Gersh, Stephen Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition, 2 Vols

SELECTED WORKS BY STEPHEN GERSH
Kinesis Akinetos. A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy

of Proclus (Philosophia Antiqua XXVI), Leiden: E. J. Brill 1973.
From lamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the

Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition
(Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mit-
telalterlichen Philosophic VIII). Leiden: E. J. Brill 1978.
'Omnipresence in Eriugena. Some Reflections on Augustino-

Maximian Elements in Periphyseon , Eriugena. Studien zu
seinen Que/len. Herausgegeben von Werner Beierwaltes,
Heidelberg: Carl Winter 1980, pp. 55-74.
'Platonism - Neoplatonism - Aristotelianism. A Twelfth-

Century Metaphysical System and its Sources', Renaissance and
Renewal in the Twelfth Century. Edited by Robert L. Benson
and Giles Constable, Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard Univer-
sity Press 1982, pp. 512-534.

PUBLICATIONS IN MEDIEVAL STLIDIES
THE MEDIEVALINSTITlJTE
l':';IIVERSJTY OF NOTRE DAME
EDITED BY
RALPH MciNERNY
.I St'rie., Fmmded by P/Jilip S. Moore, C. S.C. t. .fosepb N. G'artin, C. S.C. t.

and A. L. Gabriel
----------XXIII/I----------
STEPHEN GERSH
MIDDLE PLATONISM AND

NEOPLATONISM
THE LATIN TRADITION
VOLUME I
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS

NOTRE DAME, INDIANA 1986
Contents
Preface xix
Introduction i. Mediaeval Platonism
ii. Greek Platonism 26
PART I. I Middle Platonism: The Platonists

and the Stoics 51
Chapter 1 CICERO 53
1.1 Introduction 53
I. I I Philo of Larissa and the New Academy 55
1. 12 Cicero's Skepticism 58
1.13 Antiochus of Ascalon and the Old Academy 63
1. I .:j Cicero's Platonism 67
I. IS Stoic Tendencies 71
1.16 Greek and Latin Philosophy 73
1.17 The Division of Philosophy 74
1.18 The Themes of Philosophy 77
ix
CONTENTS
1.2 Ethics 79
1.21 The Argument of De Republica III 80
1.22 The Argument of De Legibus I 84
1.23 The Argument of De Legibus II 87
1.31 Cicero's Theology 90
1.311 The Nature of God 93
1.312 The Transcendence and Immanence of God 94
1.313 The Relation of Macrocosm to Microcosm 99
1.32 Cicero's Philosophy of Nature 101
1.321 Antioch us at Academica 24 101
1.322 Antiochus at Academica 26-27 107
1.323 Antioch us at Academica 28 110
1.324 The Question of Incorporeality 116
1.33 Cicero's Psychology 119
1.331 The Knowledge of the Soul 122
+t.332 The Transcendent Soul 125

X
CONTENTS
-r 1.33.3 The Immanent Soul 129
~. ... Logic 131
1.41 The Innate Standard of Knowledge 132
1.42 Antiochus on Sense and Mind 139
1.43 The Theory of Forms 145
Chapter 2 SENECA 155
.2. 1 Introduction 155
2. 11 Seneca's Stoicism 159
.2.12 The Themes of Philosophy 163
.2.21 Theology 165
.2 . .21 1 The Transcendence and Immanence of God 168
.2.212 Transcendence and Incorporeality 170
.2.213 Immanence and Polytheism 174
.2.22 Philosophy of Nature 176
.2.3 Seneca's Eclecticism 180
xi
CO:'IITENTS
2.31 The Argument of Epistu/a ad Luci/ium 58 I HI
2 . .32 The Argument of Epistu/a ad Lucilium 65 188
2.33 Conclusions 194
PART I. 2 Middle Platonism: The Platonists

and the Doxographers 197
Chapter 3 GELLIUS 199
3. I Introduction 199
3.11 Gellius and Philosophy 200
3.2 Platonism in the Noctes Atticae 207
3.21 The References to Plato 207
3.22 Direct and Indirect Platonism 210
3.23 The Influence of Taurus and Favorinus 211
Chapter -1 APULEIUS 215
4.1 Introduction 215
4.11 Apuldus' Works 217
4.12 Apuleius Sources 220
xii
C< >NTE:'IITS
'
-l.-
., The Triadic System 227
4.21 Gods, Demons, Men 228
4.22 God, Invisible Gods, Visible Gods 231
.!.2~ Disembodied. Semi-Embodied, Embodied

Demons 233
) .
4.-4 Explicit and Implicit Triads 236
i.25 God, Matter, Form 237
-1.2'51 God and Form in Plato 238
-1.2'52 God, Matter, Form in the Earlier Tradition 241
~.253 The Doxographers 242
4.254 The Triad in the Doxographers 244
4.255 The Earlier Tradition on God, Matter, Form 246
-1.256 God and Form in the Doxographers 246
4 . .257 Conclusions 249
-1.26 God, Soul, Nature 250
-1.27 God, Mind, Soul 252
-1.271 Mind and Soul in Plato 254
xiii
CONTENTS
4.272 God and Mind in the Doxographers 256
4.273 The Conflict in the Sources 258
+--4.274 The Equation of God and Soul 259
4.275 The Two Levels of Mind 260
4.3 The Hierarchical System 265
4.31 God I Forms I Mind 266
4.311 God's Nature 266
4.3111 God's Causality 272
4.3112 The Doctrine of De Mundo 273
4.3113 Positive and Negative Aspects of God's

Causality 279
4.3114 The Doctrine of De Platone 280
4.3115 God's Causality in its Positive and Negative

Aspects 285
4.312 The Nature of Forms 286
4.3121 The Causality of Forms 292
4.3122 The Latin Terminology 293

Xi\'
CONTENTS
4.3123 The Translation of Terminology 297
4.3124 The Greek Terminology 297
-!.32 The Gods 301
,-!.321 Invisible Gods 302
-i.322 Visible Gods 304
-!.33 Universal Soul 308
--1.34 The Demons 309
4.341 Disembodied Demons 311
4.342 Semi-Embodied Demons 313
.. -!.35 Individual Soul 315
-4-.36 Matter I Forms I Numbers I Body 318
-1.361 The Nature of Matter 318
-! ..362 Matter and Forms 321
-1.363 Matter and Numbers 324
4 ..364 The Nature of Body 325
Chapter; THE "ASCLEPIUS" 329
X\"
CONTE:'IITS
5.11 The Nature of Hermeticism 330
5.12 The Latin Asclepius 332
5.211 The Positive Approach to God 338
5.212 The Positive and Negative Approaches to

God 340
5.213 The Negative Approach to God 341
-5.2211 Transcendence 343
-5.2212 Immanence 344
5.2213 Transcendence and Immanence 345
5.2214 God's Causality 348
5.2215 The Divine Intellect 348
5.2216 The Theory of Forms 351
5.2217 The Theory of Matter 354
5.222 God and Creation 357
5.2231 Eternity as God 358
5.2232 Spirit as God 361
X\"i
CO:'I/TF.NTS
5.22.B Love as God 363
.:;.223-i The Status of Fate 365
5.2235 The Second God 370
5.2236 The Hierarchy of Gods 373
5. 2 23 7 The Second God and the Hierarchy of Gods 3 77
.:; ..11 The Theory of Man 379
.j
.....-.,.33 Man's Function 382
5.3-4 Man's Destiny 385
Excursus A CENSORINUS' DE DIE NATALI 389
Excursus B THE DOXOGRAPHY OF AMBROSE,

HEXAMERON I, I, l-4 397
Excursus C AUGUSTINE'S DE DIVERSIS

QUAESTIONIBUS LXXXIII, QU.46 403
X\'ii
Preface
It b generally agreed that those types of philosophy which are loosely call-
ed plawnic" or 'Neoplatonic' have played a crucial role in the history of
European culture during the centuries between late antiquity and the
Rlnaissance. However. no scholar has attempted to describe the evolution of
these forms of thought in a single comprehensive academic study. In order 10
redress this surprising deficiencr, it therefore seems appropriate to present a
hiswry of the Platonic tradition during the Middle Ages. Such a history must
have at least three centers of focus - one in the transmission of ancient
philosophy to the mediaeval period, another in the eighth to ninth centuries,
and another in the twelfth century - although the intervening phases
dl'slnc at least a briefer treatment.
\X" hat follow~ here represents the first stage in this project of mapping the
course of Platonic philosophy during the Middle Ages. To the intelligent
ohsener it qukkly becomes evident that those mediaeval philosophers who
arc usu;tlly styled 'Piatonists' do nut develop their theories in direct response
10 (;reek philosophy. Owing to the peculiar historical circumstances in
which the mediaeval world arose from the ashes of ancient culture, these
writers were mostly deprived of immediate access to the greatest intellectual
achievements of the Greeks. Instead they elaborate their doctrines in relation
w the Latin philosophical literature produced between the classical period
and the end of antiquity. Thus. an adequate discussion of Platonism during
the Middle Ages must begin by examining these important channels of
transmission.
In earlier versions, parts of this study were presented as lectures before
various scholarly groups during the years 1977-83: the Divinity School,
llnivcrsity of Chicago; the Renaissance Seminar. University of Chicago; the
Midwest Patristics Seminar, Chicago; the Society for Ancient Greek
Philosophy. Boston; the Committee for Medieval Studies, University of
California, Berkeley; the Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology.
Berkeley; the Department of Philosophy, St. Mary's College of California,
.\lorag;t; the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Oklahoma City;
the lmernational Patristic Conference, Oxford. I am grateful to the par-
til"ipants in those seminars for learned observations which have sometimes
crept into my footnotes.
The author is pleased to acknowledge his debt to Ralph Mcinerny. Direc-
tor of the Medieval Institute at the University of Notre Dame, for his recom-
rnenuation that this manuscript should appear among the Notre Dame
PuiJiications in /l,fediettll Studies. Much is also owed to my research
xix
PRF.FACJ:
assistants Michael Tkacz, Hugh Griffith, Mary Frances Sparrow, Robert Ken-
nedy. and John Michalski for their labors during 1980-SS. Jean Oesterle took
time away from other projects in order to edit the length}' typescript and br-
ing a European writer's punctuation and spelling into line with American
conventions. The index of Latin texts was compiled with the assistance of
three graduate students in the Medieval Institute: Gregor)' Froelich, Michael
Paletta, and Steven Werner. Finally, Alice Osberger presided over the com-
plex operation in which the material was transmitted from typewriter to
word-processor to printer.
Notre Dame, Indiana I 98S
XX
Introduction
In what sense can we speak of the influence of Plato's

philosophy in the Middle Ages? The time is long past when it
was customary to speak of the mediaeval period as a phase of
hisrorr dominated by Aristotelianism, for most modern scholars
would admit that this is a fair description only of its final stage:
the era of Scholasticism. Yet there is no agreement concerning
the nature of the intellectual movement or movements which
preceded Scholasticism and continued to make their presence
felt even after they had fallen from their predominant role,
these tendencies being variously described as Platonic or
Neoplatonic in character. To what extent is it correct to speak
of the earlier mediaeval philosophy as Platonic? Should it not
more correctly be classified as Neoplatonic? What is the dif-
ference between Platonic and Neoplatonic doctrine? What have
either the Platonic or Neoplatonic modes of thought to do with
Plato?
It is with such a bewildering series of questions that all
modern scholarship on the Platonism of the Middle Ages is fac-
ed at the outset of its endeavor. We may perhaps take an erudite
and perceptive study by C. Baeumkert as the beginning of twen-
tieth-century scholarship on this subject, and here we find the
traditional view of mediaeval thought as first theological and
secondly Aristotelian subjected to the critical reappraisal which
I. C. Baeumker: 'Der Platonismus im Mittelalter' .Beitriige zur Gescbicbte

der Philosopbie des Mille/alters 2;. l-2 (Studien tmd Cbarakterisliken zur
Clesd1icbte der Pbi/osopbie insbesondere des Mille/alters. Gesamme/le Vor-
triige tmd Aufsiitze ron C. Baeumker mil einem Lebensbilde Baeumkers.
hcraus~c~o:ehcn von M. Grabmann) (Munster, 1927). pp. 1;\9-179. Reprinted
in \'\'. Bcierwaltes: Platonismus in der Pbi/osophie des Mittela/lers,
hcrau~~cgt:ht:n von W.B. (Wege der Forschung 197) (Darmstadt. 1969). pp.
1-')'),
2 I NTROOLJCTION
is so necessary. Baeumker argued that it is mistaken to contrast

the Middle Ages so simplistically with a humanistic and Platonic
Renaissance, since both these latter tendencies are amply
represented in the earlier period. 2 The writer then demon-
strated his thesis at length by distinguishing three main tenden-
cies in mediaeval thought: the humanistic, the natural scientific,
and the theological, and by showing that in each of these areas
there is significant and persistent Platonic influence.3 Of course
- and this point is important for the current investigation -
the Platonism of the ancient period is not distinguished from its
Neoplatonic developments by the mediaeval Latin writers, this
contrast being revealed for the first time by the modern
historical criticsm of von Humboldt and Schleiermacher.4 This
is made especially clear by examining the theological tradition
where we find that Augustine, its founder and greatest represen-
tative, shows no signs of any direct acquaintance with Plato's
dialogues. His doctrines are entirely derived from the writers of
late antiquity. 5
Baeumker's discussion was taken up a few years later by E.
Hoffmann who, however, drew conclusions of a different kind
from the materiaJ.6 Hoffmann asked to what extent this
Platonism of the Middle Ages was a genuine Platonism, and
found himself compelled to answer negatively: 'Die genuinen
Motive Platons blieben fi.ir das Mittelalter stumm. '7 Given that
mediaeval Platonism was mediated through late ancient writers
in the way shown by Baeumker, would it not be better to aban-
2. Baeum ker: np. cit., p. I 39 ff.

3. Baeumker: op. cit., pp. 145-171.
4. Baeumker: op. cit., p. 156.
5. Baeumker: op. cit., p. 166.
6. E. Hoffmann: 'Piatonismus und Mittelalter', Vortriige der Bibliothek
Warburg .~ (1923). pp. 17-82.
7. Hoffmann: op. cit., p. 7-4.
MEDIAEVAL PLATONISM
don altogether the expression 'Mediaeval Platonism' as imply-

ing a verbal confusion, simply speaking of Neoplatonism or
Christian Neoplatonism in this connection?B This critique,
although embodying perhaps a judgment excessively severe
regarding Baeumker whom the writer unfairly considered to be
also a party to this historical inexactitude, was valuable at the
time. However, to be a valid interpretation, it requires the ad-
mission of two prior assumptions: that the Platonism of the Mid-
dle Ages is indeed entirely mediated through late ancient inter-
pretation, and that it is really possible to distinguish 'genuine'
Platonism from Neoplatonism.
Of these premises, the first was soon to be directly challenged
and the second subtly modified by a short but brilliant
monograph entitled The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition
during the Middle Ages. This was written by R. Klibansky as an
introduction to the Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi (published
under the auspices of the British Academy, the Union Academi-
que lnternationale, and the Warburg Institute, London) of
which he is editor.9
Speaking of the Latin Middle Ages, Klibansky distinguished
the indirect and direct traditions of Platonism. The indirect
tradition 10 consists of various Latin or Greek writers of late anti-
quity - the latter being available in Latin translation - who
were extensively read and commented upon in the mediaeval
world. These writers all transmit a mode of philosophical
thought which is indebted to Plato but more specifically reflects
the modification of his doctrine in the light of late ancient
religious and philosophical assumptions. However, although its
H. Hoffmann: op. cit., p. 82.

IJ R. Klihansky: The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Mld-
d.le Ages. Witb a New Preface and Four Supplementary Chapters .... (New
'l ork/London, 1982; the original edition was published in 1939).
10. Klibansky: op. ell., p. 22 ff.
I NTRODlJC.TION
sources do not transmit the doctrines of the Phaedo or the

Republic without further elaboration, it would be a mistake to
conclude that the mediaeval tradition is simply an offshoot of
the Neoplatonic tendency in late antiquity for several reasons.
First, such a view neglects the fact that there was also a direct
tradition of Platonism in the Middle Ages. Cicero and Apuleius
had translated certain dialogues into Latin, and Cicero's transla-
tions were available in the time of Jerome, Apuleius' translation
in that of Priscian the grammarian, although they disappeared
from circulation shortly after these authors cited them.'' The
later Platonist Calcidius had furthermore made a translation of
the cosmological dialogue Timaeus which, together with his
own lengthy commentary, exercised considerable influence
over mediaeval writers from the Carolingian period onwards.
This is shown by the imitation of its doctrine in later authors, by
its frequent citation by name in mediaeval library catalogs, and
by the number of extant manuscripts.t2 Finally, in the middle of
the twelfth century, Aristippus of Catania made fresh transla-
tions of two dialogues which began to exert influence during
the period which followed.l3 There is no doubting the
significance of Klibansky's demonstration: that Hoffmann's
thesis of a total absence of 'genuine' Platonism falls short of the
facts.
The second reason why Klibansky would not allow the
mediaeval Platonic tradition to be described simply as
Neoplatonic was the doctrinal complexity of the late ancient
tradition itself. I-t It is true that the various writers of that period
transmit to the Middle Ages in many or perhaps most instances a
doctrine which is essentially Neoplatonic in character.
II. Klibansky: op. cit., pp. 21-22.

12. Klibansky: op. cit., p. 28.
15. Klibansky: op. cit., pp. 27-28.
14. Klibansky: op. cit.. p. 27.
ME()[AE\' AI. PI.ATOL'IIISM
However. we must also realize that the term 'Neoplatonism'

strictly applies only to developments of Platonic doctrine from
the time of Plotinus onwards. Thus, a writer of late antiquity
like Augustine might transmit vestiges of earlier stages in the
e,olution of Platonic exegesis like that of the so-called 'Middle
pJawnism' of Apuleius. Furthermore, the commentary of
catddius reveals the same state of affairs, since the philosophy
contained there is of a Middle Platonic rather than Neoplatonic
character. It is easy to see that this second argument of Kliban-
skv's somewhat modifies the terms in which Hoffmann's thesis
m~1st be formulated: although it is essentially true that it does
not correspond to the 'genuine' Plato, the indirect tradition of
Platonism cannot be classified as Neoplatonism tout court. The
t:uc ancient sources of mediaeval philosophy are far too com-
plex for either of these definitions, reflecting several different
phases in the development of this tradition often in combina-
tion with one another.
Although Klibansky's monograph was a program for future
research rather than a description of work completed, it
represented a fine survey of the subject and a major step for-
ward from earlier scholarship. P.O. Kristeller's review of the
publication was therefore duly appreciative, although sug-
gesting certain ways in which the project could have been fur-
ther improved.! s The reviewer provided details of certain
humanistic translations of Greek Platonists from the late Middle
Ages to supplement and reinforce Klibansky's account of the
direct tradition, 16 yet his remarks were primarily aimed at the
picture of the indirect transmission presented by the Continui-
ty. First, Kristeller pointed out that sources of ancient
I'), 1'. 0. Kristcllcr: Review of R. Klibansky: Tile Continuity of tbe

Platonic Tradition during tile Middle Ages. journal of Plli/osophy 37
pp, -409-4 II.
( (l).IO),
16. Kristcllcr: op. ell .. p. 4 10.
6 INTRODliCTION
philosophy for mediaeval readers consist not only of

philosophical and theological works proper but also of various
non-philosophical texts. Secondly, he suggested that Klibansky
was working with too rigid a distinction between 'genuine'
Platonism and Neoplatonic distortion, and forgetting that
Neoplatonism was an elaboration of certain essential elements
in Plato's own philosophical doctrine. Kristeller therefore final-
ly concluded: 'I should also like to conceive the very term
"tradition" in a somewhat different way. "Tradition" does not
indicate merely the transmission and repetition of certain ideas
formulated at the outset; it means the process of transforma-
tion, in which certain basic ideas are continually adapted to the
intellectual problems and needs of successive periods. 17
Since the publication of Klibansky's monograph and
Kristeller's review, other essays on the Platonic tradition in the
Middle Ages have appeared, in most cases elaborating the
discussion along lines suggested by Klibansky. Thus,]. KochiS
discussed the direct and indirect sources and the periods at
which different sources achieved the high points of their in-
fluence, adding that one can divide mediaeval Platonism into
two phases: 19 the period until the mid-twelfth century and the
period after when new translations are available from Greek
and Arabic.]. Hirschberger2o examined the respective positions
of Hoffmann and Klibansky, adopting in preference the latter's
conclusions, although he stressed to a greater extent the need to
examine successive transformations of Platonic doctrine. Thus,
he proposed three basic principles of investigation:21 (i) we
17. Kristdler: op. cit., p. 4 I I.

IS.J. Koch: Platonismus im Mittelaller(Krefeld, 1948).
19. Koch: op. cit .. p. 14.
20. J. Hirschberger: 'Piatonismus und Mittelalter'. Pbi/osopbiscbes
jabrbucb der Giirresgesellscbaft 63 ( 1954 ), pp. 120-130. Reprinted in Beier-
waites: op. cit., pp. 56-72.
21. Hirschberger: op. cit., p. 124.
MEDIAEVAL PLATONISM 7
should not speak simply of 'Platonism' or 'Neoplatonism'

wHhout carefully examining our terms; (ii) we should look for
unadulterated teachings of Plato himself, awareness of which
will enable us to perceive when a transformation of doctrine has
taken place; (iii) we should try to grasp the nature of these
developments or deviations in concepts. Finally, W. Beier-
"altesll returned to the discussion of the direct and indirect
sources of mediaeval Platonism with an important observation:
we must grasp not only the relationship between different
phases of the Platonic tradition, but also that between Platonism
and Aristotelianism which was generally understood as being
more sympathetic than is suggested by many modern inter-
preters.23
Perhaps the most valuable piece of analysis to emerge from all
this modern scholarship is the distinction between the direct
and indirect traditions of Platonic philt>sophy. That is to say
various Latin translations of the dialogues which, if anything
does, will represent the pure Platonism accessible to mediaeval
readers versus original philosophical works by writers of late
antiquity which, in fact, usually contain Neoplatonic (or Middle
Platonic) doctrine. We must now turn from modern scholarship
to ancient authorities in order to examine the evidence for these
direct and indirect traditions respectively.
First, the direct tradition. Here, the earlier translations of
Plato's dialogues which have been extant only in a fragmentary
state: from the beginning of the mediaeval period until the pre-
sent day need to be contrasted with the twelfth and thirteenth-
century versions which survive in a relatively complete form.
Thus, in relation to the former group of texts, three classes of
22. \'<'. Beierwaltes: 'Vorwort', Platonismus in der Philosopbie des Mit

lelalters. herausgegeben von W. Beierwaltes ( Wege der Forschung 197)
marmsradt, 1969). pp. vii-xiv.
2,:\. Beierwalles: op. cit., p. viii.
1:'1/TRODl'CTION
evidence need to be considered: references in late ancient or

early mediaeval writers to the translations concerned, quota-
tions from those translations in similar authors, and finally the
translations themselves if extant. With the later group of transla-
tions, testimony is obviously less crucial since the texts
themselves can be examined at first hand.
A translation of the Protagoras by Cicero is mentioned in at
least four passages of Jerome,24 a writer who, although express-
ing contempt for the absurd doctrines of Plato and other pagan
authors, claims to be exceptionally well versed in their writings.
Jerome's evidence regarding the diffusion of Plato's works
among educated Latin speakers of his own day is unfortunately
somewhat ambivalent: he refers both to the rarity of Plato's
works and the obscurity even of the author's name,25 yet he
recommends him for study along with Theophrastus.26 Further-
more, it is not clear precisely how much of the dialogues Jerome
read in the original Greek, how much in Latin translation, and
how much he acquired through intermediaries. As P. Courcelle
has argued, however, Jerome's repeated reference to transla-
tions in this connection together with his rather limited grasp of
Plato's philosophy points in the direction of a somewhat
restricted contact.27 Cicero's translation of the Protagoras is
also known to Priscian, a little over a century later, who quotes
some extracts to illustrate various grammatical points,ls but it
24.Jerome: Epist. 57.5 (Pl. 22, 571); 106,3 (Pl. 22, 8.:\9); Adt. Rufin. II,
25 (Pl. 2.3. 449C); and Praef in Pent. (Pl. 28, 182A). See G.). M. Bartelink:
'Piatons Protagoras bei Hieronymus'. Rheinisches Museum 122 ( 1977), p.
192 ff.
2S. Jerome: In Epist. ud Ga/at. Ill, S (Pl. 26, 401 B).
26. Jerome: Epist. -i8, 1.'\ (Pl. 22. S02).
27. P. Courcelle: Late /.a tin Writers and Their Greek Sources. translated
hr H. E. Wcdeck (Cambridge. MA. 1969), pp. 67-70.
28. Priscian: /nst. :;, 64 (Keil: Gmmm. Lat. 2. 182, 3-i); 6 . .35 (Keil:
Gramm. Lui. 2, 226, 9-11); 6. 6.3 (Keil: Gramm. Lat. 2,247,21-248,1); and
8, .35 (Keil: Gramm. Lat. 2. 402, 22-25).
MEDIAEVAL PLA TONlSM 9
fades from view after that. It therefore has no significance for

the transmission of Platonism to the Middle Ages.
Jerome also refers to a translation by Cicero of the Timaeus,
<.k~crihing the latter as an obscure text not made any clearer by
the Roman writer's 'golden eloquence.'l9 Fortunately this Latin
work is extant, its fragmentary nature (terminating at the
equi\'alent of Tim. 47b) apparently representing the state in
which Cicero himself left it. The translation is of great interest.
It includes a preface in which the doctrines of Plato are linked
with Nigidius Figulus and the Italian Pythagorean tradition,30
and the text itself constitutes such a mine of information regar-
ding Cicero's techniques of translation that it has not lacked the
scrutiny of modern scholars.3t The translator throughout prac-
29 ..krome: In Amos 11, 5 (PL 25, 1038A). The same translation is also men-
tioned at In lsaiam Xll, 40 (PL 24, 4090).
~0. Cicero: Tim. l.
~I. On Cicero as a translator (with or without reference to the Timaeus)
see A. Engelbrecht: 'Zu Ciceros Ubersetzung aus dem Platonis Timaeus .
\l''iener Studien .H ( 1912), pp. 216-226; G. Cuendet: 'Ciceron et saint Jerome
traducteurs. Re1ue des etudes Ia tines 11 ( 19.B). pp. 380-400; J. Humbert: A
propos de Ciccron traducteur du grec'. Melanges A. Ermmt (Paris, 1940). pp.
I (r -200: E. des Places: 'L 'equivalence keramlJmai-temperari. A propos de
lkux phrases de Pia ton tradu itc:s par Ckcron . Revue de pbilologie 16 ( 194 2 ).
pp. ll.~ .. 'i; A. Traglia: Note su Cicerone crltlco e trt~duttore (Roma. 1947);
R. Poncdet: l.iceron traducteur de Pia ton. L 'expression de Ia pensee com-
fJh.,e 1!11 latin classique (Paris, 1957); D. M. Jones: 'Cicero as Translator.
l'llil'ersity of London, Institute of Classical Studies. Bulletin 6 ( 1959), pp.
2221: H . .f. Hartun~: Ciceros Methode bei der iiiJersetzung griechiscber
Pbilosopbiscber Termini. Diss. (Hamburg, 1970). On specific points see also
T. B. de Graff: Timaeus 4 I a', ClciSsical Weekly 35 ( 1941-1942). pp. 244-45:
R. (jiomini: 'Ricercbe sui testo del Timeo ciceronlmw (Roma 1967);
'Cicerone. Tim. 6. !7', Ritista di cultura c/assica e medioe1ale lO (1968),
pp. 'i<J-"'1; 'Osservazioni sui testo del Timeo cicc:roniano, ibid. II ( 1969),
PP. 25 1-5-i: M.S. Celentano: 'Qualche osser\'azioni su due passi parallc:li di
Platome Cicerone, Plat. Tim. 29b, Cic. Tim. 7', ibid. 15 (1973). pp. 5-17;
and A Franzoi: 'Osservazioni sulla traduzione ciceronian a del Tim eo di
10 INTRODUCTION
tises the sensus de sensu rather than the verbum de verbo

method,.U and its excellence as a literary creation is increased
by recasting the Greek syntax always in the appropriate Latin
form,.H by providing varying Latin translations of a single Greek
technical term which is simply repeated in the original,34 and by
adding phrases or even clauses not present in the original when
the meaning seems to require further explanation.35 This
freedom makes it difficult to use Cicero's version as evidence
for the early textual tradition of Plato, although some have at-
tempted this,36 but it underlines its value as a document of the
interpretation of Plato in the first century B.C. Thus, on cenain
questions modern scholars have been able to demonstrate that
Cicero reveals some independence of philosophical judgment:
for example, when Plato asks the question whether the world
was eternal or came to be and replies 'it came to be' (yf.yovr.v),
Cicero translates this without paraphrase as ortus est. 37 Such
simplicity is striking, since the almost unvaried tradition of an-
cient Platonism was to interpret the Greek verb not in a literal
or temporal sense but as expressing causal dependence only, a
view which makes Plato's position identical with that of Aristo-
tle: namely that the world is eternaUs That Cicero's translation
Platone', Pubblicazioni della Facolta di Magistero, Universita di Ferrara

1-:\ (1973). pp. 47-58.
:\2. See Cicero's own remarks at De Fin. III, 15, and Jerome's at Epist. 57.
5 (Pl 22, 571) and 106, 3 (Pl22, 839) .
.:B. See Cuendet: op. cit., pp. :\86-87 .
.H. See Cuendet: op. cit., pp. 393-94; Humbert: op. cit., pp. 198-99.
:\5. See Cuendet: op. dt., pp. 395-96; Engelbrecht: op. cit., pp. 223-24 .
.36. See de Graff: op. cit., pp. 244-45.
37.Cicero: Tim. 5(= Plato: Tim.28b) .
.'\8. A. -J. Festugiere: La revelation d'Henues Trisnufgiste II: Le Dieu
msmique (Paris, 19-f9). p. 104, n . .3 was first to draw attention to this
passage. SeeP. Boyann': 'Le platonisme ;I Rome. J>latun et Ciccron. Associtl-
tion Guillaume Bude. Cm1gres de Tours et Poitiers. Actes du amgres (Paris.
MEDIAEVAL PLATONISM II
does not signify a merely verbal adherence to the original is

shown by his references to Plato's cosmological theory
elsewhere. in at least one of which the Platonic view is rigidly
contrasted with the Aristotelian one.39 Besides Jerome, this
translation of the Timaeus found an interested reader in
Augustine who takes all his citations from Plato's dialogue via
the Ciceronian version.4o However, the work attains only a
limited circulation during the Middle Ages, the most notable ex-
ample of its use being only the inclusion of some extracts in a
Collectaneum of material from pagan philosophers compiled by
the ninth-century writer Hadoard which consists mainly of
Ciceronian passages:H In fact, later citations by Lanfranc and
others will go back not to the original text of Cicero but to the
Augustinian selection. 42
A translation of the Pbaedo by Apuleius is mentioned by
Sidonius Apollinaris who praises Rufinus' version of Origen by
19S 3 ). pp. 206-207. Reprinted in P. Boyance: Etudes sur f'humanisme

cin'mnien (Bruxelles, 1970), p. 232.
5lJ. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, 70.
tO. According to H. Hagendahl: Augustine and the Lati11 Classics, zt'ith a
C(mfribulion on Varru by B. Cardau11s (Goteborg, 1967), pp. 535-56. with
the exception of Soli/. I, 15, 29 (PL 32. 884), all Augustine's citations of
Plato\ t~:xt are from the section translated by Cicero. Cicero being named as
translator at Cit. Dei XIII, 16 (CCSL 48, 396-98). For a complete list of the
citations s~:~: M. Tcstard: Saint Augustin et Cicerotl II: Repertoire des textes
(Paris. llJ5H). pp. 135-36.
tl. S~:e P. Schwenke: 'Des Presbyter Hadoardus Cicero - Excerptc',
Pbilologus, Suppi.-Band. 5 (1889), pp. 397-588; M. Manitius: 'Hadoardus
(Fortlc:ben Ciceros)', Geschlchte der latelnischen Llteratur des Mittelalters I
(~li.inchen, 1911 ), pp. 478-483; C. H. Beeson: 'The Collectaneum of
~adoard', Classical Philology 40 (1945). pp. 201-222; and B. Bischoff:
lladoardus and the Manuscripts of Classical Authors from Corbic',
Diclasca/iae, Studies in Honor of A. Albareda, edited by S. Prete (New York,
l'.)(lJ ). pp . .J 1-57.
t2. SeeM. Gibson: Lanfranc of Bee (Oxford, 1978), p. 44.
12 INTRODUCTION
declaring that it is as faithful to its original as Apuleius' render-

ing of the Platonic dialogue.43 A. Engelbrecht believed that a
fragment of this work was preserved in Claudianus Mamertus'
De Statu Animae, 44 but a detailed comparison of literary styles
in the passage concerned and in Apuleius' extant writings makes
this highly unlikely, with the result that J. Beaujeu45 has exclud-
ed this text from his collection of Apuleius' philosophical works
and fragments. However, Priscian46 has preserved two authen-
tic fragments of translation from the final section of the
dialogue, one of which contains a philosophical point of in-
terest. Apuleius quite correctly translates Socrates' words 'I
shall demonstrate the cause to you and prove that the soul is im-
mortal' (tiJV aitiav &m6&i~&1V xai clV&UpftO&lV roc; a9avatOV ft
wuxit) as et causam gignendi ostensurum et inmortalitatem
animae reperturum, 47 his only addition being the word
gignendi which introduces a metaphysical implication not in
the original. Yet the addition is justified and in fact helpful to
the reader,48 since the cause concerned here is the realm of
43. Sidonius: Epist. ll, 9, 5.

44. Plato: Pbaed. 66b 67a at Claudianus Mamertus: De Statu Anim. II, 7
(CSEL11,125,14-127,2).
45. ). Beaujeu: Apulee, Opuscules pbilosopbiques et fragments, texte
etab/i, traduit et commente (Paris, 1973), p. 173. n. 2. F. Boerner: Der la-
teiniscbe Neuplatonismus und Neupytbagoreismus rmd C/audianus
Mamertus in Spracbe und Pbi/osopbie (Leipzig, 1936), pp. 1-30 considered,
on stylistic grounds, that the passage from the Pbaedo was taken from a first-
century Latin translation other than that of Apuleius. But the evidence for
this is flimsy. A more convincing hypothesis is that of Courcelle: op. cit., pp.
241-47 who argues that the quotation from Plato is associated in Claudianus'
text with Porphyrian material, probably the latter's De Regressu Animae.
Thus, the text is colored by Neoplatonism.
46. Priscian: lnst. 10, 19 (Keii:Gramm. Lat. 2, 511, 19-21) and 10, 28
(Keil: Gramm. Lat. 2, 520, 20-22).
47. Priscian: /nsf. 10, 28 (Keil: Gramm. Lat. 2, 520-522).
48. Beaujeu: op. cit., p. 173, n. 3, however, has a different view.
1 tonic Forms and Socrates is about to embark on his final pro-

~f~f the soul's immortality which will depend upon its essential
k'nship with the eternal realm. In shon, there is plenty here to
~nfirm the correctness of Sidonius' favorable judgment of the
~ranslation. and Apuleius' version of the Pbaedo was clearly a
work which would be of great interest to us had it survived. Un-
fortunately. like Cicero's Protagoras it disappears after the time
of Priscian, and therefore plays no role in the mediaeval
Platonic tradition.
The last of these early translations of Plato is that of the
Timaeus by Calcidius. This still extant work covers a larger por-
tion of the Greek text than does Cicero's version: it extends to
Tim. '53 c - leaving aside only the geometrical theory of the
elements and a certain amount of detailed physiological ex-
planation - although the author does not seem to have con-
tinued any further with it. In the dedication to a certain Osius,
the translator explains that he has rendered only the 'first parts'
of the dialogue because of the latter's prolixity and because he
thought it best to send a kind of bors d'oeuvre which might be
received with pleasure and thereby encourage him to greater ef-
forts with the remainder of the text.49 The further course of the
relationship between the two men is not documented, but the
tradition preserves no further translation of Plato's text by
Calcidius beyond Tim. 53 c. However, whatever Osius' opinion
may have been, this translation was immensely prized and enor-
mously influential during the early Middle Ages for two
rt'asons:~ 0 first, the Latin is fairly lucid despite its technicality
19. Calcidius: /11 Tim. praef. 6, 5 ff.

50. See E. Mensching: zur Calcidius- Uberlieferung', Vigiliae Cbristfanae
19 ( 196<; ). pp. -i 2-56 who lists 119 manuscripts of the Timaeus ( 4 3 of the text
together with Calcidius' own commentary) and classifies them geographical-
ly ..\!ensching: op. cit .. p. 52, n. 29 notes that, when the mediaeval library
catalogs speak of Plato or Platonis Timaeus their reference is invariably to
14 INTRODUCTION
and secondly, Calcidius had appended to his translation an ex-

tensive and learned commentary which in bulk dwarfs the text
which it sets out to explain. For this reason the history of the in-
fluence of Calcidius' Timaeus is really the history of his com-
mentary, and it will be best to discuss both works in detail in the
context of the indirect Platonic tradition.
The second historical phase in the direct tradition of Plato's
works in the Middle Ages is represented by Aristippus' versions
of the Meno and Pbaedo5I made in the mid-twelfth century.
Some details of Aristippus' life and literary activities can be col-
lected from the interesting prologues to the two Platonic
translations and to an anonymous contemporary version of
Ptolemy,52 from the last of which we learn that he was Ar-
chdeacon of Catania and eventually a prominent official at the
Sicilian court, that he arranged the importation of Greek
manuscripts from the East, and that he had natural scientific in-
terests of a practical and empirical kind. The prologue to the
Meno53 also states that Aristippus has begun a version of
Gregory Nazianzen and is at least projecting a translation of
Diogenes Laertius although neither of these works is otherwise
known. Both his translations cover their entire respective Greek
texts giving an extremely literal rendering of the original
vocabulary and syntax so that,54 although they are useful for
conjecturing the Greek text which Aristippus used, they are
often unintelligible to the reader without reference to the
Calcidius, the version of Cicero being classified among the latter's works. See
also M. Gibson: 'The Study of the Timaeus in the Eleventh and Twelfth Cen-
turies'. Pensamiento 25 (1969), pp. 183-194.
5 I. V. Kordeuter and C. Labowsky: Meno interprete Henrico Aristippo
(Plato Latin us I) (London, 1940) and L. Minio-Paluello: Phaedo interprete
Henrico Aristippo (Plato Latin us 2) (London, 1950).
52. Kordeuter and Labowsky: op. cit., pp. ix-x.
53. Kordeuter and Labowsky: op. cit., p. 5 ff.
54. Kordeuter and Labowsky: op. cit., pp. xviii-xix.
original. Disturbing from the literary point of view are especial-

tv the too frequent recourse to invented Latin words mirroring
r~oublesome Greek compounds, the slavish rendering of par-
ticles (even IJ.V and 5), and the exact transposition of Plato's
anacoloutha into the new medium. However, Aristippus' occa-
sional deviation from the purely literal translation of
philosophically technical terms - a plurality of Greek expres-
sions is often rendered by a single Latin word (for example vouc;
and v6111J.a by inte/lectus) and conversely a variety of Latin
words is frequently employed in place of a single Greek term
(for example sermo, verbum, argumentum, ratio, sententia,
and so on for A.6yoc;) - shows a sophisticated grasp of the am-
biguities of the Greek vocabulary and an intelligent perception
of the course of philosophical argument. 55 Despite their limita-
tions, these translations are not nearly as contemptible as they
are sometimes depicted to be: indeed their future influence
would belie such an assumption.56 Although they do not
achieve a sufficiently rapid diffusion to influence the twelfth
century, the Phaedo at least is known to Roger Bacon and the
Parisian Schoolmen, while both dialogues were copied at Ox-
ford in the early fifteenth century and found their way into
Nicholas of Cusa 's collection of Platonic translations.
This brief inventory includes the totality of the Platonic
material directly accessible to the learned public before the end
of the twelfth century, and it now remains to raise the question
of its real historical significance. Does it represent a body of
pure doctrine available to supplement the late ancient varieties
';S. Kordeuter and Labowsky: op. cit., indices s. vv.

