOMICS.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROPOSED SERVICE STATION OF PETITIONER WOULD POSE RUINOUS
COMPETITION TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SERVICE STATION BASED MAINLY ON
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME WITH THE SAID COURT AND WITHOUT
CONDUCTING A HEARING THEREON.
V.
ASSUMING THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS THE POWER TO
CONSIDER NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME BEFORE SAID COURT,
IT SHOULD HAVE REFERRED SUCH MATTER TO THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESORT OR PRIMARY JURISDICTION.
The issues raised by the parties in these consolidated cases bring to the fore the
necessity of rationalizing or reconciling two apparently conflicting decisions of the
appellate court on the propriety of building gasoline service stations along Benigno
Aquino, Jr. Avenue in Paraaque, Metro Manila. Considering that the questions raised
concern within the oil industry, whose impact on the nations economy is pervasive and far-
reaching, the Court is constrained to look into the policy and purposes of its governing
statutes to resolve this dilemma.
The policy of the government in this regard has been to allow a free interplay of market
forces with minimal government supervision. The purpose of governing legislation is to
liberalize the downstream oil industry in order to ensure a truly competitive market under
a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply, environmentally clean and high-
quality petroleum products.5 Indeed, exclusivity of any franchise has not been favored by
the Court,6 which is keen on promoting free competition and the development of a free
market consistent with the legislative policy of deregulation as an answer to the problems
of the oil industry.7
The Court finds the petitions impressed with merit.
The interpretation of an administrative government agency like the ERB, which is
tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
construction of the courts.8 A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will
not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies.9 More explicitly
Generally, the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to
implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the
courts.10 The reason behind this rule was explained in Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,11 in this wise:
The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs
of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative
agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of
experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged
with implementing a particular statute. In Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Customs,12 the Court stressed that executive officials are presumed to have familiarized
themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law,
and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon.
The courts give much weight to the government agency or officials charged with the
implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed
judgment, and the fact that they frequently are drafters of the law they interpret.
As a general rule, contemporaneous construction is resorted to for certainty and predictability
in the laws,13 especially those involving specific terms having technical meanings.
However, courts will not hesitate to set aside such executive interpretation when it is clearly
erroneous, or when there is no ambiguity in the rule,14 or when the language or words used are clear
and plain or readily understandable to any ordinary reader.15
Stated differently, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative
interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means.16 Thus, an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.17
However, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings
of the ERB conform to, rather than conflict with, the governing statutes and controlling
case law on the matter.
Prior to Republic Act No. 8479, the downstream oil industry was regulated by the ERB
and from 1993 onwards, the Energy Industry Regulation Board. These regulatory bodies
were empowered, among others, to entertain and act on applications for the establishment
of gasoline stations in the Philippines. The ERB, which used to be the Board of Energy
(BOE), is tasked with the following powers and functions by Executive Order No. 172,
which took effect immediately after its issuance on May 8, 1987:
SEC. 3. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions of the Board. When warranted and only when
public necessity requires, the Board may regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-
exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy
resources. xxx
The Board shall, upon prior notice and hearing, exercise the following, among other powers
and functions:
(a) Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;
(b) Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged by duly
franchised gas companies which distribute gas by means of underground pipe systems;
(c) Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaires under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 387, as amended, otherwise know as the Petroleum Act of 1949, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1700;
(d) Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of existing
refineries and license refineries that may be organized after the issuance of this Executive
Order, under such terms and conditions as are consistent with the national interest;
(e) Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum
product, or when public interest so requires, it may take such steps as it may consider
necessary, including the temporary adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum
products and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund created under Presidential
Decree No. 1956 by persons or entities engaged in the petroleum industry of such
amounts as may be determined by the Board, which will enable the importer to recover
its costs of importation.18
A distinct worldwide trend towards economic deregulation has been evident in the past
decade. Both developed and developing countries have seriously considered and
extensively adopted various measures for this purpose. The country has been no exception.
