Laforteza v. Machuca G.R. No. 137552 June 16, 2000 Facts

Laforteza v.
Machuca
G.R. No. 137552
June 16, 2000
FACTS:
On August 2, 1988, Lea Zulueta-Laforteza executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of

defendants Roberto Z. Laforteza and Gonzalo Z. Laforteza, Jr., appointing both as her Attorney-in-fact
authorizing them jointly to sell the subject house and lot property and sign any document for the
settlement of the estate of the late Francisco Q. Laforteza. Likewise on the same day, Michael Z.
Laforteza executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Roberto and Gonzalo Jr., likewise, granting
the same authority. Both agency instruments contained a provision that in any document or paper to
exercise authority granted, the signature of both attorneys-in-fact must be affixed. Dennis Laforteza also
executed Special Power of Attorneys on different dates.
In the exercise of the above authority, on January 20, 1989, the heirs of the late Francisco Q.
Laforteza represented by Roberto and Gonzalo entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (Contract to
Sell) with Alonzo Machuca over the subject property for the sum of Six Hundred Thirty Thousand Only
(P630,000.00) to be payable as stipulated: P30,000 upon signing the agreement and the remaining
P600,000 upon issuance of the new certificate of title in the name of the late Francisco Q. Laforteza and
upon execution of an extra-judicial settlement of the decedents estate with sale in favor of the plaintiff.
On June 20, 1989, the defendant was able to pay P30,000 as stipulated in the agreement. On September
18, 1989, defendants sent letter informing the defendant his obligation to pay the remaining balance to be
due after thirty (30) days, and the reconstituted title, which the defendant received on the same date, of
which on October 18, 1983, asked for an extension until November 15, 1989. Roberto, assisted by a
lawyer, was the one who affirmed said request, but not Gonzalo.
On November 20, 1989, defendant informed the heirs that Roberto had the payment for the
balance, but said heirs refused to accept said payment. Roberto declared the property not for sale for
failure to comply with the contractual obligations, and the agreement rescinded by the plaintiff-heirs.
Defendant insisted tender of payment but when the defendants refused to accept such, an action for
specific performance was filed in court. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant. When the
petitioner-heirs appealed this to the Court of Appeals, the decision was rendered against them. So, an
appeal to the Supreme Court was made.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rescission of the agreement for failure by the private respondent to fulfill his
obligations was validly done.
HELD:
No. The rescission of the agreement was invalid.

The issuance of the new certificate of title in the name of the late Francisco Laforteza and the
execution of an extrajudicial settlement of his estate was not a condition which determined the perfection
of the contract of sale. Petitioners contention that since the condition was not met, they no longer had an
obligation to proceed with the sale of the house and lot is unconvincing. The petitioners fail to
distinguish between a condition imposed upon the perfection of the contract and a condition imposed on
the performance of an obligation. Failure to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a
contract, while the failure to comply with the second condition only gives the other party the option either
to refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition. Thus, Art. 1545 of the Civil Code states:
"Art. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is
not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the
condition. If the other party has promised that the condition should happen or be performed, such first
mentioned party may also treat the non-performance of the condition as a breach of warranty. Where the
ownership in the things has not passed, the buyer may treat the fulfillment by the seller of his obligation
to deliver the same as described and as warranted expressly or by implication in the contract of sale as a
condition of the obligation of the buyer to perform his promise to accept and pay for the thing."
In the case at bar, there was already a perfected contract. The condition was imposed only on the
performance of the obligations contained therein. Considering however that the title was eventually
"reconstituted" and that the petitioners admit their ability to execute the extrajudicial settlement of their
fathers estate, the respondent had a right to demand fulfillment of the petitioners obligation to deliver
and transfer ownership of the house and lot.
The Supreme Court did not subscribe to the petitioners view that the Memorandum Agreement
was a contract to sell. There is nothing contained in the MOA from which it can reasonably be deduced
that the parties intended to enter into a contract to sell, i.e. one whereby the prospective seller would
explicitly reserve the transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as
yet agree or consent to transfer ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell until the full
payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not
considered a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event which prevented the obligation from acquiring
any obligatory force.
There is clearly no express reservation of title made by the petitioners over the property, or any
provision which would impose non-payment of the price as a condition for the contracts entering into
force. Although the memorandum agreement was also denominated as a "Contract to Sell", it held that
the parties contemplated a contract of sale. A deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated a
conditional sale in the absence of a stipulation reserving title in the petitioners until full payment of the
purchase price. In such cases, ownership of the thing sold passes to the vendee upon actual or
constructive delivery thereof. The mere fact that the obligation of the respondent to pay the balance of
the purchase price was made subject to the condition that the petitioners first deliver the reconstituted title
of the house and lot does not make the contract a contract to sell for such condition is not inconsistent
with a contract of sale.
The property in dispute, being an immovable property, is governed by Article 1592 of the NCC,
which needs the judicial or notarial act for its rescission. It is not disputed that the petitioners did not
make a judicial or notarial demand for rescission. The November 20, 1989 letter of the petitioners
informing the respondent of the automatic rescission of the agreement did not amount to a demand for
rescission, as it was not notarized. It was also made five days after the respondents attempt to make the
payment of the purchase price. This offer to pay prior to the demand for rescission is sufficient to defeat
the petitioners right under article 1592 of the Civil Code.
Besides, the Memorandum Agreement between the parties did not contain a clause expressly
authorizing the automatic cancellation of the contract without court intervention in the event that the
terms thereof were violated. A seller cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially rescind a contract of sale
where there is no express stipulation authorizing him to extrajudicially rescind. Neither was there a
judicial demand for the rescission thereof.
Thus, when the respondent filed his complaint for specific performance, the agreement was still
in force inasmuch as the contract was not yet rescinded.
At any rate, considering that the six-month period was merely an approximation of the time it
would take to reconstitute the lost title and was not a condition imposed on the perfection of the contract
and considering further that the delay in payment was only thirty days which was caused by the
respondents justified but mistaken belief that an extension to pay was granted to him, the Court agreed
with the CAs ruling that the delay of one month in payment was a mere casual breach that would not
entitle the respondents to rescind the contract. RESCISSION of a contract will not be permitted for a
slight or casual breach, but only such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object
of the parties in making the agreement.

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Laforteza v.

On August 2, 1988, Lea Zulueta-Laforteza executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of

No. The rescission of the agreement was invalid.

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