Deadly Symbols, Vibrant Electoral Politics and War-Crimes in Sri Lanka 07272010
Deadly Symbols, Vibrant Electoral Politics and War-Crimes in Sri Lanka 07272010
Deadly Symbols, Vibrant Electoral Politics and War-Crimes in Sri Lanka 07272010
A.R.M. Imtiyaz*
[Abstract: Symbols are emotional and they play significant role in all aspect of human communities,
including electoral politics. Symbols are deadly in nature because they can provoke deadly violence and
war crimes. In Sri Lanka, Sinhala politician and elites often resort to symbols in order to win political
power. This study examines the interaction between Buddhist ethnic symbols and politics in Sri Lanka.
This paper examines the process of politicization of Buddhist symbols, and the use of symbols in the
general elections in 1956 that brought the Sinhala exclusivists to the power establishment of Sri Lanka and
the sixth Presidential elections in 2010. This paper, also briefly discusses the war crimes allegedly by
[The article appeared in the IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol IV, No. 3,
July 2010. The issue of the journal in which it appears online,
http://www.iupindia.in/International_Relations.asp]
*
Dr. A.R.M. Imtiyaz, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Temple University, USA. He can be reached
at [email protected]
1
Some Remarks on the Sinhala-Buddhist Religio-Political
Although Buddhist monks have enjoyed a prominent position with the society for long
time and that the state policies were being eschewed towards Buddhism from the early
days of independent Sri Lanka, political parties solely based on religious identity is a
including the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP).1 To
date, two major political parties can be exclusively categorized as political parties that
employ Sinhala-Buddhist concerns and demands for electoral gains. They are: the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). However, the UNP and
the SLFP often use Sinhala symbols to outbid their opponents and to win power.
These political parties share common goals: to uphold Buddhism and establish a link
between the state and religion, and to advocate a violent solution to the Tamil national
question. The JHU and JVP are the key parties in this regard.2The former was founded in
The JVP, which mounted two failed rebellions against the Sri Lanka state in 1971
and 1987-89 in which an estimated 50,000 people were killed, still claims that it is
Marxist party, but its policies and actions contradict its claim and suggest that it
2
Sinhalese. However, the general elections in April 2010 for the national legislature
suggest that the JVP has become increasingly unpopular among the Sinhala masses. Mr.
Rajapaksa’s aggressive strategies to take advantage of the war victory against the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and his effective use of Sinhala chauvinism
could have contributed to the lose of the Sinhala votes for the JVP.
The JVP dynamically supported the war against the LTTE and all form of
political and military concessions to the LTTE, and thus it opposed the implementation of
the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE, the separatist Tamil Organization
commonly referred to as Tamil Tiger, established in May 1976 and defeated in May
2009). The JVP also violently rejected the Tsunami Joint Mechanism (JM) otherwise
The fact is that the JVP’s pro-war and anti-devolutions positions (modern deadly
Sinhala symbols) helped increased the sympathies for the JVP and to challenge the UNP
and the SLFP in electoral politics. The JVP, due to the existing proportional
representative electoral system (PR) and its electoral alliance with the SLFP, has grown
The JVP had suffered an internal conflict in April 2008, between Wimal
Weerawansa, who resort to extreme form of pro-Sinhala-Buddhist policies and the party
leadership.5Wimal Weerawansa suspended from all party activities from March 21, 2008,
and he formed the Jathika Nidahas Peramuna (JNP).6 The JNP began its activities on
May 14, 2008 and vowed to seek an altenative to main political parties the UNP and
3
SLFP. It rejects a political solution to the Tamil nation question and supported the
The JHU was founded by Buddhist monks to promote the interests of the Sinhala-
Buddhists and to make Buddhism a guiding principal of state affairs, as well as to wipe
out Tamil violence by force. The JHU shuns non-violence as a means to seek political
alternatives for the Tamil national question, and has been urging young Sinhala-
Buddhists to sign up for the army.8 As a result, “as many as 30,000 Sinhalese young men
The JHU in its first parliamentary elections held on April 2, 2004 won 9 seats out
of 225, or 6% of popular vote. The JHU on July 21, 2004 submitted a bill in Parliament
seeking to outlaw religious conversions based on offers of cash or other incentives.10 The
legislation which won the blessing of the government in Sri Lanka raised profound
concerns especially among Christians, a small minority of the population. 11 In 2005, Mr.