Indeed, the buzzwords of the third millenium are deregulation, globalization and
liberalization.19 It need not be overemphasized that this trend is reflected in our policy
considerations, statutes and jurisprudence. Thus, in Garcia v. Corona,20 the Court said:
R.A. 8479, the present deregulation law, was enacted to implement Article XII, Section 19 of
the Constitution which provides:
 The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires.
No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
This is so because the Government believes that deregulation will eventually prevent
monopoly. The simplest form of monopoly exists when there is only one seller or producer of a
product or service for which there are no substitutes. In its more complex form, monopoly is defined
as the joint acquisition or maintenance by members of a conspiracy, formed for that purpose, of the
power to control and dominate trade and commerce in a commodity to such an extent that they are
able, as a group, to exclude actual or potential competitors from the field, accompanied with the
intention and purpose to exercise such power.21
xxx xxx xxx xxx
It bears reiterating at the outset that deregulation of the oil industry is policy determination of
the highest order. It is unquestionably a priority program of Government. The Department of
Energy Act of 199222 expressly mandates that the development and updating of the existing
Philippine energy program shall include a policy direction towards deregulation of the power and
energy industry.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
Our ruling in Tatad23 is categorical that the Constitutions Article XII, Section 19, is anti-trust
in history and spirit. It espouses competition. We have stated that only competition which is
fair can release the creative forces of the market. We ruled that the principle which underlies
the constitutional provision is competition. Thus:
Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and spirit. It
espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition
against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the
reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying
principle of Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A.
No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-
trust law is to assure a competitive economy based upon the belief that through
competition producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the
sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid
for goods and services and, thus matches their desires with societys opportunity costs.
He adds with appropriateness that there is a reliance upon the operation of the market
system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced, how resources shall be
allocated in the production process, and to whom various products will be distributed.
The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be
produced, and on competition, among producers who will manufacture it.24
Tested against the foregoing legal yardsticks, it becomes readily apparent that the
reasons relied upon by the appellate court in rejecting petitioners application to set up a
gasoline service station becomes tenuous. This is especially clear in the face of such recent
developments in the oil industry, in relation to controlling case law on the matter recently
promulgated to address the legal issues spawned by these events. In other words, recent
developments in the oil industry as well as legislative enactments and jurisprudential
pronouncements have overtaken and rendered stale the view espoused by the appellate
court in denying Shells application to put up the gasoline station.
In reversing the ERB, the Court of Appeals first avers in sum that there is no substantial
evidence to support ERBs finding of public necessity to warrant approval of Shells
application.
The Court disagrees.
On the contrary, the record discloses that the ERB Decision approving Shells
application in ERB Case No. 89-57 was based on hard economic data on developmental
projects, residential subdivision listings, population count, public conveyances,
commercial establishments, traffic count, fuel demand, growth of private cars, public utility
vehicles and commercial vehicles, etc.,25 rather than empirical evidence to support its
conclusions. In approving Shells application, the ERB made the following factual findings
and, on the basis thereof, justified its ruling thus:
In evaluating the merits of the application, the first question that comes to mind is whether
there is indeed an increase in market potential from the time this very same application was
disapproved by the then Bureau of Energy Utilization up to the present time that would warrant a
reversal of the former decision. The history of this case serves to justify applicant Shells position
on the matter. After a little over a year from vigorously opposing the original application, Caltex
and Petron filed their respective applications to construct their own service station within the same
vicinity.
The figures in the applicants feasibility study projects a scenario of growth well up to the year
1994. Where the applicant listed only thirty-five commercial establishments, oppositor is servicing
sixty-five. The development of subdivisions along the area provides for a buffer of market potential
that could readily be tapped by the applicant service.