%. On Aristippus' translations and their influence see C. H. Haskins:
Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science (Cambridge, MA. 1924), pp.
1t2-4 3. 159-161, 165-171 and). de Ghellinck: L 'essor de Ia /literature Ia tine
~~~ XII steele II (Bruxelles/Paris, 1946), p. 15, n. 3 (survey of earlier
hliography on twelfth-century translations), p. 15 ff.
16 INTRODUCTION
of Platonism which color the indirect tradition? The answer

must be negative, for at least two reasons. First, the translations
were either lost from an early date leaving only fragmentary
testimony of their existence (Cicero's Protagoras and Apuleius'
Pbaedo), enjoyed too limited a circulation (Cicero's Timaeus),
or achieved substantial diffusion only after the heyday of
mediaeval Platonism was already past (Aristippus' Meno and
Pbaedo). Secondly, the only exception to these strictures
(Calcidius' Timaeus) was so embedded in its Neoplatonic com-
mentary that it could not be expected to project a form of
Platonism running absolutely counter not only to the commen-
tator's own inclinations but also to the universally prevalent
modes of thinking derived from the indirect Platonic tradi-
tion.57 An inescapable conclusion therefore imposes itself:
namely that for the early Middle Ages there is no direct Platonic
tradition of any significance, and that for writers of the period
Plato's doctrines are only understood to the extent that they
agree with the views of late ancient interpreters. We must
therefore turn to the indirect tradition.
This tradition consists of the various writers of late antiquity
who present philosophical material reflecting the current forms
of Platonism, these being sometimes identifiable with doctrines
taught in the dialogues but more often traceable only as far as a
Neoplatonic commentator. It is not easy to draw up a list of
such authors with any degree of confidence that it is really com-
plete, since in late antiquity these ideas are so widespread and
are frequently employed in a casual and allusive manner,
although it is perhaps feasible to collect and examine the most
important among them. Here, the main criterion for selection
57. The view of Klibansky: op. cit., p. 27 that Calcidius' translation and
commentary transmit a non-Neoplatonic variety of Platonism to the Middle
Ages is not, I think, borne out by the evidence. See the discussion on p. 421
ff.
MEDIAEVAL PI.A TON ISM 17
will be that the writer enjoyed a certain reputation among

scholars of the mediaeval West: in other words our attention
must be directed primarily to one who wrote in Latin rather
than Greek. c;H This reputation itself is measurable by examining
first. citations of or allusions to the author concerned in later
writers. secondly mentions of the author's name or of a specific
work in the mediaeval library catalogs, and thirdly the evidence
of the author's manuscript tradition itself. All three methods
have their limitations, since citations are sometimes verbally im-
precise (perhaps as a result of quotation from memory) and
often unaccompanied by the name of the source; the catalogs
are now only available for a selection of mediaeval libraries, 59
they are frequently vague in their indications of authors and
titles. and prove at most a certain interest in the writer concern-
ed rather than active influence, and so on. Yet these are the only
technical procedures available for such an investigation, the
first method - since our ultimate aim is to study the transmis-
sion and elaboration of ideas rather than the history of libraries
and books per se- obviously taking pride of place.
The writers whom previous scholarship has identified as be-
ing important in this connection fall into two basic groups:
SH. Certain Greek authors of late antiquity were also translated into Latin.
Sec hc:low.
59. The old collection of C. Becker: Catalog/ bibliotbecarum antiqui
(Bonn. IHHS), with additions by J. de Ghellinck: 'En marges des catalogues
de~ hiblioth~ques medievales', Stud/ e testi 41 (Miscellanea Ebrle 5) (Cina del
\'aticano. 1924). pp. 331-38. is still useful. However. it must be sup
plcmentcd hy the modern regional studies. M. Manitius: Handscbriften an-
liker Autoretl in mittelalterlicben Bibliotbekskatalogen (Leipzig, 193'5) is an
attempt to map the transmission of classical literature - proceeding author
hy author- through the Middle Ages. See B. Bischoff's review in Deutsche
l.iteratur-Zeitung 57 (1936), pp. 649-653. G. Glauche: Scbullekture In Mit-
le/after. Elllstebung und Wandlungen des LektUrekanons bis 1200 nacb den
Que/le, dargestellt (Miinchen, 1970) is a modern survev with good
hihl iograph y.
18 INTRODUCTION
Christian and pagan. Given the temper of the times, it is hardly

surprising that the Christian Platonic writers of late antiquity
would be enthusiastically studied by mediaeval thinkers, as oc-
curred in all periods of the Middle Ages. Yet there were natural-
ly preferences and priorities, for Ante-Nicene Fathers were
generally less popular than Post-Nicene writers,6o while certain
writers were studied from particular viewpoints only. Thus,
every mediaeval scholar knew of the criticism of Origen on
specific doctrinal questions by Jerome and Augustine, yet the
Greek writer was at the same time almost universally revered as
an exegete.6I But despite such relatively minor problems, the
Christian Platonists of late antiquity all exerted considerable in-
fluence over early mediaeval philosophy and theology for the
obvious reason that their Platonism in whatever precise form it
manifested itself had already been assimilated and transformed
according to the demands of the new Christian spirituality, it
only being necessary to elaborate along the same lines. When
we come to the pagan Platonic writers the situation is quite dif-
ferent, for not only must specific doctrines associated with the
pagan philosophy be treated with great circumspection - for
example the doctrines of transmigration and of the world soul
- but often the very recourse to pagan authors must be defend-
ed. There is in fact something of an ebb and flow during the ear-
ly Middle Ages in the reading of such authors, for during periods
when classical humanism was in the ascendant (the Carolingian
era and the twelfth century) the pagan Platonic sources and
their doctrines were eagerly discussed, yet in other periods the
60. See). S. Beddie: 'libraries in the Twelfth Century', Anniversary Essays

in Mediaer,al History by Students of C. H. Haskins, (Boston,MA/New
York,NY 1929), pp. 10-11. Beddie notes that Tertullian's Apologeticus oc-
curs most frequently in this group.
61. See H. de lubac: Exegese medievale, Les quatre sens de /'Ecriture I, I
(Paris, 1959). ch. 4: 'L'Origene latin', pp. 221-304.
Christian writers virtually held the stage alone. Moreover the

humanistic interest in the pagan writers is always accompanied
by a religiously conservative reaction: thus, Prudentius of
Troyes will attack Eriugena for following the doctrines of Mar-
tianus CapeUa62 and Manegold of Lautenbach will assail the
eleventh-century readers of Macrobius.63 Any student of the in-
direct Platonic tradition in the Middle Ages must take into ac-
count the essential differences between the Christian and pagan
currents within this tradition, for only thus is it possible to grasp
the frequent interpenetration of the two which is as complex as
it is exciting. 64
Among writers in the late ancient Christian tradition, Kliban-
sky listed the Apologists and Fathers,' Ambrose, Augustine,
62. Prudentius: De Praed. Contra lob. Scot. (PL 115, 1294 A-B).
63. w. Hartmann: Manegold von Lautenbach, Liber contra Wolfelmum,
herausgegeben von W. H. (Weimar, 1972), pp. 42,9-10; 48,16-19; etc.
6-i. Another factor which must be taken into account is the frequent use of
florilegia during the Middle Ages. Thus, it is often difficult to determine
whether a given author quotes an earlier writer having had direct access to
the texts. or whether he is citing the author through the intermediary of a
collntion of extracts. On these florllegia - which can be of Christian or
pagan works - see E. M. Sanford: 'The Use of Classical Latin Authors in the
Lihri Manuales', Transactions and Proceedings of the American
Philological Association 55 (1924), pp. 190-248; B. L. Ullman: 'Tibullus In
the Mediaeval Florilegia', Classical Philology 23 (1928), pp. 128-174;
'Classical Authors in Certain Mediaeval Flori/egia ', Classical Philology 27
(1932). pp. 1-42; F. Diekamp: 'Fiorilegien', Lexikonfur Tbeologie und Kir-
cbe 4 (Freiburg i. Br .. 1932), pp. 44-45; M. Faulhaber: 'Katenen', Lexikonfur
Theologie tmd Kircbe S (Freiburg i. Br., 1933), pp. 888-89; J. de Ghellinck:
'Diffusion, utilisation et transmission des ecrits patristiques', Gregorianum
l'f (1933). pp. 356-400; Le mouvementtbeologique du Xlfr steele (Brux-
ellcs/Paris, 1948), pp. 20-36. Among these collections, the most famous is
perh:tps that of Eugippius based on Augustine. See P. Knoell: Eugippii Ex-
~erPfa ex Operibus Sancti Augustini (CSEL 9/1) (Vindobonensis, 1885); M.
Schanz. C. Hosius, G. Kriiger: Gescbicbte der romiscben Literatur 4/2 (Miin-
l'hen, 1920), pp. 586-88; G. de Plinval: 'Eugippius (saint) moine latin du V<-
20 INTRODUCTION
Claudianus Mamertus, and Boethius as the prime transmitters of

Platonic doctrine to the Latin Middle Ages.65 This is a useful first
draft of an inventory of the indirect tradition although it omits
one important Christian Latin Platonist - Marius Victorinus
whose commentary on Cicero's De Inventione was widely read
during the Middle Ages 66 and whose Trinitarian works enjoyed
at least a small circulation during the Carolingian period67 -
and is rather imprecise regarding the identity of the 'Apologists
and Fathers.' In such a category we should presumably include
Latin writers like Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Lactantius, and Ar-
VI sii:cle'. Dictionnaire de spiritualite 412 (Paris, 1961 ), col. 1684-8'5; M.

Cappuyns: 'Eugippius', Dictionnaire d'histoire et de geographie ecclesiasti-
ques I 5 (Paris. 1964 ), col. I 3 76-78; P. Siniscalco: '11 numero primitivo degli
Excerpta di Eugippio', Retue des etudes augustfniemzes tO (1964), pp .
.B I-3H: and ). Martin: 'Die Augustinusiiberlieferung bei Eugippius',
't'liscellanea Critica 2 (1965), pp. 228-244. Among the secular collections,
that of Martin of Braga based on Seneca entitled Fonnula Vitae Honestae is
of special note. See C. W. Barlow: Martini Episcopi Bracarensis Opera Om-
nia, (New Haven, CT. 19'50), pp. 236-250; E. Bickel: 'Die Schrift des Martin
von Bracara Formula titae honestae', Rheinisches Museum 60 (1905), pp.
505-55 I; Schanz. Hosius, Kriiger: op. cit., 412, pp. 62.3-27; Manitius:
Gescbichte der /ateiniscben Llteratur des Mittela/ters I. pp. 109-113; A. Fon-
t:in: 'La tradici(Jn de las obras morales deS. Martin de Braga', Bo/etf11 de Ia
Utlitersidad de Granada 23 ( 195 1), pp. 73-86; and K.-D. Nothdurft: Studien
zum Ei11fluss Senecas auf die Phi/osophie und Tbeo/ogie des zuulften
}abrhunderts (Leiden/KOln, 1963). pp. 28-34. There arc, of course, many
other florilegia besides these, but it is best to consider them in connection
with the specific authors involved.
6'5. Klibansky: op. cit., p. 23.
66. See Manitius: Handschriften antiker Autoren in mittela/ter/ichen
Bib/iothekskatalogen, pp. 176-78. Klibansky: op. cit., p. 22 mentions Vic-
torious but only in connection with the latter's translation of the Platonic/
read by Augustine.
67. See P. Hadot: 'Marius Victorious et Alcuin', Archiles d'histoire doc-
trinale et litteraire du moyen dge 21 (1954), pp. 5-19 and 'Les hymnes de
Victorious et les hymncs Adesto et Miserere d'Aicuin', Archives d'histoire
doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 27 ( 1960), pp. 7-17.
nobius. All these were important transmitters of doxographical

information about ancient philosophy to the Middle Ages, Ter-
rullian and Lactantius especially being among the primary
sources of Isidore of Seville's Etymologiae.6B Also included
would be Latin translations of Clement of Alexandria, Origen's
Homiliae and De Principiis, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory
of :"Jyssa's De Hominis Opificio, and other Greek Fathers some
of which achieved in this way an extremely widespread diffu-
sion.69 Furthermore, one might make a case for including Cas-
sian among the Christian transmitters of Platonic doctrine. His
works reveal a wide reading in both Christian and pagan
philosophical sources,70 while his Collationes provided the
mediaeval monastic scholar with a definition of the Neoplatonic
notion of 'intellect' (vouc;).7t It is undoubtedly possible to add
vet other names to this list because of the enormous influence of
Platonism upon the earliest Christian thinkers: these writers
naturally used the philosophical tools most readily available in
their intellectual examination of the faith, and the tools were
primarily supplied by the Platonic schools then dominant in the
ancient world, although some Stoic elements were also present
especially in the first generations of the Fathers. Yet the writers
listed above all have a special claim on our attention because of
the extent to which their thought was moulded by the pagan
philosophical tradition, at least two of them - Victorious and
6H. Sec: ). Fontaine: Isidore de Ser,ille et Ia culture c/assique dans

l'l:'sfJaR1le uisiR()thique I (Paris, 1959), p. S93 ff.
69. See .J. T. Muckle: 'Greek Works translated directly into Latin before
1}')0', Mediaeml Studies -i ( 1942). pp. 3_'1,-42; A Siegmund: Die
l'herlie.feru"R der griechischerz christ/ichen Literatur in der /ateinischen
1\ircbe bis zum 12. jahrbrmdert (Miinchen, 1949). p. -!9 ff. and de Lubac: op.
cit .. pp. 221-304.
~o. See Courcelle: op. cit., pp. 227-232.
~I. Sec: Courcellc: op. dt., p. 229.
22 INTRODUCTION
Boethius- having written works almost after the pure pagan

manner.n
It is easier to compile a limited list of the pagan intermediaries
between ancient and mediaeval Platonism, and in an important
study E. Jeauneau has described four works as 'les grandes voies
par lesquelles !'heritage de Ia philosophie antique a pu etre
transmis au Moyen Age':73 Calcidius' translation with commen-
tary of the Timaeus, Macrobius' Commentarius in Somnium
Scipionis, Martianus Capella's De Nuptiis Phi/ologiae et Mer-
curii, and Boethius' De Consolatione Pbilosopbiae. 74 The
writer makes two remarks about his selection. First, he is con-
fining his attention strictly to pagan works, Boethius' De Con-
solatione being included because, despite its author's
undeniable Christian affiliation, the treatise is composed in a
largely pagan genre.75 Secondly, the titles only represent the
most important works to transmit pagan Platonism to the
mediaeval period, a fuller inventory needing to include at a se-
cond level of importance Cicero's philosophical works,
Seneca's Epistulae Morales, and Apuleius' De Deo Socratis and
De P/atone et eius Dogmate. 76 Jeauneau 's list of sources reflects
the one already compiled by Klibansky, although the latter add-
ed some further details regarding minor sources. Concerning
Seneca, Klibansky stressed the importance of Epistulae LVIII
and LXV in particular because of their most interesting discus-
sions of the Platonic theory of Forms in its first century A.D.ver-
72. Victorinus' commentary on Cicero's De lnrentione and Boethius' De

Consolatione Pbilosopbiae.
73. E. jeauneau: 'L'heritage de Ia philosophie antique durant le haut moyen
age'. Settimane di studio del Centro /t(l/iano di Studi suii'Aito Medioeto 22
(La cultura mrtica nell'occidente Iatino dal VII al/'Xf secolo) (Spoleto,
1975). pp. 1754.
74.)eauneau: op. cit., p. 21.
75.jeauneau: op. cit., pp. 25-26.
76. jeauneau: op. cit., pp. 27-28.
sion. while concerning Macrobius, he drew attention to the

,arious remarks about Platonic theology in that author's Satur-
nalia. In the same general category Klibansky placed brief items
of information regarding Platonism in Aulus Gellius' Noctes At-
ticae - presumably he recalled that this work contains,
together with Calcidius' commentary, the only information
about the content of Plato's Parmenides available in the early
Middle Ages- and in Valerius Maximus. 77 Finally, he noted the
importance of the Hermetic dialogue Asclepius which is extant
only in Latin and achieves a certain reputation in the eleventh
and twelfth centuries when it is cited by Adalbold of Utrecht,
Thierry of Chartres, and others.78
Are there any further pagan sources to be added to this list?
Among strictly philosophical works, one might perhaps feel im-
pelled to add the remaining treatises of Seneca whose Naturales
Quaestiones may have been one of the sources for Anselm of
Canterbury's famous 'ontological proof of God's existence,79
and the pseudo-Aristotelian De Mundo in the translation of
Apuleius which is often found copied in manuscripts together
with the original works of Apuleius and the Hermetic
Asclepius.so But besides such treatises there are two bodies of
literature in the early Middle Ages which, although not strictly
concerned with theology or metaphysics (the essential ingre-
dients of Platonic philosophy), do include passing references to
such topics which have considerable significance for the
transmission of the tradition. These bodies of literature are
works of logic and mythographic writings respectively. The im-
portance of the first category was also noted by jeauneaust who
Klibansky: op. cit., pp. 22-23.

7"'1.
~8. Klihansky: op. cit., p. 33.
79. See Nothdurft: op. cit., pp. 192-95.
80. See Beaujeu: op. cit., pp. xxxv-xlvi.
HI. Jeauneau: op. cit., pp. 17-18.
24 INTRODllCTION
described the advances in scholarship which have been made

during the last fifty years, and one has only to look at texts such
as the pseudo-Augustinian De Categoriis Decem and Boethius'
Dia/ogi in Isagogen Porphyrii to see how issues of logic are
often transformed into problems of metaphysics, the tendency
of late ancient thought to harmonize Plato and Aristotle which
is evidenced by Boethius' programB2 making this inevitable. The
same tendencies recur in mediaeval writers who make use of
these texts, and we thus find logical questions interpreted in
terms of metaphysics in Heiric of Auxerre's glosses on the
pseudo-Augustinian work and Gerbert's De rationa/i et ratione
uti. The second category is an equally important object of
scholarly investigation, for writings like Servius' Commentarii
in Aeneidem in their quotation of Platonic philosophical doc-
trine in an exegetical context and Fulgentius' Mitologiae with
their recourse to the common heritage of Platonists and Stoics
reveal a close interrelation of literature and metaphysics, this
approach stemming from the tendency of late ancient writers to
reduce all intellectual pursuits to the study of earlier
authorities.B3 These same tendencies recur in mythographic
82. The program of translating and commenting upon the whole of Plato
and Aristotle, and of demonstrating the essential agreement between the two
philosophies. See Boethius: In De lnterpr. ed. II. 2,3,79, 1-80,17.
83. This is indicated by the development of the mediaeval accessus ad auc-
torem - a preface attached to a literary work describing its subject matter,
the author's intention, and so on. Servius' Commentari/ in Aeneidem and
some of Boethius' logical works provided the models for such accessus, as E.
A. Quain: 'The Mediaeval Accessus ad Auctores', Traditio 3 (1945), pp.
215-264 has shown. These prefaces were in their turn based on techniques of
philosophical exegesis elaborated in late antiquity. See further R. W. Hunt:
'The Introductions to the Aries in the Twelfth Century'. Studia Mediaer1a/ia
in bonorem R.j. Martin (Bruges. I 948), pp. 85-112; C. E. Lutz: 'One Formula
of Accessus in Remigius' Works', Latomus 19 (1960), pp. 774-780; and R. B.
C. Huygens: Accessus ad Auctores. Bernard d'Utrecbt, Conrad d'Hirsau:
Dialogus super Auctores, edition critique e11tierement revue et aug-
mentee(Leiden, 1970).
MEDIAEVAL PLATONISM 2'5
writers of the Middle Ages, and the overlapping of literature and

metaphysics is found in the glosses on Martianus Capella's De
Nuptiis by Martin of Laon and Remigius of Auxerre and in
various writings of William of Conches.
All this is enough to demonstrate that the question of the in-
direct tradition of Platonism is such a complex one that we
perhaps feel the need for some further classification of the
material besides that into Christian and pagan which has so far
been employed. Fortunately, there is such a classification ready
to hand based on the different forms of Platonic philosophy
transmitted by these late ancient sources. Here, it is usual prac-
tice to distinguish in the first place 'Ancient Platonism'
represented by Speusippus, Xenocrates, and their pupils,
secondly 'Middle Platonism' which corresponds to the revival
of such teachings from approximately the first century B.C.,
and thirdly 'Neoplatonism represented by Plotinus, Porphyry,
and their followers. The classification is perhaps more com-
prehensive than is actually necessary for our purposes, since An-
cient Platonism has no counterpart among the Latin writers of
late antiquity. However,the inclusion of Ancient Platonism in
the scheme is essential, if we are to have any point of com-
parison with the Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism which do
have parallels with such writers. A classification along these
lines cuts across the previous one into Christian and pagan so
that we acquire five categories - (i) 'Pagan Ancient Platonic,'
(ii) 'Christian Middle Platonic,' (iii) 'Pagan Middle Platonic,' (iv)
'Christian Neoplatonic,' and (v) 'Pagan Neoplatonic' - into
four of which we can place the various Latin intermediaries. In-
to category (ii) would come writers like Tertullian, Lactantius.
and Arnobius; class (iii) would contain Cicero, Seneca, Gellius,
Apuleius, and the Asclepius; into category (iv) would come
Writers like Marius Victorious, Ambrose, Augustine, and Clau-
dianus Mamertus; and class (v) would contain Macrobius and
Martianus Capella.
26 INTRODUCTION
Of course such an analysis simplifies the situation con-

siderably, and in particular we have to be aware of three facts
regarding the transmission of Platonism. In the first place, some
writers criticize the doctrines which they report (Lactantius).
some report without a definite commitment (Cicero), and some
espouse the tenets of Platonic philosophy (Macrobius). Second-
ly, these writers often reflect different stages in the evolution of
that philosophical tradition, for example when Martianus
Capella combines theological ideas of Varro with a Porphyrian
demonology. Finally, we sometimes find both these considera-
tions applicable to a single author: thus Augustine will report
critically the doctrines of one period of Platonism (Varro) while
himself heavily under the influence of a later phase (Plotinus).
Yet these are just minor problems with the classification which
can surely be avoided if the material is examined with sufficient
care. More serious is the question whether the distinction bet-
ween different categories of Platonism itself is valid, and on this
topic there is considerably more to be said.
ii
It has generally been accepted for at least a hundred years

that Plato's thought and Neoplatonism are two different things,
the point apparently having been demonstrated by the great
nineteenth and twentieth-century historians of philosophy.
This view has been held to illustrate the triumph of the modern
critical spirit in historical studies - in contrast to the unreflec-
tive attitude of earlier times - and was presupposed by Hoff-
mann's argument that it was the Neoplatonism of late antiquity
which was transmitted to the Middle Ages and not Plato's
thought.B4 Obviously this view is meaningless without the
assumption that there is a radical distinction between the two
84. Seepp. 2-3.

GREEK PLATONISM 27
modes of thought. But does this contrast represent historical

fact? In answering this question we must first examine the
grounds upon which this distinction has been based, and these
seem to consist of arguments regarding the structure and the
genesis of Neoplatonic thought respectively.
The structural argument takes its starting point from the
Neoplatonic doctrine that reality consists of four hypostases:
the one, Intellect (equivalent to the world of Forms), Soul, and
the sensible world, in descending order of importance. Accor-
ding to this interpretation, the theory of the hypostases is
peculiarly Neoplatonic because such a system is not evolved to
anv degree in Plato's dialogues. Thus, E. Zeller85 argued that the
Form of the Good which Plato postulated as the first principle
of all reality in the Republic is not to be identified with the
Plotinian One because the former simply represents a supreme
Form whereas the latter is an ineffable first principle totally
transcending the realm of Forms. The fact that Plato is also
reported by Aristotle to have described his Good as the One
does not bring his theory any closer to the Plotinian position,
since this primal cause remains an immanent rather than
transcendent principle of the Forms. Furthermore, although
Plato postulates Soul as an intermediary between the Forms and
sensibles in dialogues such as the Pbaedo and the Timaeus, he
only describes its origins in a mythical manner, there being no
attempt to explain its derivation from the intelligible world in a
rational way along the lines of Plotinus' theory of emanation.
Since the Neoplatonic theory of hypostases is not only a ques-
tion of degrees of being (objective) but of grades of con-
1-!5. E. Zeller: Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Ent-

~~icklung dargestel/t 11112. 6. Auflage (Leipzig. 19 32), p. 529 ff. A similar view
1 ~ found in F. Oberweg: Grundriss der Geschicbte der Pbilosopbie 1: Die
PI 1'/
~ osoph1e fles A/tertums, herausgegeben von K. Praechter, 12. Auflage
masd, 1923). p. 596.
l8 INTRODUCTION
sciousness (subjective), it is possible to argue for the same con-

trast between Plato and Neoplatonism in epistemological terms.
Thus, E. Brehier86 observed that Plato's supreme principle is
called Being in dialogues such as the Sophist where a kind of
dialectical descent is envisaged from this Being to other genera
such as Same, Other, Motion, and Rest. For Plotinus however,
the first principle is strictly a One not described as Being but
rather as transcending it, from which develops not a dialectic
but a 'procession quasi mythique de I'etre a partir de l'Un.'87
For Plotinus there is only a dialectic through the hierarchical
ordering of Forms which constitutes the nature of Being as the
second hypostasis. Finally for Plotinus, the dialectical stage
itself is something which the philosopher must transcend in
order to attain comprehension of the supreme principle, this
latter being accessible in the last analysis to mystical experience
alone.ss
86. E. Brehier: 'Platonisme et neoplatonisme. A propos d'un livre du P.

Festugiere', Rer,ue des etudes grecques 51 ( 1938), pp. 489-498. Reprinted in
E. Brehier: Etudes de philosophie antique (Paris, 1955). pp. 56-64.
87. Brehier: op. cit., pp. 61-62.
88. P. Merlan: From Platonism to Neoplatonism, 3rd edition (The Hague,
1968), p. 1 summarizes the essential structure of the Neoplatonic system
from both the objective and subjective viewpoints. 'The following assump-
tions seem to be among those characteristic of what is called Neoplatonism.
1. A plurality of spheres of beings strictly subordinated to one another, so
that we have a series the single terms of which represent higher and lower
degrees of being - with the last, most unreal sphere of being comprising
what is usually called perceptible being, i. e. being in time and space. 2. The
derivation of each inferior sphere of being from its superior, this derivation
not being a process in time or space and therefore comparable to a mental
(logical) implication rather than a causal (spatio-temporal) relation, thus the
'causality' of all spheres with regard to each other not being of the type of ef-
ficient causality. 3. The derivation of the supreme sphere of being from a
principle which as the source of all being cannot be described as being - it is
above being and therefore fully indeterminate, this indeterminateness being
GREEK PLATONISM 29
The second kind of argument for the distinction between

Plaro and Neoplatonism is genetic in character, in that it takes
its starting point from the fact that Neoplatonic thought ac-
quired its peculiar character by synthesizing elements from
several earlier philosophical traditions, namely Platonism,
Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. A perceptive study by E. von
Ivanka89 explored the nature of the Neoplatonic doctrinal syn-
thesis by demonstrating that the dualistic aspect implied by the
contrast between Forms and sensibles follows Plato, but that
Neoplatonism also has a definite tendency towards monism
under the influence of Stoic philosophy, according to which the
dualism is essentially viewed in terms of the interrelation of
macrocosm and microcosm. This assimilation between the two
positions is made possible by the recasting of Plato's doctrine of
'participation' (J.l.E9E~1~) by combining it with Aristotle's view of
not the indeterminateness of a most universal concept, but an antic indeter-

minateness. i. c. fullest 'being' precisely because it is not limited to being this
or that. -!. The description of this antic indeterminateness also by saying that
tlu: supreme principle is One, this oneness expressing not only its uniqueness
hut also its complete simplicity, i. c. lack of any determination. 'One'
designating not some kind of adjectival description, but being rather the com-
paratively positive expression of the supreme principle being neither this nor
that. <;. The increasing multiplicity in each subsequent sphere of being,
greater multiplicity designating nor only the greater number of entities in
each subsequent sphere, but also increasing determination (limitation) of
each entity. until we arrive at spatio-temporal determination and therefore at
the minimum of oneness. 6. The knowledge appropriate to the supreme prin-
ciplt' as being radically different from the knowledge of any other object in
that the former in view of the strictly indeterminate character of the supreme
principle cannot be predicativc knowledge, which knowledge is appropriate
only to beings exhibiting some determination. And the most fundamental dif-
fkulty of what is called Ncoplatonism is the explanation and justification of
the why and how of the passage from the One to the multitude, with the prin-
l"iple of matter playing an important role in this process.
Hl). E. von lvanka: 'Die ncuplatonische Synthesc. lhre Bedeutung und ihre
Elt'menre'. Scbo/astik 20-24 ( 1945-49), pp. 30-38.
30 INTRODUCTION
the relation between matter and form. Von Ivanka's interpreta-

tion explains how the most basic tenets of Neoplatonism regar-
ding the nature of the hypostases and their relation to one
another can almost be deduced by disentangling the strains of
Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelianism which constitute it. It
goes without saying that this view explains the reason why
there is a fundamental distinction between Plato and Neo-
platonism.
If these structural and genetic arguments are valid, then we
are faced with two different kinds of philosophy, although the
one is a descendant of the other. Of course none of the scholars
who hold this view believe that the later variety of Platonism
arose suddenly or spontaneously, and it is therefore customary
to postulate an intermediate stage or series of stages in the
evolution of doctrine between Plato and Neoplatonism. Such is
the origin of the term 'Middle Platonism' or its equivalent in the
German-speaking world 'Pre-Neoplatonism' (Vorneu-
platonismus). This intermediate stage is one where historians
see for the first time intimations of the doctrine of the
hypostases or alternatively the earliest attempts to combine
Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. The admission that
there is a gradual evolution of doctrine between the earlier and
later periods sharpens the focus of the historical analysis,
although it also has the effect of bringing into question the ac-
curacy of the distinction which originally gave rise to it.
In recent years, therefore, scholars have begun increasingly
to question the validity of using 'Plato's thought,'
'Neoplatonism,' and 'Middle Platonism' as descriptions of
phases in the history of philosophy which can be significantly
isolated from one another. Such investigations have convincing-
ly shown how close to one another in aims and content are
Plato and Neoplatonism, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism,
and Plato and Middle Platonism. Of these three comparisons the
most important is the first, although it will be useful to survey
GREEK PLATONISM 31
the historical justifications for all three before proceeding to

other questions.
The argument for the tapprocbement of Plato and
Ncoplatonism begins from a study of the dialogues themselves,
and attempts to demonstrate that some of the philosophical
positions often characterized as uniquely Neoplatonic already
occur in a recognizable form in Plato's own text. Two studies
which appeared at about the same time made significant ad-
vances in this direction. That there is clear movement towards
the postulation of an ineffable first principle by Plato emerges
from an original and penetrating study of the dialogues by A.-J.
Festugiere,9o who argued for example that the final stages of the
epistemological ascent to Beauty in the Symposium have much
in common with the highest level of contemplation in Plotinus'
system. Thus, the object of love is approached through a se-
quence of negations concerning change, relation to other
things, and finally knowledge itself. Much of this is paralleled in
a more dialectical context by the Parmenides where the first
hypothesis speaks of the One using precisely the same group of
negations: it never came to be, is becoming or will come to be, it
is neither in another nor in itself, and it is inexpressible and
unknowable.91 If Festugiere is correct here, we cannot argue for
the distinction between the first and second hypostases in
Neoplatonism as totally foreign to Plato's own thinking, as
Zeller had maintained. That there is also some attempt to ex-
plain the derivation of soul from the intelligible was suggested
tJO. A.-J. Festugii:re: La rer1elation d'Hermes Trismegiste IV: Le Dieu in-

romw et Ia gnose (Paris, 1954 ), pp. 79-91. Festugiere here develops themes
1.rom his earlier work: Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon. 2<
edition (Paris, 1950). pp. 228-231 (of which Brchier's essay cited above was
l"~scmially a review).
tJ I Fcstugiere: La revelation d'Hennes Trismegiste IV: Le Dieu incomm et
1' 1 .l(llose pp. 84-86.
:U INTRODLICTION
by C. J. de Vogel92 in developing an interpretation of the famous

passage in the Sophist where Plato argues forcefully for a view
of the authentically real not as static and lifeless but as contain-
ing intellect, life, and soul. Her view was that Plato is not simply
stressing the rather obvious point that intellect, life, and soul
must really exist, but finding the source of vital and cognitive
elements in the realm of Forms itself which corresponds to the
authentically real.93 Furthermore, Plato's doctrine is here in line
with the cosmological theory of the Timaeus where the usual
world of Forms is replaced as a paradigm by an intelligible living
creature. Here de Vogel was drawing an important conclusion,
namely that we find soul in Plato described not only as an in-
termediary between the intelligible and sensible along the lines
implied by the Pbaedo but also as an intelligible principle in
some phase of its existence, whereas Zeller had only noted the
former type of description. Naturally the passages discussed by
these scholars are often minimized by interpreters of Plato - by
saying for example that one text is a purely literary interlude or
that another is a mere demonstration of methodology and so
on. But most interpreters in antiquity did not take this ap-
proach, believing rather that the burden of proof rests on those
who think that Plato does not mean exactly what he says.
Thus, there is ample evidence in the dialogues for a relation-
ship between Plato's thought and Neoplatonism much closer
than that envisaged by nineteenth-century scholarship, yet this
is certainly not the end of the matter since the important ques-
tion of Plato's so-called 'unwritten doctrines' needs to be rais-
ed. It is a fortunate accident that besides the dialogues we have a
great deal of indirect evidence regarding Plato's own teaching
in the Academy in the form of reports by later writers from
92. C. J. de Vogel: 'On the Neoplatonic Character of Platonism and the

Platonic Character of Neoplatonism. Mitrd 62 ( 195.3). pp. 43-64.
93. de Vogel: op. cit., pp. 56-57.
GREEK PLATONISM
Aristotle onwards. These accounts describe a doctrine which

has certain parallels with that in the dialogues but mainly ap-
pears to be an independent creation based upon the following
assumptions.94 Instead of the Forms being the foundation of the
sensible world there is a pair of supreme principles prior to
these called the One and the Indefinite Dyad whose interaction
generates lower levels of reality from the Forms (apparently
identified with numbers) downwards. Furthermore, these
tower levels of reality are not simply interpreted as the duality
of Forms and sensibles but through a triple classification of
Forms, mathematicals, and physicals. All this was stated by
Aristotle together with much further obscure detail, and the
tater ancient tradition accepted it without question as an ac-
curate description of Plato's metaphysical theory, such views
being held to have formed the content of a famous lecture 'On
the Good' delivered by the master.95 It is immediately apparent
that such a doctrine has much in common with Neoplatonic
theories, since we find the derivation of the world of Forms
from a higher principle or principles together with a complex
stratification of reality as in Plotinus. It was therefore quite
justified for L. Robin, one of the earliest students of Aristotle's
presentation of Plato's thought, to refer to the younger man's
'interpretation neoplatonicienne de Ia philosophic de son
m;litrc: .'96 It is also not surprising that this description of the un-
9t. A hrid account of the doctrine and its textual evidence can be found in
\'\' D. Ross: Plato's Theory uf Ideas (Oxford. 1951). p. 142 ff. P. Merlan:
'(ifl'ck Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus'. The Cambridge History of Later
Greek and Ear(J' Mediet,al Philosophy, edited by A. H. Armstrong (Cam-
bridge, 196'7). pp. 14-38 and J. Dillon: The Middle Platonists. A Stud} of
Platonism HOB. C. to A. D. 220 (London. 1977 ). pp. 1-11 describe the doc-
trinc in connection with its later influence. See also the studies cited below.
9'l. Aristoxcnus: Elem. Harm. II, 30. The later accounts in Themistlus and
Produ~ seem to be based on this. Seen. 103.
9 6. L. Robin: La theorie plat(m/cienne des idees et des nombres d'apres
.-ln.,tote (Paris. 190M), p. 600.
.H INTRODliCTION
written doctrines has led to considerable perplexity on the part

of modern scholars, especially those who have maintained the
thesis of a radical distinction between Plato and Neoplatonism.
For this reason, there seem to have arisen three modern schools
of thought regarding the significance of Aristotle's account.97
The first is represented preeminently by H. Cherniss who has
denied altogether the importance of Plato's oral teaching as a
supplement to or correction of doctrines found in the
dialogues. According to Cherniss,9S the dialogues represented
all Plato's teaching in the ancient Academy just as they do to-
day, and statements by Aristotle or other writers which seem-
ingly contradict the dialogues are a result of misunderstanding
or sometimes wilful distortion of these texts. Plato did indeed
deliver the lecture 'On the Good,' but this was an exceptional
occurrence, as shown by the widespread perplexity regarding
its doctrine which the ancient authorities report. The second in-
terpretation accepts the correctness of Aristotle's report that
Plato had a philosophical doctrine taught orally and not
reflected in the dialogues, but confines this teaching to a final
phase of Plato's career when he had ceased to write regularly on
metaphysical questions. This view is undoubtedly the dominant
one in modern times, being accepted by E. Zeller,99 L. Robin,JOo
97. There is a useful survey of the various attitudes to the evidence regar-
ding Plato's esoteric doctrine in E. N. Tigerstedt: Interpreting Plato
(Stockholm. 1977), pp. 77-82 who distinguishes five approaches in all. In ad-
dition to the three described below. Tigerstedt notes the view of H. von
Stein: Sieben Bucher zur Geschichte des Platm1ismus. Untersuchungen iiber
das System des Plato und sein Verhii/tniss zur spiiteren Theologie und
Phllosophie II (Gottingen. 1864), p. 76 ff. that the unwritten doctrines are
essentially identical with those in the dialogues. together with another more
modern compromise position.
98. H. Cherniss: The Riddle of the f..'arly Academy (Berkeley. CA. 1945)
and Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore, MD. 1944).
99.Zeller:op, c/t.,1lfl.pp.416, 712,947,and950.
100. Robin: op. cit., pp. 601-602.
GREEK PLATONISM y;
). Stenzel,IOI W. D. Ross,1o2 and others, although its supporters

manifest varying degrees of conviction. The third interpretation
is associated primarily with H. J. Kdimerl03 and K. Gaiseri04
who place considerable emphasis upon the role of Plato's oral
teaching as a supplement to or revision of doctrines expressed
in the dialogues. According to Kramer, the dialogues were simp-
tv written as introductory works aimed at the general public,
~hile Aristotle's account describes the more advanced
philosophical teaching of Plato within the Academy. Further-
more, the master himself testifies to the superiority of the
spoken over the written wordiOS by saying that the highest
philosophical truths should never be described in a book, being
accessible not to the discursive method of the other sciences but
only in a moment of intuition.I06 It is not possible to do justice
to these three interpretations in such a brief summary, but some
general conclusions may perhaps be sketched provisionally. In
lO I. ). Stenzel: Zahl und Gestalt bel Pia ton und Arlstoteles, 3. Autlage
(Bad Homburg, 1959).
I OZ. Ross: op. cit., p. 149.
10:\. H.-). Kramer: Arete bel Platon und Arlstoteles. Zum Wesen und zur
Geschichte der platonlschen Ontologie (Heidelberg, 1959) and Der Ursprung
der Gelstmetaphyslk. Untersuchungen zur Geschlchte des Platonlsmus
Zll'ischen Platon und Plotln (Amsterdam, 1964).
I 04. K. Gaiser: Protreptlk und Pariinese bel Pia ton. Untersuchungen zur
Form des platonlschen Dialogs (Stuttgart, 1959) and Platons ungeschriebene
l.ebre. Stud/en zur systematlschen und geschichtlichen Begrundung der
V:'issenschaften in der platonischen Schule, 2. Autlage (Stuttgart, 1968). The
lau~:r work contains a substantial appendix giving all the testimonia in an-
cient sources regarding the unwritten doctrines.
IO'i. Kramer: Arete bel Platon und Arlstoteles, p. 22 ff. The most signifi-
cant texts in this connection are Plato: Phaedr. 278b-c and Epist. VII, 34Ib-
.3-i'ic.
106. On this interpretation see further J. Wippern: Das Problem der
tmgeschriebenen Lebre Pia tons. Beitriige zum Verstiindnis der platonischen
Prinzipienphi/osopbie, herausgegeben \'On). W. (Wege der Fnrschtmg 186)
marmstadt, 1972).
36 l:'llTRODl!CTION
the first place, Cherniss' approach which rejects so much con-

temporary testimony and asserts that Aristotle was incompetent
if not actually dishonest has failed to gain the general support of
scholars. The view of Zeller and others is inherently more
plausible, although its adoption gives rise to certain difficulties
of interpretation: namely that Plato was engaged in writing the
Laws during his last years and this work makes no reference to
these characteristic unwritten doctrines, while Aristotle had
joined the Academy a number of years before this time and
would hardly have confined his accounts of Plato's teaching
merely to the period of the master's old age. Finally, Kramer's
thesis involves too much reconstruction of doctrine on the basis
of rather scanty and ambiguous evidence even if it is reasonable
enough as a general line of interpretation. Fortunately, it is not
necessary for us to adjudicate between these three positions but
only to draw the one inescapable conclusion from the existence
of the controversy itself. For whether the doctrines reported by
Aristotle are authentic theories of Plato or merely interpreta-
tions of his views by a circle of his students, in either case they
testify to the currency of a philosophy in the early Academy
which bears striking resemblances to that which is termed
Neoplatonism. In other words, the rigidly conceived line of
demarcation between ancient Platonism and Neoplatonism
represents an oversimplified view of the history of philosophy.
If the distinction between these two phases in the history of
philosophy is narrowed to this extent, then the precise identity
of an interm(diate stage called Middle Platonism becomes more
difficult to determine. In fact modern scholars have not been
slow to recognize the origins of characteristically Neoplatonic
notions in earlier periods of Platonism, one of the most
celebrated examples being E. R. Dodds' demonstration 107 that
I 07. E. R. Dodds: 'The: Parmenides of Plato and the: Origins of the

:'1/c:oplatonic One'. Classical Quarterly 22 ( 1928), pp. 129-142.
GREEK PLATONISM :\7
the notion of a One above Being derived from the interpretation

of Plato's Parmenides is found in certain so-called
Neopythagorean' writers of the first century B. C. and the first
century A. D. such as Eudorus and Moderatus. During his
discussion he went even further in tracing the origin of some
aspects at least of the Neoplatonic first hypostasis in Plato's own
pupil Speusippus,JOs who is said by one doxographer to have
distinguished the One from Intellect, although it seems that this
One was viewed entirely as a seminal potency and therefore on-
ly partially a forerunner of the Neoplatonic first principle.
Besides the notion of the One, we also find in the earlier
Platonic tradition numerous suggestions of the distinction bet-
ween the One and the intelligible world which will eventually
be manifested as the relation between the first and second
hypostases. Thus, C. ]. de VogeJI09 has shown how Philo com-
bined Plato's intelligible world with the Stoic Logos or imma-
nent cosmic law to form a principle called a second god or
mediator which springs forth from the divine wisdom while the
sensible world is derived from the same source as a kind of
younger son. She went on to demonstrate Ito that similar hierar-
chies of principles occur in Plutarch, the Hermetica, Albinus,
;\/umenius, and perhaps most strikingly of all in the Valentinian
Gnosticism where, albeit in a mythical form, we find something
amazingly close to Plotinus' account of the derivation of the
sensible world from soul. These are just a few illustrations of the
important results of modern scholarship in this field, but they
indicate most clearly what one might call the continuity of the
Platonic tradition in late antiquity.
It only remains to say a few words about the relationship bet-
ween Middle Platonism and Plato to parallel the earlier observa-
I 0~. Dodds: op. cit.. p. 136.

109. de Vogel: op. cit., pp. 46-47.
I 10. de Vogel: op. cit., p 47 ff.
INTRODUCTION
tions regarding the connection of Neoplatonism with Plato, and

here also we have much valuable modern scholarship to assist
us. Earlier, we saw that there were two fundamental doctrines
of Plato's oral teaching as reported by Aristotle: the postulation
of the One and the Indefinite Dyad as a pair of first principles,
and the theory of mathematicals as intermediaries between in-
telligibles and sensibles. That the doctrine of the One and the In-
definite Dyad plays a major role in Middle Platonism has been
shown by J. Dillon while examining the metaphysical system
of Plutarch from this viewpoint. The latter lays emphasis upon a
tendency of at least part of the earlier tradition to interpret the
dyad as a source of evil or disorder, supporting the view with
parallels drawn from oriental dualistic religious systems in
which he had an abiding interest. The supreme principle is call-
ed the One or Osiris and, in its lower or immanent manifesta-
tion, combines with an opposite principle known as the Dyad
or Seth. An example of the use of mathematical intermediates in
Middle Platonism is provided by Posidonius to whom attention
has been drawn by the studies of P. Merlan.II2 A passage of
Plutarch describes the theory of the ancient Platonist
Xenocrates that, since Plato's account of the generation of soul
as an intermediary between intelligible and sensible in the
Timaeus is also an account of the production of mathematicals,
then soul itself can be viewed as a self-moving number. Plutarch
goes on to attribute the same doctrine to Posidonius who
thereby becomes an important transmitter of a teaching stemm-
ing ultimately from the early Academy.
All this may seem like an excessively long treatment of the
question to what extent Plato and Neoplatonism differ. Yet the
issue is an important one, since a too rigid conceptual distinc-
tion between the two phases often serves to obscure the real
Ill. Dillon: op. cit., pp. 199-208.

112. Merlan: From Platonism to Neoplatonism, pp. 34-SR.
GREEK PLATONISM 39
philosophical questions being discussed during this period. In

saying this there is no suggestion that the history of Platonism
has no developments and that, as the ancient writers sometimes
claim, the entire Neoplatonic system was already present in the
earliest Pythagorean or Orphic utterances. There clearly is an
evolution: but this evolution is a gradual one in which doctrines
move from an implicit to an explicit form, this process of
development being the points at which the motives for holding
this or that philosophical tenet are laid bare. Thus, when
Plotinus states that his teaching about the three primal
hypostases is not a novelty, but has been accepted even if not in
any explicit form since early times, t 13 we should certainly not
dismiss this as a simple illustration of a pre-critical attitude to
the history of thought. So much of the textual evidence for the
Platonism of the intermediate period has been lost that we shall
never to be able to chart its evolution with accuracy. Yet what
remains gives considerable support to the historical viewpoint
expressed by Plotinus.
Assuming that the notions of Plato's thought and
Neoplatonism should be used more cautiously than has often
been the case in the past, does this leave us in the position of
having no viable definitions for such terms? Not necessarily so,
since what is required is simply a new attempt to define the ter-
minology which avoids both the ancient tendency to ignore the
evolutionary aspect of the history of Platonism and the modem
propensity to fragmentary interpretation of continuous
developments in ideas. The remarks which follow represent an
attempt to formulate some definitions capable of being applied
in the manner described.
It is naturally very hazardous to reduce the philosophy of so
profound a thinker as Plato to any mere tabulation of fun-
damental tenets, although we may perhaps safely indicate cer-
113. Plotinus: Enn. \'. I /10/8. I ff.

-40 INTRODUCTION
tain underlying tendencies as being crucial to the formulation of

all his teachings. These tendencies are first, the dualism of
spiritual and material and secondly, the conception of the rela-
tion between spiritual and material in a threefold manner: as a
transcendence of the former, as its immanence, and as its
simultaneous transcendence and immanence.ll4 The dualistic
element is obvious as the most fundamental feature of all Plato's
philosophy where 'intelligible' (vorrr6v) is contrasted with 'visi-
ble' (6pat6v) or 'sensible' (aio911t6v) as in the Republic, 115 or
'being' (ov) with 'becoming' (ytyv6J.lf:vov) as in the Timaeus, 116
or more specifically the 'intelligible and incorporeal Forms'
(VOTitcl xai ao<.i>JJ.ata EiB11) with 'bodies' (O<.i>J.l.ata) in the
Sophist. 117 The triple relation is not apparent as a formalized
principle in any single passage, but that it is an essential element
in the application of the theory of Forms becomes clear by com-
paring the description of the Form of Beauty in the Symposium
as 'not present in any other thing but absolute' (oM& nou ov E.v
etEPQl ttvt ... aU..'auto xa9'aut6)118 - implying transcendence
-with that of 'the tallness in us' (to f.v tiJJ.iV J.1.Eye9oc;) in the final
argument for immortality of the Phaedoll9- the structure of
the proof indicating that the reference must be both to a Form
and to its immanence. The combination of these opposites is in-
dicated by Plato in two ways: first by means of the 'presence'
(napeivat)12o of the Form in the sensible body or the 'participa-
tion' (J.l.EtEXEtv)l21 of the body in the Form, and secondly by
114. For the reasons why these doctrines should be central to Neoplatonic
thought and. at least implicitly, to Plato himself see below.
II '5. Plato: Rep. VI. S09d, etc.
116. Plato: Tim. 27d.
I 17. Plato: Sopb. 246b.
118. Plato: S;mp. 211a- b.
119. Plato: Pbaed. 102d.
120. Plato: Lys. 217d.
121. Plato: Parm. 132d-l33a.
GREEK PLATONISM 41
postulating soul as an intermediary between the higher and

lower realms. It is characteristic of Plato's writing that concep-
tual distinctions are not enshrined in a fixed terminology, and
so we find the philosophical notions described above often
treated allusively and unsystematically. Yet their repeated oc-
currence in all periods of Plato's work testifies to their fun-
damental significance as elements in his metaphysical thinking
as a whole.
It is perhaps the desire to elaborate these underlying tenden-
cies towards a dualism of spiritual and material and towards a
threefold conception of the relation between spiritual and
material which should be adopted as the distinguishing mark of
Neoplatonists. Such a definition would certainly indicate a
wider application of the term 'Neoplatonism' than is usual in
modern scholarship - it would embrace all Platonists back to
the master's younger contemporaries and pupils, only Plato
himself being totally excluded from the reckoning - yet the
manner in which these philosophers return time and time again
to these same issues provides some justification for treating
them as parts of a unified historical phenomenon. Assuming that
Neoplatonists can indeed be uniquely characterized in this way,
our next task must be to examine in detail how they elaborated
the underlying tendencies which have been identified, once
:1gain employing the distinction between structural and genetic
analyses.t22
From the structural viewpoint, the Neoplatonists continue to
operate in terms of the dualism of spiritual and material, yet the
two domains are understood in terms of progressively more
complex distinctions which tend to obscure the original
dichotomy. Thus Albinus' Didascalicus contrasts as objects of
perception intelligibles which are primary (Forms) and secon-
dary (immanent Forms) with sensibles which are primary
1.!2. Seep. 27.

42 INTRODl 'CTION
(qualities) and secondary (qualified objects).IH Plotinus' in-

telligibles are no longer simply Plato's Forms but the unity in
plurality of Intellect where the intellective subject and intelligi-
ble object are inseparable correlatives: the 'intelligible world'
(xoa~oc; vorrr6c;).t24 Proclus' intelligibles are again not simply
Plato's Forms but a multiplicity of principles both in and prior
to Intellect: life, being, the 'henads' (tvaoec;), etc.t25 The tradi-
tional dualism is also modified in a more original and striking
manner in certain texts of Plotinus where the intelligible world
or the hypostasis of Intellect attains to such a degree of com-
prehensiveness that it contains not only Forms of universals but
also of every individual thing in the lower realm.t26 This
modification of the traditional viewpoint results from Plotinus'
appreciation of the close relation between transcendence and
immanence, yet even he does not develop this tendency to its
ultimate conclusion that the sensible world is simply a
manifestation of the intelligible. 127
The Neoplatonists' elaboration of the triple relation between
the spiritual and the material in Plato's philosophy takes a much
more complicated form - herein lie the principal philosophical
developments within the tradition - and at this juncture it is
only possible to sketch these in the abstract, leaving the inter-
pretation to be confirmed later by the detailed analysis of
primary sources. In the first place, the Neoplatonists all em-
phasize the transcendence of the spiritual world in relation to
the material: a separation which is absolute and unqualified, the
123. Albin us: Didasc. 4, 7.

124. Plotinus: Enn. V. 8 I.H I I. I. etc.
125. Proclus: Elem. Tbeo/. 140, 28 ff.
126. Plotinus: Enn. VI. 7/38/12. Iff.
127. Plotinus was, however, aware of such a possibility. See A. H.Arm-
strong: 'The Theory of the Non-Existence of Matter in Plotinus and the Cap-
padocians'. Studia Patrlstica 5 (Berlin, 1962). pp. 427-29. Reprinted in A. H.
Armstrong: Plotinian and Christian Studies (London, 1979). pp. 427-29.
GREEK PLATONISM 43
basis of epistemological certainty, causality in the physical

world and ethical aspiration. Similarly, the Neoplatonists stress
the immanence of the spiritual, its causality in all respects being
dependent upon a real and active presence in the world of pro-
cess.I2B Furthermore, since for them transcendence is the
primary aspect and transcendence implies unity in relation to
space (indivisibility) and time (immutability), the spiritual reali-
tv which is transcendent and immanent must be one and the
s~me.IZ9 This final conclusion is not drawn to the same extent
by all the Neoplatonists, and it is possible to distinguish two
groups among them. The first group realizes the contradiction
implicit in this notion of spiritual reality and attempts to handle
it in one of three ways: to leave it as a paradox, to interpret the
spiritual world as a continuum, or to indicate the truth by
means of metaphors. Plotinus and Porphyry follow this ap-
proach. The other group does not emphasize the contradiction
to the same extent, preferring to explain the aspects of
transcendence and immanence respectively by postulating two
distinct spiritual principles: one transcendent and the other im-
manent. At this point, the essential unity of the spiritual world is
either sacrificed completely, or else it re-emerges in a weaker
form through the positing of an intermediate principle between
the transcendent and immanent ones. Some pre-Piotinian and
post-Plotinian writers take this approach. One is tempted to ask
why these two distinctive interpretations of reality arose among
the Neoplatonists, and the answer seems to lie in the conflict
between grasping Being intuitively (as indivisible) and discur-
12H. A. J. Festugiere: La relelafi(m d'Hermes Trismegiste II: Le Dieu

wsmique. pp. x ff. and 51-71 has ably examined the transcendent and imma-
ntnt tendencies in the philosophy of late antiquity with special reference to
the Hennetica.
12lJ. At this point especially the Neoplatonists go beyond the handling of
this problem in Plato.
44 1;\ITRODUCTION
sively (as divided). Thus, with the first group of thinkers the in-
tuitive and discursive modes of philosophy are pursued in
cooperation with one another, whereas with the second group
the two modes of thought often proceed along independent
paths.
From the genetic viewpoint, we find that the various
philosophical schools of late antiquity such as the Neoplatonic
and the Stoic appreciate the dualism of spiritual and material
and the threefold relation of spiritual to material to different ex-
tents. The attitude of the Neoplatonic school has already been
described. Here, the unity of the transcendent and immanent
relations is stressed to varying degrees and, when the unity is
heavily emphasized, the contradiction is handled by the notions
of continuum and metaphor; but when the unity is less em-
phatic, the contradiction is removed by understanding the con-
traries as distinct principles or by inserting a mediator between
them. In short, the Neoplatonic philosophy of late antiquity is a
dualism with tendencies to monism. The attitude of the Stoic
school is in many respects the opposite of that of the
Neoplatonic. With them, the transcendent and immanent rela-
tions are represented by the alternation between the two direc-
tions of the tonic motion, their unity being guaranteed by the
replacement of the duality of spiritual and material with that of
active and passive which are alike material. Thus, the Stoic
philosophy of late antiquity can be viewed as a monism with
tendencies to dualism. The influence of their doctrines upon
Neoplatonism is extensive and well documented - the most
significant legacy being the emphasis upon monism which the
earlier school transmits to the later - and it is this influence
which leads modern scholars to speak of the 'syncretism' of
Neoplatonic thought. However, such a term should only be
employed with caution when the writers of antiquity
themselves believed that the Platonic and Stoic traditions were
interdependent from the time when Zeno of Citium left the
GREEK PlATONISM
Academy. Furthermore, the term 'syncretism' is employed

somewhat inconsistently by modern scholars since Plotinus is
usually styled a syncretist for combining Platonic, Aristotelian,
and Stoic elements in his thought whereas Plato who combined
equally diverse Heraclitean, Pythagorean, and Pam1enidean
tenets is apparently not one. Finally, the term has a pejorative
connotation which is quite unjustified since it is absurd to
believe that a writer who draws influence only from one tradi-
tion is necessarily more intelligent than one who takes his in-
spiration from two or more.
One can perhaps conclude from even this brief discussion
that the proposed definition of Neoplatonism as that
philosophy which is concerned with the elaboration of certain
underlying tendencies in Plato's own teaching has a number of
advantages. First, it identifies certain patterns of thought more
basic than the postulation of three hypostases, the latter doc-
trine being actually one of the consequences of these modes of
thought. Secondly, it avoids the establishment of arbitrary
srages in the evolution of Platonism: rather, each Neoplatonist is
interpreted as making an individual response to the fundamen-
tal set of philosophical problems. Thirdly, it avoids the
establishment of artificial norms of pure' Platonism from which
most of the systems arising later must be held to lapse towards
syncretism. Finally, it provides us with a basis for examining not
only the various systems of thought elaborated in late antiquity
hut also their descendants during the mediaeval period, the
Renaissance, and modem times.
At this point we may return to the analysis of the indirect
Platonic tradition embarked upon earlier, and it will perhaps be
recalled that a classification was proposed using the following
principles.t3o In the first place were distinguished 'Ancient
Platonism' represented by Speusippus, Xenocrates, and their
130. Sec p. 25.

46 I~TRODUCTION
pupils, 'Middle Platonism' which corresponds to the revival of

such teachings from approximately the first century B.C., and
'Neoplatonism' represented by Plotinus, Porphyry, and their
followers. Since this classification cut across the obvious one in-
to Christian and pagan, we acquired four categories into which
to place the various Latin intermediaries. Thus, in the second
place were distinguished (i) 'Christian Middle Platonism' which
includes writers like Tertullian, Lactantius, and Arnobius; (ii)
'Pagan Middle Platonism' embracing Cicero, Seneca, Gellius,
Apuleius, and the Asclepius; (iii) 'Christian Neoplatonism'
which includes writers like Marius Victorinus, Ambrose,
Augustine, and Claudianus Mamertus; and (iv) 'Pagan
Neoplatonism' embracing Macrobius and Martianus Capella. 131
It was the positing of this classification of the indirect sources of
mediaeval Platonism which compelled us to examine its basis in
the history of ancient philosophy, and we must now ask
whether the results of that latter investigation have strengthen-
ed or weakened our premises.
In short we have to ask: does the division of the history of an-
cient philosophy into Ancient Platonic, Middle Platonic, and
Neoplatonic phases conflict with our definition of
Neoplatonism as the progressive elaborations of Plato's own no-
tions of spiritual and material and of transcendent, immanent
and transcendent-immanent?t32 Using a purely chronological
interpretation of the phases in ancient thought, of course, there
is no reason to consider that there is any conflict. Thus, if by a
'Neoplatonist' we mean simply a Platonic philosopher who liv-
ed in the time of Plotinus or later, by an 'Ancient Platonist' a
member of the early Academy, and by a 'Middle Platonist' a
philosopher active in the intervening period; then such ter-
131. For reasons which have already been stated in the earlier discussion.
the second classification contains only four categories.
132. Seep. 41 ff.
GREEK PLATONISM 47
minology can be employed without committing ourselves to the

belief that there are radical differences of approach to the
underlying philosophical questions among these three groups.
l :sing a more ideological interpretation of the phases in ancient
thought. however, there is clearly a conflict between the
historical division and our definition of Neoplatonism. For, if by
a 'Neoplatonist' we mean a Platonic philosopher who deviates
from the original assumptions of Plato, by an 'Ancient Platonist'
a thinker imbued with the master's own outlook, and by a 'Mid-
dlc Platonist' a philosopher whose approach lies between these
two extremes, then such terminology cannot be employed
without implying that there are significant differences of ap-
proach among these three groups to the fundamental philo-
sophical problems.l.:\3 Since our definition of Neoplatonism as
the progressive elaborations of Plato's own notions of spiritual
and material and of transcendent, immanent, and transcendent-
immanent has proved to be the one which best accords with the
facts. we shall therefore employ the division into Ancient
Platonism, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism as a purely
cbronological classification in all sections of the present study.
Assuming that each of the Latin writers who are sources of
mediaeval Platonism has a special response to the basic set of
philosophical issues first raised by Plato, can we explain the
transformation of ancient into mediaeval Platonism adequately
by examining each of these writers' doctrines in turn? This
question can certainly be answered in the affirmative. But since
the authors who represent the sources of mediaeval Platonism
were numerous and often prolific in their literary activity, is it
remotely feasible to attempt a survey of all their doctrines in the
kind of detail necessary to provide a true picture? This question
13 3. Scholars do not interpret these phases in a purely ideological way, but

u~ually with a confusion of chronological and ideological meanings.
48 INTRODUCTION
can only be answered in the affirmative with certain qualifica-

tions.t34
The first qualification is that an adequate survey of part of
the Latin sources of mediaeval Platonism can be made within a
limited compass and, since this would more clearly manifest the
intellectual legacy bestowed by the ancient upon the mediaeval
world, the part selected for examination should undoubtedly be
the pagan one. In accordance with this conclusion our study
will therefore consider first the Middle Platonic sources: Cicero,
Seneca, the Latin doxographies, Gellius, Apuleius, Censorious
134. The following table represents the conclusions of the next paragraph
in summary form:
Ill. I Cicero
2 Seneca
1/2. ~ Gellius
.f Apuleius
5 the Asclepius
A Censorinus
B Doxography of Ambrose
C Doxography of Augustine
II. 6 Calcidius
7 Macrohius
8 Martianus Capella
9 Boethius
D Marius Victorinus
E Firmicus Maternus
F Favonius Eulogius
G Servius
H Fulgentius
I Priscianus Lydus
App. X Varro
The Christian writers Calcidius and Boethius are included for reasons
stated on p. 22. For Varro seep. 809 ff.
GREEK PI.ATONISM 49
and the Asclepius: and secondly the Neoplatonic sources:

Marius Victorious, Firmicus Maternus, Calcidius, Favonius
Eulogius. Macrobius, Servius, Martianus Capella, Fulgentius,
Prisdanus Lydus, and Boethius.l35 Since some of these writers
are more widely used as philosophical sources by mediaeval
rtaders than others, it is possible to divide them into a list of
primary and a list of secondary writers respectively. The
primary list will therefore contain among the Middle Platonists:
Cicero. Seneca, Gellius, Apuleius, and the Asclepius, and among
rhe Neoplatonists: Calcidius, Macrobius, Martianus Capella, and
Boethius - these will require extensive analysis of their doc-
trine: while the secondary list will contain among the Middle
Platonists: the Latin doxographers and Censorious, and among
the Neoplatonists: Marius Victorious, Firmicus Maternus,
Fa\'onius Eulogius, Servius, Fulgentius, and Priscianus Lydus-
these can be dealt with in an altogether briefer manner. 136 Final-
ly. our study will make a further subdivision within the Middle
Platonic sources first into those in which Stoic tendencies
predominate: Cicero and Seneca; and secondly into those in
which Platonic tendencies predominate: the Latin dox-
ographers, Gellius, Apuleius, Censorious, and the Asclepius.l37
Some of the reasons for choosing this arrangement of the
material will be obvious enough to a reader of the earlier discus-
sion, although the justification for others must await the detail-
<:d analysis to be undertaken in separate chapters of this study.
The second qualification is that an adequate survey of the
doctrine of the Latin sources of mediaeval Platonism can be
15<;. Thb corrt:sponds 10 the division into Part I and Part II. Sec the table in
n. 15-1.
I:\(>. This n>rrcsponds to the division between chapters (I, 2, j, etc.) and
l'Xcur~us (A, B. c. ctc.)See the table inn. 134.
1 -~- This corresponds to the division into Part Ill and Part 1/2. See the
tahlt-inn.l:\1.
50 INTRODUCTION
made in the present state of scholarship, although only a provi-

sional survey of the influence of those sources is possible when
so many manuscript works still await the attention of editors.
Because of this state of affairs our study will devote its main at-
tention to the doctrinal positions of the Latin Middle Platonists
and Neoplatonists which can be reconstructed both in
themselves and in relation to their Greek sources, combining
this with the subordinate task of tracing these writers' influence
until roughly the middle of the twelfth century .138 It is hoped
that even this limited undertaking will produce results of con-
crete value to students of both ancient and mediaeval
philosophy, although clearly much will remain to be done in the
area described above by the present writer on some future occa-
sion and also by others.
138. This corresponds to the division between the main text and the
bibliographical notes at the beginning of each chapter.
Part 1.1
Middle Platonism
The Platonists and the Stoics

1
Cicero
1. 1 INTRODUCTION
It is fortunate for later generations that Cicero, the great

Roman orator and statesman, also applied himself to the study
of philosophy during his youth and during later periods of
politital inactivity. This study resulted in the composition of a
number of treatises which expounded the influential Greek
philosophies of the period in Latin and, because of the subse-
quent loss of most of the Greek originals, now provide virtually
the only extant documentation of this thought. For the readers
of the mediaeval period also, Cicero was an important preserver
of the treasures of ancient wisdom, either directly through his
own works - the rhetorical treatise De lnventione and the
Somnium Scipionis were extremely popular throughout the
:\1iddle Ages- or indirectly through writers of late antiquity-
for example, Macrobius and Augustine- who drew inspiration
from him'.
I. T. ,1. Hunt: 'The Mediae\'al Tradition of Cicero's Theological Works'.

PtRasus ( Llni\ersity of Exeter Classical Society) S ( 1966), pp. 54-56 concludes
that Cicero's philosophical works were little used in the Middle Ages bet-
Wt-cn bidore of Se\ille and John of Salisbury - the only exception being
lladoard's collection of extracts during the Carolingian period. This judge-
'~ll'nt is cxcessivc and based purely upon the examination of the direct tradi-
tron. thl indirect transmission of Ciceronian doctrines (especially through
lht works of certain Fathers) being of great significance. There is unfor-
tunately no detailed study of Cicero in the Middle Ages. although T. Zielinski:
54 MIDDI.E PLATONISM
Cicero im Wandel der }ahrhunderte, 4. Auflagc (Leipzig/Berlin, 1929), pp.

89-133 and R. Bossuat: 'Ciceron au moyen age', Dictionnaire des lettres
franfaises 1: Le moyen dge, edite parR. Bossuat, L. Pichard, G. Raynaud de
Lage (Paris, 1964 ), pp. 194-96 provide some initial orientation. For the direct
tradition of specific works, see for De Natura Deorum, I. Opelt: 'Ciceros
Schrift De natura deorum bei den lateinischen Kirchenvatern', Antike und
AIJem/lmul 12 ( 1966). pp. lf 1-155 and P. Busdraghi: 'II De mltura deorum
di Cicerone e Nonio Marcello', Studi Noniani 5 (Genoa 1978), pp. 7-37; for
De Officiis, N. E. Nelson: 'Cicero's De Officiis in Christian Thought
300-1300', Unirersity of Michigan Publications, Language and Literature
10 (1933). pp. 59-160; for De Republica, E. Heck: Die Bezeugung von
Ciceros Schrift De rc publica (Hildesheim, 1966); and for the Sonmium Sci-
pionis (from De Republica VI), P. Courcelle: 'La posterite chretienne du
Songe de Scipion', Rerue des etudes latines 36 ( 1958), pp. 205-234 and B.
Munk Olsen: 'Quelques aspects de Ia diffusion du Somnium Scipionis de
Ciceron au moyen :lge (du JXc au Xllr siecle)". Studia Rom ana in honorem P.
Krarup, edited by K. Ascani, etc. (Odense, 1976), pp. 146-153. Munk Olsen:
op. cit., p. 146 has counted the number of manuscripts of various Ciceronian
works in the Middle Ages (excludingjlorilegia) with the following results: De
lmentione 144, Somnium Scipionis 100, De Officiis 54, Topica 45.
Pamdoxa Stoicorum 20, Tusculanae Dispmaliones 17, De Natura Deorum
13. De Dir,inatione 12, Timaeus 9, De Fato 8, De Oratore 6, De Legibus 6,
Academica S. Lucullus 3. De Fin/bus 3. On the indirect tradition in general
see H. Hagendahl: L(ltin Fathers and the Classics. A Stud) on the Apologists,
jerome, and other Christian Writers (Goteborg, 1958). For Lactantius see R.
M. Ogilvie: The Library of Lactantius (Oxford, 1978): for Ambrose sec H. F.
Coyle: 'Cicero's De Officiis and De Officiis Ministrorum of St. Ambrose',
Franciscan Studies IS ( 1955), pp. 224-256 and S.N.D. Charles: 'The Classical
Latin Quotations in the Letters of St. Ambrose', Greece and Rome. Series 2,
15 (1968), pp. 186-197; for Augustine seeM. Testard: Saint Augustin et
Ciceron 1-11, (Paris, 1958); H. Hagendahl: Augustine and the Latin Classics,
uith a Contribution on Varro by B. Cardmms (Goteborg, 1967): G. Madec:
'L'Hortensius de Ciccron dans les livres XIII-XIV duDe Trinitate ',Revue des
etudes agustiniennes IS ( 1969), pp. 167-73; and E. Feldmann: Der Einjluss
des Hortcnsius rmd des Manichiiismus auf das Denken des jrmgen
Augustinus, Diss. (Munster, 1976). Among important recent studies of the
history of Ciceronian manuscripts see P. L. Schmidt: Die Uberlieferung von
Ciceros Schrift De legibus in Mitte/alter und Renaissance (Miinchen, 1974)
and R. Mattmann: Studie zur lmndschrift/iche11 iiberlieferung ton Ciceros
De inventione, (Fribourg. 1975).
CICERO 55
But Cicero was not merely a translator. He had enough

philosophical ability to take up certain positions of his own and,
since they also exerted some influence in later times, we should
begin by examining these views and then move on to the dox-
ographical material which his works contain. The relationship
between Cicero's own views and those of his Greek sources is a
complex one, but it can be clarified to some extent by an
analysis of his philosophical method which is in itself not
without interest.
1. 11 PHILO OF LARISSA AND THE NEW ACADEMY
During his early life, Cicero had been subject to a number of

successive philosophical influences.2 Initially he attended the
courses of the Epicurean Phaedrus whose doctrines, however,
he later came to renounce. The Stoic Diodotus was a close
friend of Cicero and resided in his house for many years, in fact
until the former's death. Yet more important were the in-
fluences which came to bear after 88 B.C. when Philo of Larissa,
then the most eminent Academic philosopher, fled to Rome as a
political refugee; and during the years 79-77 B.C. when Cicero
was in Athens hearing the lectures of Antiochus of Ascalon who,
in reaction against Philo, was teaching a form of dogmatic
Platonism, a novel phenomenon at that date. It is not too much
of an oversimplification to say that these two men together ex-
erted the decisive influences on Cicero's intellectual develop-
ment - his writings often seem to be striving for a compromise
between their respective positions - although it is probably
Philo's which predominates in the synthesis.
l For a recent discussion of Cicero's early training and philosophical in-

ll.ucnce~ see 0. Gigon: 'Cicero und die griechische Philosophic', Aufstieg und
,\,~tl!.'rgcmg der r6mischen Welt: Festschrift}. Vogt I, 4, herausgegeben von
H. fcmporini (Berlin, 1973). pp. 229-240.
56 MIDDlE PLATONISM
Philo's posltlon is that of what historians call the 'New

Academy,' a skeptical tendency which gained prominence in
Platonic circles under the guidance of the scholarch Arcesilaus
of Pitane (third century B.C.). The origins of this development
are unclear, various scholars suggesting the earlier Pyrrhonian
skepticism, certain Peripatetic tendencies, a reaction against
Stoicism, or an emphasis upon certain aspects of Plato's own
teaching as the cause.3 Whichever of these explanations (or
combination of these explanations) is correct, the main outlines
of the philosophical development are clear: namely that from
Plato's own questioning of the validity of sensation as a source
of knowledge there arose a skepticism even regarding the in-
tellect's powers to rectify external impressions. This approach
was systematized by Pyrrho of Elis (fourth to third centuries
B.C.) who concluded that 'knowledge' (f:mcrtitJ.LTJ) was unat-
tainable by human faculties, it being necessary to act according
to 'appearances' (q>atv6J,LEva) which give only a confused pic-
ture of the realities lying behind them. Apparently the Platonic
doctrine that Forms immanent in sensible things provided a
basis for knowledge had fallen into obscurity by this time, and
most philosophers who believed in the attainability of certain
knowledge appealed to the doctrine of Zeno of Citium (fourth
to third centuries B.C.), the founder of the Stoic school, that
certain sensations were of such a kind that they compelled as-
sent - the so-called 'irresistible impressions' (KataAT)1t't1Kai
q>avraaiat) - and that a system of true knowledge could be
constructed by combining these. After Zeno's time, the skeptics
seem to have attacked the claim to epistemological certainty
3. SeeP. Couissin: 'le stoicisrne de Ia nouvelle academic', Rettu! d'bistoire

de /(1 pbilosopbie 36 ( 1929), pp. 241-276; A. Weische: Cicero und die Neue
Akademie. Untersucbrmgen zur Entstebrmg und Geschibte des tmtiken
Skeptizismus (Munster, 1961), pp. 13-19; H. J. Kramer: Platonismus and
hel/enistiscbe Philosopbie (Berlin, 1971 ), pp. 5-13; and). Glucker: Antiocbus
and the Late Academy (Gottingen, 1978), pp. 32-3 7.
CICERO 57
almost exclusively in terms of the Stoic doctrine, and this was

c:specially true of the Academic scholarch Carneades of Cyrene
(.H -t-129 B. C.) who once admitted that his own philosophical
activity could never have taken place without the existence of
the Stoic Chrysippus as a foil for his polemic. Carneades,
however. modified the purely negative critique of Arcesilaus,
the first Academic philosopher to stress the skeptical approach,
hv arguing that, although sensation could never lead to absolute
c~rtainty, it was able to yield certain degrees of probability
whose relative weight it was the main task of the philosopher to
assess. How Cicero's teacher Philo fits into this tradition is very
difficult to gauge owing to the total loss of his writings and to
the ambivalence of the ancient testimony regarding his work,
yet he started his career as a follower of Carneades whatever
reaction he may have made against this teaching later in life.
Furthermore, there is at least circumstantial evidence for Philo's
position in the attitudes of his most illustrious pupil, Cicero, to
the doctrines of the Academy.
In connection with this skeptical tendency, it is usual to
speak of the 'Academic' rather than the 'Platonic' tradition:
with good reason, since it is by no means clear how far this
development is a real Platonic tendency. In other words, did the
ne" Academy make use of Plato's dialogues (or 'unwritten doc-
trines') in elaborating its position? In a recent historical study,).
Glucker has examined the relationship of this skepticism to the
t:arlier traditions of the Academy which must have interpreted
the dialogues as teaching a constructive metaphysical system,
and notes the presence of probabilist (as opposed to dogmatic)
elements in the Platonic corpus: the scattering of words like
'perhaps' (ioro~. -rax'liv, oiiJ.al) throughout the arguments, and
the general character of more 'Socratic' dialogues such as the
l.ysis, Charm ides, and Theaetetus. 4 The last work especially
1. Gluckcr: op. cit., pp. 3839.

58 MIDDLE PLATONISM
would have provided several arguments against the Stoic

epistemology and at the same time avoids the dogmatic theory
of Forms. This theory which is fundamental to all Platonism
must have provided difficulties for the followers of the New
Academy, and Glucker suggests with considerable plausibility
(although there is no real documentary proof) that the
Parmenides was used as evidence for Plato's ultimate detach-
ment from this theory.5 All this applies primarily to the position
of Arcesilaus, and it must be admitted that evidence for
Carneades' use of the dialogues is totally lacking. However,
since Cicero refers to studying the Gorgias with a pupil of
Carneades and Carneades himself systematically studied the
history of philosophy, it would seem likely that he did interpret
them.6 Equally problematic is the question of Philo's use of the
Platonic corpus, but once again we can appeal to Cicero's texts
as some indication of the Greek writer's standpoint on this
issue.
1.12 CICERO'S SKEPTICISM
But what precisely is Cicero's own philosophical position? In
passages where he describes his methodology, he seems to align
himself primarily with the New Academic tradition from
Carneadcs onwards: in other words he adopts a general skep-
ticism regarding the attainment of absolute truth, at the same
time holding that some philosophical views are more probable
than others. Thus, Cicero argues that he will not be bound to
the dogmatic assertions of any particular school but will always
seek the 'most probable' (maxime probabile) solution to any
philosophical problem.~ or that he belongs to a school which
pursues the probable and will not 'advance beyond the point
5. Glucker: op. cit., pp. 40-4 I.

6. Gluckcr: op. cit., pp. 50-52.
'7. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. IV, 7. Cf. De bw. II, 10.
CICI:RO 59
,vhere likelihood has revealed itself (ultra id quod l'eri simile

ocmrrit progredi).H Another passage makes it clear which
~clwol Cicero is following on this topic: 'What, then is to pre-
n:nt me from following those things which seem to me pro-
bable. while rejecting what seems to be improbable; and from
shunning the rashness of assertion which is most removed from
wisdom while avoiding the arrogance of dogmatism? Our
school argues against everything only because that which is pro-
haole cannot shine forth unless an evaluation of the arguments
011 hoth sides has been made. But this topic has, I think, been
adequately expounded in my Academica. '9 Thus, the doctrine
of probabilism which Cicero espouses is derived from the New
Academy, yet he clearly believes that it goes back to ancient
times. as shown by the introductory remarks in the Tuscu/anae
Disputationes where he states that he will examine various
philosophical questions by using the method of hypothesis and
refutation after the manner of Socrates, for the latter believed
that in this way 'the most probable truth' (quid veri simil/imum
esset) could be found. to The doctrine of probabilism obviously
allows Cicero an enormous freedom of action: so much so, that
in one text he can be found refuting a position which he has
ardently advocated elsewhere, only to reply that as a member of
the Academic school he is free to adopt any positions which
H. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. II, 5.

'>.Cicero: De Offic. II. R Quid est igilur, quod me lmpetliat ta. quae pro-
halntia mibi tideantur, sequi, quae nmtra improhare atque adfirmandi
arr()ganliam t'iltlnlem fugere /emerita/em. quc1e a sapientia dissidet
fJ/urimum? Contra au/em omnitl tlisputtmtur a nostris, quod hoc ipsum
fJruiJa/Ji/e elucere mm possit. nisi ex utrttque parte causarum esset facta
t'tll/fenlio. Sed haec e:rplanttta sunt in Academicis nostris sa tis. ut arhitror.
<li/igt'nter. Cf. Tusc. Disp. II, 9 where:: the: same: method of arguing ';tgainst
hoth skies (in nmtrarias part is) is auributcd to Peripatetics and Academics
:llikl'
lo. Cicero: True:. Disp. I, 8.
60 MIDDLE PLATONISM
seem reasonable. II Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that

this reflects a lack of philosophical commitment, since the
resort to probabilism itself is a consequence of a definite
epistemological tenet, inherited from Philo and the New
Academy, that sensible appearances are the only source of
knowledge but cannot yield an incontrovertible truth.12
Some of these passages have already suggested the modes of
philosophical argument which this pursuit of the probable im-
plies, and these are primarily the resort to doxography and the
penchant for dialogue form. If the attitude of the New
Academic is one of avoiding dogmatic assertions of belief and
concentrating on the critical examination of others'
philosophical tenets, 13 then it will be necessary first to collect
information about the doctrines of various philosophers and
schools, living or dead, a task extremely simple to accomplish in
ancient times because of the extensive circulation of handbooks
of philosophy listing the 'opinions' (56~at) of the great thinkers
of the past according to topic, all of which descend ultimately
from the $uau(ci>V ~6~at of Theophrastus (or its epitome).I4
This collection, dealing successively with the principles, the
II. Ibid. V, 32-33. Cf. Cicero: Luc. 121 where the speaker will adhere
neither to one view nor its opposite: 'at one moment this view seems more
probable, at anot!ler moment that view' (modo hoc modo il/ud probe~bilius
tidetur) and Tusc. Disp. V, 83 where the Academic school 'determines
nothing itself yet examines all sides of a question (nibil ipsa iudicCII, sed
lmbetur in omnis parlis).
12. Cicero: Luc. 111. This point is well brought out by A. Michel: 'Ciccron
et les sectes philosophiques. Sens et valeur de l'eclectisme academique'. Eos
57 (1967-68), pp. 106-109.
13. See pp. 58-59.
14. See H. Diels: Doxograpbi Graecl, co/legit recensult prolegomenis in-
dicibusque instru:.-:it H. D. (Berlin, 1879. reprinted Berlin, 1965), p. 181 ff.
Diels calls this collection Vetusta Placita to l'Ontrast with the second-century
Placita of Aetius.
CICERO 61
world. celestial phenomena, the soul, and body with one book
devoted to each subject is the basis for the doxographies which
one finds in Cicero and Varro. I 5 In the first century B.C. these
doxographies were put to two distinct uses according to the
philosophical aims of the collector: either a negative one by
skeptics such as Carneades, who desired to muster all the
authorities in order to show their disagreement with one
another, clear evidence of the unattainability of truth and for
the necessity of 'suspended judgment' (btO'Xtl); or a positive one
by constructive thinkers like Antiochus, who employ the same
material in order to refute all positions except the one which is
to be favored .16 Obviously, the same doxography could be used
either way, and Cicero himself reports how Antiochus
employed the Carneadea Divisio, a classification of
philosophical views regarding the chief good, in the service of
his own nonskeptical system of ethics. I 7 The doxographies in
Cicero's works are often elaborate and tend to be used in the
positive sense of clearing the way towards the most probable
position, a good example being the collection of opinions regar-
ding the nature of soul in Tusculanae Disputationes I. 18 Here,
the views of Plato, Xenocrates, Aristotle, Aristoxenus, and Zeno
are considered in sequence, leaving Cicero with the conclusion
that only a divine being could decide which are 'true' (vera) and
I~- For Varro see Appendix. n. 94.

16. See A. -J. Festugiere: La rertflation d'Hennes Trismegiste II: Le Dieu
msmique (Paris. 1949), pp. H0:\69. Further valuable discussions of this
uoxographical tradition in relation to Cicero can be found in 0. Gigon: 'Die
Erncuerung der Philosophic in der Zeit Ciceros', Recherches sur Ia tradition
/J[atrmldenne (Frmdation Hardt, Entretiens _>,) (Vandoeuvres-Genevc,
19~5). pp. 30-:\9 and A. Solignac: 'Doxographics et manuels dans Ia forma-
tion philosophique de saint Augustin', Recherches augustiniennes I ( 1958),
pp. I I ~-120.
P. Cicero: DeFbl. V. 16.
I H. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. l, 18-22.
62 MIDDLE PLATONISM
that it is difficult to determine which are 'most probable' (veri

simillima).l9 Other important doxographies occur in De
Natura Deorum where various theological doctrines are ex-
amined and refuted by the Epicurean interlocutor as a
preliminary to the exposition of his own school's view of the
gods,2o in De Legibus where different theories of the state are
assembled in order to explain and justify the Platonic position
which Cicero takes in this work, 21 and elsewhere.22
Another mode of philosophical argument which the pursuit
of the probable implies is the use of the dialogue form. In a
passage already noted, Cicero associates the method of question
and answer with Socrates whose model he will follow in the
plan of the Tusculanae Disputationes, 23 although his own use
of the dialogue does not reflect the dramatic style of Plato but
rather the Hellenistic type where the characters make long
speeches of an expository nature, punctuated occasionally by
questions. Cicero himself discusses his literary style and states
that he has employed two forms of dialogue: the Heraclidean,
where the interlocutors are famous persons of the past, in De
Republica, Laelius, and Cato Maior; and the Aristotelian,
where the writer himself appears as the leading speaker, in the
Academica and De Finibus. 24 However, despite the loss of
dramatic impetus, Cicero's dialogues gain over the Platonic
originals in relation to the structural significance of the form
itself, for in some works a given speaker will expound a
philosophical position only to become the subject of refutation
19./bid. I, 23.
20. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. l, 25-41.
2 I . Cicero: De I.eg. III, 14.
22. See Cicero: Tusc. Disp. V, 8-11; De Fin. IV. 3: and V. 88-89.
2.~ Cicc:ro: 1'usc Disp. I. 8. Sec p. S9.
24. Cicero: Epist. ad Aft. XIII. 19.
CICERO 63
bv the next speaker, and so on.25 Thus, in De Finibus, perhaps

tl;c most complex example, the Epicurean ethics are first ex-
pounded and then refuted from the Stoic viewpoint, the Stoic
svstem is next described followed by a refutation from the
standpoint of Amiochus, and finally Antiochus' ethics are ex-
plained and then criticized from the viewpoint of the Stoics.26
All this discussion is of course directed to the goal of determin-
ing the probable truth by means of critical examination of all
possible philosophical positions on a given issue.
I. 13 ANTIOCHUS OF ASCALON AND THE OLD ACADEMY
It is perhaps inevitable that a methodology based upon the

counterpoising of authorities in order to discern the most pro-
bable truth will be separated only by a narrow dividing line
from a dogmatic eclecticism. It is certainly one thing to muster
authorities so as to reveal their mutual disagreement and the
consequent necessity of suspending judgment, as Carneades had
done,27 and another to bring together the various philosophical
2'i. On the Ciceronian dialogue and its influence seeR. Hirzel: Der Dialog.
Ein literarbistoriscbe Versucb I (leipzig, 1895) p. 457ff. and II passim; M.
Huch: Le priambule dans les oeuvres pbilosopbiques de Ciciron. Essa/ sur Ia
genese et /'art du dialogue (Paris, 1958); P. L. Schmidt: 'Zur Typologie und
l.itnarisierung des friihchristlichen lateinischen Dialogs', Cbristianisme et
formes litteraires de l'antiquiti tardir.oe en occident (Entretiens Hardt 23)
(\andoeuvres-Geneve, 1977). pp. 101-190 and 'Formtradition und
Rcalitatshezug im friihchristlichen lateinischen Dialog', Wilrzburger
.labrhiicher fiir die Altertumswissenscbaft, Neue Folge 3 ( 1977), pp.
2ll-22'i; and A. Michel: 'Dialogue philosophique et vie intc.'rieure. Cicc.'ron,
~l'ncqul', saint Augustin'. Helmantica 28 ( 1977), pp. 353-376.
26. The structure of De Ffnibus is therefore the following. Book I: first
dialogue (ethics of Epicurus); Book II: first dialogue continued (Stoic refuta-
tion of Epicurus); Book Ill: second dialogue (Stoic ethics); Book IV: second
dialogue continued (Antiochean refutation of the Stoics); Book V: third
dialogut' (ethics of Antiochus followed by Stoic refutation of Antiochus).
2"". See Augustine: Civ. Dei XIX. 1-3 (CCSL 48. 657-664).
64 MIDDLE PLATONISM
schools in such a way as to suggest that they are all, despite dif-
ferences of terminology, teaching the same doctrine, as An-
tiochus maintained,2S yet both approaches make extensive use
of the doxographical method. It is also possible to bridge the
divide between the two positions by laying special emphasis
upon the notion of probable truth and including in the latter
category many of the views of dogmatic philosophers. There is
considerable evidence that Cicero's New Academicism has
deviated from the Greek skepticism of Carneades in precisely
this way, although it is difficut to say whether Cicero is in-
novating himself or following Carneades' successors
Clitomachus and Philo.29 As A. Weische has observed: 'Die
28. For Antiochus' position seep. 61.

29. The philosophical position of Philo of Larissa is not really known, an
unfortunate state of affairs from our point of view, since he was a crucial
(perhaps the crucial) influence upon Cicero. What is clear is that he began his
career as a follower of Carneades, but later reacted against the doctrine in
such a way as to provoke the anger of Antiochus, who was engaged in his
own reaction against the New Academy. Antiochus' attack upon Philo was
contained in his no longer extant work Sosus, part of which Cicero used as a
source for his Academlca. It is the precise nature of Philo's reaction which is
unclear and has aroused the greatest modern scholarly debate. There is a
good discussion of the question (with a full review of earlier bibliography) in
Glucker: op. cit., pp. 64-97. Leaving aside the somewhat unlikely view of K.
Hermann that Philo had returned to the classical theory of Forms which he
had combined by using the notion of 'recollection' (avciJ.1V11atc;) with the
Stoic criterion - it is difficult to see how such a return to dogmatism would
have offended Antiochus - the most likely hypothesis is as follows. Philo
continued to attack the Stoic 'comprehension' (KatliATlllllc;) along the tradi-
tional lines while maintaining the novel view that one could anain truth
within the realm of sense itself by other means. This was coupled with the
historical view that the Academy had always been skeptical in practice only
but not in theory, and that in actual fact there was no distinction between the
Old and New Academies. Antiochus, whose aim was to re-establish what he
held to be the dogmatic teaching of the Old Academy, attacked Philo on the
grounds that the Stoic criterion was the only valid one. and that to reinter-
CICERO 65
Skepsis besteht bei Cicero allerdings darin, dass allen Aussagen

nur Wahrscheinlichkeitscharakter zugesprochen werden soli
und dass er seine Schriften zum Teil nach antilogistischem
schema aufbaut. Der Inhalt seiner philosophischen
Weltanschauung aber ist durch die klassische Philosophie
hestimmt, deren Form im Zeitalter des Hellenismus die Stoa
war, und die jetzt von Panaitios, Poseidonios und Antiochos als
Einheit von altakademisch-peripatetischer Lehre und der
pret the N~w Academy as being mildly dogmatic was to obscure the tru~ ex-
tent of the later school's deviation from tradition. J. S. Reid: M. Tullii
Cicermzis Academica. The Text Revised and Explained by}. S. R. (London,
IHHS), pp. 57-60 went further in suggesting that Philo's historical view of the
Ac:ademy was that there had always been a contrast between its exoteric
teaching (skepticism) and its esoteric doctrine (dogmatism), in which case
Philo is the basis for Augustine's view of the history of the Academy worked
out in Contra Academicos Ill. If this interpretation is correct, it would cer-
tainly explain the bitterness of Antiochus' polemic against Philo. since the
postulation of exoteric and esoteric traditions simultaneously makes
nonsense of Antiochus' own view of the deviant character of the New
Ac:ad~my. It would also explain the hostility which Augustine (as a follower
of Philo's historical interpretation) clearly reveals towards Antiochus in the
same work. Unfortunately, the Ciceronian texts (Luc. 60 and 139) which
Rdd uses to support this hypothesis arc capable of more than one interpreta-
tion. On the history of Academic skepticism see further V. Brochard: Les
.,ceptiques grecs (Paris, 1887); L. Credaro: Lo scetticismo degli Accademlci I-
ll (Milano, 1893); A. Goedeckemeyer: Geschichte des grlechischen Skep-
tizismus (Leipzig, 190';); P. Couissin: 'L'origine et !'evolution de l'tnoxit',
Retue des etudes grecques 42 ( 1929). pp. 373-397; L. Robin: Pyrrhon et le
scepticisme grec (Paris, 1944 ); 0. Gigon: 'Zur Geschichte der sogenannten
i\euen Akad~mi~. Museum Helvetiwm I (1944), pp. 47-64; M. dal Pra: Lo
scetticismo greco (Milano. 19';0); C. Moreschini: 'Attcggiamemi scettici ed at-
teggiam~mi c.Jogmatici nella filosofia accademica'. La parola del passato 24
( llJ69), pp. 426-436; and C. L. Stough: Greek Skepticism. A Study in
l:jJistemo/ogy (B~rkdey, CA, 1969). Th~r~ has b~en a r~cent revival of in-
tnest in the thesis of an esmeric dogmatism which p~rsisted throughout the
history of the A<:adcmy. this thesis being a by-product of th~ investigation of
esotc.:ricism in the ancient Academy itself. Seep. 32 ff.