The emotional symbolic agendas of the JHU and JVP, as well as the JNP favoring
Sinhalese interests, are the biggest hurdle for the government of Sri Lanka to seek
meaningful political initiatives to reform the state and its institutions as a means to
engage with a political solution that seeks an irrevocable autonomy beyond the current
unitary state structure. The government’s decision to abrogate the CFA on January 16,
2008 confirms the influence, exerted by these extremists, on the ruling Sinhala political
class.12
4
Elections in Sri Lanka and Religious Symbolism
The introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1931 laid the foundation for a party system
in Sri Lanka and has served as the point of departure of democratic practices.13 The
country has enjoyed uninterrupted democracy in the sense that the elections have been
held in regular intervals. Since independence, the UNP and the SLFP have dominated the
island’s political system. These parties basically represent a secular political position, but
Elite mobilization manipulating Buddhist symbols have been a major strategy for
the major political parties such as the UNP and the SLFP in Sri Lanka. These emotional
symbols such as the linguistic nationalism, 14 remembering ancient Buddhist heroes 15and
constricting fears have won elections for them and are likely to be the future strategy to
attract the Sinhalese who comprise 74 percent of the population and 70 percent of the
electorate. Though the major parties formulate policies to attract the Sinhalese, they still
offer cultural and trade concessions to the non-Sinhalese voters such as the Tamils and
the Muslims. The Sinhalese, however, think they are the Buddha’s chosen people, and
view the island of Sri Lanka as the Buddhist Promised land.16 Sri Lankan Tamils who
predominantly live in the North and East consider this area as their traditional homeland
and have been non-violently and violently have been fighting against the Sinhala
symbols for electoral gains.17 The regions where the Sinhalese are majority are, in
general, under developed and thus the majority portion of the Sinhalese in the South and
people who live in the region, particularly the economically weaker section of the
5
Sinhalese become ardent audience of the Sinhalese politicians who use and manipulate
Almost all elections in Sri Lanka, between 1948 (parliamentary election) and
2010 (both Presidential and general election), have made use of religio-ethnic symbols.
Although symbolic slogans were not clearly associated with the agendas of politicians to
win the very first general elections, the ruling UNP elites enacted the Citizenship Act of
1948 and the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949 to deprive Indian
Tamils of Sri Lanka of voting rights soon after the party came to power. These two bills
decitizenised thousands of Plantation Tamils.18 The bills fragmented the Tamil political
parties, for example, the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), the major ethnic party of
the Sri Lankan Tamils, supported the bills19, while Samuel James Velupillai
Chelvanayakam, one of the chief lieutenants of the ACTC, and a Christian Tamil from
the Jaffna peninsula split from the party and formed the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi
(ITAK, literally, ‘Ceylon Tamil State Party’ commonly known as the Tamil Federal Party,
FP).20
The Sri Lankan Tamils considered that this act was ethnically motivated and
directly contrary to the British- introduced constitution21 that gave special protection
under clause 29(2) to minorities.22 Tamil nationalists have argued “the Act was inspired
by Adolph Hitler’s Nuremberg Laws of September 15, 1935, which provided: A Jew
At this time, the ACBC,24 lobbied for stern measures to protect and promote the
interests of the Buddhists and Buddhism. The ACBC also demanded a Commission of
Inquiry to “report on the state of Buddhism.”25 However, the UNP government led by
6
D.S. Senanayake resisted growing demands for special concessions to Buddhists.26 It is
important to point out that the Senanayake administration’s decision to divorce the state
from the religion (Buddhism) goaded the Sinhala-Buddhist extremists, to revolt against
the leadership of the UNP, and S.W. R. D. Bandaranayake exploited the situation for his
political gains.