Although the applicants witness could have done better in accentuating this fact, the oppositor
did not do well either in downplaying the potentials of the area. The main gist of PDSCs contention
is premised on the rising overhead cost of (increase in salaries and rent) in relation to the
establishment of new competition. The proposed station expects to target a total volume of 460,151
liters per month with a projected increase of 2.6% per annum and presumably expects to make a
corresponding profit thereof. Oppositor PDSC, on the other hand, with its lone Caltex Service
Station, expects to suffer income loss even with a projected volume of 600,000 to 800,000 liters
per month (Exhibit 5).
Considering this premise, it should be noted that the Board is tasked to protect existing
petroleum stations from ruinous competition and not to protect existing establishments from its
own ghost. The Board does not exist for the benefit of any individual station but for the interest of
the public and the industry as a whole.
In its first application, the applicants projection was to realize only 255,000 liters per month
or some 20 percent of the total potential demand. With its amended application, the 460,151 liters
it hopes to realize is almost twice the former volume representing a smaller percentage of the
present overall potential demand.
With further growth and development of the businesses in the area, the fuel potential will
tremendously increase and the presence of strategically located service stations will greatly benefit
the local community as well as the transient motoring public.
The Board believes that the construction and operation of the Shell Station will not lead to
ruinous competition since [the] additional retail outlet is necessary.
Time and again this Court has ruled that in reviewing administrative decisions, the
findings of fact made therein must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; that it is not for the reviewing court
to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of
evidence; that the administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can
only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.26 Petitioner
ERB is in a better position to resolve petitioner Shells application, being primarily the
agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether
the building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading area would benefit public interest and
the oil industry lies with the ERB not the appellate courts.
In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest
level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and
substantial evidence, in that order.27 A litany of cases has consistently held that substantial
evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact. 28 It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.29
Suffice it to state in this regard that the factual landscape, measured within the context
of such an evidentiary matrix, is strewn with well-nigh overwhelming proof of the
necessity to build such a gasoline retail outlet in the vicinity subject of the application.
In denying Shells application, the Court of Appeals next pointed to the alleged
staleness of Shells feasibility study because it was submitted in evidence about two (2)
years after it was prepared in early 1988.30
Again, this Court is not persuaded.
The record shows that the feasibility study31 is accompanied by the following data,
namely: 1.] Annual Projection of Estimated Fuel Demand, Base Area; 2.] Projected
Volume of the Proposed Shell Station; 3.] Projected Fuel Volume Derived From Base
Area; 4.] Estimated Fuel Demand Base Projection 1993; 5.] Estimated Fuel Demand Base
Projection 1994; 6.] Annual Projection of Population; 7.] Annual Projection Growth of
Private Cars in the Area; 8.] Annual Projection Growth of Public Utilities in the Area; and
9] Annual Projected Growth of Commercial Vehicles in the Area32 projects a market
scenario from 1989 to 1994.
While the Court of Appeals was initially unconvinced that Shells feasibility study was
up-to-date and proceeded to render the assailed judgment, its attention was subsequently
called, in Shells motion for reconsideration, to the ERBs Decision dated June 19, 1992 33
approving a similar application by Caltex to build a gasoline retail outlet in the same
vicinity. Said decision was appealed by PDSC to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No.
29099), and was affirmed by the latter in a Decision dated May 14, 1993. 34 The Decision
in Caltexs application, where PDSC was the lone oppositor, was challenged before the
appellate court on the very same grounds it proffered in opposing Shells application.35 In
rejecting PDSCs contentions in CA-G.R. SP No. 29099, the Court of Appeals Sixteenth
Division ruled:
As to the first ground
xxx xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner had assumed that the entire Sucat Road (starting from as far away as its
intersection with the South Expressway going towards Alabang and further South), Quirino
Avenue, Domestic Road (which passes in front of the Domestic Terminal), MIA Road, and Ninoy
Aquino Avenue, constitute what it refers to as the trading area. Thus, the herein petitioner invites
attention to the fact that in Sucat Road there are five existing gasoline stations; two along Quirino
Avenue (from Sucat Road); four along Domestic Road; and two along MIA Road, one of which is
the Caltex-Nayong Pilipino station at the corner of MIA Road and Benigno Aquino Avenue. Except
for the gas station at one end of Benigno Aquino Avenue (located in front of the Nayong Filipino),
the petitioner admits that there has been as yet no gasoline station existing along the entire
stretch of the said Benigno Aquino Avenue, although the ERB had recently approved Shells
application to put up one therein.