66 MIDDLE PLATONISM
stoischen Anschauung gesehen wurde. '30 The mention of An-

tiochus here is important since, as stated earlier, this Greek
philosopher was perhaps the greatest influence on Cicero after
Philo.3t We have also seen how Antiochus made use of the dox-
ographical method of the skeptics - the Carneadea Divisio -
in order to construct a speculative system.32 It was the central
doctrine of Antiochus that the traditions of the ancient
Academy, the dogmatic Platonic philosophy, should be revived
in the face of the New Academic perversion; and he employed
the doxographic method in the service of this constructive
philosophical spirit, the result of his historical analysis being the
view that Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism teach fun-
damentally the same doctrine although they differ in the means
of expressing it.33 Cicero seems to have considered this inter-
pretation as highly probable, for we find him frequently referr-
ing to the agreement of Platonic and Aristotelian positions,34 of
Aristotelian and Stoic positions35 and sometimes of Platonic,
30. Weische: op. cit., p. 80. Festugiere: op. cit., p. 368 also notes the easy
transition from skepticism to eclecticism.
31. Sec p. 55.
;U. Sec p. 61.
:B. See Cicero: Acad. 17-18 and 43: De F/11. V, 7 ff.; De Nat. Deor. I, 16-17
and 33. Differences of doctrine between the schools are noted at Acad. 26;
33: and 35 ff. This view is by no means as preposterous as some modern in-
terpreters suggest, since in Antiochus' (and Cicero's) time the only
Aristotelian works in circulation were his exoteric treatises. There is con-
siderable evidence that early Stoicism drew much from these exoteric works
which in their turn were exceptionally close to later Platonism; so that a
reader of the first century B.C. would be more impressed by the continuity of
doctrine than by the differences. For an excellent discussion of this point see
}. Pepin: Tbeo/ogie cosmique et tbeo/ogie cbretien11e (Ambroise, Exam. /, I,
/-4)(Paris, 1964 ), pp. 138-139.
34. Cicero: De Off/c. I, 2.
35. Cicero: De Fin. IV,; and IV, 15; Tusc. Disp. IV, 6.
CICERO 67
Aristotelian and Stoic positions.36 Of course, he is also aware of

differences of viewpoint,37 yet the syncretistic outlook is
characteristically Antiochean, the only difference between the
two writers being that Antiochus undoubtedly thought that his
historical analysis was true whereas Cicero considered it pro-
bable.
1.14 CICERO'S PLATONISM
Thus, we find Cicero often following in the footsteps of An-

tiochus and advocating the philosophical views of the Old
Academy with which the Peripatetic and Stoic schools were
essentially in agreement. The nature of this synthesis should be
investigated with some care since it is in this, rather than in his
skepticism, that Cicero left his legacy to later generations.3S It is
generally the Platonism which predominates here, and various
passages in the letters and speeches indicate that Cicero con-
sidered himself primarily a Platonist,39 a view apparently shared
by both contemporary and later Latin writers.4o Thus, in the
opening discussion of the Academica, Cicero describes the Old
Academy as 'that school which, as you know, I approve' (quam
.i6. Cicero: De Pin. IV, 3-19: De Leg. I, 37: and TtiS(:. Disp. IV, 6.
_;: Cicero: De Leg. l, 53-55 and De Offic. Ill, 20.
:\H. On the influence of the skeptical tendency see, however, C. B. Schmitt:
Uceru Scepticus. A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the
Renllissance (The Hague, 1972), p. 18ff. and E. N. Tigerstedt: The Decline
mut Fall of the Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato. An Outline and Some
Ohsermtions (Helsinki, 1974), pp. 12-13.
:\9. Sec Cicero: Pro Mur. 63. For the letters sec references in P. Boyancc:
'Trois citations de Pia ton chez Ciccron', Hom mages aM. Renard (Coi/Pctin11
f._utomus I 0 I) ( Bruxelles, 1969), pp. 126-I.U. Reprinted in P. Royancc:
Etudes sur l'humanisme ciceronien (Bruxelles, 1970), pp. 24H-255.
tO. Sec CommentClrio/um Petitionis 46 (of Cicero's brother Quintus) and
<,>uintilian: lnst. Oral. X, 1. 123.
68 MIDDLE PLATONISM
nos ut scis probamus), -1 I and in another text he declares that it

is difficult for him to abandon the ethical position of An-
tiochus.42 De Legibus goes even further for in this work, in ad-
dition to a generally Old Academic tone of argument, occurs the
following striking passage:43 'Let us implore the Academy
which causes difficulties in all these discussions, I mean the new
one founded by Arcesilaus and Carneades, to be silent, for if we
were to attack those doctrines which we seem so skilfully to
have arranged and constructed, it would wreak too great a
destruction. Yet I would like to placate this school, and I do not
dare to ignore them. '44
Cicero's admiration for Plato and the Old Academy takes a
number of different forms: in some passages, he cites Plato for
the excellence of his literary style,4t; in others he reveals ex-
traordinary interest in biographical details regarding the Greek
philosopher,46 while in others it is the collection of Plato's
memorabilia which engages his attention.47 The exposition of
4 I. Cicero: Aead. 7.
42. Cicero: Lue. 139.
4~. Cicero: De Leg. I, ~9 Perturbatrieem autem harum rmmium rerum
Ac:ademiam, bane ab Arc:esila et Carneade recentem, exoremus ut sileat.
Nam si inNISI!I'if in baec quae sa lis scite nobis instructa et amposita tiden-
tur, nimias edet minas. Quam quidem ego placare cuplo, sulnmJI!ere mm
tmdeo.
44. Other passages expressing Cicero's support for Plato's doctrines in-
clude De Fin. I, 7 and V, I; De Leg. Ill, I; Tusc. Disp. 1, 39.
45. Sec Cicero: De Oral. I, 47 and Ill, I;; Episf. ad Fam. IX, .22. For
references in this and the next two notes I am indebted to the admirable
study of P. Boyance: 'Le platonisme a Rome. Plat on et Ciceron', Association
Guillaume Bude, Co11gres de Tours et Poitiers, Actes du c:o11gres (Paris,
1953 ), pp. 195-2 21. Reprinted in Boyance: Etudes sur /'buma11isme eicero-
'lien, pp. 222-24 7.
46. See Cicero: Ctlto Maior I~ and 41: De Divin. I. 78: De Fin. V, 50;
Tuse. Disp. I, 39 and IV, 44: Epist. ad Fam. I. 9.
47. See Cicero: Brut. 24: De Fin. V, I.
CICERO 69
the Old Academic doctrine plays on the whole a greater role in

the earlier works De Oratore, De Republica and De Legibus
than in the philosophical treatises written in 46-44 B.C. and,
since these are works which contain frequent and extensive
statements in Cicero's own person, it is reasonable to consider
the doctrines expressed there as being those to which his own
inclinations are strongest.48 Yet there is a slight problem for the
modern interpreter in explaining the relationship of attitudes
expressed in these works to the New Academic statements of
the character Cicero in dialogues such as the Academica. One
explanation is that Cicero during his earlier career was an
adherent of the Old Academic viewpoint under the influence of
Antiochus, but that later in life he found himself more in sym-
pathy with Philo's moderate skepticism, a view which might be
supported by Varro's reproach in the Academica that he has
abandoned the Old Academy for the New.49 But this explana-
tion allows only a very brief space of time in which to undergo a
major change of viewpoint, and it seems more likely that
Cicero's position was consistent throughout his life, namely
adherence to the belief of Philo that probability alone was at-
tainable in this life together with the view that on important
questions the Old Academy's doctrines were most probable. In
this case, Varro's remarks simply mean that Cicero has abandon-
ed the Old Academic literary models in favor of New Academic
ones. on which point he was absolutely correct. so
If Cicero was as ardent a Platonist as all this evidence sug-
gests. then it would seem likely that he made a study of the
dialogues. Apparently the New Academy continued to read
Plato's own writings even during the period of Arcesilaus'
I H. Sec S. F. Silbiger: 'Cicero Plaf(m/s aemulus, Eos .n (I 936), pp. 19-26

anu 129 ff.: Boyancc: 'le platonisme a Rome. Platon et Ciceron', p. 233 ff.
!9. \.iccro: Acad 13.
SO. As Reid: op. cit., pp. I S-16 points out.
70 MIDDLE PLATONISM
dominances I - no doubt placing emphasis upon the critical

elementsS2 -and so Cicero must have gained a knowledge of
these texts during his studies with both Philo and Antioch us. 53
Of course, it is one thing to read Plato's own works and another
to follow the lectures of some later Platonist like Antioch us, and
some modern scholars have rightly drawn attention to the fact
that Cicero's Platonism was a light reflected through the prism
of later exegesis.s4 However, the fact that Cicero's writings are
filled with extracts and paraphrases from Plato and that he
made at least two formal translations of dialoguesss is proof of
his ability and willingness to return to the original sources. A
thorough study of these passages has been made by T .B de Graff
who shows- not surprisingly in view of Cicero's personality
and interests - that more use is made of the literary dialogues
of Plato's early and middle periods than of the later more
abstractly dialectical works, the only exception being the
Timaeus whose physical theory seems to have intrigued the
Roman writer. 56 Among the quotations we find the argument of
the Pbaedrus that soul is immortal because it is self-moving,s7
5 I. Sec Diogcncs lacrtius: Vii. Philos. IV. 32.

52. Sec pp. 57-58.
53. Cicero: De Drat. I, 47 notes that he read Plato's Gorgias with Char-
madas a pupil of Carncadcs.
54. Sec D. Hccringa: Quaestiones ad Ciceronis de divinationc libros II per-
linentes (Groningcn, I 906). pp. I 4-15: M. van den Bruwaenc: La tbeologie de
Ciceron (l.ouvain, I937), pp. 216-218- concerning De Divinatione; and M.
van den Bruwacnc: wuxt1 ct voii~ dans lc .\'omnium Scipionis de Ciceron',
L 'Antiquite c/assique 8 (I 9 39), p. 127 ff. - concerning the Somnium Sci-
pion is.
55. The Prott~goras and Timaeus. Sec pp. 8-11.
56. T. B. de Graff: 'Plato in Cicero', Classical Philology 35 ( 1940), pp.
1H-1'B.
57. Plato: Phaedr. 245c-e at Cicero: Cato Maior 78: De Rep. VI. 27-29:
and Tusc. Disp. I. 53-55. On the translation of this text sec J. Humbert: A
propos de Ciceron traducteur du grec', Melanges A. Ernout (Paris, 1940), pp.
CICERO 71
socrates remarks concerning the destiny of his soul at the end

of the Phaedo. c;s and passages from the Apology, 'i9 Gorgias, 6o
Laus,6t Menexenus62 and Repub/ic.63 Specific arguments are
sometimes paraphrased from dialogues cited by name. for ex-
ample Socrates' demonstration in the Meno that the slave boy
recollects Pythagoras' theorem.64 Finally, there are many brief
references to doctrines in the dialogues unaccompanied by any
indication of the source: to God's creation of the planetary mo-
tionsM and the sowing of human souls like seeds66 in the
Timaeus, and so on.
1. IS STOIC TENDENCIES
Cicero's advocacy of the Old Academic position as inter-

preted by Antiochus would also entail a profound reverence for
Stoicism whose tenets could frequently be employed in order to
support and develop the Platonic doctrines. This is precisely
what we do find in his works, the most notable illustration be-
ing the advocacy of the Stoic ethical position in his De Officiis.
Here, Cicero argues that the teaching of ethics is the special
right of the Stoics, Academics and Peripatetics - the synthesis
emerging once again - and that he will therefore in this treatise
197-200 and R. Poncelet: 'Deux aspects du style philosophique latin. Ciceron

t'l Chalcidius, traducteurs du Pbedre 24';c', Ret'Ue des etudes lati,zes 28
(19'i0). pp. 145-167.
';8. Plato: Pbaed. 115c-d at Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, 103.
59. Plato: Apol. 40c-42a at Cicero: Tusc. Disp. l, 97-99.
60. Plato: Gorg 470d-47t a at Cicero: Tusc. Disp. V. 35.
61. Plato: Leg. XII, 955e956b at Cicero: De Leg II, 45.
62. Plato: Menex. 247e-248a at Cicero: Tusc. Disp. V, 36.
63. Plato: Rep. IX, 571c572b at Cicero: De Dillin. I, 60-61.
6-L Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, 57.
65. Ibid. I, 63. Cf. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, 32.
66. Cicero: De Leg. I. 24.
72 MIDDLE PLATONISM
follow the Stoics primarily, choosing doctrines from here and

there according to his own judgment.67 Shortly afterwards it
emerges that Panaetius, one of the leading thinkers of the so-
called Middle Stoa and himself the author of a work nepi
Ka9iJKovto<;, will be Cicero's guide.68 Furthermore, his admira-
tion for Stoicism is not confined to ethics, for in De Natura
Deorum, after the Epicurean and Stoic theologies have both
been expounded and subjected to an extensive critique by the
New Academic spokesman Cotta, the author does not ultimately
side with the latter. As the book concludes,69 we read that the
Epicurean Velleius is convinced by the Academic discourse,
whereas Cicero himself feels that the Stoic account 'has greater
probability' (ad veritatis similitudinem ... propensior). His
reason for supporting the Stoic position is clear: only a doctrine
stressing the notion of divine providence will furnish an ade-
quate basis for human morality, and this the Stoics provide.7o
67. Cicero: De 0/fic. l, 6-7.

68. The Middle Stoa, whose principal representatives were Panactius of
Rhodes (ca. 180-110 B.C.) and Posidonius of Apamca (13S-51 B.C.) arc usual-
ly distinguished from the Old Stoics: Zcno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus by
their tendency towards rapprochement with Platonism. Thus, 'Piatonizing'
Stoics like Posidonius often have doctrines similar to those of 'Stoicizing'
Platonists like Antiochus. Cicero's knowledge of Stoicism is mainly derived
from Middle Stoic sources. and so the process of synthesizing the two
systems of thought was an easy task for him. For the: influence of Stoll"
physics upon Cicero seep. 90 ff.
69. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. Ill, 9S. Cf. ibid. I. 3-4 and De Dit1in. I, 8.
70. We have spoken of the Platonic and Stoic elements in the Ciceronian
synthesis, although most of the texts cited above also have a Peripatetic com-
ponent. Is there, then, another important aspect of the synthesis? Probably
not, for at this date the Peripatetic school was of considerably less
significance than the Stoic - there: was no major Peripatetic teacher in
Athens when Cicero was there - and most of the Aristotelianism current
consisted of exoteric doctrines assimilated into the Stoic (and latterly An-
tiochean) systems. Seen. 33.
CICERO 73
1.16 GREEK AND LATIN PHILOSOPHY
We have seen that Cicero's philosophy is characterized in

general by an attitude and method which stands on the
borderline between skepticism and eclecticism, between the
New and Old Academies. But how did he himself describe his
philosophical intentions? De Finibus provides us with some
answers in passages where Cicero prefaces his main ethical
discussions with remarks of an autobiographical nature, and
from these we learn of the urgency which he felt regarding the
task of expounding and translating masterpieces of Greek
philosophy into the Latin tongue.7t He seems especially con-
cerned with the views of detractors who argued that the com-
position of such works in Latin was unnecessary, since those
who wished to study philosophy could do so in Greek, and
Cicero was himself adding nothing to the original sources. He
replies to this criticism that even the Greeks frequently repeat
the same doctrine from generation to generation so that one
could hardly blame a Roman for doing the same, and that by
translating the works of the greatest Greek writers like Plato and
Aristotle he is doing almost a patriotic service to his fellow
countrymen in exposing them to treasures of the intellect. n It is
a commonplace of scholarship that the Romans were essentially
practical people who were suspicious of the theoretical and
abstract propensities of the Greeks, and from this point of view
Cicero was waging a campaign against the intellectual narrow-
mindedness of his contemporaries. This campaign was eminent-
ly successful, and the verdict of history is that he not only
""I. Cit:ero: De Fitz. I. 6-7.

""2. Ibid. I, 7. Cicero did not, however, think that his Roman version of
<ircek thought was an inferior copy of the original. See De Fin. I, 10 and III.
'i
74 \11DDLE PlATONISM
helped to create a Latin philosophical vocabulary73 for the first

time, but also placed a quantity of the best ancient philosophy
within the reach of later generations who no longer had access
to the original texts.
I. 17 THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY
But what precisely were the doctrines which Cicero's works

helped to transmit? Leaving aside the methodology of Cicero
which, although important for our comprehension of how the
writer himself evaluated the philosophical teachings described
in his works, exerted relatively little influence on later genera-
tions, we should now examine the central doctrines which are
stated in the Ciceronian corpus. The procedure will be a selec-
tive one based on the isolation and analysis of those teachings
which were considered of the greatest moment by the writers of
late antiquity, both pagan and Christian, irrespective of the
weight which Cicero himself placed on them.
For Cicero, philosophy is the love of 'wisdom' (sapientia),
and is ancient in fact if not in name. Wisdom on the other hand
is ancient in fact and in name, and can be defined as 'the
knowledge of divine and human things and of the beginnings
and causes of each thing' (divinarum humanarumque rerum,
tum initiorum causarumque cuiusque rei cognitio).74 As with
most writers of the Hellenistic period, the study of philosophy
is divided into three parts, the pedagogical order being in some
texts physics. ethics and logic,7S and in others ethics, physics
73. Tht. ..:reation of this philosophical vo..:abulary has been minutely

analyzed by R. Poncelct: Cin!ron traducteur de Platmz. L 'expression de Ia
pen see cmnple.w en latin cltlssfque (Paris. 1957). Sec also pp. 9-1 o.
74. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. V. 7. Cf. DeOffic. II. 5-6.
75. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. V, 68; Luc. 116; 129; and 142. The same order is
described by Diogcnes lacrtius: Vii. Pbi/os. III, 56 and Albinus: Didasc. 3. I.
CICERO 7'5
and logic. 76 The use of the former order to structure the New
Academic critique of Antiochus' system in the Lucul/us suggests
that this is the arrangement of Philo, while the use of the latter
bv an Old Academic spokesman in the Academica, together
\,:ith supporting testimonies in Seneca77 and Augustine 78 both
of which clearly go back to Varro as a source, 79 indicates the
origin of this arrangement in Antiochus. The ancient evidence
unanimously declares that the formal tripartition of philosophy
stems from the early Academy, and that it resulted essentially
from an historical analysis.so Thus, regarding the Philonian
order, Diogenes Laertius informs us that in the earliest times
philosophers discoursed only on physics (the Presocratics), to
which study ethics was later added (by Socrates), and finally
logic (by Plato).SI Concerning the Antiochean order, we find
analogous testimony in Augustine: philosophy was originally
divided into the two branches of ethics and physics, the former
achieving its finest development in Socrates, the Iauer in
Pythagoras. Plato then united the two (thereby perfecting
philosophy) to which he added logic.82 The contexts in which
~6. Cicero: Acad. I '5-19 and De Leg. I, 60-62.

--.Seneca: Epist. 89, 9.
""'H. Augustine: Civ. Dei VIII, 4 (CCSL 47, 219-221 ).
... 9. Varro was a follower of Antiochus and therefore of his interpretation
of the Old Academy.
HO. This is made especially clear by the most detailed account of the divi-
sion of philosophy in Sextus Empiricus: Adt. Math. VII, 1-26. See also
.-\pulcius: De Plat. I. 3. 187 and the texts of Diogenes Lacrtius :md Augustine
noted above. There are good discussions of this question in V. d'Agostino:
Sulla tripartizione della filosofia secondo gli stoici', Rivista di stud/ classici
I ( 1952-'i.~). pp. 24-27; P. Boyance: 'Ciceron et le Premier Ale/blade'. Revue
cles etudes l(ltines 22 ( 1964). pp. 210-22'5 (reprinted in Boyance: Etudes sur
f'bunumisme ciceronlen, pp. 256-275); and 'Ciccron ct ks parties de Ia
Philosophic'. Revue des etudes /a lines 49 ( 1971 ). pp. 127-154.
HI. Diogcnes Laertius: VII. Pbi/os. III. 56.
H2. Augustine: Cit. Dei VIII, 4 (CCSL 47. 2 19-221 ).
76 MIDDLE PLATONISM
Cicero employs the tripartite arrangement suggest that he thinks

along the same lines as these other ancient authorities, a point
which once more indicates the extent to which the systematic
study of the history of philosophy entered into the practice of
philosophy itself.83
Of the three parts, it is primarily what Cicero has to say about
physics which will concern us, for it is in this area that he is
most influential upon later writers.84 Here, he follows the usual
Hellenistic model in including within this part of philosophy
not the contents of physical science in the modern sense but
material from two main areas: theology and psychology. This is
a logical procedure since the bases of both were- as we shall
see- equally materialistic.B5 Cicero's own interest in these dif-
ferent topics varies, the psychological discussion being written
primarily from the standpoint of personal conviction, whereas
the theological treatment is more probabilistic and dox-
ographical in style, leaving us to conjecture what Cicero's own
philosophical views (if any) may have been.s6 Of course, with
regard to the later influence of the texts, the distinction bet-
83. Cicero clearly interprets this doctrine of the parts of philosophy in a

very flexible way. since we find at least two other arrangements in his works:
(i) physics, logic, ethics at De Fin. V, 10-11 and (ii) ethics, logic, physics at De
Fin. IV. 5 ff. The former order occurs also in Apuleius: De Plat. l, 3, 187 and
Sextus Empiricus: Adv. Math. VII, 4.
84. Although there will also be something to say regarding his ethics and
logic. Sec p. 79 ff. and 131 ff.
85. On this materialism see pp. 78-79.
86. Psychological questions are discussed mainly in the Tusculanae
Disputationes where Cicero speaks In his own person. Theological matters
are, however, considered primarily in De Natura Deorum and the
Academica where the expositions are placed into the mouths of spokesmen
of the Stoic, New Academic, or Old Academic schools respectively. Of
course. when Cicero proceeds in the more doxographlcal manner, he may
simply mean that the issues are really unresohed.
CICERO 77
ween Cicero's own ideas and those of other thinkers whom he

reports is relatively unimportant.
1. I H THE THEMES OF PHILOSOPHY
It is possible to identify certain philosophical themes as being

fundamental to all these discussions, and these are in the first
place, the relation of macrocosm to microcosm, and in the se-
cond place that of transcendence and immanence. The first
theme signifies that reality consists of two things: the world
(macrocosm) and man (microcosm) which exhibit structures
analogous to one another,87 while the second indicates that a
higher principle can be related to the lower in two ways:
separably (transcendence) or inseparably (immanence).SS In
Cicero and his immediate sources, we find these two themes
employed in conjunction for, from a general point of view the
macrocosm (consisting of God and matter) is sometimes con-
sidered to be transcendent and sometimes considered to be im-
manent in relation to the microcosm (consisting of soul and
body), while from the specific point of view there is held to be
both a transcendence and an immanence within the macrocosm
itself (of God in relation to matter) and in analogous structure
H~. This theme goes back to the Stoa, early Aristotle, and ultimately Plato's
Timaeus. In general see G. P. Conger: Theories of Macrocosms and
Jficmcosms in the History of Philosophy (New York. 1922): H. Hommel:
'Mikrokosmos'. Rbelnlscbes Museum, Neue Folge 92 (1943). pp. 56-89; R.
Alkrs: 'Microcosmos. from Anaximandros to Paracelsus', Traditio 2 (1944),
pp ..~ 19-Hr'; A. Olerud: L 'idee de nwcrocosmos et de microcosmos dans le
Timt'e de Pltlton. Etude de mytbologie compt~ree (Uppsala, 1951 ); M. Kurd-
zialek: 'Der Mensch als Abbild des Kosmos', Miscellanea Mediaevtllitl 8
( 1'>-t ). pp. 3S-i"i; and I. Munoz Valle: 'El principio de Ia simpatia universal y
Ia corrdacion entre el macrocosmo y el microcosmo en Ia anrigua Grecia'.
Ri1ista tli studi classici 23 ( 197S ), pp. 210-220.
HH. On these relations see pp. 4 2-44.
78 MIDDLE PLATONISM
with that both a transcendence and an immanence also within

the microcosm (of soul in relation to body). This provides the
following schema which can be said to underlie all aspects of
the Ciceronian physics:
God soul
World Man
T
matter + body
I
T +I
(macrocosm) (microcosm)
!
Two points should be made concerning this schema: first,
although the relations between God and matter or soul and
body can be interpreted as transcendent or immanent in either
case, that between the world and man is strictly only a transcen-
dent one. This is because the world is an aggregate of its parts,
the totality itself not being a separate principle from the parts
which comprise it. However, if the relation between the world
and man is transformed into the relation between God and man,
then this relation can be interpreted as both transcendent and
immanent. The second point is that all the relations can be inter-
preted both Stoically - as existing between active and passive
material principles- and Platonically- as subsisting between
active spiritual and passive material principles. Most of the
writers whom Cicero used as his sources deliberately tread a
path which is midway between Stoicism and Platonism, so that
CICERO 79
an interpreter must take great care to construe their

philosophical doctrines from the correct ontological view-
point.R9
1.2 ETHICS
Before proceeding to our main discussion of Cicero's doc-

trine, something should be said on one aspect of his ethics: the
theory of law. The treatises called De Republica and De Legibus
are. as their titles suggest, closely modelled on the correspon-
ding works of Plato, this similarity extending not only to
litc:rary form but also to philosophical content,90 which is in
both books essentially that of the Old Academy. Naturally,
Cicero read Plato's dialogues in the light of later exegesis, and
H9. See van den Bruwaene: La tbeologie de Ciceron pp. I O-Il who argues
that there is no real transcendence of causes in Stoicism nor in Cicero who
follows their teaching on these questions. Yet it is a mistake to interpret the
Stok and especially the Middle Stoic notion of cause in too restricted a man-
ner. Already in the earlier Stoa there is a tendency to replace the old
dichotomy of active (fire, air) and passive (water, earth) principles with that
of active (pneuma) and passive (fire, air, water, earth)- see Athenaeus of At-
talia~ doctrine reported by Galen: llltrod. s. medic. 9 (SVF II. 416)- and
this becomes more pronounced in Posidonius and other Stoics nearer to
Cicero's own time. In other words, there takes place a gradual spiritualiza-
tion of the pneuma. Furthermore E. Brehier: Cbrysippe et l'mlcien stoicisme
( Parb. Second Edition 195 I), p. 127 has shown that the Stoic theory of
causality is basically an attempt to solve the traditional Platonic problem of
participation between material and spiritual: see his analysis of Philo ludaeus:
/Je FuRaet lment. 13 (SVF II, 760) where the Stoic 'quality' (7tot6v) is treated
;h equivalent to the Platonic Form. In \'iew of the seamy evidence, it is dif-
tkult to sav how far Antiochus- the immediate source of much of Cicero's
lloctrine ~has gone In this direction, but clearly the transition has begun.
90. On the literary relation between Cicero's works and the originals by
Plato see Hirzel: op. cit. l, p. 463 ff. This writer points out that Cicero's debt
to Plato in De Republica and De Legibus is not, of course, restricted to the
lktlogues of the same names. For example, the eschatological elemem in the
lorrner work is probably influenced mostly by Plato's Pbaedo.
80 MIDDLE PLATONISM
those who have pursued the Quellenjorschung of the two

treatises have rightly drawn attention to the influence of
Panaetius and Antiochus especially.9J Thus, we would expect to
find the original Platonic doctrines subtly transformed in the
direction of Stoicism.
1.21 THE ARGUMENT OF DE REPUBLICA III
The principal discussion of De Republica III takes its starting

point from a disputation regarding justice which Carneades
once held in Rome. In this he practised his usual method of
arguing from both sides of the question,92 on this occasion by
first summarizing the views of Plato and Aristotle in favor of
justice, and then arguing the contrary case for injustice. The
speaker Laelius is charged with the task of expounding the case
for justice,93 and he begins in the following way: 'True law is
right reason in agreement with nature, diffused through all
things, unchanging and eternal, summoning to duty by its com-
mands and deterring from crime by its prohibitions. It does not
command or prohibit good men in vain, although its command
and prohibition have no effect on the wicked. It is a sin to alter
this law, nor is it permitted to undermine any part of it, while it
is impossible to repeal it totally. We cannot be freed from this
law either by senate or by people, nor is any arbitrator or inter-
91. The controversy has abated somewhat in recent years, although

without any definite conclusions having been reached. See E. Rawson: 'The
Interpretation of Cicero's De Legibus', Aufstieg wzd Niedergang der
romischen Well: Festschrift]. Vogt I. 4, herausgegeben von H. Temporini
(Berlin, 1973). pp. 340-342. For exhaustive bibliography seeP. L. Schmidt:
'Cicero: De republica: Die Forschung der lctzten fi.inf Dezennien', ibid.. PP
307-314.
92. On Carneades' method and Cicero's use of it see pp. 60-62.
93. Another speaker, Philus, having already undertaken the case for in-
justice.
CICERO 81
preter of it like Sextus Aelius to be sought. And there will not be

one: law at Rome and another at Athens, nor one law now and
another in the future, but one everlasting and unchangeable law
will cmhrace all peoples for all time. There will be one common
master and ruler of all, that is God, the author, promulgator and
jllll~c: of this law. Whoever does not obey it will flee himself and
despise his human nature. '9-t The philosophical argument of this
passa~e is more complex than it might seem at first sight, since it
determines the nature of law in terms of a whole series of rela-
tions to God, the world and man.
In the first place, law is described as reason in agreement with
nature. unchanging and eternal, and diffused through all things.
Leaving aside the question of nature, it is obvious that we are
dealing here with some kind of supreme or absolute principle
which is immanent in the world as a whole. Yet its relation is
not only to the macrocosm but also to the microcosm, for it
functions both as a standard in accordance with which all
human conduct is determined - it therefore has a transcendent
relation to it - and as an internal arbiter of that conduct - it
also has an immanent relation. The later part of Laelius' account
returns to consider the relation of this principle to the
macrocosm, and it now determines this more precisely. Thus,
'J-1. Cicero: /Je Rep. III, :H est quidem vera lex recta ratio. naturae con-
gntens. t1Ufu.m in rmmis, crmstans sempiterna, quae t'ocet cui officium
iuiJeltdo. tetcmdo a fraude deterreat. quae tamen neque probos frustra
iuiJtt aut l'elat. nee improbos iubendo cmt tetcmdo mm,et. b11ic fegi nee
" 11 rugari fas est. neque clerogari ctfiquid ex bac licet, neque tota af>rogari
fJutest. nee tero a111 per senatum aut per populum softi hac lege possumus.
111 ''/11<' est Cfllll<'l'elldus e.\1Jfanator aut lntcrpres Sextus Aelius, nee erit alia
h.\' 1/r,nae alia :ltbenis, alia mmc alia postbac, sed et omnes gentes et omni
lt' 111 /lllre una lex et sempitenw et imnutafJi/is crmtinebit, Wlllsque erit com-
lltunis lfUasi magister et imperator omnium deus: ilfe legis bulus imentor,
cltscefJiatur, Ialor: cui qui mm parehit. ipse se fugiet ac llctturmu lmmiuis
' 1Sf1<'1"11C/IIIs ...
82 MIDDlE PlATONISM
the supreme law which is immanent in the world is now said to

be dependent upon God who, since he is the author of the law
itself, exists as a transcendent cause of all things lying beyond
the immanent principle. Finally, Laelius returns once again to
considering the nature of the microcosm, and reaffirms that a
man who disobeys this law is not only turning aside from the
transcendent standard of his conduct, but from the immanent
standard as well. Such conduct is, as the speaker concludes, tan-
tamount to denying human nature itself.
No other passage in this work provides us with as rich a store
of information about Cicero's theory of law as does this opening
speech, although a few short texts add important further details
enabling us to fill out the larger picture. In two passages, the
nature of the microcosm and its relation to the macrocosm are
further examined, and here we learn9s not only that man has a
'reason' (ratio) or 'soul' (animus) by means of which he con-
trols the lower part of his nature - the transcendent relation of
soul to body within the microcosm; but that there is an analogy
between the macrocosm and the microcosm since, just as God
rules man, so does the soul control the lower man - the
transcendent relation of macrocosm to microcosm. Another
passage from the same work provides us with a further
characterization of the reason described above, for here we
discover96 that it functions as an immanent principle of order in
l)5. Ibid. Ill. 36 'For why dse docs God rule man. the soul body, reason
lust, an~er, and the other evil dements of the souP (cur igitur deus bomini.
cmimus imperat corpori, ratio libidini iractmdiaeque et ceteris vitiosis
eiusdem animi partibus?). Note that thc analogy of ruin and ruled is extend-
ed even to within the soul itself, for Cicero is hen: followin~ Plato's triparti-
tion of thc soul ;u Rep. IV. -1:\6b ff. The other passa~e is Cicero: De Rep. IV, I
'To me indent it seems as mud1 worse as the soul is more excellent than thc
body' (mibi quidem ftmfo !'itletur qtumto praestabi/ior est animus cor-
pore).
l)6. Ibid. Ill, 3. The word 'reason' (ratio) does not actually occur in the
CICERO 83
the arts of grammar, by marking the distinctions of letters and

svllahles, and in that of arithmetic, where it emerges as number
~nified, unchangeable and eternal' (una inmutabilis et aeter-
na). Unfortunately, the text is too fragmentary to allow us to
determine whether the reason discussed is the absolute reason
immanent in the world, the macrocosmic reason immanent in
human individuals, or the microcosmic reason of the human in-
dividual.9"
The evidence of these passages certainly confirms our
original suspicion that the Platonism of this work is combined
with Stoic doctrines. Ever since Zeno had composed his work
entitled noA.tt&ia,98 it had been a fundamental conviction of the
Stoics that just as the state was an entity sustained and governed
hy Jaw so was the world,99 and that this natural law penetrating
the world was equivalent to the divine nature itself immanent in
all things.too If this doctrine is a valid parallel, then Cicero's no-
text which is here fragmentary. Yet the usually synonymous term 'mind'
(mens) is present. and the context makes the nature of the missing element
dear.
<r. This passage is preserved by Augustine: Contra Julian. IV, 12 (PL 44,
~6~) who decides on the second interpretation. He explains the context by
saying that Cicero was describing the weak state of man at birth and his
gradual acquisition of civilization and the arts, this process being the result of
a certain divine fire of Intelligence and mind' (quidam divinus ignis ingenii
et mentis) implanted in him. Of course, the whole discussion is interpreted as
orthodox Platonism by Augustine.
9H. On this work see Clement of Alexandria: Strom. V. 12 (SVF I, 264).
99. See Plutarch: De Alex. Virt. I, 6. 329a (SVF I, 262) on Zeno, Stobaeus:
/:'clog. I, 184 (SVF II, 527) on Chrysippus, and Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Pbilos.
\'If. 138-139 (SVF II. 634) on Posidonius.
I 00. Diogencs Laertius: Vii. Pbilos. VII, 88 uses language very similar to
Cicero's in De Republica Ill when describing the Stoic notion of law: 'the
~ommon law. that is right reason which pervades all things. identical with
~~us. this ruler of the order of things'(6 v611oc; 6 Kow6c;, 6a1tEP tativ 6 6p9oc;
Aoyoc;, 0Ul1tUVtOlV tpX,611EVOc;, 6 aUtO<; WV tt'i> ~li, Ka9TJYE116VI tOUt(!l tijc; tOOV
ovtrov OIOtKl\aEroc; 6vn). Similarly Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus in Stobaeus:
84 MIDDLE PLATONISM
tion of the reason or law diffused through the cosmos will be,
ontologically speaking, a combination of the Platonic incor-
poreal reason with the 'artisan fire' (nup tEXVlK6v) of Stoicism,
while the relation of this law to the individual things through
which it is diffused will be a combination of Plato's theory of
participation with Stoic materialistic causality. I oI That this is
the case is indicated by the further developments regarding the
theory of law which occur in Cicero's De Legibus, where the
main argument is explicitly set out as a sequel to the construc-
tive notion of law expounded by Laelius in the previous
work.J02
1.22 THE ARGUMENT OF DE LEG/BUS I
After a prologue imitated from Plato's work of the same

name, Cicero (now himself a character in the dialogue) launches
into the exposition of a positive theory of law which he at-
tributes to the most learned men. 103 According to their defini-
tion, 'law is the highest reason, implanted in nature, which
commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite, this
same reason, when it is rendered firm and perfected in the
Eclog. I, 25 (SVF I, 537) refers to 'the common reason which pervades all
things' (Kmvoc; A.6yoc; 6c; Sla nav<rov QlOlT~). See also Cicero: De Nat. Deor. I,
36 (SVF I, 162); Minucius Felix: Octav. 19, 10 (SVF I, 162); Lactantius: lnst.
Div. I, S (SVF I. 162); Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Phi/os. VII, 128 (SVF Ill, 308);
and Plutarch: De Stoic. Repug11 9, 10.3Sc (SVF Ill, 326). It is interesting that
all these passages equate the law with God, whereas me passage of De
Republica places God In some way prior to the law as its creator. This may be
a purely literary mode of expression which also occurs sometimes in other
Stoic writers, or else it may imply a distinction between transcendent and Im-
manent principles in a more Platonic manner. On the Stoic theory of law see
further G. Watson: 'The Natural Law and Stoicism'. Problems in Stoicism,
edited by A. A. Long(London, 1971), pp. 216-238.
101. See pp. 78-79 and n. 89.
102. Cicero: De Leg. I, 20 and I, 27.
103. Referring, no doubt, to Panaetius or Antiochus.
CICERO s;
human mind, being law.' IOi It is easy to see that Cicero here
returns to the framework of the earlier treatise, for once again
he is postulating a principle of reason which is not only imma-
nent in the world or macrocosm but also in man or
microcosm. los The latter aspect is developed further in the next
few paragraphs of the text, but with a subtle change of emphasis
which might pass unnoticed, for Cicero no longer speaks of the
immanence of the macrocosmic reason in the microcosm, but of
the microcosmic reason itself, law being redefined as a 'natural
force - the mind and reason of an intelligent man.'I06 Soon,
however. we return to the macrocosm, when the speaker
reminds us that any discussion of the nature of justice must
begin with that supreme law which existed ages before any
written system of jurisprudence.I07 In these opening
paragraphs, then, we find Cicero postulating the existence of
reason or law in three different relations: as absolute reason im-
manent in the macrocosm, as absolute reason immanent in the
microcosm, and as individual reason immanent in the
microcosm.
But a little further on, our attention is shifted to the cor-
responding transcendent relations, since it is quickly agreed by
all parties to the discussion that everything is governed by the
p<nver or reason of the immortal gods.Ios This compels us to ad-
mit that 'that animal which we call man, provident, wise, com-
plex. endowed with intelligence and memory, full of reason and
judgment, has been created by the supreme God with a certain
IOt. Un:ro: /Je l.eg l. 18-19 lex est ratio summa. insila in natura. quae
iuiJet ea tfllllefacienda sun/. probihetque nmtraria. Eadem ratio cum est in
humin is mente nmfinnclla et pe1fecta, /e., est.
IO;. ~ote the phrase 'this same reason' (eadem ratio) which indicates that
011 l' and the same reason is immanent in both macrocosm and microcosm.
I 06. Ibid. I. 19 naturae l'is ... mens ratfoque pruden tis.

lo-.ll>id. I. 19.
I OH. Ibid. I, 21.
86 MIDDLE PLATONISM
distinguished status. For he alone, among all the varieties and

kinds of animals, participates in reason and thought, while the
rest are deprived of it. But what is more divine, I will not say in
man only, but in all heaven and earth, than reason? And reason,
when it is fully grown and perfected, is rightly called wisdom.
Thus, since there is nothing better than reason, and reason ex-
ists in both man and God, the principal link between man and
God is reason. But those who share reason must also share right
reason and, since right reason is law, we must conclude that
men and gods are also linked by law. Furthermore, those who
share law must also share justice, and those who share these
things must be considered as members of a single society. This
must be even more the case if they obey the same authorities
and powers, as those do who obey this celestial system, the
divine mind, and the God whose power is supreme.' 109 The
discussion concludes with some further remarks about the crea-
tion of the human race by God, when seed was scattered upon
the earth at the appropriate time, and then granted the divine
gift of reason.IIO
I 09. /hid. l. 2 2-2.~ em/mal hoc prmidum sagax multiple.\' aczlftan memor
plenum ratirmis et consilii, quem trJcamus bominem, praec/ara quadam
condicione generatwn esse a supremo deo. So/tun est enim ex tot animan-
tium generilms a/que naturis particeps mlirmis el cogilalionis, quom
cetera sin/ omnia expert/a. Quid est tllllem, non dicam in bomine sed in
omni cae/o a/que terra, ratione ditinius? Quae quom ado/evil atque perfec-
t a est. nomitwtur rile sapienlia. Est igitm. qtwnimn nibil est rulimze
me/ius. etlqU(' est el ill bomine el ill deo, prima lmmini cum lleo rulionls
sot'ielcts. Inter quos au/em ratio, inter eosdem eliam reclcl rulio communis
est: quae ('Um sit /e.--.:, lege qtmque nmsociali homlues cum dis puttmdi
sum us. Inter quos fHJP'ro est commuuio legis, iuler eos nm11111111io /uris est.
Quihus uulem baec suul inter eos communia, ei citilatis eiusdem babendi
sunt. Si tenJ isdem imperils et Jmfeslalihus parent, multo elictm magis.
Parent au/em huic caelesti discripliorzi menlique ditinae el praepotenti
deo.
110. Ibid. I, 24. The theory is a reminiscence of Plato's Tlmaeus. See P.
CICERO 87
In this passage once again we see the nature of reason ex-

plored in terms of a series of relations, and perhaps most strik-
ingly it is the transcendence of the supreme reason which is
brought into focus, for God has created man as an animal
himself endowed with reason. The discussion of this relation of
macrocosm to microcosm now gives way to an analysis of the
relations within the macrocosm itself, for a little further on in
the text we discover that reason is present in heaven and earth
_ the immanent relation of the supreme reason to the things
which participate in it, and furthermore that all things obey the
divine mind and highest God - the corresponding transcen-
dent relation. Finally, Cicero returns to the relation of
macrocosm and microcosm discussed at the beginning of this
text, in order to explain further the nature of God's creative act
as a sowing of seeds in the earth. ttt
1.23 THE ARGUMENT OF DE LEG/BUS II

The second book of De Legibus returns to many of the
themes in the first with a slight difference of emphasis in that,
whereas in the earlier book the aim was primarily to show the
foundation of individual human laws in an absolute standard, in
the later book it is mainly the nature of the standard itself which
is the subject of discussion. A quotation from Aratus'
Phaenomena I ll introduces developments of an essentially
religious character, in the course of which the various aspects of
the relation of reason to both macrocosm and microcosm are
explored. The transcendence of reason in relation to the
llopncc: 'Ciccron et tes semailles d':lmes du Timee', Romanilas 3 (1961).

rr. I 11-1 I'. Reprinted in Boyancc: Etudes sur /'bumanisme ciceronien, pp.
2lJ.f-300.
I I I. Other passages In De Legibus I dealing with reason and law in
macrocosm and microcosm are ibid. I. 29-30: I. 33-35: and I. 42-43.
I 12. Unro: De J.eg II. 7 'With Jupiter the Muses hegin their song' (A lme
.\Jusarum fJrinwrdia).
88 MIDDLE PLATONISM
macrocosm is underlined by the conclusion 'that law is the

primal and ultimate mind of God whose reason directs all things
by command or prohibition, '113 whereas its immanence in rela-
tion to the microcosm seems to be indicated by remarks a few
paragraphs later that human life represents the same reason
when perfected in man. 114 All this is similar to things stated in
the earlier texts, but towards the end of the argument we find a
new development, in that Cicero explains the philosophical
grounds for understanding the nature of the macrocosm in this
way. 'For what is more true than that nobody should be so
foolishly arrogant as to think that reason and mind exist in
himself, yet do not exist in the heavens and in the world, or that
those things which can scarcely be comprehended by the
highest human reason are moved by no reason at all'? II; The
most striking aspect of this passage is what the writer says. not
about the immanent relations of reason to both the macrocosm
and the microcosm in an analogous manner, but about the rela-
tion between the macrocosm and the microcosm themselves.
Since the nature of the macrocosm cannot be or can barely be
grasped by human intellect, its transcendence is of the most
radical kind. One is even reminded of the Neoplatonic view-
point on this question.ll6
These passages from De Republica III and De Legibus I and II
provide us with the most detailed description of reality as a
113. Ibid. II, 8 Ita principem legem i/lam et ultimam men tem esse ... om-
nia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis del.
114./bid. II, 11. The text is partly conjectural at this point.
IIi. 1/Jitl. II, ((,Quid est enim terius quam neminem e.~se oportere tam
stulte adrogantem, ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in caelo mtm-
doque non putet.~ Aut ut ea quae tix summa ingenii ratione conprebendan-
tur. nulla ralirme mm,eri putet?
116. Other passages in the second book of De Legibus dealing with the
transcendent and immanent relations of reason and law are ibid. ll, I 0 and II,
13.
CICERO 89
whole which Cicero was prepared to undertake from his own

point of view.117 As one might guess from the character and in-
terests of the author, this account has been developed primarily
in terms of God's role as the basis of law and morality, the
supreme principle itself being viewed either as the source liB of
or equivalent toll9 an absolute standard. This absolute standard
which is called alternately law and reasont2o exists in both a
transcendent and an immanent relation to the world, while its
analogue, the human law or reason exists in a similar transcen-
dent or immanent relation to every man. Finally, the absolute
law or reason exists in both a transcendent and an immanent
relation also to the human individual.t21 The importance of
Cicero's early writings on politics for the comprehension of his
philosophical position as a whole has been underlined by A.-J.
Festugiere, 122 yet they are clearly limited in many ways and pro-
117. There are also some passages in De Legibus III, for example III, 2-3
and Ill. 12. But these basically repeat the same material.
118. See Cicero: De Rep. III, 33.
119. See Cicero: De Leg. II, 8 and II, 10.
120. See Cicero: De Rep. Ill, 33 (law, reason); De Leg. I, 18-19 (law,
n:ason); I, 22-23 (law, reason); II, 8 (law, reason); II, 16 (reason); etc.
I 2 I. It may be useful to add a diagram indicating the various modes in
which rlason is manifested in De Republica and De Leg/bus.
ratio, lex ratio, lex
T+I
1--- T+l T+
I
world
~ man
1.22. Fcstugiere: op. cit., pp. 425-433 and 459.
90 MIDDLE PLATONISM
vide us with little real ontological analysis of the nature of the

first principles. For further information on these questions we
must therefore turn elsewhere.
1.31 CICERO'S THEOLOGY
When modern scholars examine the theology of Cicero, they

usually employ De Natura Deorum as their principal source.l23
The content of this work is obviously of primary relevance,
since nowhere else do we find as abundant a supply of material
on themes such as the existence, nature, and providence of God
or the gods in the Ciceronian corpus. However, there is a slight
problem in using this text as a source of Cicero's theological
views, because all the discussion is placed into the mouths of
Epicurean, Stoic and (New) Academic speakers. One might be
tempted to argue that Cicero, as a self-declared Academic, 124
could be assumed to endorse the essentially negative opinions
expressed by the spokesman of this school (Cotta). Yet the
much discussed remarks of Cicero himself at the end of the
work, 12s where he sides with the Stoic representative (Balbus),
indicate that the nature of his Academicism should not be
misunderstood. In terms of philosophical method, he un-
12:\. Amon~ rnt:nt studic:s of Ci<:ero's tht:olo~r. in addition to thost:

alrt:ady mentiont:d. St:l' C. Beukers: Cicero's Godsdienstigheid (Nijmegen.
1912); P. Dt:fourny: 'l.t:~ fondaments de Ia rt:ligion d'apris Ci<:cron'. les
eludes classiques 22 ( 19';1). pp. 241-2;3 and 566-37H;J. (iuillcn: 'Oios y los
diost:s t:n Cict:nin', Helmcmtica 2.:; (19"4). pp. ';IJ-<;6.:;; _1. M. Andre: 'La
philosophic rdi~ieust: dt Ciecron. Dualisme :tcadcmiqut t:ttripanition \'arro-
nil'nnt:'. Cicenmiana. Hom mages a K. Kummziecki, publies par A. Mkhel et
R. Vt:rdrit:re (l.dden, 19"'';), pp. 11-21; and .J. Guillen: 'lntroducd(m :t Ia
tc:olo~ia de Cker6n'. Helmantica 27 ( 1976). pp. 193-259.
124. See pp. 5H-60.
125. Sc:t: p. 72.
CICERO 91
doubtedly agrees with the Academic spokesman in thinking that

all constructive positions should be subjected to vigorous criti-
que. Cicero's support of such a procedure is reflected in the
structure of this work itself.126 On the other hand, he disagrees
with the Academic representative regarding the degree of pro-
bability which the Stoic theological views may be held to con-
tain. His final remarks show that he considers them highly pro-
b:thle and therefore worthy of an Academic's provisional sup-
port.l27
But if Cicero's views on theological questions are primarily
Stoic, even if somewhat reflected through the New Academic
prism, what has this to do with an investigation of his
Platonism? The answer is perhaps obvious, and lies in con-
sideration of the eclecticism which this author displays in his
philosophical works.
We have already seen how Platonic and Stoic notions of
reason are synthesized to form the central doctrine of De
Republica and De Legibus, na this combination perhaps
representing Cicero's own philosophical views but more pro-
bably that of his sources. Since the main influence behind the
Platonic tendencies in these political works is undoubtedly An-
tiochus, 129 and we know from elsewhere that the latter's
physical theory was based on Plato's Timaeus interpreted from
an essentially Stoic viewpoint, 130 it would seem quite likely that
Cicero is indebted to the same writer in his approach to
cosmological questions, the latter being handled within a fun-
126. St:e p. 62.

12""'. St:t: pp. 63-67.
128. See pp. 82-84.
129. This thesis has been effectively demonstrated in relation 10 De
Le~ihus I by Boyance: 'Ciceron et le Premier Alcibiade'. pp. 256-261. See
abo n. 61.
130. St:t: p. 10 I ff.
92 MIDDLE PLATONISM
damentally Platonic framework filled out with an abundance of

philosophical detail derived from the Stoa. Indeed when we
turn to De Natura Deorum, we discover an exposition of Stoic
philosophy which must have been of more than usual impor-
tance to the author, an exposition which owes much not only to
Old Stoic writers like Zeno and Chrysippus, but also to the more
recent eclectic members of the school. 131
I:'\ I. The question of Cicero's sources in De Natura Deorum. especially in

the second book where the Stoic theology is mainly expounded, is a con-
troversial one. furthermore, since Cicero clearly composed his book by
following a Greek source or a succession of Greek sources in different sec-
tions. the question of sources is inextricably connected with the problem of
the work's structure. See festugiere: op. cit., p. 3H4.n. I. The following
writers have studied these questions during the last fifty years: K. Reinhardt:
Poseidonios (Miinchen, 192 I). pp. 22-4-239 and Kosmos und .\)'mpathle.
Neue Untersuchungen tiber Poseidonios (M(inchen, 1926) pp. 161-177; M.
Pohlenz: 'Reinhardt: Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften etc.', Giit-
tlngische gelehrte Anzeigen 184 (1922), pp. 161-187: ibid. 188 (1926), pp.
273-306; and ibid. 192 (1930), pp. 137-156; P. finger: 'Die drei
kosmologischen Systeme im II. Buch von Ciccros Schrift iibcr das Wesen der
Gutter'. Rheinisches Museum 80 (1931 ), pp. IS 1-200 and 310-320; van den
Bruwaene: La theologie de Cicermt, pp. 84-121: R. Philippson: 'Cicero, De
natura deomm Buch II und Ill. Eine Quellenumersuchung', Symbo/ae
Os/oenses 21 ( 1941 ), pp. 11-38: Ibid. 22 ( 19-42), pp. 8-39: ibid. 23 ( 1944 ), pp.
7-31: and ibid. 2-i ( 19-lS), pp. 16-43: M. van Straaten: Panetius, sa l'ie, ses
ecrits, et sa doctrine atec une edition des fragments (Amsterdam. 1946), pp.
2-I0-255; festugiere: op. cit., pp .."t75-425; A. S. Pease: M. Tullii Ciceronis De
Natura Deorum 111. edited by A. S. P. (Cambridge, MA), 1955-58, passim; A. J.
Kleywegt: Cicems Arbeitsweise im ZU'eitetl wtd drittetl Bucb der Scb,ift De
natura deorum (Groningen, 1961 ); M. van den Bruwaene: Cicercm, De Natura
Deorum, Lit,e I (Bruxelles, 1970), pp. I 5-;'\2 and Litre II (Bruxelles, 1978).
pp. 5-12. Some of this bibliography (especially the earlier items) has arisen as
part of an attempt to dissolve the Ciceronian material into Posidonian ex-
tracts, for the most part rather unconvincingly. This tendency is evaluated by
van den Bruwaene: Cicemn, De Natura Deorum. Litre /, pp. 24-29. The most
useful introduction to the whole study of the soun:es is, however. Pease: op.
cit., pp ..'\6-49 who distinguishes the various possible: approaches to the se-
CICERO 93
1.311 THE NATURE OF GOD
The first question to ask in connection with Cicero's

theology is, of course. what is the nature of 'God' (deus)? One
or two passages which have already been examined indicate
that GodLU is equivalent to 'nature' (natura), since the law or
reason contained in the divine mind has been described as 'in
agreement with nature' ,133 as 'implanted in nature', 134 and so
on. That this is primarily a Stoic view which Cicero has
adopted, seems to be indicated by the espousal of the same posi-
tion by the Stoic representative in De Finibus III, who argues
that a true understanding of good and evil requires knowledge
of nature and the divine life.l35 Nature in its turn is identifiable
cond hook: (i) using one source (Reinhardt), (ii) using a number of sources
(Pohlenz. Finger), (iii) using one source of a compendium character (Philipp-
son~. Festugii:re: op. cit. p. 384, n. 1 considers that the problems will never
the resolved, but that the investigations of Reinhardt and Philippson have
made definite progress by distinguishing two parts of the work: De Nat.
Df!(}l'. II. 4-72 probably based on a compendium. and ibid. II. 73-167 follow-
ing a continuous treatise.
132. Naturally Cicero. as a Roman pagan, believed in a multitude of gods.
However, he follows the universal practice of late ancient philosophy In see-
ing all the lower gods as manifestations of a supreme one. It is this highest
God with which our investigation is concerned.
I 3 3. See Cicero: De Rep. Ill, 3 3. Also see pp. 80-81.
13-.. See Cicero: De Leg. !, 18. Also see pp. 84-85.
135. Cicero: De Fin. Ill. 73. The equation between God and nature is
discussed at greater length by van den Bruwaene: La theologie de Cictfrmz,
pp. J"72-182 and 248 ff. The most recent discussions of Stoic physical theory
:1re S. S:1mhursky: Physics of the Stoics (London, 1959); F. Solmsen: Cleanthes
()I' Posidonius? The Basis of Stoic PIJ)'Sics (Amsterdam. 1961 ); J. Christensen:
An Essay on tbe Unity of Stoic Philosophy (Kobenhavn. 1962). pp. 23-38; E.

\X'eil: 'Remarques sur lc materlalisme des stoiciens'. Melanges A. Koyre II
!Paris. 1964). pp. 556-572; J. B. Gould: The Philosophy of Chrysippus
(l.eiden. 1970). pp. 99-102; L. Bloos: Probleme der stolschen Physik (Ham-
burg, 1973). pp. 52-113; M. Lapidge: 'Archai and Stoichela. A Problem in
94 MIDDLE PLATONISM
with the physical element of fire, according to the famous

definition of the founder of the Stoic school Zeno: 'Nature is a
craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to generation'
(naturam ... ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progre-
dientem via), 136 the term 'craftsmanlike' in this definition refer-
ring to the different parts of nature considered separately,
whereas the term 'craftsman' would more correctly apply to
nature as a whole. Finally, the Stoics draw the logical conclu-
sion from the equivalences already proposed, by arguing that
God is to be identified with fire.t37 Thus, according to their
view, there will come a time when the entire physical cosmos
will be resolved into fire which, however, as a living creature
and God is later able to fashion the world anew.
1.312 THE TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE OF GOD
This God, nature, or fire has a relation to the world which is

both transcendent and immanent.t3B The transcendence of God
Stoic Cosmology', Pbronesis 18 (1973), pp. 240-278; A. Graeser: Zenon von

Kltion. Posltiot~en und Probleme (Berlin/New York, 1975), pp. 82-124; ).
Longrigg: 'Elementary Physics in the Lyceum and Stoa', Isis 66 (1975). pp.
211-229; M. Lapidge: 'Stoic Cosmology', Tbe Stoics. edited by J. M. Rist
(Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1978), pp. 161-185; and R. B. Todd: 'Monism and Im-
manence. The Foundations of Stoic Physics', Ibid., pp. 137-160. Since our
concern is wilh Platonists rather than with Stoics, and since the evidence for
the latter is invariably fragmentary, I shall speak of Stoicism loosely as a
unified system of thought.
136. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. ll, 57-;R. See ibid. Ill, 27 and Diogenes Laer-
tius: Vit. Pbi/os. VII, 156 (SVF I, 171) tilv J.lEV qll)atv &fva11tiip t&XVIKOV, M(j>
~a&i~ov ⁣ ytv&atv.
137. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, 118. Cf. Aetius: Plac. I, 7, 23 (SVF I, I 57 =
DG 303bll-12); Censorious: De Die Nat. 4, 10 (SVF I, 124).
138. We would expect this. if the God/nature/fire of these passages is iden-
tifiable with the supreme law or reason of De Republica and De Legibus. See
p. 80 ff.
CICERO 95
is affirmed in various passages where he is said to produce or ad-

minister the world - in one place arousing the Epicurean
criticism that this would be a laborious activity for a divine be-
ingt:W - or to produce or administer nature - the Stoic argu-
ment about providence leading to the conclusion that 'God is
not obedient or subject to any form of nature, but himself rules
all nature' (nulli igitur est naturae oboediens aut subiectus
deus; omnem ergo regit ipse naturam).l-40 Yet God is also
equivalent to nature, and so it is not surprising to find other
texts \vhcre it is nature which is described as the transcendent
cause. nature's role in the creation and sustenance of living
things hdng compared to that of an artist in relation to his han-
dicraft. J-t' Furthermore. God is equivalent to fire, and we find
similar passages where it is fire which functions as the transcen-
dent principle: either as 'that nature which generates all things,
including mind and sense' (ipsa natura quae quidque gigneret
et mentem atque sensus),I4Z or more specifically as the aether
l:W. Cicero: De Nat. Denr. l, 52. Cf. ibid. II, 16; II, 127; and Ill, 28. For
the notion of God as a transcendent cause in the Stoics see Diogenes Laertius:
l'it. Pbifos. VII, 137 (SVF II, 526) and Stobaeus: Ec/og. I. 184 (SVF II, 527).
The texts indicate two tendencies: (i) to consider the active cause as a
pneuma of fire and air operating on the passive elements water and earth. Sec
texts cited inn. 142, (ii) to view the active cause as a pneuma transcending all
four elements and operating upon them. See Galen: lntrod. s. medic. 9 (SVF
11. -116); Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Pbilos. VII, 135-137 (SVF II. 580); and
l.ucan. Scbol. Bern. IX. 578. Tendency (ii) seems to be mainly in the later
Stoks and is especially characteristic of Posidonius. However. tendency (i) is
perhaps predominant in Cicero's reports of Stoic doctrine. As van den Bru-
waene: Cie~fron: De Natura Deorum, Lit1re I. p. 28 notes. this is an argument
a~ainst the belief that Posidonius is the sole source of Cicero's understanding
of Stoic physics.
IHl. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II. 77-78.
1-t I./bid. II, 57-58; II, 81; II, 83-84; and II. 87.
1t2. Cicero: Acad. 39. Cf. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, 91-92 and II, 117-118.
For fin: as a transcendent cause in the Stoics see Plutarch: De Stoic Repugn.
96 MIDDLE PLATONISM
which surrounds the world and sustains the lower elements by a

reciprocal process of condensation and rarefaction.tH
These texts give us the impression of a fairly coherent
physical theory, although there are undeniably certain problems
of interpretation. One obvious difficulty concerns the nature of
the transcendence which the causal principle seems to enjoy,
since we are clearly not concerned with the transcendence of a
Platonic Form in relation to space and time, where the ap-
plicability of space and time to the principle is denied. Although
it is possible that the spiritualization of the pneuma in the Mid-
dle Stoa, especially in Posidonius, had reached a stage where it
approximates to the character of the intelligibles in
Platonism, 144 and we must remember that the rigid distinction
between spiritual and material was less obvious to writers of an-
tiquity - a point demonstrated by J. Pepin in connection with
the mens-aetber of Aristotle's De Pbilosopbiat45 -,there is un-
fortunately not much evidence to suggest that Cicero thought of
the active cause of the world in this way. In fact the
transcendence of the cause in these texts is in relation to space
and time, but only to the degree that materialism permits, name-
ly a transcendence of space in the sense that fire constitutes the
41, 1053b (SVF II, 605); De Comm. Not. 36. 1077c (SVF II, 1064); Arius
Didymus: Epit. Phys. fr. 29 (SVF II, 642 = DG 465, 7-10); and Diogcnes Laer-
tlus: Vit. Philos. VII, 139 (SVF II, 644).
143. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, 117-118.
144. See Posidonius in Luc. Scho/. Bern. IX, 578 'For what other abode
does God have than the elements which he names. Posidonius the Stoic says
that 'God is an intellectual pneuma pervading the whole of substance'. that is
to say earth, water, air, heaven' (Quae enlm aHa est del sedes nisi e/ementa
haec quae dicit? Aft etlim Posldonius Stoicus: 9e6c; tan 7tVEUJ.1a voepov
l>li;Kov l>l'ancianc; oua(ac;: deus est spiritus rationalis per omnem dlffusus
materiam, hoc est terram aquam aera caelum). Sec nn. 89 and 139.
145. Pepin: Tbeologie cosmique et theologle chretlenne (Ambroise, Exam.
/,I, 1-4), pp. 241-247.
CICERO 97
outermost circle of the cosmos, 146 and a transcendence of time

implied by the survival of the fire alone after the conflagration
in which this world is destroyed.147
Another difficulty arises from the ambivalent status which
certain principles seem to have. For example, on the one hand
God is said to be the transcendent cause of nature, and on the
other nature is itself the transcendent principle of causality.
some scholars have therefore been driven to argue that the am-
bivalence must be the result of Cicero's unthinking and
misleading practice of using a plurality of sources on the same
ropic even when some of these teach doctrines inconsistent
with or actually contradicting one another.148 Fortunately,
rhere is no need for such drastic solutions since - as A.-J.
Festugiere has demonstrated using texts such as Cleanthes'
Hymn to Zeus - it was quite logical for a Stoic to speak of a
principle such as nature both as an extrinsic demiurgic cause
and also as an indwelling vital force, the whole problem going
back to Plato's division of the creative principle into a Demiurge
and a world soul in the Timaeus. 149 In fact, this difficulty
should merely remind us of something which we have already
discovered: namely, that the Stoic cause enters into both a
116. Ck<:ro: De Nat. Deor. II, 40; II, 9192; and II, 115 (fiery nature of
h<:an:n): ibid. l, 36; 11, 55; and De Rep. Vl, 17 (the heaven as God). Cf.
l>iogcncs laertius: Vit. Pbi/os. Vll, 139 (SVF II. 644) and VII, 148 (SVF l. 163
and II. 1022). Cleanthes complicates the picture by placing his ruling part in
lht Sun. Sec Diogenes l.aertius: Vlt. Ph/los. VII, 139 (SVF I, 499).
li~. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, 118. Cf. Philo Iudaeus: De lncorr. Mundi
2')-1, .., (SVF II, 61 1); Aetius: Plac. II, 9. 2 (SVF II, 609 = DG 338bl618);
Plutarch: De Stoic Repugn. 41. 1053b (SVF 11, 605). Panaetius (to whom
Cic<:ro rt:fers in the passage quoted) denied this theory. See Diogenes laer-
tius: l'it. Pbilos. VII. 142.
11!-1. Sec: Reinhardt: Poseidonios, pp. 234-239 and Kosmos und Sym-
{lat/Jie. Neue Untersuchungen fiber Poseidon los, pp. 92-111.
111). Festugiere: op. cit., pp. 397-398 and 417-418.
98 MIDDLE PLATONISM
transcendent and an immanent relation to its effect.

The immanent relation of God, nature, or fire to the world is
also described in many Ciceronian texts. Thus, God is said to be
equivalent to the world, spherical and spinning on its axis with
incredible velocity, 150 the parts of the world being the limbs of
the divinity .151 Nature is also coextensive with the world: an in-
ner motion behind all nurture and growth,152 a 'rational force'
(vis particeps rationis) producing different effects in plants,
animals, and man, 153 and a principle capable of volition and ap-
petition.t54 Finally, fire is the essence of the world, the basis of
all force, 155 a principle of self-motion and cohesion in every liv-
150. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. I, 52. Perhaps significantly, such statements of

crude pantheism are placed in the mouth not of the Stoic representative in
the dialogue but of his critics: the Epicurean Velleius in Book I and the
Academic Cotta in Book Ill. Seen. 151. The real Stoic position is that God is a
principle pervading the world, that is to say immanent in it, but not identical
with the world. See nn. 15 2-156. For this notion see also Arat us: Pbaen. I,
1-18; Philo ludaeus: De Mundi Opif. 8 (SVF II, 302); Hippolytus: Pbilos. 21, 1
(SVF I, 153 and II, 1029 = DG 571, 7-10); and Stobaeus: Eclog. I, 25 (SVF I,
537). The Christian doxographers lay great emphasis on the ethical problems
presented by this theory of divine immanence: that God seems to become
thereby the source of evils. See Clement of Alexandria: Protr. 58 (SVF I, 159);
Tatian: Ad Graec. 3 (SVF I, 159). Velleius' account at Cicero: De Nat. Deor. I,
39 once again proposes the simple equation God = world, yet modifies it
slightly by speaking of the universal diffusion of soul as soul. For a good
discussion of the non-pantheistic character of the real Stoicism see Brehier:
op. cit., pp. 153-156.
151. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. I, 24.
152. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. V, 37.
15 3. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II. 81. Cf. ibid. II, 120 and De Ditin. II, 33-34.
According to Stoic theory, the different levels result from degrees of tension
in the pneuma. See Sextus Empiricus: Adl'. Math. IX, 78 (SVF H. 1013);
Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Ph/los. VII, 148 (SVF II, 1132); and Themistius: In de
Anim. II, 64, 35. 32-34 (SVF 1, 158).
154. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, 58.
155./bid. Ill, 35.
CICERO 99
ing organism.' S6 This notion of a divine power immanent in the

cosmos was not originated by the Stoics, ts7 having a long and
interesting history which has been examined by). Moreau,t58
A.-J. Festugiere,t59 and J. Pepin t6o in particular. Their investiga-
tions have revealed a continuity of doctrine beginning from
Plato's world soul in the Timaeus and Laws, transformed
through the Aristotelian notion of aether in the early dialogues
and De Caelo, and ending in the pervading pneuma of Zeno,
Chrysippus and Posidonius. Most importantly, it is now clear
that the Stoic physics is not simply a materialistic reaction, but a
logical development of certain aspects of the earlier tradi-
tion.161
I. 3 1.3 THE RELATION OF MACROCOSM TO MICROCOSM
A final question to ask regarding Cicero's Stoic theology is:

what is the nature of God's relation to man? The answer is that
there is a close kinship between macrocosm and microcosm
since God, like man, is a living creature comprising soul and
I 56./bid. II, 23-24 and II, 41.

I 'i'7. The Stoic thesis that God is the world, in the Stoic sense of being an
immanent principle of all things, is based upon a deduction from 'our
prt:l'Onception and concept' (praesensio notioque nostra) at ibid. II, H.
Thus, our preconception of divinity as that 'than which there is nothing
more excellent in all nature' (in omni natura nibil eo sit praestantius). there
is nothing in the universe which is more excellent than the world itself.
therefore the world itself most precisely fits our preconception of divinity.
The argument is attacked by the Academic Cotta at ibid. Ill, 2021 where he
fastens on the ambiguity of the word 'superior' (me/ius). On the
epistemological significance of preconception In the Stoics seep. 132 ff.
I 'i8.J. Moreau: L 'dme du mondede Platon aux stoiciens (Paris, 1939).
I 'i9. Festugiere: op. cit., pp. 75340.
160. Pepin: op. cit., pp. 103-328.
161. There are, of course, also important modifications. See Moreau: op.
cit., pp. 187-189.
100 MIDDLE PLATONISM
body. This thesis becomes the basis of several of the arguments

for the existence and nature of the gods which are such a strik-
ing feature of De Natura Deorum 11,162 for example of Zeno's
group of syllogisms proving the presence of rationality in the
cosmos: (i) That which uses reason is superior to that which
does not use it, nothing is superior to the world, therefore the
world employs reason; (ii) Nothing lacking sensation can have a
part of itself which is sentient, the world has parts which are
sentient, therefore the world does not lack sensation; (iii)
Nothing that is inanimate and irrational can generate from itself
an animate and rational being, the world gives birth to animate
and rational beings, therefore the world is animate and ra-
tional.163 A similar argument is presented in a somewhat ellip-
tical manner, but seems to have the following structure: that
which is a living creature is superior to that which is not a living
creature, nothing is superior to the world, therefore the world
is a living creatu~e ,164 Cicero's special interest in these
arguments was no doubt stimulated by the formally dialectical
character which they all exhibit.
162. For an analysis of these arguments seeP. Boyance: 'Les preuves stoi-
ciennes de !'existence des dieux d'apres Ciceron', Hermes 50 (1962), pp.
4 5-71. Reprinted in Boyancc: Etudes sur /'buma11isme ciceronien, pp.
301-334. The writer disagrees with the assessment of earlier scholars and em-
phasizes Cicero's personal contribution to the development of these
arguments.
163. Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, 21-22. These three arguments are also
documented by Sextus Empiricus: Adv. Math. IX, I 04 (SVF I. I I I) = i; Ibid.
IX. 85 (SVF I, 114) = ii; ibid. IX, I 10 (SVF I, 113) =iii. A more complex ex-
ample of an argument from microcosm to macrocosm occurs at Cicero: De
Nat. Deor. II, 29-30.
164. Ibid. II, 45. The argument is presented in rather confusing combina-
tion with another based upon the definition of God as that than which there
is nothing more excellent in nature. Sec n. 157. It is also presented by
Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Pbi/os. VII, 142-143 (SVF II, 633).
CICERO 101
1.32 CICERO'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Such are the main elements of the Stoic physical theory

presented by Cicero. As a typical Platonist of the first century
B.C. he would have assimilated much of this doctrine into the
physical system of his preferred school, tM yet it was not
necessary for him to accomplish the work of synthesis entirely
by means of his own efforts, since he already had a model for
such a procedure in his teacher Antiochus. In fact, the exposi-
tion of the latter's system by Varro in the A eadem lea is the most
thorough analysis of physical theory per se in the entire Cicero-
nian corpus, and it is Antiochus' account which we must ex-
amine next.t66
1.321 ANTIOCHUS AT ACADEMICA 24
This philosophy of nature, derived by Antiochus from the

Old Academy, also takes its starting point from the notion of a
God who is both transcendent and immanent in relation to mat-
ter.167 Thus, paragraph 1 divides nature into two principles: the
active representing force, the passive matter, while the opera-
tion of the former on the latter produces a physical entity .168
165. Seep. 91 ff.

166. On Antiochus in general see A. Liider: Die pbilosopbiscbe Per-
sonlicbkeit des Antiocbos liOn Askalon (Gottingen, 1940); H. Strache: Der
l:'klektizismus des Anliocbos rmn Aska/on (Berlin, 1921); G. Luck: Der
Ake~demiker Anliocbos (Stuttgart, 1953): and ). Dillon: The Middle
Platmzists. A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (London. 1977), pp.
'l2-106. For Amiochus relation to the New Academy see Glucker: op. cit.,
pp. 13-90.
167. Seep. 94 ff.
168. To assist the discussion here. I append the complete text (Cicero:
--lead. 2'1: 26-29) divided imo paragraphs.
I. De naturtl autem (id enim sequebatur) ita dicebant ut ettm dividerent
in res fluas. ut alteru esset efflciens, altera uutem quasi buic se praebens,
eaque efficeretur aliquid. in eo quod efficeret rim esse censebant. in eo
emtem quod efficeretur tantum modo materiam quandam; in utroque
tamen utrumque: neque enim mater/am ipsam cobaerere potuisse si nulla
l'i crmtineretur. neque tim sine aliqua materia; nibil est enim quod mm
alicubi esse cogatur. sell quod e.\ utroque. id lam corpus et quasi
qualltatem quandam nom/nahant ...
2A. earum igitur qua/ita tum sunt aliae principes a/iae ex his ortae. prin-
dpes sufllrmius modi et simplices; ex his autem ortae tariae stmt et quasi
multiformes. itaque aer (hoc quoque utimur enim pro Latino) et ignis et
aqua et terra prima sunt; ex his autem ortae animantium formae earum-
que rerum quae glgmmtur e tena. ergo 11/a inilia et ut e Graeco t'ertam
e/ementa dietmtur; e quibus aer et ig11is nuwe11di rim babe1ll et efficiendi,
reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. quln-
tum genus, e quo essen! astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor
quae supta eli.,-; dissimi/e Aristoteles quodda m esse rebatur.
2B. Sed sublectcmt putant omnibus sine ulla specie atque carentem omni
ilia qualitate (j'aclamus e11im tractcmdo usittltius boc verbum et tritlus)
mater/am quandam. ex qua omnia expressa atque effecta sint. quae Iota
omnia accipere possit omnlbusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte eo-
que etiam interire, non in nibilum sed in suas partes, quae infinite secari
ac ditidi possltll. cum sit 11ihil onmlno In rerum mllura minimum quod
dil'idi nequeat.
:\. quae autem moveanlur omnia inlertllllis moteri, quae interralla

item infinite dit,idi possi11t. et cum ita moteatur ilia tis quam qualitatem
esse ttiximus, et cum sic ultro citroque t'ersetur, et nwter/am ipsam totam
pettitus commutari putant et ilia effie/ quae appellant qualia: e quibus In
omni natura cobaerente et contimulla cum omnibus suis partibus unum
effectum esse mundum. extra quem nulla pars mtlleriae sit nul/umque cor-
pus. Pt~rtis autem esse mzmdl om11ia quae insint in eo, qut~e natura sen
lintle te11eantur. In qua ratio perfec:ta i11sil. quae sit eadem sempitema
(nihil enim talentius esse a quo intereat); quam tim animum esse dicrmt
mumli. eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum ap-
pellant, mnniumque rerum qzwe sint ei subiectae quasi prudent/am quan-
dam procurcmtem caelestia max/me. deinde in ter,.,s ea quae perlineant ad
homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant, quia nibil aliter
posslt Clique aiJ ea constitutum sit. interdum ... quasi fatalem et im-
mutaiJilem nmtimwlionem ordinis sempiterni ...
CICERO 103
varro 's account here is clearly referring to the traditional Stoic

duality of principles where God - here concealed in the
abstract terminology of 'active cause'- functions as a transcen-
dent principle in relation to matter.'t69 Yet the second half of
the paragraph goes on to emphasize an aspect of the Stoic
theory which has not so far emerged from the Ciceronian texts:
the notion that the two opposing principles have a reciprocal
relation to one another. Each principle is present in the other,
for neither could matter cohere were it not sustained by some
force, nor could force exist in the absence of matter when
nothing exists without being in some place, this combination of
force and matter producing a physical body which we may also
call a quality. That the two principles enter into combination
with one another merely indicates how the transcendence of
the active principle is accompanied by an immanence, t7o yet
the nature of this latter relation is perhaps not immediately ob-
vious from what has been said.
One of the most striking aspects of the Stoic theory of causa-
tion is the use of the notion of mixture to explain the relation
between cause and effect which leads to a totally new concept
of unity and plurality. Since the fundamental assumption of
Stoicism is that all principles are corporeal,I71 it is obviously not
possible for them to explain causation in terms of the action of
an incorporeal principle upon something corporeal, as the
Platonists did in employing the duality of Form and sensible.
Thus the Stoics, according to Simplicius,1'72 substituted the no-
I<J9. See pp. 94-96.

I "70. Sec pp. 98-99. On the problems of transcendence and immanence and
of the redproc.::al relation between active and passive principles see Todd:
':\lonism and Immanence. The Foundations of Stoic Physics', pp. 139-143
and l.:tpidge: 'Stoic.: Cosmology', pp. 163-166.
I "7 I. See Aetius: Plac. I, 11, 5 (SVF II, 340 = DG 31 Oa6-7) and Simplicius:
In Pbys. Ill, I, 420, 6-11 (SVF II, 339).
1-2. Simplicius: In Pbys. IV, I, 530, 9-11 (SVF II, 467).
tion of a penetration of one body by another for the relation of

participation between Form and body: in other words, their at-
tention became focused on the concept of mixture 173 as an ex-
planation of the causal relation. The various kinds of mixture
were examined with great care, one specific type being selected
to function as a universal physical principle, the so-called 'total
mixture' (Kpdmc; lit'oA.rov).174 This kind implies certain definite
characteristics of the relation between cause and effect in that,
on the one hand there is a reciprocity between the two - it is
impossible to alter the nature of one without altering that of the
other, 175 so that one might even speak of them as mutual causes
-while at the same time there is independence on both sides-
the blending of the two does not lead to a dissolution of either
nature, 17 6 even if a drop of wine is blended with the entire
173. Alexander of Aphrodisias: De Mixl. 223, 25 (SVF II, 441) and 224, 32
(SVF II, 310). On the Stoic theories of mixture see H. A. Wolfson: The
Pbi/osophJ1 of the Church Fathers I. Faith. TriniiJ, Incarnation (Cambridge,
MA, 1956), pp. 372-386; Samhursky: op. cit., pp. Il-17 and I2I-123;).
Pepin: 'Sti/la aquae modica multo infusa vino, ferrum ignitum, luce per-
fusus aer. L'origine de trois comparaisons familieres a Ia theologie mystique
medievale'. Miscellanea A. Combes I (Divinitas, II) (Roma, 1967), pp.
344-355; and R. B. Todd: Alexander ofAphrodisias on Stoic Physics. A Study
of the De Mixtione with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Com-
mentary(Lciden, 1976), pp. 29-73.
174. For the various types of mixture see Stobaeus: Eclog. I, 153 (SVF II,
471 ). They are 'juxtaposition' (napa8ea1c;), 'mixture' proper (lli~l<; of solids
or Kpdmc; of liquids), and 'fusion' (al)yxumc;). In the first case, there is no real
l'omposition since each <.onstituent retains its identity, e.g. stones in a
mosaic. In the last case, all the constituents lose their own characteristics,
e.g. in a drug. Thus the Stoics concentrate on the intermediate kind as their
paradigm of physical relations.
175. See Clement of Alexandria: Strom. VIII, 9 (SVF II, 349) 'causes to one
another' (aUi)A.mc; a ina). See Samhursky: op. cit.. pp. R 1-88.
176. See Alexander of Aphrodisias: De Mixt. 2I7, 27 (SVF II, 473) 'being
preserved along with their own qualities' (we; aimi aq>~OJLEva JLEta nov
oiKeiwv nmoti)twv). See Brehit:r: op. cit.. pp. I 14-14 I.
CICERO 105
ocean. Obviously this changes our whole way of thinking about

unity and plurality, since in any causal relation two bodies
blend in order to form one physical entity, although they re-
main distinct bodies nonetheless.177 This consequence of the
theory is revealed by the way in which the Stoics, as
documented by Sextus, can pass with ease from viewing the
world as a unity to viewing it as a collection of elements, the
srnthesis of the two notions being embodied in their special
c~mcept of 'condition' (g~tc;).178 Of course, such a doctrine im-
plies a view of reality based on the analogy between macrocosm
and microcosm, 179 a characteristic of Stoicism which has
already been discussed.
It seems very likely that, when Antiochus refers to the rela-
tion between the active and passive principles as being so close
that each is combined with the other, matter being unable to
cohere without force and force being unable to exist in the
absence of matter, he has in mind the Stoic theory of mix-
ture.so However, it is clear that the argument contains
elements of Platonism also. Although Varro uses the term 'mat-
ter' - clearly a translation of uA.11 in the Greek original - to
177. The contrast with the Aristotelian theory of causation is obvious,

since in the latter the efficient cause will be another individual. whereas in
Stoicism the active and passive causes will be part of the same individual. The
contrast between these two philosophical approaches is brought out by Alex-
ander's De Mlxtlone from which several texts have already been quoted.
1"'8. See Aetius: Plac. I, 28, 4 (SVF II, 917 = DG 324al-3) and Seneca:
Epist. 6<;, 11 (SVF ll, 346a).
179. See Sextus Empiricus: Adv. Math. IX, 78 (SVF ll, 10 13) and Stobaeus:
!:"clog. I. 2 5 (SVF I. 53 7 ).
180. Reid: op. cit., p. 125 maintains that Antiochus is simply concerned
with the combination of matter and form in the Aristotelian 'individual thing
(To auvoi..ov). Clearly there is an implicit relation to Aristotle's theory -An-
tiochus was indeed attempting to harmonize Platonism, Peripateticism, and
Stoicism - yet Aristotle alone does not explain this theory of active and
passive principles. Reid stigmatizes other views by saying that 'these words
describe the passive principle and thereby follows an essentially

Aristotelian nomenclature, 181 the threefold schema of force,
matter, and body recalls the arrangement of 'paradigm'
(napaoetyJla), 'receptacle' (unoooxit), and 'copy' (JllJlllJla) in
Plato's Timaeus.1s2 This parallel seems to be indicated by the
description of the union of active and passive as a quality -
Plato's argument hinges on the fact that the cooperation of
transcendent Form and space generates an immanent Form
which is, however, not a 'this' (touta) but an 'of this kind' (to
tmoutov) since it resides in the fluctuating realm of becom-
ing. 183 It is also indicated by the presence of an actual phrase
translated from the Greek text when Varro says that force can-
not exist in the absence of matter 'since nothing can exist
without being in some place' (avayKatov eivai nou to ov anav
ev ttVl t6ncp).IB4 The combination of Stoic physical theory with
the doctrines of the Timaeus will obviously lead to interesting
consequences since, whereas the former system is concerned
with the blending of corporeal principles while the latter
operates with a participation between incorporeal and cor-
poreal principles, the combination of the two systems will
postulate a mixture of incorporeal and corporeal being.
have received many wrong interpretations which il is unnecessary to

discuss', but in doing so he has missed the main significance of the passage.
which is that the physical theory expounded by Antiochus is primarily a Stoic
one. Reid similarly ignores the reference to the tensional motion a little later
in the text.
181. Plato referred to his substratum of physical change in various ways.
but never by using the actual word 'matter' (UATJ). Later writers invariably
employ the Aristotelian term, however, a fashion perhaps started by An-
tiochus.
182. Plato: Tim. 48e-49a, ';2a-b. The relationship between this Ciceronian
text and the Timaeus has also been discussed by Dillon: op. cit., pp. 82-83.
183. Plato: Tim. 49d-e.
184. Ibid. <;2b.
CICERO 107
1. )22 ANTIOCHUS AT ACADEMICA 26-27
After a brief digression on the translation of Greek technical

terms in philosophy occasioned by the introduction of the no-
tion nm6tT]c; = qualitas, Varro continues his exposition by ex-
amining the transcendent element of causality in greater detail
during paragraph 2. The content of this paragraph divides it
naturally into two sections: paragraph 2A which studies the ac-
tive principle, and paragraph 28 studying the passive principle.
Concerning the former, we learn that qualities are of two kinds:
(i) those which are primal. These are homogeneous and simple,
and are represented by the so-called principles or elements of
air, fire, water, and earth, of which the first pair have a moving
and active force, the second pair a receptive and passive capaci-
ty; (ii) those which are derivative. These are varied and multi-
ple, being represented by the species of living creatures and all
things produced from the earth. (At this point Varro appends a
footnote concerning the first kind of quality, by saying that
Aristotle adds a fifth element to the four already mentioned, an
element unlike the others which is the substance of the heaven-
ly bodies and mind). Concerning the passive principle, we learn
that matter lacks all form and quality, but that all things are pro-
duced from it because of its capacity to undergo transformation
in every respect. It can even be dissolved, not into nothing but
into its own parts which can be divided to infinity.
This paragraph contains several points which seemingly con-
firm that the inspiration for the whole argument is primarily
Stoic. In the first place, there has been a change of focus from
the opposition of a single active principle and a single passive
principle which occurred in paragraph 1, to the opposition of a
pair of active principles - air and fire - to a pair of passive
principles - water and earth - in paragraph 2A. There is pro-
bably no inconsistency between the two positions, since the no-
tions of activity and passivity can be applied at many different
levels in Stoic philosophy: to the opposition of God and the

four elements,IR'i to that of an active and passive pair of
elements, 186 and to that of an active and passive aspect within
each single element.t87 Yet it is perhaps significant that An-
tiochus' physical theory does not begin with the opposition of a
pneuma composed of air and fire to a material principle of earth
and water, but with a more fundamental opposition from which
the various visible elements are produced. The latter viewpoint
is more characteristic of the Middle Stoatss and harmonizes
naturally with the Platonic interpretation of the first principles.
Another revealing point is contained in Varro's description of
matter as something capable of infinite division at the end of
paragraph 2B. The reason for this view of matter is stated in the
same passage - namely, that only on this basis could it be
capable of endless transformation into a multitude of visible
bodies - and we find apparently the same argument attributed
to Chrysippus by Diogenes Laertius.t89 In general, the Stoics
manifest a highly sophisticated approach to the mathematical
concept of infinity, as indicated by Chrysippus' reply to a
paradox formulated by Democritus in defense of his atomic
theory: if a cone is cut parallel to the base, are the surfaces of its
sections equal or unequal? If unequal, then the cone will really
consist of a series of indentations, but if equal, then the cone
will not be a cone but really a cylinder.I90 Chrysippus
185. Galen: lntrod. s. medic. 9 (SVF II, 416); Diogenes Laertius: Vii.
Philos. VII, 13'H 37 (SVF II, '580); and Luc. Schol. Bern. IX, '578.
186. Sec Galen: De Nat. Fac. II, 4 (SVF II, 410); De Mult. 3 (SVF II, 439):
Alexander of Aphrodisias: De Mi:~:t. 224, 14 (SVF II, 442): De Anim. 26. 13
(SVF II, 786); and Nemesius: De Nat. Hom.;, 6258 (SVF II. 418).
187. Plutarch: De Stoic. Repugn. 43. 10'53f (SVF II, 429): Galen: De Elem.
sec. Hippocr. I, 6 (SVF II, 408) and In Hippocr. de Nat. Hom. I (SVF II, 409).
188. Seep. 94 ff. and n. 139.
189. Diogenes Laertius: Vii. Philos. VII, 150 (SVF II, 482).
190. See Plutarch: De Comm. Not. 38-39. 1079a-d (SVF II, 483-484 and
CICERO 109
countered that the surfaces will neither be equal nor unequal,

although the bodies will be unequal since their surfaces are
neither equal nor unequal. The first part of this sentence in-
,olves a violation of the law of contradiction which is absolute-
ly necessary to the solution of the problem, since only thus can
static notions such as equal and unequal be applied to the
mathematical conception really required here: that of a
dynamic limiting process or approach to zero. It is difficult to
say whether Antiochus came as close to formulating elements of
the infinitesimal calculus as Chrysippus, but whatever his
theory of infinite division was, it must have led to interesting
consequences when he moved on to interpret Plato's theory of
geometrical solids later in the Timaeus. 191
One final sentence in paragraph 2 requires some comment:
the remarks about Aristotle's introduction of a fifth element to
he the substance of the heavenly bodies and mind. This passage
to be compared with two others in Cicero where the same iden-
tification is made - one introducing the technical term
EVOEASX.Eta for the continuous and eternal motion of the ele-
ment, 192 and one noting the problematical nature of this doc-
trine which Zeno failed to espouse - gives rise to two ques-
tions. 193 First, is the equation of the fifth element with mind,
which does not occur in Aristotle's extant works, an aberration
of later interpreters? The answer is that there is sufficient cir-
cumstantial evidence from ancient testimonia to suggest that
Aristotle had made the identification in his early works now
Iost,t94 an identification which would produce a partly sensible
IH9). For an illuminating discussion of this question see Sambursky: op. cit.,
pp. HH-9H.
19 I. See Plato: Tim. 53c ff.
19.2. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. 1, .2.2.
19:\. Cicero: De Fin. IV, 1.2.
19-l. See Pepin: Tbeo/ogie cosmique eltbeo/ogie cbretiemze (Ambroise, Ex-
am./, /, 1-4), pp. 206-247.
and partly intelligible principle capable of substitution for the

already abandoned Platonic Forms. The second question is:
what role did Antiochus assign to aether in his system, given the
correctness of his interpretation of Aristotle? To this we must
unfortunately reply that the parenthetical nature of the remarks
make its role unclear, 19-; although its partly intelligible and pan-
ly sensible nature would make it a likely candidate for iden-
tification with the active force of paragraph 1.
1.323 ANTIOCHUS AT ACADEMICA 28
In paragraph 3. Varro goes on to consider the immanent

aspect of causation in greater detail. Returning to the theme of
infinite divisibility, he now combines this with the idea of mo-
tion, and concludes that all things move through intervals
capable of infinite division. Thus, the force which was called
quality has a motion exhibiting two features: (i) it consists of in-
finitely divisible intervals, and (ii) it passes to and fro. Because
of the operation of the active principle, matter seems to be in a
state of complete transformation, so that the various things call-
ed qualified are produced. From these in turn, as a result of the
continuous character of nature as a whole, a single world has
been produced, outside of which there is no matter or body. All
the things in the world are parts of it, the whole being sustained
by a sentient nature in which perfect reason is immanent, and
which is eternal because there is nothing more powerful which
might destroy it. Finally, this force is equivalent to the soul of
the world, to that perfect mind and wisdom which they call
God, and to that providence or necessity which governs not on-
ly the heavenly bodies but also the affairs of mankind.
This paragraph is by far the most complex of the three, and
also the most ambiguous in points of detail. Taking the minor
19<;. See Luck: op. cit., pp. 3"'-Hl.

CICERO III
difficulties first, an immediate question should be raised regar-

ding the meaning of the intervals through which motion takes
place: are these temporal or spatial? Either answer is possible,
since the Stoics used the term ouicrtllll = intervallum to in-
dicate both time and space, the point being that the principle of
infinite divisibility was applied to the two dimensions equal-
lv .196 From the spatial viewpoint, however, it should be em-
phasized that there is no question of any void within the cosmos
through which the motion might take place, since the Stoics
held fast to the notion of continuity in the world, 197 as Varro
states later in the text. This gives rise to a further difficulty
since, although the argument supports the usual Stoic view that
there is no void within the cosmos, it rejects their other position
that there is void outside it into which the present world passes
at the conflagration.I98 It therefore seems likely that Antiochus
rejects the notion of a conflagration, a position on which he was
probably following the unorthodox Stoic Panaetius, as reported
dsewhere in Cicero's works.l99 More conventional, however, is
the view that all things in the world are parts of the world, a
statement which is not simply the self-evident assertion that it
seems. but reflects the notion of a cosmos unified by an imma-
196. See Sextus: Adr1. Math. X . .3 (SVF II. SO';) for 'interval' (BuiatlUta) ap-
plit:d to space; Stobaeus: Eclog. I, 106 (SVF II, 509) for the same notion ap-
plkd 10 lime. Reid: op. cit., p. 1.31 considers that only a reft:rence to space is
imtnded. the main aim of the passage being refutation of the Atomists' con
cept of void.
197. Sc:e Plutarch: De Comm. Not. 37. 1077e (SVF II, 465); Alexander of
Aphrodisias: De Mixt. 216, 14 (SVF II, 473)and 223,25 (SVF II, 441).
198. Set: Ac:tius: Plac. I. 18. 5 (SVF I, 95 = DG .H 6b 1113 ). II, 9. 2 (SVF II,
h09 = DG .HHb 16-18): Sextus Empiricus: Adr. /1-lclth. IX, 332 (SVF II. 524 );
Achilles Tat ius: In trod. H (SVF II, 610); and Simplkius: hz D(' Caelo I. 9. 2f!.:j,
.?H-285. 2 (SVF II, 535).
I<Jt.>. Cicero: De Ntlf. Deor. II, I 18. For the influence of Panaetius upon An
liochus' physics se~ Strache: op. cit., pp. 2021 and Luck: op. dt., p. H.
nent divinity.loo This latter belief also underlies the assertion

towards the end of the paragraph that there is nothing more
powerful than the world, a variant on the doctrine which has
already been discussed in connection with Cicero's Stoic
theology. 2o t
Having disposed of these minor points, we come to the main
theme of this paragraph: the relation of the active and passive
principles, the first part of the paragraph taking up the analysis
of the active principle along lines suggested in paragraph l, the
second part adding a number of new characteristics. The begin-
ning of this text is a little confusing, since Varro speaks of the
motion of 'that force which we call quality, so that our initial
inclination is to identify this with the qualities of paragraphs 1
and 2, or more particularly the primary group of those qualities
- the elements. But two aspects of the later argument make this
identification impossible: first, the fact that it suddenly appears
in the singular, and secondly the arrangement by which it acts in
relation to matter in order to produce a third term entitled
'qualified' and thereby apparently mirrors the threefold pattern
of paragraph 1. Thus, the quality described here should be iden-
tified with the single active principle of the beginning of the
text. The second part of this paragraph determines the nature of
this principle more precisely by identifying it with nature, the
world soul, and the divine mind, and by saying th~tt it is the
eternal principle which sustains the whole cosmos. That this
description does not apply to something distinct from the
original active cause is indicated clearly by the connection bet-
ween the phrases 'that force' (ilia vis) and 'this force' (quam
vim) in the earlier and later parts of the paragraph respectively,
although the term 'force' itself is evidently one which could be
200. See Cicero: De Nat. Deor. l, 39 and Seneca: E"pist. 92. 30 (SVF II.
637).
20 I. See pp. 99-100.
CICERO 113
applied to many different principles in Antioch us' physical

system.
Two further aspects of this text are of paramount impor-
tance. In the first place, there is the question of the peculiar mo-
tion which the active principle undergoes in relation to matter,
making the unqualified substratum itself appear to be transform-
ed throughout.202 Cicero describes it as a motion 'to and fro'
102. This whole account should be compared with Calcidius report of the
Stoi1.: theory of maner at/n Tim. 292. 294, 17-.295, 14 (SVF I, 88) 'Zeno fur-
ther maintains that this essence is finite and the one common substance of all
existing things. and that it is also divisible and mutable in every respect, since
it~ parts change although they do not perish in the sense of passing from ex-
istence to nothingness. But just as is the case with innumerable different
forms made out of wax, so he contends that neither form nor shape nor any