The symbolic politics based on ethnic outbidding first appeared in the early 1950’s with
the formation of the SLFP, the main opposition party to the UNP in 1952 practiced by
inconstant, visionary’ leader of Sri Lanka. The SLFP, the splinter group of the UNP lost
to the UNP in the 1952 general elections.27 The defeat inherently pushed the SLFP to
seek straightforward alternatives to win Sinhalese votes in the crucial 1956 general
nationalism to outbid his electoral enemies, particularly the liberal leaning ruling UNP. It
is also important to note that the SLFP customarily relied upon the socially and politically
influential groups including the Buddhist clergy or bhikkus, the Sangha28 to carry its
message to the Sinhalese villages where representative of the Sinhalese rural middle class,
such as village teachers, indigenous physicians, and petty landowners play a major role in
believed Tamils enjoyed privileged positions and benefits under the British colonial
sentiments, which promised to safeguard the interests of the Buddhists and offered
egalitarian social reforms such as the introduction of the Sinhala-Only official language
7
policy, land reform measures and subsidized agricultural policies and social reforms to
institutionalize equity for the rural sector. The significant point is that Bandaranayke
vigorously attempted to prove that he was the only voice of the oppressed Sinhalese who
would lose their rights and centuries-old Buddhist traditions if the UNP were elected to
power. Thus, the SLFP found an easy passage to public office, and gave up
Bandaranayke’s early policy of language parity between Sinhala and Tamil. In fact,
Bandaranayke’s only aim was to exploit the social and cultural conditions of
To win the general elections of 1956, he formed an electoral alliance with the pro-
Sinhala nationalist parties. An election coalition called the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna
(MEP) or People’s United Front was formed between Bandaranayke’s SLFP, Philip
Party, and W. Dahanayaka’s newly formed Sinhala Bhasa Peramuna (SBP) or Sinhala
Language Front. The election coalition manifesto declared “Sinhala only within 24
hours” with “reasonable use of Tamil.” The newly formed, monks-only party, the Eksath
Bhikku Peramina (EBP) played a critical role in this election as a major political pressure
group. The EBP, fiercely anti-UNP, anti-West and anti-Catholic, presented a ten-point
agenda (the Dasa Panatha) to Bandaranayake, at a massive rally in Colombo. The ten-
point agenda included making Sinhala the only official language and giving Buddhism its
‘rightful’ place.29
in the villages of the South and West of the island, while his anti-West and anti-Catholic
groups largely concentrated on the urban areas of the South and West with pro-Buddhism
8
voices. One of the EBP’s slogans was “A vote for the UNP is a vote for the Catholics; a
vote for the MEP is a vote for the Buddhists.”30 The EBP succeeded in organizing a
strong structure that would provide a militant basis for the purpose of attracting
The election results sent the message that Bandaranayke’s religio-ethnic symbolic
policies had swayed the Sinhalese, particularly the rural voters: the MEP polled 39.5% of
the votes and won 51 of the 95 seats in Parliament and hence formed the government.
The UNP, which campaigned on a secular platform, was decimated, gaining a mere eight
seats although it polled 27% of the votes. Leftist parties, both the Lanka Samasamaja
Party (LSSP) and Community Party (CP), opposed to the Sinhala-Only language agenda
Federal Party (FP), led by Tamil politician S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, won 10 seats, polling
5.4 % of the votes.31 The FP, the major Tamil moderate party, campaigned on the
federalist alternative for the territorially- based Tamils and attempted to win Tamil rights
to make Sinhala the only official language of Sri Lanka. The purpose of the legislation
was to terminate the English language influence in Sri Lanka. Due to the British language
policy, the English language had occupied a superior place in pre-independence Sri
Lanka. Minorities in Sri Lanka particularly ethnic Tamils and Christians enjoyed better
9
The bill was passed on the same day with the main opposition UNP voting with
the government and opposed by the Tamil parties (FP and ACTC) and leftist parties
The Tamils were riled because their language was not given the same official
language status as Sinhala, and they actively tendered their support to the FP’s non-
violence campaigns. The Sinhalese political leaders’ decision to introduce the Sinhala-
Only Act not only promoted religio-ethno-linguistic nationalism, on both sides of the
ethnic divide, but became a source of radical Tamil nationalism in the 1980s.