This court is of the view that the aforementioned assumption adopted by petitioner is fallacious
or incorrect considering the conclusion of ERBs Manuel Alvarez in his Ocular Inspection Report
and In-Depth Analysis of Feasibility Study that no outlet presently exists along the whole stretch
of the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (Rollo, p. 126) and that the outlets along Sucat Road are far from
the proposed site, a distant several kilometers away along Dr. A. Santos Avenue in Sucat
which can already be considered a different trading area (ibid., - underscoring supplied)
Assuming in gratia argumenti that the entirety of the above-specified road/avenues may be
considered as a single trading area, the petitioner had failed to show why Caltexs 9.7% share of
the total market potential, as found in Alvarezs Market Study, is not attainable or that it
would result in ruinous competition. As pointed by the respondents (citing MD Transit & Taxi
Co., Inc. v. Pepito, 6 SCRA 140 and Raymundo Trans. Co. v. Cervo, 91 Phil. 313), even if a new
station would bring about a decline in the sales of the existing outlets, it need not necessarily
result in ruinous competition, absent adequate proof to that effect.
As to the second and third grounds
Concerning the averment that the evidence of Caltex is stale, this Court notes that the said
evidence refers principally to a revalidation study conducted by ERBs Alvarez who undertook an
ocular inspection of the proposed site on November 23 to 27, 1987. The hearings of the instant case
continued up to early 1992 (ERB Decision, p. 4). The Decision was rendered on June 19, 1992
(Rollo, p. 36). It may be conceded that substantial time had elapsed since the time of the
aforementioned revalidation study. However, it is this courts view that unless the petitioner is
able to prove by competent evidence that significant changes have occurred sufficient to
invalidate the afore-stated study, the presumption is that the said study remains valid, as
found by the ERB in its decision. Bare and self-serving manifestations cannot be accepted by
Us as proof; especially if We take into account that hearings (as in the case at bar) would take
time and it would be quite absurd if what was once applicable and acceptable evidence would
be ipso facto rendered stale through mere lapse of time absent any controverting evidence.
Sound procedural policy requires that the burden of proof relative to the present invalidity
of the Alvarez report rests not with Caltex but on the herein petitioner.
The petitioner had attempted to make comparisons between the figures specified in the 1987
study and those of the Bureau of Energy Utilization or BEU (which were given earlier in 1986).
Thus, the petitioner points out that while the BEUs decision indicated that 9,034 cars on the average
passed by going in both directions along Ninoy Aquino Avenue, the Alvarez revalidation study
gave an average car traffic of only 8,395 resulting in a decline of 639 cars. The petitioner, however,
conveniently ignored or failed to note that the 9,034 figure was that given by applicant Shell and
not be the government agency itself. The BEU refers to the said figure as the applicants estimated
potential demand. It is natural to expect that an applicant would try to give up as high an estimated
potential demand as possible to support its application.