4uality at all is attributable: to matter the foundation of all things, although it
is always joined to and coheres inseparably with some quality. And because it
is without beginning or end- it does not come: to be from non-existence nor
is it reduced to nothing- it has from eternity a spirit and force which moves
it rationally sometimes as a whole and sometimes in part, this being the: cause
of the frequent and violent changes in the universe. Moreover, he holds that
this moving spirit is not nature but a rational soul which bestowed life on the
sensible world and adorned it with the beauty by which it is now distinguish-
ed. They call the world a blessed living creature and God' (Deinde Zeno bane
ipsam essentiam jinitam esse dicit zmamque earn communem omnium
quae sunt esse substantimn, diziduam quoque et usque quaque mutabilem;
partes quippe eius Lerti sed 11on interire, ita ut de existentibus consumantur
in nibilum. Sed ul innumerabilium diversarum, eliam cerearum,
Jigumrum. sic nequejormam 11equejiguram nee ullam omnit~o qualilatem
proprhun fore censel jundamenti rerum omt~ium silz,ae, coniut~ctam
ltmun esse semper et inseparabiliter cobaerere alicui qutllilati; cumque
tam sine urtu sit quam sine interitu, quia neque de notl exislente subsistit
nee co11sumetur in nihilum, non deesse ei spiritum ac 11igorem ex aeter-
nilclle. qui 11WlJeat eam rationabiliter lolam inlerdum, non numquam pro
Jmrtirme. quae causa sit tam crebrae tamque lebemenlis universae rei con-
tersirmis; spiritum porro motitum ilium fore non naturam, sed an imam,
et quidem rationabi/em, quae vivijicans set~silem mundum e:~:ornaverit
eum ad bcmt qua mmc 11/ustratur venustatem. Quem quidem beatum
animal et deum appellant).
(ultro citroque), a phrase which he uses elsewhere to signify the

interchange between two speakers in a conversation and bet-
ween elemental qualities in the cosmic process.2o3 The latter
reference is of special relevance, since it occurs during the
discussion of Stoic physics, which indicates for us that, on one
level at least, the explanation of the motion is once more to be
sought in this philosophy. In fact, the origin of Antioch us'
theory here is easy to identify: it is the Stoic notion of a 'ten-
sional motion' (tOV1Klt KiVllatc;) which represents the nature of
the pneuma in its dynamic aspect. The pneuma is, of course, the
divine cause immanent in the world which produces different
levels of being according to the degree of its tension,2o4 while
the tension is the result of the dynamic force contained in the
pneuma which pulls it in different directions. The tonic motion
is described sometimes simply as proceeding in opposite direc-
tions,zos but sometimes as directed on the one hand towards the
periphery of a given object (thereby constituting its various
qualities) and on the other towards its center (thereby sustaining
the unity of its substance).206 Furthermore, the tonic motion is
spoken of sometimes as though the opposite tendencies
manifest themselves successively (as in the case of condensation
and rarefaction)207 and sometimes as though they are
simultaneous (as with the tightening of a bow string).208
Although the tension of the pneuma is reflected in different
203. See Cicero: De Rep. VI, 9 and De Nat. Deor. II, 84.
204. See Philo ludaeus: Quod Deus sit immut. 35 (SVF II, 458).
205. See Alexander of Aphrodisias: De Mixt. 224, 14 (SVF II, 442).
206. See Philo ludaeus: Quod Deus sit immut. 35 (SVF II . .J58); Quaest. et
So/ut. in Gen. II, 4 (SVF II, 802); Sextus Empiricus: Adt. Math. IX, 149 (SVF
II. .f54); Nemesius: De Nat. Hom. 2, 'i40A-B (SVF II, 451); and Simplicius: /tz
Categ. R, 269, 1-l-16 (SVF II, -!52).
207. See Galen: De Trem. Palp. Com'. 6 (SVF II, 446).
208. See Philo ludaeus: De Sacrif Abel et Cain 68 (SVF II, 4'i3) and Alex-
ander: DeMixt. 224. 1-4 (SVF II, .J42).
CICERO I I '5
levels of reality, its primary manifestation is in the relation bet-

ween the 'ruling part' (ll'YEIJ.OVlK6v) of the soul and the sensory
organs in an organism where there occurs an alternating motion
between the unity of consciousness and the various sense
organs.209 The Stoics interpret this in both a macrocosmic and a
microcosmic context, the ruling part in the former case being
the surrounding aether or the sun.2IO
The motion of the active principle to and fro can therefore be
explained in terms of Stoic physical theory, yet it would be a
mistake to conclude our investigation here, since we have
already seen that Antiochus probably interpreted the active
principle, the passive principle, and their product in terms of
Plato's trichotomy of paradigm, receptacle, and copy.211 The
present passage allows us to go perhaps a little further in this
direction by introducing as an additional parallel the account of
the motion of the receptacle in the Timaeus. According to
Plato, the receptacle which existed even before the heaven
came into being was not simply a bare substratum but informed
by transient qualities, these lacking equilibrium to such an ex-
tent that the receptacle was shaken by them and in the resulting
motion shook them in its turn.2t2 Plato compared this motion
to that of a winnowing fan in which the different elements are
separated by moving 'some this way and some that way' (CiA.A.a
CiA.A.oae). It is true that there is no unambiguous allusion to the
dialogue at this point in the discussion but, since the whole
argument is clearly inspired by the cosmology of the Timaeus,
one would have to be obsessively circumspect to refuse this
most illuminating general parallel. The conclusion is therefore
209. See Philo ludaeus: Qrmest. et Sol. in Gen. II, 4 (SVF II, 802) and
Act ius: Plac. IV, 21. 1-4 (SVF II, 836 = DG 410a2 5-4 II a24 ).
210. St:e Stobat:us: Eclog. I, I '53 (SVF II, 471 ).
2 I I. St:t: pp. I 05-106.
2 12. Plato: Tim. 52d-'53b.
that the motion of the active principle in the process of inform-

ing matter engenders an appearance of motion in the passive
principle, this appearance of motion constituting the sorting of
the various elements described in Plato's account.
The second aspect of this text which is of paramount impor-
tance is the equation of the active principle with nature, the
world soul, and the divine mind. The introduction of the world
soul, of course, follows the Timaeus once again,213 but it is
perhaps significant that the Demiurge from the same dialogue is
not introduced as a separate principle, a fact indicated by the
equation of the world soul with the divine mind. In other
words, Antiochus stressed the immanent rather than the
transcendent cause described by Plato, no doubt in order that
the agreement with Stoicism on this question might be
underscored, the latter school postulating a single cosmic prin-
ciple in which transcendent and immanent functions were
merged.214 The agreement with the Stoics is not difficult to ac-
complish in this context, since they believed as ardently as Plato
in the controlling of the universe by a rational power, the only
difference being that Stoicism spoke of this governing force
primarily as a 'reason' (ratio = A.oyoc;). Antiochus' continued
adherence to their viewpoint is confirmed by his reference to
the active principle as nature in which perfect reason is imma-
nent, a description which verbally recalls the theory of law
elaborated at length in Cicero's political writings.21;
1.324 THE QUESTION OF INCORPOREALITY
One final point should be considered before leaving this

fascinating physical theory: the much debated question whether
2 13. Ibid. 34b ff.

214. Seep. 94 ff.
215. Seep. 80 ff.
CICERO II7
Antiochus system left any place for a real concept of incor-

poreality along Platonic lines. Apart from the remarks in
paragraph 2 which have already been discussed,2I6 there are
two other passages in Cicero's works shedding light on this
issue. The first comes later in the Academica where Varro, hav-
ing completed his description of the philosophical beliefs of the
Old Academy, goes on to consider departures from the original
positions by later writers.2I7 The account of Zeno's defection
from the Academy is most interesting, since we learn that he dif-
fered from the Platonists in holding that an incorporeal
substance 'of which kind Xenocrates and the earlier thinkers
considered soul to be' (cu.ius generis Xenocrates et superiores
efiam ani mum esse dixerant)2IB was incapable of any activity.
Here we find the basic tenet of Stoic materialism opposed to the
tradition until the time of Xenocrates and, since Antiochus -
whose historical account this is - claimed to have returned to
the position of the Old Academy,2I9 the conclusion is in-
escapable that Antiochus felt the Stoic viewpoint to be opposed
to his own doctrine also.220
.216. See pp. I 07-IOS .

.2 1-. Cicero: A cad. 33 ff .
.2 lH.lbitl. .W .
.2 19. Seep. 66 .
.2.20. My interpretation of this text differs from that of Dillon: op. cit., p.
H.3. Dillon holds the passage to mean that Zeno disagreed with Xenocrates
~pecifically rather than with Platonists in general. in other words that An-
tiochus considered the Old Academy with the exception of Xenocrates to
han: rejected the notion of incorporeal principles. Yet Cicero's text explicit-
ly states that a belief in the incorporeal was held hy Xenocrates 'and the
earlier thinkers'. Dillon's further point that there is no indication of An-
tiochus' disagreement with Zeno might also be questioned. In fact, the whole
argument in this section of the Academica is designed to show that defec-
tions hy various Peripatetics and Stoics from the original Academic position
took place.
118 MiDDLE PLATONISM
A second relevant passage occurs in De Finibus where An-

tiochus' system of ethics is being expounded. Here, Cicero at-
tacks the Stoic doctrine that the supreme good resides in virtue
alone which is a condition of soul from this viewpoint, saying
that the Stoics care for nothing except soul 'even though the
soul itself is not some intangible something (for I cannot unders-
tand what that is) but belongs to a certain category of body'
(cum praesertim ipse quoque animus non inane nescio quid sit
-neque enim id possum intellegere-, sed in quodam genere cor-
poris). 221 This statement seems to contradict the argument of
the previous text that the Old Academy accepted the notion of
an incorporeal substance, and indeed it might be justifiable to
conclude our study of Antiochus with a question mark added to
its last sentence. However, it is possible to suggest a com-
promise position based on an assessment of what he may really
have understood by the term 'incorporeal'. Thus, he perhaps
believed:222 (i) that the distinction between corporeal and in-
corporeal is one of degree. This position would be realistic if he
also held: (ii) that the distinction between corporeal and incor-
poreal principles cannot exist independently of bodies. The
adoption of these two views would give a more profound mean-
ing to his doctrine stated in paragraph 1 that the active and
passive principles can never exist independently of one
another. It would also explain the apparent denial of the con-
flagration in paragraph 3, since his God- unlike Chrysippus'223
- will never exist without the world which he has created. Of
course, the interpretation of Antiochus' doctrine of incor-
poreality along these lines must remain in the realm of
hypothesis rather than that of proof.
221. Cicero: De Fin. IV, 36.

222. See pp. 96-97 and nn. 139 and 144-14'5.
223. See Plutarch: De Comm. Not. 36. 1077e (SVF II, 1064).
CICERO I I9
1.325 THE RELATION OF MACROCOSM AND MICROCOSM
These discussions in De Natura Deorum and the Academica

represent the major theme of Cicero's physical doctrine. Unfor-
tunately, almost none of them contain the explicit indications of
personal approval which accompanied the exposition of the
legal theories,224 although the obvious points of agreement bet-
ween the Stoic and Antiochean physics and the theory of
natural law make it likely that Cicero's own beliefs were basical-
ly of this kind. The fundamentals of his theory are therefore that
God is related in a transcendent 225 and immanent226 way to
matter, God being interpreted in the Stoic texts as the divinity,
as nature, and as fire, and in Antiochus' scheme as the active
principle in the cosmic process.227 However, the relation bet-
ween God and matter corresponds as macrocosm to the
microcosm of the relation between the human soul and
body .22s The next task is therefore to examine the minor theme
of Cicero's physical theory expounded mainly in the
Tusculanae Disputationes. Here, we find the human soul
related in a transcendent and immanent manner to the body, the
soul itself being understood as a divinity, as the fifth element, or
as fire. The whole treatment is much more personal in character
than those of the Stoic and Antiochean cosmologies, consisting
of a series of discourses where Cicero speaks from his own
viewpoint on the ethical questions which interest him.
1.33 CICERO'S PSYCHOLOGY
The first book of the Tusculanae Disputationes is especially
224. See p. RO ff.

22<;.Sec pp. 94-96.
226. See pp. 98-99.
22"".Seep. 10 I ff.
22H. Sec pp. 99-100 and I I6.
important for the consideration of Cicero's theory of the human

soul since it takes the form of a debate on the question: is death
an evil?229 One issue which naturally occurs in such a discussion
is that of the soul's immortality, and various arguments for this
are drawn from the consensus of mankind and from the views
of different philosophers.230 Cicero's method throughout this
work is that of the New Academy, and so both the form of the
discussion and the historical survey are directed towards the at-
tainment of a probable solution to this question.23I Thus, the
writer is free to utilize a number of philosophical sources, some
of whom were themselves dogmatists, without implying any
specific commitment to their views. The question who these
sources were has been much debated among modern scholars,
although there has been no significant measure of agreement.
What is clear, however, is that Cicero is making the most exten-
sive explicit use of Plato anywhere in his works. and also that
the interpretation of Plato is along lines established by eclectic
philosophy of the first century B.C.232 But something should be
said on each of these points.
The importance of Plato is underlined by a brief interchange
between the two speakers which is inserted into the argument
229. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. l, 9-25.

230./bid. I, 26-81.
231. Sec p. S8 ff.
232. On the sources of the Tusculanae Disputationes (with special
reference to book I) see R. M. Jones: 'Posidonius and Cicero Tusc. Disp. I.
17-81', Classical Philology 18 (1923), pp. 202-229; van den Bruwaene: La
tbeologfe de Ciceron, pp. <;4-83 and 'Les traces de Posidonius dans le premier
livre des Tusculanes. L 'Antiquite c/assique 11 ( 1942). pp. 55-66: A. Barigaz-
zi: 'Sulle fonti dellibro I delle Tusculane di Cicerone'. Rivista di fi/ologia e
di istruzione c/assica 27 ( 1949), pp. 15 I-203 and 28 (I 950), pp. 1-29; Gigon:
op. cit.. pp. 51-59; A. J. Kleywegt: 'Philosophischer Gehah und personliche
Stellungnahme in Tusc. I, 9-81', Mnenwsyne 19 (1966). pp. 359-:HiH; and
Dillon: op. cit.. pp. 96-10 I.
CICERO 121
for the immortality of the soul. This passage performs a struc-

tural function of dividing a short initial argument that, just as we
have a general preconception that the gods exist, so do we have
a similar universal belief regarding the permanence of the
souJ.H3 from a more extensive sequence of proofs of the soul's
immortality drawn primarily from Plato's dialogues.234 The
connection between the two sections is made by means of the
statement that Plato learned of this doctrine from the
Pythagoreans but was the first to have added rational proof.235
Because of the complexities of the latter, Cicero suggests the
abandonment of the whole undertaking, but his companion will
not agree, saying that he would rather go astray with Plato than
hold true views with his opponents. Cicero congratulates his
companion on holding this opinion, and thereupon launches in-
to a series of arguments concerning both the soul's existence
and its nature which are quoted from or adapted from the
Phaedrus, Meno, and Timaeus. There are also references to at
kast two more dialogues: the Phaedo and the Apology. 236
It is obvious from Cicero's use of the first three works named
that he is adapting his sources quite freely, and this gives rise to
an immediate question: is he making his own adaptations or
following some intermediary between Plato and his own time?
It is on this point that the greatest controversy has arisen, on the
one hand between those who admit that Cicero could himself
have made a contribution to the argument and those who do
not, and on the other between partisans of Antiochus as the in-
termediary and partisans of Posidonius.237 These debates will
probably never be resolved since so many of Cicero's sources
l.H. Cicero: Tttsc:. Disp. I. 35-36 .

.2.1-i. Ibid. 1, 40-75.
235. Ibid. l, 39. Cf. ibid. l, 49.
2.~6.See pp. 70-71.
2.1"'. Sec n. 2.'\.2.
arc now lost, although the one writer who seems least relevant
is Panaetius who was the principal source of De Officiis.l.~H
Panaetius' view that the soul consists of a pneuma of air and
fire, which represents orthodox Stoicism, is noted without
criticism early in the longer section of the argument for immor-
tality . .:!.~') Less sympathetic to Panaetius, however, is an appen-
dix to the argument where the Stoic view that souls survive
bodies for a certain length of time but eventually perish is ex-
amined and rejected. Cicero here notes the inconsistency of a
philosopher who, although expressing reverence for Plato, con-
tradicts his idol on a most fundamental point by arguing that the
manifest birth of souls also implies their death . .Z4o Furthermore,
there is an obvious reason why Cicero would need to avoid
Panaetius in approaching the doctrines of the Phaedrus: the lat-
ter had actually denied the authenticity of this dialogue .HI
1.331 THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOUL
The Ciceronian doctrine of the soul begins from the fun-

damental question: what can we know about the soul? The
answer to this question is illuminating not only for its
epistemological implications, but for the way in which the no-
tion of analogy between macrocosm and microcosm is ex-
ploited. We have already seen how the nature of the world as a
living creature has been demonstrated by analogy with the
microcosm,242 and in the Tusculanae Disputationes there are a
number of examples of similar deductions regarding man by
analogy with the macrocosm. Thus, Cicero argues that, just as
2~8. Seep. 72.

2W. Cicero: Tusc Disp. 1, i2.
2-tO. Ibid. l, 78-79.
2-tl. See Asdepius: /11 Metaph. l, 9, 90, 2~-24.
2.f2. Sec pp. 99-100.
CICERO 123
we know 'by natural instinct' (natura) that the gods exist and
can Jearn by 'reasoning' (ratio) about their nature, so also 'by
the agreement of all peoples' (consensu nationum omnium) we
believe that souls endure and can learn by 'reasoning' (ratio)
about their nature and place of abode.243 The distinction bet-
ween notions grasped instinctively and demonstrated by argu-
ment is Stoic in origin, and we may conclude that Cicero
understands the relation between the two kinds of knowledge
in the manner peculiar to this school.244 Thus, the preconcep-
tion can either be strengthened by the process of reasoning, or
else can be employed as the basis for further deductions, the lat-
ter being on account of their epistemological genesis
unassailable truths. Cicero shows his interest in both these kinds
of argument, on the one hand by strengthening the instinctive
knowledge of the soul's immortality with the aid of Plato's
famous proof that the soul which is self-moving and therefore
eternally moving is immortal,245 and on the other by
demonstrating the divinity of the soul from the fact that just as
the order of the cosmos indicates that it has its origin in a divine
cause so do the products of human art testify to the presence of
divinity in man,246 or from the fact that since the definition of
reason as that than which a greater cannot be thought evidences
its wholly divine character thus the presence of this reason in
man indicates that the latter contains within himself an element
of divinity .247 It will be seen that in such arguments it is the
2-13. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, 36. The same distinction of preconception and
reasoning together with the analogy between God and the soul underlies
ibid. I. 70-71.
2H. Seep. 131 ff.
2-iS. Tusc. Dtsp. I. 53-54. There is an analogous argument regarding God
:tl ibid. I, 65-66.
2-+6. Ibid. I, 62-63. That the belief in a divine cause of cosmic motions is a
rrcmnception in the Stoic sense is indicated by Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, <i.
2i...,. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, 64-65. For the notion that reason is 'that than
analogy between macrocosm and microcosm upon which the

cogency of the deduction depends. Cicero uses the same con-
ceptual framework to great effect in many other passages where
the immortality and divinity of the soul are established.248
According to these methodological assumptions, then, it is
possible to determine something regarding the nature of the
soul by philosophical argument. The present text contains many
such arguments, and one of the main things established by
Cicero is that the soul is composed of higher elements: either
air, fire, or a fifth element. Thus, he argues that although he is
not confident that he understands the nature of the soul, its pro-
digious power of memory proves that it is not constituted of
earthy or watery powers.249 Another passage returns to the
method of analogy by demonstrating that, just as the nature of
God is either air or fire - a fact which is here said to follow
from his possession of life, wisdom, discovery, and memory-
so must the human soul be similarly constituted.250 The con-
tinuation of this argument is interesting, since Cicero now
quotes his own Consolatio (written on the occasion of his
daughter's death) to the effect that, since none of the elements
of earth, water, air, or fire 'possesses the force of memory,
mind, or thought' (vim memoriae mentis cogitationis
habeat), the nature of both God and man must consist of a fifth
element first discussed by Aristotle.251 There are two points
worthy of note in this passage. First, the ambivalence regarding
the elemental nature of soul - air and fire or a fifth substance -
which no greater can he though!" (icl. quo ne ... qulcquam maius inl1/e!!,i
potest) see Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, 2122.
248. See Cicero: Tusc. Disp. 1, 67-70. At De Leg. II. 28 two levels of
blessedness are apparently established for souls: immortality (for all men) and
divinity (for the good and brave).
249. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, 60.
250. Ibid. I. M.
251./bid. I, 66.
CICERO 12<;
is striking although not inexplicable in view of the eclecticism

of philosophical doctrine in his day.252 The notion that the soul
is a pneuma composed of air and fire occurs earlier in the text
where it is attributed to Panaetius who apparently used the
natural tendency of these elements to rise as evidence for the
heavenward course of the soul after death.253 The notion that
the soul consists of the fifth element seems to have lent itself to
easy assimilation with the Stoic theory because of the similarity
between aether and pure fire. Secondly, the analogy between
God and the soul is made specifically in terms of God's identity
with the heavenly system, a point underlined by the Somnium
Scipionis where 'each man has been given a soul from those
eternal fires called stars and planets' (iisque animus datus est ex
ill is sernpiternis ignibus quae sidera et stellas vocatis).2'H
1.332 THE TRANSCENDENT SOUL
The notion of the soul's divinity naturally implies its

transcendence or at least its potential to be transcendent, and in
the Tusculanae Disputationes we find the theme of the soul's
transcendence in relation to body elaborated at some length.255
Early in the first book, Cicero defends his attempt to study the
soul from this point of view by saying that those philosophers
who deny the possibility of understanding the soul in its disem-
2U. Sec pp. 6~-6i.

25~. Tusc. Disp. I, 42. The same theory seems to be implied at ibid. I, 18
and I. iO.
25f. Cicero: De Rep. VI, I 5.
255. Throughout the passages 10 be cited in this section. the term
translated as 'soul' is the Latin animus. As Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I. 80 indicates.
animus refers ro the soul in its widest aspect (including the irrational parts)
whereas mens signifies the highest element alone (excluding the irrational).
On this terminology see H. Merguet: Lexikon zu den pbilosopbischer
Scb,iften Ciceros (Leipzig, 1887-1894 ). s. vv.
bodied state should realize the difficulties involved in conceiv-

ing the soul when it is actually in the body.256 Of course, he ad-
mits that the study of the soul is always difficult: so much so
that 'in contemplating itself as an object the mind's gaze
sometimes grows dim' (mentis acies se ipsa intuens non num-
quam hebescit) just as the eye's vision fails when looking intent-
ly upon the setting sun.257 Cicero is therefore conscious both of
the importance and of the difficulty of his theme.
The soul's nature is such that, even when joined to the body
during this earthly life, it enjoys a transcendence which will
ultimately be the basis of its separation. In a discussion modell-
ed on a passage in Plato's Phaedo,25B the writer argues that the
soul does not consist of a mingling, combining, or duality, and it
is for this reason that it cannot be divided or destroyed, since
such a process inevitably requires the separation of parts.259
Here we are clearly to understand not the soul as a whole but its
highest part, since elsewhere in the same work he attacks
Panaetius' view that the soul is perishable on the grounds that
the Stoic philosopher has failed to grasp the distinction between
the 'mind' (mens) which is always free of disorderly impulses
and the parts of the soul subject to distress, anger, and lust.26o
Elsewhere Cicero goes further and speaks of a tripartite struc-
ture of the soul which therefore contains 'a sovereign part or
reason' (cuius principatus, id est ratio) placed in the head, an
'irascible part' (ira) situated in the breast. and a 'libidinous part'
(cupiditas) placed below the diaphragm.l<>l It is these lower
parts which are dependent upon the presence of an earthly
256. Cicero: Tusc. Dlsp. I. 51.

257. Ibid. I. 7 .'\. Cf. ibid. I, 67 and I. 70-71.
258. See Plato: Pbaed. 78c.
259. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I. 71.
260. Ibid. I, 80.
26 I. Ibid. I. 20.
CICERO 127
body and not capable of detachment, while the reason will

depart to the celestial realm at the moment of death. There is lit-
tle doubt that the doctrine of all these passages is Platonic and
not Stoic, since according to the latter school the soul is unitary,
although it can be divided into seven 'faculties' (J..LEPTt) - the
five senses plus the powers of speech and generation - con-
trolled by an eighth called the 'ruling part' (TJ'YEJ..LOVtK6v), these
resulting only from different degrees of tension in the
pneuma.l62 Despite the name employed by Cicero for his
highest part, the distinction between a rational and an irrational
part of the soul is peculiarly Platonic, while the theory of tripar-
tition is expressed in exactly the terms used by Plato in the
Timaeus,263 a text which Cicero knew well.
The doctrine outlined so far has dealt with the transcendence
of the soul in relation to body in the sense that its nature is of
such a kind as to permit its eventual separation. Other texts
speak of a transcendence of the soul in the sense that this
separation has already been accomplished by the death of the
body, for example that in which Cicero urges us in Socratic style
to live the present life with as little dependence on the body as
possible, since when the separation comes the soul's course will
be so much the less impeded.264 The actual life of the disem-
bodied soul is described in various ways, one passage con-
trasting the destiny of those souls which have kept themselves
free of bodily contagion and will therefore find an 'easy return'
(reditus facilis) to the realm of the gods, and those who have
heen enslaved by lusts only to obtain as their reward a course
2<>2. Sec Alexander of Aphrodisias: De Anim. IIH. 6 (SVF II, 823) and
lamblichus: De Anim. in Stobaeus: Eclog. I, 367 (SVF II, 826). For the role of
the ruling part' (~yE~OVIK6v) see Aetius: Plac. IV, 4, 4 (SVF II. 827 = DG
:I'JOa'5-13) and Diogenes Laertius: Vii. Pbilos. VII, I 10 (SVF II, 828).
26:1. See Plato: Tim. 69d ff.
26--J. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, 75. Cf. De Rep. VI. 14.
'separate from the assembly of the gods' (seclusum a conctllo

deorum).26; Elsewhere Cicero speaks further concerning the
elect group which apparently consists of those who have engag-
ed in great acts of statesmanship: for tllese there willhe ..a special
place arranged-in_ heaven where t~_w:ill. ~l!i.Qy_ _a blessed life
'f~Hime' (aevo sempiterno).266 The continuation of this text
gfves us some idea of what this blessed vision is, for Scipio has
revealed to him in his dream a view of the world completely in-
accessible to the mortal state, in which he sees the outermost
celestial sphere - the supreme God - holding within itself the
sphere of fixed stars and the seven planetary spheres.267 In such
26;. Cicero: Tusc. Dis/1. I. 72-73.

266. Cicero: De Rep. VI, 13. Cf. De Leg. II, 27. The bibliography on the
Somnium Scipionis and its eschatology is quite extensive. See especially R.
Harder: '0ber Ciceros Somnfum Scipionis', Schrifterl der Konigsberger
gelebrten Gesel/scbaft, geisteswiss. Klasse 6, 3 (Halle, 1929); C. josserand:
'L'ftme-dieu. A propos d'un passage du Songe de Scipirm ', L 'Ant/quite c/assi-
que 4 (1935). pp. 141-152; P. Boyancc: Etudessur/e Songe de Scipion. E'ssai
d'bistoire et de psycho/ogle re/igieuses (Paris/Limoges, 1936); van den Bru-
waene: 'IIIUX" et vouc; dans le Somnium Scipionis de Ciccron', pp. 127-152;
P. BoyancC: 'Sur 1e Songe de Scipion 26-28'. L 'Antiquite classique I I ( 194 2).
pp. S-22 (Reprinted in Boyancc: Etudes sur f'bumanisme cicerrmien, pp.
276-29 3 ); A. Traglia: Sulle fonti e sulla lingua del Somnium Scipionis (Roma.
1947); G. Luck: 'Stud/a divina in vita bumana. On Cicero's Dream of
Scipio and its Place in Graeco-Roman Philosophy', Harvard Theological
RerJ/eu 49 (19S6). pp. 207-218; A. Ronconi: Cicerone, Somnium Scipionis.
ltllroduzione e Com men to a cura di A. R. (Firenze, 1961 ); ) . Fontaine: 'Le
Songe de Scipion premier Anti-Lucrece?', Miltmges A. Piganiol. cditcs parR.
Chevallicr (Paris. 1966), pp. 171 1-1729; L. Scarpa: 'Sistema celeste c armonia
delle sfere nel Somnium Scipionis ciceroniano . Atti e memorie de/I'Ac-
cademia Pata11ina di Scfenze, Lettere ed Arti, Classe di scienze moral/, /et-
tere ed arti 87 (1974-7')), pp. 17-24; and K. Buchner: Somnium Scipionis.
Que/len, Gestalt, Sinn (Wiesbaden, 1976).
267. Cicero: De Rep. VI, 17. Cicero combines the notions of (i) dream or
ecstasy in this life. and (ii) journey of the soul after death. Thus, the content
of the two visions will coincide. See Festugiere: op. cit., p. 442.
CICERO 129
passages also the philosophy is Platonic rather than Stoic, since

according to Stoicism human souls can only survive after bodily
death until the next conflagration or in the case of unwise souls
not even that long,26H whereas Cicero is clearly concerned with
the notion of an immortality of everlasting duration.
l.):L\ THE IMMANENT SOUL
In these texts, there is little discussion of the soul from the

opposite viewpoint of its immanence in body, and for this latter
theme we must turn to the Old Academic ethical system ex-
pounded in De Finibus. Here, Cicero's aim is to show how the
Stoics have perverted the ancient teaching on the supreme good
towards which all human conduct should be directed, by argu-
ing that this good consists of virtue only which is a condition of
soul. while bodily goods such as health or beauty are not only
not part of the supreme good but not good at all.2CJ9 According
w C.i.cc.w. this view of the matter treats man not as though he
were primarily~o':J[..,...... which is quite acceptable - but as jf be
t:,onsists of nothing clse.27o Furthermore, even if we were seek-
ing the supreme good of some creature other than man which
consisted purely of soul, this imaginary creature would still
desire health, security, and so on ..271 The Old Academic posi-
tion on the other hand, although it admits that the goods of the
soul are to be preferred to those of the body, maintains that 'the
,ir!l!.t.::S of each are desirable for their own sakc;s' (t,irtutes quo-
lftte utriusque eorum per se expetendas esse).272 We have an im-
.26H. Sc:c: Arius Didymus: Epit. Ph)'S. fr. 39 (SVF II, 809 = DG 471, 18-24);
Ac:tius: Plac. IV, 7, 3 (SVF II, 810 = DG 393al-7); and Diogenc:s Laertius: Vit.
Philos. VII, I '57 (SVF II, 811 ).
.269. Cicero: De Fin. IV, 14 ff.
2"'0. Ibid. IV. 28.
2"' I. 1/Jid. IV, .2'7 .
.!" 2. Ibid. IV, 16.
portant parallel testimony to this theory in Augustine who

reports at length Varro's discussion of the supreme good in
which he claimed to follow the Old Academy in accordance
with the teaching of his master Antio~;\ Of the three
possibilities that man is the soul alone or body alone or the soul
and b~.Y_!9.t:!~-~r, Varro chooses th.tl.b.ir.d. s_g that the SYQ_~eme
good of man_which_ make~)~!m_ h_!l...QP...Y.__0nsists in_ the combina-
~L<m..oLt.il:~.S~~d~ _of the S()U La.n.Q_Q.g_~y. ------ -
The existence of such an ethical theory in Cicero's works
gives rise to a problem of interpretation, for is there not a con-
flict between the transcendent goal of the Somnium Scipionis
and the Tusculanae Disputationes where the focus is upon the
disembodied state of the soul,274 and the immanent goal of De
Finibus where the aim is to cultivate the soul and body in com-
bination? When we turn to Cicero's probable sources for il-
lumination the problem seems to become even more intractable
since on the one hand, the postulation of a transcendent end
seems to be characteristic of the Old Academic philosophy
whose principal defender at this point in history was An-
tiochus27S while on the other, the same Antiochus is indicated
as having originated the opposing doctrine of the immanent end
by the unanimous testimony of Cicero and Varro. However, it is
possible that the conflict between the transcendent and imma-
nent ends seemed different to Antiochus, since there is con-
siderable evidence that the notion that man is to be identified
273. Augustine: Civ. Dei XIX, 3 (CCSL 48, 662-664).

274. At Cicero: De Rep. VI, 26 we learn that 'each man is his own mind'
(mer~s cuiusque is est quisque). Sec further De Leg. I, 59-60 and Tusc. Disp.
V, 70. Sccalsopp. 126-127.
275. The theme ultimately goes back to Plato: Alclb. I, I 28c, and most
scholars believe that it is Antiochus who has transmitted it to Cicero. See
Luck: Der Akademiker Antiocbos, p. 40 and Boyancc: 'Ciceron ct lc Premier
Alcibiade p. 264 ff.
CICERO 131
with his soul had become more associated with Stoicism,276

while Platonism had developed in directions where the in-
separability of active and passive principles in physics had been
developed into an analogous doctrine in the ethical field.277 It is
also possible that Antiochus explicitly held both views, arguing
that in the present life man's essential nature is that of a soul in
conjunction with body, although after death the situation
\vould naturally be different.278 There is no way of determining
the exact position of Antiochus on this question, however likely
it seems that he synthesized the contrasting viewpoints, this
synthesis becoming in its turn the basis of Cicero's theory.
1.4 LOGIC
This completes our survey of Cicero's physics, and it now re-

mains for us simply to examine one aspect of his logic: the
theory of knowledge or - as they called it in ancient times -
the theory of the 'criterion' (Kpttr\p10v). All the Hellenistic
schools paid considerable attention to the question how our
knowledge of the external world arises, and Cicero follows this
tradition at length in works such as the Tusculanae Disputa-
tiones. Not only does he say a great deal on the subject of
epistemology which cannot be exactly paralleled in other extant
writings from ancient times, but he also reports in considerable
detail the views of Antiochus and the Stoics also described in
Greek sources.
2""'6. See J. Pepin: "Que l'hommc n'cst rien d'autre que sun arne." Ohscr-
,.ations sur Ia tradition du Premier A/cibiade', Rerue des etudes grecques 82
( 1969), pp. 56-70 who cites Clcanthes in Epiphanius: Adr. Haer. Ill, 2. 9 (SVF
I. 1'16 = DG 592, 21-29).
r-:r. Scepp. 101-106.
2":'8. As suggested by Dillon: op. cit., p. 98,n. I.
1.41 THE INNATE STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE
Cicero's discussions of epistemology are perhaps most strik-

ing, at least in comparison with the writings of Hellenistic Greek
philosophers about whom we have information, for the em-
phasis which they place upon innate notions. Two passages in
the Topica indicate the general significance of this theory. The
first is concerned with definitions which, according to Cicero,
can be of two primary classes of things: 'those that exist' (quae
sunt) for example a farm or a horse, and 'those that are
understood' (quae intelleguntur) for example guardianship or
lineage. The former group of things can be touched or pointed
to, whereas the latter- which 'do not exist' (non esse)- can
be comprehended by the mind. 'These things have no body, but
a certain clear pattern and understanding impressed upon us,
which I call a concept' (quarum rerum nullum subest corpus,
est tamen quaedam conformatio insignita et impressa in-
tellegentia, quam notionem voco).279 The second passage deals
with the meaning of genus and species, the former being defin-
ed as a 'concept' (notio) which can be applied to several species,
the latter as a concept whose special characteristic can be refer-
red back to the genus. 'By concept, I mean what the Greeks call
sometimes a "notion"and sometimes a "preconception": a
knowledge of anything, innate and previously perceived, and
needing unfolding to be understood' (Notionem appello quod
Graeci tum fvvmav tum np6A.TI\jllV. Ea est insita et ante percep-
ta cuiusque cognitio enodationis indigens).28o
These passages tell us that concepts are innate and enfolded,
while the examples show that they include what are usually
termed 'universals'. Yet there is not much further information
regarding the general epistemological theory here implied. This
279. Cicero: Top. 26-27.

180. Ibid. 31. Reading cmte percepta with codd.
CICERO 133
means that we must examine other texts for enlightenment, and

fortunately there are several which provide examples of the
kind of knowledge held by Cicero to be innate. Thus, one
passage states that 'nature has engendered in man the desire to
see truth' (natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri viden-
di),lHl another refers to 'seeds of virtues inborn in our minds'
(ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum),2B2 another to 'the
understandings and so to speak foundations of knowledge'
(intellegentiae ... quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae)
which nature has laid bare,2B3 and so on. Some passages connect
these innate concepts of knowledge and virtue in the human
soul with analogous patterns in the order of things, and suggest
that in some way the inherent rationality of the macrocosm is
transcribed in or emanated to the microcosm. Examples of this
can be found by referring back to Cicero's theory of law already
outlined.1.84
These innate concepts represent an immanent standard of
truth whose precise nature yet remains obscure. However, the
fact that Cicero identifies them with the so-called 'common
concepts' (communes notiones)2B5 of the Stoics suggests that
some explanation of their status can be sought in a brief survey
of that school's epistemology.
In Stoicism all knowledge begins from sensation, the first
stage being the passive reception of a 'presentation' (visum =
<pavmaia) given by an external object.2R6 Sextus Empiricus
1H I. Cicero: De Fin. II. ..f6. Cf. Tusc. /Jisp. I. .f4.

1M2. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. Ill. 2. Cf. De Fin. II. 46 and V, S9.
1H.'\. Cicero: De Leg. I, 26.
1H..f. Ibid. I, 16; I, 18-20; and I, 26.
28S. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. IV, 53.
2H6. This passive character is indicated by references to the 'impression'
(ttinromc;) in the soul, etc. See Aetius: Plac. IV, 12, 1-6 (SVF II, 54 = DG
tO I a I fHI2a;\4 ): Diogenes Laert ius: Vii. PJJilos. VII, 46 (SVF II, S ;\ ); and Sex-
tus Empiricus: Adt. MatJJ. VII. 227 (SVF II. 56).
l.H MIDDLE PLATONISM
reports that the Stoics made a complex classification of presen-

tations into 'probable' (1tl9avai) - for example, that I am
discoursing- and 'improbable' (cmi9avm)- for example that
if it is day the sun is not above the earth; of the probable into
'true' (al.:n9Ei<;) - for example, that it is day - and 'false'
(\lfEUcSEi<;)- for example, that the oar in the water is bent; and of
the true into 'compelling' (Karal.:rpntKai) - when the person
who receives it is healthy - and 'not compelling' (ou
Katal.:rptttKai)- when the recipient is suffering from frenzy or
melancholia. 287 Naturally, the most important presentation is
the compelling one which Sextus defines as follows: 'A compell-
ing presentation is one caused by an existing object, and imaged
and stamped upon the subject in accordance with that object, in
such a way that it could not be derived from a non-existent ob-
ject' .288 It is clear that the Stoics postulated as the basis of their
epistemology a kind of presentation to sense which carries the
mark of its own truth- they employed a special technical term,
'clearness' (evapyeta), to describe this self-evident character-
and as such it requires no rational proof by definition.289 This
latter aspect also reveals a most important feature of the Stoic
compelling presentation, namely that it implies a purely passive
state of the subject - the Greek adjective applied to the presen-
tation: 'compelling' (Katai..TJ7tttK"Ji) therefore carrying an active
sense - so that the subject engages in no process of reflection
or judgment upon the presentation.29o This occurs only in the
287. Sextus Empiricus: Adv. Math. VII, 241-247 (SVF II, 65).
2HH. Sextus Empiricus: Adt. Math. VII. 248 (SVF II, 6'5) I\UTUA111tTLKiJ ot
i:anv n ano (mapxovro~ Kai ~~:ar'auro TO (mapxov EVU1tOjljlU'YilEV11 Kai
EVU7t0qlpaytajlEV11, 6noia OUK civ YEVOITO ano llil (mapxovro~. The same
definition is given by Cicero: l.uc. 18 tisum igitur inpressum effictumque ex
eo unde esse I qua/e esse non{msset ex eo unde non esse I.
289. Cicero: Luc. 17.
290. This point is somewhat controversial. many scholars maintaining that
CICERO 135
next stage of the cognitive process.

According to Cicero, four stages in the process of acquiring
knowledge were described by Zeno, and these were illustrated
in the following graphic manner. First comes the 'presentation'
(t'isum) indicated by a hand with fingers extended, secondly the
act of assent' (adsensus) symbolized by a slight bending of the
fingers. thirdly the 'comprehension' (conprensio) indicated
by the fully closed fist, and finally 'knowledge' (scientia) sym-
bolized by the squeezing of the closed fist by the other hand.29J
It is obvious that in this account the later stages of the cognitive
process involve an active element of reflection or judgment on
the part of the subject, a fact confirmed by other descriptions of
Stoic epistemology where this active role is assigned to the 'rul-
ing part' (tlYEJ.lOVtK6v) in the souJ.292 The result of this process
there is already an element of subjective reflection in the compelling impres-

sion. The latter view is based on the equation of 'compelling presentation'
(KataA.rptttKit q>avtaaia) with the 'comprehension' (KatclATlllll<;) to be
discussed below, this being suggested by the verbal similarity between the
two Greek technical terms themselves. However, Brehier: op. cit., pp.
HO-I 07 argues convincingly against R. Hirzel: Untersuchungen zu Ciceros
fJbUosophischm Schrifterz II (leipzig, 1883), p. 183 ff. and]. Stein: Die
Erkemztnislehre der Stoa (Berlin, 1888), p. 155 ff. that the two are quite
distinct. In particular, Sextus Empiricus: Adv. Math. VII, 151 (SVF II, 90)
seems decisive: between knowledge and opinion 'comprehension is in-
termediate, being assent to a compelling presentation' (KatclATlljllV ot. titv
~ETO~U TOIJt(J)V, lltl~ ECJTi KOTQATl1tTlKll~ q>avtaa{a~ CJUj'KQTcl9ECJl~). Further-
mort. Cicero suggests no activity on the subjecl's part when he explains how
we yield to the self-evident impression at Luc. 38: as the bowl on a pair of
sc:1les must sink when weights are placed in it 'so must the soul yield to dear
impressions' (sic animum perspicuis cedere).
291. Cicero: Luc. 145. For adsmsio see Seneca: Epist. I 13, 18 (SVF Ill,
169). The Greek term is auyKata9&m~ and occurs in the same sense at Sextus:
.ldt. ,Hath. Vlll, :\96 (SVF II, 91) and Stobaeus: Eclog. II, 88 (SVF lll. 171 ).
292. On the relation between the 'ruling part' (1)y&JlOVlK6v) and com-
of judging is called variously a 'comprehension' (KTclAll\lll~),l93

a 'sensation' (aia9T)crt~),294 or a 'natural concept' (<pUatKft fv-
vota),295 and signifies the counterpart from the side of the active
subject of the compelling presentation.296 So far we find a fairly
consistent theory regarding the origin of simple perceptions,
but difficulties arise in connection with the Stoic explanation of
more complex forms of knowledge, these being founded upon
the so-called 'common concepts' (Kotvai fvvmm),297 the most
famous illustration of which is the judgment that the gods ex-
ist.29S The origin of the latter is explained in two ways. First, we
can arrive at them from simple perceptions by 'conjunction of
ideas' (coniunctio), 'analogy' (similitudo), or 'logical deduc-
tion' (collatio rationis),299 an example of the last method being
the syllogism: the world is beautiful, what is beautiful is the
prehension see Diodes Magnes in Diogenes Laenius: Vit. Pbilos. VII, 52 (SVF
II,71).
293. Cicero: De Fin. Ill, 17 explicitly translates Kat<iATJijllc; as eomprehen-
sio or pereeptio, although the former occurs most frequently in his accounts
of Stoicism.
294. The term 'sensation' (aio9rrmc;) therefore has a wider meaning than
passive reception of sensory impressions. See Aetius: Plae. IV, 8, 12-9, 4 (SVF
II, 72 and 78 = DG 396b3-25) and Galen: In Hippoer. de Med. Offie. (SVF II,
75) where the consequence that all sensations are true is brought out.
295. See Aetius: Plae. IV, ll, 1-5 (SVF II, 83 = DG 400al-401al0);
Plutarch at Olympiodorus: In Phaed. 156, 8-10 (SVF II, I 04 ); and Diogenes
Laertius: Vit. Philos. VII. 53.
296. In conjunction with the comprehension. therefore, the 'compelling'
(KataArptnK6c;) of the presentation will also take on a passive sense. See pp.
I:BI:\5.
297. According to Galen: De Hipp. et Plat. Plae. V, 3 (SVF 11. 841),
Chrysippus argued that the Logos was a 'collection' (d9pmo~ta) of common
concepts.
298. See Aetius: Plae. I. 6, I ff. (SVF II, 1009 = DG 292a20 ff.) and Diodes
Magnes at Diogcnes Lacrtius: Vlt. Phi/os. VII. 52 (SVF II, 84).
299. Cicero: De Fin. Ill, 33.
CICERO 137
work of some creator, the world is the work of a creator.300 Ac-

cording to this viewpoint, the concept that the gods exist com-
pels assent because of its derivation from more primitive com-
pelling presentations. Secondly,the Stoics believe that one can
arrive at such concepts directly, and that just as the comprehen-
sion of 'sensible presentations' (aio9rrnKai q>avtaoiat) produces
natural concepts so does the comprehension of 'rational presen-
tations' (ai oui tile; 01avoiac;) produce common concepts,30t
these latter also being termed 'preconceptions' (npoA.it\JfE1c;).302
some texts emphasize the directness in apprehension of these
concepts by speaking of them as 'innate' (~IJ.q>Ut0l).303
Although these two ways of explaining the origin of common
concepts are not necessarily inconsistent with one another304 -
one might argue that even the ability to grasp the conclusion of
a chain of reasoning requires the consciousness of a standard of
rruth30S- it is obvious that the second explanation represents a
300. Aetius: Plac. I, 6, Iff. (SVF II, 1009 = DG 292a20 ff.).

30 I. See Diodes Magnes at Diogenes Laertius: Vlt. Philos. VII, ';J (SVF II,
61) and Galen: Defin. Medic. 126 (SVF II, 89).
302. On this identity see Seneca: Epist. 117, 6; Plutarch: De Comm. Not.
5. 1060a; and Epictetus: Diss. II, 11, 3-4. According to A. Bonhoffer: Epictet
mzd die Stoa. Untersuchungen zur stoiscben Philosopbie (Stuttgart, 1890), p.
IH"' ff. the equation between the two terms only applies within the context
of moral and theological doctrine. F. H. Sandbach: ~wma and np6A.T]Ijlt<; in
the Stoic Theory of Knowledge', Classical Quarter(J' 24 ( 1930). pp. 4-f-52
<.Juestions the equation itself.
503. See Plutarch: De Stoic Repugn. 17. 1041e (SVF lll, 69) 'innate
preconleptions' (~J.Iq>UtOl npoA.itljl&t<;) and Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Pbilos. Vll,
S-1 'a preconception is a natural concept of the universal' (Eatt o'it np6Al]ljlt<;
fvvma q>UatKli tV Ka96A.ou) .
.'\0-f. For anempts to reconcile these positions sec Brehier: op. cit., pp.
I 0(). ICI"' and Sandbach: op. cit .. pp. 47-50.
50S. Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Philos. VII, 54 (SVF I, 631 and II. 105)
describes an expanded Stoic list of criteria. This includes sensation.
prt:conception. and right reason among others.
MIDDLE PLATONISM
move away from the basic sensualism of the Stoics to a kind of

Platonic dualism. It is precisely this tendency which is reflected
in Cicero's description of the common concepts as innate, as
the investigation of a further group of texts will confirm.
The innate concepts are the starting point for the develop-
ment of knowledge and virtue according to Cicero, and this
development is described as one in which nature 'without any
external guidance, sets out from those things whose kinds she
has determined through a primal and rudimentary understan-
ding, and through herself strengthens and perfects the
reason' _306 This passage suggests that the human subject comes
into the world equipped with an inchoate logic of concepts
which eventually develops into a coherent rational system, and
perhaps most significantly it is stressed that the process operates
entirely under an internal stimulus. However, another text in-
dicates a kind of teaching process in which the nature of the in-
choate concepts is illuminated by other concepts whose
understanding has already advanced to a later stage: 'For man
began to form certain shadowy understandings of all things in
his soul and mind at the beginning, and when these have been il-
luminated under the guidance of wisdom, he perceives that he
will be a good man and therefore happy'.307 The theory of in-
nate development in these passages seems to have been derived
from Antiochus whose doctrine regarding the genesis of moral
ideas is described in De Finibus. Here, nature's endowment of
the human soul at birth is considered from two aspects: on the
one hand she equips the senses in a way already adequate to
.~06. Cicl"ro: De Leg I. 27 quae etiam nullo doce11te. profecta ab iis

quorum ex prima et incboata intellexentia genera cowwl'it. confirmat ipsa
per se 1atirmem et pelficit.
:Hl7. Ibid. I. 59 quoniam principia rerum omnium quasi adumbratas in-
tellegentias cmimo (1" mente conceperit. quibus inlu.~tratis S(ljJienti" duce
bonum uirum et oh eam ipsam ccmscm1 cernat se heatumfore.
CICERO 139
perception, but on the other she endows the mind only with
rudimentary concepts of the most important things. This
passage clearly describes the same theory as in the other Cicero-
nian texts, although the distinction between sensory and mental
impressions adds a new element to the picture.308
t .4 2 ANTIOCHUS ON SENSE AND MIND
So far. Cicero has spoken of an immanent standard of

knowledge in the form of innate concepts. But in some texts we
already see a tendency to distinguish innate concepts of dif-
ferent levels - sensory and mental - and the suggestion of a
transcendent standard of knowledge. It is now our task to in-
vestigate how far he is prepared to go in the direction of
transcendence. Is it simply a question of distinguishing mind
and sense by degree according to Stoic practice, or is there a
more radical dichotomy of intelligible and sensible in the
Platonic manner?
Many Ciceronian texts distinguish the functions of mind and
sense, and of these it is hardly surprising to discover that the
largest number occur in the Tusculanae Disputationes. In one
passage he examines the mechanism of perception and con-
dudes that it is the soul which sees and hears and not the organs
.~OH. Cicero: De Fin. V, 59. See further Cicero: De Fin. II, 46: De Leg. I. IH
:uH.I I. 33: Tusc. Disp. Ill, 2. The doctrine in these texts and Cicero's deriva-
tion of it from Antiochus have heen discussed by G. Luck: Der Akculemfker
.llztiocbos, pp. 40-4 l and Boyance: 'Ciceron et le Premier Alcibiade', pp.
260-262. Both authors stress the difference between the position of An-
tiochus and Cicero - for whom the common concepts are implanted in the
human soul, even if inchoately, from the start - and that of the Stoics -
Wht-rt they an~ developed only later in life. However, the Stoic position has
htTome \'err ambivalent bv Cicero's time, as we have already seen on p. 133
If and so it is unwise to press this point too far. Fur a more explidtly Stoic
account of the genesis of knowledge see Cicero: De FiP1. III, 21.
of sensation, these latter being in actual fact merely the 'win-

dows of the soul' (fenestrae animt). Furthermore, since the
same mind can perceive dissimilar things such as color, taste,
heat, smell, and sound, it is apparent that there is a single faculty
which can judge them all.309 Elsewhere, he refers to this highest
part as the 'gaze of the mind' (actes mentis) through which it is
possible in the case of exceptional men to pierce the darkness
which impedes the vision in this earthly life,3JO or alternatively
as the 'light of the mind' (lumen mentis) in whose absence the
soul is reduced to a state which one might reasonably call that of
mindlessness.3II It is the possession of this highest part which
distinguishes man from beasts, since only he has a 'reason'
(ratio) capable of grasping the relation between cause and ef-
fect, drawing analogies, and connecting the past with the
future. Finally, it is this reason which unites man to man
through the medium of language and forms the basis of his ex-
istence as a social animal.3I2 All these texts indicate a significant
disjunction between the higher and lower parts of man's soul,
although it is not absolutely clear what form this disjunction
takes. In Stoicism we find a similar contrast between the ruling
part of the soul and its lower faculties, 313 and it is possible that
Cicero has some theory such as this in mind. But perhaps there
is more to it?
It is fortunate that there are preserved three separate descrip-
tions of Antiochus' theory of knowledge in Cicero's works, for
Antiochus' explanation is much more complete than Cicero's
309. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. 1. 46.

3lO.lbid. 1. 45. At ibid. V, 39 Cicero links this gaze with 'perfect mind, ab-
solute reason and virtue' Cperfecta mens. id est absoluta ratio, quod est idem
rirtus).
311. Ibid. Ill, 10. cr. De Leg. I, 59.
312. Cicero: De Offic. I, 11. Mind and sense are also contrasted at Tusc.
Disp. I, 38 and Ill, 11.
313.Seepp.l25-127.
CICERO 141
own and seems to have been at least partially its basis. The first
description occurs in the Lucu/lus where the character of that
name expounds Antioch us polemic against the New Academic
skepticism, and begins by positing the 'judgments' (iudicia) of
the senses as certain, provided that (i) the subject is in a healthy
state and (ii) all obstacles have been removed.3t4 This last re-
quirement defends the theory against problems raised by the
skeptics concerning the oar which appears bent in the water,
and so on. Furthermore, just as those objects which are perceiv-
ed by the senses yield clear presentations, so do those which are
not perceived by the senses but 'by a kind of sensation'
(quodam modo sensibus).315 Examples of this are: (i) 'this is
white' or 'this is sweet', and (ii) 'that object is a horse' or 'that
object is a dog'. 'Such things we hold to be comprehended now
by the mind and not by the sense' (animo iam haec tenemus
conjJ1'ehensa non sensibus).316 Next comes a series of percep-
-~ 14. Cicero: Luc. 19-20.

3l'i.lbitl. 21-22.
316. This passage requires several comments. First, Cicero contrasts
cmimus ('the mind') and sensus ('the senses'), although he normally employs
mens for 'the mind' (the highest, rational part of the soul) while animus
signifies 'the soul' (the whole soul, including its lower functions). This ir-
rt"gularity could be explained either by saying that Cicero is here following
another writer closely whose terminology is not his own, or by interpreting
sensus as 'the sensory organ which could reasonably be said to contrast with
'lhl' sour. Secondly, Cicero and his source are distinguishing (i) bare sensa-
tion (for example, a patch of whiteness impinging upon the sense of sight)
which involves the operation of the senses only, and (ii) 'a kind of sensation
in which it is really the mind which is operating (the judgment 'this is white').
Slxtus Empiricus: Adv. Math. VII. 344-34'i makes the same distinction and
argut"s that perception (ii) cannot be attributed to the senses operating alone.
Finallr. the statement that perception (ii) results on the one hand from a kind
of Sl'nsaJion' and on the other from the operation of the mind suggests that
Amiochus treats the distinction between sense and mind as one of degree
r:uhl'r than one of kind. In other words. the doctrine at this point is definitely
Stok rather than Platonic. See the next text.
tions which connect more elements, for example: 'if it is a man

it is a rational mortal animal'. Such perceptions embrace a
'complete comprehension of things' (expleta rerum conprehen-
sio ), and it is from these that the concepts of things are impress-
ed upon us' (nobis notitiae rerum inprinumtw). The speaker
concludes hy identifying these last concepts with the Greek ~v
votat and by defending the veracity of the more complex kinds
of perception and of 'memory' (memoriae). Only on this basis
can the sciences have validity.
The fundamentals of Antiochus' epistemology are explained
once again later in the same work, where the speaker apologizes
for the abstruse character of the discussion.317 Here also the
starting point is sensation in which three stages are distinguish-
ed: (i) the subject is struck by 'presentations' (visa), (ii) an 'ap-
petition' (adpetitio) on the part of the subject results from the
impact of the presentation, and (iii) the subject 'directs'
(intendere) the senses to the object to be perceived.318 This
threefold description seems to correspond to the second stage
of sensation in the previous passage- 'this is white' -or to the
connection between the first and second stages,319 and the role
of the mind which is now described also parallels the earlier ac-
count. 'For the mind itself, which is the source of the senses,
and even is itself a sense, has a natural force which it directs to
the objects by which it is moved' (Mens enim ipsa, quae sen-
suum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, natura/em vim
habet, quam intendit ad ea qu.ibus movetur).!tlo The mind now
317. Cicero: Luc. 30-31.

318. A few sentence~ further on. the speaker describes this process as that
of 'comprehension' (Kato).fllj/1~) according to the Stoic terminology .
.:H 9. Sec pp. H 1- 14 2 .
320. Here. Cicero reverts to his usual contrast of 'mind' (mens) and 'sense'
(sensus). The closeness between mind and sense postulated by Antiochus'
theory is further stressed below. where the mind is said to use the senses to
produce the arts (systems of rational concepts) as a second set of senses.
CICERO 143
dcals with these presentations in various ways: (i) they are seiz-
ed for immediate use, (ii) they are stored away 'as the sources of
memory' (e quibus memoria oritur), or (iii) they are collected
according to their likenesses 'from which are formed the con-
cc.:pts of things which the Greeks sometimes call "notions" and
somctimes "preconceptions" ' (ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae
rerum. quas Graeci tum &vvoiac; tum npoA.i)\jiEtc; vocant). This
final group. when reason and logical proof have been added and
when reason has heen perfected through these various stages,
produces 'wisdom' (sapientia). It is easy to see that a new and
potentially significant element has entered into the argument
for. hy introducing the notion of a comparison between the
presentations according to their 'likeness' (similitudo). An-
tiochus seems to open the way to a systematic theory of univer-
sals).! I
.~11. See the: passages from Cicc:ro's Topica discussed on pp. 13l-133. I in-
tlrpret thl' text as showing the point where thl' transition to univt"rsality has
h~:~:n an:omplished. However, there is undoubtedly more to the argument
than that. Set" Reid: op. t:/1., pp. 212-213 who compares Diogem:s Lacrtius:
l'il. Pbilos. VII, S2-S3 and Sextus Empiricus: Adv. Matb. Ill. 40. IX, 393 and
\1. .:!'iO. All St"xtus' passages contrast knowledge which is obtained 'by im-
rnnliat~: dt:ar impression' (Kati.t nepilttwcnv ~vapyfl) with that which is ob-
tainld hy 'transference' (f.1Etal3acn<;) from immediate clear impression. the
lmn taking place in three ways: 'by similarity' (6f.lOlWtlKW<;). 'by composi-
1ion ltmauv9enKci><;). or 'by analogy' (avaA.oytattKci><;). By immediate clear
imprnsion Wl' conceive 'the whitt"'. 'thl' bitu::r', and so on. By transfcrenct"
1\'l' concdve Socrates himself from his picture (similarity). the hippocentaur
tn,m horsc: and man (composition). and the Cyclops from an ordinary man
I analog)'). Diogenes Laertius' passage contrasts sensory knowledge:, for exam-
pll- 'tht" white:', 'tht rough' with rational knowledge based upon demonstra-
1iun' (AOY((.l oi: tci>v 5t'ano5ei~ew<; OUVUYOf.lEVWV). for l'Xamplc tht" existc:nce of
till' gods. 'Thing!! nmceived' (tci>v yi.tp VOOUf.lEVWV) can he 'by immediate im-
prc:"ion' (Kata nepintwcnv). 'by similarity' (Ka9'6f.lm6tnta). 'by :malog(
11\Ut'civaA.oyiav). 'by transposition' (Kata f.lEta9ecnv), 'by composition'
(1\ura ouvllemv). or 'by contrariety' (Kat'~vavtiwcnv). Cict"ro's argumc:nt at
/Jl' Fin. Ill. .:H clearly renects the: samt" traditions. It will be noted that in
There is one further description of this epistemology, and

this occurs in the Academica where Varro is the speaker. Here,
the criterion of truth is said to arise 'from the senses' (a sen-
sibus) although it is not 'in the senses' (in sensibus).322 The
judge of things is in fact the mind 'for only that perceives what
is eternal, simple, uniform, and invariable, namely that which
they called "the idea" - a name already bestowed by Plato-
although we may correctly term it "the Form" ' (quia sola
cerneret id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale
quale esset (bane il/i iMav appellabant, iam a Platone ita
nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere)). The contrast
between the activities of sense and mind is continued when
Varro argues that the senses are so sluggish that they do not
even perceive the things which are said to be part of the sensible
realm. The mind,323 however, is capable of true knowledge
because of the 'concepts and reasons' (notiones atque rationes)
which it contains, this latter fact leading to the practice of defin-
ing things and indeed to the whole science of dialectic. Varro's
discussion adds considerably to our understanding of the later
stages in the cognitive process, for it associates the mind
specifically with the perception of universals in the guise of
Platonic Forms, although these latter seem to function in a
peculiarly Antiochean manner. In the first place, the criterion of
none of these passages is there a formal treatment of the question of univer-

sality, no doubt because of the Stoic view that the distinction between
universal and particular is one of definiteness versus indefiniteness rather
than of ontology, as Sextus Empiricus: Adv. Math. VIII, 93 (SVF II, 205)
points out. It is possible that Antiochus and Cicero also thought in this way,
although their tendency to combine the Stoic epistemology with the Platonic
theory of Forms suggests a movement towards the clearer distinction bet-
ween universal and particular.
322. Cicero: Acad. 30-32.
323. 'Mind' here is once again animus, although mens predominates
earlier in the passage. See nn. 316 and 320.
CICERO 145
truth has already been said to arise from the senses, so that a
completely transcendent role for the Forms is apparently ex-
cluded. Secondly, the statement that sensation is not even ade-
quate to perceive the so-called sensory realm suggests that
truth. even in the sense world, is dependent upon the mind's
knowledge of the Forms. We seem here to be faced with two
contradictory epistemological views brought together in a
single passage: the Stoic comprehension together with Platonic
intellectual knowledge.
The introduction of Plato's theory at this point suggests that
the standard of intellectual truth is no longer the immanent one
described in the first group of Ciceronian passages. Antiochus,
hy equating intellectual knowledge with the perception of the
Forms, seems to open the way towards a transcendent standard
of truth. But we must return to Cicero in order to see whether
such a theory is further developed.
1.43 THE THEORY OF FORMS
A number of texts speak either implicitly or explicitly of the

theory of Forms.324 Among the implicit references are passages
which mention innate concepts using terminology reminiscent
of the Platonic theory: for example, the argument in De Officiis
where the definition of the good man is sought by unfolding
that concept which is wrapped up in our mind325 and which is
also called a form.326 Here, the interpretation of the concept as
the culmination of a process of definition and the employment
of the terminology 'form' strongly indicate the Platonic
character of the discussion. Also among implicit references is a
.~2!. Then~ is a list of definite or probable references in de Graff: op. cit.

pp. ld-IB .
.US. Cicero: DeOffic. Ill, 76.
526. Ibid. Ill. 81.
passage where Cicero speaks of the virtue or wisdom which

cannor be beheld by the eye although it would arouse the most
passionate love if it were seen.327 Even if Plato had not been
mentioned by name here, we would recognize his characteristic
dichotomy of the invisible and visible realms, that of Forms and
that of sensibles. In fact, the passage contains a definite
reference to Plato's Pbaedrus. 328
The explicit references to the theory of Forms appear in four
texts which it will be most convenient first to quote and then to
comment upon:
(i) 'So Aristotle was the first to undermine those Forms which
I discussed a little earlier and which Plato had incorporated
wonderfully into his system speaking of them as containing
some element of divinity' ,329
(ii) 'And in portraying the perfect orator, I shall describe such
a one as perhaps never existed. For I am not seeking who he
was, but what that thing is than which nothing can be more ex-
cellent, and which rarely if ever appears in a whole speech, but
only in some places and at some times, more frequently in some
speakers than in others. My view is that there is nothing of any
kind which is so beautiful that it is not excelled in beauty by that
after which it is copied, just as a mask is a copy of a face. This
original cannot be perceived by the eyes, the ears, or any sense.
Yet we can grasp it with thought and mind. It is possible to
think of things even more beautiful than the statues of Phidias
or the pictures which I have named, even though we see
nothing more excellent within their kind. Furthermore that
great sculptor, while making the statues of jupiter and Minerva,
327. Cicero: De Fitz. II, 52. Cf. De Offic. I, I 5.

328. Plato: Pbaedr. 250d.
329. Cicero: Acacl. 33 Aristoteles i~itur prim us species quas paulo ante
dixi laht'.factal'it, quas minfice Plato erat mnplexatus. ut in iis quicldam
dit'inum esse cliceret.
CICERO 147
did not look at any person as the source for the likeness; but in
his own mind resided some surpassing form of beauty at which
he gazed intently, and according to whose likeness he guided
his art and hand. Thus, just as there is something perfect and ex-
cellent in forms and shapes: an intellectual form with reference
to which an artist depicts those things which do not appear to
the eye, so we perceive the perfect form of eloquence with our
mind but seek its copy with our ears. These forms of things are
called "Ideas" by Plato, that most eminent teacher and master
not only of thought but of diction. He says that they do not
become, but exist eternally, being sustained by reason and in-
telligence, while other things arise, perish, change, decay, and
do not remain long in the same state. Whatever therefore is to
be discussed rationally and methodically must be reduced to its
ultimate form and type of its class'330.
(iii) 'But you say "such a man never existed". I agree. For I
am discussing what I seek and not what I have seen. I return to
that Platonic Form or Idea of which I spoke and which,
although we do not see it, we can grasp with our minds. For I
am not seeking some eloquent person, mortal or transitory, but
that thing the possession of which makes a man eloquent. This
.~50. Cicero: Oral. 7 ff. Atque ego in summo ora/ore fingendo la/em in-
.fiil"mabu qualisfortasse nemo fuit. non enim quaero quisfuerit, sed quid sit
illud quo nibil possil esse praestantius, quod in pe1petuitate dicendi non
Sllt'/Je atque baud scio an lllllltfUtl111, in aliqua autem parte eluceat ali-
quando, idem apud alios densius apud alios fortasse rarius. sed ego sic
statuo. nibil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulcbrius id sit
unde illud ut ex ore aliquo quasi imago exprimatur; quod neque oculis ne-
Cflle auribus neque ullo sensu percipi potesl; cogitalione ttmle11 et mente
mmp/ectimur. itaque et Pbitliae simulacris, quibus nibil in illo genere
fn!tfeclius tidemus. et iis pic/uris, quas nominmi, cogitare tamen
/}()ssumus pu/cbriora. nee tero ille artifex, cum fttcetet lmis formam aut
.llh1erNte. crmtemplabatur aliquem e quo similitUtlinem duceret, sed ips ius
in mtute insidebat spedes fmlcbritudinis eximiu quaedam. quam intuens
in eaque defixus ad illiu.~ similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat. ut ig
is none other than eloquence itself, which nobody can see ex-
cept with eyes of the mind'331.
(iv) 'In the first place, the soul has memory and at that an in-
finite memory of things without number. Plato wishes to inter-
pret this as recollection of a previous life, for in the book entitl-
ed Meno, Socrates asks some young boy various geometrical
questions about the measurement of a square. Although he is
young and the questions are easy. the boy replies in such a way
that, proceeding step by step, he arrives at the same conclusions
as he would if he had studied geometry. From this Socrates
wishes to conclude that learning is nothing other than recollec-
tion. This topic is developed with more care in that conversa-
tion which he held on the very day he departed this life, for he
teaches there that anyone who seems in all matters to be
uneducated, shows in responding to a skilful questioner that he
is not at that point learning such things, but recognizing them by
recollection. Nor is it possible in any other way for us to possess
frt'>m childhood the innate and so to speak impressed concepts
called "notions" of so many and such important things unless
the soul had grown strong in the knowledge of things before it
itur itz fomzis' et flguris est aliquid perfectum et excel/ens, mius ad

cogitatam speciem imltando refenmtur ea quae sub ocu/os ipst~ non CCI-
dunt, sic pelfectae e/oquentlae speciem animo tidemus. effigiem t~urlbus
quaerimus. has rerum form as appellllt ioeac; il/e mm lntel/igendi solwn sed
etit~m dicendi grmissimus e~uctor et magister Plato, et~sque gigni negtlt et
Clit semper esse ac rlltione et intelligent/a contine1i. cetera nasci occidere,
fluere /abi nee diutius esse uno et eotlem statu. quicquid est igitur, de quo
ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generisformmn speciemque
redigendum.
:HI. Ibid. I 0 I nemo is, inquies. unquam fuit. ne fuerit: ego enim quid
desiderem. nmz quid l'iderlm disputo redeoque (IC/ il/am Platonis de qua
tlixermn rei formam et speciem, qut~m etsi non cernimus tamen t~nimo
tenere possumus. non enim eloquentem quaero neque quicqzwm mortale et
t:tlducum. sed illml ipsum. cuius qui sit compos, sit e/oquens; quod nihil est
a/itul nisi eloquent/a ipscl, quam nul/is nisi mentis ocu/is ,,;den! possumus.
CICERO 149
entered the body. And since there is no true existence in that

which comes to be and passes away - as Plato everywhere
maintains- and that alone truly exists which always retains its
own nature: namely the "Idea" or as we call it the Form, the
soul could not have apprehended these things when in the body
and must therefore have brought its knowledge with it at birth.
For this reason, our amazement that the soul knows so many
things is removed. Nor can the soul see its objects clearly when
it has suddenly entered into such an unaccustomed and
disorderly dwelling-place, but when it has collected and
recovered itself it then recognizes them by recollection. Thus,
learning is none other than recollection. But for my part, I am
amazed even more by memory ... '332
It is clear that all these passages speak of a single episte-
':\2. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, ';7-58 Habet primum memoriam, et eam in-
jinitam remm innumerabilium. qumn quidem Plato recordationem esse
mit t>itae super/oris. nam in i/lo libro, qui irzscribitur Menon, pusionem
quendmn Socrates interrogat quaedam geometrica de dimensione
qumlrali. ad ea sic il/e responder ut puer, et ramen ita faclles interroga-
fiones stml, ut gradatim respondens eadem pert,eniat, quo si geometrica
didicissel. e:r quo efficltmlt Socrates, ul discere nihil a/iud sit nisi recordari.
quem locum multo etiam ac:curatius explical in eo senmme. quem habuit
eo ipso die. quo excessit e l'ila; docet enim que,wis, qui omnium rerum
l'lltlis esse t'ideatur, bene irzterrogtmtl respmzdentem dedarare se mm tum
ilia discere. sed reminiscendo recognoscere, nee t'ero fieri ul/o modo posse.
111 a jmeris tot rerum lllque tante~rum insitlls et quasi nmsig,wtas in mzimis
noti(mes. qtulS f:vvoiac; tocant, baberemus. nisi animus, ante quam in cor-
pus intnu,isset, in rerum cognitione l'igulsset. cum que nibil esset ... , ut om-
llibus locis a P/atcme disseritur- nibil enim putat esse, quod oriatur et in-
tereat, idque solwn esse, quod semper tale sit quale est (iotav appellat ille.
nos spec/em) -. non potuit tmimus htlec in corpore inc/usus adgnoscere,
tognita attulit; ex quo tam multarum rerum cognitionis admiratio
lo/litur. neque ea plmze 11/det tmimus. cum repente in tam insolitum tam-
que perturbatum domicilium inmigratil. sed cum se co/legit atque
/'('Ct'l!tllit. tum adgnoscit ilia reminisc:endo. itct nibil est aliud discere nisi
recurdari. Ego autem maiore etiam quodammodo memoriam admiro1' ...
mological doctrine - the Platonic theory of Forms - yet this

theory is set out in two distinct ways. In (i) and (iv) it is quoted
as a doctrine of Plato or of the Old Academy from which Cicero
withholds his personal commitment, whereas in (ii) and (iii) it is
cited as a doctrine of Plato which is central to the development
of Cicero's own argument. This distinction may be of purely
literary significance, although we should at least bear it in mind
if our analysis reveals doctrinal differences between the texts.
Thus, it might indicate that Cicero himself only supports one
aspect of the theory333.
Texts (ii) and (iii) describe a theory whose essentials can be
summarized under the following headings:
1) There are certain principles which Plato called 'Ideas'
(iaEat) and we call 'Forms' (formae, species) (ii, iii).
2) There are Forms of qualities such as eloquence (ii, iii).
3) The Form of such a quality is equivalent to the quality 'in
itself' (ipsa) (iii).
4) The Form of a given quality is 'that than which nothing can
be more excellent' (il/ud quo nihil possit esse praestantius) (ii).
5) Knowledge of this Form is arrived at by the process of
definition (ii).
6) Forms can only be perceived by the mind and not by sense
(ii, iii). 334
7) Forms 'dwell in' (insidere) the mind and 'are sustained by'
(continert) the mind (ii).335
333. The first sentence of Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I. 59 (last sentence of text
(iv)) suggests that the writer has reported a theory without implying his per-
sonal approval. Thus, the theory of Forms in texts (ii) and (iii) may represent
his own conviction, whereas the version of it in (iv) may not. However,
Cicero may simply be affirming once more that, as a New Academic, he con-
siders all such doctrines probable rather than certain. Sec pp. 58-60.
334. For the terminology mens, animus see nn. 316, 320, and 323.
335. According to L. & S. contineri + ablative is a common expression in
Cicero for 'be contained in, be composed of, be supported by'. This seems to
be the meaning here.
CICERO 151
8) Forms 'exist eternally' (semper esse) (ii).

9) Sensible things relate to Forms as copies to originals (ii).
10) Sensible things relate to Forms by being 'participant in'
(compos) them (iii).
The contents of texts (i) and (iv) can similarly be summariz-
ed:
1) There are certain principles which Plato called 'Ideas' and
we call 'Forms' (i, iv).
2) Knowledge of Forms can be arrived at by the process of
question and answer (iv).
3) Knowledge of Forms is obtained by the soul 'before it has
entered into body' (ante quam in corpus intravisset) (iv)336.
4) The soul's acquisition of knowledge through question and
answer is actually its recollection of Forms seen before birth
(iv ).
S) Recollection of Forms is the only explanation of our 'in-
nate and so to speak impressed concepts' (insitas et quasi con-
signa/as . .. notiones . .. evvoiac;) of so many things (iv).
6) A Form is 'eternal and immutable' (semper tale sit quale
est) {iv).
7) Forms contain an element of divinity (i).
Most of the theory set out in these texts corresponds to
Plato's and therefore requires little in the way of commen-
tary:rn. That there are certain absolute qualities which can be
.:\36. The latin could imply (i) before the soul has entered this body. or (ii)
hc:fore the soul has entered body as such. Thus (i) might only signify that the
~oul has acquired its knowledge in a previous incarnation. However, the
remark at Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, 58 that the soul cannot know the Forms fully
in an incarnate state shows that the writer intends sense (ii) here.
~~ -r. These passages on the theory of Forms have been extensively discuss-
ed in the modern literature. Sec especially W. Theiler: Die Vorbereitung des
Neup/atonismus, 2. Auflage (Berlin, 1964), pp. 16-19 and 38-43; luck: Der
.lkatlemiker Antiochos, pp. 28-44: Boyancc: 'le platonismc a Rome', pp.
2!1-245; W. Burkert: 'Cicero als Platoniker und Skeptiker. Zum
discovered by the process of recollection stimulated by

philosophical argument, which comprise a realm of eternal be-
ing only accessible to the mind, and to which sensible things
relate by imitation or participation, can easily be paralleled by
passages in the dialogues. In all this, it is perhaps only the choice
of eloquence as the absolute quality which is more typical of
Cicero than of Plato, although the latter certainly reifies
psychological qualities on occasion33B. Yet there are three
aspects of the doctrine expressed in these passages which do
differ from the earlier formulation, and it is these which
primarily indicate the direction of Cicero's own development of
Platonism.
First, the notion that the Form indicates a maximum of a
given quality was never developed as an explicit formulation
for, although Plato had spoken of a Form as a paradigm339, he
had not systematically defined it as 'that than which nothing
can be more excellent'. In fact, the use of this latter phrase
seems to reflect the Stoic definition of God34o, so that it looks as
though Cicero or his source is combining Stoic theology and
Platonic epistemology. We should perhaps not go too far in
making deductions from a brief text, but it seems likely that
Cicero viewed the Form of eloquence in the Orator as a concept
not only in the human but also in the divine mind341. This no-
Platonvcrstandnis der Neuen Akademic', Gymm1slum 72 (1965). pp.

190-191: W. Wimmel: 'Cicero auf platonischem Feld. Zu Kap. 9 des Orator',
Festschrift H. Gundert(Amsterdam. 1974), pp. IHi-194: and Dillon: op. cit.,
pp. 93-96. Theiler stresses the influence of Antiochus over Cicero's formula-
tion of the theory, although such influence is exceedingly difficult to prove.
Luck is perhaps correct in being more cautious.
338. See Diilon: op. cit., p. 94
339. See Plato: Rep. IX. 592b and Tim. 28c-29a.
340. Seen. 157 .
.'\41. Burkert: op. cit .. pp. 190-191 considers the 'Idea' {iota) to be non-
ontological in Cicero: Orat. 10.
CICERO 153
tion is not explicit in Cicero, but it occurs without equivocation

in Varro who is clearly dependent upon Antiochus at this point.
Of course, the location of the Forms in the divine mind does not
in itself reveal a metaphysical status for the Forms, since God
himself according to Stoicism and Platonism influenced by the
Stoa is a corporeal artisan fire342.
Secondly, the view that the Forms dwell in or are sustained
by the mind is a deviation from Plato which is of great
significance for the future development of the Platonic tradi-
tion. Plato's Forms had been separately subsistent principles
which were the objects but not the subjects of intellection343,
whereas the theory in these Ciceronian texts stresses the essen-
tially intellective character of the Forms. a fact which helps to
explain the postulation of a Form such as eloquence. The cause
of this transformation of Plato's doctrine is once again clearly
the intervention of the Stoics, for their common concepts are
intellective in precisely this way and, when combined with the
universals of Plato's thought, will produce a Form-concept of
the kind described by Cicero. It is possible that the Aristotelian
notion of intellective form has also been combined with the
other elements in the tradition, although the evidence to prove
this interpretation is totally lacking. In later times, however, we
do find the theory of forms systematically developed as a syn-
thesis of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism - the
Neoplatonists will call the result 'Intellect' (vouc;) - and the
roots of this tendency clearly lie in the Platonism of Antiochus'
and Cicero's time.
Finally, the statement that the soul's recollection of the
Forms is the basis of its possession of innate and impressed con-
cepts marks a distinction from Plato's original theory of
342. Seep. 93 ff.

343. Significantly, in Plato's Timaeus the Demiurge (divine mind) is
distinct from the Paradigm which he contemplates. See Plato: Tim. 30c-d.
recollection. Plato generally spoke of a direct apprehension of

the Forms by the soul, whereas Cicero apparently postulates
two distinct sets of Forms: a primal set which the soul con-
templates before birth, and a second set which is innate and re-
mains as a kind of residue of the prenatal intellective activity.
This change of viewpoint indicates first, that we are really con-
cerned in these passages with a relation between macrocosm
and microcosm.H-t. In other words, the '"Forms are not simply
concepts innate in all human beings individually, but are depen-
dent upon a higher set of concepts probably viewed as contain-
ed in the divine mind. Secondly, the change of viewpoint shows
that the relation between macrocosm and microcosm is not
simply the epistemological one most often described by Plato
but a definite ontological one in which a higher level of being
gives rise to a lower one.
The Ciceronian theory of Forms is a striking complement to
his general epistemological theory, for it shows that the stan-
dard of truth is not only immanent but also transcendent. It
must be admitted that the transcendent notion of truth sug-
gested in the Tuscu/anae Disputationes may not represent
Cicero's personal view, yet it seems difficult to ignore the fact
that his own argument in the Orator implies such a doctrine.
344. See pp. 99-100. 119 and 122 ff.

2
Seneca
2.IINTRODUCTION
In the century following the death of the great rhetorician

and statesman, only Seneca the Younger (or the Philosopher)
plays a major role in the Latin Platonic tradition. That Seneca's
influence is significant not only in later antiquity but
throughout the mediaeval period has been decisively proven by
modern scholarship.' However, since the eminent Roman
writer is not usually ranked among the great Platonists of
I. Seneca's influence during the Middle Ages was sustained (although not
really substantial until the twelfth century) and the reasons for this have been
investigated by modern scholars. A. Momigliano: Contrlbuto all storia deg/1
studi classici (Roma, 1955), pp. 13-32 has shown that there is no evidence
th;u the legend of his conversion to Christianity was current before the four-
teenth century, and so Seneca's reputation must have stemmed on the one
hand from the praise bestowed upon him by certain early Christian writers
like Tertullian and Lactantius, and on the other from the existence of some
apocryphal correspondence with St. Paul first mentioned by jerome which
became connected with the authentic Epistulae in the eleventh century. At
all events it is Seneca the moralist who is influential, although there is
C:\'idence for his use as an authority on natural science in the twelfth century.
For a good general survey of his influence see G. M. Ross: 'Seneca's
Philosophical Influence'. Seneca, edited by C. D. N. Costa (london, 1974),
pp. 116-165 who deals with three periods: pagan antiquity (influence on
Pliny's Natura/is Historia, Gellius, and Macrobius), Christian antiquity (Ter-
tullian. Lactantius, Martin of Braga, and Isidore of Sevilk). and the Middle
155
history or indeed among the Platonists at all, we must begin

with some remarks to justify treating him as a thinker whose
teachings are relevant here.
That Seneca can be considered a philosopher at all might be
questioned by those readers who are familiar with various
passages in his works attacking the misplaced subtlety of the
dialecticians. The famous Epistula ad Lucilium LXXXVIII is
primarily directed against a tendency to cultivate the liberal arts
as ends in themselves divorced from the task of living, but con-
cludes by bringing those philosophers into general censure who
have adopted the methods of the liberal arts in their specula-
Ages (Alcuin's use of the apocryphal correspondence together with traces in

Paschasius Radbertus, Walafrid Strabo, Sedulius Scouus, Hucbald, Gerbert.
and Otloh of St. Emmeram). K.-D. Nothdurft: Studien zum Einfluss Senecas
auf die Pbilosopbie und Tbeologie des zwolften jabrbunderts (Leiden/Koln,
196~) provides more detailed information by distinguishing the separate for-
tunes of the Epistulae, De Benefic/is, and De Clementia (used from the ninth
century), of the Naturales Quaestiones (from the twelfth century), and of De
Vita Beata and other dialogues (from the thirteenth) (Nothdurft: op. cit.. pp.
11-15); by noting the division of the corpus of Epistulae itself into two parts
(Epist. 1-88 and Epist. 89-124) which were circulated separately. the first half
being much more common than the second (Nothdurft; op. cit.. p. 12); and
by studying the role of florilegla such as Martin of Braga's Formula Vitae
Honestae (sometimes circulated under Seneca's own name) in the transmis-
sion of these ideas (Nothdurft: op. cit., pp. 29-~4). One should also consult
this fine study for a closer examination of the most important period of
Senecan influence: the twelfth century, where we find William of Conches
and Adelard of Bath using the Naturales Quaestim1es (Nothdurft: op. cit., pp.
161-178), and the author of De Unitate Divinae Essentiae et Pluralitate
Creaturarum and perhaps Thierry of Chartres using the important Epistulae
58 and 65 (Nothdurft: op. cit.. pp. 182-190). For a closer examination of the
manuscript tradition of Seneca's epistolary output see L. D. Reynolds: The
Medietal Traclltiort of Seneca's Letters (Oxford, 1965). These studies have
outdated most of the earlier scholarship although C. Picard-Parra: 'lJne
utilisation des Quaestiones Naturales de Seneque au milieu du XII siecle'.
Ret 'lie du moyen tlge latin ; ( 19--i 9). pp. II S-126 is still important.
SENECA 15""'
tion. As examples of such misused erudition, Seneca cites Pro-

tagoras' view that one can debate either side of any question
with equal success, Nausiphanes' doctrine that things which
seem to exist have existence as much as they have non-
existence, and Parmenides' view that none of the things which
we see exist except one thing: the world, among other teachings
of the philosophers.2 It is clearly not so much the content of
these doctrines - which may or may not have been reported
accurately by Seneca- but the dialectic employed in their for-
mulation which is under attack, for elsewhere he satirizes the
philosophical method by quoting the following syllogisms:
mouse is a syllable, a mouse eats cheese, therefore a syllable
eats cheese' or alternatively 'mouse is a syllable, a syllable does
not eat cheese, therefore a mouse does not eat cheese' .3
These texts undeniably reveal a fundamental attitude on
Seneca's part, yet it is important not to commit the error of
many later interpreters in taking them outside their proper con-
text. In fact, he was clearly concerned not with the study of the
liberal arts independently of or in conjunction with philosophy
but with their abusive employment by certain writers in either
case.4 This is indicated by Seneca's own use of the liberal arts in
texts such as Epistula LXXXV where he explains to Lucilius
that, although the view that only the honorable is good leads to
the conclusion that virtue is sufficient for the purpose of living
happily, the converse is not necessarily the case5: a clear sign
that he understands the value of correct deductive procedure as
well as anyone else. It is also shown by the wider context of his
2. Seneca: Epist. 88,42-45.

:\.Ibid. 48, 6. Cf. ibid. 65. t6and Ill, 1-2.
-i. Thus Walter of St. Victor: Contra Quatuor Labyrimhos Franciae IV. I
seems to misunderstand the point of Seneca's critique (text quoted by
Nothdurft; op. ell.. p. 5).
5. Seneca: Epist. 85. 17-18.
ISH MIDDLE PLATONISM
discussion of the liberal arts in Epistula LXXXVIII. Here, Seneca

describes the difference between the liberal arts and true
philosophy by saying that subjects like mathematics build their
structures on somebody else's land whereas philosophy builds
everything on its own soil.6 However, the liberal arts for all
their limitations retain a certain value in that, although they do
not produce virtue - which for Seneca is the aim of true
philosophy - they can prepare the human soul for its recep-
tion. 7 Furthermore, although the liberal arts are not parts of
philosophy they are nevertheless aids to it, just as the art of
carpentry is not a branch of mathematics although it can assist
the mathematician.s
6. Ibid. 88, 26-28.

7.1bid. 88, 20.
8. Ibid. 88. 25. This Epistula has given rise to much scholarly debate on
two points: (i) the relationship of Seneca's view of the liberal arts and
philosoph)' to Posidonius who is mentioned by name at ibid. 88, 21, and (ii)
the conflict between more positive and less positive views of the liberal arts.
Since Posidonius is often held to be the source of the more positive view,
these points are obviously connected with one another. That Epistula 88
takes the form of a debate with Posidonius and reveals an ambivalent attitude
on Seneca's part has been argued by A. Stiickelberger: Senecas 88. Brief Ober
Wert rmd Unwert der freien Kiinste (Heidelberg, 1965). p. 31 ff. and 71 ff.
However. the evidence for Posidonius' position is circumstantial, while the
conflict in Seneca is an unreal one for reasons already suggested. SeeK. Abel's
review of Stiickelberger's book in G'wmon 38 ( 1966). pp. 45 S-460 reprinted
in G. Maurach: Seneca als Philosoph, herausgegeben von G. M. (Wege der
Forschung 414) (Darmstadt, 1975). pp. 323-331. On Seneca's own extensive
use of dialectic see W. Trillitzsch: Senecas Bewelsfiihrung (Berlin, 1962). pp.
46-58 and H. Cancik: Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae morales
(Hildesheim, 1967), p. 35 ff. Seneca's stress on the propacdeutic role of the
liberal arts in relation to philosophy suggests a comparison between the pre-
sent text and Philo ludaeus' allegorical interpretation of Abraham's union
with Hagar (equivalent to encyclopaedic learning) and Sarah (equivalent to
wisdom and virtue) in De Congressu Quaerendae Erudltlonls Gratia. See
Stiickelberger: up. cit., pp. 60-64 where the extensive earlier bibliography on
this question is discussed.
SENECA 159
2.11 SENECA'S STOICISM
Thus, Seneca does believe in the value of philosophy, provid-

ed that it is pursued in the correct manner. But this leaves us
with a further question: to what school of philosophy does he
primarily adhere? Throughout his works he quotes lavishly
from the history of philosophy: from Presocratics such as
Pythagoras, Parmenides, and Democritus; from Plato, Aristotle,
and Theophrastus; and from Hellenistic writers like Epicurus,
Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Posidonius. 9
Among these thinkers it is the Stoics who figure most extensive-
ly in the Senecan corpus - on occasion he will even refer to
them as 'my school' (nostri)10- yet we clearly cannot describe
the author as a Stoic without qualification. I. Hadot has sum-
marized an extensive scholarly controversy on the question of
Seneca's precise relation to the Stoic school, by noting that he
has sometimes been classified as an orthodox Stoic, sometimes
as an eclectic one; and within the school itself he has sometimes
bt:en considered as a follower of the Old Stoa, and sometimes of
the Middle Stoa.tt Furthermore, the exact nature of Seneca's
response to Stoicism is not disconnected from his relevance to
the main theme of the present work: the history of Platonism in
late antiquity. If his viewpoint is fairly orthodox and closer to
that of the Old Stoa, his association with the Platonic tradition
will be slight; but if his outlook is more eclectic after the manner
9. On Seneca's citation of various philosophical authorities sec Trillitzsch:

(}p. cit .. pp. 73-83. Lists of references can also be found in A. L. Motto:
Seneca S(}urcebook. Guide to the Thought of Lucius Amraeus Seneca in the
1:".\'ltml Prose Works: Epistulac Morales, the Dialogi. De Bcneflciis, De
Clementia, and Quaestiones Naturales (Amsterdam. 1970). pp. xiii-xiv and
fwssim.
10. See Seneca: Episl. 89,8: 117. 2: etc.
I I. I. Hadot: Senecct tmd die griecbisc:b-riimische Trt~dilion der Seel-
enleitung (Berlin, 1969). pp. 2-3.
of the Middle Stoa, the influence of Platonism upon his thought

is likely to be significant.12 It is fortunate that Seneca's extant
writings provide us with ample material on which to base
answers to these questions.
Praise of the Stoics occurs in many Senecan texts, and as il-
lustrations one could cite the passage in which their definition
of philosophy as the pursuit of virtue is approved, 13 or that in
which the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of causation are
abandoned in favor of the simpler Stoic doctrine and the
'throng of causes' (turba causarum) in favor of a single creative
reason.I4 However, in other passages Seneca is more cir-
cumspect regarding Stoicism, and we find him referring to 'the
absurdities of our school' (nostrorum ineptiae) in the field of
natural science, 15 or attacking the facile syllogism by which
Zeno sought to dispel the fear of death: no evil is glorious, death
is glorious, therefore death is no evil.16
Such texts indicate a general respect for Stoic philosophy
coupled with a certain independence of mind in relation to its
tenets, an outlook which is even more strikingly revealed by the
arguments of Epistulae CVI and CXVII where Stoic doctrines
are actually invoked in order to refute Stoicism. In the earlier of
these two texts, Seneca discusses the fundamentally material-
istic viewpoint of this school with regard to the good. It is a
12. This will especially be the case if the Influence of Posidonius on Seneca
is as great as some scholars suggest. See A. D. Leeman: 'Seneca and Posi-
donius. A Philosophical Commentary on Senela: Epist. 102, 3-19', Mne-
mosyne S ( 1952), pp. 57-79 and 'Posidonius the Dialectician in Seneca's Let-
ters', ibid. 7 ( 1954), pp. 233-240: M. Laffranque: 'Scnt:que et le moyen stoic-
isme', Aetas del Congreso lnternacional de Filosoffa en (onmemoraclon
de Seneca II (C6rdoba, 1966 ). pp. 185-19S: and other works cited inn. 8.
13. Seneca: Epist. 89, 8.
14./bid. 6S, 11-12.
15. Seneca: Nat. Quaest. IV 8, 6.
SENECA 161
principle of their physical theory, he observes, that 'what af-

fects a body is a body' (quod imperat corpori corpus est), and
so any good which affects the body by being beneficial to it
must be a corporeal one. This applies to both the goods of the
body and those of the soul, he continues, for according to
Stoicism the body and the soul are likewise corporeal.17 In the
later text, Seneca examines funher developments of the same
theory current in the school and describes their view that,
although 'wisdom' (sapientia) is a good and therefore both ac-
tive and corporeal, 'being wise' (sapere) is only an accident to
something else - namely wisdom - and therefore incor-
poreal. 18 A few paragraphs further on, Seneca explains that this
doctrine is based upon the Stoics' belief that there are two
classes of things: (i) 'bodily natures' (naturae corporum) which
are indicated, for example, in the statement 'I see Cato walk-
ing'; and (ii) 'motions of souls which declare something about
bodies' (motus animorum enuntiativi corporum) indicated,
for example, in the statement 'Cato walks'. In the former case, it
is a 'body' (corpus) which is signified, but in the latter an 'ut-
terance, declaration, or statement' (effatum ... enuntiatum ...
dictum) concerning a body. When we apply this Stoic distinc-
tion to the question of wisdom, he continues, we therefore con-
clude that, although saying the word 'wisdom' (sapientia)
means that we understand something corporeal, saying the
phrase 'he is wise' (sapit) means that we grasp something con-
cerning a body ,19 Throughout this discussion, Seneca is expoun-
ding the classical Stoic theory of incorporeals, and he makes it
dear that he personally finds their distinction unconvincing.2o
However, it is not so much his rejection of the doctrine itself