radically changed the shape of the island’s politics for years to come: the major Sinhala
sandwiching religious emotions and ethnic hostile politics as a way to garner popular
Sinhalese support.33 The LSSP, the major left party, is a case in point. The party which
used to claim that it fights for the oppressed marginalized segments of the society
demanded that the state provides special assurance to the Sinhalese people so that a
national unity can be forged.34 Notably, since then the UNP has changed its secular
policies and rhetoric to balance the Sinhala nationalists. The UNP’s support of the MEP’s
March 1960 and after the 1977 general elections, and its abrogation of the power-sharing
pact with the FP leader Selvanayagam in 1965,36 otherwise known as the Dudley-Selva
Pact, to allay the Sinhalese opposition, were a few demonstrations of the UNP’s radical
10
changes in adopting anti-Tamil outbidding strategies to challenge the SLFP and left
extremists, and encouraged Buddhist monks to play a more active role in state affairs and
lobby government to make Buddhism the national religion, and opposed political
with the FP to reduce Tamil fears. He took the constructive step of signing an agreement
Jayawardene, the opposition leader (later President of Sri Lanka) mobilized Sinhala-
safeguard their religion and language and promised that he would lead the campaign to
this effect.
religion.38 His efforts to seek a political compromise with the Tamils and his inability to
make Buddhism the state religion frustrated the Sinhala extremists who had tirelessly
worked for the election victory of Bandaranayake. All this effectively contributed to his
votes. Such use of symbols can polarize the society when moderate political forces use
symbols of a particular group to refuse political and social equality to the ethnic others.
11
Marginalized groups seek justice through their moderate politicians. When dominant
forces deny justice, given the fact that they were being filled with hatred by the
politicians of the majority people, it is likely extremists would dominated the politics of
the marginalized, and oftentimes extremists would lead a campaign for partition when
Sri Lanka’s post-1956 elections and social transformations effectively prove the
theoretical rational. The scholars on Buddhism and politics in Sri Lanka suggest the
politicians one of the major contributing factors for the rapid growth of Buddhist
extremism.
In 1966, the opposition parties, including the left opposed political autonomy to
elections, the SLFP had moved back to an anti-Tamil line, portraying the
provided a focus for such attacks, spurred by Buddhist monks. Some UNP
UNP leadership withdrew the bill… the party had not yet faced an election
with the Federal Party millstone around its neck and did not know how
much it weighed.”41
12
The general elections in 1970 brought the pressured the SLFP to form an alliance
with the leftists. The alliance also promised to replace the British introduced Constitution,
with its article 29(2) which sought to protect the rights of minorities to outbid the UNP.42
The SLFP allies who fought on the symbolic pro-Sinhala agenda recorded a massive win:
the SLFP won 91 out of 108 seats, while its key allies the LSSP and the CP won19 and 6
seats respectively. The UNP only secured 17 seats out of 130 it contested. And the Tamil
moderate party the FP which contested in the Tamil dominated Northeast on Tamil
The new government took some drastic measures to consolidate its power by
Constitution. Dr. de Silva who voiced equality and justice for all the Sri Lankans
“compromised his Trotskyite principles” to consolidate his party among the Sinhalese
patronage for Buddhism, which re-affirmed the pre-eminence of the Sinhalese language
in all aspects of public life and anti-Tamil education policies. Notably, the new
constitution removed the formal safeguards for minorities that had been incorporated into
the British Soulbury Constitution under article 29(2). Chapter II of the 1972 Constitution
read as follows:
“The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and
accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism
while assuring to all religions the right guaranteed by section 18 (1) (d).”
13
The UNP did not oppose the constitution. The major reason is that it did not want
youths whose chances to gain admission to the universities were marginalized due to the
positive discrimination.45
supremacy.”46 The SLFP led alliance deep desire to Sinhalacize the island provided a
sense of identity triumph to the Sinhalese over the Tamil nation, and thus pushed the
Sinhala masses to demand more from the government to help their material needs.
However, the government that stimulated the Sinhalese symbols did not succeed to fill
their materials needs. The country had to face severe economic difficulties due wrong
During this period, the LTTE emerged as the major Tamil polity entity. The
irrevocable political autonomy, the decisive political will to politicize the state and its
institutions with Buddhism and Sinhala interest through constitutional provisions, were
some of the key factors that gave birth to the LTTE, which adopted violence, to seek a
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, the rapid politicization of the Tamil
nation and the Tamil struggle to win a separate state strappingly encouraged the Sinhala
14
politicians to increase the influence of Sinhala-Buddhist extremism. The growth of the
By 2004, the island of Sri Lanka witnessed vigorous Bhikku politics to win power.