The contention of the petitioner that the Alvarez study/report is hearsay on the ground inter
alia that Alvarez was not presented as a witness deserves scant consideration by this Court. In the
first place, the ERB is not bound by technical rules of procedure as contained in the Rules of Court,
the latter being made applicable to ERB only in a suppletory character (Rule 16 of the Rules of
Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB). More importantly, Section 2,
paragraph 2 and Section 7, paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned ERB Rules provides as follows:
The Board may, in the disposition of cases, before it, take judicial notice of any data
or information existing in its judicial records, that may be relevant, pertinent or material
to the issues involved, x x x x
The Board may also, on its own initiative or upon a motion of a party, conduct such
investigation or studies on any matter pertinent, related or material to the issues involved
in a case the results of which may be sued by the Board as bases for the proper evaluation
of the said issues. (Rollo, pp. 205-207 underscoring supplied)
The petitioner asserts that the island divider along Benigno Aquino Avenue in front of
the proposed site was not taken into consideration in the 1987 survey. It could not be denied
that the construction of such divider could have an effect on the matter of potential demand.
Neither can it be denied however that the gas station that would be affected would be Caltex
itself. It is not alleged that there exists a divider along the whole of Sucat Road for example.
Hence, the existing outlets have no reason to complain about the divider.
The contention that when construction is completed (connecting Sucat Road to the
coastal road), a good number of vehicles would pass through the coastal road instead of
along Benigno Aquino [Avenue] appears to Us as speculative. There is no need for the
petitioner, which it failed to do, to show qualitatively and convincingly that the effect
would be such as to make the sales level go down to such an extent that the viability of the
existing outlets would be seriously endangered or threatened.
The foregoing pronouncement of the Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division is more in
keeping with the policy of the State and the rationale of the statutes enacted to govern the
industry.
In denying Shells application, the Court of Appeals finally states that the proposed
service station would cause ruinous competition to respondent PDSCs outlet in the subject
vicinity.
We remain unconvinced.
It must be pointed out that in determining the allowance or disallowance of an
application for the construction of a service station, the appellate court confined the factors
thereof within the rigid standards governing public utilility regulation, where exclusivity,
upon the satisfaction of certain requirements, is allowed. However, exclusivity is more the
exception rather than the rule in the gasoline service station business. Thus, Rule V, Section
1, of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Establishment, Construction, Operation,
Remodelling and/or Refurbishing of Petroleum Products Retail Outlets issued by the Oil
Industry Commission,36 and adopted by the ERB, enumerates the following factors
determining the allowance or disallowance of an application for outlet construction, to wit:
(a). The operation of the proposed petroleum products retail outlet will promote public
interest in a proper and suitable manner considering the need and convenience of the end-users.
 (b) Reasonable expectation of a commercially viable operation.
(c) The establishment and operation thereof will not result in a monopoly, combination in
restraint of trade and ruinous competition.
(d) The requirements of public safety and sanitation are properly observed.
(e) Generally, the establishment and operation thereof will help promote and achieve the
purposes of Republic Act No. 6173.37
While it is probable that the operation of the proposed Shell outlet may, to a certain
extent, affect PDSCs business, private respondent nevertheless failed to show that its
business would not have sufficient profit to have a fair return of its investment. The mere
possibility of reduction in the earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove ruinous
competition.38 Indeed
In order that the opposition based on ruinous competition may prosper, it must be shown that
the opponent would be deprived of fair profits on the capital invested in its business. The mere
possibility of reduction in the earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove ruinous
competition. It must be shown that the business would not have sufficient gains to pay a fair
rate of interest on its capital investment.39 Mere allegations by the oppositor that its business
would be ruined by the establishment of the ice plants proposed by the applicants are not sufficient
to warrant this Court to revoke the order of the Public Service Commission.40
It would not be remiss to point out that Caltex, PDSCs principal, whose products are
being retailed by private respondent in the service outlet it operates along the
MIA/Domestic Road in Pasay City, never filed any opposition to Shells application. All
told, a climate of fear and pessimism generated by unsubstantiated claims of ruinous
competition already rejected in the past should not be made to retard free competition,
consistently with legislative policy of deregulating and liberalizing the oil industry to
ensure a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous
supply, environmentally clean and high-quality petroleum products.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the challenged Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 8, 1993, as well as the subsequent Resolution dated April 6, 1994,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 27661, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one rendered
REINSTATING the Order dated September 17, 1991 of the Energy Regulatory Board in
ERB Case No. 89-57, granting the amended application of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation to relocate its service station to Benigno Aquino Jr., Avenue, Paranaque,
Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

1
G.R. No. 114923 Rollo, pp. 37-46.