17. Ibid. 106, 3-10.

18./bid. 117, 1-3.
19. Ibid. I 17, 13.
20. St:c pp. 824-825 and app .. n. 49 for a discussion of this tht:ory.
which is remarkable, but the fact that he rejects it by appealing

to the equally traditional Stoic doctrine of the common con-
cept.21 just as we infer, he comments, that the gods exist or that
the soul is immortal because such concepts are implanted in the
minds of all men, so it is self-evident that if wisdom is a good
then being wise is equally so.22 It would seem that Seneca holds
the theory of incorporeals to be a perfect example of the misuse
of dialectical skills by professional philosophers.
The picture which emerges from passages such as these is of a
writer who does not adhere dogmatically to the tenets of his
chosen philosophical school but is prepared to examine their
views critically in the light of his own conscience and judgment.
This relatively favorable picture of Seneca is reinforced by
passages where the doctrines of schools other than the Stoic are
described with understanding and perhaps even sympathy. The
most striking examples of this are contained in Epistulae LVIII
and LXV in which Platonic and Aristotelian theories are examin-
ed,23 and in conclusion he defends the value of studying such
doctrines in the face of Lucilius' expected response that these
subtleties contribute nothing to man's moral welfare. Such
studies, he contends, serve to turn the human soul away from
preoccupation with transitory things and towards the con-
templation of the divine providence which sustains all things in
their being,24 so that the soul becomes lightened from the bodi-
ly burden which weighs it down and strengthened in the an-
ticipation of its return to the elements from which it was
originally constituted.25 These sentiments are fundamentally
Platonic, yet they are expressed in language which gives them
21. See pp. 132-133.

22. Seneca: Epist. 117, 6. A dialectical proof is added at/bid. 117,7-10.
23. See the detailed analysis of these two Epistulae below.
24. Seneca: Epist. 58, 26 ff.
25./bid. 65. 15 ff.
SENECA 16.:\
an instant appeal to a Stoic. In other words, Seneca is attemp-

ting to demonstrate how the opinions of the two schools of
philosophy can be brought into a constructive relationship with
one another.
The question whether this Stoicism is orthodox or eclectic is
obviously connected with the further question whether it ap-
proximates to the position of the Old Stoa or of the Middle Stoa.
There is no general scholarly agreement on the correct answer
to this latter question, owing to the fact that it is a virtually im-
possible task to reconstruct the position of the Middle Stoa now
that its principal Greek sources are lost. Thus, on the one hand
we find writers such asP. Grimal who maintains that Seneca's
position 'repond precisement a l'intuition centrale du Stoicisme
lc: plus orthodoxe,'26 and on the other scholars like G. Stahl
who can speak of a 'Spiritualisierungsprozess' which the tradi-
tional doctrines have undergone in Seneca's hands.l7 Fortunate-
ly, the solution of this question is a task for those who study
Stoicism rather than Platonism and so no systematic attempt to
pursue it will be made here.2B
2. 12 THE THEMES OF PHILOSOPHY
Seneca gives two definitions of the nature of philosophy in
26. P. <irimal: 'Sencquc est-it un philosophe?'. L 'informaticm /itleraire, :;

(Paris. 19<;3). p. 64. See the same author's Seneque. Sa vie. son oeuvre. at,ec
un ('.\Pose de sa pbllosopble, 3 edition (Paris, 1966). p. 41 and 'Scncque et Ia
pensec grecque'. Bulletin de /'Association Guillaume Bude ( 1966). pp .
.UO-.U I.
2-. <i. Stahl: 'Die Naturales quaestiones Senecas. Ein Beitrag zum
Spiritualisicrungsprozess der riimischen Stoa'. Hermes ')2 ( 1964 ). pp.
'-~t--t-40. This ;article summarizes themes from the writer's thesis entitled
Auj1Jcm, Darstel/urzgsform und pbllosopbiscber Geba/t der Naturales quaes-
tiones des Lucius Annaeus Senectl (Kiel, 1960).
2H. Sec pp. 94-97.
16-i MIDDLE PLATONISM
Epistula LXXXIX. In the first place, it is to be distinguished

from wisdom since the latter 'is the perfect good of the human
mind' (Jlerfectum bonum est mentis bumanae) whereas the
former represents the 'love and striving' (amoret adjectatio)
towards it.29 Furthermore, philosophy can be defined as the
study of virtue, the study of correcting the mind, or the search
for right reason30; while wisdom is characterized as the
knowledge of divine and human things and of their causes, the
last phrase added to the traditional formula being considered
superfluous by Seneca.3J Whatever view is best, he adds,
everyone agrees that philosophy and wisdom differ in that the
latter is the object and the former the subject of desire. In these-
cond place, the authorities state that philosophy consists of
three parts: 'ethics' (mora/is), 'physics' (natura/is), and 'logic'
(rationalis); although the Peripatetics, Epicureans, and
Cyrenaics propose different divisions concealing the tripartition
in other terminology ,32 Ethics is further divided into an
evaluative, an impulsive, and an active part; physics has a more
complex division first into 'corporeal' (corporalia) and 'incor-
poreal' (incorporalia), and secondly- of the corporeal part-
into 'things which are active' (ea quae Jaciunt) and 'things
which are produced from them' (quae ex his gignuntur); final-
ly, logic is further divided into dialectic and rhetoric.33 Seneca
29. Seneca: Epist. H9, 4.

30. Ibid. 89. 5-6.
;\I. Ibid. 89. c;. The same definition occurs several times in Cicero. See p.
"74 0
32. Ibid. H9. 9-13. Cf. Ibid. 88, 24.

33. Ibid. 89, 14-18. Two points should be made regarding Seneca's use of
the traditional threefold division of philosophy. First, the order of the three
subjects- ethics, physics, logic- is that used by the spokesman of the Old
Academy at Cicero: A cad. 17-19 and by Augustine: Citl. Dei VIII, 4 (CCSL 47,
219-221 ). Both these texts are dependent upon Antioch us via Varro. J. M.
Dillon: The Middle Platonisls. A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220
SENECA 165
concludes by observing ~hat such analyses are useful if they are

rurned towards their proper end of regulating human con-
duct.34
As in the case of Cicero, it is the treatment of the physical
branch of philosophy with which we are most concerned, and
Seneca's writings contain much on this topic. To simplify the
discussion of his doctrine, it will be best to divide our treatment
into two parts. First, a general analysis of Seneca's notion of
God and his relation to the world will be made using as wide a
range of texts as possible and noting both the Stoic and Platonic
elements in his theory. Secondly, we shall examine his ap-
proach to theology and cosmology by making a detailed study
of two short texts and observing their treatment of dox-
ographical material.
2.21 THEOLOGY
God is defined in a number of different ways in the Senecan

corpus, this multiplicity of names indicating not an uncertainty
(London. 1977), p. 121, n. I suggests that the Senecan passage reflects the
tcac.:hing of Eudorus via Arius Didymus' Epitome which may also be true. At
all events. the order presented by Seneca is more characteristic of the
Platonic than of the Stoic tradition. The second point is that of the three sub-
jcns Sencc.:a, to a greater extent than earlier writers, emphasizes the primacy
of ethics as a philosophical discipline. Thus, even the study of physics is pur-
Mil"d primarily with ethical ends in mind. See L. Thorndike: A History of
Jlagic tmd Experimental Science I (New York, 192.3). p. 101; Stahl: 'Die
.\'atura/es quaestiones Senecas. Ein Beitrag .. .' pp. 425, 428-429, 431-434.
H2H.~. 446 ff.; and F. P. Waiblinger: Senecas Naturales quaestiones.
Griecbisches Wissen und r6miscbe Form (Munchen, 1977), pp. 19-28. This
~hould he borne in mind throughout our remaining discussion. Thus, when
we c.:oncern ourselves exclusively with Seneca's physics, we are actually shif-
ting the center of gravity away from the writer's own viewpoint .
.H. Seneca: Epist. 89, 18.
on the author's part but the essential character of divinity itself.

Thus, in a passage which has been interpreted as showing Var-
ronian influence,3s the creator of the world is said to be an om-
nipotent cause, an incorporeal reason creating great works, a
divine spirit pervading all things, or the ineluctable succession
of fate. The blend of Platonic and Stoic elements in this descrip-
tion may well be Varronian rather than Senecan,36 yet most of
its ingredients can be paralleled in other texts which reveal a
similar ambivalence in the view of God's relation to the world
which he creates. From one set of passages, for example, it
emerges that God is both equivalent to the world and somehow
distinct from it as its cause. This can be seen by considering
Seneca's remark that 'neither is nature without God nor God
without nature, but both are the same thing although they differ
in function' (nee natura sine deo est nee deus sine natura, sed
idem est utrumque, distat offieio);37 and by comparing his
statements (i) that the world is all things,38 (ii) that God is all
things,39 (iii) that the world is that than which there is no
greater,4o and (iv) that God is that than which there is no
3S. Seneca: Consol. ad Helv. 8, 3. See pp. 820-822.

36. This is the view of I. Marten. Sec app .. n. 42.
3 7. Seneca: De Benef IV, 8, 2-3.
38. Seneca: Nat. Quaest. II, 3. 1 'The world embraces all things which fall
within or can fall within our knowledge' (Omnia quae in notitiam nostram
cadunt aut cadere possunt mundus complectitur).
39. Ibid. 1, pr. 13 'What is God? The mind of the universe. What is God?
The totality which you see and which you do not see. In short. only thus is
his greatness grasped - a greatness than which nothing greater can be con-
ceived - if he alone is all things, and if he is active both within and outside'
(Quid est deus? Mens unit1ersi. Quid est deus? Quod vides tatum et quod non
rides tatum. Sic demum magnitudo illi sua redditur, qua nibil malus
cogitari potest, si so/us est omnia, si opus suum et intra et extra tenet). On
the notion that God is the mind of the universe see below.
40. Seneca: Consol. ad Hell!. 8, 4 'This world, than which nature has
created nothing greater nor more beautiful' (Mtmdus bic. quo nibil neque
maius 'teque ornatius rerum natura genu it).
SENECA 167
greater. 4t All these comments certainly indicate that God is

equivalent to the world, yet clearly Seneca does not believe in a
simple identity here but a more complex form of identity in dif-
ference. This is shown by the fact that statements such as the
above are sometimes linked to counterbalancing assertions that
God is 'the totality which you see and which you do not see'
(quod vides tatum et quod non vides totum),42 or that nature
has created that world than which there is no greater.43
The distinction between God and what he creates is em-
phasized in another set of passages either by an ontological or
by a spatial separation of cause and effect. God is distinguished
ontologically from his creation in passages where he is describ-
ed as the 'mind' (mens)44 of the universe, for here he is not
viewed as equivalent to the world simply but to the highest or
ruling part of the world. Texts which speak of God as the 'soul'
(animus) or 'spirit' (spiritus) of the world - associating these
titles with one or more of the appellations: 'fate' (jatum),
'providence' (providentia), 'nature' (natura), 'world' (mun-
dus),H 'harmony' (concentus), 'force' (vis), 'air' (aer), 'incor-
poreal power' (incorporalis potentia)46 which in themselves
may indicate greater or lesser degrees of distinction- also imp-
ly this disjunction between God and the world. Finally, passages
which describe God as the 'reason' (ratio)47 inserted into the
world must be interpreted in a similar manner. God is
.. 1. Sec n. 39.
-!2. Sec n. 39 .
.f:\. Sec n. 40 .
.fi. Sec n. 39.
i';. Seneca: Nat. Quaest. II, 45. 1-3 .
.. 6. Ibid VII, 25. 2. The reference ro 'air' follows Haase's reading of the
text where Gerckc and Oltramare read 'breath' (anima). Fonunately. bmh
:1moum to the same thing: the Stoic corporeal pneuma which contrasts wirh
the incorporeal power described next. On the details of Seneca's physical
thc:orysecpp. 176-179 .
.. ., . Seneca: De Benef IV. 7. I. Cf. De Otio <;, <;,
distinguished spatially from his creation in texts where he is

identified not simply with the world but with its outer region-
the heaven - which is described as equidistant from man
wherever he is, 48 or rejoicing in the constancy of his rotation. 49
In both these sets of passages, Seneca shows that the distinction
between God and the world is a significant tenet of his thought.
2.211 THE TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE OF GOD
The ambivalent notion of God which such texts contain is

not peculiar to Seneca but characterizes the Platonic and Stoic
traditions as a whole. In connection with Cicero, we found it
useful to distinguish transcendent and immanent relations bet-
ween God and his creation- the transcendent aspect signifying
that the active cause of all things is to be distinguished from the
passive material upon which it operates, the immanent aspect
signifying that the active principle is united with the passive ele-
ment which it pervadesso- and this mode of analysis is equally
applicable to Seneca. Thus, in those passages which distinguish-
ed God in some way from the world as its mind, its reason, and
so on, the dominant aspect is transcendence; whereas in those
texts which identified God with the world by saying, for exam-
ple, that he is all things, it is the immanent aspect which
dominates. By speaking of the transcendence or immanence as
'dominant' one implies that neither aspect can exist in the
absence of the other, this interrelation between the two being
equally important in further texts where the polarity appears in
a more extreme form.
In Epistula XLI, Seneca explains the fundamentals of his
religious belief by saying that we do not need to visit the idols in
48. Seneca: Conso/. ad Heir'. 8. 5.

49. Ibid. 6, 8.
50. See pp. 77-79.
SENECA 169
the temple in order to pray to God. Rather 'God is near to you,

with you, and within you. This I affirm, Lucilius: a sacred spirit
dwells within us, one who observes our good and bad deeds,
and is our protector. As we treat this spirit, so does it treat us.
Indeed no man can be good without God's aid: can one rise
above fortune unless one is assisted by him? He is the one who
gives noble and upright counsel. In every good man "a god
dwells, but which god we do not know" '.51 The juxtaposition
of the idea of an unknown - and therefore transcendent -
God and a known - and therefore immanent - God is an
epistemological paradox which has its counterpart in the jux-
taposition of a divinity who creates the world- is transcendent
in relation to it - with a divinity who is part of the world
which he has created - is immanent in relation to it. Similarly
in Naturales Quaestiones VII, Seneca considers what
knowledge man may have of physical processes by asking the
rhetorical question: 'How much a part of this great work has
been entrusted to us? He who governs all things and creates
them, who established the foundations of all that is and placed it
around himself, and is the greater and better part of his own
work, escapes our vision and must be seen by thought.
Moreover, many things related to the highest divinity and allot-
ted a power close to his are obscure and perhaps, as will amaze
you more, both fill and elude our vision. '52 Seneca's concluding
remarks show that he is well aware of the paradoxical nature of
this doctrine.
5 I. Seneca: Epist. 4 I, 2 prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est. Ita dico,
l.ucili: sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum honorumque nostrorum
obsencltor et custos; hie prout a nobis tractatus est, ita tws ipse tractat.
Ron us tero t.tir sine deo nemo est: an potest aliquis supra .fortutultn nisi ah
11/o adiutus exsurgere? 1//e dat consilia magnifica et erecta. In mwqtwque
tirontm bonorum '(quis deus incertum est) habitat deus'. The quotalion is
from Virgil: Aeneid. VIII. :\'52.
52. Seneca: Nat. Quaest. VII. 30. 3-4 Quota pars operis tanti nobis com-
2.212 TRANSCENDENCE AND INCORPOREALITY
Some modern scholars have been led by their knowledge of

such texts to inquire whether the Stoic notion of divinity is be-
ing gradually replaced by a Platonic conception; whether
materialistic monism is being replaced by a dualism of spiritual
and material. The question is answered affirmatively by G.
Stahl, who argues that certain Senecan texts indicate a move-
ment towards greater transcendence, in which the active princi-
ple no longer implies the passive principle. From an ontological
viewpoint, therefore, one might speak of a spiritualization of
the active cause .53 G. Scarpat has studied similar texts, and con-
cludes that there is indeed a tendency towards greater
transcendence on the part of the active principle. However, he
considers that Seneca's understanding of both the active and the
passive principles remains fundamentally materialistic.54 Ob-
viously, the question whether these texts reflect a more Stoic or
more Platonic notion of divinity is central to the present in-
mittitur? Ipse qui isla tractat, qui condidit, qui totum hoc fundavit dedit-
que circa se, maiorque est pars sui operis ac melior, effugit ocu/os; cogita-
tione l'isendus est. Mu/ta praeterea cognata numini summo et vicinam sor-
tita potentiam obscura sunt aut fortasse, quod magis mireris, oculos
nostros et implent et effugiunt. Cf. ibid. I. pr. 3.
S3. Stahl: 'Die Naturales quaestiones Senecas. Ein Beitrag .. .', p. 437 'Der
deus impliziert nicht mehr materia. Dieser unbcgriindete, wie
selbstverstandlich erscheinendc Ubergang von monistischem zu
dualistischem Denken'; p. 438 'Die Annaherung des r()mischen Stoikcrs an
platonische Denkformen'; p. 439 'Seneca entwirft hicr in platonischer
Bildersprachc cin Reich der Transzendenz', etc.
S4. G. Scarpat: La Lettera 65 di Seneca. Secunda edizione (Brescia, 1970),
pp. 146-154. Both Scarpat and the previous author usc the important
Epistula 65 as part of their evidence regarding Seneca's philosophical posi-
tion, although their arguments are based on many other texts as well. The dif-
ficulty with Epistulu 65 (to be discussed in detail below) is that its self-
declared Platonism docs not seem to reflect Seneca's regular viewpoint.
SENECA 171
vestigation, yet to answer it correctly requires a more careful

analysis of the notion of spiritualization.
One technical term is especially connected with the postula-
tion of spiritual principles at this period in the history of
philosophy: 'the incorporeal' (aaroJJ.atov-incorporale).
However, the mere presence of such a term in Seneca's writings
would not prove very much regarding his philosophical posi-
tion, since the notion of incorporeality occurs in at least three
different senses in the technical writings of his forerunners and
contemporaries: (i) the Stoic usage. Orthodox Stoicism from at
least the time of Chrysippus had applied the term 'incorporeal'
to four different classes of things, namely 'expressions' (A.eKt<i),
'space' (t6noc;), 'time' (x.p6voc;). and 'the void' (K&v6v).55 There
is considerable discussion of the first class in the extant
fragments, from which it emerges that such incorporeals have
no causal relation to the underlying reality of physical processes
- which are entirely corporeal - but are simply effects of
those processes taking place on the surface of reality;56 (ii) the
Platonic usage. In the doxographical tradition we find frequent
references to the notion of incorporeality as applied to 'God'
(9&6c;). 'the Forms' (il>eat, &il>n). or 'mind' (vouc;) either separate-
ly or in various combinations.57 This naturally implies that in-
'i5. All four classes are listed by Sextus Empiricus: Adv. Math. X, 218 (SVF
11, 331) 'Of the things which are "something" they say that some are cor-
poreal. some incorporeal. Four kinds of incorporeal are listed: expression,
void, space, and time' (tcilV yap twci>v q~aoi tci ~tv Elvat o~ata tci lit
aoci>~ata, tci>V St aoro~citrov ttooapa &iBn Katapt6~0UVtal WI; AeKtOV Kai
K&vov Kai t6nov Kai xp6vov). For the 'expressions' as incorporeal see further
Sextus Empiricus: Adr. Math. VII, 38 (SVF II, 132); Sextus Empiricus: Adv.
.Hath. XI. 224 (SVF II, 170): and Alexander of Aphrodisias: In Top. IV. 30 I,
I 9 (SVF 11. 329). For time and the void see Arius Didymus: Epit. Phys. fr. 2'i
(SVF 11, 503 = DG 460, 18-461, 3) and Diogenes Laertlus: Vit. Phi/us. VII,
140 (SVF I, 95).
'i6. See pp. 823-82').
'i7. The oldest doxography seems to be that upon which Cicero depends at
corporeal things are the causes of corporeal or material things

- for the sensible world participates in or imitates the intelligi-
ble archetypes - which is exactly the reverse of the Stoic posi-
tion; (iii) an eclectic usage. This seems to be implied in certain
Stoic fragments which speak of the 'causes' (ttpxai) as incor-
poreal.58 Although the interpretation of these texts presents
considerable difficulties, their meaning seems to be that these
incorporeals have a causal relation to the underlying reality of
De Nat. Deor. I, 30 (DG 5.37a2-9) 'In the Timaeus Plato says that it is impossi-
ble to name the father of the world; in the Laws he declares that one should
make no inquiry at all regarding God's nature. Further, he wishes God to be
understood as without body' (in Timaeo patrem buius mundi nominari
11eget posse, In Le~:um autem libris quid sit om11ino deus anquiri oportere
non censeat. Quod vero sine corpore ullo deum vult esse (probably Cicero
himself is responsible for the addition of the Greek word aaro1-1aTov after the
end of the quotation.)). This doxography- which H. Diels its editor entitled
Vetusta Placila - is probably the basis of the later Placita of Aetius who
speaks of incorporeality in the following Platonic contexts: Plac. I, 3, 21 (DG
288a4-6 cf. b4-6) 'A Form is an incorporeal substance in the thoughts and im-
aginations of God' (i6ta 6 OUa{a clCJroi!UTO<; ~V TOi<; V01'!1!UCJ\ Kai Taic; cpav-
Taoiatc; TOU 9eou). (Cf. Plac. I, 10, I (DG 308a16 and b16)); Plac. l, 7, 31 (DG
304b26-30 cf. a26-30) 'God is intellect, a separate Form. By "separate" one
means unmixed with any matter and associated with nothing corporeal'
(vouc; ouv 6 9e6c;, xwplaTov E6oc; TO 6 xwptaTov aKouta9w TO cll!lYc; ncia11c;
0All<; Kai l!fl6vi TWV CJW!!UT\KWV CJU1!1t1tAEyi!SVOV). See also the doxographies
in Hippolytus: Pbilos. 19 (DG 567, 14 ff.) and Galen: Hist. Pbilos. 16 (DG
608, 16 ff.) both of which explicitly contrast Platonic and Stoic viewpoints.
58. See Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Pbilos. VII, 134 (SVF II, 299) 'They say that
there is a difference between principles and elements. Principles are
ungenerated and indestructible, elements are destroyed at the conflagration.
Moreover, the principles are Incorporeal and formless, the elements have
been formed' (6tacptpetv 6& cpamv O.pxac; Kai aTotxeta' Tac; !lEV yap dvat
cly&VT\TOU<; Kai acp9cipTOU<;, Ta 6 CJTOl'X&ia KaTa TTtV bC7tUpWCJ\V cp9&ipa9at.
cilAa Kai clCJW!!dTOU<; dvat Tci<; apxac; Kai al!6pcpouc;, Ta 6 1!&1!0P<PWCJ9at).
That the principles discussed here are the primal active and passive causes
seems to be shown by comparing the following texts: Sextus Emplricus: Adv.
Math. IX, 76 (SVF II, 311) discussing the reasons for the view that there is 'a
SENECA 173
physical processes - which are completely corporeal - and

are not effects of those processes taking place on the surface of
reality: in other words their Stoicism is giving way to
Platonism. 59
When we come to inquire which of these senses of 'incor-
poreal' is present in Seneca, the scarcity of references makes the
answer simple enough. As we have already observed, sense (i) is
included by him in a discussion of the notions 'wise' and 'being
wise', although there is little to suggest that he understood the
certain power which pervades the universe ... there exists, then, a power
which is self-moving in itself, and this must be divine and eternal' (&UvaJ.L{v
nva 6t'atmi~ 7tEij)Ol'rTJKUiav ... fan tt~ cipa Ka9'tautl')v autOKtVTJTO~ &UvaJ,1t~.
iitt~ liv EiTJ 9Eia Kai ai6to~)- thus, the Stoic active cause is 'eternal'; Arius
Didymus: Epit. Pb_vs. fr. 20 (SVF I, 87 = DG 457, 25-458, II) reporting the
doctrine of Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius that 'the substance of all things
is primal matter, which is totally eternal' (ouaiav 6& Elvat tl')v tcilv llvtwv
7tQVT(I)V 1tPolTTJV UATJV, taUTTJV 6& 7tciaav ai6tov)- thus. the Stoic passive prin-
ciple is also 'eternal'. In both these texts the notion of 'eternal' corresponds
to that of 'ungenerated and indestructible' in the passage of Sextus Empiricus.
Cf. Arius Didymus: Epil. Pbys. fr. 21 (SVF II, 413 = DG 459. 7) 'the princi-
ple, Logos, and eternal power'(~ clPXil Kai 6 A6yo~ Kai ~ aioto~ &UvaJ.Lt~); fr.
29 (SVF 11, 528 = DG 465, 1-3) on the creativity of Zeus; and fr. 37 (SVF 11,
S99 = DG 469, 18-25) on the cosmic cycles.
59. The following process may have taken place in the minds of the dox-
ographers or their immediate sources. It was orthodox Stoic doctrine that the
active and passive principles were 'eternal' (ai6tot) or more precisely
'ungenerated and indestructible' (aytVTJtot Kai ciq>9aptot). See Plutarch: De
Stoic. Repugn. 38, 1051f (SVF III, Antipater 33) on the indestructibility of
<;od. However, the same terminology had also been employed by the
Platonists to describe God and the Forms, and had been associated in other
texts with the Parmenidean One. See Aetius: Plac. IV, 7, S (DG 393al2) on
the God of Pythagoras and Plato; Arius Didymus: Epit. Pbys. fr. I (DG
i-l7a8-19) 'Besides all living creatures there is an ungenerated and indestruc-
tible living creature ... the Form is an eternal substance, the cause and princi-
ple of each thing being what it is' (7tapa 7tQVta ~<\)a ~<\)OV aytVTJtOV Kai
liq>9aptOV ... Elvat 0& tl')V !6tav af6tOV oua(av, a!t(av Kai apxl'Jv toii fKa<JtOV
e:lvat totoiitov, ora eativ autl'!); Hippolytus: Philos. 11 (DG 564, 19-20); and
Stoic theory of 'expressions' (AKta).60 Sense (ii) occurs

nowhere in Seneca's works. However, there are a few passages
which employ the notion of incorporeality in a context distinct
from that of the Stoic expressions, and here he seems to come
close to sense (iii) by speaking of God as an incorporeal 'power'
or 'reason' operating in the cosmos.6t These passages represent
the entire Senecan discussion of such questions, and it is within
their limits that any spiritualization of reality by the author must
be conceived.
2.213 IMMANENCE AND POLYTHEISM
Of course, all these observations relate to the question of the

distinction which is visualized between God and what he
creates. Yet Seneca's theology follows in the tradition of Cicero
by speaking equally of the identification between God and his
creation, this latter tendency being especially apparent in the
philosophical interpretation of God's many names and of his
ps.-Piutarch: Strom. 5 (DG 580, 24) on the One of Parmenides. This led to an
assimilation of the Stoic and Platonic positions to such an extent that even
the attribute 'incorporeal' - which fitted the metaphysical principles of
Platonism but was somewhat inconsistent with the physical theory of the
Stoics- began to be applied to the active and passive principles of Stoicism.
This is perhaps documented by the text of Diogenes Laertius cited in the
previous note. The process of assimilation was no doubt aided in the minds
of the doxographers by the fact that the Stoics already postulated incor-
poreality for expressions, space, time, and the void.
60. See pp. 161-162.
61. Seneca: C(msol. ad Helv. H. :\ and Nat. Qtwest. VII. 2 c;. For these
passages see pp. 166-167 and 820-822. There is also an apparent reference to
incorporeality in the lost De Superstitione (quoted by Augustine: Civ. Dei VI,
10 (CCSL 47, 181-183 ): 'Shall I tolerate either Plato or the Peripatetic StraU>,
of whom one maintains that God is without body, the other that he is
without soul?'(Ego feram aut Platonem aut Peripateticum Stratonem,
quorum alter fecit deum sine corpore, alter sine animo?).
SENECA 175
relation to the pantheon of lesser gods.62 That Seneca himself

has relatively little interest in the details of mythological inter-
pretation is suggested by his critical remarks about Chrysippus'
allegorical exegesis of the three Graces,63 although occasionally
he will adopt it in passages such as that in which he addresses
the supreme cause of the universe as Jupiter using the words of
Cleanthes' famous hymn.64 At one point he seems to follow
Varro's theory that the ancients did not worship the Capitoline
Jupiter as an anthropomorphic deity hurling thunderbolts with
his own hand but 'in the same way we do' (eundem quem nos)
as the soul and spirit of the world.65 Elsewhere he pursues the
philosophical rationalization of mythology at somewhat greater
length by noting that Jupiter's various names or the plurality of
the Olympian gods itself signifies the different operations of the
divine power within the cosmos. Thus, on the one hand the
supreme deity is called 'the Stayer' (Stator) not because the
Roman battle line once stayed its retreat in answer to prayer but
'because all things are stayed by his beneficence' (quod stant
beneficio eius omnia).66 On the other hand, one can regard this
selfsame God as 'Liber' because he is the source of seminal
power, 'Hercules' because his power is invincible- whenever
it grows weary it returns to the primal fire - or 'Mercury'
62. Cf. p. 822 ff.

6:\. Seneca: De Benef I, 3. I ff.
64. Seneca: Epist. I 07, I 0-12. It appears from the lost De Superstitione (at
Augustine: Cit'. Dei VI. 10-11 (CCSL 47, 181-183)) that Seneca not only
criticized the poetical theology-as Varro had done previously-but also the
dvil theology with some vehemence. It is the natural theology alone which
he considers to have some value although even that is limited.
6<;. Senna: Nat. Quaest. II, 45, 1. This concept of the most ancient Roman
n:ligious observance is stated by Varro: Anliqu. fr. 18 (Augustine: Cit. Dei
IV.:\ 1 (CCSL -i7, 12')-126)). Seep. 818 ff.
66. Seneca: De Benef IV, 7, 1-2. Cf. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 237 (Augustine: Cit'.
Dei VII, II (CCSL47, 195-196)).
because he is the source of reason, number, and order.67 These

various names are equally applicable to God according to
Seneca, since there is no place which is free of him and he
himself fills his own creation.68
2.22 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Seneca's philosophical account of the traditional religious

beliefs is brief but illuminating, and the same can be said about
his description of the mechanism of physical processes. Here
once again along the lines of Cicero,69 we find as the basis of
physical reality both in the world as a whole and in each in-
dividual thing7o a pair of opposing principles. Of these the
67. Cf. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 93 (Augusrine: Civ. Dei VI, 9 (CCSL 47, 178-181))
for lhe inrerprelalion of Liber. There are no exacl parallels lO Seneca's imer-
prerarions of Hercules and Mercury in rhe exram Varronian fragmems.
68. Seneca: De Benef IV, 8, 2 'Whichever way you rurn, you will see God
coming ro meel you. Norhlng is void of him, and he fills his own work'
(Quocumque te flexeris, lbi ilium tJ/debis occurrentem tlbi; 11ihil ab 1/lo
vacat, opus suum ipse implet).
69. This Sroic (and wilh Amlochus also Plalonic) physical lheory has been
described in connecrion wilh Cicero on p. 90 ff. Seneca's version adds
norhing lo rhe rradilional scheme.
70. Seneca: Epist. 65, 2 'Our Sroics, as you know, maimain rhal rhere are
rwo principles in rhe universe from which all lhings are made: cause and mar-
rer. Mauer remains inerl, prepared for all lhings yel des lined lO idleness. if no
one moves il. Cause however, by which we mean reason, forms mauer. rurn-
ing il whichever way h wishes, producing various rhings from h. Thus, rhere
musr be, in rhe case of each lhing, something from which il comes, and rhen
somerhing by which ir comes ro be. The Iauer is rhe cause, rhe former rhe
mauer' (Dicunt, ut scis, Stoict' nostri duo esse in re1um natura ex quibus
omnia fimtt. causam et mater/am. Materia facet ine1s. res tld nnmia
parctta, cessatura sf nemo mor,eat; ,ausa autem. id est ratio, materiamfor-
mtlt et quocumque tult terstlt, ex /1/(l ttlr/(l opertl pmducit. Esse ergo debet
wulefiat aliquid, deinde a quo fiat: hoc causa est. 1/lud nwterill).
SENECA 177
higher7t is variously called 'cause' (causa)72, 'the active' (quod

Jacit), 73 that 'by which' (a quo) things are produced,74 'soul'
(animus),75 'reason' (ratio), 76 or 'God' (deus);77 the lower 'the
-1. /IJid. 65, 23-24 'Indeed all things are composed of matter and God.
<iod controls that which surrounds him and follows him as ruler and leader.
For that which acts, namely God, is more powerful and worthy than matter,
which is passive in relation to God. God's place in the world is analogous to
soul's place in man' (nempe unltersa e:'C materilt et ex tleo constam. Deus
isla tempera/ quae circumfusa rectorem sequuntur et ducem. Potent/us
autem est ac pretiosus quod facit, quod est deus, quam materia patiens del.
!}llt'm in boc mundo locum deus obtinet, bunc in homine animus).
""'2. Seen. 70.
-~.Seen. 71 and Seneca: Epist. 89, 16 'The physical part of philosophy is
divided into two: corporeal and incorporeal. And each of these is divided in-
to its own levels, so to speak. The topic of corporeals is divided first into
these levels: things which produce and things which are produced from
them. The latter consist of the dements. The topic of elements itself, as some
think. is undivided, but according to others, is divided into matter. the cause
whil"h moves all things, and the clements' (Ntlfum/is pms pbilosopbiae in
duo sdnclitur, corpora/ia et incorporaliCI; utraque dividtmtur in suos, ut
ita diaun. grtulus. Corpo,.,tm locus in bos primum, in ea quae faciunt et
tJuae ex bis gignuntur - gignuntur autem elemenftt. Ipse de elementis
locus. ut quiclam putant, simplex est. ut quidam. in materiCim et causam
IJIIIIIianwtetlfem et element a ditiditur).
""'-f. Seen. 70.
""'5. Seen. 71.
7 6. Seneca: Epist. 65, 12 'But we now seek the primary and general cause.
This must be simple, since matter is also simple. We ask what the cause is. It Is
the reason which is active, that is to say God' (Sed nos nunc primam et
swneralem quaerimus causam. Haec simplex esse debet; nam et materia
simp{(,, est. Quaerimus quid sit causa? ratio scilicet faciens. id est deus).
-::o-,. See nn. 71, 76 and Seneca: Nat. Quaest. J, pr. 16 'How powerful is
God? Does he form matter himself, or does he employ what is already there?
Which comes first; does reason determine matter. or matter reason?' (quan-
tum deus Jmssit; mater/am ipse sibi fonnet an data utatur; utrum utro sit
/Jrius, materiae supervenerit ratio an materia ration/).
passive' (patiens).7B that 'from which' (unde) things are produc-

ed,79 'body'(corpus),so 'the elements' (e/ementa),Rt or 'matter'
(materia),82 each of these two simple83 principles being cor-
poreal in character.s4 The relation between the two principles is
described by appealing to the notions of circularity and tension
for on the one hand, 'God also, the all-embracing world and
ruler of the universe, stretches out to external things, yet from
all sides returns to within himself (Nam mundus quoque cunc-
ta comp/ectens rectorque universi deus in exteriora quidem
tendit, sed tamen introsum undique in se redit)85 and on the
other, physical bodies are said to be held together not by the
assemblage of atomic particles but by the 'tension' (intentio) of
their components' harmonious interaction.s6 It is clear that
Seneca here refers elliptically to the classical Stoic theory that
the active principle produces different levels of being through
the varying degrees of tension which it imparts, this tension
manifesting itself as an alternating motion to the exterior and in-
terior of a given physical object.87 From the point of view of its
78. Seenn. 71 and73.

79. Seen. 70.
80. Seen. 71. This notion is implied if not stated.
81. Seen. 73.
82. Sec nn. 70, 71, 73.76 and 77.
83. Seen. 76.
84. Seen. 73.
85. Seneca: De Vit. Beat. 8, 4.
86. Seneca: Nat. Quaest. II, 6, 2.
87. On the Stoic theory of tensional motion see pp. I 13- I 15. Seneca
follows earlier Stoics in holding that the alternating motions are both
simultaneous and successive-herein lies the link between the notions of ten-
sion and circularity-although the Roman writer deals mainly with the latter.
See Nat. Quaest. III, 10, 35 on the circular transmutation of the elements.
Waiblinger: op. cit.. pp. 313 7 and 89 has made the interesting suggestion
that the structure of the Naturales Quaestiones Itself reflects the physical
theory that the cosmos is sustained by the balance of the elements in relation
SENECA 179
visible operation, the active principle takes the form of a

pneuma composed of fire and air- the two essentially active
elements in Stoic physics- although it is sometimes manifested
simply as fire or simply as air.ss
2.23 THE RELATION OF MACROCOSM TO MICROCOSM
The complex relation between God and his creation which

these texts indicate is a fundamental element in Seneca's physics
and perhaps for our immediate purposes its most important
feature. However, it would be a distortion of his position to in-
sist upon theology to the exclusion of everything else, since for
Seneca and other writers of this period the principal aim of
philosophy is the study of man. We must therefore insert a few
remarks on the relation of the world to man which his teaching
seems to visualize.
In the first place, the relation between the world and man is
one of analogy since, just as the world is a composite of God
and matter, so is man a composite of soul and body. Sometimes
Seneca speaks simply of the analogy of structure between
macrocosm and microcosm,89 but sometimes he develops the
analogy in greater detail. He does this in texts where he com-
pares the circular motion of God's going forth into matter and
then returning to himself with the mind's outward and inward
motions in relation to sense,90 or where he compares the unity
of God which underlies the multiplicity of titles such as nature,
fate, and fortune with the unity of the soul which is not com-
promised by its exercise of justice, prudence, fortitude, and
to one another, books 1-11 dealing with contrasting roles of fire, books lii-IV
A with water, books IV 8-V with air, and book VI with earth.
HH. For fire and air see ibid. V, 6, 1-2, for fire ibid. III, 13, I, and for air
ibid. II, 4. I.
H9. See Seneca: Epist. 65, 24 and De Olio 4, 1-2.
90. Seneca: De Vit. Beat. B, 4.
temperance.9I In the second place, the application of the

analogy has the further consequence that, just as God enjoys a
transcendent and immanent relation to the world, so does the
soul manifest a transcendent and immanent relation to the
body. The transcendent moment is implied in passages where
Seneca speaks either of the soul's desire to free itself from its im-
prisonment in the body and reunite with the totality92 or of the
freedom from contamination and reabsorption into the cosmos
as being already accomplished.93 The immanent moment is
described in a passage where the views of two members of his
own school - Cleanthes and Chrysippus - regarding the pro-
cess of locomotion are compared. According to the former, this
results from a pneuma sent forth from the ruling part of the soul
whereas according to the latter, it is consequent upon a diffu-
sion of the ruling part itself. 94
2.3 SENECA'S ECLECTICISM
If Seneca has a coherent physical theory of his own, 1t 1s

represented by the predominantly Stoic synthesis outlined in
the preceding pages. That one should speak of a primarily rather
than exclusively Stoic system in this context follows not only
from his own criticisms of the school on various occasions95 but
from the fact that in his Epistu/ae ad Lucilium LVIII and LXV
he deals with philosophical questions from an essentially
Platonic viewpoint.% The relatively sympathetic treatment of
91. Seneca: De Benef IV. 8, 3.

92. See Seneca: Epist. 6;, 18-19; Conso/. ad He/11. 9. 1-2; and Nat. Quaest.
I,pr.11-12.
93. See Seneca: Epist. 71, 16 and 102, 22.
94. Seneca: Epist. 113. 23.
95. See pp. 160-162.
96. We have therefore reserved these texts for separate consideration in
the latter half of this chapter.
SENECA 181
these latter doctrines suggests that Seneca is well aware of the

tradition of harmonizing Platonism and Stoicism which was
established a century earlier by Antiochus and is prepared to
view positively the contribution of thinkers outside his favorite
school. It is therefore to the author's handling of these more
Platonic doctrines that we must now turn.
2.31 THE ARGUMENT OF EPISTULA AD LUCILIUM LVIII97
This letter contains an ontological discussion of great in-

terest, and Seneca begins by exploring the possible Latin transla-
tions of the Greek technical terms ouaia and ov. The former
term can be rendered quite simply as essentia, although the lat-
ter - owing to the lack of an equivalent Latin substantive -
must be translated into the verbal form quod est. Similarly the
meaning of the former term is easy to explain: it signifies the
nature which constitutes the substratum of all things. The mean-
ing of the latter, however, can only be explained after certain
philosophical preliminaries have been dispensed with.98
97. It is perhaps W. Theiler who deserves the most credit for bringing
Seneca's Eplstulae 58 and 65 to the attention of students of the history of
philosophy in late antiquity. His important book entitled Die Vorbereitung
ties Neuplatonismus, 2. Auflage (Berlin/Zurich, 1964) includes a lengthy
opening chapter which is primarily an expanded commentary on these two
letters. My own discussion owes more to his account than can be
acknowledged in detail as well as to the later treatments of E. Bickel: 'Senecas
llrie.fe <;R und 6<;. Das Antiochus-Posidonius-Problem', Rheinisches Museum,
:">Jeue Folge I 03 ( 1960). pp. 1-10 and Scarpat: op. cit., p. I 03 ff.
98. Seneca: Epist. 58, 6-8. It is as difficult to find English equivalents for
ouaia and 6v as it is to find Latin ones, and so I have opted to leave the Greek
terms (as well as Seneca's Latin equivalents) untranslated at this point, allow-
ing their meaning to emerge from the general context of the argument.
However, the renderings of l'lv = quod est as 'being' or 'the existent', and of
6vm = quae sulll as 'beings', 'existents', or 'things' can be accepted provi-
sionally.
Above all, Seneca continues, we must understand the mean-

ing of genus and species. This can be accomplished by ascen-
ding mentally from the lowest species to the highest genus: for
example from 'man' one passes to the prior term 'animal', from
'animal' to 'living thing', from 'living thing' to 'body', and from
'body' to 'existent' .99 One can also descend mentally from the
highest genus to the lowest species, by dividing 'existent' into
'bodily' and 'non-bodily', 'bodily' into 'animate' and
'inanimate', 'animate' into 'things having mind' and 'things hav-
ing life alone', and 'things having mind' into 'mortal' and 'im-
mortal' .too This process of classification is simple enough to ex-
plain what is meant by genus and species, but Seneca concludes
by observing that certain Stoics postulate another genus:
'something' (quid) prior to the highest one mentioned in the
previous illustrations. Their reasoning is as follows:tot 'In the
nature of things, some things exist, and some things do not ex-
ist. Even those things which do not exist are contained in the
nature of things. These are what occur to the mind: for example
centaurs, giants, and whatever else is formed by false thinking
and begins to take a certain shape, although it has no substance'.
This preliminary analysis enables us to return to the explana-
tion of the term quod est, and Seneca now informs us that
Platot02 understands it in six ways:
(i) It can signify 'that which is generic' (quod genera/iter est):
99. Ibid. 58, 8-12.

100./bid. 58, 14.
I 0 I. Ibid. 5H. 15 In rerum ... natum quaedam sun/, qtwedmn mm sunt,
et haec mi/em quae mm sun/ rerum natura cnnpleclitur. quae animo suc-
Oirrtml, tamquam Centauri, Gigantes et quidquid a/iud fit/sa cogilalione
forma tum habere a/iquam imaginem coepit, quam11is non habeat substan-
tiam. The same point is made at ibid. 58, 13. Seneca's illustrations suggest
that he has not fully understood the Stoic theory of classification. See pp.
IH'i-187.
102. Plato's name is explicitly mentioned at ibid. 58, 16-20 and 22.
SENECA 183
for example the universal 'man' which can be grasped by

thought. The individual man, however, is comprehended by vi-
sion and touch.I03
(ii) It can mean 'that which stands out and surpasses
everything else' (quod eminet et exsuperat omnia). Just as
Homer surpasses all others in the class of 'poet', so does God
surpass all others in the class of 'existent' .104
(iii) The third meaning is 'things really existing' (quae proprie
sunt). These are Plato's Ideas, innumerable, everlasting, and im-
mutable. Plato himself defines them as follows: 'An Idea is the
eternal pattern of things which come to be in accordance with
nature' (idea est eorum quae natura fiunt exemplar aeter-
num). This definition can be explained by a simple illustration.
If I wish to paint the likeness of a person, I possess in that per-
son the pattern from which my mind takes a certain outline to
be embodied in the picture. 'That shape which teaches and in-
structs me, and from which the imitation is derived, is the Idea'
(ita ilia quae me docet et instruit facies. a qua petitur imitatio,
idea est) Nature has an infinite number of such patterns in ac-
cordance with which all created things come to be. tos
(iv) It can signify 'Form (idos). What Plato means by this
term can be explained by recalling the illustration of the painter
and his model. Whereas the 'Idea' was the shape contained in
the model which was to be the pattern of the work, the 'Form'
is the shape which the artist has himself embodied. 'And if you
desire a further distinction, the Form is in the work whereas the
Idea is outside it, and not only outside it but prior to it' (Etiam-
nunc si aliam desideras distinctionem, idos in opere est, idea
e.\'t1a opus. nee tan tum extra opus est, sed ante opus). 106
10.~./bid. 58, 16.

10'1./bid. 58, 17.
105./bitl. 58. 1819.
106./bid. 58, 20-21.
J8.j MIDDLE PlATONISM
(v) It can mean 'things which exist in the usual sense of the
term' (quae communiter sunt). Examples of these are the ob-
jects which most immediately concern us: men, cattle, proper-
ty.J07
(vi) The sixth meaning is 'things which are quasi-existent'
(quae quasi sunt). Examples of these are the void and time.tos
This complex ontological classification by Seneca - it is the
most detailed example surviving from this period - has been
extensively discussed in the modern scholarship, attention be-
ing focused on two principal questions which are obviously not
unconnected: what are the sources of the scheme, and what en-
tities precisely come in each of the six divisions? E. Bickel at-
tempts to trace the doctrine back to Plato's Timaeus alone, the
existent of class (i) signifying the unchanging model of which
there can be an irrefutable account, that of class (ii) the
Demiurge, that of class (iii) the transcendent Forms embraced in
the intelligible living creature, that of class (iv) the immanent
Forms entering into the Receptacle, that of class (v) the sensible
world, and that of class (vi) matter. 109 The establishment of
these parallels is a striking example of scholarly ingenuity, yet it
must be admitted that - if we read the Senecan text with the
care which it deserves - some of the identifications seem forc-
ed. Thus, the equation of Plato's unchanging model with the ex-
istent of class (i) represents a viable interpretation of the present
passage, but that of Plato's Demiurge with the existent of class
(ii) fails to explain the peculiar character of the Senecan God as
that which surpasses all other beings; that of Plato's transcen-
dent Forms with the existents of class (iii) seems to conflict with
Seneca's clear statement that the Idea is the 'shape' (facies) of
the object which is being depicted: in other words it is the im-
107./bid. 58, 22.

108. Ibid. 58. 22.
109. Bickel: op. cit.. pp. 1-7.
SENECA 185
manent form in the artist's model; that of Plato's immanent

Forms with the existents of class (iv) apparently runs counter to
Seneca's view that the Form is contained in an artificial and not
a natural object: that is to say it is the immanent form of the ar-
tist's work; that of Plato's sensible world with the existents of
class (v) is sustainable although so trivial as to be uninformative,
but that of Plato's matter with the existent of class (vi) fits ill
with the fact that the latter is said to be exemplified by the void
and time. In short, Bickel's interpretation of the Senecan
classification in totally Platonic terms 11 o is difficult to justify,
and we must therefore try another approach.
P. Hadot has argued that Epistu/a LVIII describes not a
Platonic scheme but a primarily Stoic one which has been fur-
ther elaborated using certain Platonic elements, and this inter-
pretation looks much more promising. 111 That the relationship
with Stoicism is a crucial factor seems to be suggested by
Seneca's discussion of the genus quid ( = ti), which according
to some Stoics precedes the genus quod est ( = <'>v), in the
preamble to the description of the six classes of existent.112 This
would suggest that the source from which the material has been
110. Although he admits that the use of Plato Is not simply direct but
mediated through Posidonius.
Ill. P. Hadot: Porpbyre et Victorinus(Paris, 1968), pp. 156-16.3.
112. According to Hadot, a confusion has been imported into the scheme
by Seneca in giving as illustrations of the 'things which do not exist' which
form one species of the genus 'something' imaginary things like centaurs. As
emerges from a careful study of Sextus Emplricus: Adv. Math. I, 15-19 (see
Hadot: op. cit., p. 162,n. I), the Stoles considered these 'things which do not
exist' to be the incorporeals: space, time, the void, expressions. This group
was opposed to 'things which exist' exemplified by the corporeal realities of
Stoic physics. Both these groups were then subsumed as species of the genus
'something. Yet this is not the end of the classification, since the latter group
was opposed to 'the not something' exemplified by imaginary things such as
chimaeras. Finally, both these groups were subsumed as species of the genus
'concepts', That Seneca has confused the first two genera in the Stoic scheme
taken included a certain amount of Stoic doctrine, and we

should therefore be alert to the possibility that Stoicism has also
infiltrated the six-fold classification itself. This seems to be ex-
actly what has occurred for, as Hadot argues, the generic exis-
tent which represents the content of class (i) is perhaps of a
Stoic rather than Platonic variety; the placing of God who is ob-
viously the supremely existent on the second level of being- as
the existent of class (ii) - makes better sense if the distinction
between classifying things and classifying concepts has become
blurred - as in Platonic and Stoic syncretism -; and the quasi-
existents representing the content of class (vi) are clearly the
Stoic 'incorporeals' (ciaroJ,.lata) rather than Platonic prin-
ciples. J 13 If this is correct, what we have in the Senecan passage
is a basically Stoic scheme to which certain Platonic elements
have been added, and Hadot concludes his discussion with the
intriguing suggestion that the Roman writer has inserted the
classes (ii), (iii), (iv), and (v) at precisely the points where the
four Stoic categories of 'substratum' (imoKEiJJ.Evov), 'quality'
is clearly indicated first, by the placing of imaginary things as a subspecies of

'something' and secondly, by the removal of the incorporeals to class (vi) in
the overall classification.
I 13. Hadot's argument is a valuable corrective to the interpretation of
Bickel. although one might question his view that Seneca's class (i) consists
simply of the supreme genus 'the existent' (see Hadot: op. cit., pp. I ';7 and
160). This reading of the passage undoubtedly links the scheme closely with
the preliminary remarks on the nature of genus and species. Thus, the term
quod est is a genus consisting of a number of different species represented by
the classes (i) to (vi). Furthermore, class (i) represents this genus itself.
However, the actual wording suggests that the first class in the scheme in-
cludes genera of many kinds. Thus, the term quod est is a genus consisting of
a number of different species represented by classes (i) to (vi). Nevertheless,
class (i) represents the first species of quod est rather than the genus itself.
Despite this reservation. Hadot's view that the generic content of class (i) is
of a Stoic (nominalist) rather than Platonic (realist) kind may still be correct
(sec Hadot: op. cit. p. 160,n. 2).
SENECA 187
(rtot6v), 'state' (7tCoc; ~xov), and 'relative state' (rtpoc; ti 7tCoc; ~xov)
would be expected to appear .114
It would seem that Hadot's interpretation of Seneca's on-
tology as a mixture of Platonic and Stoic elements is substantial-
ly correct. One might perhaps only take issue with his accep-
tance of the view that the existents of classes (iii) and (iv) repre-
sent the transcendent and immanent Forms respectively .115
Thus, in a metaphysical sense it seems clear from Seneca's own
description that the contrast between Idea and Form is not
equivalent to that of first and second intelligibles which occurs
later in Albinus' Didasca/icus.116 Rather, the contrast is bet-
ween the pattern contained in a natural object and the outline
derived from that pattern embodied in an artifact which im-
itates it.117 Even if Seneca believes that the Idea is contained in
the divine mind as seems likely on the basis of remarks
elsewhere, 118 this takes us nowhere beyond the position of An-
114. Hadot: op. cit., pp. 162-163.

115. Hadot: op. cit., pp. 158 and 162. On this poimthe author follows the
views of certain earlier scholars. Thus, Theiler: op. cit., pp. 11-12 maintained
that Seneca's ontological classification was an amalgam of three schemes
which he found in the doxographies: (a) matter, Idea, God, (b) matter, Idea,
Form, and (c) things having real existence, things generally held to exist,
things having quasi-existence. Despite the value of many of Theiler's observa-
tions, he perhaps interprets the Senecan formulae too readily in the light of
later writers like Albinus, Calcidius, and Maximus of Tyre, all of whom are
closer to Plato and further from the Sroa.
116. Sle pp. 41-2 and 286 ff.
11'7. Seep. 183.
118. At Seneca: Epist. 58, 27 we are asked to contemplate 'the Forms of all
things which flit about on high and the God who moves among them' (in
sublimi volitantes rerum omnium formas deumque inter ilia versantem).
Here the language makes no suggestion of a transcendence in the strict
Platonic sense, while the description of the divine mind's contents using the
term 'form' suggests as close a link with the ldos of class (iv) as with the idea
of class (iii).
tiochus who understood the Platonic Forms as tonic motions in

the pneuma, in other words as transcendent only to the limited
extent permitted in this heavily Stoic brand of Platonism.
This brings us to our final point regarding this text: what are
the immediate sources of this Stoic and Platonic discussion of
quod est? The scarcity of extant Greek philosophical material
from this period makes it impossible to answer this question
with any confidence, but among the likely sources three
thinkers have been actively discussed by modern scholars:
Posidonius, Antiochus, and Eudorus. 119 Perhaps the strongest
case can be made for Antiochus, and here one can do no better
than consult the analysis of W. Theiler, who first stressed the
imponance of these Senecan letters for the history of
philosophy. However, it seems even more probable that the on-
tological scheme is drawn from a handbook such as that of Arius
Didymus who could have been influenced by any of the three
and perhaps by all of them.
2.32 THE ARGUMENT OF EPISTULA AD LUCILIUM LXV120
Whereas the letter previously cited was concerned with the

question of being, this one is devoted to an examination of
causation. But as we shall see, the subject matter of these two
letters overlaps, since it is impossible to discuss the nature of be-
ing without asking how things are as they are. Furthermore,
Seneca's method of analysis is the same in the two cases: the
juxtaposition of conceptual schemes derived from different
schools of philosophy.
119. For Posidonius see Bickel: op. cit .. pp. 1-20, for Antiochus see
Theiler: op. ell .. p. 37 ff., and for Eudorus see Dillon: op. cit .. pp. 135-13 7. A
detailed examination of the various possibilities can be found in Scarpat: op.
ell .. pp. 94-101.
120. For general bibliography on this Epistula seen. 97.
SENECA 189
Seneca begins by examining the Stoic theory of causation. Ac-

cording to these thinkers there are two principles of all things:
(i) matter' (materia) which is inert but capable of being formed.
It is that 'from which' (unde) something comes to be; and (ii)
'cause' (causa) or 'reason' (ratio) which is moving and capable
of forming. It is that 'by which' (a quo) something comes to
be .121 The relation between these principles can be explained
by the illustration of a sculptor moulding a statue, for the
bronze is an example of the matter while the artificer is an ex-
ample of the cause.l22 Next, Aristotle is brought into the pic-
ture. His doctrine suggests an expansion of the scheme since-
unlike the Stoics who believe in one cause only - he postulates
four. These are explained once more in terms of the artist simile
as (i) 'matter' (materia) which is capable of being moulded, (ii)
'the artist' (opifex) who shapes the work, (iii) 'form' (forma)
which is embodied in the work, and (iv) 'the purpose'
(Jlropositum) which motivates the undertaking.I23 Finally,
Plato's doctrine of causation is incorporated into the scheme.
His theory indicates a further extension of the list of causes
since - in addition to Aristotle's four - he proposes a fifth
cause. These are described again by using the artist simile for
not only must we postulate (i) that 'from which' (ex quo) the
work is fashioned: 'the bronze' (aes), (ii) that 'by which' (a quo}
it is accomplished: 'the artist' (artifex), (iii) that 'in which' (in
quo} it is fashioned: 'the form' (forma), and (iv) that 'on behalf
of which' (propter quod) it is produced: 'the purpose'
I Z I. Seneca: l:'pist. 6';, 2-~.

122. Ibid. 65. 3. Throughout his discussion of causes, Seneca speaks both
of God's creative role in relation to the world and of the artist's creative role
in relation to the artifact. The one is naturally the analogue of the other, since
'all art is imitation of nature' (omnis ars naturae lmitatio est). The reader
should therefore note that Seneca begins with God at ibid. 65, 2 and moves
on to the artist at Ibid. 65. ~- 14. God reappears at Ibid. 65, 7- 10 and 12.
I 23. Ibid. 65. 4-6. Seneca also describes cause (iii) as 'Form (ldos).
(propositum); but also (v) that 'according to which' (ad quod) it

is fashioned: 'the model' (e.r:emplar).t2-4 All of this is naturally
by way of illustration only, and the discussion is not complete
until the nature of the world itself has been explained with
reference to matter, God, the order of the visible cosmos, the
divine beneficence, and the model respectively .tzs
The nature of the fifth cause which only occurs in the system
of Plato is the subject of an especially detailed note by Seneca.
'To these four, Plato adds as a fifth cause the model, which he
himself calls the "Idea." For it is to this that the artist looked
when he accomplished what he was planning. However, it
makes no difference whether he had this model outside himself,
to which he might tum his eyes, or within himself, having con-
ceived and placed it there himself. God has these models of all
things within himself, and has embraced the numbers and
measures of all things which are to be accomplished in his mind.
He is filled with those shapes which Plato calls "Ideas": immor-
tal, immutable, indefatigable. Therefore, although men may
perish, humanity itself according to which a man is moulded re-
mains and, although men may be afflicted and die, it suffers no
change'. 126
Next, Seneca passes on to criticism of these various theories
of causation, and concludes that the Aristotelian and Platonic
124./bid. 65.7-8.
125./bid. 65.9-10.
126. Ibid. 6<;, ..., /lis quintam Plato adicit exemplar. quam ipse '/dean
tmcat; hoc est enim ad quod respiciens artijex id quod deslinabal ejfecit.
Nibil cmtem ad rem pertinet utrum joris balJeut exemplar ad quod rejerat
oculos em intus. quod ibi ipse nmcepit et posuit. Haec exemplar/a rerum
omnium deus intra se babet rwmerosque Utlitersorum quae a~entla sunt et
modos metlte nmplexus est; plenus bls fiJ!.W'is est quas Plato 'ideas' ap-
pe/lat. imnorlales, inmut(lfJiles, inf"ligabiles. ltaque homines quidem
pereunt. ipsa cmtem JJunuttlitas, cui quam JJomo ejjitll{llltr, permanet. et
bominibus /aboranliblls, interetmtibus, ilia nibil palitur.
SENECA 191
doctrines go astray either by naming too few or too many

causes. It all depends upon what one means by the term 'cause',
for if by the latter one signifies 'that without which something
cannot be accomplished' (quocumque remoto quid effici non
potest), further causes should be added to the list. Thus, without
time nothing can come about, while place in which a thing is
made and motion through which this process takes place are
equally necessary.I27 On the other hand, if one employs this
term to indicate 'the primary and general cause' (prima et
generalis causa), the various causes listed are not independent
but consequent upon one efficient cause. For example, the form
is not a cause but merely something imposed upon the work by
the artist, and the model is not a cause but simply the instru-
ment which the artist employs.12s In conclusion, a correct
analysis of causation requires us to distinguish between a
multitude of accessory causes and the single efficient cause: the
creative reason or God.
It is obvious from the way in which Seneca criticizes the
Aristotelian and Platonic doctrines of causation that it is the
Stoic position which he finds to be the most satisfactory. Yet it
would be a mistake to interpret this text as implying that
Stoicism was to be understood in stark opposition to the other
systems, since the writer's handling of the three physical
theories seems to suggest rather that the Stoic viewpoint
represents the underlying truth to which the other doctrines ap-
proximate. By saying that the Aristotelian and Platonic theories
either name too few or too many causes, Seneca clearly implies
that there is a terminological confusion about the meaning of
'cause' in these philosophies, and that the fundamental agree-
ment of their views with one another and with Stoicism can be
revealed through revised definitions. In fact, the position which
l2i.fbid. 6';, II.

12H. Ibid. 65. 12-14.
the writer expresses in this text regarding the harmonization of

different doctrines seems exactly parallel to that which careful
investigation showed to underlie the text previously con-
sidered. Of course, this fact gives additional support to that in-
terpretation.t29
The eclecticism of Seneca's viewpoint is confirmed by more
detailed analysis of his descriptions of the Aristotelian and
Platonic theories of causation. Thus, the Aristotelian position
seems to have been subtly transformed in the directions of both
Platonism and Stoicism when the writer, although presenting
the four causes upon which all physical change depends in a
manner recalling Aristotle's own discussion in Physics II and
elsewhere, explains the mechanism of natural processes in
terms of the efficient cause: God, the formal cause: the order of
the visible cosmos, and the final cause: the divine beneficence.
As E. Gilson has argued,t30 Aristotle's approach to the explana-
tion of natural change would be quite different since for him the
efficient, formal, and final causes would coincide either in the
male parent - in the case of animal reproduction - or in the
elemental form - in the case of qualitative or quantitative
change or locomotion.t3t Although in Seneca's version of the
theory the efficient and final causes come together in the nature
of the divine, one should note their radical disjunction from the
formal cause of the individual thing: a deformation of the
Aristotelian theory which can only result from an identification
of the efficient and final causes with the Demiurge of Plato's
Timaeus and perhaps also with the 'artisan fire' (nup tEXvtK6v)
of Stoicism.t32
I 29. Seep. 18-i ff.

130. E. Gilson: 'Notes pour I'histoire de Ia cause efficiente'. Archives
d'histoiredoctrina/e et litterairedu moyen dge 29 ( 1962), pp. 7-12.
131. See Aristotle: PhJs. II. 3. 194b23-195a26 and ibid. ll. 7. 198a 14 -b9.
132. R. B. Todd: 'The Four Causes. Aristotle's Exposition and the An-
cients'.jouma/ of the History of Ideas, 37 ( 1976). pp. 319-322 has also com-
SENECA 19:\
The eclectic character of Seneca's theory of causation is also

confirmed when we turn to the Platonic elements themselves.
That the five causes allegedly identified by Plato have a certain
Stoic complexion is indicated by the fact that they parallel at
least partially the various kinds of existent described in Seneca's
earlier classification, and it has already been argued that that
scheme contains a Stoic framework to which certain other
elements have been added. Thus, although the material and
final causes do not appear in the previous classification, the effi-
cient cause can be equated with God, the formal cause with
Form. and the exemplary cause with Idea in that scheme.I33 The
Stoic complexion of the doctrine of the five causes is also
revealed by the peculiar nature of certain of those causes for,
despite the fact that the material, formal, and final causes are in-
terpreted in a way generally consistent with Platonism - the
material cause is equivalent to the Receptacle, the formal cause
to the reflections of the transcendent Forms in the Receptacle,
and the final cause is at least a reasonable development of a sug-
mented on the un-Aristotelian aspects of Seneca's account. He notes that the

sculpture illustration, at least as applied to all four causes, is nowhere found
in Aristotle, although it occurs in Clement of Alexandria: Strom. VIII, 9, 26,
2:\ and Alexander of Aphrodisias: De Fato 3. 167, 2-12.
I :B. The relation between the two schemes can be tabulated in the follow-
ing manner:
Epist. 65 I material Epist. 58

2 efficient - class (il)
3 formal class (iv)
4 exemplary --+ class (iii)
5 final
It is possible that one should :>lso connect I matt~rial and class (vi) on the basis
of Epist. '5H, 22-23. However, the language is so imprecise as to render the
equation hazardous. At all events, classes (i) and (v) of the earlier scheme have
no obvious relations with the later one.
gestion made in the Timaeusl34- the interpretation of the effi-

cient and exemplary causes is on the whole un-Platonic. Thus,
the efficient cause is a God whose mind contains the Ideas of all
things, a notion having more in common with the Stoic Logos
which embraces the formative principles of all things than with
the Platonic Demiurge who contemplates a paradigm outside
himself. Further, the exemplary cause is an Idea which is
manifested as a pattern inherent in a natural object, in other
words as an Idea only in the sense in which Antiochus might
have understood the term. In conclusion, Seneca's fivefold
scheme of causation is a classic piece of Platonic, Aristotelian,
and Stoic syncretism.l3'5
2.33 CONCLUSIONS
Despite their essentially traditional character, Epistulae LVIII

and LXV do point forward in certain respects: this is one of the
reasons for their great interest to us. In particular, it is the evi-
dent doxographical character of these texts which is crucial, for
perhaps the handbook tradition alone preserved something like
the essence of ancient Platonism at this period. While the great
creative thinkers of the generations immediately before
Seneca's were busily reinterpreting Plato's texts in the light of
the best recent physical theory - Antiochus' predominantly
Stoic revision of the ancient system is the most noteworthy ex-
ample - the bare summaries of Platonism 136 which filled the
134. Pla10 does not postulate a final cause in any systematic way.
However, Seneca is prepared w complete his scheme at this point, Epist. 65.
I 0 bono nulla cuiusquam boni invidia est recalling Plato: Tim. 29e aya9Q>
of: otiOEic; 7tEpi OOOEVOc; oOot7tOTE eyyiyvETQl cp96voc;.
135. The problem of Seneca's sources for the scheme in Epistula 65 is
analogous with that regarding the sources of Epistula 58. See pp. 187-188.
136. For illustrations of these see nn. 57. 58 and 59.
SENECA 195
handbooks helped to keep the more archaic form of the doc-

trine alive even if barely so. These two Senecan texts are a
testimony to the existence of this tradition, and behind his
descriptions one can just discern the presence of a more authen-
tic Platonism. However, the intellectual climate is not yet
prepared for a systematic return to older traditions, a return
which does take place a hundred years later in the speculation
of Albinus, Apuleius, and their contemporaries.l37
1.37. The Epistulae 58 and 65 seem w have exercised an especial influence

over mediaeval readers, for whom these texts were perhaps the most conve-
nient summaries of Platonism. On this question see the important remarks of
f:. Brchier: Histoire de Ia Philosopbie I (Paris, 194 3). pp. 571-575; Nothdurft:
op. cit., pp. 182-191; and Gilson: op. cit., pp. 7-31.
3
Gellius
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In chronological sequence, the next writer of importance to

transmit information about Plato and Platonists is Aulus Gellius,
the author of the miscellany Noctes Atticae. I The circumstances
of his life and work are veiled in obscurity - during the Middle
Ages even his name was misconstrued by connecting his
praenomen A. with his nomen Gellius to form 'Agellius' -
although it is known that he lived in Rome and was active in the
middle of the second century A.D.
The preface to his work describes its origins and purpose.
During long winter nights in Attica, it had been the author's
custom to pass the time collecting notes on any subject of in-
terest, and these jottings were later assembled into twenty
books whose form still reflects the heterogeneity of the original
collection.2 It is the author's declared hope that the reading of
this material will on the one hand, provide an incentive to the
young to delve more deeply into the subjects briefly described
and on the other, provide some culture to those adults whose
occupations in life preclude sustained study .3
I. On Gellius in general see E. Yoder: A Second-Century Classical

Scholar'. Clt~ssiml journal .B ( 1937-38). pp. 280-294 and B. Baldwin:
Studies in Au/us Gel/ius (Lawrence. KS, 1975). There is a bibliographical
survey by R. Marachc: 'fronton etA. Gellius (1938-1964)', /.ust,.um 10
( 1965), pp. 213-245.
2. Gcllius: Noct. Attic. pr. 1-5 .
.~./bid.pr.l1-12.
199
The result of this labor is a compendium of notes about the

arts, history, philosophy, and law. Considered in terms of their
literary quality, these are of modest value in comparison with
the achievements of the classical age, yet they will ultimately
furnish a wealth of information about the ancient world to the
mediaeval reader.4 Like other authors of the second century,
Gellius is an enthusiastic antiquarian whose penchant induces
him to excerpt many Greek and Latin writers whose own works
are already beginning to pass out of circulation. These excerpts
will figure among the scanty extant remains of Cato and Varro,
to name only the more celebrated examples.
3.11 GELLIUS AND PHILOSOPHY
It is for these reasons that his notes on the history of

philosophy are so interesting, notes which cover not only
Greek and Roman philosophy of the classical periods, but also
more recent developments in which philosophers personally
known to Gellius play a role. 5 Among the earlier Greek writers,
the Noctes Atticae preserve interesting reports concerning the
Pythagorean, Peripatetic, Stoic, and New Academic schools.
4. There is no detailed study of Gellius' influence in the Middle Ages,

perhaps because this influence - although considerable - is in the realm of
anecdotes rather than ideas. Material which can be traced back 10 the Noctes
Atticae as well as explicit citations can be found in countless writers from
late antiquity onwards. of whom the most important include Apulcius,
Macrobius, Augustine. Isidore of Seville. Lupus of Ferrieres, Martin of Laon,
John of Salisbury. and Peter Helias: see M. Manitius: Gescbichte der la-
teinischen Litera fur des Mittelalters 1-111 (Miinchen. 1911-1931 ), indices s. n.
'Gellius'. On the extensive use of Gellius by John of Salisbury see J. Martin:
'Uses of Tradition. Gcllius. Pctronius. and John of Salisbury', Viator 10
(1979), pp. '57-76.
S. Gellius' text is important because of the varied information which it
contains, not because of any coherent pedagogical program carried out by
GELLIUS 201
With respect to the Pythagoreans, Gellius describes the practice

of the school in dividing its students into three grades: the
'auditors' (aKouanKoi) who simply listened to the teachings
without the permission to ask questions, the 'mathematicians'
(J..La9ru.tanKoi) who could ask questions on the various subjects
which they had begun to study- geometry, music, and other
sciences - although they did not apply these to the investiga-
tion of nature as a whole, and the 'physicists' (q>UatKoi) who
made use of the sciences in studying the phenomena of the
natural world.6 The Peripatetic school is invoked in connection
with Aristotle's view that living beings are endowed with the
five senses of taste, touch, smell, hearing, and sight, but that on-
ly the first two occur in all creatures, some animals being born
lacking one of the remaining senses.7 Among his discussions of
the Stoics, Gellius cites the argument from Chrysippus' nEpi
Opovoiac; that, although fate is an everlasting and ineluctable se-
quence of events, our minds are only subject to it to the extent
that our individual characters permit. In other words, a mind
naturally endowed with health and usefulness will suffer little
the assemblage of this material. ). Gassner: 'Philosophic und Moral hci

<idlius'. Serla Pbilologica Aenipontmza 2. herausgegeben von R. Muth (flm-
s!Jrucker Beitriige zur Ku/turll'issenscbaft 17 ( 1972)), pp. llJ"'-235 goes too
f:tr in emphasizing this latter aspect.
6. Gellius: Noct. Attic. I. 9. 1-7. On the Pythagoreans see also ibid. IV, II.
1--! (on abstinence) and VII, 2. 12 (on moral responsibility). etc.
7. Ibid. VI, 6, 1-3. Gellius mistakenly quotes this doctrine as being from
Aristotle's nepi MvtiJJ'l~ In fact, it comes from DeSomrm 2, 455a4ff. Gellius
generally cites Aristotle on scientific questions as at Noel. Attic. II, 30. I-II
(on the waves of the sea); III. 6, 1-3 (on the strength of the palm tree); XIX. 2,
5 (on the pleasures of the senses); and XIX, 6. I (on blushing). In all these
l'ases the Prob/emata are cited. Aristotle is also mentioned in conjunction
with his definition of the syllogism at Noel. Attic. XV. 26. 1-2 which Gellius
translates. Here the reference is to Top. l. I. 100a25-7. Finally. the anecdote
of Aristotle's deathbed conversation with Theophrastus and Eudemus is
quoted at Noel. Attic. XIII, 5. 1-12.
from the external impact of fate, while a mind which is not so

gifted will be unable to resist even the smallest external in-
fluence. The situation is illustrated by a cylinder being rolled
down a hill, for a man provides the initial cause of its motion yet
it soon speeds on because of its own circular shape.s The views
of the New Academic school are examined in comparison with
those of the Pyrrhonian skeptics, both groups being described
as holding that absolute truth is unattainable, although the
former admits that this statement can be grasped as true while
the latter denies even that.9
Discussions of Roman philosophy also comprise a significant
part of the Noctes Atticae, and among the writers mentioned
Nigidius Figulus, Cicero, Varro, and Virgil are perhaps the most
important. Nigidius is quoted in conjunction with his argument
that the imposition of words is shown to be natural rather than
conventional by our pronouncing of words such as vos, tibi
('you, to you') with an outward projection of the vocal organs
and nos, mibi ('we, to me') with an inward one.IO Regarding
Cicero's writings, Gellius is most interested in discussing their
use of Greek sources or originals, an example being the rework-
8. Ibid. VII, 2, 1-12- a discussion which begins in the previous chapter.

The Stoics are also quoted at ibid. V, 15. 6 (on the corporeality of voice); V.
16, 2 (on the mechanism of sight); and XII, 5. 1-15 (on the endurance of
pain). Sometimes Gellius quotes specific Stoic thinkers, for example Chrysip-
pus at ibid. XI. 12. 1-3 (on ambiguity of words) and XIV. 4, 1-5 (on justice);
Panaetius at ibid. XIII, 28, 1-4 (on duties); and Epictetus at ibid. XIX, 1.
14-21 (on epistemology). On evidence for the doctrines of Panaetlus in
Gellius seeM. Schaefer: 'Panaitios bei Cicero und Gellius'. Gymnasium 62
( 1955). pp. 334-353.
9. Ibid. XI, 5, 1-8. On the New Academy see also ibid. XVII, 15. 1-2 (for
Carneades' polemic against Zeno of Citium).
10. Ibid. X, 4, 1-4. The reference is explicitly to Nigidius' Grammatica
Commentaria. The same work is cited at ibid. XIX. 14, 1-8 and is the source
of many of Gellius' etymological and grammatical observations. Nigidius ap-
parently elaborated the consequences of his doctrine that words are imposed
GELLIUS 203
ing of Theophrastus' analysis of friendship which he considers

to be much inferior in precision of argument to its model. That
such a judgment is not made without studying the authors con-
cerned at first hand is indicated by the fact that Cicero's own
text is cited followed by extracts from Theophrastus both in
Latin translation and in the original Greek. II Varro is cited for
his discussion of the properties of the number seven in his Heb-
domades where the pervasive influence of this number is
revealed both in the cosmos - the constellations of the Greater
and Lesser Bear have seven stars, there are seven heavenly
spheres, the course of the moon is completed in four times
seven days- and in human nature- the different stages in the
evolution of the embryo take periods of seven days, certain
periods of a man's life are more dangerous because his number
of years is a multiple of seven, the extreme limit of human
growth is the height of seven feet.I2 Concerning Virgil, Gellius
is especially interested in the poet's expertise in religious mat-
ters demonstrated, for example, by his verses about the evil in-
fluences of certain divinities and the necessity of their propitia-
tion prior to any undertaking.t3
according to nature'" (q>li01) by using etymology as the starting point for ex-
amining the natures of things. Nigidius fragments have been collected by A.
Swoboda: Publii Nigidfi Flguli operum re/iquiae (Vienna, 1889).
II. Gellius: Noct. Attic. I, 3. I 0-29. Cicero is also mentioned in connection
with his adaptation of Panaetius at Ibid. XIII, 28, 1-4, although on this occa-
sion the reference is a more favorable one.
12. Ibid. Ill, 10, 1-17. Among other references to Varro's scientific
sheories, Gellius cites his geometrical definitions at ibid. I. 20, 1-9; his discus-
sion of the physiology of birth at ibi,l. Ill, 16, 6-14; and his definition of an
axiom at ibid. XVI. 8, 6.
13./bid. V, 12. 13. ThereferenceistoVirgil: Georg. IV, 6-7. That Virgil's
poetry is full of valuable philosophical and scientific doctrine is a notion very
characteristic of Gellius' discussions, and is also elaborated to fantastic
lengths by writers of later antiquity such as Macrobius and Servius both of
whom knew Gcllius. It is to a large extent a projection into the Roman con-
20-l MIDDLE PLATONISM
Although Gellius shows a definite preference for the older

over the more recent writers on philosophical questions, some
intellectual figures of his own day or of the generations im-
mediately preceding claim his attention, and in particular
Plutarch of Chaeronea whom he could not have known per-
sonally and Favorinus of Arelate whom he did know.t4 From
Plutarch's work De Homero he quotes two examples of alleged-
ly faulty reasoning by Epicurus- the one case a syllogism prov-
ing that death is no evil, the other a definition of pleasure as the
removal of everything which causes pain - and on both occa-
sions defends Epicurus against the captiousness of the later
critic .1 s From the Symposiaca he cites Plutarch's account of a
conflict of views on human anatomy between Plato who
followed Hippocrates' belief that liquid could pass through the
lungs to the bladder and Erasistratus who argued that such a
movement was prevented by the epiglottis.t6 Regarding
Favorinus, he mentions a celebrated discourse which the
philosopher gave at Rome against the astrologers arguing that,
although some physical phenomena were clearly influenced by
the heavenly bodies, one should not assume that all human af-
fairs were so governed and that, even if such events do take
place according to a divine plan, one could not understand this
text of the exegetical methods of the Alexandrian grammarians who had

discovered such technical information in the Homeric poems. As noted by
Yoder op. cit., p. 283, Virgil is one of the few first century Latin writers in
whom Gellius shows any genuine interest.
14. However. most important of all the recent philosophers is the Platonist
Calvenus Taurus who will merit some special attention later in this chapter.
Seep. 21 I ff.
15. Gellius: Noct. Attic. II, 8, 1-8 and II. 9. 1-5. For Plutarch see also ibid.
Ill. 6, 1-3 (on the strength of the palm tree) and XV. 10, 1-2 (on an example of
psychic disorder).
16./bid. XVII, II. 1-6.
GELLilJS 205
plan in a lifetime's study.t7 Also regarding Favorinus, a dinner

table conversation is reported in which the philosopher
employs a question about the meaning of the Latin word iapyx
as the starting point for a substantial lecture on the names and
natures of the various winds. IS It is obvious that Gellius' ac-
quaintance with Plutarch is a purely literary one, whereas his
knowledge of Favorinus is based on a long period of personal
familiarity between a disciple and his master.
Much of the material in Gellius' compilation is excerpted
from an authority who is identified by name: in other words the
discussion takes the form of a conventional florilegium.
However, in some passages there are signs that he is attempting
17. Ibid. XIV, I, 1-:H. Most of the information regarding Favorinus is

anecdotal in character. a good illustration being ibid. XVIII, I, 1-16
(Favorinus arbitrates a discussion on the happy life between a Stoi<.. and a
Peripatetic). However, the occasional dtation of a work by Favorinus - for
example of his nuppwvEtot Tp67tot at ibid. XI.;, 5- suggests that the latter's
writings also influenced the Noctes Atticae. Since Favorinus is a figure who
appears so frequently and Gellius describes him in such terms of admiration,
the question has arisen whether a work or works of Favorinus influenced the
structure: of the Noctes Atticae as a whole. Two texts arc significant in this
connection: (i) Ibid. pr. 8 where among the titles of similar florilegia which
Gellius cites we find a <.ertain navto&ami 'latopia: (ii) ibid. XIV. 6. 1-'i
where Gc:llius speaks of a prominent friend who offered him a hook :thoun-
ding in doclrirwe omnigenus as a possible: source:. Photius refers to a work of
this title 'in which arc various storks and cxplan:uions of the origins of
words' (EV of~ &ui<popm iatopia! Kai TWV Kata TQ OVOJlaTa ecaEWV
alnoA.oyiat) hy l'avorinus. Sec A. Barigazzi: FaNJrino di Anlate. Opere. /n-
troduzione, tes/o critico e ammtento (Firenze. 1966), p. 207 ff. and M.Pcz-
zati: 'Gdlio cIa sc.:uola di Favorino'. Annali de/lei Scuola Normale Super/on
di Pisa, Classe tli lettere e fllosojia 3 ( 19' 3). pp. H.'\~-H60. The case for seeing
Favorinus' hook as a major or the principal source for <ic:llius compilation is
extremc:ly strong. and we should therefore he alert to thl possibility th:u
reports of other Greek philosophers may he: drawn from it and colored hy thl'
approach therein. Sec the rem:trks about Plato on pp. 210-211.
18. Gellius: Noct.Attic. 11. 22. 1-26.
to bring material from different sources together. adding his

own observations on the relative weights of different
arguments.t9 This seems to be the case with an interesting note
on the question whether voice is corporeal or incorporeal
where Gellius, prefacing his argument with the observation that
the Latin incorporeus is a translation of the Greek technical
term ciaroiJ.atoc; and that body can be defined in two ways - as
'that which either acts or is acted upon' (to ~t011t01ouv f\ miax.-
ov) or as 'that which has three dimensions' (to tptx.fi ouiatatov)
- describes the opinions of the Stoics, Plato, and the Atomists
on the nature of voice. The Stoics maintain that voice is the air
which is struck and therefore corporeal, whereas Plato states
that it is the striking itself and therefore incorporeal, and the
Atomists that it is a stream of atoms and therefore corporeal.
Gellius refuses to speculate which of these views is correct and
concludes his note by observing that the hearing of such idle
sophistries convinced him of the truth of Ennius' judgment that
philosophy is just for the few .20 His view of logical problems
seems to be somewhat more sympathetic than his view of
physical ones, for in another note we find an interesting discus-
sion of the nature of propositions. Gellius begins by stating that
when he was trying to master the 'introductory elements'
(Eiaayroyai) of dialectic, he sought in vain for a clear doctrine of
propositions in the Roman writers Varro and Aelius. He was
therefore forced to turn to the Greeks where he found a pro-
position defined as 'an expression which is complete and self-
contained in its signification' (AKt0V autotd.i:c; cl1t6q>avtov
oaov q>'aut0) together with examples of various kinds of pro-
positions such as the 'hypothetical proposition' (OUVTJIJ.IJ.EVOV
19. Of course, a compliation of different views may itself be derhed from

a single source. However, the examples below seem to contain an individual
contribution on Gellius' part.
20. Ibid. V, 15, 1-9.
GELLilJS 207
a~iroJ.I.a) and the 'disjunctive proposition' (01l;EUYJ.I.EVOV a~{ro

J.I.a). Gellius concludes by making remarks on the correct ways
of converting these technical terms into Latin and suggesting to
his readers that such studies eventually lead to positive results
even if at the outset they seem contemptible.2t
3. 2 PLATONISM IN THE NOCTES ATT/CAE
So far. we have examined the references in the Noctes Atticae

to philosophers from the earliest times until Gellius' own day
with the exclusion of the most famous of all thinkers: Plato. In
view of our author's interest in antiquities, it is hardly surprising
to find that the great philosopher of classical Greece is frequent-
ly cited - perhaps more so than any other Greek writer - and
these references are obviously worthy of our serious attention.
In fact, they provide us with vital evidence regarding the
knowledge and interpretation of Plato's works in the intellec-
tual milieu of the second century A.D.22
3. 21 THE REFERENCES TO PLATO
Gellius refers by title or explicit textual citation to ten

dialogues. He knows that the Pbaedo is a work concerned with
the immortality of the soul23 and takes from it the notion that
pleasure and pain are contraries which are always found in con-
21. Ibid. XVI. 8, 1-17. For another discussion of logic see Ibid. XVI. 2,
1-13.
22. A useful brief survey of the state of our knowledge regarding Plato's
writings in this period can be found in P. de Lacy: Plato and the Intellectual
Life of the Second Century A.D.'. Approaches to the Second Sophistic (Papers
presented to tbe I 05th Annual Meeting of the American Pbilologi,al
Association). edited by G. W. Bowersock, (University Park, PA, 1974) pp.
1- Ill.
23. Gellius: Noct. Attic. II, 18, 2-3.
20H MIDDLE PLATONISM
junction with one another.24 The theory stated in the

Parmenides that the transition from rest to motion or motion to
rest is not a period of time but 'the nature of the instant' (fJ
t~aiq>VTJc; q>u01c;) is employed by Gellius to answer the difficult
question whether a man is living at the moment of his death or
dead. According to the philosopher Calvenus Taurus the theory
shows that, just as the instant between motion and rest is
neither in motion nor at rest, so is the moment between life and
death neither living nor dead.25 The Symposium is quoted on
two occasions in conjunction with Taurus: on the first occasion
the philosopher complains that today's students simply want to
read this text as a model of literary style rather than to improve
24. Ibid. VII. I, 6 ( = Plato: Phaed. 60b).

2'i. Gdlius: Noel. Attic. VII. 13, H-11 ( = Plato: Parm. I S6d). Taurus is
described at Noel. Allie. VII, 10, I as 'an eminent Plawnist of my time' (vir
memoria nostm in disciplina Platonica celelnatus). and we learn of his
philosophical activity not only from frequent references to Gellius but also
from Philoponus' De Aeternitate Mundi Contra Proc/um. According to
Philoponus. Taurus wrote a l'ommentary on Plaw's Timaeus in whkh he ex-
plained the statt:ment that the world is 'something which has come to be'
(YEV'lt6c;) by distinguishing four senses of the latttr term: (i) belonging to till'
class of YEVT(tci. (ii) logically distinguishable into components. (iii) in a con-
tinual process of gcncration. and (iv) dcpendent upon an cxtcrnal cause (De
Aetem. liJumli VI, H, J.l'i. Hff.) Whichcver of these: views seemed the
strongest 10 Taurus. hc clearly hcld that Plaw's description of the temporal
process of creation was metaphorical. Another passage: in Taurus' commen-
tary apparently linked thc five senses and the elements by associating sight
with fin:, hearing with air. taste with water. touch with earth, and smell with
an intermediate between air and water (ibid. XIII. I 'i. 'i20, -i ff.) This theory
is of great interest because it rcnals th;u Taurus systematically opposed the
Aristotelian theory of the fifth clement, thereby avoiding the eclecticism
which more generally prevailed. For discussion of his work sec 1-1. Diirril-: 'L.
Kalhenos Tauros. D;ts Persiinlkhkcitshild cines plawnischen Philmophcn urn
die Mittl' des 2. Jahrhunderts nach C. hr., Kairos l 'i ( 197 3). pp. 2-i-3S and J.
Dillon: Tbe Middle Platouists. A Slul~J' of Platonism HO H. C. to A.D. 220
(l.ondon. 197"'1. pp. 23 .. 2-i"'.
GELLilJS 209
their lives,26 and on the second he recommends Pausanias'

eulogy of love not simply as a model of literary style but as an
example of finely constructed syllogistic reasoning.27 Taurus
similarly mentions the Pbaedrus as a text which is unfortunate-
ly treated solely in terms of its literary merits: he complains that
the students wish to begin their studies in Plato with it simply
because it contains the speech of Lysias.2B The Tbeages is
quoted by Gellius on account of a verse of Euripides which it
contains,29 and the Protagoras is cited as a work whose name
was derived from that of the famous sophist.30 More extensive
reference is made to the Gorgias from which in one passage the
theory that there are two reasons for punishment is contrasted
with the view expressed by Taurus in his commentary on that
dialogue that there are three;31 in another the speech of Callicles
against the idle pursuit of philosophy is quoted together with
Gellius' own observation that these criticisms do not apply to
the true philosophy which is the teacher of all the virtues,32 and
in another the well known Socratic maxim 'that it is worse to be
unjust than to suffer injustice' (Kci K\OV Eiva1 to aOtKEiv ii to
UOlKEiaOat).B Regarding the Republic he reports that
Xenophon quickly produced a rival treatise on politics in op-
position to it, to which Plato in his turn made a polemical rep-
ly.3-i That he is aware of the work's content as well as its
historical circumstances is indicated in another pasage in which
26. Gdlius: Noct. Attic. I, 9. 9-11.

2..,. fiJid. XV II. 20. 1-9 .
.ZH./IJid. I, 9. 9-11.
29. /hid. Xlll, 19. 1-2 ( = Plato: T/Jeag. 12Sh). Gcllius mistakenly quotes
this as the T/Jeaetetus.
30. Gellius: Nnct. Attic. V, 3. I.
31. Ibid. VII, 14. S-9 ( = Pla10: Gorg. S25b) .
.U. Gellius: Noct. Attic. X. 22. 1-24 ( = Plato: Gorg. -iR4c--i8Se) .
.'d. <idlius: Noel. Attic. XII, 9, Cl( = Plato: Gorg. 473:t; -i89a: and 'iOHh).
3-t. Gellius: Noct. Attic. XIV. 3. 3-4.
the theory of holding wives as common property is discussed.35

The Timaeus is quoted on no less than four occasions: in one
passage alluding to the notion that voice is constituted by the
striking of the air,36 in another to the theory that vision is pro-
duced when light issues from the eyes and becomes joined with
the light of the sun or some other light in order to make us see
what it has struck,37 in another to the idea that liquids pass
through the lungs to the bladder,38 and in another - where
Favorinus is quoted as the immediate source - to the notion
that a recovery from certain kinds of fever will produce more
lasting health.39 Finally, Gellius shows his knowledge of the
Laws by referring to remarks which the work contains on the
subject of the moderate consumption of alcohol, 4o and to the
fact that it consists of twelve books - the last point mentioned
once again in conjunction with Favorinus.4t
3.22 DIRECT AND INDIRECT PLATONISM
Most of these references to Plato's works are brief, yet they

tell us much about the extent of Gellius' knowledge of this
author and his manner of interpreting him. Above all it is
perfectly clear that the Roman compiler has access to the
original Greek texts and is not dependent solely upon sum-
maries of doctrine. This is shown by the presence of extensive
citation from the Greek in the second reference to the Sym-
posium and in the first and second references to the Gorgias.
35./bid. XVIII, 2, 8 ( = Plato: Rep. V, 457c-d).

36. Gellius: Noel. Attic. V, 15, 7 ( = Plato: Tim. 67b).
37. Gellius: Noel. Attic. V, 16, 4 ( = Plato: Tim. 45b).
38. Gellius: Noel. Attic. XVII. 11, I ( = Plato: Tim. 70c and 91 a).
39. Gellius: Noel. Attic. XVII, 12, 3 ( = Plato: Tim. 86a).
40. Gellius: Noct. Attic. XV. 2 . .3-R (=Plato: Leg. I. 637a: I. 647c; 11. 666a:
and II. 671b).
41. Gellius: Noel. Attic. XX, 1,4.
GELLIUS 211
That Gellius is able to misquote the source of the Euripidean

verse does not undermine this interpretation, since one only has
to postulate that for the shortest extracts the compiler would re-
ly upon his memory which on occasion could fail.42 Gellius' use
of the original Greek texts does not of course indicate that he
came to these writers uninfluenced by the traditions of inter-
pretation prevalent in his own day. Thus, we find the reference
to the Parmenides and the two references to the Symposium
made in connection with the teaching of Taurus, while the
fourth reference to the Timaeus and the second reference to the
Laws are made in connection with that of Favorinus. Bearing
this in mind we have to ask: does Gellius' attitude to Plato
reflect the viewpoints of these teachers? Furthermore if it does
reflect their views, is it closer to the teaching of Taurus or to
that of Favorinus?
3.23 THE INFLUENCE OF TAURUS AND FAVORINUS
These questions can be answered in the first instance by con-

sidering Gellius' attitude to the question of form versus content
in Plato's writings. In other words, given that Taurus as a
dogmatic philosopher was primarily interested in the doctrinal
content of the dialogues,43 whereas Favorinus as a skeptical
sophist was concerned mainly with the dialogues' value as
rhetorical paradigms,44 how does Gellius' own approach to
these works reveal itself? All the passages referring to the Sym-
posium and the Pbaedrus report Taurus' strictures against
reading these works purely as rhetorical exercises, yet Gellius'
own comments on Taurus' admonition which occur in these-
cond passage dealing with the Symposium make his position
42. Seen. 29.

l~. Seen. 2'i.
-14. Seen. 17.
clear.4; The warning of Taurus, he observes, did not only not

deter him but actually encouraged him to imitate Plato's style in
Latin, and of this imitation there are various illustrations scat-
tered through the pages of the Noctes Atticae. 46 In short, the
evidence points mainly to a stylistic interest in the Platonic
writings and to the influence of Favorinus.
The second way in which Gellius' relation to the different
contemporary attitudes to Plato can be assessed is by examining
the kind of doctrinal material from the dialogues which he
selects most frequently for quotation. Thus, if his approach to
Plato followed Taurus, we would expect to find a strong in-
terest in metaphysics, 47 whereas if his approach mirrored
Favorinus, we would expect to find very little interest in this
area.4s But what is Gellius' position? Undoubtedly in the ex-
tracts concerning Plato's works it is the ethical interest which
predominates, since the second passage referring to the Phaedo,
all three passages referring to the Gorgias, the second passage
referring to the Republic, and the first referring to the Laws are
concerned with ethical questions. By contrast there is little
metaphysical interest in the Platonic extracts, the only ones
dealing with such matters being the first passage referring to the
Pbaedo and the passage referring to the Parmenides. It is true
that the presence of four extracts dealing with natural science in
which the Timaeus is quoted helps to shift the statistical
balance back towards metaphysics, yet the references to this
dialogue are only to the later part of the text where medical
questions are discussed and never to its more significant
cosmological arguments. In conclusion, then, the influence of
H. Ibid. XVII. 20.7-9.

-i6. See the observations of L. Gamhcralc: La traduzimw iu Gel/lo (Roma.
1969). pp. 96-100, 116-119. I "i"i-160 ami 162-63.
i"~. Seen. 29.
-i8. Seen. 2;.
GELLIUS 21~
Favorinus seems once more to be at work49.

Gellius' second-century miscellany contains an abundance of
philosophical material which will provide innumerable items of
information to later ages. Within this material the Platonic com-
ponent is significant and perhaps predominant. However, the
interest in Plato is primarily literary and secondary ethical, an
aspect which serves to contrast the Noctes Atticae with other
second-century writings.
-!9. That Gellius' approach to Plaw is predominantly along lines establish-

ed by Favorinus is also argued by Pezzati: op. cit.. pp. 846-48.
4
Apuleius
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The major figure of the next generation is undoubtedly

Apuleius of Madaura.t According to his own description, he was
the author of a great variety of literary works including satires,
histories, orations, and philosophical dialogues, and wrote with