The JHU, monks only party, formed in February 2004, provided political vehicle to
mobilize the Sinhala masses. In April 2004 general elections, the JHU won 6 seats out of
225 seats of national legislature. What election results suggest is that the JHU’s
systematic pro-war, anti-Tamil and anti-political solution campaign had attracted the
accommodation aimed at sharing power with the Tamil nation cunningly connected the
West with the Sri Lanka’s pathetic condition and opposed all form of political
involvement with the LTTE. In other words, the JHU, monk-only party, shun non-
violence.
understand the JHU’s sudden growth. This study argues that the growing popularity of
the LTTE among the Tamils, the South India’s interests in the island’s politics as well as
the West’s demand for a political solution to the Tamil question and to negotiate with the
On July 21, 2004, the JHU submitted Anti-conversion bill to Parliament. The
legislation has raised profound concerns especially among Christians, a small minority of
the population. The JHU believed that the bill was consistent with the Constitution which
15
guarantees Buddhism the foremost place and requires the State to protect and foster
Buddhism. Moreover, the Supreme Court has assured the President and the Speaker of
the House that the bill entitled “Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Act”
published in the Gazette of 28 May 2004 does not contravene the Constitution.48
A casual reading of Sri Lankan history suggests that the movement for anti-
policy that helped precipitate the country’s violent ethnic conflict and civil war.
“Buddhism-only” policy that has the potential to provoke a level of religious conflict akin
The JHU openly supported the war against the LTTE and recruited Sinhala youth
to join the Army to fight against the LTTE. On May 17, 2009 the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam, (LTTE), the major Tamil resistant movement, admitted defeat in the war
that was waged without any witness and vowed to silence guns against the Sinhala-
Buddhist state. In May 18, Sri Lanka security forces announced that the LTTE chief
Velupillai Prabhakaran, was killed by “Sri Lanka’s military in a firefight that signaled the
Human right groups expressed deep concerns about the use of heavy weapons
against the Tamil civilians. Human Right Watch in its report on Sri Lanka’s war against
the LTTE pointed that “the Sri Lankan armed forces have indiscriminately shelled
densely populated areas, including hospitals, in violation of the laws of war.”50 Evidence
gathered by the Times newspaper has revealed that at least 20,000 Tamil people were
16
The Presidential Elections in 2010
Sri Lanka’s Sixth Presidential elections held in January, 2010 provided a means to
reinforce the past tradition that linked the state with symbols. Politicization of Buddhism
and war victory against the LTTE were the key agendas of the ruling UPFA in a bid to
There were 22 candidates in the field. However, the major competitors of the
elections are incumbent Rajapaksa who came to power on November 17, 2005 on an anti-
peace and anti-Tamil agenda and Fonseka who was carefully recruited to the Sri Lanka’s
Army by the ruling Sinhala political establishment led by Rajapaksa to defeat the violent
Sinhala extremists and the traditional Marxist parties as well as some minority parties
while Fonseka portrays himself as a common candidate and contests the elections, using
the swan symbol. The major opposition parties, including the UNP and the JVP endorse
the candidacy of Fonseka. Also, Fonseka won the endorsements of the major parties,
representing the minorities such as the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the
Most importantly, Rajapaksa was able to secure support of the JHU, the party that
strongly supports the Sinhalization of the island, and want the unitary character of the Sri
17
Lankan state to be preserved. The JHU significantly contributed to the victory of
Rajapaksa in 2005.
For Rajapaksa, the major problem of the island is the LTTE, which successfully
challenged state terrorism since 1983. Rajapaksa successfully capitalized the war victory
to secure a second term to further fill his family and friends’ interests in the name of
Both Rajapaksa and Fonseka were able to win the support of the minority political
establishment. But the election polices and promises of these candidates did not
recognize the special problems of the Muslims, existence of the ethnic conflict between
the Tamils and the Sinhalese, or for that matter the Tamil national question.
Mr. Fonseka, for example, wants the people of Sri Lanka to believe him as an
agent for change. Also, he is assertively trying to represent himself as a human face of
Sinhala compassionism. It was reported in the media that Mr. Fonseka strongly believes
that Sri Lanka belongs to the Sinhalese. According to an interview in Canada’s National
Post newspaper in 2008, Mr. Fonseka said that “We being the majority of the country,
75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a
strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the
pretext of being a minority, demand undue things…In any democratic country the
majority should rule the country. This country will be ruled by the Sinhalese community
(57.88%). The latter was only able to win 4,173,185 or 40.15% of the votes.53 Mr.