22
Ibid., pp. 48-50.
3
G.R. No. 113079 Rollo, p. 75.
4
Ibid., p. 21.
5
Garcia v. Corona, 321 SCRA 218 [1999], Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Quisumbing, p. 263.
6
NPC v. CA, 279 SCRA 506 [1997].
7
Garcia v. Corona, supra, pp. 229, 231.
8
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 293 SCRA 440 [1998]
9
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 552 [1996], citing Ysmael, Jr. & Co. v. Deputy
Executive Secretary, 190 SCRA 673 [1990].
10
Nestle, Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 504 [1991], citing In re Allen, 2 Phil. 630 [1903].
11
Ibid., pp. 510-511.
12
29 SCRA 617 [1969].
13
Lim Hoa Ting v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 104 Phil. 573 [1958], citing Erwin N. Griswold of Harvard
Law School.
14
Divinagracia, Jr. v. Sto. Tomas, 244 SCRA 595 [1995].
15
Melendres, Jr. v. Comelec, 319 SCRA 262 [1999], citing Leveriza v. IAC, 153 SCRA 282 [1988].
16
Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425 [1992], citing Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. SSS, 114
Phil. 555 [1962].
17
Ibid., citing Sagun v. PHHC, 162 SCRA 411 [1988].
18
R.A. No. 7638 has since transferred the non-price regulatory jurisdiction, powers and functions of the ERB
to the Department of Energy.
19
Garcia v. Corona, supra; See Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Panganiban.
20
Ibid.
21
American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781; 90 L Ed. 1575.
22
R.A. No. 7638.
23
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 [1997].
24
Id., p. 358, citing Gellhorn, Anti Trust Law and Economics in a Nutshell, 1986 ed. p. 45.
25
G.R. No. 114923 Rollo, pp. 122-147.
26
Lo v. CA, G.R. No. 128667, 17 December 1999, 321 SCRA 190, citing Timbancaya v. Vicente, 9 SCRA
854 [1963]; Itogon-Suyoc Mines v. Office of the President, 270 SCRA 63 [1997].
27
Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, 215 SCRA 808 [1992].
28
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation v. Factoran, 154 SCRA 49 [1987]; Naval v.
Panday, 321 SCRA 290 [1999], citing Lachica v. Flordeliza, 254 SCRA 278 [1996], citing Santos v. CA, 229
SCRA 524 [1994]; Trans-Asia, Phils. Employees Association v. NLRC, 320 SCRA 547 [1999]; Benguet
Corporation v. NLRC, 318 SCRA 106 [1999]; Phil. Veterans Bank v. NLRC, 317 SCRA 510 [1999];
Consolidated Food Corp. v. NLRC, 315 SCRA 129 [1999]; GSIS v. Gabriel, 308 SCRA 705 [1999]; Pimentel
v. CA, 307 SCRA 38 [1999].
29
Gonzales v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 169 [1999], citing Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]; Audion Electric
Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 308 SCRA 340 [1999]; Association of Independent Unions in the Phils. v. NLRC, 305
SCRA 219 [1999].
30
CA Decision, p. 5, par. 4.
31
G.R. No. 114923 Rollo, pp. 122-124.
32
Ibid., pp. 125-147 passim.
33
Id., pp. 253-259.
34
Id., pp. 244-252.
35
Id., p. 247.
36
Id., pp. 260-266.
37
Id., p. 263.
38
Meralco v. Pasay Transportation Co., 66 Phil. 36 [1938].
39
Ibid.
40
Ice and Cold Storage v. Valero, 85 Phil. 10 [1949], citing Santos Vda. de Pilares v. Arranze, G.R. No.
45462, 28 July 1938.