1. The influence of Apuleius upon later antiquity (pagan and Christian) and
the Middle Ages has been studied from at least partial viewpoints by a number
of modern scholars although there is no single adequate treatment of the
whole question. This influence can be assessed from one point of view by ex-
amining the manuscript tradition. The philosophical works were transmitted
separately from the rest of the corpus - the two groups only being reunited
in the fourteenth century - and for the manuscript tradition of the former
one may consult: P. Thomas: Apulei Platonici Madaurensis opera quae
supersuntlll (Leipzig, 1908). pp. v-xiv and J. Beaujeu: Apulee. Opuscules
philosophiques et fragments, texte etabli, traduit et com mente (Paris, 197 3),
pp. xxxv-xliv. The remains are scanty before the eleventh century, but
thereafter the number of manuscripts increases rapidly. One of the most in-
teresting of the early survivals is the Leidensis Vossianus I 0 (first noted by
Beaujeu: op. cit., p. xxxix) in which the Apuleian philosophical works occur
together with Cicero's translation of the Timaeus and Calcidius' commen-
tary. The influence of Apule ius can also be assessed by collecting the quota-
tions or references in later writers. For brief surveys of the influence of the
philosophical texts see C. Weyman: Studien zu Apuleius utzd seinen
N(lCbahmern (Sitzungsbericbte der Bayeriscbetz Akademie der
Wissenschajten 1893/2) (Munchen, 189.'\), pp. 3Hl-.'\B';: S. Costanza: Lajor-
trma di Apuleio tzell'etii. di mezzo (Palermo. 1937); E. H. Haight: Apuleius
and his Influence (New York, 1927); and C. Moreschinl: Apuleio e it
Plutonismo (Firenze, 1978), pp. 219-266. Among examples of the use of
Apuleius by later writers might be mentioned: (i) Ancient pagan writers. a)
Definite citations. Fulgentius, the Lucani Scholia Bernensia (see Beaujeu: op.
215
equal fluency in both the Greek and Latin languages.2 Much of

this writing is lost, but from the small number of works still ex-
tant it is possible to form a clear picture of Apuleius' literary per-
sonality which was partially that of a natural scientist - he
places himself in the tradition of the empirical study of nature
initiated by Aristotle and Theophrastus3 and examines topics
such as the properties of different species of fish4 and the
mechanism of visions - and partially that of a devotee of
mystery religions - he possesses sacramental objects for use in
religious ceremonies6 and is the author of the most extensive
treatise on demonology surviving from the ancient world7 and
of a novel which culminates in its hero's salvation by the god-
cit., p. xliv). b) Possible Use. Martianus Capella (see L. Lenaz: Martiani

Capellae De ~uptiis Philologiae et Mercuri! Liber Secundus. lntroduzione,
traduzione e commento (Padova, 1975), pp. 96-99). (ii) Ancient Christian
Writers. a) Definite Citations. Lactantius, Augustine (see H. Hagendahl:
Augustine and the Latin Classics, with a Contribution on Varro by B. Car-
dauns (Goteborg, 1967), pp. 681-687). b) Possible Use. Tertullian, Arnobius,
Ambrose (seeP. Courcelle: 'De Platona saint Ambroise par Apulc~e. Paralleles
textuels entre le De Excessu Fratris et le De Platone', Revue de philologie 35
( 1961) pp. 15-28 ), Claudianus Mamertus. (iii) Mediaeval Writers. a) Definite
Citations. John of Salisbury, Vincent of Beauvais, the Anonymous of Firenze.
Bibl. Naz. 1/, VI, 2 (see G. C. Garfagnini: 'Un accessus ad Apuleio e un nuovo
codice del Terzo Mitografo Vaticano'. Studi Medieva/1, Serle 3. 17 (1976),
pp. 307-362). b) Possible Use. Bernard Silvestris (see B. Stock: Myth and
Science In tbe Twelfth Century. A Study of Bernard Silvester (Princeton,
1972), p. 126 and passim). If one includes Peri Hermeneias in the authentic
corpus, the Apuldan innuence on mediaeval literature is considerably ex-
tended. See M. W. Sullivan: Apuleian Logic. The Nature, Sources, and Jn-
flueme of Apuleius 's Peri Hermeneias (Amsterdam. 1967), pp. 170-234.
2. Apulcius: Apol. 4. Cf. Ibid. 36 and 38; Flor. 9 and 20.
3. Apol. 36.
4./bid. 29-36 and 40-42.
i. Ibid. 15.
6. Ibid. 55.
'7. De Deo Socratis.
APlll.EilJS 21""
dess Isis.R Such a combination of interests is not unusual at this

period and derives from the influence of Plato who was held to
be the master of all sciences sacred and profane. It is to the lat-
ter's school that Apuleius declares his allegiance.9
~.II APULEIUS' WORKS
Two sets of extant works (transmitted separately in the

manuscript tradition) are associated with Apuleius. (i) A literary
group consisting of a) the Metamorphoses, a novel based upon
an earlier Greek work by Lucius of Patras and telling of the
adventures of its hero who is transformed into an ass; b) the
Apologia, representing Apuleius' own defense against a charge
of magical practices in the court of the proconsul Claudius Max-
imus; and c) the Florida, an anthology of passages from epideic-
tic orations delivered by Apuleius at various times. (ii) A
philosophical group comprising a) De Deo Socratis, a treatise on
demonology which describes the general mediating function of
demons between gods and men, classifies them into various
ranks, and determines the specific nature of the famous Socratic
'genius' (~a11J.OV10V); b) De Platone et eius Dogmate which sum-
marizes the Platonic teachings on the subjects of physics and
ethics along the lines of the handbook tradition; c) De Mundo, a
translation or rather adaptation of the pseudo-Aristotelian
cosmological work entitled nepi K6<JJJ.OU; d) Peri Hermeneias,
constituting an introduction to logic according to the teachings
of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school; and e) the Asclepius, a
translation or adaptation of a Hermetic work called the A6yoc;
TtA.&toc; in which the god Hermes Trismegistus reveals to his
disciple Asclepius a body of doctrine concerning aspects of
cosmology. theurgy, and eschatology.
H. The Metumorpboses.
9. Apuleius: II pol. I 0. Cf. ihid. 1.~ and 4 I; and F/or. IS.
Although all eight works have been ascribed to Apuleius at

some point in the history of scholarship, modern criticism has
disproved or questioned the authenticity of at least some of
them, its arguments being either lexicographic or doctrinal in
character. The authenticity of the Asclepius is now universally
rejected since. although the work has been preserved in the cor-
pus of Apuleian writings probably from the ninth century,
neither the ancient and mediaeval testimonia nor the subscrip-
tions in the mediaeval manuscripts attribute the work to
Apuleius himself. JO In connection with Peri Henneneias,
scholarly opinion has been divided. In favor of its authenticity
are certain testimonia of late antiquity such as those of
Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville which attribute the work to
Apuleius by name. II Against it are its preservation separately
from the other works in the corpus together with its manifest
differences in both linguistic style and doctrinal content from
the other philosophical treatises.l2 Although of these arguments
only the lexicographic ones have real weight, the balance of
modern scholarly opinion is on the side of rejecting its authen-
ticity. 13 In connection with De Mundo and De Pia tone et eius
Dogmate, modern opinion has once more been divided. In
favor of their authenticity are the unambiguous attribution of
both texts to Apuleius in the best manuscripts and the testimony
of Augustine, a writer who elsewhere reveals a detailed
knowledge of the Apuleian corpus, that the former work is in
10. See A. D. Nock ct A.-). Festugiere: Corpus Hermeticum II. Texte etab/i
et tratluit Paris. 1946), pp. 2 ';9 and 277.
II. Cassiodorus: lnst. II, 3, 12 and Isidore of Seville: Etym. II, 28, 22.
12. Sec ). Rcdfors: Ec/Jtbeitskritiscbe Untersucbtmg der apuleiscben
Scbriften De Platone rmd De mundo (Lund. 1960), p. ;, n.2.
13. The scholarship on this question has been summarized by Sullivan: op.
cit .. pp. 9-14 (who accepts authenticity) and Beaujeu: op. cit .. pp. vii-viii
(who rejects it).
APULEIUS .219
fact by this writer.I4 Against it are certain obvious differences in

linguistic style from the works definitely authenticated, the oc-
casional mistakes in translation which the former work reveals
when compared with the extant Greek original, and the ap-
parent differences of philosophical doctrine between the two
works and the remainder of the corpus.I5 Once more it is
perhaps only the lexicographic argument which is telling, for
the various errors of translation are slight and can be explained
in certain cases by the translator's possession of a defective
Greek manuscript, while a careful study of Apuleius'
philosophical position indicates that the so-called discrepancies
in doctrine are on a verbal rather than a conceptual level. For
these reasons, most modern scholars have concluded that the
two works should be classed together with De Deo Socratis and
the literary group as a whole as authentic productions of the
second-century writer. 16
The chronology of these writings is not easy to determine
owing to an almost complete lack of information about
Apuleius' life. Aside from the fact that an extract from Gellius
has been integrated into De Mundo which shows us at least the
posteriority of the latter text, 17 one must fall back upon a mere-
ly probable order of composition derived from a comparison of
literary styles. In particular, the rather dry and academic style
14. Augustine: Cit'. Dei IV, 2 (CCSL 47, 99-100).

15. See Redfors: op. cit., pp. 27 ff. (style) and 13-18 (errors).
16. The scholarship on this question has been summarized by Beaujeu: op.
cit., p. ix. Beaujeu responds separately to each of the arguments against the
authenticity of the two works. See Beaujeu: op. cit., pp. xv-xxiii (style), xi-xv
(errors), and xxiii-xxvlii (doctrine). F. Regen: Apuleius philosophus
Platonicus. Untersuchunget~ zur Apologie (De magia) rmd zu De mundo
(Berlin/New York, 1971) is an able defense of the authenticity of these works
based on a minute analysis of doctrinal parallels.
17. Apuleius: De Mundo 13, 318-14, 321 (= Gellius: Noel. Attic. II, 2,
3-.29). The passage concerns Favorinus' discussion of the winds.
which characterizes De Mundo and De Platone et eius Dogmate

contrasts with the elaborate and rhetorical flourishes in the
other treatises, IS a difference which has led some scholars to
conclude that Apuleius wrote these two works early in life
when undergoing his formal philosophical training in Athens
while the other texts date from the period of his maturity.l9
However, since both works include addresses to the writer's
son Faustinus a later date seems likely,2o in which case the con-
trast in styles must be accounted for either by Apuleius' belief
that different kinds of content required different modes of ex-
pression or by his intention that the one variety of work should
be for his personal use and the other for wider public dissemina-
tion. It will be obvious that in either case a chronological argu-
ment based on style depends on the acceptance of these two
philosophical texts as authentically Apuleian.
4.12 APULEIUS' SOURCES
Despite the citation of a number of different philosophical

writers, it is beyond doubt that Apuleius sees his primary
allegiance as being to the Platonic school. Indeed, an essential
ingredient in his cleverly written defense against the charge of
magical practices is an appeal to the sense of brotherhood im-
plied by both his and the proconsul's adherence to the Platonic
'sect' (secta).21 This raises the important question how he gain-
18. See Beaujc:u: op. dt., pp. xii-xiii.

19. The thesis is argued by T. Sinko: De Apulei et Albini doctrinae
Platonicae t~dumbmtione. (Krakow, 1905). p. 44 ff. and G. Barra: 'La ques-
tione dell'autenticit:l del De Plato11e et eius Dogmate e del De Mundo di
Apuleio', Rendiconti deli'Acetldemitl di Arcbeologit~, Lettere e Belle Arti di
Napoli 41, ( 1966) pp. 127-188.
20. As noted by J. Dillon: The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism 80
B.C. to A.D. .l..?O(London. 1977). p. 310.
21. Apuleius: Apo/. 64. Cf. ibid. I I.
APULEiliS 221
ed his knowledge of Platonism. That he read the dialogues for

himself in Greek seems scarcely to admit of doubt, since the
texts were widely available in his day and more or less explicit
citations occur throughout the Apuleian corpus and especially
in the Apologia.22 However, since his interpretation of Plato is
of a special kind in which the metaphysical and especially
religious elements are greatly emphasized - an approach con-
trasting vividly with that of his older contemporary Gellius -
we need to ask whether a particular recent interpreter of Plato
influenced him in this direction either through his writings or
personal contact. The Florida provides us with the important
piece of biographical information that Apuleius took his higher
education in philosophy at Athens,23 and there is one major
Platonic philosopher who is known to have been active there
during our writer's youth or shortly before: Calvenus Taurus.
22. Three dialogues are cited by name in the Apologia: the Pbae(/rus
(Pbaedr. 247b-c at Apol. 64), Timaeus (Tim. 82a-86a at Apol. 49-50). and
Laws (Leg. XII, 955d-956a at Apol. 65), the first and last including Greek
quotations, the second involving paraphrase. There are also unmistakable
quotations in Greek of the Alcibiades I (Ale/b. I. 121e-122a at Apol. 25) and
Epistula II (Epist. II, 312e at Apol. 64) although neither text is identified by ti-
tle. More allusive references are to the Symposium (Symp. 180d at Apol. 12
;md -~vmp. 202e at Apol. 43). Charm/des (Charm. 157a at Apol. 26), and
rimaeus (Tim. 59d at Apol. 4 I). Other works of Apuleius draw freely upon
Plato's doctrine without the use of direct citation, for example De Platone et
eius Dogmate employing the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Tfmaeus, and De Deo
Socratis using the Symposium and the pseudo-Platonic Epinomis. Of course,
it is possible to argue that in passages where Apuleius is drawing freely upon
Plato's doctrines he may not be using the dialogues themselves but some in-
termediate doxographical sources. Apuleius' use of such materials being in-
dicated by a quantity of other evidence. However. it is perverse to imagine
that he derives his knowledge of Plato entirely from compendia, since the
quotations in the Apologia, his own activity as translator of the Phaeclo, and
the independent evidence of the availability of the dialogues during the se-
nmd century. all point to familiarity with the original texts.
23. Apuleius: Flor. 18.
Unfortunately most of our testimonia regarding Taurus do not

relate to his metaphysical or theological teaching, and so it is
difficult to establish the doctrinal parallels between the two
writers which would prove an influence. However, on at least
one point there is a close similarity between them, namely in an
interpretation of Plato's Timaeus which formulates a certain
correlation between the five senses and the elements.24 This is a
minor point perhaps, but one which makes the notion of an in-
fluence of Taurus upon Apuleius more than an empty
hypothesis.
Regarding Apuleius' philosophical education and the sources
of his Platonism one cannot safely go further than this, although
some brief remarks should be made on the question - exten-
sively debated during the last fifty years - whether his works
show the influence of the so-called 'School of Gaius.' Building
upon the suggestions of some earlier scholars who had noted
striking similarities of doctrine between various philosophical
works of the early second century ,25 T. Sinko made an elaborate
comparison of the Didascalicus of Albinus and Apuleius' De
Platone et eius Dogmate which revealed a number of doctrines
shared by the two works, his conclusion being that both writers
depended upon a common source identifiable as the Platonist
Gaius known to be active during this period.Z6 Unfortunately
there are no extant works of Gaius, and so the nature of the lat-
ter's teaching and his relation to Albinus and Apuleius can be
24. Apuleius: De Plat. 1, 14, 209-210. Taurus' view is described at

Philoponus: De Aetern. Mundi Xlll, 15. 520, 4 ff. The Greek and Roman
wrilers differ from other Platonists (for example Plutarch and Albinus) in
refusing 10 associate the fifth sense -sight - with the Aristotelian fifth ele-
ment.
25. See H. von Kleist: De Lucii Apulei Madaurensis /ibro qui lnsuibitur
Philosoph/a morali (Gottingen. 1874) and H. Hobein: De Ma_.'l:imo Tyrio
quaestiones philologae se/ectae (lena, 1895 ).
26. Sinko: op. cit.
APULEIUS 22.3
determined by circumstantial evidence only. This evidence

comprises (i) references to commentaries by Gaius in Porphyry
and Priscianus Lydus,27 (ii) the association of Gaius and Albinus
by Proclus, a note in the manuscript Paris. gr. 1962 fol. I46v,
and Galen,2s and (iii) Apuleius' reference to his own
philosophical studies in Athens.29 But we must admit that,
although the reasons for linking Gaius with Albinus seem ade-
quate,30 those for connecting him with Apuleius are less cogent
since on the one hand, the doctrinal similarities between
Albinus and Apuleius are offset by equally significant
27. Porphyry: VII. Plot. 14, 12 and Priscianus Lydus: Solut. ad Cbosr. pr.
42, 9-10. The reference to Lavin/ in the latter text is almost certainly a scribal
corruption of Alv(b)lni, in which case the passage is further evidence for the
association of Gaius and Albinus. See J. Whittaker: Parisinus Graecus 1962
and the Writings of Albinus', Phoenix 28 ( 1974), pp. 326-328.
28. Proclus: In Tim. I, 340, 24 and Galen: De Anim. Morb. 8, 41. Galen
refers to his early studies not with Albinus but with an unnamed disciple of
Gaius. Albinus is, however, specifically mentioned at Galen: De Propr. Libr.
2, 16.
29. Seen. 23.
30. Especially the reference in Proclus: In Tim. I, 340, 24. It should be
noted that it is the link between Galus and Albinus which is certain, and not
the link between Galus and the Didascallcus, since Albinus' authorship of
that work Is not fully established. All manuscripts of the treatise attribute it to
a certain 'Aiclnous', but it has been customary among modern scholars to
treat this subscription as the result of a scribal error for 'Aibinus' at some
point in the tradition. See the discussion of J. Freudenthal: 'Der Platoniker
Albinos und der falsche Alkinoos', Hellenisliscbe Studien III (Berlin. 1879),
p. 242 ff. The arguments for the identification of 'Aicinous' and Albinus are
the following: (i) the putative scribal corruption noted above, (ii) similarity of
doctrine between the Didasca/icus and testimonia regarding Albinus In Ter-
tullian and Proclus, and (iii) similarity of style between the Didasca/icus and
another indisputably authentic work of Albinus entitled the lsagoge. This
generally accepted view has, however, been challenged recently by M.
Giusta: 'AA.j3ivou 'EnttOf..ll't o 'AAKtv6ou dt5aaKaAtK6~'?, Alii della Ac-
wdemia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di scienze morali, storicbe e
/ilologicbe 95 (1960-61), pp. 167-194 and J. Whittaker: 'Lost and Found.
dissimilarities3t and on the other, there is no evidence to in-

dicate that Gaius ever taught in Athens.32 Sinko's thesis of a
dependence of both writers upon the teachings of a 'School of
Gaius' has been accepted with varying degrees of enthusiasm by
K. Praechter,33 W. Theiler,34 C. Moreschini,35 andJ. Beaujeu;36
it has been questioned with varying degrees of skepticism by E.
Pelosi,37 J. H. Loenen,38 B. M. Portogalli,39 and J. Dillon.4o For
Some Manuscripts of the Didaskalikns of Alcinous (Aibinus)", Symbolae

Osloenses 49 (1973). pp. 127-139. for an attempt to reply to Giusta's
arguments see Moreschini: op. cit., pp. 61-66. It will be immediately ap-
parent that if Albinus is not the author of this work, any attempts to link it
with the 'School of Galus' by pointing to evidence associating Albinus and
Galus will be futile .
.31. These dissimilarities are examined by most of the scholars mentioned
in nn. 37-40.
:\2. Pupils of Galus were teaching at Smyrna and Pergamum according to
Galen's testimony. Cf. n. 28.
33. K. Praechter: 'Hierax der Platoniker', Hennes4l (1906), pp. 593-618;
zum Neuplatoniker Gaios', ibid. 51 (1916). pp. 510529; and 'Nikostratos
der Platoniker', ibid. 57 (1922), pp. 481-518. See F. Uberweg und K.
Praechter: Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie l, 12. Auflage (Basel,
1923), pp. 524-556. Praechter develops at length the thesis of an 'eclectic'
school of Platonists - Albinus, Apulcius, the anonymous commentator on
the Theaetetus (the 'School of Galus')- in contrast to an 'orthodox' school
-Plutarch, Atticus, Cclsus, Taurus .
.34. W. Theiler: Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (Berlin, 1934.
reprinted Berlin/Zurich, 1964), pp. 2-3. 12, 35. and 37 ff.
35. Moreschini: op. cit., pp. 51-66 and 133 ff. Recent supporters of the
'School of Galus' have tended to be less confident than earlier ones. Thus,
Moreschini: op. cit., p. 61 toncludes 'Non i: quindi del tutto illogico credere
che le dourine di Apuleio risalgano in ultima analisi a Gaio' (my italics).
36. Bcaujeu: op. cit .. pp. 5559. His conclusion at op. cit .. p. 57 is as
cautious as Mon:schini's: 'Nous dccouvririons peut-etre que Gaios n'a jouc
qu'un role d'intermcdiaire entre ses devanciers et ses auditcurs et qu'il n'a
nullement etc le chef d'une 'Ecole' digne de ce nom'.
_1.,7. E. Pelosi: 'Een Platoonse Gedachte bij Gaios, Albinos en Apuleius van
Madaura', Studia Catholica (Nijmegen) 15 (1939). pp. 375394 and ibid. 16
( 1940), pp. 226-24 2.
APlJLEILIS 225
our purposes, it is perhaps best to treat it as a possible although

scarcely proven hypothesis.
Often associated with the thesis that the Didascalicus and De
Platone et eius Dogmate are both influenced by the Platonist
Gaius is a further argument that both works also derive some of
their content from the doxography of Arius Didymus. This lat-
ter theory was first expounded by H. Diels41 in connection with
his pioneering work of collecting the ancient doxographic
material and is based on the following evidence: (i) a close tex-
tual parallel between a chapter of Albinus' treatise and passages
in Eusebius and Stobaeus both of which follow a section in Arius
Didymus work although with differing degrees of accuracy,
and (ii) the presence of certain characteristically Stoic doctrines
in Albinus which seem to reflect the philosophical position
otherwise associated with Arius Didymus. Regarding these
arguments we may conclude that, although the textual
dependence of Albinus upon the doxographer is established in
this particular instance, 42 it is unwise to connect the former too
closely with the latter's position since on the one hand, the in-
fluence of such doctrines is so widespread in Platonic writers of
the second century that it is impossible to use its presence as
evidence for the following of a specific sourceB and on the
other, the influence of Stoic notions in Albinus is far outweigh-
~H. J. H. Loenen: 'Alhinus' Metaphrsics. An Attempt at Rehabilitation',

.Unemusyne. Series 4. 9 ( 1956). pp. 296-319 and ibid. I 0 ( 1957). pp. 35-';6.
59. B. M. Portogalli: 'Sulle fonti della concezione teologica e
1kmonologica di Apuleio'. Stud/ clclsslcle orient ali 12 ( 196.-\ ). pp. 227-241 .
.to. Dillon: op. cit .. pp. 337-338.
II. H. Diels: Doxograpbi Graeci. Co/legit recmsuit prolegomenls in-
dicibusque instruxit H. D. (Berlin. 1879), pp. 76-77. Cf. H. Diels und W.
Schuhart: Anonvmer Kommentar zu Platons Theaetct 11ebst drei
BrudJstiicken pbilosopbiscbetl In halts (Berlin, 190'5), p. xxiv ff.
i2. See alsop. 242 ff.
I j. The inlluen<.e of Stoic thc:orv is one of the characteristic traits of all
later Platonism (including that of Pl~tinus).
ed by that of Platonism which is less characteristic of the dox-

ographer.44 Diets' thesis has been accepted together with that of
the 'School of Gaius' to explain the doctrinal background of
Albinus and Apuleius by H. Strache,45 W. Theiler,46 C.
Moreschini, 47 and J.Beaujeu;4s it has been accepted in-
dependently of the thesis of the 'School of Gaius' by R. E.
Witt,49 M. Giusta,so and). Dillon51 the second of these scholars
taking the more extreme position that the Didasca/icus is a
purely Stoic doxography. In conclusion, the dependence of
Albinus and Apuleius upon Arius Didymus seems well establish-
ed, although the degree of that influence remains an open ques-
tion.
This brief discussion of the present state of scholarship will, I
hope, demonstrate that regarding the question of Apuleius'
philosophical sources there is much debate but little hard fact.
44. Arius Didymus was influenced by the Platonist Antiochus of Ascalon

but, like his source. has a system leaving no place for the strict Platonic no-
tion of transcendence. Significantly, Albin us and Apuleius do have the latter
concept.
4S. H. Strache: De Arll Didymi in Mora/i pbilosopbia am:toribus (Berlin,
1909) and Der Eklektizismus des Antiocbos von Askalon (Berlin, 1921 ).
46. Theiler: op. cit .. p. 36 ff.
47. Moreschini: op. cit.. pp. 55-57. 61, n.28, and 62-66.
48. Beaujeu: op. cit., p. 57.
49. R. E. Witt: Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge,
1937), pp. 95-103. Although Witt makes occasional use of the 'School of
Gaius' hypothesis, his main argument is based upon the postulation of Arius
Didymus as source of the Didascalicus. He concludes atop. cit., p. 118: 'We
can establish that Albinus, the Commentator, and Arius agree more than
once. That in these cases Gaius may exercise influence is not to be denied.
But it must at the same time be admitted that Arius alone would suffice as the
source'.
50. M. Giusta: I dossografi di elica 1-11 (Utlit,ersitil di Toritlo, Pubblica-
zioni della Ftlcoltil dl Lettere e Fllosofltl IS. 3-4) (Torino. 1964 and 1967).
S I. Dillon: op. cit .. pp. 269 and 338.
APULEIUS 227
All that seems certain is that he studied in Athens around the

middle of the second century, and of the Platonic philosophers
with whom he was most likely to have come into contact it was
Taurus who seems to have had the greatest reputation as a
teacher.52 That he also had contact with Gaius or one of the lat-
ter's pupils is possible, although this cannot be substantiated by
the examination of his doctrine or by a comparison with
Albinus. If the personal influence of Taurus was indeed signifi-
cant for our writer, then we can assume that he studied Plato's
dialogues in the kind of convivial seminar which Gellius
described, 53 the study of the original texts probably being aided
by doxographical compilations like that of Arius Didymus. If
there is any concrete result from this preliminary discussion, it
is the realization that we must strive to understand Apuleius'
philosophical position primarily on the basis of statements in his
works themselves, the doctrines of contemporary or earlier
Platonists providing illuminating parallels but not explanations
of his viewpoint.
4.2 THE TRIADIC SYSTEM
Of the three traditional parts of philosophy, it is physics

which is primarily of interest to Apuleius. 54 This is indicated not
'52. Seep. 208 and ch. 3, n. 25.

53. Seep. 207 ff.
'54. Apuleius follows the custom - well-established by his time - of
dividing philosophy into three parts. At De Plat. l, 4. 187 he lists these in the
sequence natura/is - rationalis - mora/is following the chronological order
of their appearance. Thus, physics was discovered by the Pythagoreans, logic
by the Eleatics. and ethics by Socrates, Plato being the first to combine them
into a coherent whole. At ibid. l, 4, 189 Apuleius accordingly begins his
discussion with physics to which the first book is devoted, although his se-
cond book concerns ethics and not logic. For this tripartite division in earlier
sources see pp. 7 4-77.
2.28 MIDDLE PLATONISM
only by the fact that his most personal philosophical treatise -

De Deo Socratis- is concerned with the problem of mediation
between the divine and human realms, but by the predominant
position - quantitatively speaking - which problems of
physics occupy in the extant writings as a whole. When a
modern interpreter comes to investigate what Apuleius has to
say on this subject, he is perhaps immediately struck by a
peculiar characteristic of the doctrine, which marks it off
distinctly from earlier forms of Platonism. One might describe
this as a penchant for triadic schemata. ss
4.21 GODS, DEMONS, MEN
In the first place among these schemata comes a tripartition

of the world as a whole which is presented systematically in
two separate texts. In De Deo Socratis we read as follows: 'Plato
has divided the whole nature of things, at least that part which
comprises the higher and animate beings, into three parts. In the
highest position he has placed the gods. By speaking of a
highest, middle, and lowest, one should not understand a mere
distinction of place but one of natural dignity, this latter being
perceived not in one or two but in three ways. However, the
spatial distinction furnished the most clear starting point for his
classification, so that he assigned heaven to the immortal gods
as their majesty required'. s6 This text provides us with the prin-
ciple of dividing reality into three levels and describes the
nature of the highest of the three. However, we must discover
SS. As Regen: op. cit.. p. 51 ff. and Beaujeu: op. cit., p. xxiii ff. have noted,
the presence of such schemata and their agreement with one another in all
the works of the Apuleian corpus are factors which speak forcefully in favor
of the authenticity of the disputed texts.
S6. Apuleius: De Deo Socr. I, I IS Plato omnem naturam rerum, quod
eius ad animalia praecipua pertifletll, trifariam divisit censuitque esse
summos deos. Summum, medium et infimum fac intel/egas non modo loci
APULEIUS
the nature of the middle and lowest levels by turning to the text
of De Platone et eius Dogmate. This informs us that 'the kinds
of animate beings themselves are divided into four species, of
which one is of the nature of fire such as we see in the cases of
the sun. moon, and other heavenly bodies. Another is of the
quality of air - Plato calls this the race of demons. The third is
composed of water and earth: a mortal and corporeal race
divided into a species "dwelling in the earth" and a species
"dwelling on the earth" - thus have I translated yyetov and
niyetov - the former comprising trees and other plants which
pass their life rooted to the ground, the latter those creatures
which the earth nourishes and sustains'. S7 Since the fourth
species announced at the beginning of the passage turns out to
he a subdivision of the third, we seem to have a triadic schema
corresponding to that in the previous text. In this case we have
discovered the nature of the middle and lowest levels described
earlier together with the additional fact that each of the three is
characterized by at least one physical element.
The theory that the world of animate beings is divided into
gods who are fiery. <.lemons who are aery. and mortals who are
watery and earthy is attributed by Apuleius to Plato. However,
there is certainly no authentic text by the latter which outlines
such a theory. What Apuleius seems to have done is to combine
disclusicme terum eliam naturae dignitate, quae et ipsa neque uno neque
gemino modo sed pluribus cemitur. Ordlrl tamen manifeslius fuit a loci
clispositicme. Nam proinde ut maiestas postulabat. diis inmorta/ibus
caelum diccuit.
';'7. Apuleius: De Plat. I. I I, 204 lam ipsa animantium genera in quat-
ltwr species ditiduntur. qua rum una est ex natura ignis eiusmodi qut~lem
solem ac lunam videmus ceterasque siderum stel/as, alterum e.x aeria
Cftllllilate - bane etimn daemcmum dicit -. tertium ex t~qua terraque
nmlescere; et mortale genus corporum ex eo dividi terrenum atque terrestre
- sic enim yyttov et btiyttov censui nuncupanda - terrenumque esse ar-
lmrum ceterclrumque frugum, quae bumi fixae titam trahunt, terrestr/Cl
tero quae alit ac sustinet tel/us.
2:\0 MIDDLE PLATONISM
two separate doctrines of Plato: (i) the theory of the Symposium

that 'the demonic' (to 8at1J.OV10V) is an intermediate between
immortal and mortal, 58 and (ii) the classification of animate be-
ings in the Timaeus into 'the heavenly race of gods' (oup<ivlOv
9Erov ytvoc;), 'the winged beings who travel in the air' (7ttT)VOV
Kai <iEpo7t6pov), 'the kind which dwells in water' (Evu8pov
d8oc;), and 'the kind which goes on foot and dwells on land'
(1tE~OV at. Kai 'XEpaaiov). 59 By combining the notion of the
demonic as an intermediate rank between gods and men with
the fourfold classification of animate beings according to the
elements, Apuleius arrives at a schema which has many
similarities to the hierarchy of living things in the pseudo-
Platonic Epinomis. Here, the animate beings are correlated with
the five elements in such a way that the heavenly gods are
associated with fire and the three lower classes of living things
with earth, leaving three apparently different ranks of demons
to be correlated with the intermediate elements of aether, air,
and water.6o Of course, Apuleius' schema associates the
demonic rank only with air, and so he is clearly not reporting
the theory of the Epinomis exactly. However, the similarity of
aim between the two writers - to construct a coherent
cosmological system from scattered statements by Plato - sug-
gests that Apuleius may be inspired by the pseudo-Platonic
work.6I
58. Plato: !J)mp. 202d-e.

59. Plato: Tim. 39e-40a. That the character of the first class of animate be-
ings is 'fiery' (EK 1tup6c;) is stated in the next sentence. Of course. Plato's
schema at this point makes no place for demons, since the four categories
correspond to heavenly bodies, birds, fish, and land animals respectively.
60. Ps.-Piato: Epin. 984d-e. On the interpretation of this text and its in-
fluence in late antiquity see L. Taran: Academica. Plato, Philip of Opus, and
the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis (Philadelphia, 1975), pp. 42-47. 159-163. and
283-284.
61. Further texts in Apuleius which allude to the first schema (without
APULEIUS 231
4.22 GOD, INVISIBLE GODS, VISIBLE GODS
The second Apuleian schema is not totally independent of the

first tripartition, but represents a further triadic subdivision of
its highest term. Thus, we find those gods who were earlier
mentioned collectively now divided into three classes which
Apuleius describes in a mixture of prose and verse in the follow-
ing way: 'And of these heavenly gods, some we comprehend
with our vision, the others we investigate with our intellect. It is
by vision that we perceive "you brightest lights of the world
who steer in heaven the waning year" ... There is another class
of gods which Nature denies our sight, although we may con-
template them with an attentive intellect, surveying them more
penetratingly with the gaze of the mind. Among these are the
twelve whose names were so disposed that Ennius could bring
them together into two verses: "Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres,
Diana, Venus, Mars, Mercury, Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan,
Apollo" and the rest of that kind .... Their father who is the ruler
and author of all things, liberated from all the constraints of suf-
fering or performing anything, and unconfined by obligation at
all times, why should I now attempt to speak of him'?62 Since
the earlier passages described the gods primarily in terms of
necessarily memioning all three terms) are De Deo Socr. 4, 127; 6, 134; 12.
146-13,148;andDeP/at. 1,12,206
62. Apuleius: De Deo Socr. I, 116- 3. 124 quos quidem deos cae/itespar-
lim visu usurpamus, alios intellectu vestigamus. Ac visu quidem cernimus
'tos, o clarissima muP~di /lumina, /abeP~tem caelo quae due ills ammm' ...
Est aliud deorum genus, quod natura visibus nostris denegavit, nee non
lumen intel/ectu eos rlmabundi contemplamur, acie mentis acrius con-
temp/antes. Quorum in numero sunt ill/ duodecim situ nominum in duo
tersus ab Ennio coartati: 'Juno, Vesta. Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus,
!'rJars. I Mercuri us, Jovis, Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo' ceterique id genus ...
Quorum parePltem, qui omP~ium rerum dominator atque auctor est,
solutum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid gerendive, nulla tice ad
a lieu ius rei munia obstrictum. cur ego nunc dicere exordiar ....
their spatial location and elemental composition, it is the first

category - the visible gods - of the present text which cor-
responds most nearly with the original schema. However,
Apuleius now informs his reader that the notion of divinity
should not be restricted to the heavenly bodies but also applies
to various invisible powers and most importantly to the first
cause itself.
The source of this second schema is easier to specify since all
the notions necessary to establish the tripartition of the divine
into the supreme God, the invisible gods, and the visible gods
can be found in Plato's Timaeus.63 In that dialogue. the primal
cause of the universe is the 'Demiurge' (cSnJ..I.lOUpy6~) who
creates all the subordinate gods and then assigns to them certain
further creative tasks appropriate to their station.64 That
Apuleius has this doctrine in mind seems to be indicated by the
final words of the passage quoted, where the author's reticence
in speaking of this God parallels a similar expression of
forbearance in Plato's original.65 A division of the subordinate
gods into invisible and visible also occurs in the Timaeus where
two classes of the gods created by the Demiurge are described:
'those who reveal themselves as much as they wish' (<Sam
cpaivovtat Ka9'5aov liv &etA.roatv) and 'those who rotate visibly'
(oaot tE 7tEptnoA.oumv q>avEpci>c;).66 The first group consists of
divinities such as Cronus, Rhea, Zeus, Hera, and all those whose
genealogies have been reported by the poets, while the second
comprises the moon. sun, Venus, Mercury, and the other
heavenly bodies which are composed of the fiery element.67
Apuleius' description of the two classes makes use of a similar
63. Cf. Plato: Leg. XI, 930~:-9.~ Ia and ps.-Piato: Epin. 9R4d.
64. Plato: Tim. 4Ia.
6S. Ibid. 28c.
66.1bid. 4Ia.
67. Ibid. 3Rc-d and .Jod-4Ia.
APllLEil!S H3
contrast between mythology and astronomy. although on this

occasion as elsewhere we find the Latin writer's analysis to be
more rigid and schematic in character.68
4.23 DISEMBODIED, SEMI-EMBODIED, EMBODIED DEMONS
The third Apuleian schema is, like the second, not totally in-
dependent of the original tripartition of reality. However. in
this case we find not a further triadic subdivision of its highest
term but rather a dyadic subdivision of its middle term. This
constitutes a triad when juxtaposed with a revised interpreta-
tion of the lowest term. According to De Deo Socratis: 'In a cer-
tain sense, even the human soul is called a demon while it yet re-
mains in the body. "Is it the gods who place such ardor in our
minds, Euryalus, or baneful desire arising to each as his god"?
Thus also a good desire of the soul is a good god. Thus, some
maintain, as I have already said, that those who have a good
demon - that is a soul perfect in virtue - those blessed ones
are called "eudaemones". You may call this a "genius" in our
language, a translation which I shall hazard even if it is not a
good one ... In a second sense, the human soul which has com-
pleted its earthly service and retires from the body is also a
species of demon. This was usually called a "lemur" in the old
Latin language, as I discover69 .... There is however another
68. Apuleius' distinction of the invisible and visible gods occurs again at
De Deo Socr. 4, I 28.
69. It is clear that within this second class of demons- human souls after
their carthl\' incarnation - further triadic subdivision is visualized. Thus.
Apulcius co~tinues his analysis by suggesting: 'Among these "lemurs" who
have hcen allotted the care of their descendants and rule their domain with a
quiet ami tranquil divinity is the so-called "familiar Jar". However. those
who hccause of their evil deeds in life have no abode and are punished by
unccrt:Jin wanderings and a kind of exile, the kind who rcpresem a vain tcr
ror for the good but a serious one for the bad, are normally called 'larvae''.
23-1 MIDDLE PLATONISM
higher and more august kind of demon, in number not inferior

to the others and in dignity far superior, which is always free of
the body's impediments and constraints and has certain powers.
Among these, Sleep and Love have powers contrasting with one
another, of Love the power to arouse and of Sleep the power to
lull. '70 Because the earlier passages described the demonic
nature as intermediate between gods and men, it is the third
category - demons always disembodied - which parallels the
original schema most closely. However, Apuleius goes on to
argue that the demonic nature should also be held to embrace
human souls and, since these latter exist both in the body and
after the period of earthly incarnation, two further classes of
When we are uncertain to which of these groups a given spirit belongs -

whether to "'lemurs" or "larvae" -we call it "the god Manes" '. (E."C bisce
ergo Lemur/bus qui posterorum suorum curam sortitus placato et quieto
numine domum possidet, Lar dicitur fami/iaris; qui vero ob adr,ersa vitae
merita nul/is sedibus incerta vagatione ceu quodam exi/io punitur, inane
terricu/amentum bonis bominibus, ceterum ma/is noxium, id genus pleri
que Larvas perbibent. Cum vero incertum est, quae cuique eorum sortitio
evenerit, utrum Lar sit an Larva, nomine Manem deum nutzcupant).
Naturally. the third class is not distinct from the others in an ontological
sense, although its postulation is further evidence of Apuleius' penc:btmt for
triadic schemata.
70. Apuleius: De Deo Socr. 15,150 - 16,155 Nam quodam sigtzificatu et
animus bumanus etiam nunc in corpore situs daemon nuncupatur: 'dine
bunc ardorem mentibus addrmt, I Euryale, an sua cuique deus fit dira
cupido?' lgitur et bona cupido animi bonus deus est. Unde tzmmulli ar-
bitrantur, ut lam prius dictum est, eudaemonas dici beatos, quorum
daenum botzus id est animus virtute perfectus est. Eum nostra lingua, ut
ego interpretor, baud sciam an bono, certe quidem meo periculo poteris
Genium !locare ... Est et secundo significatu species daemonum animus
bumanus emeritis stipend/is !Jitae corpore srw abiurans. Hunc 11etere
Latina lingua reperio Lemurem dictitatum ... Sunt autem non poster/ore
numero, praestantiore Ionge digt~itate, super/us a/iud, augustius genus
daemonum, qui semper a corporis conpedibus et nexibus /iberi certis
potestatibus curant. Quorum e numero Somnus at que Amor diversam ITiter
se rim possident, Amor vigilandi, Somnus soporandi.
APllLEIUS
demons are required. Of these, it is the first category - demons

currently embodied - which corresponds to the lowest term in
the original schema or perhaps supersedes it.
When we come to consider the question of sources, it is this
third schema which presents us with the greatest difficulties of
interpretation for on the one hand, it is necessary to explain the
origin of the various philosophical concepts involved and on
the other, we must account for the translation of these concepts
into the language of Roman religion. In connection with the
first point, it is easy to see that Apuleius is once again drawing
together into a systematic form scattered doctrines in Plato's
writings. Thus, the notion that the human soul is a demon is bas-
ed upon the Timaeus where the rational part of the soul is
described as something 'which God has bestowed as a demon
on each individual' (auto 5aiJJ.OVa eeoc; EKQO'tf.!l 55roKEV).71
That the human soul which has departed from its earthly ex-
istence is a demon could be gleaned from the Cratylus in which
we read that a good man who is deceased 'has a great portion
and honor and becomes a demon' (JJ.Eya).:nv JJ.Oipav Kal. 'tlJJ.i]v
~'X.El Kai yiyvetal 5aiJJ.roV). 72 Finally, the notion of a third class of
demon which has never existed in an embodied state goes back
- as we have already seen - to the doctrine of the Symposium
that the demonic nature is 'intermediate' (JJ.E'ta~u) between gods
and men. 73 Concerning the second point it is unfortunately not
possible to be equally precise, since the translation of the Greek
term 5aiJJ.roV by various Latin expressions such as genius and tar
can be documented in certain earlier Roman writers,74 but in
71. Plato: Tim. 90a.

-:'2. Plato: Crat. 398bc.
73. See pp. 229-230. For these references to Plato and for other points of
detail. I am indebted to the excellent notes on the history of Greek and
Roman demonology by Beaujeu: op. cit., pp. 183-20 I and 231-233.
"4. Cicero hesitantly translates Sai~c.ov by far at Tim. 38 ( = Plato: Tim.
iOd). Seneca refers to the belief in such divinilles at Epist. 90, 28. For Varro
see pp. 838-840.
most of these cases it is difficult to determine the nature of the

various spiritual beings with sufficient precision to permit any
secure identifications with the different Greek classes of
cSaiJ.l.ovec;. However, the testimonies regarding Varro's doctrine
take us some way towards this goal, for according to Augustine
the great Roman encyclopaedist had defined a genius as 'the ra-
tional soul of each man' (uniuscuiusque animus rationalis),75
while according to Arnobius he had spoken of lares, larvae,
and genii as 'the souls of the the deceased' ifunctorum animae
mortuorum).76 Whether Varro also believed in a class of spirits
who had never been subject to embodiment is unclear from the
extant evidence, although he apparently postulated disem-
bodied souls which could be called lares or genii inhabiting the
region of air below the moon and perceptible by intellect but
not vision. 77 Since this last description especially parallels
remarks in Apuleius account, it seems possible that the latter
was harmonizing Platonic philosophy and Roman religion
under his predecessor's influence.7B
4.24 EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT TRIADS
The three schemata already described are central to Apuleius'

philosophical doctrine and as far as we can tell peculiar to him.
However, in these works we also find certain other schemata
which, although less important for his particular philosophical
aims, indicate a position in relation to more general currents of
75. See Augustine: Cit. Dei VII. 13 (CCSL 47, 196-197).

76. Varru: Antiq. fr. 209 (Arnobius: Adv. Nat. Ill, 41 (CSEL 4, 139)).
77. Varro:Antiqu. fr. 226(Augustine: Civ. De/VII,6(CCSL47, 191)).
78. The use of Varro by Latin writers of this period is adequately
documented by the numerous citations of his works in Gellius' Noctes At-
ticae. Seep. 203. Apuleius does not cite Varro by name very often. although
he is mentioned at Apol. 42 in connection with divination, one paragraph
before a reference to Plato's theory of the demons 'intermediate status.
APllLEIUS 2~7
Platonism. Unfortunately, none of these schemata is presented

with the same care which the author bestowed on the descrip-
tion of the earlier examples, and so it will be necessary to inter-
pret and perhaps reconstruct from the outset.79 But this effort
will be repaid handsomely, I believe, by the philosophical
results which can be accomplished .
..f.25 GOD, MATTER, FORM
The fourth Apuleian schema is basically independent of the

three earlier schemata and clearly constructed according to dif-
ferent presuppositions. It is described in a passage of De Platone
et eius Dogmate which runs: 'Plato believes that there are three
principles of things: God, Matter (which is incomplete and un-
formed, distinguished neither according to shape nor quality),
and the Forms of things which he calls ''Ideas" [these being in-
complete and unformed, distinguished neither according to
shape nor quality] .so Of the three elements which constitute
this schema the first - God - presents us with no problems of
interpretation, since he is clearly identifiable with the first term
'9. This state of affairs is not unconnected with the fact that we must draw
these later schemata from De Pia tone et eius Dogmate primarily whereas the
earlier schemata occurred mainly in De Deo Socratls. We have already noted
that there is a considerable difference in style between these two works.
Thus, De P/atone et eius Dogmate often reads like the hasty exposition of
partially digested handbook material, whereas De Deo Socratis is a careful ac-
t:ount of Apuleius' own religious beliefs. Seep. 217.
HO. Apuleius: De Plat. I, 5. 190 lnitia rernm esse tria arbitratur Plato:
deum et materiam (inabsolutam infonnem, nullt1 specie nee qualitatis
significatione distinctam). rerumqueformas. quas iota<; idem l'ocat [inab-
solutas infonnes, nulla specie nee qualitatis significatione distinctas]. I
h;l\e presented here the two possible versions of this text, J. Beaujeu reading
the sement:c together with the phrase in parentheses, P. Thomas reading it
together with that in brackets. For the significance of these different versions
seep. 2H6 ff.
in the first and second schemata. The second element - Matter

- clearly introduces a new factor into the system of Apuleius as
previously described, although its relation to elements in the
first three schemata can be determined without any con-
siderable likelihood of error. According to the main traditions
of philosophy current at this period, Matter is a kind of
substratum underlying all physical objects, which it constitutes
by entering into combination with some formal principle. Since
the information derived from the analysis of the first three
schemata indicates that the visible gods and the demons have a
physical composition which is fiery and airy respectively, we
must therefore conclude that such beings possess the Matter of
the fourth schema as an underlying constituent. The third ele-
ment - Form - also introduces a new factor into the Apuleian
system, although on this occasion the relation to elements in the
first three schemata cannot be determined without a more
detailed analysis.st
4.251 GOD AND FORM IN PLATO
The question of the role of Form in Apuleius can perhaps best
HI. The triadic schema of God, Matter. and Form which occurs not only in
Apuleius but in many other writers of late antiquity has been extensively
discussed in modern scholarship. See C. Baeumker: Das Problem der Materie
in der griecbiscben Pbilosopbie. Ein bistoriscb-kritiscbe Untersucbung
(Munster, 1890), p. 114 and n. 2: Theiler: op. cit. p. 1'i ff.; Will: op. cit., pp.
96-97; A. -J. FcstugiC:re: 'Lc Compendium Timaei de Galien'. Retitle des
etudes grecques 65 ( 1952), pp. JO'i-114; J. H. Waszink: 'Observations on Ter-
tullian's Treatise against Hcrmogcnes', Vigiliae Cbristitmae 9 ( 19'i'i), p. 130;
H. Dorrie: 'Die Frage nach dem Transzendenten im Millelplatonismus', Les
sources de P/otin (Fondation Hardt, Entretiens sur I'Antiquite class/que 'i)
(Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1960), p. 205 ff.; ). Pepin: Tbeologie cosmlque et
tbeo/ogie cbretiemze (Ambroise, Exam. /, I, 1-4) (Paris, 1964), pp. 17-58:
Beaujeu: op. cit., pp . .254-.256: Dillon: op. cit., pp. 410-411; and Moreschini:
up. cit., pp. 69-70, 166, 174, n.ll6, and 178 ff.
APULEIUS 2.:\9
be approached through a consideration of the sources of the

triad: God, Matter, Form. As in the case of the earlier doctrine,
the obvious starting point is Plato whose dialogue Timaeus con-
tains philosophical notions somewhat analogous to those under
investigation. Two passages in particular provide us with similar
details: (i) The maker or father of the universe is said to have
made it according to an everlasting and unchanging 'paradigm
(7tapcicS&1YIJ.U).82 Since the latter is clearly identifiable with the
usual Form or Forms of Plato's philosophy, we have a parallel
for the first and third elements in the Apuleian schema,
although the further element implied in Plato's text is not Mat-
ter but the world. (ii) Three things are said to be necessary for
the constitution of physical objects: 'Form' (&icSoc;) analogous to
the father in the process of generation, 'the Receptacle' (to
cS&XOIJ.&VOV) or 'Space' (x.ci>pa) analogous to the mother, and 'the
nature which arises between them' (fl IJ.&ta~i> toutrov q>umc;)
analogous to their offspring.s3 Here the Receptacle plays a role
similar to that of a material principle, so it seems reasonable to
find parallels to the second and third elements in Apuleius'
schema, the only difference being that the further element in
Plato is not God but the physical object. So much is clear, yet it
must be admitted that our attempted rapprochement between
the two authors gives rise to certain problems which cannot
honestly be ignored. In the first place, the identification of
terms is rendered uncertain at one point by the fact that God in
the earlier text and Form in the later text are both described as
fathers. Does this mean that Plato intended us to equate the two
elements? Secondly, in neither of the texts from Plato do we
find all three elements presented together but only God and
Form in the earlier and Matter and Form in the latter. Is it possi-
ble that the more rigid systematization has been suggested to
H2. Plato: Tim. 28a-29a. Cf. ibid. 39e.

M:\. Ibid. 50c-d and 52a-b. Cf. ibid. 48e-49a.
Apuleius by some intermediate source?

Taking the question of the possible identification of God and
Form first, we immediately touch upon one of the greatest dif-
ficulties in both ancient and modern interpretations of Plato.
The problem is that in the Timaeus the relation between the
Demiurge and the Paradigm seems to be visualized in two dif-
ferent ways: on the one hand, the Demiurge is described as
distinct from the Paradigm - the latter being a group of
separate Forms which he contemplates- and on the other, the
Demiurge is treated as coinciding with the Paradigm -in which
case the latter becomes a group of his own thoughts upon which
he reflects. The first interpretation is implied in passages where
the Demiurge is said to have fashioned the world by 'looking
towards the eternal' (npoc; to ciiotov ~Atnetv),B4 or by 'bringing
the Paradigm into use' (npoox,p<iliJ.Evoc; napaoeiyjlatt),85 or by
'discerning the Forms contained in the Living Creature in Itself
(evouoac; iotac; tQ> ofonv ~q>ov ... Ka6opav ).86 Such statements
seem to indicate Forms which are separate from the Demiurge
in the sense of being prior to and determinative of his creative
activity. However, one must be aware that Plato is consciously
describing the divine activity by employing the analogy of
human craftsmanship, and that his real view of God's creativity
is perhaps more adequately expressed in the Republic. Here
Plato elaborates the interesting argument that, although the
human artisan fashions a bed by 'looking towards the Form'
(npoc; ttiv iMav ~Atnrov) but 'in no way manufactures the Form
itself'(ou yap 7tOU ttiv 'YE iotav auti]v OTJjllOUpyei), the Form of
bed 'is made by God himself (6eov epycioao6at).87 This discus-
sion suggests Forms which are separate from God in the sense of
84. Ibid. 29a.

85. Ibid. 28a.
86. Ibid. 39t:.
87. Plato: Rep. X, 596b and 597b.
APlJLEIUS 241
being posterior to and determined by his creative activity. The

second interpretation is implied in the passage of the Timaeus
noted earlier where Form is said to be 'comparable to a father'
(rcpoaEtKaaat rcptrcet ... rcatpi).R8 This seems to suggest that the
Forms are identified with the Demiurge in the sense that they
assume the essential characteristic of his paternity in relation to
the world.89 Equally indicative of a merging in the roles of the
1wo principles are other passages in the same work where the
Oemiurge is described as lacking all envy and therefore 'wishing
all things to be as much like him as possible' (7t<ivta l:m J.UiA.tata
&J3ouA.it9TJ yeva8at rcapanMma eautep),90 or where he is said to
have had a 'plan' (A.oyta1J.6~ ... A.oyta9Ei~) regarding the ap-
propriateness of the world's spherical shape.9I On both these
occasions, Plato suggests that the Demiurge is identified with
the Forms in the sense that he adopts their essential
characteristics of being paradigmatic and rational principles of
the cosmological process.92
4.2;2 GOD, MATTER, FORM IN THE EARLIER TRADITION
Even if it has proved impossible to answer the question

whether God and the Forms should be identified by appealing
to the ultimate source of Apuleius' doctrine, perhaps it will be
easier to answer the further question whether the triadic
schema of God, Matter, and Form described by Apuleius has
HH. Plato: Tim. SOd.

H9. See ibid. 28c; 37c; 41 a; and Pollt. 273b.
90. Plato: Tim. 29e.
C) I. ll>id. 33a and 34a-b.
92. See if1id. 30c-31 b: 39e; and 50c-d. For an excellent discussion of these
passages in Plaw seej. PC:pin: 'Elements pour une histoire de Ia relation entre
l'intelligence et l'intelligible chez Platon et dans le neoplatonisme'. Re11ue
fJIJit~Jsopbique 146 (1956), pp. 42-43 and Tht!o/ogle cosmique et thtfologie
cbretienne (Ambroise, Exam./, 1. 1-4), pp. 22-24.
been inspired by some intermediate philosophical source. In

order to tackle this problem it will first be necessary to make
some observations about the possible character of such an in-
termediate source.
4.253 THE DOXOGRAPHERS
A significant feature of philosophical act1v1ty from the

Hellenistic period onwards is the increasing tendency to collect
information about the doctrines of various schools into hand-
books.93 This so-called 'doxographical tradition' which stems
ultimately from the enormous history of philosophy by
Theophrastus entitled Cl>u<nKrov .l\6~at plays a major role in the
educational programs of the later classical period, as evidenced
93. For details regarding the doxographical tradition one should consult-
in addition to the work of H. Diels cited inn. 41 -the following studies: H.
Diels: 'Stobaios und Aetios', Rheinisches Museum 36 (1881), pp. 343-350;
Uberweg und Praechter: op. cit., pp. 10-26; ). Burnet: Early Greek
Philosophy, 4th edition (London, 1930), pp. 31-38; 0. Regenbogen:
'Theophrastos von Eresos', Paulys Realencyclopiidie der k/assischen Alter-
tumswissemchaft, Suppi.-Band 7 (Stuugart, 1940), col. 1536ff.: E. Zeller:
Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. 13th edition revised by W. Nes-
tle and translated by L. R. Palmer (London, 1931 ), pp. 4-8; A.-). Festugiere: La
riL,ilatiotz d'Hermes Trismegiste II: Le Dleu cosmique (Paris, 1949). pp.
345-369; A. Solignac: 'Doxographles et manuels dans Ia formation
philosophique de saint Augustin', Recherches augusliniennes I (Paris, 1958),
pp. 113-148; J. B. McDiarmid: 'Plato in Theophrastus' De Sensibus',
Phnmesis 4 ( 1959). pp. 59-70: 8. Wyss: Doxographie'. Reallexikon fiir An-
like zmd Christentum 4 (Stuttgart, 1959), col. 197-210: C. H. Kahn: Anax-
imarzder atzd the Origirzs of Greek Cosmology (London/New York, 1960),
pp. 11-24: G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven: 7'he Presocralic Philosophers. A
Critical History uith a Selecliorz of Texts (Cambridge, 1962). pp. 1-7: I.
Opelt: 'Epitome'. Realle:~ikon fiir Antike zmd Chtisletztum 5 (Stuugart,
1962), col. 950-952: and W. K. C. Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy 1:
The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans (Cambridge, 1967), pp. xiii-
xiv.
APlJLEillS
by the frequent resort to such sources made by Cicero, Varro,

seneca, and other writers in order to supplement the informa-
tion which they may have gained from a reading of the primary
sources themselves.94 The task of examining and classifying the
extant remains of the doxographical tradition was undertaken
by H. Diels in the late nineteenth century and, since the results
of his investigation are still valid today, it may be useful to sum-
marize his main conclusions here.9'i Of Theophrastus' original
work only one chapter entitled nepi AiaOnaerov has survived,
although other fragments are preserved in the commentary on
Aristotle's Physics by Simplicius, who apparently derived his
Theophrastean material through the intermediary of Alexander
of Aphrodisias.96 Naturally, Theophrastus' handling of the
earlier philosophical material reflected the style and critical ap-
proach of the school to which he himself belonged: the
Peripatetic. This Theophrastean doxography formed the basis
of all later handbooks of the same type, and among these Diels
succeeded in reconstructing the content of two of the most im-
portant, namely the Placita of Aetius and an earlier compilation
which he decided to call the 'Vetusta Placita'. The existence of
the later of these doxographies was shown by Diels himself who
had noted that there were striking agreements of content bet-
ween the pseudo-Piutarchian Placita and the Eclogae Physicae
of Stobaeus suggesting a common source for the two works, and
that the identity of this source is explicitly revealed as 'the col-
lection of Aetius concerning opinions' (' Ae-riou T) 7tEpi
apeaK6v-rrov ~uvayroyij) by Theodoret who preserves the same
material in a somewhat fuller form.97 Diels further argued that
94. For the doxographies and Cicero see pp. 60-62, 91-2 :md ch. I. n. I:\ I.
For Varro see app. n. 94. For Seneca see ch. 2, n. '59.
9'5. Diets: Doxographi Graeci, pp. 1-263.
96. Diels: Doxographi Graeci, p. I 12 ff. The need to postulate Alexander
as an intermediary has been questioned by Regenbogen: op. cit., col.
I '536-1 '5'52.
97. See Diets: Doxographi Graeci. pp. 4 5-69.
since this doxography included writers as late as the first cen-

tury B.C. it must he dependent not simply upon Theophrastus
but also upon an intermediate compilation, and that the ex-
istence of a common source is indicated by the presence of
parallel content in Aetius' Placita and Varro's Logistoricus
Tuhero an extract from which is preserved in Censorinus.<JH The
remains of the 'Vetusta Placita' are sufficient to reveal that their
author has reworked his material from the standpoint of Stoic
doctrine and terminology. while the remains of Aetius indicate
a relatively neutral position in relation to the various schools of
philosophy.
4.254 THE TRIAD IN THE DOXOGRAPHERS
Among the doxographers and philosophers who depend

either directly or indirectly upon the Theophrastean tradition, a
large number made reference to the triadic schema of God, Mat-
ter, and Form. 99
(i) Timaeus of Locri: De Nat. Mund. et Anim. 94b-c 9e6c;,
uA.a, iOta.
(ii) Varro: Antiqu. Rer. Div. fr. 206 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII,
28 (CCSL 47, 210-211 )) caelum, terra, ideae.
(iii) Plutarch: Quaest. Conv. VIII, 2, 720a-b 9E6c;, UATJ, iOta.
(iv) Aetius: Plac. I, 3. 21 (DG 287, 17- 288, 6) 9e6c;, UATJ, iOta.
(v) Taurus at Philoponus: De Aetern. Mund. VI, 8, 147, 19-20
OTJt..uoupy6c;, UATJ, 7tapciOE1'YJ.1a .. wo
98. See Diels: Doxograpbi Graeci, pp. 178-214.

99. Although the threefold schema of God, Matter, and Form characterizes
most of the doxographical accounts of Plato. there are traces of a simpler
twofold schema of God and Matter in the tradition. This occurs in Diogenes
Laertius: Vii. Philos. Ill. 69 and is perhaps closer to Plato's original dualistic
view. For a brief discussion see Dillon: op. cit.. pp. 408-410.
100. For Taurus as a possible teacher of Apuleius see pp. 226-227. Unfor-
tunately, the threefold schema is such a commonplace in philosophical
APULEJlJS 24;
(vi) Albinus: Didasc. 9, 1 96<;, UAT\, iJ 7tapaOElYJ..LOnKi}

rourtan iJ r&v ioe&v.
(vii) Alexander of Aphrodisias at Simplicius: In Pbys. I, 2, 26,
1~-1 s -ro 7tOlo0v, uA.11, 7tapcioem.La.
(viii) Martianus Capella: De Nupt. VII, 733 deus, materia,
ideates formae.
These writers WI are all pagan exponents of the Platonic theory
of principles, and to them we should add Christian authors who
use the doctrine polemically:
(ix) ps.-Justin: Cobort. 6 (PG 6, 253A-B) 9e:6<;, UAT\, doo<;.
(x) Irenaeus: Adv. Haeres. II, 14, 3 (PG 7. 75IC) deus,
materia, exemplum.
(xi) Hippolytus: Pbi/os. 19, 1-4 (DG 567. 7-20) 9e:6<;, UAT\,
7tapciOE\'YI..La.to2
(xii) Gregory Nazianzen: Poem. Dogm. 4, 3-6 (PG 37, 416A)
9e6<;, OA.T\, eroea.
(xiii) Ambrose: Hexaem. I, 1, 1 (CSEL 32/1, 3) deus, materia,
exemplar.
(xiv) Epiphanius: Panar. l, 6, 1. (DG 587, 8-9) 9e6<;, UAT\,
doo<;.
(xv) Hermias: lrris. Gentil. Pbilos. 11 (DG 653. 27-28) 9e6<;,
GA.11, nap<iOEl'YIJ.O.
To these one should finally add an author whose adherence to
Christianity seems cenain, although his exegesis of Plato is
writc:rs of the period that its presence in both Taurus and Apuleius is insuffi-
cient to establish a ddinitc connection between them.
I 0 I. In this list of doxographers I have included not only writers earlier
than Apukius but also contemporary and later ones. Although the latter arc
naturally not to be included among his sources, they are nevertheless
testimonies to the persistence of the tradition. The same reasoning moti\ates
my inclusion of Christian writers in the list of doxographers.
102. Hippolytus' account of Plato's teaching has aroused some interest
among scholars. See fur example the treatments in Dillon: op. cit., pp.
t liH lt and Moreschini: op. cit., pp. 178-185.
developed along entirely pagan lines:

(xvi) Calcidius: ln. Tim. 307, 308, 14-309, 2 deus, silva, ex-
emplum.I03
4.255 THE EARLIER TRADITION ON GOD, MATTER, FORM
Since the triadic schema of God, Matter, and Form was such a
commonplace of the doxographical tradition, a writer like
Apuleius could clearly have picked up the theory during any
elementary course in Platonism. Furthermore, perhaps this
discovery illuminates the earlier question whether God and the
Forms should be identified since the doxographers may well
have disseminated a definite view even in the absence of a clear
teaching on Plato's part?
4.256 GOD AND FORM IN THE DOXOGRAPHERS
Unfortunately the doxographers do not speak with a single

voice on this question, and on the part of those writers who
gave any thought to the matter it is possible to distinguish three
different approaches. The first approach separates God and the
Forms and is illustrated by Theodoret who rejects the pagan ac-
count of creation with the following words: 'We do not believe
that God has need of any deliberation or preconception so that
he might make his creation, as the myths of Plato would have it,
according to the Form of his reflection' (ouTE oeta9at 13ouA.ilc;
I 03. The list of references to the threefold schema of God, Mauer, and
Forms should be supplemented by certain passages in the literature which
refer to a fivefold or sixfold schema. These Iauer seem to represent an expan-
sion of the simpler theory in order to include more Aristotelian elements. See
Seneca: Epist. 65, 3-10; Porphyry in Simplicius: In Phys. I, I. 10.35 - 11,3;
and Proclus: In Tim. I. 2, Iff. For a discussion of these texts sec Theiler: op.
cit., pp. 19-23.
APLJLEILJS
nvoc; Kai npo9&ropiac; cpaJJ.tv, iva Kata toile; TIA.atrovoc; JJ.U9ouc;,

npoc; tltV tfjc; v9UJJ.TJOEroc; iaav KataCJKEUQOlJ tO 1t0l1"IIJ.a).104
There is some evidence that this separative view goes back to
the original Peripatetic formulation of Platonism at the beginn-
ing of the doxographical tradition, since Aristotle had criticized
the theory of Forms on the grounds that it accounted for the
paradigmatic but not the efficient cause of things. Thus, an
Aristotelian summary of Plato's doctrine might attempt to make
good this missing element by recasting the original duality of
Matter and Form as a triadic schema of God, Matter, and
Form.os Naturally, this version of Platonism would tend to ap-
pear in Christian writers intent upon polemics against paganism,
since the separation between God and the Forms is especially
difficult to reconcile with a monotheistic approach to theology.
The second approach identifies God and the Forms, and an
example of this can be found in Varro's Antiquitates Rerum
Diz,inarum where Jupiter is allegorically identified with the
aether and Minerva - born from the head of Jupiter - is
equated both with 'the highest point of aether' (summum
aetheris cacumen) and with 'the paradigms of things which
Plato calls "Ideas" ' (exempla rerum, quas Plato appellat
ideas).l06 A later example occurs in Albinus' Didasca/icus
where the Forms are described as 'the eternal and self-complete
thoughts of God' (voija&tc; 9&ou aiOOV\01 tE Kai autot&A.Eic;).107 At
least in the case of the earlier of these texts, it is clear that the
principal motive for identifying God and the Forms is a desire to
reinterpret Plato's theory in terms of Stoic physics, so that the
I 04. Theodoret: Quaest. in Gen. I. 19 (PG 80, I 04A).

105. This is the suggestion of Pepin: op. cit., p. 24 who cites Aristotle: De
Gen. et Corr. II, 9, 335b7-24 (explicitly criticizing Plato's Pbaedo).
106. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 205 (Macrobius: Saturn. Ill, 4, 8) and fr. 206
(Augustine: Cit'. Dei VII, 28 (CCSL 47, 210-211 )).
107. Albinus: Didasc. 9, 2.
.248 MIDDLE PLATO!'IISM
original paradigms are no longer viewed as static and transcen-

dent principles but as dynamic and immanent logoi.tOB
The third approach is not so much a definite interpretation of
Plato's theory as an awareness of the fact that the teaching on
the relation between God and the Forms is ambivalent in the
tradition. This awareness is reflected in different ways by Aetius
who reports both that a Form is 'a self-existent principle' (autit
J.LEV Oq>Eatroaa Ka9'a6tt1v) and that Plato 'holds the Forms to be
existent in the thoughts and imaginings of God' (tac; i5&ac;
(moA.aJ.L~O.vet ev toic; vot1J.Laat Kai mtc; q>avmaiatc; toO 9eo0)
without noting that there is any inconsistency; 109 and by Hip-
polytus who similarly suggests that Plato holds on the one hand
God to be 'without Form' (avei5eoc;) and on the other 'that the
Paradigm is the thought of God which he also calls the "Idea" '
(to lit 7tap0.5etyJ.La titv 5t0.vmav wu 9eou Elvat, o Kal. i5&av
KaA.ei).tiO Both these writers are aware of the ambivalent posi-
tion which the combination of successive Peripatetic and Stoic
additions to the doxographic material has bequeathed, but are
unwilling to make the act of interpretative vision necessary to
resolve the conflicting data. The ambivalent approach is also
characteristic of ps.-justin who states that Plato 'originally gave
Form a cause of its own by revealing it to be made existent
through itself, but later he maintained that Form had its status in
thoughts. (tc"f> EiOEl ot apxt;v ioiav 7tp6tepov OEO(l)KOJ<;, Kai
Ka9'tauto ouatroaeat cmoq>t1aac;, UOtEpov EV tote; VOtlJ.LaOlV auto
toOt'Eivat Myet ). It I This treatment is rather striking since,
108. In the case of Albinus, the identification of God and the Forms seems
to have resuhed from an attempt to combine the demiurgic God of Plato and
the self-cognitivt: God of Aristotle. On this development see pp. 260-26.~.
109. Aetius: Plac:. I, 10, I (DG 308al6-17, 308b20-21) and I, 10, 3 (DG
309a2-4 ). Cf. ibid. I, 3. 21 (DG 288a4-6 and b4-6).
110. Hippolytus: Pbi/os. 19. 2-3 (DG 567 ,12-15).
Ill. Ps.-justin: Cohort. 7 (PG 6, 256A). That the author refers to God's
thoughts is suggested by Cyril of Alexandria who paraphrases the text at Con-
tra Julian. II (PG 76, <; 7 30).
APULEILJS
although the writer finds himself faced with exactly the same
contradictory statements as the previous authors, he postulates
the interesting hypothesis of a chronological evolution in
Plato's thought to reconcile them.
4.257 CONCLUSIONS
The study of this doxographical material has taken us a long

way from our original question regarding the relation of Form
w the other elements in Apuleius' physical system. We attemp-
ted to answer this question by investigating the origins of the
triadic schema of God, Matter, and Form in Plato's writings only
to discover that the relation between God and Form was highly
problematic and the threefold schema itself hardly prominent in
the Timaeus. At this point, we may perhaps summarize the
results of the investigation which ensued by saying that neither
the analysis of Plato's own thought nor that of the dox-
ographical material has answered our question about the rela-
tion of God to Form. On the contrary, the ambivalence of the
teaching on this issue in most of the texts which we have
studied suggests that either Apuleius' own view was equally
uncertain or else, if he had a definite interpretation, this was
either influenced by a source no longer available to us or the
result of his own powers of speculation. This may seem a disap-
pointing conclusion for a lengthy analysis, but it is unsafe to go
beyond it until we have completed the study of other aspects of
Apuleius' doctrine. However, the examination of the dox-
ographical material has answered our question about the origins
of the triadic schema. From this we have learned that the listing
of the three terms is a fundamental feature of all doxographical
accounts purporting to summarize the teaching of Plato, and
that Apuleius' reference to these terms indicates that on this
point he is not simply following Plato's writings themselves but
reading them in the light of later handbooks. This discovery is
lSO MIDDLF. PLATONISM
an important one, for it may prove possible on other occasions

to illuminate Apuleius' cryptically expressed doctrines by refer-
ring to such parallels.
4.26 GOD, SOUL, NATURE
Apuleius' fifth schema is also independent of the first three

schemata but, unlike the fourth schema which is presented very
systematically. is only intimated in the text. The relevant
passage reads: 'But Plato declares that the soul which is the
source of all souls, the celestial soul which is the best and wisest
and endowed with generative power, serves God who has
fashioned it and is ready to perform any tasks which he should
require' .112 Despite the form of this description, I think that it is
possible to detect the presence of three elements - a soul
which animates the world, a God who creates the soul and
governs its activities, and various natural processes over which
the soul presides - and these three can readily be associated
with elements in the earlier schemata. Thus, the God who is
described as the fashioner of the soul is undoubtedly equivalent
to the highest God of the second schema and the God of the
fourth schema, the only new aspect being the fact that this ar-
tificer God exercises his creativity by employing a soul subor-
dinate to him. The celestial soul itself has not been included in
any earlier schema, although its relation to other elements in
Apuleius' system can be determined with certainty as a result of
its description in the present text as 'source of all souls'. Accor-
ding to the third schema, most demons are souls either current-
ly embodied or after embodiment, and so the source of souls
112. Apuleius: De Plat. l, l), 199 Sed illmn, jontem animarum omnium,
cae/estem cmimam, optimum et sapientissimam 11irtute esse genetricem,
subsert,ire etiam fabricator/ deo et praesto esse ad omt~ia i1wenta eius pro-
nun fiat.
APUl.EilJS 2';1
must also be the origin of demons. This means that the celestial
soul must be prior to the demonic class of the first schema and
to at least two classes of the third schema, its relation to the se-
cond and fourth schemata being more problematic. Finally, the
natural processes have also not been included in the earlier
schemata, although their character is such that they can only be
inserted at one point in the order of things. namely immediately
prior to the Matter of the fourth schema.tt3
The sources of the fifth schema are not difficult to specify.
Apuleius once again attributes the theory to Plato and, although
there is perhaps no single text from the dialogues which con-
tains all the necessary information, most of its elements can be
derived from a combination of passages. The text begins by
referring to a primary soul which is the source of all other souls,
a notion derivable from the Pbilebus where Socrates establishes
an analogy between macrocosm and microcosm: 'Whence does
our soul originate ... unless the body of the world which has the
same elements as our bodies although in all respects more
beautiful also has a soul?' (n68sv ... A.aj36v, sinsp ~f) -r6 yr. -roO
nav-roc; aro~a f~\iluxov <>v huyxavr., -ratmi yr. fxov -rou-r4> Kai fn
nav-ru KaA.A.iova ).tt4 That this universal soul has been created
by God is stated in the Timaeus where the Demiurge is said to
I 13. That the passage refers to a triadic schema of the kind described
would no doubt be contested by Moreschini who maintains that the intentcl
of the last line signify not God's creative labors but his thoughts or the Forms
in the divine mind. See his discussion atop. cit., pp. R6-87. This interpreta-
tion seems to me somewhat forced and only justifiable on the assumption
that the doctrine of Albinus: Didasc. 14, 3 can be equated with Apuleius'.
Sint:e the flimsy character of the 'School of Gaius' hypothesis makes this
equation questionable lO say the least, it seems best to interpret the present
passage in its most natural and non-technical sense.
114. Plato: Pbileb. 30a. The reference to the soul as 'source' ifons) pro-
h:lhly recalls Plato's ltTJYl'l at Pbaedr. .Z4;c. However, Plato speaks of a source
of motion and not of a source of souls.
have 'fabricated' (JJ.TJXavnaaro) or 'contrived' (auveatitaato)

this soul to be prior to the universal body in excellence and
therefore ruling over it. 1 15 The last part of the text speaks of the
primary soul as the motive force of physical processes, and
Apuleius perhaps had in mind the account in the Laws which
refers to the soul which 'directs all things in heaven, earth, and
sea by her motions which are called consideration, delibera-
tion ... and all the other primary motions akin to these which
assume the secondary motions of bodies and lead all things to
growth, decay .. .' (a yet ... 1tavra rei Kat'oupavov Kai yfjv Kai
80./..attaV taic; auti'jc; KtVli<JEatV, aic; OV6J.1ata anv j3ou/..Ea8at,
aKo7tEia8at ... Kai 7taaatc; 5aat rounov auyyeveic; ii 1tproroupyoi
KtVliaetc; tcic; OEUtEpoupyouc; au 7tapal..aJJ.j30.vouaat KtVliaetc;
<J(I)J.latrov liyouat 7t0.Vta Etc; aU~T)atV Kai q>Siatv ... )I 16 By bring-
ing all these passages together our writer reveals his com-
petence in the exposition of Plato's philosophy, to which he
himself adds little aside from the more systematic presentation
of material.
4.27 GOD, MIND, SOUL
The sixth Apuleian schema is presented in such an obscure

way that one might reasonably question whether it exists at all.
This doubt cannot be resolved with absolute certainty, but in
order to draw as complete picture of the physical system under
investigation as possible. we need to take account of the follow-
ing vague notions. In certain texts a schema is apparently
presented which is not completely independent of the fifth
schema, but takes two of its terms from the latter between
which a new mediating term is placed. Thus, one passage in De
Platone et eius Dogmate gives a list of principles as follows:
II 'i. Plato: Tim. 34c-35a.

116. Plaw: Leg. X. 896e-897a.
APLILEil!S
And the primary substances or essences are the first God, the
mind and the Forms of things, and the soul', 117 while another
states that 'Plato holds that the primary goods are the highest
God and that mind which he also calls vouc;'.11s These two texts
mention three terms which are by now familiar to us together
with a new term of uncertain meaning which is given in both its
Greek and Latin forms. The first God of course corresponds to
the highest God of the second schema and the God of the
fourth. the Forms are obviously identical with the Forms of the
fourth schema, and the soul can with equal certainty be iden-
tified with the soul of the fifth schema. The new element is the
mind. and regarding this we have to ask some important ques-
tions. Assuming that Apuleius intends this mind to be identified
with the Forms either as representing their totality or as a prin-
ciple which contains them, 119 do we equate the mind or Forms
with the first term in the schema: God, with the third term:
soul. or with neither? If the third possibility holds true, then we
are dealing with a further triadic schema which must somehow
be aligned with the earlier ones; but if the first or second
possibility holds true, then we have not so much a further
schema as a revised statement of existing doctrine. There is
perhaps no clear answer which can be extracted directly from
the Apuleian texts, and so we are once again impelled towards
possible sources or analogous statements in other writers in our
search for clarification.
I I~. Apult:ius: De Plat. I, 6, 19 3 Et primae quidem subs/(mt/ae rel essen-

tiae primum deum esse et mentem formasque ren1m et an imam.
II H. Ibid. II. I, 220 Prima bona esse deum summum mentemque illam,
cjuam voOv idem rocat.
Ill.>. This identification seems to be implied by the wording of the earlier
of these two passages. The three main terms are liked by et ... et. while the
que appended to fonnas suggests their closer relation to mens. Without this
interpretation it is extremely difficult to grasp the nature of the three prin-
l'iples.
4.271 MIND AND SOUL IN PLATO
The starting point for such an investigation is Plato as always,

and a perusal of the dialogues reveals an interesting body of
doctrine regarding vou~.120 In the first place, we find insistence
on the notion that the universe is governed by intelligence
rather than by chance: in the Phaedo, Socrates describes the im-
pact which Anaxagoras' theory that intelligence is 'the arranger
and cause of all things' (6 5taKOOIJ.cOV n: Kai 7t6:vtrov aitto~) had
had upon him, 121 while the concluding pages of the Laws
contrast the theistic view that intelligence is 'the arranger
of all things in the universe' (6 5taKEKOOIJ.11KW~ 7tav9'6aa
Kat'oupav6v) - which some of the early philosophers had
suspected - with the atheistic notion that 'soulless bodies ar-
range the causes of the whole world' (chvuxrov aroiJ.atrov
5taVEIJ.OVtOOV tel~ aitia~ 1tQVtO~ tOU K60IJ.OU)- from which the
said philosophers had yet not freed themselves.l22 One should
not conclude from these passages that Plato completely rejected
the physical variety of cause. for in the Timaeus he also
underlines the role of the latter by dividing the whole
cosmological process into two not necessarily temporally
distinguishable moments. Thus, 'the generation of this universe
was a mixed result of the combination of necessity and in-
telligence' (IJ.EIJ.ElYIJ.EV11 yap ouv ~ to05E tou K6a1J.OU yevEm~ t~
avayK11~ tE Kai vou auataaEro~ tyyEvti911 ), that is to say the
cooperation of the causality of the Demiurge and Paradigm and
1.20. The: Grc:ek term vouc; is diffkult to translate: hy a single: English word,
since in some texts it signifies a principle but in others it approximates to a
function. I have adopted two terms: 'intellect' and 'intelligence' to reflect
this ambivalence of meaning. In Plato the Iauer sense seems 10 predominate,
while in the doxographers and Neoplatonists the: reverse: is the: case.
12 I. Plato: Pbaed. 97b-c.
122. Plato: Leg. XII, 967h-c.
APULEIUS 255
that of the Receptacle and elemental qualities.t23 The more

technical argument of this dialogue brings us face to face with
the second main aspect of Plato's doctrine regarding in-
telligence: the notion that it is identifiable with soul or with a
higher function of soul. The looser relation is implied in
passages such as that in the Cratylus where Anaxagoras' theory
'that intelligence or soul is the arranger' (vouv Kai \jluxflv Eivm
rflv BtaKOO"J.lOUaav) is again discussed, 124 or that in the Laws
where the view that 'intelligence' (vouc;) arranged the universe
is contrasted with that of people who 'mistake the nature of
soul' (aJ.laptavovn:c; \IIUXf\c; cpuaeroc;).t25 That intelligence is
associated with soul although not identical with it emerges from
the statement in the Philebus that 'wisdom and intelligence can
never exist without a soul' (aocpia J.lllV Kai vouc; avw \j/UXf\c; ouK
av note yevoia9nv), 126 and from the argument in the Laws that
if the whole universe moves akin to 'the motion, rotation and
calculation of intelligence' (vou K1VJlO"E1 Kai neptcpopQ. Kai
AO'Y10"J.10ic;) then it is governed by 'the best soul' (i) apiatn \j/UXJl),
but if it moves wildly and irregularly it must be guided by an evil
soul. 127 Most of these texts are susceptible to varying interpreta-
tions, but it seems at least clear that intelligence is contrasted
with chance, matter, and evil and closely associated with
soul. 12s
123. Plato: Tim. 47e-48a.

12-4. Plato: Crat. 400a.
125. Plato: Leg. XII, 967b-c.
126. Plato: Pbileb. 30c-d.
127. Plato: Leg. X, 897c-d.
12H. The important point is that for Plato intelligence is more explicitly
assodated with soul than it is with the Forms, a position which apparently
sets him apart from the doxo~raphical tradition where the opposite seems to
he true. Plato himsdf comes closest to linking intelligence and the Forms at
Sopb. 249a where the Stranger asks: 'Can we easily be convinced that mo-
tion, life, soul, and understanding are not truly present to the perfectly exis-
tent- that it has neither life nor thought but stands immutable, solemn, and
2S6 Mli>DI.I: PLATONISM
4.272 GOD AND MIND IN THE DOXOGRAPHERS
The position of the doxographers regarding the nature of

vouc; seems to be rather different, as shown by the remarks
which Aetius makes about Plato in the chapter of his Placita
devoted to the question of God's nature. According to this
source, 'Plato assigns "the One", "the unitary", "the
monadic", "the really existent", "the Good", - all these
names to intellect. Thus, God is intellect, the separate Form'
(nA.aTrov To fv, To Jlovoqmec;, ro J.1ovaBtK6v, To c5vTroc; ov,
Taya96v' 7tQVTQ at
TQUTa TCOV 6VOJ.1Q T(I)V Eic; TOV vouv 07tEUBEt'
vouc; ouv 6 9E6c;, xroptOTOV EIBoc;). 129 This doctrine is not taught
explicitly in the dialogues and may perhaps be included in that
category which is so problematic for modern scholars: the oral
teaching of Plato. The reference to the monad seems especially
uncharacteristic of Plato, and a confusion with reports of
Pythagorean doctrine is also possible, especially since Aetius
notes in his chapter on causes that according to Pythagoras 'the
monad is intellect' (vouc; J.1EV ouv iJ J.10vac; ~onv).130 Either way,
aloof, devoid of intelligence' (ci>c; cii.118G>c; KiVT'Iatv Kai ~roi]v Kai '1/UXi]V Kai
cpp6V11atV ~ pq.&iroc; neta811a611E!Ja r(j> navrel.roc; 6vn 111'1 napeivat, 1111& ~iiv
auto J.111BE cppoveiv, cil.l.a OEJ.IVOV Kai aytov, VOUV OUK fxov, ciKtVllTOV ~atoc;
dvat;) However, even in this passage the close relation of intelligence and
soul is retained. On the whole doctrine see). H. Loenen: De Nous in bet
Systeem van Plato's Philosophie (Amsterdam. 19S I).
129. Aetius: Plt1c. I. 7. 3 I (DG 30-la 1-6 and b-23-27). Other references to
Plato's interpretation of intellect in Aetius occur at ibid. I. 3. 21 (DG 288a2
and b2-3) 'God is the intellect of the world' (6 &eeoc; vouc; ~OT! TOU KOOI!OU);
ibid. 1. 10, 3 (DG 309a 1-4) 'Plato maintains that the Forms are substances
separate from matter, existent in the thoughts and imaginings of God, that is
to say. intellect' (0/.<itrov xroptatcic; ti;c; lil.11c; ouaiac; rae; lBtac; uno/.aJ.IPcivEt
EV toic; VOtll!at Kai taic; cpavtaaiatc; TOU IJEOU, TOUTtan TOU VOU, U(jlEOtaac;);
and ibid. 1.11,2 (DG 309a I S-17 cf. b 13-14) 'He considers the more important
cause to be "that through which". that is the efficient cause. which is in-
tellect' (KUPIWTEpov Bi: t'IYEiTat TO ucp'ou' TOUTO & ~v TO 7tO!OUV, 6 &an vouc;).
130. Ibid. l, 3. 8 (DG 282a 16). cr. ibid. 1. 3. B (DG 281 aB-12 and b6-to).
APlii.EiliS 257
the whole doctrine was clearly extensively discussed in the ear-

tv Academy, with major figures in the school lining themselves
t;p on opposite sides of the question. Thus, Xenocrates
denloped an elaborate theory 'that the monad and dyad are
gods. the former ... he calls Zeus, the odd, and intellect, the lat-
ter ... is for him the world soul' (tf)v 1J.Ova5a Kat 'tTJV 5uci5a
8eou~, TTJV IJ.EV ... iivnva 7tpoaayopEUEl Kat Ziiva Kai 7tEplHOV
Kai vouv ... TTJV M ... iin~ &ativ aut<j> \IIU'XTJ 'tOU navt6~).1.~ I On
the other hand, Speusippus maintained 'that intellect was not
identical with the One or the Good but had its own distinct
nature' ('tOV vouv OU'tE 't<j> Evi OU'tE 't<j> ciya8<j> 'tOV aut6v, i510q>Uii
5).1:\.Z The difference of viewpoint here noted by Aetius is
15 I. !fJid. I. r. 30 (DG 304b 11 0). On the interpretation of this passage sec

H. 1h:inze: Xetwkrates. Darstel/ung der Lebre tmd Samm/ung der Fr~1gmente
(Leipzig. IH92). pp. 35. 72 ff.; P. Boyancc: 'Xenocrate et les Orphiques',
Nel'lte des etudes anciennes 50 ( 194H). p. 21 Hff.; and Dillon: op. cit .. pp.
2'i2~. Since the traditional Pythagorean theory holds that numbers are dcriv-
cll from and therefore originally contained in the monad. and Aristotle in
forms us at Metapb. Z, 1028b24ff. that Xcnocrates equated Plato's 'Forms'
<Ei<'irl) with numbers' (0:pt9t.LO(), the latter must have believell that the Forms
were derived from and originally contained in the monad. The present text
~ays that this monad is intellect and God, which means that Xenoerates is the
earliest philosopher whom the evidence clearly shows to have taught the
donrinc that the Forms are God's thoughts. On Xenocratcs' importance as
the founllcr of this tradition see A. N. M. Rich: 'The Platonic Ideas as the
Thoughts of God'. Mnemosyne. Series 4. 7 (1954). pp. 125-126 and A. H.
ArnlSirong: 'The Background of the Doctrine "That the lntelligiblcs arc not
OUisille the Intellect" . Les sources de Plotin (Fondation Hardt. Entretiens
sur I'.Jntiquite classique 'i) (Vandoeuvres-Geneve. 1960) pp. 39H-399.
132. Aetius: Plac. I, '7. 20 (DG 303b3-'i). The passage creates the impres-
~ion that Spcusippus had anticipated the famous Plotinian doctrine of the
One which transcends imellcctual activity. This impression is strengthened
by a reference in lamblichus' De Comm. Math. Sci. 15. 'i-18 to a theory that
mathematical numbers arc derived from a pair of principles - the One
'whic.:h we should not even call being' (om:p ... oM ov nro 6Ei KUAEiv) and the
'lany - whic.:h is almost certainly Speusippian; and anmher in Proclus' In
Parmeniclem lnterprete G. de Moerbeke 40, 1-'i to Speusippus' view that the
258 MIDDLE PLATO:'IIISM
significant, for it shows that the doxographer is not uncritically

conflating all his data regarding the early Academy. In fact, he
left for later generations an interesting discussion of the status
of intellect in which a prominent although not universally ad-
mitted theory was the identification of the latter with the first
God and the Forms and its separation from souJ.t33
4.273 THE CONFLICT IN THE SOURCES
It seems reasonable to assume that Apuleius was familiar with

the discussion of intellect not only in Plato's dialogues but also
in doxographical sources similar to if not identical with those
examined above. From these texts he would have learned that
intellect could be identified -either with soul or with God, and
this conflict in the testimony goes some way towards explaining
the uncertainty of Apuleius' own statements on the subject. Yet
perhaps he is responding to the tradition by leaving the concept
of intellect in a deliberately ambivalent form, and it is possible
to suggest two ways in which this might have been done. First,
ancients 'held the One to be above being and the source of being' (le unum
enim me/ius ente putantes eta quo le ens). On the former text seeP. Merlan:
From Platonism to Neoplatonism, 3rd edition (The Hague, 1968), pp.
96-140, and on the Iauer R. Klibansky and C. Labowsky: Procli Commen-
tarius in Parmenidem, Pars ultima adhuc inedita interprete Guillelmo de
Moerbeka. Ediderunt praefalione et adnotalionibus instmxerunt R. K. e/ C.
L. (London, 195 3 ). p. 86 and P. Merlan: 'Greek Philosophy from Plato to
Plot in us'. The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medietal
Philosophy, edited by A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 3032. In ad-
dition, E. R. Dodds: 'The Pannenides of Plato and the Origins of the
Neoplatonic One', Classical Quarterly 22 (1928). pp. 129-143 traces the in-
fluence of Speusippus' theory through the Neopythagorean tradition
represented by Eudorus and Moderatus.
133. It should also not be forgotten that Aristotle. another member of the
early Academy. desnibed his first principle as vouc; at Metaph. A 7.
1072bl4-30. etc.
AI'ULEIUS 259
Apuleius could have maintained that intellect is identifiable

with both God and soul because ultimately these two principles
are one and the same. Secondly, he might have believed that in-
tellect was identifiable with both God and soul because these
two principles are although distinct equally intellective in
character. That these were both interpretative possibilities for
Apuleius is suggested by the fact that other writers probably
known to him had handled the question of intellect along these
lines.
4.274 THE EQUATION OF GOD AND SOUL
In studying the sources of Apuleius' doctrines one naturally

approaches the Greek writers first, yet it is important to
remember that the influence of the earlier Latin tradition is not
negligible. The hypothesis that the term vofx,lmens could be ap-
plied to both God and soul b~~-lh~-~Q_P~!I!fiples are
uhiiD!!!~IJ:)~e~~~~al would naturally be suggested by the Stoic or
eclectic Stoic and Platonic theory that the relation between God
and the world is analogous to that between soul and body.
Although there is no evidence of a direct literary dependence,
Apuleius could have derived such a view from reading the ac-
count of Antiochus of Ascalon's physical theory in Cicero's
Academica where the followers of this doctrine are said to hold
that the reason immanent in the world 'is also intelligence and
perfect wisdom which they call God' (eandemque esse mentem
sapientiamque perfectam, quem deum appellant).I34 It will be
recalled from our earlier discussion of this text that Antiochus'
theory is part of an interpretation of Plato's Timaeus, and so it
is possible that the allusion to the intelligence of the world was
inspired by Plato's reference to 'the craftsmanship of in-
134. Cicero: A cad. 29. For a full discussion of this text seep. 101 ff.
.260 MIDDLE PLATONISM
telligence' (tci Olci vou OEOTJJ.l.lOupyru.Ltva). t;s However, that this

explanation is not absolutely necessary is shown by other texts
describing the active principle in the cosmos as intelligence
where the context is strictly Stoic and not Antiochean. A good
illustration can be found in Seneca's Naturales Quaestiones
where the author asks: 'What is God? The intelligence of the
world. What is God? The whole which you see and the whole
which you do not see' (Quid est deus? Mens universi. Quid est
deus? Quod vides to tum et quod non vides to tum). t 36 Accor-
ding to the interpretation already proposed, Seneca's aim in this
passage is to show that God is identical with the world as the
force which pervades it, and different from it as representing
that force in its highest manifestation. Furthermore, to
underline this latter aspect, God is elsewhere described as the
intelligence of the world rather than simply as its soul, since in-
telligence for the Stoics is the highest phase of soul. t37 There
seems little doubt that a knowledge of texts such as these might
have facilitated the identification of intelligence both with God
and soul for Apuleius, yet it is also clear that his philosophical
position is not Stoic or even Platonic in the style of Antioch us. Is
it still possible to apply the term 'intelligence' to both God and
soul in the context of second-century Platonism? This question
can be answered in the affirmative if we turn to the second of
the interpretative possibilities described earlier.
4.275 THE TWO LEVELS OF MIND
The hypothesis that the term vouc; could be applied to both

God and soul because these two principles although distinct
135. Pla!O: Tim. 47e.

136. Seneca: Nat. Quaest. I. pr. 13. On this passage see ch. 2, n. 39.
13 7. The Stoic tendency to speak of the all-pervading reason in this way
can be further documented by comparing two texts: Aetius: Plac. l, 7. 23 (DG
303b23-24 = SVF I. 157) "Zeno the Stoic maintains that God is a fiery in-
APl!LEIUS 261
have a similarly intellective nature might have been suggested

lw a work like Albinus' Didascalicus in which a systematic
philosophical doctrine is constructed from elements scattered
throughout Plato's writings. In an important section of this
treatise, the traditional threefold schema of God, Matter, and
Form furnishes the starting point for a theological discussion,
one chapter being devoted to each of the three terms. The
chapter dealing with God is characterized by an interesting
albeit confusing use of the term 'intellect' in which the follow-
ing principles have this name applied to them: (i) 'the intellect in
activity which knows all things simultaneously and eternally' (6
Kat'EVEPYEtav navta voci>v Kai UJ.La Kai ciEi), (ii) 'the potential in-
tellect' (voOc; 6 Ev cSuvaJ.LEt), (iii) 'the intellect of the world' (6
voOc; -roO OUJ.L7tavtoc; oupavoO ... oupav10c; voOc;). (iv) 'the in-
tellect which knows itself and its thoughts eternally and whose
activity constitutes its "Idea" (eautov liv ouv Kai ta eautoO
VOliJ.La"Ca aEi VOOl'l, Kai a\Jt'l f) evpyEta aUtOO icSEa U7tapX,E1 ),
and (v) 'the intellect of the soul of the world' (f) wux.i] toO
KOOJ.LOU ... toO voO autiic;).l38 Albinus himself gives us some
guidance through this bewildering sequence of terms by stating
explicitly that 'the first God' (6 npci>toc; 9E6c;) is equivalent to
(iv) and 'cause' (ainoc;) of both (iii) and (v), yet the further rela-
tions between the different kinds of intellect must be deduced
telligence' (Zftvrov 6 ~tW\Koc; vouv K60f.10U 7tupwov) and Varro: De Ling. Lat.
V. 59 (SVF I. 126) 'According to Zeno ofCitium the seed of animals is that fire
which is soul and intelligence' (sive, ut Zenon Citieus, animalium semen ig-
nis is. qui anima ac mens).
l.:\8. Albinus: Didasc. 10. 2-3. On the interpretation consult the following
studies: Witt: op. cit .. pp. 114-144; H. Dorrie: 'Zum Ursprung der
neuplatonischen Hypostasenlehre', Hennes 82 (1954), pp. 331-342; loenen:
Alhinus' Metaphysics. An Attempt at Rehabilitation. pp. 296-319 and 35-56:
II. Diirrie: Albinos. platonischer Philosoph des 2. Jahrhunderts'. Paulys
Realencyclopadie der klassiscben Altertumswissenscbajt. Suppl.-Band 12
(Stuttg:lrl, 1970), col. 14-22: J. Mansfeld: 'Three Notes on Albinus', Theta-Pi
I ( 19"'2) pp. 61-80; and Dillon: op. cit .. pp. 280-285.
from his text by the interpreter. These seem to be that (iii) is

equivalent to (v)- since (iv) is described as the cause of both of
these -. that (iii) and (v) are equivalent to (i) - since both (iii)
and (i) are said to have eternal activity -, and that (ii) is in-
troduced hypothetically rather than as a distinct principle -
since activity is described as better than potentiality and not as
its cause.t39 It is difficult to be absolutely certain about the inter-
pretation of this passage, although there seems little room for
139. There has been considerable debate among modern scholars on the
question how many levels of intellect are postulated in Albinus' system. The
text which is at the heart of the controversy runs as follows (Didasc. 10, 2):
'Since intellect is better than soul, and intellect in activity which knows all
things simultaneously and eternally is better than intellect in potentiality. and
more beautiful than this is the cause of this and whatever might exist superior
to these. this would be the first God which is the cause of the eternal activity
of the intellect of the whole world' (brEi lit wuxilc; volic; fiJ..L&ivrov, voli lit toG
tv liuvaJ..LEt 6 Kat'tv&py&tav ncivta vov Kai dJ..La Kai fiEi, mutou lit KaUirov 6
ainoc; TOUTOU Kai on&p av ~n avrot&pro TOUT(I)V U(jl&OtT]KEV, oumc; av EiT] 6
npciltoc; 9&6c;, aittoc; unapxrov TOU ad tv&py&iv t(i> vq> TOU OUJ..Lnavtoc;