18
Rajapakse who carefully employed Sinhala-Buddhist slogans and war victory over the
LTTE attracted massive sympathies from Sinhalese voters, members of Sri Lanka’s
Buddhist majority. Mr. Rajapakshe in his native Hambantota district “got 67% of the
vote. His triumph also extended to coastal areas, where General Fonseka, a member of
the Sinhalese fisher caste, had been expected to do well. In the general’s home town of
Ambalangoda Mr. Rajapaksa won with 63%. He also won in several strongholds of the
parties that backed his rival. In the southern towns of Galle and Matara, turf of the
Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, Mr Rajapaksa got 64% of the vote.”54 On the hand,
Mr. Fonseka won 76% of the vote. In other words, Mr. Fonseka won the majority of the
Tamil and Muslim votes. In Jaffna, for example, the crumbling northern capital of Sri
Lankan Tamils, who are 12% of the island’s 20m people, he won 64%.55 What the 2010
president election results suggest is that the country is deeply divided along ethnic lines,
and the minorities particularly the Tamil nation has less trust in the state and its
institutions.
The country has entered into a new phase. A new (the post war) phase would not
anyway promise peace in Sri Lanka nor would it take the island into a post-conflict
period. Sri Lanka, in the context of this study, poses some questions; will the demise of
the LTTE lead to the erosion of the rights of the non-Sinhala Buddhists in the island of
Sri Lanka? Will the collapse of violent resistant by the LTTE further strengthen the hands
of the Sinhala-Buddhist extremists who aspire to build Sinhalese only Sri Lanka? Or will
There are no hypothetical answers for these questions, but Sri Lanka’s past
behaviors and attitudes do not offer any optimistic answers to ease the concerns often
19
share by the ethnic and religious minorities. The point is that the commitments from the
UPFA leaders, both Kumaratunga and Rajapakshe, to Buddhism and safeguard the
interests of the Sinhala-Buddhists increasingly generate sense of deep anxieties and fears
among the minorities, particularly the Christians and Hindus. It also suggests that
Buddhism will continue to play a determined role in Sri Lanka’s polity, and that Sinhala
Concluding Remarks
This study argues that symbols are powerful, and they often motivate voters
against the ethnic others when they are being politicized. In electoral politics, as argued
above, symbols of groups become critically important due to its appeal to the nature of
electoral politics, which requires votes for its survival. Political choices of masses not
always associated with rational choices, and symbols often influence their choices.
In Sri Lanka, elections are heavily symbolized. Sri Lanka experiences prove that
the symbols win votes and thus politicians continuously use them to win and consolidate
power. But what is equally true is that the use of symbols or politicization of symbols of a
particular group gradually increases the sense of insecurity among the ethnic others who
became clear victim of politicization of symbols. In Sri Lanka, the Tamils, who became a
clear victim of politicization of symbols that paved the way for the introduction of the
deadly anti-Tamil policies such as the Sinhala-only language and ethnic education
standardization as well as state supported anti-Tamil ethnic pogroms, feel that they were
20
being marginalized by the Sinhala politicians to please the Sinhalese, and they will not
win justice from the Sinhala polity. Conversely, the Sinhala symbolism and nationalism
pressed the Tamils to adopt their own form of symbolism as a defensive strategy to
counter the threats of the Sinhala symbolism. Moreover, the Tamils’ distrust in the fair
deliver of state and its institutions persuaded some to embrace violence to exercise their
self-determination to build the separate state in the corner of the North and Eastern.
Sri Lanka experiences also prove that the use of symbolism for electoral politics
in deeply divided societies would hurt the progress of the country. The island of Sri
Lanka could have emerged as a model for successful democracy and economic growth if
there was ethnic harmony and unity among the masses. But such progressive end was not
gained mainly due to Sinhala elites’ misuse of primordial symbols for electoral gains.
conflict and instability when politicians resort to deadly symbols to win power in vibrant
democracy in deeply divided ethnic societies. The Sinhala political establishment needs
to understand this basic truth. The form of violent Tamil ethnic nationalism, led by the
LTTE, was inhumanely crushed, and threats by the LTTE had been marginalized. The
questions now are, will Sri Lanka win peace? Is ethnic reconciliation possible?
The global actors, including the West assumed that the regime led by Rajapakshe
would deliver peace. But it is plain fact that the regime in Colombo is not at any rate
interested in building peace, and in fact, it is difficult for the regime to commence
genuine peace when the Sinhala political elites had used the symbols in its war against
the Tamils. The political elite may think it can retract its symbolic promises once in
power. However, Sri Lanka’s past experiences suggests that politicians find it next to
21
impossible to backtrack on their divisive promises. And the same problem befalls their
successors.
Despite the fact that Sri Lanka is practicing illiberal democracy, it still maintains
some form of (unhealthy) relations with the democratic institutions. This may be a
positive and can be used to build viable mechanisms for power-sharing democracy as an
effective means to seek ethnic reconciliations between the different ethnic groups.
partition. Partition may not terminate tensions and violence, but it can eventually calm
the fears and concerns of conflicting groups and provide them much needed security in
the near future. “Experiences of Pakistan from India, Eritrea from Ethiopia, Bangladesh
from West Pakistan, and Greeks from Turks on Cyprus all show that partition can be
the recent experiences of Kosovo and the possible partition (in 2011) for the Christians in
the South Sudan further validate the case for partition when ethnic nations refuse to live
together.
It is a plain fact that the global actors energetically assisted the government of Sri
Lanka in its war which killed many thousands of Tamil people “than previously
estimated and targeted hospitals and humanitarian operations as part of their final
onslaught on the rebel Tamil Tigers” in the so-called “No-Fire Zone” due to government
fire.57 Tamils expect the same global forces should apply their leverage on the
government of Sri Lanka to initiate ethnic reconciliation. The starter may be the call for
the establishment of war crimes allegedly committed by the warring parties, both the
LTTE and the security forces. Special attention should be made on the war crimes of the
22
security forces for two reasons (a) the LTTE silenced its guns and its leaders either
brutally killed or security forces detained them undisclosed military location. Hence, war
crime charges against them would not any logical sense, but charges still can be made
against them as well for their role to kill fleeing Tamils and (b) Sri Lanka security and
war establishment is unbroken, and serious accusation related war crimes against the
For example, International Crisis Group documents the mass murders of the
Tamil civilians. It explains that the security forces killed “tens of thousands of Tamil
civilian men, women, children and the elderly …countless more wounded, and hundreds
of thousands deprived of adequate food and medical care, resulting in more deaths.”58 All
this qualifies the ruling Sinhala political establishment to face the UN (appointed war
tribunal). Further, it is the responsibility of the global actors to devote serious efforts to
bring those (particularly the members of the Sinhala political and military establishment)
who committed war crimes against the innocent civilians from 1983, and to urge the
It is not clear to what extent the developments of the past can help resolve the
basic issue at stake: whether, federalism or partition–as repeatedly asked by the Tamil
nationalists, Sinhala political elites would not seek beyond the failed 13th amendment.
Then again, one would have to be a considerable optimist to believe that the global
pressure will compel Sinhala ruling hard-line elites to change direction toward the Tamil
question.
23
1
List of political parties in Sri Lanka,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_Sri_Lanka, accessed on April 6,
2010.
Politics and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka. (Washington, DC: East West Center.
2007), 24-27.
3. “The JVP intensifies its campaign against Sri Lankan peace talks,”
9. Ibid.
10. Timothy Samuel Shah and A.R.M. Imtiyaz, “A Brief on Sri Lanka’s
www.lankaliberty.com/reports/Anti-ConversionLegislationBrief.doc.
11. Sarah Page, “Buddhist Mobs Attack Five Churches in Sri Lanka: Aggression
24
12. “Sri Lanka 'withdraws' from CFA,” BBC Online,
2008). A. R.M. Imtiyaz, “Theoretical understanding of the death of truce,” The Sunday
13. Robert N. Kearney, “The Political Party System in Sri Lanka,” Political
and Identity in Sri Lanka," in Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri
Lanka, eds Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R. de Silva. (Albany, New York: State
15. Josine van der Horst, ‘Who is He, What is He Doing’: Religious Rhetoric and
17. The ethnic composition of the east has undergone transformation both as a
result of natural factors and as a result of the conflict. The long civil war has created
many Internally Displaced Persons. There are also a considerable number of both Tamils
and Muslims who have migrated. The stated percentage as it is today going by the recent
survey done by the Department of Census and Statistics makes the Muslims a majority in
the Eastern region, the former stronghold of the Tamil Tigers where elections were held
18. A. Shastri, “Estate Tamils, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 and Sri Lankan
25
19. Sri Lankan Tamils who dominate the island in the North and east consider
they area nation of people due to their symbolic identities and do not identify with the
Indian Tamils who were brought to the island in the 19th century as an economic class.