oupavoli). According to Witt: op. cit., pp. 128-129 there are three principles
above the level of soul: intellect in potentiality, intellect in activity, and the
cause. The interpretation of Dorrie: 'Zum Ursprung der neuplatonisc:hen
Hypostasenlehre', pp. 339-340 and 'Albinos. platonischer Philosoph des 2.
jahrhunderts' col. 20 is along the same lines. These scholars therefore expand
the number of principles and suggest that Albinus' first principle- prior to
the intellect in activity - is an anticipation of the Plotinian One. According
to Loenen: 'Albinus' Metaphysics. An Attempt at Rehabilitation'. pp. 305-309
there is only one principle above the level of soul: the cause. since intellect in
potentiality is only introduced hypothetically while intellect in activity cor-
responds to the highest phase of soul. The interpretation of Mansfeld: op.
cit .. pp. 61-67 develops this thesis further. These scholars accordingly reduce
the number of principles and bring Albinus' theory c:loser to the traditional
teaching of Plato and the doxographers. It is the view of the present writer
that the reductive interpretation makes the best sense of the text quoted and
avoids the need to introduce an elaborate hierarchy of principles which has
no relevance to the rest of Albinus' doctrine. However, the most appropriate
scholarly attitude is perhaps one of caution in regard to the whole question.
APLILEILJS 263
doubt that at least two distinct intellects are envisaged here:

those of God and of soul. Thus, whether similarities between
Albinus and Apuleius are explained through a common
dependence upon the teachings of Gaius or simply in terms of
an analogous response to conflicting statements by the dox-
ographers, it seems clear that a theory such as that in the
Didascalicus would provide a ready means of identifying in-
tellect with both God and soul to the Latin author.
4.276 CONCLUSIONS
We began this analysis of Apuleius' sixth schema by asking

whether the mind or Forms should be identified with the first
term in the schema: God, with the third term: soul, or with
neither. If the third possibility held true, then we would be deal-
ing with a further triadic schema which must somehow be
associated with the earlier ones; but if the first or second
possibility held true, then we would be concerned not so much
with a further schema as a revised version of the earlier doc-
trine. Our study of the interpretation of mind in Plato, the dox-
ographical tradition, earlier Latin writers, and Albinus has in-
dicated that the postulation of such a principle as independent
of both God and soul would not have been suggested to
Apuleius by existing traditions of philosophy. Such a doctrine
will eventually become one of the characteristic features of
Platonic philosophy from the time of Plotinus onwards and, t4o
although we should not exclude the possibility that Apuleius has
anticipated this standpoint, we would expect an innovation of
this kind to be set out in explicit statements rather than simply
glossed over with a few ambiguous words. Our study of the in-
140. Precisely such a doctrine is implied in Calcidius who combines the

traditional tripartite schema of God, Matter, and Form with the Neoplatonic
theory of the three hypostases. See Calcidius: In Tim. 307. 308, 14-309, 2.
terpretation of mind in earlier writers has further demonstrated

that the identification of this term with God and the identifica-
tion of this term with soul could equally have been suggested to
Apuleius by earlier philosophical traditions. These doctrines
were typical of both the more eclectic and the more orthodox
currents of Platonic philosophy since the time of Cicero, 141 and
in the absence of any definite indications to the contrary it
seems most reasonable to assume that Apuleius would have
taken a conservative line on a question not central to his own
philosophical interests.
It only remains to summarize the interrelation of the Apuleian
schemata, and here a graphical presentation may be useful: 142
2 .; .:j :; 6
~matter
physical
_mt."n t."mbodicd things
demons
semi-embodied
dt."mons
-demons dist."mbodied
demons
Form soul soul/
-visible (Forms) mind
gods
-gods -in\'isible
gods
first God/ God God/
(iod (Forms) mind
14 1. Of course, the terms 'eclectic' and 'orthodox' are relative when one is
speaking of the history of Platonism. However, the two tendencies may be
distinguished according to their relative awareness of metaphysical
transcendence.
14 2. In the diagram, a parenthesis indicates that the position of this princi-
APULEil!S 265
-4.3 THE HIERARCHICAL SYSTEM
our study of Apuleius' philosophical system in terms of the

analysis of fundamental triadic schemata and their interrelations
has turned out to be extremely profitable. By this means, the
nature of his physical system has been delineated in a general
way. However, henceforth it will be more convenient to in-
,estigate the various principles themselves arranged in their
overall hierarchical order. With this end in mind, the remainder
of the discussion will be arranged as follows:
4.31 God/ Forms/ Mind
4.32 The Gods
4.321 Invisible Gods
4.322 Visible Gods
4.33 Universal Soul
4. )4 The Demons
4.341 Disembodied Demons
4.342 Semi-Embodied Demons
4.35 Individual Soul
4.36 Matter/Forms/Numbers/Body
ph: is determined by extrapolation from another schema, while the broken

lines signify principles existing on more than one level.
4.31 GOD/FORMS/MIND
Apuleius' account of the first God is extremely detailed,

although no single text presents all the relevant information.
Rather than examining each passage in turn, the best procedure
is to collect the various references to God and classify them ac-
cording to their manner of description. Such a method will pre-
sent a rather complex doctrine in the briefest and most
systematic manner.
4.311 GOD'S NATURE
In the first place, we find subjective descriptions either in a

positive or a negative or a positive and negative form. A subjec-
tive description is one in which the nature of God is explained
in terms of our manner of perceiving him, and when Apuleius
states that God 'is conceived only by thought ... comprehended
by the eyes of the mind' (cogitatione sola concipitur ... mentis
oculis conprehenditur)143 or that he is 'conceivable only by a
few' (paucis cogitabilis), 144 he is underlining the possibility of a
perceptive approach to God. On the other hand, when he
declares that God is 'unspeakable and ineffable' (indictus, in-
nominabilis)I4r; or 'that he is silent regarding the nature of God'
143. Apuleius: De Plat. I, 6, 193. Cf. De Mundo 30, 3';7 'the ruler of all
things and father, whom only our thoughts perceive with the eyes of the
soul' (rex omnium et pater. quem tantummodo em/mae (JCIIIis nostrae
cogitationes tJident).
144. Apuleius: Apol. 64. Cf. De Plat. I, 5. 191 God's nature 'is impossible
to reveal to many' (in multos eam ermntic1ri non posse).
14<;. Apuleius: De Plat. I, <;, 190. Cf. Apol. 64 'speakable by nobody'
(nemini effabilis); De Deo Socr. 3. 124 God's nature 'has a greatness so in-
credible and ineffable that it cannot be expressed even a little owing to the
poverty of human language' (maiestatis incredibili quat/am nimietate et in-
effablli not! posse penuria senrwnls human/ quat,ls oratione 11el modlce
conprebendi). It should be noted that Apuleius says that God can be grasped
APUlEilJS 267
(quid sit deus ... tacere), 146 he stresses that the first principle lies
bevond the perceptive grasp. The contradiction between these
tw'o positions is reconciled either by postulating a special man-
ner of perceiving God 'intermittently, just as a bright light
flashes in the deepest darkness' (interdum, velut in artissimis
tenebris rapidissimo coruscamine lumen candidum inter-
micare)l47 or an indirect manner of perceiving him 'through the
traces of his divine works' (divlnorum operum vestigiis).14H On
all these points, Apuleius reveals himself to be a follower of
philosophical tradition, for the notion that God is perceptible
bv thought rather than sense is fundamental to Plato's doc-
by thought although he cannot be expressed in language. Thus, the contrast

with the position in the previous texts is less extreme than it appears at first
sight to be. Apuleius' view is identical with that of Albinus: Didasc. 10, 4 that
God is 'perceptible by the intellect alone' (v<j) ~t6vq> ATJ7tt6~) and also 'inef-
fable' (cippTJtO~).
1-46. Apuleius: Apol. 64.
1-47. Apuleius: DeDeoSocr. 3, 124.
1-18. Apuleius; De Mundo 31, 360. The theory that God can only be
p~rceived indirectly through his works is used by Apuleius as a device to
reconcile philosophical monism and religious polytheism. For a full state-
m~nt see ibid. 37, 370-371 'And although God is one, he Is invoked under
many names because of the multitude of aspects in whose diversity the
multiform force Is revealed. The same God is called "Jupiter" because he aids
whom the Greeks rightly call "Zen" because he is the source of our life. They
;tlso call Saturn "Cronos" as if he were a kind of "Chronos" or "Time"
which has never had a beginning and will never have an end' (Et cum sit
wms. pluribus nominibus cietur, specierum multltuditJe, quarum diter-
sitate fit multijom1is tis. Idem ab iuvando Iuppiter dictus, quem Zilva
Graeci, quod titae nostrae auctor sit, rectissime appellant. Satumum
eliam illi Kp6vov, quasi xp6vov quendam, incoeptum ab origine, inler-
minum ad finem tempus appellant). It is according to this doctrine that
Apuleius refers to the Queen of Heaven as 'Ceres ... Heavenly Venus ... sister
of Phoebus' (sive tu Ceres ... seu tu caelestis Venus ... seu Pboebi soror) at
"letam. XI, 2, 267 and to Isis as 'the uniform shape of gods and goddesses'
!deomm dearumque facies unijormis) at ibid. XI, 5. 269. On the question
whether these two passages refer to the same divinity see J. G. Griffiths:
26B MIDDLE PLATONISM
trine, 149 the idea that God is ineffable can be derived easily from
the Parmenides, 15o Symposium, 151 Timaeus, 152 and Epistula
VIII'B and - as scholars such as E. R Doddsl54 and A.-J.
Festugierel55 have demonstrated - was established as a com-
Apuleius of Madauros, The Isis-Book (Metamorphoses, Book XI). Edited

with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary by ]. G. G. (Leiden,
197S ), p. I I 5. However, from the point of view of the philosophical doctrine
which underlies the religious syncretism, the question would have little
meaning. On the Stoic origins of the theory see Griffiths: op. cit., p. 137 ff.
149. See Plato's description of the supercelestial place at Phaedr. 247c
'perceptible by the intellect alone which is ruler of the soul' (IIIUXilc; Kuj}ep-
vTJTlJ J.16Vcp 9ean; vcj>).
150. Plato: Pann. I42a Of the One 'there is no name nor expression nor
knowledge' (oUli 'cipa 6vo11a ~OTIV autcj> ou6t A.6yoc; ou6& nc; &ntOTllJ.111).
I 51. Plato: Symp. 21 I a Of the Beautiful 'there is no expression nor
knowledge' (ou6& nc; Myoc; ouo& tlc; &ntOTllJ.111).
152. Plato: Tim. 28c 'The maker and father of this universe is difficult to
find, and having found him it would be impossible to declare him to all
mankind' (tov J.1EV ouv nOlTITl)v Kai nat&pa tou6e tou navtoc; eupeiv t ~pyov
Kai Eup6vta Elc; navtac; a6uvatov AiyElV). This is undoubtedly the passage by
which Apuleius has been influenced most, since he quotes it at De Plat. l, 5.
19 I in inexact Greek.
153. Plato: Epist. VII, 34 Ic The first principle 'can in no way be expressed
like other subjects' (PTITOV yap OUOaJ.lroc; tanv roc; ciA.A.a J.1n9'JlJ.1ata).
I <;4. E. R. Dodds: Proclus, The Elements of Theology. A Revised Text with
Translation, Introduction and Commentary, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1963),
pp. 310-313. Dodds rightly challenged the view of E. Norden: Agnostos
Tbeos. Untersuchungen zur Fonnengeschichte religi6ser Rede (Leipzig,
1913 ), pp. 84 and 109 that the notion of a God who transcends all knowledge
and expression was not genuinely Greek by collecting some of the significant
passages in Plato and by distinguishing the various senses in which ciyvroatoc;
and cognate terms can be understood.
155. A.-J. Festugiere: La revilatio11 d'Hennes Trismegiste lV:Le Dieu in-
connu ella gnose (Paris, 1954 ), pp. 92- I 40. This author's account is the most
detailed discussion of the notion of a God who transcends knowledge and ex-
pression in second-century sources, and he considers in succession the
Platonic works and fluri/egia relevant to the question (up. cit.. pp. 93-95):
Alhinus (op. cit.. pp. 95-102), Apuleius (op. cit., pp. 102-109). Maximus of
APULEIUS 269
moo place of the handbook tradition by the second century,

while the notions that God must be perceived either through a
special state of mind or indirectly through other objects are
derived from Plato's doctrines of an intuitive 156 or analogical I 57
approach to divinity.tss
In the second place, we find objective descriptions: that is to
say accounts of the nature of God in which there is no explicit
reference to our manner of perceiving him. Into this category
must be placed a great variety of descriptions not only of God
himself by also of the Forms contained in God's mind.
The accounts of God himself include that title which has been
applied to him most frequently within the Platonic tradition:
Tyre (op. cit.. pp. 109-115). Celsus (op. cit.. pp. 115-123), Numenius (op.
cit., pp. 123-132), and the Cbaldaearz Oracles (op. cit., pp. 132-135).
Festugiere identifies as a significant feature of all this literature the coupling
of two apparently contradictory notions: (i) that God is the object of in-
tellect, and (ii) that God is unknowable. See op. cit., p. 98 (Aibinus), op. cit.,
p. 131 (Numenius), and op. cit., pp. 132-133 (Cbaldaean Oracles). He ex-
plains this contradiction by suggesting: 'II faut ici observer que Ia langue
philosophique platonicienne manquait d'un terme special pour designer ce
qui est seulement organe de J'intultlon mystique ... D'ou vient que le meme
mot vou~ sert a Ia fois pour designer l'organe normal de Ia connaissance des
vorrni ct l'organe d'intuition mystique qui entre en contact avec l'av6rrrov'
(ufJ. cit .. pp. 138-139). The writer is certainly correct regarding the teachings
of :"..umenius and the Clmldaean Oracles. although Albinus actually refers to
<iod only as 'ineffable' (c'ippTJTO~) and not as unknowable, so that the con-
tradiction in his case is considerably lessened.
156. See Plato's account of the moment of intuition at Epist. VII, 341c
suddenly, like a fire kindled by a leaping spark' (t~aiq>VTJ~, o{ov ano nupo~
7t'l<'iitaavtoc; t~aq>9v q>roc;).
IS"'. Sec Plato's simile of the Sun at Rep. VI. SORb 'which the Good has
gl'Jlcratcd as an analogy with itself (OV taya9ov tyEVVTJO&V avciA.oyov E:aut<iJ).
158. For further discussion of the ineffable and related notions in late anti-
quity see P. Boyance: 'Fulvius Noblllor et le Dieu ineffable', Revue de
/Jbi/ologie 29 (1955). pp. 172-192; and Moreschini: op. cit .. pp. 162-178 and
198-199.
'the Good' (to ciya96viS9, bonus).I6o They also include various

expressions of his transcendence - God is described as 'one'
(unus), 161 as 'lacking nothing' (nibil indigens),162 as
'highest' (summusl63, exsuperantissimus),IM as 'infinite'
(anepi~J.&tpoc;), 165 as 'incorporeal' (incorporeus), 166 as 'non-
spatial' (nequ.e loco comprebensus), 167 as 'beyond the world'
(ultramundanus),168 as 'non-temporal' (neque tempore com-
prebensus),l69 as 'everlasting' (inmortalis aevz),170 and as 'un-
changing' (neque vice ulla comprebensus, 171 semper et eodem
modo et sui par ac simi/is, 172 inmobi/is).173 Concerning these
descriptions we should note first, that the terminology
employed by Apuleius contains a mixture of tradition and in-
novation: the traditional elements being the references to God
as good, complete, beyond the world, everlasting, and un-
changing which derive from Plato, 174 the innovative aspects be-
159. Apuleius: Apol. 27.

160. Apuleius: De Plat. II, 1, 220.
161. Apuleius: De Plat. I. 5. 190; I, 11, 204; and De Mundo 37. 370.
162. Apuleius: De Plat. l, 5. 190.
163./bid. I. 11,204 and I, 12.205.
164. Ibid. I, 12, 205 and De Mundo 31, 360.
16;. Apuleius: De Plat. I, 5, 190.
166./bid. I, 5. 190 and I, 11, 204.
168. Apuleius: De Plat. I. 11, 204.
170. Apuleius: De Mundo 31, 360.
171. Apulc:ius: Apol. 64.
1'72. Apuh:ius: De Plat. I. 6. 193.
173. Apuleius: De Mtmdo 35.365.
174. For 'good' see Plato: Rep. VI, 506b; Leg. I. 6:~ I b: for 'everlasting' see
Symp. 211a; Tim. 28a; etc.; for 'unchanging' see Phaed. 78d; Parm. 135b-c;
etc. The reference to God's completeness may reflect the navreM~ of the
Paradigm at Tim. 31 b, while the notion that he is beyond the world is deriv-
ed from the unepoupavto~ t6no~ of Phaedr. 247c according to Beaujeu: op.
cit., p. 271 and Moreschini: op. cit., p. 198. For 'everlasting' and 'unchang-
ing' see also the Greek De Mundo 6, 399b21 and 6, 400b 11-12.
APULEIUS 271
ing the references to him as one and 'infinite' (ci7ttpiJ.1Etpoc;)

"hich seemingly reflect rather the religious milieu of the second
century. liS Secondly, it is important to note the definite
metaphysical transcendence which the uniting of the notions of
incorporeal, non-spatial, and non-temporal implies, 176 for
Apuleius is the first Latin writer to reestablish the metaphysical
transcendence characteristic of ancient Platonism 177 as opposed
to the physical transcendence advocated by Antiochus of
Ascalon, Cicero, Varro, and Seneca.ns Finally, we should note
that the reference to God as 'highest' (exsuperantlssimus) again
links Apuleius with the religious milieu of his own day, 179 for
this Latin word which is rare in literary contexts is shown by
epigraphic evidence to have been employed by adepts of the
l"''i. For the notion of God as 'one' in the second century see R. Braun:
Deus Christianorum. Recherches sur le l'ocabulaire doctrinal de Tertu/lien
(Paris. 1962), pp. 67-68. For cbt&pi~&Tpoc; which is a hapaxlegomenon see
Beaujeu: op. cit., p. 256 and Moreschini: op. cit., p. 199.
1"6. On the importance ot' Apuleius' careful delineation of the
metaphysical transcendence of God - which in many ways parallels the
treatment by Albinus: Dldasc. 10, Iff. - see B. M. Portogalli: 'Sulle fonti
della concezione teologica e demonologica di Apuleio', Studi classici e or/en-
tali 12 ( 1963), pp. 229-230. Portogalli raises the important question of possi-
ble Aristotelian influence over the notion of metaphysical transcendence in
this period.
177. Plato nowhere brings together these three essential attributes of a
transcendent metaphysical principle, although an attentive reading of the
1'imaeus (especially combining Tim. 27d-29a on the Demiurge and Paradigm
with ibid. 38b on the nature of time and Ibid. 52a-b on that of space) would
reveal such a transcendence clearly enough.
178. There is no need to repeat the results of our earlier discussion of this
question. On the absence of metaphysical transcendence in the earlier latin
tradition seep. 153 and ch. 1, n. 343 (for Cicero). pp. 833-835 and app .. nn.
"".f- '76 (for Varro), and p. 187 and ch. 2, n. 118 (for Seneca). On the earlier
history of incorporeality in the Platonic tradition of late antiquity see pp.
l""l-3andch. 2, nn. 5759.
1'79. See the important study of F. Cumont: 'jupiter summus exsuperan-
tissimus', Archivfiir Religlonswlssenschaft9 (1906), pp. 323-336.
Syrian cult of Ba'al Samin introduced into Rome during the

reign of the emperor Commodus. tso
4.3111 GOD'S CAUSALITY
The descriptions of God himself also include various expres-

sions of his causality either in a positive or a negative or a
positive and negative form. As examples of the first mode we
find him described as 'cause, creator, father' (causa, origo,
opifex, exstructor, auctor, parens, genitor) of all things, tat of
180. According to Cumont: op. cit.. pp. 323-336. Ba'al Sam in was believed
to reside in the sphere of fixed stars, so that his cult was primarily an
astrological one. The identification of the outermost cosmic sphere with the
supreme God had been suggested earlier by Cicero: De Rep. VI, 17, and it ac-
quired a new vogue in the teachings of certain Chaldaean and Syrian cults of
the imperial period. See Statius: Thebaid. IV, 515-516 and Lactantius
Placidus: In Thebaid. IV, 515-516. That Apuleius accepts this theory is sug-
gested not only by his use of the Greek De Mundo which locates God similar-
ly at the periphery of the cosmos (ITEpi K60110U 6, 398b7 tni tile; avrotci.tro
xropac; {l)pua9at = Apuleius: De Mundo 25, 344 sacrata caeli penetralibus),
but by his explicit reference to the 'Chaldaeans' (Chaldaei) as a source of
astronomical information at De Deo Socr. 1, 117. and by the tripartite
classification of gods into 'supermundane' (ultramundanus), 'heavenly'
(caelicolae), and 'intermediary' (medioximi) in De Platone which recalls
schemata attributed to the Chaldaeans by other sources. To Cumont's results
we should perhaps add two observations. First, Apuleius' version of this
theory differs from the earlier one in that his supreme deity is not the sphere
of the fixed stars itself but a metaphysical principle whose operation is
primarily manifested in this sphere. This makes his doctrine strikingly similar
to that of Aristotle who believed that the Unmoved Mover was metaphysical-
ly transcendent yet somehow present at the periphery of the universe. See
Aristotle: PbJs. VIII, 10, 267a21-b8. Secondly. Apuleius interpretation of the
first God as the summus exsuperantissimusque deorum of oriental cult is not
necessarily inconsistent with his view that it is equivalent to the
supercelestial place of Plato's Phaedrus. See Festugic~re: La revelation
d 'Hermes Trismegiste 11: Le Dieu cosmique (Paris, 1949), pp. 514-515 and
Regen: op. cit., pp. 97-98.
181. Apuleius: Apol. 64; De Deo Socr. 3. 124; and De Plat. I, 5. 190.
APUI.Eil!S 273
the gods. IHZ and of soull83- here God is viewed primarily as an

originative cause - or as 'lord, ruler' (~amA.euc;, rex, rector,
dominator) of all things, 1!!4 of the gods, tss and of soull86 -
here he is viewed primarily as a sustaining cause. In the second
mode we find God described as 'liberated from all the con-
straints of suffering or performing anything and unconfined by
obligation at all times' (solutus ab omnibus nexibus patiendi
aliquid gerendive, nulla vice ad alicuius rei munia obstric-
tum).IHi In the third mode we find Apuleius describing God as
rhe cn:ator without effort, the savior without concern, the
father without generation' (sine opera opifex, sine cura
sospitator. sine propagatione genitor). 188 From these passages,
a complex picture emerges in which the first principle is said to
intervene actively in the cosmic process, or not to intervene in
the cosmos, or to intervene in a non-interventive manner. If this
is not to be viewed simply as rhetoric, what precise sense can be
given to such an explanation?
4.3112 THE DOCTRINE OF DE MUNDO
The answer lies in the theological section of the pseudo-

Aristotelian nepi KOO'J.I.OU which begins with the following argu-
ment.IR9 The traditional belief that all things which we perceive
by sight or hearing are 'full of gods' (9erov 1tMa) is a reasonable
one provided that one bears in mind the distinction between the
divine 'power' (ouvaj.uc;) and the divine 'substance' (ouoia).
I H2. Apult:ius: De Deo Socr. 3. 124.

IH5. Apuldus: Apol. 64.
IIi I. Apulcius: Apol. 64 and 65; and De Mrmdo .24, 34 1-342 and 30. 357.
IR5. Apuleius: De Plat. I, 12,205.
I H6. Apulcius: Apol. 64 and De Plm. I. 9, 199.
IIi~. Apuleius: De Deo Socr. 3. 124.
IHH. Apuleius: Ajml. 64.
llil). Ps.-Aristotlc: n&pi K6aj.10U 6. 3l)7b9 ff.
274 MIDDI.E PI.ATONISM
God is indeed the cause of all things which happen in the world,
but he achieves this not through any direct intervention but
through the exercise of an 'unwearied power' (iitputoc;
MvaJ.Ltc;) from afar. God has taken for himself the highest sta-
tion, and the body which is nearest to him 'draws off most from
this power' (IJ.QAlO'tQ OS moe; autou tile; OUVQj.I.E(I)c; cmoA.aUEl)
while the next nearest draws less and so on. When we say that
'the divine pervades all things' (bti 7tQV OUKVEia9at 7tE(j)UKEV to
eetov), we mean that things share to different degrees in the
divine power. Thus, it is more fitting to say that it is 'the power
established in heaven. (~ v oupavq> OUVQI.llc; lopujJ.tVll) which
provides the stability of each thing from afar rather than
something which achieves this directly by approaching and per-
vading its objects. just as the Great King remains unseen in his
capital, yet sees and hears all things by means of the agents
which he dispatches to various places, so does God govern the
world which is subject to him. It is appropriate that he 'should
be established in the highest place' (7ti tile; avrotatro x.c.i>pac;
iop0a9at) while the heavenly bodies are moved by 'the power
which pervades the whole cosmos' (~ ouvaj.l.tc; oui toO OUIJ.7tav-
toc; K60J.lOU BtitKouaa). In the same way, makers of machines
are able to produce a complex series of movements as a result of
a single ingenious trigger mechanism.
My paraphrase has remained deliberately close to the text of
this rather discursive presentation, and so it may be useful to
state in a single sentence what the principal argument is. In
brief, the author of the treatiset9o distinguishes two aspects of
God: his transcendence in relation to the world (indicated first
190. The authorship and date of the Greek De Mundo have not been deter-
mined with certainty, although nobody maintains that it is an authentic work
by Aristotle. According to W. L. Lorimer: The Text Tradition of Ps. -Aristotle
De Mundo together with an Appendix containing the Text of the Mediaer,al
Latin Versions (Oxford. 1927). p. I. it was the: work of an otherwise
unknown author between A.D. 40 and A.D. 140, the latter date being furnish-
APtJLEH.JS 275
by expressions of his distance from the things which he

causes, 191 and secondly by expressions of their distance from
him)l92 and his immanence in relation to the world (indicated
first by statements that a divine element pervades the things
which are caused,t93 and secondly by statements that these
things partake in a divine element.)194 Furthermore, this
transcendence is described by referring primarily to the
substance of Godl95 (but also to a transcendent power), 196
while the immanence is described by referring mainly to the im-
manent power of God 197 (but also to his assistance).198 The
origins of this interesting theory which here makes its first entry
into the history of philosophy have been much debated by
modern scholars, although there seems little reason to deviate
from the majority view that it represents a fusion of Aristotelian
cd by its priority to the Latin version of Apuleius and the former by the occur-
rence of the phrase ci>an&p O.t.u~A.&t which appears in literature around
Plutarch's time.
191. God has the 'highest and primal station' (avc.i>"tano Kai npc.i:ml fopa,
nepl K6af,lOU 6, 397b25); he is 'in heaven' (ev oupavcp Ibid. 6, 398a2-3); he is
'in the highest place' (em n\c; avomitro xropac; ibid. 6, 398b7-8).
192. Things caused by God are 'far away' (n6ppro Ibid. 6, 397b24); 'nearer
... farther' (to d.TJaiov ... to f.lEt'EKEivo ibid. 6, 397b28-30); 'at the greatest
distance' (ev anoataG&l ni..&iOTlJ Ibid. 6, 397b30-31 ); 'nearer and farther' (ey-
YIOV <E Kai nopprottpro ibid. 6, 397b35); 'at the greatest distance' {toic;
nJ..eiatov ciq>&atfiK6mv ibid. 6, 398a:n.
19.:\. The divine element 'pervades all things' (Eiti nav OllKVEia9at ibid. 6,
,Wra:B); 'pervades the whole world' (ota toi:i GIJfl7tUVtoc; KOOflOU OlllKEIV
ihid. 6. 598b8).
19'l. Things caused by God are 'full of gods (9ewv nJ..ta ibid. 6,
W""b 17-18); they 'draw off the divine power' (<iic; ouv<if,l&roc; anoJ..au&t ibid.
6. W7b28-29); they 'participate in its benefits' (Wq>&A.&iac; f.!E<aAaf,ll}<ivovm
ibid. 6, 398a I).
195. oua(a at ibid. 6, 397b20.
196. Mvaf.ltc; at ibid. 6, 398a2-3.
19'. Mva1-uc; at ibid. 6, 397b 19; 6, 397h23; 6. 397b28; and 6, 398bR.
198. wq>tl..&ta at ibid. 6, 39rb31 and 6. 398a I.
and Stoic elements.I99 Thus, God's transcendent relation to the

world is derived from Aristotle's teaching that each cosmic mo-
tion is derived from its prior and ultimately from a first
moverzoo which is unmoved,lOI eternal,202 non-spatial,203 and
incorporeal. zo4 The latter causes motion which is first manifest
at the circumference of the universe205 by being an object of
desire,zo6 since an incorporeal thing cannot move by the con-
tact implied in pushing or pulling. His immanent relation to the
world is based upon the Stoic doctrine that all cosmic motions
are produced by the Logos or Pneuma207 which is dynamic,208
199. See especially M. Heinze: Die Lehre t'Om logos in der griechischen
Philosopble (Oldenburg. 1872). p. 174 and E. Zeller: Die Philosophie der
Griechen in ibrer gescblchtlichen Entwicklung Ill. I (Leipzig. 1923 ), p. 664.
Other s<.holars have added minor details or modifications to this interpreta-
tion, although much of the more detailed Quellenforschrmg has produced
unconvincing results. See W. Capelle: 'Die Schrift ''onder Welt. Ein Beitrag
zur Geschichte der griechischen Popularphilosophie'. Neue jahrhiicher fur
das klassische Altertum I 5 (1905). pp. 529-568; M. ). Lagrange: 'l.es
pcripatcticiens jusqu':l I' ere chrctienne'. Re11ue Thomiste 32 ( 1927), p. 202 ff:
). P. Maguire: 'The Sources of Pseudo-Aristotle De Mundo. Yale Classical
Studies 6 (1939), pp. 147-162; G. Verbeke: L 'etrolulion de Ia doctrine du
pneuma du stoicisme as. Augustin. Etude phi/osophique (Louvain, 1945),
pp. 138-141; Festugiere: La revtflation d'Hermes Trlsmegiste II: Le Dieu
cosmique, pp. 160-164; M. Adriani: 'Note sui trattato llpi K6aJ.LOU', Rivista
di fi/ologia e di istruzione c/assica 30 ( 1952), pp. 208-222; and S. di Cristina:
'L'idea di ouvaJ,w;, ncl De Mundo e nell'Oraliu Cld Graecos di Taziano',
Augustinianum 17 ( 1977), pp. -485-504.
200. Aristotle: Phys. VIII . .J. 25.fh7 ff.
201. Ibid. VIII. 5. 257a:H 258h9.
202. Ibid. VIII, 6. 259a6- 19.
203. Aristotle: De Caelo l, 9, 279a 18-22.
204. Aristotle: Phys. VIII. 10, 267h I '7-26.
205.1bid. VIII, 10, 267b6-9.
206. Aristotle: Metaph. A. 7. I 07 2a26-h I.
207. Sec: pp. 107-108.
208. Seepp. 113115.
APllLF.IliS
operating in time 209 and space,2JO and corporeal.21 1 It causes

motion throughout the universe by its twofold directional
tendency from and to the surrounding aether,212 its corporeali-
tY permitting the explanation of all motions in terms of con-
t~ct _z 13 It is not difficult to see that our author has combined the
first part of the Aristotelian theory with the second part of the
Stoic one. thereby fashioning a doctrine in which the rival
claims of transcendent and immanent divinity receive their due.
Apulcius' translation of this text is of considerable interest
since - as the researches of F. Regen2 14 have effectively
demonstrated - the translator introduces various paraphrases
which adapt the theory to his own philosophical aims. Thus,
the following points should be noted. First, Apuleius renders
the technical terms signifying the two aspects of divinity as 'ma-
jesty' (maiestas) and 'power' (potestas) respectively throughout
the passage.215 The only exception occurs in the second
sentence where we find an interesting substitution of
'providence' (providentia) for the usual 'power'. Secondly, he
rephrases the traditional doctrine that all things are full of gods
in the language of Latin Stoicism by speaking of the belief that
'all things are full of Jupiter' (omnia love plena esse). Further-
209. Sccpp. 110-112.

210. Sec pp. I 10-112.
211. Slcpp. 101-IO';aml 1'70-P.f.
212. Slc pp. 9"i-96.
21.~. Sec pp. 101-105.
21t. Rcgln: op. cit., pp. 2.'\-R3. That some of Apulcius' c.Jnlations from the
<i rnk original result from a desire to reinterpret the text in terms of his
lkmonological interests had already been su~gestcc.l hy S. Muller: 'Das
\'crh;iltni~ ,-on Apulcius De mtmdo zu seiner Vorlage'. Pbi/o/ogus.
Suppi.-Band 32/2 (l.cipzig, 1939), p. 42. Regen then clahoratt:c.l this thesis at
ll-ngth The conclusions of these researches h:l\e earned the just approval of
lkaujl'U: op. cit .. pp. XX\'i-XX\'ii and 329-332 and Morcschlni: op. cit.. pp.
20t- 20"i.
2l"i. Apuldus: DeJitmdo 24, 3-fl-27, 3';2.
more, by noting how this interpretation suggests that 'not only

thought but eyes and ears and sensible substance comprehend
God's presence' (cuius praesentiam non iam cogitatio sola,
sed oculi et aures et sensibi/is substantia conprehendit) he
contrasts this Stoic materialism with his own Platonic outlook.
Thirdly, Apuleius replaces the contrast between God's
substance and the degrees of his power which various things
receive with the contrast between God's substance and a hierar-
chy of principles which carry out his functions. This is indicated
in the second sentence where the statement that God is the
cause of all things is translated by substituting for the relatively
vague phrase 'all things which in some way occur in the world'
the more precise words 'all those who are born or made for the
completion of the cosmos' (omnium, qui ad conplendum mun-
dum nati factique sunt). Here, the use of the word 'to com-
plete' (conplere) seems to echo Plato's teaching that the
demonic nature 'fills the gap' (aUIJ.1tATIPOUV) between the divine
and human realms, thereby suggesting that the concept of a
reception of divine power is to be understood in terms of
demonic mediation. A similar transformation of the original is
indicated in the third sentence where the statement that dif-
ferent things receive God's power to differing degrees is
translated by substituting for the vague phrase 'the body which
is nearest to him draws off most from his power, the next
nearest less' the more specific 'all the nearest things draw off
most from his power: the celestial bodies, to the extent that
they are nearer, take that much more from God, while the
bodies which are next after them take much less' (Denique pro-
piores quosque de potestate eius amp/ius trahere: corpora ilia
cae/estia, quanto finitima sunt ei, tanto amp/ius de deo
capere; multo minus, quae ab il/is sunt secunda). Here, we
seem to have a clear reference to Apuleius' theory that in the
hierarchical order of the universe the first God is followed by
invisible gods, visible gods, and demons, for the visible gods
would correspond to the celestial bodies and the demons to the
APULEJlJS 279
bodies which are next after them in the present passage. Fur-
ther, an analogous transformation of the Greek occurs in the
fifth sentence where the statement that the power established in
heaven provides the stability of all things is translated by replac-
ing the relatively vague phrase 'provides stability' with the
more explicit 'provides stability through itself and through
others' (per se et per alios opem salutis adferre). Here, Apuleius
refers to the two ways in which God sustains the existence of
other things, presumably contrasting a direct intervention in the
causal process with operation through intermediaries such as
celestial gods or demons. Finally, the same transformation of
the original is indicated in the seventh sentence where the state-
ment that the power which pervades the whole cosmos moves
the heavenly bodies is translated by replacing the vague phrase
'the power which pervades the whole cosmos' with the more
precise words 'those powers which God distributes through all
the parts of the world' (eas autem potestates per omnes partes
mundi orbisque dispendat). Here, the substitution of the plural
'powers' (potestates) for the singular of the original suggests
that the notion of degrees has given way to that of a hierarchy,
especially since there is evidence for applying the plural term to
demons elsewhere in the Apuleian corpus.
4. 3 113 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS 0 F GOD'S

CAUSALITY
This text is clearly a most important document for the inter-

preter of Apuleius' theory of causation, and provides an ex-
planation of the ambivalent way in which God's relation to the
world is expressed.216 Interpreted in terms of the Latin
paraphrase, the positive expressions of divine causality signify
the immanence of God or the diffusion of his power through all
216. Sec pp. 272-273.

things; the negative expressions of divine causality indicate the

transcendence of God or the elevation of his majesty above all
things; the positive and negative expressions of divine causality
signify the simultaneous immanence and transcendence of God
or the diffusion through all things of a power whose exercise is
vested in intermediate principles. Yet one must not misunders-
tand the nature of this solution by concluding that the exercise
of power by intermediate principles supersedes the diffusion of
power by God or that the immanence of the divine is abandon-
ed in favor of its transcendence. Since Apuleius argues clearly in
other texts that the various intermediate principles can also be
understood as aspects of God himself, one must conclude that
immanence and transcendence are ontologically inseparable
aspects of his causality. This solution is of fundamental impor-
tance since it will reappear in some form in almost every
Platonic writer of late antiquity.
4.3114 THE DOCTRINE OF DE PLATONE
It will be recalled that in one passage of Apuleius' paraphrase

the Greek word MvaJ,.w; was rendered not by the usual term
potestas but by providentia, 217 and this suggests that whatever
he has to say about providence can be interpreted as an exten-
sion of the theory just described. In fact, there is discussion of
providence in De Platone et eius Dogmate which contains cer-
tain elements similar to those occurring in the discussion of
substance and power, and this runs as follows.21s First, Apuleius
defines providence as 'the divine plan which assures the well-
being of that for whose benefit it has undertaken this task'
(divina sententia, conservatrix prosperitatis eius, cuius causa
217. Sec p. 2'77.

21 H. Apuleius: De Plat. I. 12. 20';-206.
APL'lEIUS 281
tale suscepit ofjicium).219 Then he defines fate as 'the divine

law through which the ineluctable thoughts and projects of God
are fulfilled' (divina lex ... per quod inevitabiles cogitationes
dei atque incepta conplentur).220 Since the divine plan of the
earlier text seems to be equivalent to the ineluctable thoughts
and projects of the later text, fate is implied to be posterior to
providence and a further determination of it. This is confirmed
hy the next sentence where Apuleius states that 'if something is
undertaken by providence it is also performed by fate, and that
which is completed by fate must be viewed as initiated by pro-
vidence' (si quid provident/a geritur, id agitur et Jato, et quod
Jato terminatur providentia debet susceptum videri).22t
However, the relation of fate to providence is made more pro-
blematic by the fact that providence itself is manifested on two
levels: that of the 'first providence' (prima providentia) exer-
cised by the highest God, and that of the 'second providence'
(secunda providentia) associated with the subordinate
219. The nature of providence is further defined at ibid. II, 23, 253 'The
supreme God does not only consider all these activities by means of his
thoughts. but he surveys the first. middle. and last. and rules the things which
he: knows intimately with the unl\'ersality and continuity of providential
ordering' (summus deorum ctmcta haec non solum cogitationum raUone
crmsideret, set/ P''ima, media, ultima obeat conpertaque intime prol'ldae
ordinatimzis tmitersitate et constantia regat) .
.220. For fate see further Apulcius: De Mundo 38 ..F2 'The Greeks like to
Gill fate EillUPilEVTJ because of a certain sequence of interrelated causes, they
l'all this decree 7tE7tPWJlEV11 because all things are defined in our universe and
then~ is nothing undetermined in this world. They also l'all it j.IOtpa because it
is composed of parts' (Fa tum autem Graeci EillUPJ.1EV11V a tractu quodam in-
ticem etll/sarum se continentium tolunt diet; decretum idem 7tE1tPWJ.1EVTIV
clicunt. quod unmia in hoc statu rerum deflnita sl'lt nee sit in hoc mundo
aliquid interminatum: idem fatum j.IOtpav tmcm11. quod ex pmtibus con-
stet).
221. The posteriority of fate to providence is also indicated in certain
other texts of the period which seemingly reflect the same teaching. See p .
., .... _.and ch. 6. n 232.
deities.222 Whether fate is to be understood as posterior to the

first providence or posterior to both the first and second pro-
vidences is not explained, although the latter hypothesis is
perhaps the more likely.
Apuleius seems to have constructed his doctrine of pro-
vidence from the usual range of sources. Among these Plato
naturally holds the first rank, having provided the basic
elements which constitute the later theory even if not the means
by which these elements could be combined into a coherent
system. Thus, Plato speaks of the 'providence' (np6vma) exer-
cised by God in fashioning the world as a living creature endow-
ed with soul and intelligence223 and, since he is declared to have
fashioned it in this way so that it might be as perfect in nature as
possible, it becomes clear that this providence is teleological in
character. Plato also speaks of 'fate' (dJ.LaPJ.l.EVTI) as a kind of
numerical pattern according to which the growth and decay of
222. It is possible that Apult'ius envisages a third level of providence

associated with the demons who arc mentioned in the next sentence. This
seems to be indicated by Flor. 10 'The sun ... the moon ... and the powers of
the other five wandering stars: the bendkent of jupiter. the voluptuous of
Venus, the swift of Mercury, the baneful of Saturn, and the ardent of Mars.
There are other intermediate divine powers which we can feel but not
perceive. like that of love and similar things. whose form is unseen although
their force is known. It is this force which operates even on earth, where\er
the order of providence demands' (So/ ... Luna ... nee non quinque ceterae
tagantium potestates: lmis benefica. Veneris toluptifica. pemix Mercuri,
pernidosa Suturni. Martis ignitcl. Sunt et allae metlhw deum potestates.
quas 1/cet sentire. non datur cernere. ut Amoris ceterorumque id genus.
quorum forma imisilata. t-'is cognilcl. Item in ferris, utcu mque protiden
liae rtttio poscebat). Here we find not only further evidence for the general
equation of power and providence. but a definite statement that both of these
operate on three IC\'cls: the heavenly. the intermediate (demonic). and the
terrestrial. For a different conclusion sec G. Barra: Apulcio c: il problema
ddl'origine del male', Vicbimw. Num:t Serie I ( 19721. pp. IOHI09.
223. Plato: Tim. 30b.
APULEIUS 28.3
an ensouled being is determined,224 although references to the

possibility of violating the natural order by an act of suicide in-
dicate that fate is not ineluctable for man.225 Nowhere does
Plato make an explicit statement of the relation between these
two concepts although the combination of two passages in the
Timaeus - God is first said to have fashioned the world accor-
ding to his providence226 and later to have explained the laws of
fate to the created souls227 - seems to imply that fate is to some
degree posterior to providence. The theory that there are levels
of providence is even less explicitly stated by Plato and seems
rather to reflect a second-century school tradition independent-
ly documented by ps.-Plutarch's De Fato, Calcidius' Commen-
tarius in Timaeum, and Nemesius' De Natura Hominis. 22s Ac-
cording to this teaching, there are three levels of providence
associated with the first God, the secondary gods, and the
demons paralleled by three grades of fate apportioned to the fix-
ed stars, the planets, and the subcelestial region, the levels of
providence being in some way prior to those of fate.
Although it is possible to trace the various elements in
224. Plato: Pbaed. 115a; Tim. 89c; Leg. IX, 873c and X. 904c.
22S. Plato: Leg. IX. 873c.
226. Plato: Tim. 30b-c.
22"'. Ibid. 41e.
228. The doctrinal parallels between these three works (and Apuleius)
were first noted by A. Gercke: 'Eine platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus'.
Rbeiniscbes Museum 41 ( 1886). pp. 266-291. For a comparative study of the
lloctrincs of providence and fate in these authors sec Dillon: op. cit., pp.
:'120-.U6. See also for the individual writers E. Valgiglio: Ps.-Piutarco. De:
Fa to. lntroduzione, testo crltico, traduzi(me e nmwzento (Rom a. 1964 ); A.
Siclari: L 'mztropologia di Nemesio di Emesa (Padova,l974). pp. 266-301: G.
Vcrhckc: ct J. R. Moncho: Nemesius d'Emese, De Natura Hominis. Traduction
cle Burgundio de Pise. Edition critique avec rme introduction sur /'an-
thropotogie de Nemisius par G. V. et]. R. M. (Leiden, 19"5), pp. lxii-lxxxv:
:mll J. dt"n Boeft: Calcidius on Fate. His Doctrine and Sources (Lei den,
1'-TO), pp. R-46.
Apuleius' theory of providence back to earlier sources, we still

have to explain why he felt it necessary to synthesize these
elements into such a complex system. In particular two ques-
tions demand answers: first, why does he distinguish pro-
vidence and fate? Secondly, why does he postulate different
levels of providence? The answer to the first question seems to
be that Apuleius wishes to distance himself from the Stoic
theory that providence and fate are both identifiable with the
immanent Logos,229 since this view makes it impossible to ex-
onerate God from the causation of evil which is clearly an ingre-
dient if not of providence at least of fate.230 Platonists such as
Apuleius found the implications of the Stoic doctrine unaccep-
table, and therefore usually attempted to distinguish clearly bet-
ween providence which involves the causation of goods only
and fate which embraces the causation of both goods and evils,
assigning direct responsibility only for the former to God.231
The answer to the second question is probably that Apuleius
wishes to take account of Plato's statements that providence
can be attributed both to the first God232 and to the secondary
229. Aetius: P/ac. l, 2i, ~ (DG 322b9 = SVF I, 176) 'Zeno the Stoic calls
fate a power which moves matter in an invariable and constant manner in his
"On Nature". He says that one can equally well call this providence or
nature' (Zftvrov 6 I:trotKO<; tv t<\> npl cl>uaroc;, 5UVUJllV KlVlltlKtlV ti\<; UATJ<;
Katci tautci Kai aautroc;, ~vnva lltl ota<PEPELV np6vOtav Kai <PUOtv KaA.Etv).
According to Calcidius: In Tim. 144. 183, 6-14 (SVF II, 933). Chrysippus
made the same identification while Cleanthes distinguished providence and
fate.
230. Despite this crucial disagreement, Apuleius continues to describe pro-
vidence and fate with much Stoic terminology. Thus. the definition of pro-
\'idence as the divine plan (see n. 219) recalls the Swic interpretation at
Calcidius: In Tim. 14-i, 183.8 (SVF II, 933)dei tmluntas. while the definition
of fate as the divine law (seen. 220) recalls the Stoic terminology of Cicero:
De Nat. Deor. 1. 36 (SVF 1. 162) rwturalis lex.
2.'\ I. Plato himself had stressed that God could not he the cause of evil. See
Rep. II, 376b; X, 617e; Tim. 42d; and Leg. X, 899d-903a.
232. Plato: Tim. 30b-c.
2R5
gods,233 the former being concerned with the well-being of the

world as a whole and the latter with that of the human body in
particular. Plato himself did not specify the relation between
these two manifestations of providence, and it fell to later
systematizers such as Apuleius to distinguish them as primary
and secondary providence respectively.
4.3115 GOD'S CAUSALITY IN ITS POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE

ASPECTS
The discussion of providence in De P/atone et eius Dogmate

supplies us with material which reinforces our interpretation of
the Apuleian theory of causation at significant points. It further
illustrates the ambivalent way in which God's relation to the
world is expressed, since the positive descriptions of divine
causality signify the immanence of God, the diffusion of his
power through all things, and his providential relation to the
universe; while the positive and negative descriptions of divine
causality indicate the simultaneous immanence and
transcendence of God, the diffusion through all things of a
power whose exercise is vested in intermediate principles, and
a providential relation to the universe which is manifested in
the causality of those intermediates.234 Once more it is impor-
tant to note that the exercise of power by intermediate prin-
ciples, the manifestation of providence in the causality of the in-
termediates, and the immanence of the divine do not supersede
the diffusion of power by God, the providential relation of God,
and the transcendence of the divine. As we have already argued,
.n.~. Ibid. -1.tc

2:\of. It will be obvious to the reader that. since the doctrine of providence
is an extension of the notion of God's power :111d not of the notion of his
substance. the negathe expressions of divine causality have no counterpart
within the theory of providence.
286 MIDDLE PI.A TON ISM
Apuleius' real position is that the various intermediate prin-

ciples can also be understood as aspects of God himself, and that
immanence and transcendence are ontologically inseparable
aspects of his causality.
4.312 THE NATURE OF FORMS
So far we have been devoting our attention to descriptions of

God himself, but it is also necessary to consider descriptions of
the Forms contained in God's mind. These latter consist in the
first instance of expressions of the Forms' transcendence such
as statements that they are 'simple' (simplices), 'incorporeal'
(nee corporales), and 'eternal' (aeternae).235 By describing the
Forms in this way, Apuleius follows the tradition established by
Plato himself and preserved by generations of doxographers.
Thus, Plato frequently returns to the question of the Forms' uni-
ty,236 describes them as incorporeal either by using the term
naci>f..l.ato~237 or some synonym or periphrasis,238 and constant-
ly stresses the everlasting character of the Forms.239 Among the
doxographical writers Arius Didymus speaks of the unity of the
23<;. Apuleius: De Plat. I, 6. 192.

236. See Plato: Pbaed. BOb; Parm. 13la-b; Pblleb. 15a; Symp. 2lla-b;
Tim. 31 band 3<;a.
23 7. The locus classints is Pl:uo: SfJpb. 2-46a ff. Hert a group of
philosophers (dearly the followers of Plato) is described which believes in
'lertain intelligible :md incorporeal Forms' (VOllTU ana Kai UOWJ.IQTQ Ei611).
2.~8. See Plato: Pbaedr. 247c 'the colorlt:ss. shapeless. and intangible be
ing' (t'J yap CxXPWJ.IQT6c; TE Kai CxOXTlJ.IQTlOTOc; Kai avaqn'Jc; ouaia) and Symp.
21la-b 'Beauty will appear to him which is not in the manner of a fal'e or
hands or any other bodily part ... which does not exist in any other being. for
example: in an animal. in earth, in heaven, or in anything else' (oM'au qmv-
taa6iJaETal autcp TO Kai..Ov o{ov np6aom6v Tl ou6i: xEipEc; ouM iiHo oMi:v rov
O<OJ.IQ J.IETEXEl ... oueSt 1tOU OV tv EtEpq> TlVl, o{ov tv ~Wq> il tv YU il tv oupavcp il
EV Tq> c'iAA.q>).
239. See Plato: Pbaecl. 80b; Pblleb. 15b; Symp. 2lla-b: and Tim. 37d.
APlllEJllS 287
Forms,24o Aetius of their incorporeality which is associated

equally with their existence in the thoughts of God24t and with
their existence in themselves,242 and Arius Didymus of their
everlasting character.243 On these points then, Apuleius did not
find any disagreement among his authorities which might have
necessitated independent reflection.
The same cannot be said of certain other expressions of the
Forms' transcendence which perhaps occur in another part of
Apuleius' discussion. We say 'perhaps' because the existence of
these expressions depends upon the interpretation of a sentence
whose precise wording has been subject to major scholarly con-
troversy. In the edition of P. Thomas it reads: 'Plato believes
that there are three principles of things: God, Matter, and the
Forms of things which he calls "Ideas". These latter are in-
complete and unformed, distinguished neither according to
shape nor quality.' (Initia rerum tria esse arbitratur Plato:
deum et materiam rerumque formas, quas i5&ac; idem vocat,
inabsolutas, informes, nulla specie nee qualitatis significa-
tione distinctas).244 However, in the edition of J. Beaujeu we
have: 'Plato believes that there are three principles of things:
God, Matter- which is incomplete and unformed, distinguish-
ed neither according to shape nor quality - and the Forms of
things which he calls "Ideas" (lnitia rerum esse tria ar-
bitratur Plato: deum et materiam inabsolutam, informem,
nulla specie nee qualitatis significatione distinctam, rerum-
que formas, quas i5tac; idem vocat). 24'; Thus, according to the
2i0. Arius Didymus: Epit. Pbys. fr 1 (DG 447aS-19 and b 1-22).

211. Altius: Plctc. I, 3. 21 (DG 28Ra4-6 and b.\-6). For a discussion of this
passa~t: and its implications see pp. 246-249.
2-12. !hid. I. 10, I (DG ;\08al6-19 and ;\08bl6-309b2). On the
philosophical significance of this passage seep. 248.
21.~. Arius Didymus: Epit. PhJ'S. fr. I (DG -l47aR-9 and b7-R).
211. Apuh:ius: De Plat. I, S, l90.
24;. For the: triadic schema in which the Forms occur see pp. 237-49.
.288 1\IIDDLE PLATONISM
reading in one version of Apuleius' text there are two further

characteristics of the Forms: incompleteness and lack of form.
But why should there be a scholarly controversy on this point?
The testimony of the manuscript tradition predominantly
favors the reading accepted by Thomas, but the transposition of
the phrase 'incomplete ... quality' by Beaujeu is inspired by the
conviction that such terminology could accurately describe
matter alone.246 On this point, the latter editor follows the in-
terpretation of certain earlier scholars such as E. Zeller 247 and}.
Redfors248 who maintained that Apuleius had confused the
meaning of a Greek original which he was following where the
three principles had been described in the order: God, Forms,
Matter to such an extent that he altered the order of the terms
without making the necessary transposition of the description;
or of scholars like T. Sinko249 who suggested that Apuleius'
understanding of the doctrine was accurate enough for him to
have assigned the description to the correct principle, the con-
fusion having crept into the text as result of a scribal error at
some later date. However, G. Barra has defended Thomas'
reading by pointing out first, that it may be possible to find a
coherent philosophical justification for applying the description
to the Forms and secondly, that the passage reveals a care of
literary construction undermine.d by the transposition.250
It is not easy to decide which of these two schools of thought
has produced the strongest arguments, and the best solution
.2-16. See the notes in Beaujeu: op. cit .. pp . .2';4-.2';6 .

.2 .. 7. Zeller: op. cit. Ill. 2, p. 226.
2-18. Redfors: op. cit., p. 21.
2-19. Sinko: op. cit. pp. 4-5 .
.250. G. Barra: 'lnitia rerum. lin passu controverso del De Platone el eius
Dogmate di Apulcio'. Rendlconli deii'Acc:ademia di Arc:heologia, Lettere e
Belle Arli di Napol/40 ( 1965). pp. 35-42. Barra notes the rhetorical force of
the antithesis form as ... informes and the paralldism inabsolutas informes
- nulla specie nee: qua/itatis significatione dislinctas. One might add that
APlii.Eil!S 2H9
might be to leave the interpretation of the vexed passage

without a dogmatic commitment. However, one or two points
seem worth making. Thus, we should perhaps concede to the
supporters of Beaujeu's reading that the phrase 'incomplete ...
quality' looks suspiciously like descriptions of matter in other
writers of approximately the same period ..25t On the other
hand, there are two arguments in favor of associating the phrase
with the Forms in this context: one historical and one
philosophical. The historical argument is that Apuleius could
have found support in the tradition for describing the Forms in
this way, namely in Plato's Phaedrus where the supercelestial
place is said to be the location of a being which is aax-
THHi'rtatoc;.2'i2 - a Greek word which means both 'shapeless'
and 'formless' and could therefore be the basis of Apuleius' in-
formis - and in the doxographers one of whom has left us a
testimony that the Platonic God had been called civsicSsoc;253 -
this Greek term being the exact counterpart of the Latin infor-
m is. The philosophical argument is that Apuleius may have been
genuinely concerned about the problem of reconciling the unity
of God's mind and the plurality of the Forms, therefore coming
to the conclusion that the Forms in the divine mind must be en-
folded in a unitary state and lacking the determination which
Apulciu!> elsewhere reveals a love of such antitheses. Sec for example Apol.
6'1 where God is described as 'the artificer without artifice, the consoler
without concern, the begetlcr without generation' (sine opera opifex. sine
cum sospitator, sine propagt~tione genitor).
2'i I. Cf. Alhinus: Didasc. H. 2 'Matter in itself exists without shape, quali-
ty. and form'(aun'w f> Ka9'aurt)v ciJ.top(jl6v tE unapxEtv Kai cinmov Kai avEi-
f>r.ov).
2'i2. Plato: Phaedr. l47c. Apulcius has already shown his interest in this
passage hy using it at A pol. 64.
2'i:\. Hippolytus: Phi/os. 19 (D(i <;67. I<;). Apulcius did not know this text
;tlthough he had access to the tradition which it represents.
accompanies their unfolding into multiplicity at the first level of

instantiation. 254
Whichever view is correct, a striking feature of the accounts
of the theory of Forms is the absence of any systematic attempt
to list the kinds of Forms which must be postulated. However if
one reads the text carefully enough, it is possible to see that two
classes of Forms are visualized: those of the four elements and
those of the species of living things respectively. That there are
Forms of the four elements is suggested by Apuleius' statement
that matter 'is marked by the imprint of Forms so that the primal
elements are generated: fire, water, earth, and air' (bane et
signari inpressione forma rum. Hinc prima elementa esse pro-
genita, ignem et aquam et terram et aera).2'i'i That there are
Forms of living things is implied by his statement that 'the kinds
of animate being themselves are divided into four species, of
which one is of the nature of fire ... another is of the quality of
air .. . the third is composed of water and earth' (lam ipsa
animantium genera in quattuor species dividuntur, quarum
una est ex natura ignis . . . alterum ex aeria qua/itate . . . ter-
tium ex aqua terra que coalescere). 256 The most significant
feature of this theory is the apparent restriction of the Forms to
those of natural substances, for this corresponds to the teaching
of Xenocrates who had defined a Form as 'a paradigmatic cause
of things regularly arising according to nature' (ahia
napaOEt)'J.I.attKft tei>v Kata q>umv <lEi auvEat6nrov).2'i7 These are
indeed the only kinds of Forms explicitly mentioned in the
2S4. Barra: 'Initia rerum: Un passo controverso del De Pk1tone et eius

Dogma/ di Apuleio'. p. ;\7 ff. has anempted a similar philosophil'al justifica-
tion of Thomas' reading. However. his interpretation requires the attribution
to Apuldus of a degree of metaphysi<:al subtlety which he probably did not
possess.
l'i'i. Apuldus: De Plat. l. '7, 194.
2;6. Ibid. I. I I, .20.3-204.
l'i7. Proclus: 111 Parm. 888. 17-19 (Xenocrates: fr. 30).
APlJLEIUS 291
Timaeus258 but, since elsewhere in the writings of Plato moral

and mathematical Forms are emphasized in preference to
natural ones and qualitative Forms in preference to substantial
ones,259 this interpretation seems like a deviation from the
master's original teaching. Nevertheless, Xenocrates' version of
the theory of Forms becomes the universal doctrine of the dox-
ographical writers, being repeated in Arius Didymus and later
philosophers who made use of his compendium.260 That
Apuleius also believed in Forms of moral qualities is perhaps
suggested by a passage stating that 'there is no other reason for
taking delight in physical shape than because it reminds the
souls made divine of that Beauty which they have previously
beheld in its truth and purity among the gods' (neque enim
2'iR. Plato: Tim. 39e (living things) and ibid. SIb (elements).
2'i9. It is impossible to give a complete list of the references to Forms in
Plato's writings or to classify these references since (i) Plato generally avoids
the rigid technical terminology whose presence would invariably permit us
to identify the occurrence of a Form, and (ii) Plato's thought seems to have
undergone :m evolution in which his notions regarding the kinds of Forms to
be postulated may have changed. However, the following passages are the
main ones referring to the types of Form discussed above. a) Moral Forms
(qualitative): Pbaed. 7Sc-d; 76d; Parm. 130b; 130e-13la; Symp. 21lc;
Phaedr. 247d; Rep. V, 476a; V. 479a; and Epist. VII, 342d; b) Mathematical
Forms (qualitative): Pbaed. 75c-d; Pann. 130b; 130e-13la; Rep. V. 479b;
Rep. VI, 'i JOe; and Epist. VII, 342d; c) Forms of natural objects (substantial):
Pbileb. I 'ia; Tim. 39e; S lb; and Eplst. VII, 342d. The following texts contain
the most important general discussions of the range of Forms: Pann. 130a-e
(moral and mathematical Forms assumed, Forms of natural suhstances ques-
tioned, l'orms of negatives rejected); Rep. X, 'i96a (Forms of all general terms
postulated); lpist. VII, 342d (the fullest list of l'orms including moral and
mathematical Forms, Forms of natural substances, and others); and Aristotle:
Jletapb. A. 9. 990a33-993a I 0 (discussion of various arguments which deter-
mine the range of Forms). For a detailed analysis of this question sec W. D.
Ross: Plat(} 's Theory of Ideas (Oxford, I9'i 1). pp. 24, 84-85. and 16'i ff.
260. Arius Didymus: !:'pit. Phl'S. fr. I (DG 447al-27). Cf. Alhinus: Didasc.
12, 1-2. .
quicquam aliud in corporum forma diligendum quam quod

ammoneant divinos animos eius pulcbritudinis, quam prius
veram et sinceram inter deos videre).261 Since Apuleius does
not explicitly refer to a Form, his argument which is here loose-
ly based upon the Pbaedrus262 can be interpreted in two ways:
either he considers Beauty to be a Form but like Plato in the
original text prefers to indicate this by the context rather than
by special terminology; or he does not consider Beauty to be a
Form but an attribute of the divine essence since the dox-
ographical tradition had postulated Forms of natural substances
only. It is impossible to adjudicate decisively between these two
interpretations. 263
4.3121 THE CAUSALITY OF FORMS
The descriptions of the Forms contained in God's mind also

include expressions of their causality, and the best example of
the latter is provided by a passage where Apuleius states the
following points: (i) the Ideas are the paradigms of things which
are to be created, (ii) each paradigm gives rise to a multiplicity
of individual Forms, and (iii) the relation of each paradigm to
the multiplicity of individual Forms is analogous to the impres-
sion of a single seal upon different pieces ofwax.264 On all these
points Apuleius seems to follow the tradition of Plato and the
doxographers once again, for both Plato and Arius Didymus
161. Apuldus: Ajml. ll.

262. Plato: Pbaedr. 150e-2'; Ia.
163. A similar situation arises with another moral Form: the Good. AI Rep.
VI, '508e Plaw explicitly refers 10 'the Form of the Good' (Tt toii ciya6oii icSta).
yet Apuleius at Apol. 27 speaks only of 'the Good' (to ciya06v). A comparison
with De Plat. II. I, 220 suggests thatlmnus Is a description of God's essence
in general and not a Form in the divine mind. Thus. Xenocrates' restricted
definition of a Form seems 10 be preserved.
26-l. Apuleius: De Pltll. l, 6, 192-193.
APlll.EIUS .293
speak of (i) the Ideas as the paradigms of things which are to be

crcated ..Wi and both Plato and Arius Didymus explain (iii) the
relation between the paradigm and an individual Form by
means of the analogy of seal and wax.266 Arius Didymus alone
connects these two notions with the explicit statement (ii) that
each paradigm gives rise to a multiplicity of individual
Forms,267 although the doctrine that the intelligible and sensible
are related as unity to multiplicity is common enough in Plato's
writings.268
4.) 122 THE LATIN TERMINOLOGY
A striking feature of this Apuleian text269 is the proliferation

of technical terminology which at first sight renders its meaning
somewhat obscure, and in order to justify the interpretation
contained in my paraphrase it may be useful to list these terms
26"i. Plato: Tim . .29b and .J8e. Cf. Arius Didymus: !:.'pit. Pbys. fr. I (DG
..f..f-a2-"i. 19-21 and bl-3. 12-22).
266. Plato: Tim. 50d-c:. Cf. Arius Didymus: Epit. Pbys. fr. I (l)G 447a9-11
and h8-12).
26-. Arius Didymus: Eplt. Pbys. fr. I (DG 447a9-l.~) 'just as many impres-
~ions arise from a single seal and many images of a single: man, thus many
natures of sensible bodies arise from each single: Idea' (ov tp61tOV 5i:
CHppayiooc; llltlc; tKilUYEiU yiV09Ul 1t0A.J..ci KUi OUXVclc; iK6vac; EVOc; QVOp6c;,
of,twc; Kai llttic; tKaat'lc; icSeac; aia811trov aro!llinov cpuaL<; 1tUil1tA'19⁣).
llowc:vc:r, Arius docs not speak of the impression of individual Forms - ;ts
Pbto docs in the passages from the Timaeus - hut simply of individual
naturc:s.
26H. Sec n . .2:\6.
269. Another text dc:aling with the: causality of the: Forms is Apulc:ius: D
Plat. I. 6. 193-194. This speaks of individual things as (i) possessing in-
dividual Form. and (ii) taking their origin from the: Paradigm. Here Apuleius
dlarly follows Plato once: again. although the reference is not to the: Timaeus
- whc:rt Plato speaks of th!.' 'Receptacle:' (tmocSoxli) ;ts receiving Form rather
than of individual things doing so - hut perhaps to passages such as Phaefl.
~8d-c:: I 02d; and 103b.
together with their meanings.

The following are used to indicate the transcendent Form:27o
(i) iota ('Idea')
[ ... and the Forms of things which he also calls "Ideas" '
(rerumque formas, quas iota~ idem vocat)27lf'The "Ideas",
that is to say the Forms of all things, are simple, eternal, and in-
corporeal' (iotac; vero, id est jormas omnium, simplices et
aeternas esse nee corporales tamen)] .2n
(ii) exemplum ('paradigm')
['It is from among these Forms that God chooses the paradigms
of the things which are or will be (esse autem ex his, quae deus
sumpserit, exempla rerum quae sunt eruntve)273/'The forms
and configurations of all things which come to be are marked -
just like a seal upon wax - by the impression of these
paradigms' (gignentiumque omnium, ad ins tar cerae, formas
et figurationes ex ilia exemplorum inpressione signart)274f'AII
things which are informed, which come to be, and which take
their origin from a paradigm of the higher substance' (omnia
quae informantur quaeque gignuntur et quae ab substantiae
superioris exemplo originem ducunt)] .21;
(iii) exemplar ('archetype')
['Nor is it possible to find more than a single image of each kind
of thing among the archetypes' (nee posse amp/ius quam
270. I think that it is possihlc to suhstitute 'translendc:nt Form' for the Idea
and 'immanent Form' for the: individual Form. By so doing, the: rc:lationship
of this part of Apuleius theory to the doctrines already dc:scrihed will
hecomc more apparent. See pp. 279-280 and 285-286.
2'1. Apuleius: De Plat. I. 5. 190.
272./hid. I. 6. 192.
27 3. Ibid. l. 6. 192-19 3. The use of exemplum in this sense: is not
documentc:d hc:fore Apuleius. However. the: analogous non-metaphysical
usage of the: term is l'ommon enough in writers of the classical pc:riod. Sec L.
and S. s.v.
274. Apuleius: De Plat. I. 6, 19:~.
275./bid. I, 6. 194.
APULEil!S 295
singularum specierum singulas imagines in exemplaribus in-

tenirt)l. 276
The following terms signify the immanent Form: 277
(i)figura ('shape')
['Matter is the ftrst of all things, with the capacity to receive
shapes and be susceptible to moulding' (ex omnibus primam,
figurarum capacem fictionique subiectam)] ,278
(ii)figuratio ('configuration')
['The forms and configurations of all things which come to be
are marked - just like a seal upon wax - by the impression of
these paradigms' (gignentiumque omnium, ad instar cerae,
Jormas et figurationes ex ilia exemplorum inpressione
signari)] .279
(iii) species ('kind')
[Nor is it possible to find more than a single image of each kind
singularum specierum singulas imagines in exemplaribus in-
l'enirt)] .280
The following terms are used to indicate both the transcen-
dent and the immanent Form:281
(i)forma ('form')
A. Transcendence
[ ... and the Forms of things which he also calls "Ideas" '
2""'6. Ibid. I. 6, 192- I 93. For earlier illustrations of the usc of exemplar in
this sense see Cicero: Tim. 6; Seneca: Epist. 58, I8-I9; 65, 7-8; etc. Cf. n.
2 ...~.
27""'. cr. n. 270.
2""'8. Apuleius: De Plat. I. S. 191. On the use of figum in the tec.:hnkal
sense of immanent Form sec Moresc.:hini: op. cit., pp. 200-20 I .
.2-:'9. Apuleius: De Plat. I. 6, 193.
280. Ibid. I, 6, I 93. Species is one of the standard terms used hr Cicero to
render the technical term Eiooc; into latin. Sec Cicero: Acad. 33; Drat. I01;
Tusc. Disp. l, 58, etc.
28 I. Cf. n. 270.
(rerumque formas, quas ioea~ idem vocat)282f'The "Ideas" that

is to say the Forms of all things, are simple, eternal, and incor-
poreal' (loea~ vero, id est formas omnium, simplices et aeter-
nas esse nee corporales tamen)283/'And the primary substances
or essences are the first God, the mind and the Forms of things,
and the soul' (Et primae quidem substantiae vel essentiae
primum deum esse et mentem formasque rerum et
animam)] .284
B. Immanence
['The forms and configurations of all things which come to be
are marked- just like a seal upon wax- by the impression of
these paradigms' (gignentiumque omnium, ad instar cerae,
formas et figurationes ex ilia exemplorum inpressione
signart)] .285
(ii) imago ('image')
A. Transcendence
['Nor is it possible to find more than a single image of each kind
singularum specierum singulas imagines in exemplar/bus in-
venirt)] .286
B. Immanence
['But in the case of that which is like a shadow or image of the
higher, the arguments and the words which concern it are
uncertain in their employment' (At eius, quae veluti umbra et
imago est superioris, rationes quoque et verba, quae de ea
disputantur, inconstant/ sunt disciplina)] .287
282. Apuleius: De Plat. I. ;, 190. Forma is also a standard term used by

Cicero to translate the technical term Elooc; into Latin. See Cicero: Orat. 101.
etc.
283. Apuleius: De Plat. I, 6. 192.
284. Ibid. I. 6. 193.
285. Ibid. I. 6, 193. For an earlier illustration of the use offorma in this
sense see Seneca: Epist. 65, 8.
286. Apulcius: De Plat. I. 6, 19 3.
2H7./bid. I. 6, 194.
APULEILTS 297
-L3123 THE TRANSLATION OF TERMINOLOGY
One might well ask why Apuleius would choose to express a

relatively simple theory of causation by using pluralities of
terms for single philosophical notions and single terms for
pluralities of philosophical notions. If this variety of ter-
minology is motivated by purely literary or rhetorical con-
siderations, it would seem inappropriate as a means of express-
ing an important philosophical theory. However, Apuleius'
decision to write in this way was probably inspired by the style
of the Greek original which he clearly had in mind at this point
in his exposition.
-1.3124 THE GREEK TERMINOLOGY
In an important passage of Plato's Timaeus we find a descrip-

tion of the three principles underlying the cosmic process
which contains a similar variety of terminology,2ss and it seems
that Apuleius has attempted to mirror this treatment as much as
the inevitable differences between the two languages permit.
The following seem to be the Greek originals of Apuleius'
terms for the transcendent Forms:289
(i) iMa I i5ta
['So that which provides truth to things known and the power
of knowing to the knower you must call the ''Idea' of the good'
(LOU!O LOtVUV !0 tftv aA.t18&taV 7tapEX,OV !Ol~ ytyVOOOKOJ.H:vm~ Kai
!<!) YlYVWOKOV!l tftv OUVQJ.llV ano5t5ov rftv !OU aya8ou iMav
q>ci8t &{vat )l .290
288. Plato: Tim . .J8e-53c. All the Greek passages to be quoted below arc
llrawn from these pages with the exception of those marked with an asterisk.
As always, Apuleius does not simply follow one text but integrates ap-
propriate references to others from time to time.
289. Cf. n. 270.
290. Plato: Rep. VI. ';08e. The term iota does not seem to he used in a
(ii) exemplum lnapa5ElYJ.1a

['One thing which was postulated was the paradigm, intelligible
and always of the same nature' (ev J.LEV roc; napa5EiyJ,1atoc; Ei5oc;
U1tOtE9Ev, VOT)tOV Kai. aEi Kata tatml ov)].291
(iii) exemplar I apxetU1tOV
['just as in the case of partial things the archetypes precede the
sensible bodies, thus the most beautiful and most complete
substance which contains all substances within itself is the
paradigm of this world' (Ka9anEp OUV til Katil J.1EPO<; rocmEp
apXEtU1ta tCOV aia9T)tV 7tpOT)yEia9at O(J)J,1Qt(J)V, OUtro<; ti}V
1taaac; EV SaUtfj 1tEPlEXOUOaV KQAAlOtT)V Kai. tEAElOtUtT)V oua{av
unapxEtv toli5E napa5EtyJ.La mu K6aJ.Lou * )J. 292
The following seem to be the Greek originals of the terms for
the immanent Forms:29:'
(i)Jigura I axfiJ.La, J.LOP<t>li
['Those who attempt to mould shapes in soft substances allow
absolutely no shape to appear there beforehand' (oam tE fv
tlOlV tci>v J.LUAaKci>V axiJJ.Lata an6J,1attElV E1tlXElPOUOl, tO
napanav axfiJ.La oMsv v5T)A.ov unlipXElV f:ci>m)294/'The nurse of
becoming becomes watery and fiery and receives the shapes of
earth and air' (ti}V 5f; 5i) YEVEOEro<; n9i)VT)V uypatVOJ.lEVT)V Kal.
7tUpOUJ.1EVT)V Kai. til<; yfjc; tE Kai. aepoc; J.10pq>il<; 5EXOJ.1EVT)V )] .295
(ii)figuratio I 5taOXTJJ.1Uti~Ea9at
['Thus, the god first gave shape to the things constituted in this
purely transct:ndcnt sc:nst: in tht: Timaeus, although that text tmploys the
regular synonym Ei&oc; thus. See Tim.'; le-d.
291. Plato: Tim . ..jBe.
292. Arius Didymus: Epit. Pbys. fr. I. (DG ..j.f':'a 19-2..j .).
293. Cf. n. 270.
29..j. Plato: Tim. ';Oe. On the multiplicity of terms which Plato employs to
designate the immanent Forms see F. M. Cornford: Plato 's.Cosmology. The
Timaeus of Plato trans/tiled tl'ilh t1 Rtmning Commentary (London, 1937),
p. 186. nn. 1-2.
29';. Plato: Tim. ';2d. Cf. ibid. ';Od and'; I a.
APULEILIS 299
wav with forms and numbers' (oihro Bti t6n; 7tEq>UK6ta taOta
rrp&tOv 5tEOX.TJIJ.aticrato Ei5Ecri tE Kai cipt91J.oi<;)] .296
(iii) species I ytvo<;, dtSo<;
[So that which is to receive in itself all kinds must be free of all
forms' (5u) Kai ncivtrov EKto<; Ei5rov dvm X.PEci>v to til ncivta
EK5E~61J.EVOV tv aut~ YEV11)297 /'Similarly' that which is duly to
receive throughout its extent and repeatedly the likenesses of all
the things eternally existing must in its own nature be free of all
kinds' (taU'tOV ouv Kai 't~ til 'tOOV 7tclV'tOOV ciEi 'tE OV'tOOV Katil nav
tautou 7tOAAclKl<; ciq>OIJ.OlCOIJ.ata KaA.ro<; IJ.EAAOV'tl OEX,Ecr9m navt-
rov EKtO<; aut~ npocriJKEl7tEq>UKEVal 'tOOV EitSrov )]298
The following seem to be the Greek originals of Apuleius'
terms for both the transcendent and the immanent Forms:299
(i)forma I itSta
A. Transcendence
['So that which provides truth to things known and the power
of knowing to the knower you must call the "Form" of the
good' (toOto toivuv to ttiv ciA.iJ9Etav naptx.ov tot<;
YIYVOOOKOIJ.EVOt<; Kai 't~ ytyVOOOKOV'tl tiJV OUVaiJ.lV cino5t5ov tiJv
tou aya9o0 i5tav q>ci9t dvm*)].3oO
B. Immanence
['If there is to be an impression representing different things,
that in which the impression is to take place cannot be well
prepared unless it is free of all those forms which it is to receive
from elsewhere' (o,lK av iiA.A.ro<;, EK'tU7tOOIJ.ato<; crEcr9aliJ.EAAOV-
toc; iBEtv nmKiA.ou naaa<; notKtA.ia<;, touT'auto f:v <!>
EKTU7t0UIJ.EVOV evicrtatm ytvon'liv rtapEOKEUaOIJ.EVOV EU, nA.tiv
296. /hid. '53b.

29"'. Ibid. '50t:.
298. Ibid. 5 Ia. Cf. ibid. 50e.
299. Cf. n. 2'0.
500. Plato: Rep. VI. '508c:. On the: transcendent sense of ili&a and ElcSoc; in
Plato- hoth of which Apuleius translates into Latin asjorma- seen. 290.
iiiJ.OP<POV ov eKeivrov lmaarov trov lcSerov 6aac; IJ.EA.A.m Mx.ea9ai

no9ev)] .301
(ii) imago lllillTIIJ.a, (j)avtaaiJ.a, eiKci>v
A. Transcendence
['Just as many impressions arise from a single seal and many im-
ages of a single man, thus many natures of sensible bodies arise
from each single Idea' (ov tp6nov M a(j)payicSoc; lltac; EKIJ.ayeia
yiVE09at 7t0AAft Kai OUX,Vclc; elK6Vac; voc; clV5p6c;, OUtroc; Kai
IJ.tac; KaOtTic; icStac; aia9Tit&v OWIJ.atrov cpuaetc; 7tQIJ.7tATI-
9eic; )].302
B. Immanence
['... and the second thing postulated was the image of the
paradigm, coming to be and visible' (llillTIIJ.a cS napacSeiyiJ.atoc;
cSeutepov, ytvemv fx.ov Kal 6pat6v)303/'For a copy, since not
even the principle on which it has come to be belongs to itself,
but is always borne as the image of something else ... ' (roc; elK6vt
IJ.EV, eneinep oM'auto tOUtO E<P'c!> ytyovev. eautf\c; EOttV, etepou
eSt nvoc; O.Ei (j)tpetat (j)avtaalla ... )] .304
The presence of such a variety of terminology in both Plato's
and Apuleius' texts seems to be strong evidence for the conclu-
sion that the latter is indebted to the former. Furthermore, the
weight of this proof is not diminished by the revelation that
Apuleius is also integrating material from the doxographical
30 I. Plato: Tim. 50d.

302. Arius Didymus: Epit. PbJs. fr. I (DG H7a9-13). A careful reader of
Arius' text in the version preserved b)' Eusebius will note that the author did
nm speak of the transcendent Forms as 'images' (EiK6v&~) but cml)' of the im-
manent Forms. This would be the more usual application of the term. Where
then did Apuleius obtain the notion that images could be transcendent
Forms? One explanation would be that he had a defective version of Arius'
text in which the relation between the transcendent and the immanent Forms
had become confused. The onlr clearlr documented reference to a transcen-
dent Form as an image is apparently Timaeus of Lucri: De Nat ..'1-lund. et
Anim. 99d.
303. Plato: Tim. 48e. Cf. ibid. 50c and 51 b.
304./bid. 52c.
APllLEillS 301
tradition into his account. Thus, parallels between the two texts
permit us to use the one in interpreting the other and to clarify
certain obscure features of the doctrine of the Forms' causality .
..J.32 THE GODS
In a few passages Apuleius speaks of the gods in general

terms. contrasting their nature with those of lower principles
such as demons or human souls. Thus, we find him describing
them as beings than which 'nothing is more powerful and
nothing is more perfect' (nibil est deo potentius ... nibil est deo
perfectius) so that they cannot be moved from their status
'either by another's power or by their own' (nee alterius vi ...
neque suapte naturapos They are said to enjoy an 'eternal
stability of mind which is never driven from its own boundaries
wward grief or pleasure' (semper eodem statu mentis ... qui
numquam illis nee ad dolorem nee ad voluptatem finibus suis
pelliturpo6 Furthermore, although Apuleius describes the gods
as 'devoting themselves to the task of a secondary providence'
(jJnJllinciam dii secundae providentiae ita naviter reti-
nent),30" he also stresses that 'they are not sullied by any contact
with human beings' (nulla adtrectatione nostra contaminan-
tur).30H The interpretation of the divine nature presented here is
traditional in every way. Thus, the notion that the gods have a
most perfect being is derived from Plato's Republic, as also the
conclusion that they cannot be moved either externally or inter-
nally .309 The picture of the highest life which consists of sus-
30';. Apulcius: De Deo Socr. 12, J.l6. Cf. ibid. i. 127.

:\06. Ibid. 12, l.:i6. Cf. ibid. .:j. 12'7.
:w~. Apuleius: De Plat. I 2. 206 .
.:\OH. Apulc:ius: De Deo So cr. ,._ 12M. Cf. ibid. '7, 136 and 7. 13 7 .
.'\09. Plato: Rep. II, 3R I h 'Rut God and the things of God are in nery
rtspt"<.:t the hest' (aHa J.U)V 0 8E6c; YE Kai tel tOO 8EOU miVtlJ c'ipt<HO ~XEI). Cf.
iiJid. II. 3R0d-e 'Is it not necessary that. whenever something changes its
;\02 J\IIDDlE PlATO:'IJISM
tained contemplation unaffected by impulses of pleasure and

pain is described in the Philebus.3W Furthermore, although the
notion that the gods exercise a secondary providence is derived
rather from the second-century school tradition,311 the com-
plementary view that they have a status which precludes con-
tact with humanity Is based upon the Symposium.312 The com-
bination of all these sources by Apuleius produces a doctrine
which ascribes all the characteristics of transcendence and of
positive and negative causality earlier attributed to the first God
to the secondary divinities.
4.321 INVISIBLE GODS
Among the secondary gods, Apuleius distinguishes in the first
form. it dther changes itself or is changed by something else? ... Surely

things which are in the best condition are least likely to be moved and chang-
ed by something else' (OUK clVUYKTl, Ein&p n &~iataltO tfic; autou 16&a<;, i\ auto
uq>'&autou f.1&9iataa9al ii un'ciUou; .. OUKOUV U7t0 f.ltV iiAA.ou til ciplata xovta
ijKiata cii..>..moutai t& Kai KIV&ital;) .
.310. Plato: Pbileb . .Hb 'You realize that for a man who has chosen the life
of intelligence there is nothing to prevent him living thus. You mean. I sup-
pose, the life which contains neither pleasure nor pain' (tcp tov tou q>pov&iv
EAOIJEV(!> Piov ola9'wc; tOUtOV tOV tp6nov ou6tv U1tOKWAUl ~fiv. t6v tOU Jllt
xaip&lV 1.1116& AU7tia9at MyEl<;;). The transference of this human ideal
spedfically to God by Apuleius probably indicates the influence of Aristotle's
teaching regarding the lJ nmoved Mover. Sec Aristotle: Metupb. 1\., 7,
1072b26-28 And life also belongs to God, for the actuality of intelligence is
life. and God is that activity. And God's self-dependent actuality is the life
which is best and eternal' (Kai ~wit M y& u7tCip'X,1. it yap voO &vtpy&la ~rol\,
EK&ivoc; St n &v&py&w' &v&py&la ot ,; Ka9'auti]v EK&ivou ~roil apiatn Kai
aiOlO<;). The influence of Aristotle over Apulelus and other second-century
Platonists is particularly important in that il reinforces the tendency towards
metaphysical transccndcn<:c which had been absent during the periods of
Stoic dominance. On this point see Bcaujcu: op. cit.. pp. II am.l214.
311. See pp. 27 3279.
:\12. Plato: Symp. 20.3a 'God docs not mingle with mankind' (9&o<; ot
av9pw7t(!> ou 1Jiyvutal).
APllLEIUS .303
place a group of invisible gods. Like the supreme God himself,

these divinities can be described in both a subjective and an ob-
jective manner, examples of the former being Apuleius'
statements that they are known 'by the intellect or the gaze of
the mind' (intellectu ... acie mentis)3i3- a description positive
in character - or that their powers are 'conjectured by our
souls from the various advantages to our life observed in those
things which they individually provide' (animis coniectatae
per Farias utilitates in vita agenda animadversas in iis rebus,
quihus eorum singuli curant)314 - an account blending a
positive and a negative element. As examples of the latter, we
find him describing them as 'natures incorporeal and living,
having neither end nor beginning, with minds perfected to the
highest blessedness, good in themselves without any participa-
tion in an external good' (naturae incorporales, animates, ne-
que fine u//o neque exordia .. . ingenio ad summam
heatitudinem perfecto, nullius extrarii bani participatione sed
ex sese bonae)3i5 - here the emphasis is upon their
transcendence - or as beings which exercise 'powers' (jJoten-
tiae).Wl although they 'dwell at the extreme periphery of the
aether. separated from human contact' (in sublimi aetheris ver-
tice locati, ab humana contagione procu/ discretr)317- where
the stress is placed upon their causality. This discussion of the
invisible gods is a mixture of Platonic and Stoic theories, the no-
tions that they are perceived by the intellect and that their
natures are incorporeal, eternal, and so on being derived from
Plato's teaching about the intelligible realm,318 while the ideas
-~ 1.~- Apull'ius: De Den Socr. 2, 121. Cf. ibid. I, 116 .

.31-t.lbid. 2. 122.
-~I<;_ Ibid. 3. I 2:\.
:\16. Ibid. 2. 122.
-~ 1-. IIJid. 3, 12.3.
j I H. Sec Plato: Phaedr. 247c where the supercelestial place is 'perceptible
IH the intelligence alone' (1-16V<p9Eatit v~)- Apuleius' rendering of the Greek
that their powers are conjectured from the various benefits

which they confer and that their abode is on the periphery of
the aether are closer to Stoic or Varronian views.3t9
4.322 VISIBLE GODS
Among the secondary gods, Apuleius also distinguishes a

group of visible gods. Like the supreme God and the invisible
gods, these divinities can be described from both a subjective
and an objective viewpoint, the former being implied in his
assertion that a man who understands astronomy 'knows ex-
pertly' (probe ca/let) the motions of the visible gods.320 The lat-
ter is represented by the details of Apuleius' astronomical
theory which, since it is of concern more to a historian of
science than to a historian of philosophy, need only be sketched
vouc; as acies mentis is, however. influenced by Ciceronian texts like Tusc.
Disp. I, 45. For the interpretation of transcendence by Plato see the discus
sion on pp. 269-272 and 286-287. It is perhaps worthy of note that Apuleius
declares the subordinate gods to be without beginning as well as without end.
He must therefore understand the narrative sequence of Plato's Timaeus in
an atemporal manner.
319. See Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, 60 'It was thought that whatever confer-
red great benefits on the human race must be a result of divine benevolence
towards men' (quidquid enim magnam utilitatem generi adferret bumano
id mm sine dilina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur). For the Stoic
and Varronian equation of God and aether see pp. 96-97 and 831-835.
However, one must remember that Apuleius' notion of the gods involves a
real metaphysical transcendence. Thus, the periphery of the aether indicates
the place where their power is manifest and not the elemental nature of the
divine substance.
320. Apulcius: De Deo Socr. 2, 120. Cf. De Plat. I. 10, 202. Beaujeu: op.
dt .. pp. 206-209 and 261 rightly notes that Apuleius' discussion of the visible
gods and the astronomical theory implied is based partl)' upon Plato's
Timaeus (especially Tim. 38c-39e) and partly upon Cicero's De Natura
Deorum (especially De Nat. Deor. II, 49-56) together with a few
reminiscences of Peripatetic teachings.
Al'liLEil'S 30S
briefly here. Thus, regarding the structure of the 'heaven'

(c:ae/um), the Latin writer postulates the existence of heavenly
bodies and of heavenly spheres, the former being inserted each
into a separate sphere and the latter being arranged concen-
trically with one another.32I The bodies are of a fiery nature and
ar~ nourished by drawing from the aetherial substance of the
spheres - the aether apparently representing the most rarefied
and therefore invisible form of the fiery element322 - although
the relation between fire and aether is not clearly stated in all
t~xts with the two sometimes being equated and sometimes
distinguished.323 Furthermore, the heavenly bodies are of two
kinds: the fixed stars and the planets, the former being inserted
in the outermost and largest sphere and the latter in the seven
inner spheres of descending magnitude.324 The elemental com-
position of the fixed stars and of the planets is similar, although
the writer is careful to note that the fixed stars are located on
the back of the aether while the lower bodies are situated within
the aether itself, there being however no speculation regarding
a surrounding void.325 Regarding the motion of the heavens, we
learn that both the fixed stars and the planets have an eternal
.~21. Apuldus: De Plat. I, 11, 203. The placing of the heavenly bodies in
anual phy~ical spheres renects the cosmology of Aristotle rather than that of
Plato .
.~22. Ibid. I, 11, 203. Cf. Apuleius: De Den Socr. I, 118; De Plat. l, 11,
20-J; De Mundo I, 290; 2, 293; 4. 297; ami 21, .B6. The notion of a feeding
of the heavenly bodies is not Platonic but Stoic. Sec Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II,
tO; II, H5; II, 92; II. IIH; etc.
525. For the equation of fire and aether see Apuleius: De Deo Socr. 8. 138;
for their distinction De Plat. I, HI, 2Q5. The aether is described in l>eripatetic
terms as a fifth clement at De lWtmdo 1, 291.
_J,2t. Apuleius: IJe P/(11. I, II, 20:\ and De Mundo 2, 292.
52'i. Apuleius: De Mundo 2. 292-295. The phrase 'the back of the acther'
n
luetberis dorsum) which Apuleius uses to translate the bnqHiV&lQ toO OUJ.L
1tUVTO~ oupavoii of the original (ps.-Aristotlc: n&pi K6a)lOU 392a I H) is a
reminiscence of Plato: Pbaedr. 24 7b.
306 MIDI>l.E PLATONISM
rotation.326 The motion of the former is absolutely unerring327

and that of the planets is not erratic - whatever appearances
may suggest - since the progressions, stations, and retrograda-
tions visible to the naked eye result from the angles of the
planets' orbits in relation to us and not from any variation in
their velocities.3ZB The most striking feature of the heavenly
motion is the universal harmony which pervades it from the
outermost regions down to the surface of the earth.329
It is clear that these visible gods are unlike the previous group
of divinities in that they are physical bodies, a point which
Apuleius himself seems to underline in passages where he
speaks of 'the divine bodies' (divina corpora) or of 'the fires of
the heavenly bodies which Plato calls living gods' (hos
astrorum ignes ... ethos anima/is deos dicit esse).HO However,
since all the texts which refer to the gods in general imply that
these are entities having a definitely metaphysical status, we
should be alert to the possibility that the gods of this group also
have in addition to their physical manifestation a spiritual com-
ponent of some kind. That this is actually the case seems to be
indicated by the following four considerations. First, the invisi-
ble gods have been described as dwelling at the periphery of the
aether, some of the visible gods as located on the back of the
aether. 331. The similarity between these accounts raises the
possibility of identifying the two groups. Secondly, when
Apuleius gives the names of the planets he sometimes says not
that a planet is a particular god- Mars or Venus- but that the
planet belongs to a particular god - that of Mars or that of
326. Apulcius: De Plat. I. II. 203 and De Mundo I. 290 .

.u-r. Apulcius: De Mundo 2. 292.
;U8. Apult:ius: De Deo Socr. 2, 120.
329. Apulcius: De Mundo 21. 336 and 30. 3';5.
330. Apulcius: De Mundo I, 290 and De Plat. I. II, 203.
331. Apuleius: De Deo Socr. 3. 123. Cf. De Mundo 2. 292.
API ILEIIJS :\07
venus ..B.z This implies a distinction between the physical body

and the spiritual force manifested in it.333 Thirdly, Apuleius
speaks of the powers over the lower world exercised by the
planets and describes these in decidely psychological terms: the
beneficent power of Jupiter, the pleasure-giving power of
venus, and so on.334 It would probably be repugnant to a
Platonist to admit that a non-physical effect could be produced
Jw an entirely physical cause. Finally, the list of names which
h~s already been given for the invisible gods includes several
which are also given to visible gods.335 This is undeniable
evidence that the same divinities have manifestations in each of
these forms.336 If all these arguments are valid, the conclusion
forces itself upon us that the visible gods represent the sensible
manifestation in the heavenly bodies of those spiritual powers
without spatial location which constitute the invisible gods.337
:\32. Apuleius: De Mundo 2, 293 'Pyrois ... the planet of Mars .. .

Phosphorus ... that of Venus' (P_yrois ... Martis stella ... Phosphorus .. .
Veneris stella). At Flor. 10 and De Plat. I, 11, 203 the names of the planets
and those of the gods are simply identified.
:\:\:\. That there is a significant conceptual distinction underlying the dif-
ft-n:nt types of nomenclature (indicating the gradually evolving syncretism
httween classical mythology and oriental astral religion) has been argued by
F. Cumont: Les religions orientales dans /e paganisme romain, 4 edition
(l'aris. 1929). pp. 34-35, etc.
H-J. Apuleius: Flor. 10 .
.H<;. Apulcius: De Deo Socr. 2. 121. Cf. F/or. 10; De Pltll. I. 11. 203: ;md
Dl! Mwul() 2. 292-293. Jupiter, Venus, Mercury, Mars. Apollo, and Juno occur
as both invisible and visible gods. Vesta, Minerva. Ceres, Diana. Neptune. and
\'ukan appear only as invisible gods. Saturn and Hercules appear only as visi-
ble gods. Of course, none of these lists is intended to he a systematic
classification .
.3:\6. A correlation of this kind would suggest that the highest God also has
:l physical manifestation: presumably in the sphere of fixed stars. We have
already seen inn. 180 that there is strong evidene~: for interpreting Apuleius
system in this wa\'.
55~ As we sh~ll discover below, some of the invisible gods :1re to In: iden-
tified not with visible gods hut with demons.
Thus, Apuleius' metaphysical system is perhaps more subtle

than it seemed on initial acquaintance.
4.33 UNIVERSAL SOUL
Of the various passages in Apuleius' works referring to 'soul'

(anima), one is especially significant in that it speaks not of the
individual souls of different creatures but of a universal soul of
the world itself. It runs as follows: 'But that source of all souls,
the celestial soul, is the best, the wisest, and has generative
power. Plato says that it serves the artificer God and is ready to
carry out all his projects. And the substance of this mind is com-
posed of numbers and ratios, doubled and multiplied' (Sed il-
lam, fontem animarum omnium, caelestem animam, op-
timam et sapientissimam virtute esse genetricem, subservire
etiam fabricatori deo et praesto esse ad omnia inventa eius
pronuntiat. Verum substantiam mentis huius numeris et
modis confici congeminatis ac multiplicatis augmentis).338
We have already seen in an earlier context that Apuleius
follows Plato's doctrine of the world soul very closely
throughout this passage,339 the only slight deviation being that
whereas Plato spoke of the individual souls as fashioned by God
from the psychic substance from which he had previously pro-
duced the universal soul Apuleius speaks of the universal soul
338. Apuleius: De Plat. I. 9. 199. For useful commentaries on this passage

sec Morcschini: op. cit .. pp. 86-87 and 154-155: and Dillon: op. c:/1., pp.
-~ 15317.
339. Sec Pla!O: Tim. 35c After this he filled up lhl double and lriplt: imcr-
\'als' (l.lETcl lit TQUTQ OUVE1tATIPOUTO tci TE limA.aata Kai tpmA.aata
litaotl\l.lata) and ibid. .-\6c-37a 'And soul is invisible. participating in reason
and harmony. the best of things brought imo being by !he best- the intclligi
hie and eternal principles' (au-ri] lit ci6pa-roc; l.lEV, A.oytOI.lOU lit l.lEttxouaa Kai
cipl.lOViac; ljiUXY\. ni:lv vonni:lv clEi TE OVTWV U7t0 TOU apiotou cipiOTTI YEVOI.lEVTI
nov YEVVTI9EVTWV).
APllLEillS 309
itself as the source of the individual souls,.34o the Apuleian ver-

sion accordingly placing greater emphasis upon the notion of
the world soul as an intermediate principle.341 However, one
point is worthy of special note: the reference to the universal
soul also as a 'mind' (mens). Since Apuleius elsewhere couples
the: existence of mind with that of the plurality of Forms. it
seems reasonable to assume that this universal mind must also
embrace Forms. in which case these Forms will exist on a lower
te,el than those contained in God's mind. Thus, there will be
rwo levels of Forms, the higher relating to the lower presumably
as archetype to image ..342
-i.34 THE DEMONS
When Apuleius speaks of the demons in general terms, he

does so by contrasting their nature both with higher principles:
the gods and with lower ones: human souls. Thus, he repeatedly
stresses the notion that they are 'intermediate powers' (mediae
potestates, medioximi).34.3 The postulation of such a status
enables him to deduce a set of their characteristics by combin-
ing some qualities of the higher principles with some of the
ltO. See ibid. 41d 'Thus he spoke. and turned again to that same mixing
howl in which he had mixed and hlt:nded the universal soul' (taut'EinE, Kai
nul.tv bri rov np6tEpov Kpatilpa, tv c!> t~v toii navroc; 111ux~v KEpavvuc;
f.tuoyEvl. Apuleius' modification prohahly results from interpreting this
p;tssa~e in the light of Plato: Phileb. 30a and Phaedr. 2-i;c.
-~II. See pp. 250-253, 259-260 and 263-264 .
.H2. An interpretation along similar lines is suggested by Moreschini: op.
cit .. pp. H6-H'"' and I 54-I 55, although his support of the thesis hy appealing
10 Albinus: Didasc. 169, _U is not convincing.
3--t 3. Apuleius: Apol. 4 3; De Deo Socr. 6. 132; and De Plat. I, I I, 204. The
term mediu.\imi whkh m:rurs in the last passage mentioned is a traditional
titk for gods of intermediate status although not always explicitly for
dlmons. See Senius Danielis: In Armeid. Ill. 131 and VIII, 275 where
Apukius is cited.
.HO MIDDLE PLATONISM
lower. For example, we have the following passage: 'Indeed, I

would define demons as living creatures, endowed with reason,
having a soul subject to passion, an aerial body, and an eternal
existence. Of these five characteristics which I have
enumerated, the first three they have in common with us. the
fourth is peculiar to themselves, the last they share with the im-
mortal gods' (Quippe, ut fine conprehendam, daemones sunt
genere animalia, inge11io rationabilia, animo passiva, cor-
pore aeria, tempore aeterna. Ex his quinque, quae com-
memoravi, tria a principio eadem quae nobis sunt, quartum
proprium, postremum commune cum diis inmortalibus ha-
bent).344 Their status is also revealed in their function which is,
broadly speaking, to serve as a means of communication bet-
ween the higher and lower realms 'passing hither and thither
and bringing requests from below and gifts from above' (ultra
citra portant hinc petitiones inde suppetias) and, more
specifically, to preside over 'all revelations, various magical
phenomena, and all kinds of prophecy' (cuncta denuntiata et
magorum varia miracula omnesque praesagiorum
species).345 Apuleius' account of the demons is as traditional as
his description of the gods, and we find once again a mixture of
notions drawn directly from Plato and from the second-century
school traditions. The doctrine that the demons are in-
344. Apulcius: De Deo Soc:r. 13. 148. Some of these attributes are mention-
ed elsewhere. One should compare the discussion of rhe demons' aerial
bodiesat/bid.6.132:9.140-lil:and/JePiat.l,II.204.
:\45. Apuleius: De Deo Soc:r. 6. 133-134. On the functions of demons see
also Apol. Hand De Plat. I. 12. 206. Apuldus' demonologicalthcories have
been extensively discussed in the secondary scholarship. for example by Por-
togalli: op. cit .. pp. 227-24 I; Regen: op. cit .. pp. 3-22 (with special reference
to the Apologia); Moreschini: op. cit.. pp. 19-42 (mainly concerned with the
Metamorphoses); and Dillon: op. cit .. pp. 317-320. Beaujeu: op. cit .. pp.
183-201 is a masterly historical discussion of the background to Apuleius'
doctrine.
APLJLEHJS 311
termediates is, of course, taken from the Symposium,346 while

the detailed definition of their nature seems to reflect a standard
handbook tradition - it can be paralleled almost verbally in at
least one other extant source347 - and the account of their
functions the religious beliefs current in learned circles of the
period ..HH The account of the demons, however, differs from
the earlier account of the gods in that the emphasis is now upon
a status mediating transcendence and immanence and upon a
causality executive rather than administrative in character.