See Elizabeth Nissan and R.L Stirrat, “The generation of communal identities,” in Sri
Lanka: History and the roots of Conflict, ed Jonathan Spencer. (London: Routledge.
1990), 38.
20. Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka: The Fractured Island. (New Delhi: Penguin
Books.1989).
21. V. Navaratnam, The Fall and Rise of the Tamil Nation. (Madras:
safeguard prohibiting the enactment of any law which would make persons of any
persons of any community or religion which were not conferred on persons of any
communities or religions. This provision, which became Section 29(2) of the Soulbury
23. Bruce Fein, “International Law, Human Rights will salute Tamil Statehood”,
early twentieth century. Among the most important of these was an organization of lay
26
Buddhists-the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, whose goal was totally dedicated to
25. K.M. De Silva, “Religion and the State,” in Sri Lanka: Problems of
Governance, ed K.M. De Silva. (New Delhi: Center for Policy Research. 1993), 316.
1966), 456-57.
27. Laksiri Jayasuriya, The Changing Face of Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka:
29. S.J Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?: Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri
32. The left parties realized that their pro-minority policies would alienate them
from the majority Sinhalese, who are demographically and electorally superior. And the
LSSP at its annual conference in June 1964 accepted “Sinhala-Only” and joined the
SLFP and other Sinhala chauvinistic groups’ demonstration to protest the Dudley-Selva
pact of 1965, a power-sharing accord signed by the then Premier Dudley Senanayake of
27
33. Kumari Jayewardene, Ethnic and Class Conflicts in Sri Lanka: Some Aspects
of Sinhala Buddhist Consciousness over the past 100 years. (Colombo, Dehiwala.: Center
35. The pact could have resolved the ethnic conflict in a way acceptable to both
the Tamils and the Sinhalese. The pact paved the way for the wide-ranging
North and East. This pact sought that Tamil Northern Province would constitute a single
regional authority, while the predominantly Tamil but demographically more complex
eastern province would be divided into two or more such units. However, all these units
would be free to amalgamate, if they so desired. Moreover, it was agreed that Parliament
would devolve all powers to the regional bodies on the following subjects-agriculture,
fisheries, housing and social services, electricity, irrigation schemes and roads. Most
important of all, the pact stipulated that Tamil should be used as the official language for
36. The new pact proposed a moderate degree of devolution of power through the
mechanism of district councils in the Tamil areas. It also underscored in the granting of
land under colonization schemes, the following priorities to be observed in the northern
and eastern provinces: (a) Land in the two provinces to be granted in the first instance to
28
resident in the northern and eastern provinces; and (c) thirdly, to other citizens of Sri
Lanka, preference being given to Tamil residents in the rest of the island
administration and devolution of powers to the Tamil areas of the north and east. It
proposed that a Tamil Northern Province would constitute a single regional authority,
while the predominantly Tamil but demographically more complex Eastern province
would be divided into two or more such units. However, all these units would be free
devolve all powers to the regional bodies on the following subjects - agriculture,
fisheries, housing and social services, electricity, irrigation schemes and roads.
38. Section 29 (2) (c) of the Soulbury constitution explicitly states that no law
religions.
39. Mapitigama Buddharakkita was the key figure behind the assassination of
Bandaranayeke who played the leading role in mobilizing the Bhikkhu against the UNP.
29
42. To prevent discriminatory laws being enacted, the British provided a
safeguard prohibiting the enactment of any law which would make persons of any
persons of any community or religion which were not conferred on persons of any
communities or religions. This provision, which became Section 29(2) of the Soulbury
47. Ibid,115.
30
52 National Post, September 23, 2008.
53
Department of Elections,
http://www.slelections.gov.lk/presidential2010/province.html, accessed on April 5, 2010.
54
Victory for the Tiger-slayer
31