4.341 DISEMBODIED DEMONS
Within the demonic class itself, Apuleius identifies in the first

place a group of demons which are never incarnate in human
hodies. As in the case of the gods, we find these spiritual beings
described from both a subjective and an objective viewpoint,
the former finding expression in Apuleius' assertion that they
are 'visible to nobody' (nemini conspicut)349 - an account
negative in character - or that they can reveal themselves as 'a
kind of voice, although not the usual or human kind' (vox
~46. See pp. 229-230.

~I"'.Sec Calcidius: /11 Tim. 13';. 17';, 16-18 'The definition of a demon
will he as follows: a demon is a living creature. rational, immortal, passive.
aetherial. exercising concern for mankind' (Erit ergo de/initio daenumis
talis: t/(wmon est (m/mal rationabile immortale patibile aetbereum
diligenliam homi1libus impertie1ls). As Beaujeu: op. cit., pp. 227-228 has
observed, there were disagreements among Platonists regarding some of the
demons' auributes. Thus, Maximus of Tyre: Pbilos. R. R. 96. R ff. affirmed
their eternity while Plutarlh: De Def Orac. 19. 420a denied it. However, this
fact simply makes the agreement between Apuleius and Calcidius the more
striking. No doubt they were both following a handbook teaching ultim;udy
derived from Xenocrates and the Epi1lomis.
~4H. In particular, Plutarch documents many of the same tendencies. Sec
De lsid. et Osir. 361 b. etc.
~49. Apuleius: DeDeoSocr. 16, 15';. Cf. Flor. 10.
.312 MIDDlE PlATONISM
quaepiam ... non usitata vox nee humana)350 or using 'a sign
which is the apparition of the demon itself' (signum ... et ipsius
daemon is species)35 I - descriptions blending negative and
positive elements. The latter finds expression in his statements
that they are 'always free of the shackles and bonds of the
human body' (semper a corporis conpedibus et nexibus
liberi)352 - here their distinguishing mark is a status mediating
transcendence and immanence - or that they are 'guardians
assigned to individual men during their lifetime' (in vita agenda
... custodes singulis additt),353 coming to our aid when were-
quire 'not counsel but revelation' (non consilio sed
praesagio),354 who 'take us from here and bring us as their
charges to that judgment when our earthly lives are past' (vita
edita . . . rap tare iiico et trahere veluti custodiam suam ad
iudicium)355 -where the distinguishing mark is a causality ex-
ecutive in relation to the higher providence. The discussion of
the demons never embodied contains elements definitely deriv-
ed from Plato together with notions whose origins are more
doubtful. That demons can manifest themselves by means of a
voice or a sign, that they are assigned to men during their ear-
thly lives, and that they accompany them on their journey into
the hereafter are all ideas which can be extracted from Plato's
dialogues.356 Furthermore, the distinction between reasoning
3';o. Apuldus: De Deo Socr. 20. 16S. The reference is w Socrates' demon
said to be in this categorr.
:\S I. Ibid. 20, 166. Here. the reference is to Minerva's appearance as a
demon to Ulysses.
3S2.11Jid. 16, IS"! .
.3S.3. Ibid. 16. ISS.
3SI. Ibid. Ji. I Si. Cf. ibid. 16. ISS ;md 18. 162 (Socrates' demon).
3SS. Ibid. 16, ISS .
.3S6. For the demonic voice of Socrates see Plato: Apnl. 40h-c 'the sign of
the god ... the customary sign' (To Tou 6eou OT]J.IEiov ... To Eiw6oc; OT]J.IEiov). An
association between demons and men both now and in the afterlife is describ-
APllLEJliS 313
and revelation can be paralleled in the same author, although

there is no explicit connection with demonological theory.:\57
However, that demons are invisible to all men, that they can
produce visible apparitions of themselves, and that they can be
totally free of bodily impediments are notions which cannot be
traced to the writings of Plato himself. What we have here is
probably a theoretical elaboration by Apuleius himself or at least
by some Olher writer nearer his own time.358
-L.H2 SEMI-EMBODIED DEMONS
Within the demonic class, Apuleius also identifies a group of

demons which have previously been incarnate in human bodies
but are now free of the earthly impediment. As in the case of the
gods and the demons never embodied, we find these spiritual
beings described from both a subjective and an objective view-
point. the former being illustrated by his statement that some of
them represent 'an object of terror' (terriculamentum) to evil
men.359 The latter is exemplified in the details of Apuleius'
ed in many passages of Plato. See especially Pbaed. 107d; Polit. 271 d; Rep.
X. 6 17d-e; X. 620d-e; and Leg. IV, 713d-e.
3'i~. See Plato: Phaedr. 24.:id 'So much more beautiful did the ancients
consider the madness which comes from God to he than the sanity which
derives from man' (t6oq> KaA.I..tov 1-1aptupouatv oi 7taA.alOi 1-1aviav
O(J>(j)poouVTJ<; tliv EK 9EOii til<; 7tap'av9pro7trov ytyVO!!EVTJ<;). Plato's text in-
dudes a word-play on llaV\Kll!llaVttK~ - the Iauer being reflected in
Apuleius' praesagium.
3'iH. That demons produce visible manifestations of themselves is an idea
also of Plutan:h who speaks of the Socratic demon as so doing. Plutarch: De
(;en. Socr. I 0, 'iHOc. I hope to demonstrate below that the other
characteristics attributed to this class of demons result from Apuleius' desire
to establish higher and lower demonic groups analogous to the higher and
lower di\'ine groups .
."t'i9. Apuleius: De Deo Socr. 15. 153. It is specifically the second group
memioned hdow which is the object of terror to the had. To anompllsh this
function they would obviously have to he visible or at least sensihlc.
demonological theory, namely that human souls disembodied

by death have entrusted to them 'the care of their descendants'
(posterorum suorum cura), 36o and that among these disem-
bodied souls there are three kinds: those which discharge their
functions tranquilly, those who wander in aimless fashion, and
those whose activity does not allow us to place them definitely
in one category or the other.361 Regarding the second group, we
learn that their erratic behavior is a punishment for the sins
which they committed during their earthly life.362
It seems obvious that these demons after embodiment must
be distinguished from the previous group of spiritual beings, not
only because their respective definitions - being after embodi-
ment and being never embodied- are mutually exclusive,363
but because the examples of each group given- great heroes of
history on the one hand and personifications of abstract
qualities on the other- are so different.364 However, there are
360. Ibid. IS. I S2.

361. Ibid. IS. I S3. The three kinds of demon are called lares. larvae, and
memes respectively. Apuleius is here combining Plaw's theory uf demons
with notions derived from Roman religion. See pp. 233-236.
362.1hid. IS, IS2-IS3.
36.~. It is possible that Apuleius visualizes a structural analogy between the
relation of the invisible 10 the visible gods and that of the demom never em-
bodied 10 the demons after embodiment (or perhaps between the relation of
the invisible to the visible gods and that of the demons never embodied to the
demons currently embodied). In both cases we arc concerned with the rela-
tion of a spiritual principle to its corporeal vehicle. Thus, Apuleius suggests
that the demons never embodied can manifest themselves in a visible form
when they so desire. whilt: this manifestation in a visible form must be
equivalent to an embodiment in a certain sense. See ibid. II. 143- I4S
(Homer's Minerva and Virgil's Iuturna) and ibid. .20, 166 (Socrates' demon
and Homer's Minerva). However, it is clearly a question of analogy between
the gods and the demons rather than one of identity. since all demons have at
least some dement of corporeality albeit in a refined form. See ibid. I:\, 148
and the discussion on pp. 309-311.
364. As examples of demons never embodied we have 'Sleep' (Somnus)
APlJLEIUS .315
certain aspects of Apuleius' theory which bring the nature of the

distinction into question, and it is only fair that these should be
noted before coming to a final conclusion. In the first place, the
functions of at least one type of the demons after embodiment
and of the demons never embodied in general are similar, since
both groups are concerned with the guidance of currently em-
bodied human souls.365 In the second place, the demon of
socrates himself seems to be included in both groups, since it is
described not only as Socrates' own 'family spirit' (lar
jamiliaris)366 but also as a spiritual being of the more elevated
kind. Of course, this might simply be a sign that Apuleius is be-
in~ negligent in the construction of his theory, but it is more
likely that it is a further sign of the fluid relations between the
various ontologicallevels.367
4.35 INDIVIDUAL SOUL
An interesting feature of Apuleius' discussions of the human

soul is the fact that he treats it as a third variety of demon com-
plementary to the two earlier kinds - namely as a demon cur-
rently embodied - a view justified by the etymology of the
Greek term eucSaiiJ.OOV and by the equation of the Greek concept
and 'Love' (Amor). See ibid. 16. 155. Love is also mentioned without precise
'ktermination of its status at Apuleius: Apol. 12; F/or. 10; and Mel am. IV. 2R
ff. A~ examples of demons after embodiment we have Amphiaraus. Mopsus.
Osiris, and Asdepius. See Apuleius: De Deo Socr. 15. 153-1 'i-1.
36S. Sec pp. 311-313 .
.:'166. Apulcius: De Deo Socr. 17, l'i7. This was noted by P. Vallette:
I. 'Apologie d'Apu/ee (P:tris, 190R), p. 246.
:\6:-. In fact, Apuleius often obscures the wider distinction between gods
and demons themselves by applying the term 'god' (deus) in different con-
texts to demons never embodied. demons after embodiment, and demons
currently embodied. For the t1rst see Apuleius: De Deo Socr. 2. 121-122 and
.w. 166 where the same spiritual being, Minerva, is described as an invisible
god and as a demon respectively. For the second see ibid. I 'i. 153 where the
of oaiJ..Lrov with the Roman notion of genius.368 The nature of

this soul is delineated carefully in a passage which states that
'the soul of all living things is incorporeaJ. It will not...perish
w_he.n it is separate~ f~o~ _the body, it is foremost among all
tbings _wJ]i_c.l.u;:_om~.!Q..b_e._,__~nd it directs ana tiTles those things
~l.w~e_ care .and.. admirustration have been-allotted to it. It is
~b}!--irseU" ete-mally' (Animamveroantmantfum omnium
non esse corpoream nee sane perituram, cum corpore fuerit
absoluta, omniumque gignentium esse seniorem; atque ideo et
imperitare et regere ea quorum curam fuerit diligentiamque
sortita; ipsamque semper et per se moverz).369 The relation of
term 'god' is applied 10 disembodied human souls which have led excellent
earthly lives and even 'honorifically' (honoris causa) to disembodied souls of
uncertain moral status. For the 1hird see ibid. I 5, I SO-l 5 I where the term
'god' is applied lO currently embodied human souls. All this reflects not only
the looseness of the classical terminology for various spiritual heings but the
fluid structure of Apuleius' ontology based on the multiple unfolding of the
unitary divine power.
368. Ibid. I 5. 150-152. I have detected no significant difference of mean-
ing between the two Latin terms - animus and anima - which Apult:ius
uses to speak of this principle. That hoth are employed in similar contexts is
indicated hy a comparison of the following sets of passages: (i) Apuleius: De
Plat. II. 22. 25 I with De Mumlo I, 288 and 30, 357 (the eyes of the soul); (ii)
De Plat. II, 9, 2:H with ibid. I, 13, 207 and I, 18, 216 (the rational pan of the
soul); and (iii) De Deo Socr. I 5, I 52 wilh De Plat. I. 17. 217 (the conjunction
of the soul and the body). The flexibility of usage follows a tradition of Latin
philosophical writing at least as old as Cicero. See ch. I, n. 255.
369. Apulcius: De Plat. I. 9, 199. For the immortality of the soul cf. ibid.
II. 20, 2-19 and II, 23, 255; and De Deo Socr. 4, 126 and 15, 151. For its
separation from the hody d. De Plat. II, 21, 250-251. For its generation cf.
De Deo Socr. I 5, 151. The last parallel raises difficulties of interpretation
since the words cmmiumque gigrzerzlium esse seuiorem are amhiguous and
could mean either 'it is foremost among all things which come to be' or 'it is
prior to all things which come lO be'. If the latter interpretation is correct,
then Apuleius believes the soul to he eternal in the past as well as in the
furure. In this case we must translate the words quodammodo cum homine
Al'l' I.E I LIS .:H7
the human soul to its body is described in another text by using

an analogy, for just as the divine force is invisible yet is the
source of every physical motion which we can see, 'the quality
and shape of the soul itself are not presented to our eyes,
although we may understand its nature and power from the im-
portance of the things it accomplishes' (nee ipsius animae
qualitatem ac figuram oculis occurrere, sed momentis ab ea
gestarum rerum intellegi, qua/is et quanta sitp 7 o Finally the
nature of the human soul and its relation to the body are
brought together in a passage which states: 'Since Plato believes
that there are three parts of the soul, he says that the rational
~ is situated in the citadel of the head, the irascible part has its
place in t~far from reason - here in deference it
responds to the behests of wisdom - and the l)Jstful part oc-
cupies the lowest regions of the abdomen' (At enim cum tres
partes animae ducat esse, rationabilem ... bane ait capitis
arcem tenere; irascentiam vero procu/ a ratione ad
domicilium cordis deductam esse obsequique eam in loco
respondere sapientiae; cupidinem ... infernas abdominis sedes
tenere).371 Anyone familiar with Plato's writings will see that
the later author is following tradition very closely in speaking of
the human soul's incorporeality, immortality, self-motion,
tripartition, and bodily distribution.37Z The only innovation
seems to be the description of this soul as qualitiless and
Rignitur ("the soul is ill some way born with the man') at ibid. I 'i. I 'i I with
tmphasis upon the italicized words. It is difficult to be sure which of the two
intc:rpretat ions is t'orrect .
.:\70. Apuleius: De !Hundo 31. 3'i9 .
.Pl. Apuleius: De Plat. 1. 13. 207. Thc: tripartition of thc: soul is also
discussed at ibid. I, 18. 216-218 and II, L 22'i ff .
.~"'2. P1aw speaks of the soul as 'immortal' (a9avato~) at Pbaed.
10'ie-106d; 114d; Phaed1". 24'ic-e; Rep. X, 6llb; etc.; as 'self-moved' (to
auto KlVOUV) at Pbaedr. 24 'ic-e; and as tripartite at Rep. IV. 4 39d ff.; IX.
'i~ lc-'i72a; IX. 'i80d ff.; and Tim. 69c-72d. He does not seem 10 have refer-
rtd to the soul explicitly as incorporeal although this notion was established
318 MIDDLE Pl. A TONISM
shapeless which is a rhetorical elaboration of some brief

remarks in the pseudo-Aristotelian source.3"'3
4. 36 MA TTER/FORMS/NUMBERSIBODY
Apuleius' account of the nature of matter is fairly detailed,

although the presentation of all the relevant information in a
single continuous text makes it simple for the interpreter to
describe his treatment, ambiguities arising only occasionally
where the narrative becomes rather compressed. We shall
therefore summarize this doctrine approximately following the
order of discussion in the Apuleian text, stopping where
necessary to explain his ideas in the light of earlier philosophical
traditions.
4.361 THE NATURE OF MATTER
As in the case of the other metaphysical principles, we find

matter described from the subjective viewpoint and in both
positive and negative terms. Thus, Apuleius argues that this
principle can be grasped 'neither simply by touch nor simply by
the conjecture of thought ... but by a bastard conjecture' (nee
tactu solo neque tamen sola opinione cogitation is ...
adulterata opinione). 374 That this is an interpretation of matter
from the subjective viewpoint is indicated by the
epistemological character of the argument, and that this subjec-
tive description has both a positive and a negative component is
in the school tradition hy Apuleius' time. For a good discussion of the in

nuence of these texts of Plato on second-century interpretations of the soul
see Moreschini: op. cit.. pp. 98-99.
3"'3. See Ps.-Aristotle: n&pi K60J.10U 399b I 5 'the soul is invisible yet \'isible
through its functions' (a6patoc; ouaa toic; fpyotc; autoic; 6pdtal).
37-i. Apuleius: De Plat. I. 5. 192.
APLJLEIUS 319
indicated by the statements that the principle can be grasped by

wuch or thought and that it cannot simply be grasped by touch
or thought respectively. By speaking of a 'bastard conjecture in
this context, Apuleius shows that he is following the teaching of
Plato's Timaeus very closely - the phrase is a translation of
similar words in the Greek original375 - although the re-
mainder of his description is not paralleled in Plato's text, for
reasons which we shall discover in the next phase of our
analysis.
Apuleius also describes matter from the objective viewpoint,
and here it is possible to distinguish perhaps three phases in the
development of his thesis. In the first place, that aspect of mat-
ter which necessitates a peculiar epistemological approach is
delineated, for the principle is said to be 'neither corporeal nor
indeed incorporeal' (neque corporea nee sane incorporea).
This is because corporeal things always possess some form,
which matter lacks, while incorporeal things cannot provide a
basis for body, as matter does. However, the principle can be
described as corporeal 'in terms of power and relation' (viet ra-
tione) - an obscure phrase apparently signifying that it is
potentially corporeal because of the physical objects which
arise from it. 376 Secondly, Apuleius lists three aspects of matter
which indicate its distinction ontologically from the various
5~'i. Sec Plato: Tim. S2b The Receptacle "is tangible without the aid of sen-
sation but with a kind of bastard reasoning, and is scarcely an objelt of belief'
taGto Of: J.u:t"civata9naiac; cintov i..oyta~C\.J nv1 v69<p, J.16ytc; mat6v). In this
passage. the ant6v leads to Apuleius tactu, the A.oytaJ.I<!> TIVI v69<p to his
aclultera opinirme, ;md the mat6v perhaps to his opinione cogit(lfi(mis.
Tim~. we achieve the Latin writer's notion that matter is ambivalently the ob-
jen of sc:nse. That it is also ambivalently the object of thought may have bec:n
suggc:stc:ll by Plato's statc:ment a little earlier in the text that the: Receptacle
"participates in a puzzling way in the intelligible and is difficult to grasp'
(J.IEtCIAUJ.II}<ivov OE cl1tOPWtaTQ 7tl) tOU VOTJTOU Kai OUOUAWtOtaTOV) .
.~~6. Apulcius: De Plat. 1, 5. 192.
material things: it is 'ungenerated' (inprocreabilis), 'indestructi-

ble' (incorrupta), and 'infinite' (infinita, infinibilis).377 The
first two aspects imply that matter is of everlasting temporal
duration, while the last aspect seems to indicate that it is equally
unlimited in spatial extent. Finally, an aspect of matter which
indicates its relation to higher metaphysical principles is noted,
for it is said to be 'rough and lacking in the specification of
form' (rudis etfigurationis qualitate viduata). Yet the artificer
God is able to work upon it as a whole and bring it to an orderly
state since it is 'receptive of forms and susceptible to moulding'
(figurarum capax fictionique subiecta).37B Here there seem to
be implied two moments logically if not temporally
distinguishable in the moulding of matter - a point to which it
will be necessary to return in connection with our discussion of
the world's body. In these three parts of Apuleius' analysis we
find an interesting blend of notions taken directly from Plato
and concepts derived from the doxographical writers. That
there exists a substratum of the visible world which is im-
perishable and which, although lacking form, is capable of its
reception is a fundamental feature of Plato's cosmology;379 yet
the actual term materia is a translation of the u).TJ employed
habitually by the doxographers to denote this conception, and
is ultimately derived from the physical theories of Aristotle and
Theophrastus.~so Furthermore, it is to the doxographers that we
must look for parallels to other features of the theory, since the
notions that matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal and
that it is potentially corporeal are contained in Arius Didymus,
3""1./bitl. I. 'i, 191192.

3""8./bid. I. s. 191.
:P9. Plato: Tim. 48e ff.
380. See Aristotle: Phys. IV. 2, 209blll6; De Cae/o 3. R, 306bl620; and
Theophrastus: Pbys. Opin. fr. 9 (DG 485, 2:\). The later doxographical tradi-
tion is reflected in Albinus: Diclasc. R, 13 and Hippolrtus: Philos. 19 (DG
.:;67. ""-12).
APLILEIUS 321
Aetius. and Hippolytus,3BJ while the notions that matter is

ungenerated and that it is infinite occur also in Diogenes Laer-
tius and Calcidius.382 This is not to say that there are no signs of
independent philosophical synthesis on Apuleius' part in all
this. but simply that his expansions of Plato follow well
established methods of procedure.
-L362 MATTER AND FORMS
Of the various aspects of matter so far described, it is the
5H I. Aetius: Plac. I. 9 . .f (DG 30Ha<; and h<;) describes matler as 't:orporcal'

1CJ(!>J.itowSJic;). which seems at first sight to conflict with Apulc:ius doctrine.
llowt'\'l'r. other doxographical texts indicalc what lhc traditional doctrine
wa~ in it~ fullest form: namely that matter is in ilsclf incorporeal yet becomes
~.:orporcal whtn forms arc impressed upon it. The theory is slated (a propos
..\ri~totll') by Arius Didymus: Epit. Pbys. fr. 2 (DG .f.IH, H-12) who writes:
'\X'Ill'n it docs not parlicipare it is nor a body according 10 dcfinilion.
althou~h il is corporeal in rhe sense: that it underlies :til qualiries like: a mould .
.Ju~ as form when separated from matter is incorporeal. thus matter
~cparattd from form is not a body. II is necessary that both should come
to~cthcr for a body 10 he produced' (ou J.IETEIATJq>uia M, Kata >..oyov aJ.lu
~lEV OUI\' av EiTJ, OWJ.IUtiKTt lit l>ui to 1taaau; ci'>mtEp tKJ.IUYEiov U1tOKEia8at taic;
1lllllir'lOIV. ov tp07tOV yap tO Eil>oc; tijc; UATJc; (upatpr.etv aati>J.lTOV r.ivat
Tl>y;(UVF.l, ounoc; Kai titv UATJV tOU r.i5ouc; x.roptae&vtoc; ou O&J.IU. 5r.iv yap QJ.l-
lj}Oiv tijc; auv6oou 7tpoc; tilv tOU OWJ.latoc; u7t6atamv). Some doxographical
texts tlndop this argument further by saying that matter is potentially cor
porcal. Set Hippolytus: Pbi/os. 19 (DG <;6'7, I <;-17) 'Matter is potentially
hotly hut not yet actually so. It is shapeless and formless in itself, yet can
lwwnw hotly hy acquiring shapes and qualities' (titv 5& UATJV 5uvaJ.1Et J.IEV
OtiJ).lU, i':vr.pyr.iq. 5 OUli7tw' QO;(TJJ.IQtiOtOV yap UtTtV OUOUV Kai Q1tOIOV, 7tp0
a).aJlouaav ax.iJJ.luta Kai notOTTJtuc; yr.v&aeat a&J.la). For a brief note on these:
and othtr paralld ttxts set Dillon: op. cit., pp. 313314 .
.~H2. For matter as ungeneratc:d sec: Calcidius: In Tim. 306, 307. 710 who
argues that matter is a 'principle' (inifium) and a principle hy definition can-
r~ot he preceded by something else. For matter as infinite sec Diogcnes Lac:r
tru~: \'it. Pbilos. Ill. 61) and Calcidius: In Tim. 312, 311, 10312. l. Both
writers rl'flr to infiniry in the sense of ahscn<:e of determination as such
rather than in that of absence of spatiallimil.
potency towards corporeality and the susceptibility to form

which are the most important from the cosmological view-
point. We must therefore follow the further development of
these questions in De P/atone et eius Dogmate with care. Un-
fortunately, this task is made difficult by the fact that Apuleius'
mediaeval copyists have left us with some uncertain textual
readings at a particularly significant juncture in the argu-
menUH.~ Thus, having learned that matter is subject to the im-
print of forms and that from this imprint are produced the four
elements, we read: 'And if these are elements they must be sim-
ple and not united by a reciprocal bond as in the case of
syllables. This latter relation characterizes those things whose
substance is produced by the manifold coming together of
powers. But since those things were disorderly and blended
with one another, the God who created the world reduced
them to order in a circular motion by means of numbers and
measures. And from a plurality of elements they were reduced
to single elements' (Quae si elementa sunt, simplicia esse de-
bent neque ad instar syl/abarum nexu mutua copulari, quod
istis evenit, quorum substantia mu/timoda potestatum coi-
tione conficitur. Quae quum inordinata permixtaque essent,
ab illo aedificatore mundi deo ad ordinem numeris et men-
suris in ambitum deducta sunt. Haec e plurimis e/ementis ad
unum redacta esse).3B4 In the first sentence the quod, quorum,
and multimoda potestatum are conjectures - the first and
third by P. Thomas and the second by J. Beaujeu - in the face
of the manuscript readings quae, quarum, and multi
potestatem respectively. However, since these alone provide
the possibility of coherently interpreting this troublesome
passage, we shall accept them .
.~83. See the notes of Beaujeu: op. cit .. p. 261 and Morcschini: op. cit .. pp.
81-tH.
384. Apuleius: De Plat. I. 7. 19-i.
APULEilJS
Apuleius' doctrine seems to be as follows.38S (i) The fire, air,

water, and earth which are to be the basic constituents of the
,isible world must be simple. They must not relate to one
another through any mutual bond in the way that syllables
relate to one another in forming words.3B6 The meaning here
might perhaps be illustrated by comparing the simple relations
bemeen the letters A, B, C, D (each unit being dissimilar to the
next) and the complex relations between the letters AB, BC, CD
(Where each pair has a similarity to the next). (ii) The complex
relation obtains between things whose substance is produced by
the coming together of powers. These 'things' could be inter-
preted either as the composite objects which now make up the
,isible world or as the congeries of qualities which appeared in
the material substratum prior to the Demiurge's activity. That
the latter interpretation is correct is suggested (a) by the in-
troduction of the word potestates by Apuleius which is pro-
bably a reminiscence of the 6uvci~Etc; described by Plato as fill-
ing the Receptacle,3B7 and (b) by the easy grammatical connec-
tion through the relative pronoun which this permits with the
inordinata permixtaque of the next sentence. (iii) Before the
ordering of the world the elements were in a disorderly and
confused state, and the Demiurge had to arrange them by the
.~H;_ For other discussions of this Platonic theory see Dlogenes Laertius:
Vit. Philos. Ill. 70-75; Albinus: Didasc. 13. 1-2; and Calcidius: /11 Tim. 20.
~ I . I 0 ff.
~H6_ The comparison with syllables may have been inspired by Plato: Tim.
-IHb-c.
~H"'. Plato speaks of the powers contained in the Receptacle at ibid. 52c
'Aut hccausc it was filled with powers which were neither similar nor balanc-
td. there was no equipoise anywhere in it. It was everywhere swayed
unnenly and shaken by those things, and by its motion shook them in
return (oui Ot tO llTJ8'61-1oiwv c'iuvliJ.lEWV J.l~TE iaopp6nwv EJ.17tlJ.l7tAaa8o.t
Kat'ouotv auti\c; iaoppon:Eiv, aH'aVWJ.laA.wc; 7tUVTU TO.AQVTOUJ.lEVT]V OE{Ea8at
lltv U7t'EKEivwv aut~v. KIVOUJ.lEVTJV B'o.u nO:>.. tv EKEi~o. OEiEIV ). The process by
whkh the Demiurge confines the powers within the geometrical shapes is
:\24 MIDDLE PLATONISM
imposition of numbers and geometrical shapes. This reference

to the confused state of the original elements presumably takes
account of the fact that, owing to the anomalies in the Recep-
tacle itself, these elements were not completely distinguishable
from one another.3H8 If it is permissible to return to the illustra-
tion from the beginning of the passage, we can say that the
original elements have among themselves the complex relation
analogous to that between AB, BC, CD. (iv) During the process
of ordering the world, the Demiurge reduces the original
elements from their multiple state to a simple form. Here
Apuleius is probably referring to the fact that, once again
because of the anomalies in the Receptacle, the original
elements were indefinitely multiple.389 Using the earlier illustra-
tion once again, we can say that multiplicity was implied by the
complex relation between the elements - analogous to that
between AB, BC, CD- and that the Demiurge produced unity
by henceforth permitting only the simple relation - analogous
to that between A, 8, C, D.:\90
4.363 MATTER AND NUMBERS
The next stage in Apuleius' account of the reception of form
described at ibid. i6c And God has harmonized in due proportion and ab-
solutely perfected the ratios of their numbers. motions. and other powers'
(Kai 51) Kai TO tt:i>V avaA.oyu:i>v !tEp( TE ta nA.Ji9TJ KUi tac; KtviJaEtc; KUi tac;
a Hac; liUVUIJEtc; navmxu TOV 9E6V ... un"au-rou OUVT]p1J6a9at mOta ava
A.6yov). On Plato's notion of power see also Theaet. I i6a; Soph. 248b; Tim.
:'d:t; l.eg. X. HH<Jh; etc.
:\88. See Plato: Tim. 52e where the Receptacle is everywhere swayed
unc\"enly" (clVWIJUAWc; 7tUVT1J taAQVTOUIJEVT]).
58lJ. See ihitl. i6c where numbers" (nA.li9TJ) are associated with "powers'
(liuvaiJEtc;). The connection between matter and multiplicity is also emphasiz-
ed by Xcnocratc:s. Sec Actius: Plac. I. 3. 21 (DG 2H8b 15-18).
390. It will be obvious from the above account that the notion of matter
APlilEIUS 325
bv matter is much easier to interpret, since he follows Plato's

d~scription of the imposition of geometrical shapes upon the
substratum closely.391 According to this theory, the original
dements are transformed from a disorderly into an ordered
stare by the Demiurge, who accomplishes this by assigning
geometrical figures to the congeries of qualities which lie before
him. The triangle is the fundamental geometrical unit from
whil"h the various figures are derived, and by combining right-
angled scalene triangles it is possible to construct pyramids, oc-
tahedra and icosahedra while by combining right-angled
isosceles triangles it is possible to construct cubes. Since the
geometrical figures can be arranged in a hierarchy of lightness
and mobility and the physical elements can also be classified ac-
cording to their degrees of lightness and mobility, the Demiurge
allocates a specific figure to each element representing the
ordered form imposed upon the congeries of qualities. Thus,
the pyramids are associated with fire, octahedra with air.
icosahedra with water, and cubes with earth, although the
possibility that there are other principles besides geometrical
figures composed of triangles is left open.392
-1.36-i THE NATURE OF BODY
When matter's potency towards corporeality is realized,

body - and in the first instance the body of the world.393 -
arises. Apuleius describes the latter as 'made from all the water,
~.111 Plil"ll b quite: consistent \Vith Plato's view. Only the: tc:rm materia itself ( =
lJAlll rc:calls Aristott:lianism.
5'>1. Apukius: De Plat. I.~. 19';-196. Cf. Plato: Tim. ')3c-S7d.
592 Apull"ius is more: explicit than Plato regarding the identity of these:
Ill hc:r prindples.
:W 3 Apuleius also states that 'the bodies of ani mate and inanimate things'
(cmilnalium et inunimantium corpora) are fashioned from the elements.
Sec De Plat. l. 8. 196.
the totality of fire, the whole of air, and the entire earth' (exom-
ni aqua totoque igni et aeris zmiversitate cunctaque terra esse
factum), these elements being 'placed within one another and
connected among themselves' (ex se intra se apta et conexa
esse).394 This world fills the whole of space since there is 'no
place left in which another world could arise' (nee relictus
locus, in quo a/ius), and it occupies the whole of time because
'a perpetual youth and inviolate strength have been assigned to
it' (ei adtributa est perpetua iuventas et inviolata
va/etudo).395 Furthermore, he describes its shape as having 'the
resemblance of a beautiful and perfect sphere' (instar pulchrae
et perfectae spbaerae), its proper motion being not one of the
six kinds of rectilinear motion but 'the rotation of reason' (ra-
tionabi/iter volvere).396 In all this Apuleius follows the doctrine
of Plato without significant addition from the later traditions.397
However, on one final question a definite interpretative
stance is taken since the Latin writer attributes two views regar-
ding the origin of the world to his predecessor: 'And sometimes
Plato says that this world is without a beginning, but sometimes
that it has a beginning and has come to be. It has no commence-
ment or beginning because it has existed always, but it appears
to have arisen because its substance and nature is composed of
those things which have the characteristic of becoming' (Et
hunc quidem mundum nunc sine initio esse dicit, alias
originem habere natumque esse: nul/um autem eius exordium
atque initium esse ideo quod semper fuerit; nativum vero
videri, quod ex his rebus substantia eius et natura constet,
quae nascendi sortitae sunt qua/itatem).39B By raising this
391. Ibid. I. 8, 196.

39<;. Ibid. I, 8, 197.
W6. 1/Jid. I. R. 198.
39'. See Plaro: Tim. 31b31a.
398. Apuleius: De Plat. I. R. 198.
APllLEiliS 327
question Apuleius enters into one of the major exegetical con-

troversies of late antiquity, regarding which the modern
scholarship is so extensive as to render detailed discussion at
this point unnecessary.399 However, two observations may be
in order here. First, the Aristotelian view that Plato believed the
world to have an origin in time - the literal reading of the
Timaeus account4oo - and the Xenocratean view that he
believed it not to have a temporal origin - the allegorical
reading of the account40t -are here combined into a single in-
terpretation according to which Plato himself stated both of
these alternatives at different times.402 Secondly, by saying that
Plato was able to hold these two contradictory positions
because he actually understood coming to be in the special
sense of 'consisting of things which come to be' the writer is
reflecting a standard exegetical posture of second-century
Platonism. 403 On both these points Apuleius' interpretation has
399. For general studies sec C. Baeumker: 'Die Ewigkcit dcr \'felt hci
Plato'. Phi/nsopbiscbe Monatsheft 23 ( 1887). pp. 'H 3-<;29:). Baudry: Le pro-
IJ!i!me de f'origine et de l't!temittf du mrmde dam Ia philosophie grecque d'
Platrm ti /'ere cbretienne (Paris, 1931 ); W. Spoerri: 'Encore Platon et
I'Oril:nt', Retue de pbllologie 31 (19<;7). pp. 209-233; and M. Baltes: Die
Weltentstebtmg des platonischen Timaios mtch den ant/ken lnterpreten I
(lciden. 19"'6). Specifically for Apuleius' view of the question stc Beaujcu:
ufJ. cit .. pp.262-26:~; Dillon: op.l'it., pp. 2f2-2-H. 2H6-2H~. and :\I<;; and
:\loreschini: np. cit .. pp. H3-H<;. Only Beaujeu appreciates the real suhtlety of
Apuldus' interpretation .
.foo. See Aristotle: De Caelo l, 10, 280a30-32.
WI. Sec Xenocrates: fr. 54 (and Aristotle: De Caelo 1. I 0. 279b3 2-280a2).
t02. It is clear from Apulcius' statements in this passage that the two
moments in the cosmogonical process - the disorderly qualities in matter
Uht originotl elements) and the qualities arranged according to geometrical
proportion (the configured elements)- are conceptually but not temporally
distinct.
-f03. See ch. 3. n. 25.
:UB MIDDLE PLATONISM
extant parallels- on the former with Plutarch404 and on the lat-

ter with Taurus405 - although his combination of these notions
indicates some measure of philosophical ingenuity on his own
part.
404. Sec Plutarch: De Anim. Procr. 10 16d-e (noted by Beaujeu: op. cit., p.
265).
-105. See Taurus in Philoponus: De Aetem. Mundi VI, 8, liS, 8.
5
The Asclepius
'i.l INTRODUCTION
Proceeding in the likely chronological sequence, the next

philosophical work important to a historian of Platonism is
perhaps the Latin dialogue entitled Asclepius.l This work, in
which the divine figure of Hermes Trismegistus discourses to
his disciple Asclepius, is the translation of a no longer extant
1. In studying the influence of the Asclepius' doctrine one must consider

(i) the influence of the Latin text itself, and (ii) the influence of its Greek
origin:ll. (i) Discussions of the manuscript tradition of the Latin text can be
found in W. Scott: Hennetica, The Ancient Greek and Lati11 Writi11gs which
contain Religiou.~ or Philosophic Teachings ascribed to Hermes
Trismegistus I. Edited with English Translation and Notes by W. S. (Oxford,
192-i: reprinted London, 1968), pp. 49-51 and A. D. Nock et A.-J. Festugiere:
Corpus Hermeticum II. Texte etabli par A. D. N. et traduit par A.-]. F.,
(Paris. 1946), pp. 259-64. There is a discussion of the testimonia to the
rlading of the Latin text in Nock and Festugiere: op. cit., pp. 264-75. Among
the latter are references in Augustine: Cit'. Dei VIII. 23-7 (CCSL 47, 239-49)
(to Asclep. 2j-'l and .H); in Thierry of Chartres: Comm. 4. H. 97. H8-90 (to
Asc/(p. I); Lect. 4, 11, 189, 22-190, 27 (to Asclep. 1); Lect. 4, 11. 190, 28-9
(to .4sdep. 20); Clmtra Eutych . .:\, 45,24.:\,68-74 (to Asc/ep. 20}; Glosa 2, 10,
2""'0. 62-i (to Asclep. 6); G.losa 2. 31. 275, 7-10 (to Asclep. 20); Glosa 4, 11.
2H6, ; 4-.., (to Asclep. 20); De Sex Dier. Oper. 26. 566. 32-4 (to Asclep. 14 ); De
Sex /Jilr. Oper. 26, 566, 35-43 (to Asclep. 19); and in Alan of Lllle: Crmtra
Haer. I. .'\0 (PL 210. 332 C-D) (to Asclep. 2, 28); Contra Haer. Ill. 3 (PL 210,
IOiD) (10 .4scltp. 23). (ii) The influence of material derived from the Greek
original has been discussed b)' Nock and Festugiere: op. cit., pp. 266-8: A.
Wlosok: l.aktanz tmd die philo.mpblsche Gnosis. Untersucbrmgen zu
Gescbicbte uml Tenninologie der gnostiscben ErWsungs- Vorstellung
329
Greek original written by an unknown author,.z and modern

scholars are undoubtedly correct to approach its interpretation
from the standpoint of such works of similar genre as survive in
the original language. We must therefore begin this chapter with
some remarks about the origin and nature of the so-called
'Hermetic' writings.
5. 1 1 THE NATURE OF HERMETICISM
As noted by the greatest authority on this question in modern

times: A.-J. Festugiere, it is difficult to comprehend the nature
of 'Hermeticism' in a single definition.:\ If one means by this any
doctrine purportedly revealed by Hermes Trismegistus, then a
large number of writings concerned with astrology, alchemy,
and magic and dating from the third century B.C. onwards as
well as a series of philosophical and theological treatises com-
posed in the second and third centuries A.D. can reasonably be
called 'Hermetica'. If one signifies by the term a certain kind of
religious attitude, only the second group of texts (together with
(Heidelberg 1960), pp. 26I-2; G. Sfameni Gasparro: 'L' Ermetismo nelle

testimonianze del Padri', Studia Patristica II (Berlin I972), pp. 58-64; and
P. Siniscalco: 'Ermete Trismegisto, profeta pagano della rivelazione cristiana.
La fortuna di un passo ermetico (Asclepius 8) nell'interpretazione di scrittori
cristiani'. Atti della Accaclemia delle Scienze di Torino, C/(lsse di scienze
morali, storicbe efi/ologiche 10 I ( I966-7). pp. 83-II3. From these investiga-
tions it emerges that the Greek text was known to Lactantius (who quotes it
hoth in Greek and in his own Latin translation) and that he transmitted its
content to the pseudo-Augustinian Ad11ersus Quinque H"ereses. Either or
hoth of these texts were then used as sources of information about 'Hermes' '
doctrine by later writers such as Sedulius Scottus, Adalbold of Utrecht. the
anonymous twelfth-century Commentarius in Roethii Consokltionem
Phi/osopbiae. and Abelard.
2. As we have already noted, the grounds for associating this translation
with Apulcius are very flimsy. See pp. 21 R-219.
3. A.-J Festugiere: Hermetisme et mystique paienne (Paris. 1967). p. 39.
THE ASCLEP/US 331
the Latin Asclepius and various fragments preserved in

swbaeus) could be comprehended in this definition. If one
means by the term a specific philosophical doctrine, then only
selected treatises from the latter group can be included.
Taking the second definition of 'Hermeticism' proposed by
Festugii:re as the most convenient for our purposes, we should
sav something briefly about this group of texts nowadays called
th~ 'learned Hermetica'.4 Here are comprised (i) a number of
treatises in Greek brought together at some time between Johan-
nes Stobaeus (sixth century), who does not yet refer to them as a
group. and Michael Psellus (eleventh century), who does so
describe them: I. 'Of Hermes Trismegistus, the Poimandres', II.
of Hermes to Tat, the Universal Discourse', III. 'Of Hermes, the
Sacred Discourse', IV. 'Of Hermes to Tat, the Bowl or the
Monad'. V. 'Of Hermes to his son Tat', VI. (Untitled), VII. (Un-
titled), VIII. (Untitled), IX. (Untitled), X. 'Of Hermes
Trismegistus, the Key', XI. 'Intellect to Hermes', XII. 'Of
Hermes Trismegistus, On the Universal Intellect, to Tat', XIII.
'Of Hermes Trismegistus to his son Tat', XIV. 'Of Hermes
Trismegistus to Asclepius, Greetings', XVI. 'Of Asclepius to
King Ammon, Definitions'. XVII. (Untitled), XVIII. (Untitled);
(ii) the Latin Asclepius; (iii) twenty-nine fragments in Greek
drawn from Stobaeus. 'i The form of these writings is generally a
didactic one in which a master elaborates upon some point of
doctrine before one or more of his disciples: a fact which sug-
gests that the literary composition is based on notes ultimately
rdlecting an oral presentation. 6 Their content usually consists
either of a summary of the philosophical system as a whole -
i. Fcs1ugierc: op. cit .. pp. 32-38.

'i. For a more de1ailed inventory of the Greek corpus see A.-J. Festugiere:
l.a n!te/atifm d'Hermes Trismegiste II: Le Dieu cosmique (Paris, 1949). pp.
1-IH.
6. See Fes1ugiere: op. cit.. p. 28 ff.
the Asclepius deals successively with hierarchy and continuity

in the cosmos, the dual function of man, the dual nature of man,
the primal causes: God, matter, spirit, the hierarchies of in-
telligible and sensible gods, the cause and mode of producing all
things, the greatness of man endowed with intellect, and so on
- or else of a disquisition on some individual point of doctrine
- treatise V demonstrates that God is both unseen and most ap-
parent, treatise VI that the good exists only in God and nowhere
else, and treatise VII that the greatest evil for man is ignorance
of God, to take three examples. 7 Since most of these treatises
represent compendia of earlier doctrine, it is virtually impossi-
ble to determine their individual dates of composition.
However, writing of the group can be roughly assigned to the
period between the first and third centuries A.D.H
5.12 THE LATIN ASCLEP/l!S
The Asclepius is undoubtedly among the most interesting of

the Hermetic writings, not only because it contains an extensive
survey of doctrine but because - being a translation into Latin
- it alone exercised some influence over mediaeval western
thought. Its connection with the Greek Corpus Henneticum has
been fully established by A. D. Nock who noted striking
parallels both of literary expression and of doctrinal content
between the two texts, although it is unclear whether the
author of the Asclepius' original can be identified with that of
one or more of the extant Greek treatises or whether he was
simply acquainted with these other writings and influenced by
them.9 At all events, this Latin dialogue provides a convenient
i. These two categories (and others) ;ue distinguished hy Festugicre:

Hermetisme et mystique paienne. pp. 90-91 .
H. See Festugicre: op. cit .. p. 90 and n. 14.
9. A. D. Nock et A.-J. Festugiere: Corpus llenneticum II. Texte eta/Jii et
traduit. pp. 285-287.
THE ASCLEP/lJS :H.~
summary of the main teachings of the Greek Corpus

J{ermeticum for those later western writers who will interest
themselves in such matters.
The Latin Asclepius is a translation or rather adaptation, writ-
ten by an unknown author active before A. D. 413, of a Greek
treatise entitled 'the Perfect Discourse' (A6yo<; TEAElO<;).JO The
fact that the work is a translation rather than an original com-
position is perhaps made obvious by the numerous Grecisms
which it contains, II although the existence of a certain amount
of direct evidence regarding the Greek original allows us to
understand the genesis of the Latin version more precisely. This
nidence consists in the first place of certain fragments of the
Greek preserved in a magical papyrus, Lactantius, Cyril of Alex-
andria. Stobaeus, and Johannes Lydus which allow us to
establish parallels with the Latin in brief and isolated passages. 12
It consists in the second place of two excerpts in the Coptic
translation of Nag Hammadi Codex VI which permit us,
especially when these are used in conjunction with the Latin, to
conjecture the Greek original of more extended passages with
some confidence. 13 The identity of the Latin translator is
unknown to us since all attempts to equate him with figures like
Apuleius. Calcidius, and Marius Victorinus have failed to carry
conviction on stylistic grounds. I-t However. his activity can be
10. Lll"tantius: lnst. Dit. IV, 6, l (CSEL19. 287, 1).

I I. A list of these stylistic features can be found in Nock and Festugiere:
rJfJ. cit . pp. 2"78-279.
12. Set: Sl'Ott: op. cit., pp. 77-78 and Nock and Festugiert:: op. ell .. pp.
r')-r-.
15. Set J. -1'. Mahc: /lermes en Haut-Egypte. Les textes hermt!tique.~ de Nag
llammmli el leurs pamlleles grecs et latitzs I-ll (Quebec. 1978) and D. M.
Parrott, t:lc: Ne~g Hammadi Codices V, 2-'i w1d Vluitb Papyrus Berolensis
H-)0.2, lmul--i (Nag Hammadf Studies XI) (leiden. 1979).
l1. For a dtmonstration that Apuleius could not have been tht: translator
~l'l' Scou: op. cit., p .... 8. For arguments that neither Marius Victorious nor
Cakidius was the translator see Nock and Festugiere: op. cit.. pp. 277-278.
MIDDLE PLATONISM
placed before A. D. 4 I 3 since Augustine cites lengthy passages

from this work in the section of his De Civitate Dei written
around that date. I<;
The Asclepius takes the form of a continuous address by
Hermes Trismegistus to his disciple Asclepius. punctuated occa-
sionally with questions raised by the latter. Hermes speaks first
of the continuity of life throughout the cosmos, and of the
hierarchical order in which the creator God rules the heaven,
the heaven the changeable bodies; and in which the astral gods
communicate with the demons, the demons with mankind.l6
Man plays a special role in the cosmic system since he has two
functions: to worship God and to cultivate the earth, in accor-
dance with his dual nature of soul and body.1: Those who
discharge their functions correctly will return after death to the
purely divine state, but those who fail in this will endure
transmigration into animal form. 18 Hermes next describes the
basic principles of the cosmos which are three in number: God,
spirit, and matter. Each of these is unproduced and eternal, and
corresponds to a different aspect of the various living creatures:
God to intellect, spirit to soul. and matter to sensible form.l9
Since the highest of these living creatures - endowed with in-
tellect alone - are the superior gods. a brief digression is in-
serted on their hierarchical arrangement, one in which a group
of five intelligible gods or 'rulers of substance' (oucruipx_at) -
Zeus, Phos. Pantomorphos, Heimarmene, Deuteros- presides
over a group of five sensible ones - the heaven, the sun, the
thirty-six decans, the seven spheres, the air ..w For Hermes, the
I 5. Augustine: Cit. Dei VIII. 23 ff. (CCSL 47. 2W ff.)

16. Asclep. 2-:.
17.1bid. 8-9.
I R. Ibid. I 0-14.
19.1bid. 14-18.
20. Ibid. 19.
THEASCLEP/US 335
primal God is bisexual in the sense that he produces all things

without the cooperation of a second principle. Human beings
have only one sex, although they can participate in a divinely
ordained mystery by copulation.21 The kinship between the
primal God and man is further emphasized in two arguments:
first. since man has been endowed with reason in order to con-
trol the hostile impulses of matter whereas the astral gods have
no need of reason, he is in a sense closer to the creator.22
Secondly, since man is a maker of gods by placing statues
prepared to receive the higher influences in his temples, while
the primal God has produced the superior gods by placing astral
bodies in the temple of the cosmos, there is an affinity of func-
tion.2:1 In fact Egypt is the analogue of heaven in the sense that it
serves as a temple for the whole world, a statement which leads
to a digression foretelling the decline of religious observances in
that land, then the natural disasters - flood, conflagration, or
pestilence- to be wrought as instruments of divine retribution,
and then the restoration of the ancient beliefs.24 At this point
Hermes returns to his earlier argument that man should correct-
ly discharge the functions enjoined by his dual nature. Thus, he
will suffer one kind of death represented by the separation of
soul from body but not the other kind of death manifested in
the soul's punishment by relegation to the region of turbulence.
It is easy to see that these deaths are more apparent than real, a
necessary consequence of the fact that the cosmos itself is eter-
nally living.ls The cosmos is eternally living since eternity con-
tains it and vivifies it from the outside, just as the cosmos con-
21. Ibid. 20-21. The parallel Coptic version hegins in the middh: of chapter
21'
22. Ibid. 22.
2.~. 1/Jid. 23.
2-t. /bit/. 24-26 .
.!S. Ibid. 27-29. Tht parallel Coptic version ends early in l'hapter 29.
How-,~r
~ ~ . th ere
ts
a separate extract covermg
part o f c h apter. 41.

.336 MIDDI.F. PLATONISM
tains and vivifies the temporal things within.26 Furthermore the

cosmos is both full- since there is no void surrounding or ex-
tending through it, the sensible world being enveloped by the
intelligible world -and varied- since there is a diversity of in-
dividual forms within a single species, these forms themselves
being subject to continual transformations.27 Hermes once again
returns to his argument that man should discharge the functions
associated with his dual nature, this time focusing on man's role
as a creator of terrestrial gods which are subject to a similar
duality. just as the astral gods exercise a kind of general pro-
vidence, so the terrestrial gods preside over the individual
details of human affairs.2R This last point gives rise to a question
about the role of Heimarmene in this system but, although one
can define this as the necessity linking all events, one cannot say
whether it is equivalent to the primal God, the world, or the
order of celestial and terrestrial things.29 Finally, Hermes and
his disciple terminate their discussion with a prayer.
It will be immediately apparent from this summary that the
Asclepius is a text which is loose and discursive in its structure.
This fact has led certain modern scholars to conclude that the
work, as we now have it, is not a literary unity but a composite
product. Thus, T. Zielinski argued on the basis of certain incon-
sistencies in the dialogue structure that the treatise consists of
four shorter texts joined end to end,30 A. S. Ferguson suggested
26./bid. 30-;U.
2-:'./IJid. .33-36.
28. Ibid. .3'7-38.
29. /hid. 39--40. In the foregoing summary I have included onl}' the main
arguments of the Asclepius so that its underlying logical structure might
become apparent. For a more detailed analysis sec Fcstugiere: La ritelalion
d 'Hermes Trismegiste II: Le Dieu cosmique. pp. 18-27.
30. T. Zielinski: 'Hermes und die Hermetik'. Archil! fiir Religions-
\Vissenscbaft 8 ( 190S). pp. 321-372. The shorter texts would he (i) Asclep.
1-14. (ii) ibid. 14-27. (iii) ibid. 27-37, and (iv) ibid. 37-41.
THE ASCLEPIUS B7
that the final prayer is an addition to the original version,.H and

w. Scott maintained that the work comprises three smaller
treatises joined end to end on the grounds that there are un-
necessary repetitions of material and radical inconsistencies in
philosophical doctrine which cannot be explained on the
hypothesis of a single author ..u The questions raised by these
scholars are of considerable importance for, if their conclusions
arc correct, it will be impossible to reconstruct a single
philosophical system for this treatise. However, other scholars
have countered these arguments by asserting that the work is
most I y a literary unity, as the manuscript tradition indicates,
even if its author is revealed to have the mentality of a compiler
rather than that of an original thinker. This is the position of
A.D. Nock who supports his thesis by pointing out first, that
there are certain philosophical themes which run through the
entire text and secondly, that there are numerous verbal
parallels between the different sections of the work.:\3 If
anything can be said in response to this controversy, it is
perhaps that we should study the treatise in the form in which it
has heen transmitted by the manuscript tradition, assuming that
there are no really convincing arguments against doing so. That
this is the case seems to have been demonstrated sufficiently by
Nock's discussion.
Thl' Asclepius is an important document concerning the state
i I. A. S. Ferguson: 'Introduction' to Scott: op. cit. IV, p. xxxii. This view

is t:onfirmld hy the separate preservation of a Greek version among the
l'apyri Jlagicae and of a Coptic version in Nag Hammadi Codex VI. Sec
!\l:hC:: op. cit. I, p. 137 ff.; Parroll: op. cit., p. 376.
:\2. Snm: op. cit. I. p. 51 ff. and op. cit. III. pp. I. 6M. 92. etc. The shorter
ll'XIs arc 1i) Ascle{J. 1- 11. (ii) ibid. 1-i-16. and (iii) ibid. 16--i I. In addition 10
Lli\'iding the work inw three parts, Scou makes numerous transpositions of
lhc lcxr in (iii). His whole procedure is rightly criticized by A. S. Ferguson in
Scou: op. cit. IV, pp ..'\9-i-395 and 40H ff.
-~-~. :-.Jock and Fesrugiere: op. cit.. pp. 292-295.
MIDDLE PLATONISM
of Platonism in the third and fourth centuries A.D ..~-i That the
work does indeed belong to the Platonic current in the history
of philosophy is indicated by the author's emphasis upon the
radical transcendence of the divine.:\o; In this respect his posi-
tion is similar to that held by Apuleius and other Platonists ap-
proximately a century earlier. However, that the work must
also be associated with the Stoic tradition in the history of
thought emerges from the writer's insistence upon the thorough
immanence of the divine .36 On this point he diverges from the
standpoint held by the most influential Platonists of that era.
Finally. that the work is a notable example of syncretism bet-
ween the Platonic and Stoic doctrines in the history of
philosophy is demonstrated by the author's interest in the rela-
tion of macrocosm to microcosm.37 On this question again he
deviates from the position of Apuleius and his contemporaries.
It is obviously necessary to take account of these various in-
fluences in interpreting the structure of the Asclepius'
philosophical system.3H
5.211 THE POSITIVE APPROACH TO GOD
Since the doctrines of Hermeticism are esscntiall y religious
34. If we think in terms of the Greek original, the Asclepius dm:uments

Platonism of the third t:entury; if we think in terms of the Latin \"ersion, it
dot:uments that of the fourth.
;.:;. Both Platonism and Stoicism speak of God's transcendence. but only
with the former is this transcendence radical (or metaphysical) .
.36. Both Stoicism and Platonism refer to God's immanence. but only with
the former is this immanence thorough (or materialistic) .
.:\7. This theme derives ultimately from Plato (especially from his inter-
pretation of the relation between world soul and individual souls in the
Timaeus) yet it is more usually associated with the Stoa.
38. The discussion which follows wiii therefore be arranged partly along
the lines of our earlier discussion of Apuleius. and partly along those of our
earlier treatments of Cicero and Seneca.
THEASCLEPIUS 339
ones, the statements in this treatise regarding the nature of God

have the principal claim on our attention. According to the
viewpoint of earlier Platonism, descriptions of God can be in
the first instance subjective- his nature is explained in terms of
our manner of perceiving him; such subjective descriptions be-
ing positive - God can be perceived by a human being, or
positive and negative - he can be perceived but only in a cer-
tain manner, or negative - God cannot be perceived by a
human being ..i9 The Hermetic text provides us with further ex-
amples of all these descriptions of God, among which the
following should be especially noted. When the writer states
that the first principle is 'intelligible by the mind alone' ,-io he is
emphasizing the possibility of a cognitive approach along the
traditional Platonic lines. When he describes God as the princi-
ple 'which illuminates man with the intelligence of mind
alone~ 1. he is extending the same idea in terms of that
epistemology of illumination which caa be traced all the way
back to Plato's dialogues, although the suggestion that this il-
lumination is a personal act of the divinity is more typical of the
later religiosity. One other text encapsulates the Hermeticist's
entire theory of our cognitive approach to God: 'We thank you.
0 Highest and Supreme One. It is through your favor that we
have obtained this great light of knowing you. You endow us
with intellect, reason, knowledge: with intellectH that we may
W. All these: aspects have been noted in connection with Apuleius. See pp.
266-269.
iO . ..tsclep. 16, 3 I 'i. I '7 mente sola intel/egibi/is.
II. Ibid. 29. 336. 6-7 hominem sola inte/legentia mentis inlumimms. Cf.
ibid . .U ..HI, 20-21 and 4 I, .'\'i3. 2. For the theme of illumination in the
<ircek corpus cf. Corp. Herm. I, 32. 19, 5; IX, 3. 97, 10-11; Xlll. IH. 20H, 5;
;md XIII, 19, .20R. 17 together with F. J. Klein: Die Lichtterminologie bei
Pbilon ton ..tlexand1ien und i11 den hermetiscben Scbriften. Unter-
sucbungen zur Struktur der religiosen spracbe del' bel/e11istiscben M)'stik
!Lcidcn, 1962).
-i2. Sensus = 'intellect'. Comparisons with the Greek version in the
know you, with reason that we may pursue you in our thoughts,
and with knowledge that we may rejoice in knowledge of you
. . . this knowledge of your greatness is alone the reward of
humanity'H. Here, the writer reveals three aspects of the
human being's knowledge of God: first, the association between
knowledge and illumination; secondly, the fact that illumina-
tion- as indicated by the occurrence of words like 'favor', 'en-
dow'. and 'reward' in the text - is dependent upon divine
grace; and thirdly, the division of knowledge and illumination
into definite stages. -H.
S. 212 THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE APPROACHES TO GOD
Elsewhere the Hermeticist argues that, although the doctrine
Papyrus Mimaut and with the Coptic version of Nag Hammadi Codex VI in-
dicate that set~sus represents the Latin translator's habitual rendering of the
original vouc;. See Scott: op. cit. Ill, p. 290; Nock and Festugiere: op. ell., p.
363; Mahe: op. cit. I, pp. 148-149 and 162-163; and Parrott: op. cit., p. 380.
4.~. Asc/ep. 41, 353. 1-355, 4 gratias tibi summe, exsuperantissime; tua
enim gratia tan tum sumus cognitionis tuae lumen consecuti ... condonans
nos sensu, ratione, itlle/legentia: sensu, ut te cognouerimtls; ratione, 111 te
suspicion/bus indagemus; cognitimle, ut te cognoscentes gaudeamus ...
haec est enim humana sola gratulatio, cognitio maiestatis tuae. This
passage comes from the final prayer of the Asclepius and can be compared
with the Greek and Coptic versions. For discussion of the religious sen-
timents expressed see R. Reitzenstein: Die bellenistiscben Myst-
erienreligimlen nacb ibren Grundgedanken tmd Wirkungen, 3. Auflage
(Leipzig, 1927). p. 285 ff. and P. A. Carozzi: "Hoc lumine salvati ltw
(Asclepius 4 I)". Perennitas: Studi in onore di A. Brelicb (Roma, 1980). pp.
ll'i-138 in addition to the works cited in n. 4 2.
+4. There has been considerable discussion concerning the precise
epistemological values of these three stages although the Asclepius, the
Papyrus iHimaut, and Nag HamnUidi Codex VI. 7 all explain them quite ade-
quately in the respective texts. See Scott: op. cit.. p. 291; Nock and
festugicre: ofJ. cit., p. 399: Klein: op. cit .. pp. 17'7-180; and Mahe: op. cit., p.
l.f8 ff.
THEASCLEP/US 341
regarding God can be grasped by an application of intellect

given by the divine, it descends from above with such headlong
rapaciry that it outstrips that application in its swiftness ..f5 This
passage. which connects the simile of a descending stream with
the notion that God can be perceived but only in a certain man-
ncr. should be compared with another. Here, the Hermeticist
states that. since the doctrine regarding God is beyond the ap-
plicttion of human minds, it will flow past or back to its source
without the attentive acquiescence of its hearers. 46 This texr is
of grcar importance in showing that the difficulty of perceiving
God necessitates a revealed rather than a demonstrated
philosophy.
:;.21) THE NEGATIVE APPROACH TO GOD
Finally. the Hermetic treatise stresses the impossibility of a

cognitive approach to God once more along the lines of earlier
Platonism: 'We shall not definitely describe God with any of
these names. For if a word is this - a sound arising from our
breath striking the air, declaring all the wishes or thoughts
which a man has conceived in his mind according to sensible
impressions, something whose entire substance is composed of
a few syllables, defined and circumscribed to permit the essen-
tial communication between speaker and hearer-!"' - then the
-t';. Asclep. 3. 298, 21-299. 2 divinitatis etenim ratio dit,ina sensus inten-
tirme mJsn1ula torrenti simi/lima est fltwio e summo In pronum praecipiti
rajmcitate current/: C/IW efficitur, ut intentionem nostrtlm mm solwn au-
dhlllium tenm1 tre~ctantium ipsorum celeri telocitate praetereat.
t6. Ibid. 19. 318. 12-17 sublimis etenim ratio eoque diti11ior ultra
lmminum mentes intentirmesque crmsistens. si 11011 attentiore aurium obse-
lfl//() rerlu1 loquentis acceperis, trcmstolabit et tmnsfluet aut magis rej7uet
suique se frmtis liquor/bus m iscet.
t~. All the dements contained in this definition are traditional (Piatonk
and Stoic). Sec Plato: Tim. 6""b; Aetius: Plac. IV. 19, I (DG 40~. 22a and b
.H2 MIDDLE PLATONISM
whole name of God includes simultaneously the thought,

breath, and air together with everything which is in these,
through these, or from these. One cannot hope to describe the
creator of all greatness, the father or lord of all things with a
single name however so many syllables it may contain. for God
is without name or rather has every name on the grounds that -
being himself one and all- one must either call all things by his
name or him by the names of all things' .-is Here, the writer
makes a complex argument about human being's knowledge of
God consisting of three stages: first, since a name comprises
conceptual and physical elements which are distinct from one
another. while God has cognitive and physical manifestations
which are inseparable, then the divine nature cannot be com-
prehended in a name.W Secondly, since God is identical with all
things created by him, his essence can be comprehended by all
their names. Thirdly, since a name comprises a limited number
of syllables, while God is infinite in his modes of existence, so
then the divine nature cannot be comprehended in a name.
When the Hermeticist elsewhere invokes the deity's 'single
ff.); Seneca: Nat. Quaest. II. 6. 5. etc. For more parallels see Scou: op. cit. Ill.
pp. 13;\-134 and Nm:k and Festugicrc: op. cit.. pp. 375-376.
48. Asclep. 20. 320. I 5-321. 9 nullo e.\ his no minibus eum definite nun-
cupabimus. sl enim I'O.\' boc est - ex ai!re spiritu percusso smws dec/arcms
omnem hominis roluntatem rel sensum, quem forte ex senslbus mente
perceperit. cui us nominis Iota substantia pauds conposita syllabis definita
atque circumscriptct est, ut esset in bomine necessarium tocis auriumque
commercium - simul etiam et sensus et spiritus et ai!l"is er omnium in his
aut per haec aut de hi.~ nomen est totum dei: non enim spero totius
maiestalis effectorem (mmiumque rerum patrem rel dominum uno posse
quanll'is e muftis conposito nutuuJmri nomine. hunc terrJ imromitwm rel
poilus omnhwminem siquidem is sit rmus er omnia. ut sit necesse aut om-
nia esse eius nomine aut ipsum omnium nominibus nuncupari.
49. For God as nameless in the Greek corpus see CmtJ. Herm. V. I. 60, -1;
lactantius: Dit. blst. I. 6. 4 (CSEL 19. 19. 18) and IV. 7. 3 (CSEL 19. 293. I).
50. For God as many-named in the Grlc:k corpus sec: Corp. Herm. V. 10,
6-1.:\-10.
THE ASCLEPIUS 343
name by which God alone is blessed according to our ancestral

religion' without informing us what the name being invoked
is,-; it is likely that this omission is a deliberate one inspired by
his elaborate theory of naming. Such passages as these are clear-
tv examples of descriptions of God which are subjective - his
~ature is explained in terms of our manner of perceiving him -
and negative - God cannot be perceived by a human being -
according to the criteria suggested earlier.
'S.2211 TRANSCENDENCE
According to the viewpoint of earlier Platonism. descriptions

of God can also he objective - his nature is explained without
reference to our manner of perceiving it. 'i2 The Hermetic
treatise provides us with numerous further examples of this,
among which references to the first cause as 'good' (bonus)'i3
are naturally prominent. The same category would also include
the frequent expressions of his transcendence: he is characteriz-
ed as 'one' (unus, 54 unum)55, as 'complete' (plenus atque
perfectus)56, as 'highest' (summus57, exsuperantissimus)SB, as
51. Asclep. 41, 353, 3-354, 2 nomen unum, quo solus deus est benedicen-
dus religione paterna. This passage also comes from the final prayer of the
Asclepius, and so a comparison with the Greek text of the Papyrus Mfmaut is
possible. In the latter we read that God has an 'unspeakable name' (acppaatov
ovo!la). On the notion of ineffability in the Hermetica see A. D. Nock: 'The
Exc:gesis of Timaeus 28c'. Vigilfae Christianae 16 ( 1962), pp. 79-86.
52. This aspect has been noted in tonnection with Apuleius. Sc:c pp.
269-2-,2.
53. Asclep. R. 305. 10; 20, 321. 12; and 26. 331. 20. Cf. Corp. Herm. II,
l"i.5H.ll;VI,J,72,4-5;andX,3,114,7-H.
::,~. Asclep. 2, 298. 4 and 20, .321. 7. Cf. Corp. J/erm. XVI, 3, 23.3. 1.
5"J.Asclep. 1,296, l0and2,297,23-24.
S6.Jbid. 30,338. 19.
"i-.lbid. 16.315.17and41,353. l.Cf.Corp.Herm. 1.31, 18,9.
58. Asclep. 41, 353. I. The: attribute: 'highest' is absc:nt from the: text of the
corresponding Coptic version.
'infinite' (indefinitum)59, as 'incorporeal' (ab omnibus rebus

eorpulentis alienus)60, as 'lacking quantity' (nee quantus sit
quantitate)61, as 'lacking quality' (nee qua/is sit qualitate,62
quomodo aut quale sit ineertum)63, as 'non-spatial' (ubi et quo
et unde ineertum est)64, as 'beyond the heaven' (ultra
eaelum)6'i, as 'everlasting' (aeternus66, sempiternus)67, and as
'unchanging' (stabile, fixum, inmobile)6B. Perhaps the most
striking feature of these different expressions of God's
transcendence is their almost exact equivalence to similar ones
which occurred in Apuleius.69 This clearly indicates the extent
to which philosophical doctrine has become standardized in the
second and third centuries A.D.
5.2212 IMMANENCE
The objective descriptions of God also include various ex-

pressions of his causality in relation to other things. Into this
category must be placed an important argument which recurs in
several passages of the Aselepius where the creator is said to be
identical with the things created by him. Thus, in the opening
section of the dialogue Hermes Trismegistus declares that, if the
disciple understands the teaching about to be revealed to him,
'5lJ. Ibid. 31. 339. 23. Cf. Corp. Herm. IV. 8, '52, 12 and XI. 20, I '55, 13.
60. Asclep. 27. 332. 11-12. Cf. Corp. Herm. II, 4, .B. 1-2; V, 10, 64, 5-6;
and XI. 16. 154, 1-2.
61. Asclep. 2lJ. 336. 5. Cf. Corp. Herm. XII. 23. 183. 12-13.
62. Asclep. 29.336. 5. Cf. Corp. Herm. XII, 23. 183. 13.
63. Asclep. :\I. 339. 26.
64.1bid. :H. 339. 2'5-26. Cf. Corp. Herm. \'. 10. 64. 13.
6'5. Asclep. 27. 3.U. 10.
66. Ibid. 14. 313. 17. Cf. Corp. Herm. VIII. 2. 88, 2 and XVIII. 9. 252. 3.
6"".Asclep. 14.313.16-17and26.331. II.
68. l"'tl. 30. 338. 16. Cf. Corp. Herm. 11. 12. 37. f and X. l'f, 120, 2.
69. See pp. 269-272.
THE ASCLEPIUS 345
his mind will be filled with all goods. However, it may be more
correct to say that his mind will be filled with the one good
which contains all, there being a reciprocal relation between the
notions of unity and totality: 'All things are of one and the one is
all things since these are so connected with one another that it is
impossible to separate them'. 7 0 It is important to note that,
when the Hermeticist speaks of the reciprocal implication of
unity and totality, he is referring not simply to a relation bet-
ween two concepts- 'one' and 'all'- but to the association of
cause and effect- God and his creation. This is indicated clear-
ly in the later passage where Hermes argues that God can be
described with the names of all the things which he creates -
either hy applying his name to all of them or all their names to
him - 'because he is himself both one and all'. 71 Here we learn
two facts: first, that unity represents God and totality his crea-
tion and secondly, that God can be described as unity or totality
because he is identical with his creation .
.:; . 2 2 13 TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE
The presence of such an ontological doctrine in our treatise

suggests on initial impression that its writer has retreated from
the Platonic doctrine of a God who transcends his creation
towards the Stoic position that he is immanent in it (and in a
sense identifiable with it).72 However, some further texts which
~o. Asclep. I. 296, 11-13 rmmia unlus esse emf unum esse omnia; IICI
enim sibi est utrumque cone.'l:tan, ut separari alterum ab utro non possil.
U Cm11. 1/erm. Xll, H. 1"'7. S; Xlll. 17, 207, IH; Xlll, IH. 20H, 3: and XVI. 3.
2.U. IH-.n.3 . .3.
"'I .hclep. 20 ..U I. 7 siquidem is siltmus et omnia.
~ 2. For the Stoic (or syncretistic Stoic and Platonic) position sec p. 9.3 ff.
(Cicero) and p. 168 ff. (Seneca). Of course, the Stoic doctrine holds that God
is hoth transcendent and immanent. However, the: transcendence is not
metaphysical in this case:. Sec: pp. 96-97 (Cicero) and pp. 170-174 ff. (Seneca).
346 MIDDlE PlATONISM
expand upon the notions of unity and totality show precisely

what the Hermeticist's viewpoint is. In one argument, it is
stressed that God is identical with his creation in the sense that
creation is derived from God: 'For God is all things. and all
things come from him and depend upon his will'.73 The nature
of this derivation is explained in another passage which seems
to distinguish a state before and a state after God's creation as
two temporal phases: 'Have I not said that all things are one and
the one all things, since all things existed in God before he
created all things?'. "4 Such statements would indicate that God
is identical in a primary sense with created things as they pre-
exist in him before their temporal process of creation, and only
in a secondary sense with created things as they exist outside
him after their temporal act of creation.":''; If so, there is obvious-
ly no compromise in the transcendent nature of God's existence
occasioned by the theory. On the other hand, further passages
in the treatise show that we cannot rest content with this simple
reformulation of the problem, since they reveal that the process
of creation itself is not simply temporal. These texts contain the
following clear line of argumentation: (i) creation is the opera-
tion of the divine will. '6 (ii) God's will is unchanging, .... (iii) the
13. Asclep. ;H. 344, 22-23 om11it1 enlm deus et t~b eo omnia et eius omnit1
tolu1lft~tis. Cf. ibid. 2. 298, 3--i .
..,4. Ibid. 2. 29". 23-29H. I mm enim lmc di:~:i. omnia unum esse etunum
omnia, utpote quae in (Tea/ore Juerint omnia. antequam creasset omnia?
Cf. ibid. 14, 3 I 3, "-9.
7';. This pre-existence of created things in God is presumably - along
rr;Iditional Platonic lines- as Forms in the divine mind. For the appearance
of this latter notion in the Asclepius sec pp. HS-350.
""'6. Sec n . ..,3.
"7. !Md. 26 . .'d I. 12-1-i 'For the will of God has no hq.:innin~. It is the
same and as it is eternally. Indeed. the plan of God's will is equivalent to his
nature' (toltmlfiS etenim dei caret initio, quae emlem est et. sinlli est, sem-
piterna. dei enim 1/ctlum nmsilium ('Sf tolunttltis). Cf. Corp. Herm. X. 2.
113. 11-12.
THE ASCLEP/l!S .:\-!7
divine will operates in time,7H and (iv) creation is both unchang-

ing and in time. 79 The conclusion to this argument is not self-
contradictory but merely a statement that the creative process is
neither simply temporal, nor simply atemporal, but of the atem-
poral in relation to the temporal. On this basis, God is certainly
identical in a primary sense with created things as they pre-exist
in him before their temporal process of creation, and in a secon-
dary sense with created things as they exist outside him after
their temporal act of creation. Yet these two identifications are
not completely distinct from one another since the relation of
God to created things is not that of the temporal to the temporal
but of the atemporal to the temporat.so Thus, the divine nature
turns out to be both transcendent and immanent from different
\'iewpoints. Some further texts which expand upon the notions
of unity and totality are only explicable on the assumption that
this is precisely the Hermeticist's viewpoint. In one argument, it
is stressed that God is identical with ltis creation in the sense
that creation is part of the divine: 'not without reason is God
said to be all things, for all things are his limbs' .st The presence
"'8. Asclep. 8, 30S, 12-1 'i For the will of God itself is the highest comple-
tion. since he realizes his willing and completion at the same instant of time'
(toluntas etenim dei ipsa est summa perfectio, utpote cum t.oluisse et
pe1:{ecisse 11110 eodemque temporis puncto conp/eclt). Cf. Corp. llerm. XIII.
19.208, 1-f-l'i .
... 9. Asdep. 20, 321, 9-11 'He is absolutely filled with the fertility of hoth
M:xes: always pregnant with his will and always giving hirth (utraque sexus
fenmditate plenissimus. semper tmluntatis praegmms stwe parit semper).
That creation is both unchanging and temporal was dearly grasped by Scott:
op. L'it. Ill, pp. 184 and 192-193.
HO. That God transcends time (as opposed to hc:ing eternal in time) is not
explicitly stated in the Asclepius, although this notion is undoubtedly im-
plkd hy the essentially Platonic theology expounded there. Cf. Corp. Herm.
XII. 2~. 183, I~- J.i 'there is no time in relation to God' (OUT xp6vo~ 1tEPi tov
96v Eon).
HI . .lsclep. 2. 298. 1-2 nee inmerito ipse diet us est om11ia. cui us membra
sunt omnitl.
.'\48 MIDDLE PLATONISM
of such an ontological doctrine in this treatise indicates that its

author has in actual fact combined the Platonic doctrine of a
God who transcends his creation with the Stoic theory that he is
immanent in it (and in a sense identifiable with it).H2
5.2214 GOD'S CAUSALITY
God's causality in relation to other things is exemplified not

only by the doctrine of unity and totality but also by the
teaching concerning the three principles. Along the lines of the
traditional Platonic doxographies, the Asclepius maintains that
creation takes place through the interaction of God, Form, and
Matter, although there are divergences from the tradition in cer-
tain details.ll.~ Unfortunately, since the Latin translator seems
not to have fully understood the metaphysical theory involved,
we must elicit this doctrine from references which are
somewhat oblique.
5.2215 THE DIVINE INTELLECT
The following passage is of primary importance: 'The whole

intellect, which is similar to the divinity, is immobile but self-
moving in its stability. It is holy. incorruptible. eternal, and
whatever higher attribute is applicable. since it is the eternity of
the supreme God which exists in truth itself, filled with all sensi-
ble things and the whole of knowledge, co-existing so to speak
with God' .H-I Here, an obvious difficulty is occasioned by the
82. This <:ombination of Platonic and Stoic nOiions would not really be
no\'cl, but simply a reflection of tendencies in second-century (and also
e;arlicr) thought.
8.'\. Sec pp. 25 "'-250. The Hcrmeticist uses the: terminology: deus. genera
(species. formae). mundus. That mundus = uA.n is indicated at ibid. 11. 315.
1-5; lL .H5. 20; and 17,515. 2-L
8-i. Ibid. 32 . .Ho. 16-21 omnis ergo sensus dit>i11ilatis simi/is inmobilis
THE ASCLEPIUS 349
Hermcticist's reference not to God's intellect but to the whole

intdlcct.H'i However, the context of the passage suggests that
these two can be identified, since the next few sentences refer
10 a descending hierarchy of intellects consisting of (i) the
whole intellect, (ii) the intellect of the world, and (iii) the
human intellect; while the sentences following these speak of an
ascending hierarchy of intellects comprising a) the human in-
tc:lkct. b) the intellect of the world, c) the intellect of eternity,
and d) the divine intellect, the first term of the descending
hierarchy presumably being equivalent to the last term of the
ascending one.R6 This interpretation might be challenged on the
grounds that, since the Hermeticist refers to the whole intellect
as co-existing with rather than as identical with God, the main
pass;tge must be concerned with a secondary intellect.R7
ipse in stabilitate se commrwet sua: sanctus et incorruptus et sempiternus

est et si tfllid pot est me/ius nuncupari del summi in ipsa ueritate consistens
aetemitas. plenissimus omnium sensibilium et to/ius disciplinae, coll-
.~isi'1/S, 111 ita di.verim, cum deo.
H<;. Aleording to Nock and Festugiere: op. cit., p. 389 omnis sensus =
lotus sensus (an inversion of terms found elsewhere in this text). The Greek
ori~inal will therdore have been 6 nci~ vou~ signifying the divine intellect of
which the intellect of the world and the human intellect are simply participa-
tions. <>ne might add that the expression onmis sensus fits well with the con-
~uhstantiality between the divine intellect and the Intellect of eternity men-
tioned later in the passage.
H6 . .lsclep. 32. ;\40, 21-3-i I. 20. The 'divine intellect' (sensus ... del) men-
tioned :11 the end of this text is clearly equivalent to the "divine mind ...
rla~on (mens ... ratio tlitilltl) discussed at ibid. 15, :\ 12, 7-16.
H~. A. S. Ferguson in Scott: op. cit. IV, p. 423 explained the statement in
anothl'r way. He argued that the Latin translator had confused the original by
running together descriptions of two different intellects: that of God in the
firs! half of the main p:tssage and that of eternity in the second half. His con-
jenure of the Greek original therefore reads: nci~ j.lEV ouv vou~ t(j> lkiq~ [sc.
v(j>]Oj..lOIO<; EOtlV. au-roc; j.lEV aKiVlltOc; wv ev tfj il)i~ OtciO&l tau-rov KlV&i, O&j.l-
voc; Kai t'iq>Oaptoc; Kai aili10~ WV, Kal ti tlVI tlAA(!l KpthtOVI 6v6j.latl
1\EKAftoOat Buvatal. tOU l)t UljliOtOU 0tou EV autfj tfj 'AI..119&i~ &v 6 Aicl>v,
However, since God's intellect is here treated as consubstantial

with that intellect described as secondary in the fuller account
of the hierarchy in the sentences which follow- c) the intellect
of eternity - the apparent reference to the former as coexisting
with God is merely an indication that it can to a certain extent
be viewed as secondary to itself.BH The upshot is that the main
passage can he taken as a statement of the traditional Platonic
doctrine that there is a divine intellect which transcends space
and time,89 contemplates its own contents in a manner accor-
ding with its transcendence,90 and has as its contents the Forms
of sensible objects. 91
7tA11PEOtatoc; 7tcivnov rwv ala811twv Kai 7tciallc; tci~Ewc;, Kai wa7tEp

auvuq>Eatroc; ~Eta tOU 8wu. This interpretation has the :tdvantage of making
the ascending and descending hierarchies agree with one another - both
having the intellects of God and of eternity as the higher terms; it has the
disadvantage of postulating an extraordinary grammatical incompetence on
the translator's part - for example he applies the masculine adjective
plenissimus to the feminine noun aeternitas. Fortunately. this speculative
explanation is unnetessary if one bears in mind the consubstantial relation of
tht two higher intellects.
88. The nature of the relation between the divine intellect and the intellect
of eternity will be explored in terms of several further texts. See pp. 3<;8-361.
89. Compare the reference to the eternal character of the whole intellect.
The Hermeticist does not explicitly interpret this eternily as atcmporality
here. although a later passage seems to indicate what his meaning is. Thus,
referring to the divine intellctt ht writes at Asclep. 32. 34 1. I <;-17: 'One can-
not recognize the slightest image of it in this world, for where everything is
measured by time there arises deception (cui us l'eritatis in mundo ne-
quldem extrema linea umbra dinoscitur. ubi enim quid temporum dimen-
sione dinoscitur. ibi sunt mendacia). That the whole intellect is also non-
spatial would follow from its identity with God. Seep. :H4.
90. Com pan. the references to immobility and self-motion in stability. As
in Neopl:uonism. the atempor:tl and non-spatial t'h:tratter of the divine in-
tellect necessitates that its motion (of thinking or causation) is of a transcen-
dent variety.
91. Compare the reference to the whole intellect :ts being filled with all
sensible things and the totality of knowledge. That its content is the Forms is
THE ASCLEPIUS 351
-;.2216 THE THEORY OF FORMS
Several passages deal with the Forms in such a way as to in-

dicate that the Greek original of the Asclepius entered into an
especially high degree of elaboration at this point. 9.Z It is
therefore a pity that the Latin translator has apparently
obscured much of the meaning with terminological inexac-
titude. '>3 The following represents a summary of this doctrine of
Forms drawn simultaneously from the most important texts
which deal with it:94
(i) The range of Forms. The Hermeticist seems to visualize
Forms of two classes of object: first, the physical elements of
earth. water, air, and fire;9S and secondly, the living species of
gods, demons, men, animals, and plants.96
(ii) The distinction of higher and lower Forms. In several
implkd not only by the terminology itself but by the details of the Hermetic
theory of Forms to be studied below.
92. To the theory of Forms presented in the: L;uin work it is Corpus
Hermeticum XVI which furnishes the most striking parallels. Sec: the follow-
ing passages in relation to each of the categories listed below: (i) Cmp. Herm.
X\'1. R. 2.~-1. 20-235. 2; (ii)/bid. XVI. 9. 235. 3; (iii)/bid. XVI, 17,2:\7. 11-12;
(iv) ibid. XVI. I 5, 236. 18-26; and (v) ibid. XVI, 17. 237. 12 H.
9:~. Sec: Nock and Festugiere: op. cit .. p. 360 (commenting on Asclep. i.
300, i-10) 'Au surplus, toutle passage est tres embrouille, et je doute que
I' auteur se soit compris lui-meme'.
9-!. The main passages are: Asdep. 3. 299 ..'\--!, 300, 18 (text I); ibid. 17.
-~ 16. 'i-18. 318, 2 (text II); and ibid. 34. :H.f, 1.~36. 347. 3 (text Ill).
9'i. IIJid. 3. 299. 131 5 (text I) 'Nature imprints Forms upon matter
through the: four elements' (natura autem per species imagilums mundum
fJerqtulttuorelementa). Cf. ibid. 36. 346. 10-3-!7, 3 (text Ill).
96. Ibid. 4, 299, 19-300, 7 (text I) 'The species of gods produces from itself
individual gods, the species of demons and similarly that of men produces in-
dividuals like itself' (genus ergo deorum ex se deorum faciel species.
de~enumum genus. aeque hom inurn ... sui similes species gener(lt). The: usc:
of these two types of Form follows the tradition of Platonic doxography. See
pp. 290-292.
passages we find a distinction of higher and lower Forms,

although no single text defines what the precise difference bet-
ween these is. The terminology for the two kinds of Form
varies: a) genus is contrasted with species,9' b) genus is con-
trasted with imago, 911 c) species is contrasted with imago.99
Furthermore, both formawo and specieslOl occur in the two
senses. The relation between the two kinds of Form is described
as follows: a) species to individual, 102 b) whole to part, 103 c)
same to different, 104 d) intelligible to sensible, 10; e) incorporeal
to corporeal, 1o6 f) immortal to mortal.I07 A comparison of these
passages indicates that, whichever pair of terms is employed,
the contrast is between both species and individual and
transcendent and immanent Form.
(iii) Association of God and the higher Forms. The agent
through which Forms combine with matter to produce sensible
objects is stated to be God. 1011 Some passa~es associate the latter
97. Ibid. 4. 299. 17-19 (text I) and ibid. 4, .300, 10-12 (text 1).
98. Ibid. 35, 345, 10-11 (text III).
99. Ibid. 17, 3 16, 11-13 (text II) and ibid. 35, 345, 24-:H6, 2 (text Ill).
100. Cf. ibid. 35. 345, 13-15 (text III) and Ibid. 35, 345. 24-346. 2 (text Ill)
-higher Form; ibid. 35, 345, 19 (text Ill) and ibid. 35, 346, 4-6 (text Ill)-
lower Form: ibid. 17, 316. II (text II)- uncertain status.
I 0 I. Cf. ibid. 34, 3H, 20 (text Ill) and passages mentioned in no. 96 and
98.
I02.1bid. 4, 299, 19-300,2 (text I) and ibid. 4, 300,8-18 (text 1).
I 03. JfJid. 4, 299. I 8-19 (text I) and Ibid. 4. 300, 10 (text 1).
10-f.lbld. 35. 315, 11-316. 6(1ext Ill).
I 05. Ibid. 17, 3 16, 12 (text II); ibid. 17. 3 16, 17-:\17. I (text II); and Ibid.
.'\5, 345. 18 (text III).
106. Ibid. 35. :H5. 17-20 (text III).
I 07. Ibid. 4. 300, 8- I 8 (text 1). For the distinction of transcendent and im-
manent Forms in earlier Platonism see pp. 18 I ff. and 293 ff. The
Hermeticist 's use of idea for the immanent Form at ibid. 17, 316, 17 deviates
somewhat from this traditional theory.
108. Ibid. .H. 344, 19-22 (text III) 'This so-called sensible world is the
receptacle of all the qualities or substances of sensible Forms. None of these
THE ASCLEP/l!S
with the Forms in a general sense, 109 although others connect

him specifically with the higher Forms.IIO It is not explicitly
stated whether God actually gives existence to these Forms or
mcrdy presides over their instantiation. Ill
(iv) Association of the god llavtOJ.I.Opq>oc; and the lower
Forms. Just as the God whose operation is localized in the world
as a whole presides over the instantiation of the higher Forms,
so the god whose operation is localized in the zodiac circle
presides over the instantiation of the lower Forms.ll2 The
reason for this is that the relation of higher to lower Form is
thin~s can have life without God' (hie ergo sensibilis qui dicitur mundus
receptaculum est omnium sensibilium specierum qua/ittltum 11e/ cor-
purum. quae omnia sine deo regetari mm possunt). If the ambiguous quae
of the last clause refers to species rather than corpora, then the argument is
that (;od docs not merely preside over the instantiation of the Forms hut a<.-
wally gives them existence. Seen. 110.
109. IIJid. -~- 299. 11-13 (text I) 'Matter has been prepared by God as the
ren:ptade of all kinds of Forms' (mundus aulem praeparatus est a deo
receptaculum omnifonnium specierum).
110. /!Jid. .B. 343. 2-8 (text Ill) 'just as this so-called place outside the
world (if there is such a thing- which I do not believe) would have to be fill-
ed. I think. with intelligible things similar to the divinity of that place. thus
the ~o-called sensible world is filled with bodies and living creatures similar
to ih nature and quality' (sicttfi enim quod dicitur exlrCI mundum, si tamen
est ttliquid (nee istud enim credo), sic babeo. plmum esse inte/legibilium
remm. id est ditinitati suCle simi/lum, ut hie etiam sensibi/ls mundus qui
tlicitur sit plenissimus corporum et Clnimalium 'wturae sue1e el qua/itali
crmtenientium). It is quite clear from the context that the author postulates
two lnds of reality: the 'intelligible world' (intel/igiiJilis mu11clus (ibid. .34 .
.-\H. 1-i )) comprising God and the higher Forms and the 'sensible world' (se11-
siln'lis numdus (ibid. 31 ..HL 19)) comprising matter and the lower Forms.
The implication of the main passage is therefore that the higher level of reali-
ty can only he a realm filled with metaphysical principles, and not a realm of
l'lllpty physical space as visualized in the traditional Stoic doctrine of the sur-
round in~ void.
I I I . S~:e n. I 07.
112./hid. 19.319.1-S.
MIDDLF. PLATONISM
equivalent to that of species to individual.11:\ Since the world as

a whole is unchanging, each Form which its God instantiates
will be unique in its omnipresence; whereas since the zodiac cir-
ck changes in rotation, each Form which its God instantiates
will be multiplied according to spatial and temporal position.t14
It is certainly peculiar to speak of the instantiation of the higher
Forms, since their transcendence would apparently preclude
any combination with matter. But the reason once again is that
the relation of higher to lower Form is equivalent to that of
species to individual. Thus, the instantiation of the higher
Forms signifies their presence as specific characters in in-
dividuals while their transcendence indicates their logical
priority to the latter.
(v) The emanation of Forms. The Hermeticist clearly views
the Forms as dynamic in character, since terms such as in-
fluere, tt 'i dejluere, 116 and cognates often appear in conjunction
with them.
5.2217 THE THEORY OF MATTER
One further passage is important for our analysis. Here, the
113. As argued in section (ii).

11'1. Ibid. 35, 345, 18-346. 6 (text Ill). Cf. ibid. 3. 299. "7-11 (text I). For
the introduction of astrological notions into Platonic philosophy see pp.
269-2"72. The ~krmctidst's usc of these ideas within a theory of individua-
tion is, however, quite unparalleled in earlier sources.
II S. Ibid. 3. 299. 7-11 (text I) 'From all the aforesaid c:1uses which arc
alike ruled by God. a continuous emanation takes place through the world
and through the soul of all species and indi\'iduals. throughout nature' (a
supradictis enim omnibus, quorum idem gubernator deus omnium, fre-
quentalio fertur influens per mundum et per an imam rmmium generum el
omnium specierum per rerum naturam).
116. Ibid. 19. 320, 3--4 'All things arc dependent upon the one and
emanate from it' (e.\' uno etenim nmcta pent/entia ex eoque defluenlicl). Cf.
ibid. 3. 298. '7-9; 5, 301. 2-4; and 19.318. 15-1'7. The emphasis upon
THE ASCLEPIUS 355
writer turns to the consideration of matter which is described as

ungcnerated 'yet having the power to engender and produce in
itself: as equivalent to space - 'that in which all things are,
since they could not exist without it'; as ungenerated 'yet con-
taining all things by providing a most fertile womb for their
generation'; and as a source of evil things - 'that which is
equally productive of wickedness. '117 This text presents con-
siderable difficulties to the interpreter on account of the am-
bivalence of its terminology. In the first place, the statement
that matter is ungenerated could mean either that it has no
beginning in time or that it has no beginning at all (it is not
causally dependent upon another principle). However, another
passage which states that all things can ultimately be reduced to
two principles - God and matter -clearly demonstrates that
the second meaning is intended.tts Furthermore, the assertion
that matter has the power to generate all things could be taken
in several ways, although presumably the way in which God has
the power to generate all things would have to be excluded.
Fortunately, other parts of the text delineate matter's role: its
identification with space shows that it is the cause of all things
in that the latter could not exist without space,tt':> while its
equation with disorderly motion indicates that it causes all
dynamism is very characteristic of the later Platonic tradition. See pp.

2""72""9.
I J"!'. Ibid. 14. 313. 20-314. 22 tamen in se nascendi procreandique vim
.. locum cmtem dico in quo sint mm1ia: neque enim haec omnia esse
fJotuissent. si focus deessel ... itt se tamett omnium naturas habet, utpote
qui his omnibus ad concipiendum fectmdis.~imos sinus praestet ... et
mafiRnitatis eadem est aeque jecrmda.
II H. IIJid. 19. 320, 3-8. The writer argues that one can consider all things
as a plurality or - in the sense that they depend upon a single: cause: - as a
unity. In the: Iauer case one can consider all things 'as one or rather as two'
(/Ilium tef potius clun): in other words as a unitv which is however more cor-
rt'l'tly a duality.
119. Seen. 124.
things by underlying the stability of form as a dynamic

substratum. t.w In addition, the statement that matter is the
source of evil things could mean either that it produces both
good and evil effects or that it produces only evil effects (it is
therefore inherently evil). However, another passage which
states that matter is the vehicle of chance occurrences - ob-
viously involving good and evil -demonstrates that the first in-
terpretation is correct.t2t Finally, it might be argued that the
identification of matter and space is not really intended by the
writer. This is the most difficult point on which to feel certain,
although one parallel text seems to reinforce the interpretation
here proposed.tl2 In conclusion, then, the writer clearly repeats
the traditional doctrine that matter is the ungenerated
substratum, spatial and dynamic, tH of good and evil occur-
rences, despite the obscurities of his principal discussion.
120. Ibid. 17 . .315, 24-316. l. Maner is 'the receptacle, source of motion,

and origin of multiplicity for all things ruled by God' (omnium est recep-
taculum mmziumque agitatio atque frequentatio quorum deus guber-
nator). The whole passage is extremely difficult to construe, although Nock
and Festugiere: op. cit., p . .373 suggest the following as the original: ncivtrov
uno&oxiJ 7tclVT(I)V t'tv KIVtlOEI 7tUKV6tllc;. The termfrequentatio is particularly
obscure but probably involves the notions of motion and multiplicity. See L.
Delatte, S. Govaerts, et J. Denooz: Index du Corpus Hermeticum (Roma,
1977), s. 1'.
121. Asclep. -10 ..~51, 12-2.3. The writer states that 'accident or chanle is
present in all things, blended in their materiality' (eventus autem tJe/fors i1l-
sunt omnibus permixta mzmdan is).
Ill. Ibid. 17, .316, 9-1.3. Space is invisible in itself 'but is held to have a
son of visibility through the Forms alone with whose images it seems to be
impressed' (per enim furmas so/as spec Ierum, qua rum imaginibus tideltlr
insculpta, quasi tisibilis creditur).
123. As stated above. the attribution of these characteristics to matter is
not completely certain. However, it seems reasonable to resolve ambiguities
by appealing to Pl:uo's Timaeus as a parallel. since the doctrine stemming
from that text is a clear ancestor of the Hermeticist's own teaching.
THE ASCLEPIUS 357
<;.222 GOD AND CREATION
There now seems little room for doubt that the traditional
doctrine of the three principles is a fundamental philosophical
motif of the Asclepius. It is also clearly established that two of
these principles are ultimate in the sense that neither can he
reduced to the other, even if some modern interpreters have at-
tempted to find a monistic position expressed.l24 However, the
11-1. Thus, Scott maintained that of the components into which he divides
tht 1n:atise Asclepius I ( 1-14) and Asclepius III (I 6-41) are monistic while
Asclepius II ( 14-16) is dualistic in character. Furthermore. he argued that
e\'en Asclepius II ( 14-16) holds its dualism in a restricted form. See Scott: op.
cit. 111. pp. 82, 87, 123. In accordance with this thesis, Scott suggested that
Asclep. :\. 299. 11-13 (sec n. 109) meant not that God simply ordered matter
hut thai he actually created it (Scott: op. cit.. p. 22); that Asclep. 14. 314, 3-4
.\Iauer is therefore able to produce alone. without joining with another prin-
cipk' (baec itaque sine alieno comeptu est sola generabilis) does not imply
re:llly independent causality on matter's part (Scott: op. cit., p. 87); and that
.t.~clep. 19. 320, 5 (seen. 118) was inserted into the argument by an inter-
polator who misunderstood its real significance (Scott: op. cit., p. 123). Of
toursc. thl' interpretation of these texts along such lines is only possible in
nmjunction with the thesis that the Asclepius is composed of several smaller
lr~::nbes. However, the notion that they expound a monism is held by Scott
to he supported (i) by the presence of the one-all doctrine (Asclep I, 296.
I 1-12 and 20. 321. 7) which seems to contradict dualism; and (ii) by clearly
monistit st:ucments in the Greek treatises (Corp. Henn. Ill, I, 44, 2-3 and
XII. 22, 183, 7-8) and testimonia (Iamblichus: De Myst. 8, 3. 265, 6-7 cf. Pro-
dus: In Tim. l, 386, 10-11). See Scott: op. cit., pp. 10, 22, and 138. In reply
to I his interpretation one must say that the thesis of the Asclepius' composite
structure is if not untenable certainly not demonstrated. Furthermore. the
prestnte of the word receptaculum in Asclep. 3, 299. Il-l:\ indicates that
tht author may be thinking of Plato's (mo6ox11 which has not previously been
intcrprtted as caused by God. In addition. the statement of ibid. 14, 314, 3-4
that mattt:r is an independent source of causality must be taken at face value
in the abst:nce of definite evidence to the contrary. Finally. the notion of an
interpolation at ibid. 19, 320, 5 cannot be maintained without the highly
spt:culative thesis of tht: work's multiple authorship. We must therefore con-
dude that. despite the undeniable existcnct: of monistic tendencies in the
<in:ek trt:uises, the Asclepius remains in the tradition of Platonic dualism.
MIDDLE PLATONISM
doctrine of the three principles represents only one strand in

the more complete fabric of this dialogue, and we must also in-
vestigate the role of various further principles such as Eternity,
Spirit, and the second god. Only some of these principles will
prove to be independent in the sense that they are not simply
aspects of one another, and so it will be necessary to consider
them in at least two distinct categories.I2'i
S.2231 ETERNITY AS GOD
According to the Hermeticist, God and Eternity are the 'prin-

ciples' (primordia) of all things.I26 However, that these two are
not completely distinct from one another is indicated by
passages stating that with Eternity, God contains the Forms of
all things; 12" that 'whether as God or as Eternity or as both or as
one in the other or as both in each' (sive deus sive aeternitas
sive uterque sive alter in altero sive uterque in utroque) he
moves in immobility; 12s and that through Eternity, God con-
12S. The remainder of our discussion of God will he divided up as follows:

Category (i) Principles having a status not independent of God
a) Eternity S.22.31
b) Spirit S.2232
c) love 5 ..2233
Categories (i) = (ii) Principles having a status which is both not independent
and independent of God. Their position is ambivalent.
Fate S. .223i
Category (ii) Principles having :1 status independent of God
a) The second god S.223'i
b) The hierarchy of gods 'i.2236
c) The second god and the hierarchy of gods S.22P
It should be n01ed that 'independent of God' does not mean 'not caused bv
God'- which applies only to maner- but rather 'existing apart from God'.
126.Asclep. 32.340,11-12.
127. Ibid. 32, 340, 17-.21. See pp. 3'i2-353.
128. Ibid. 31, 339. 26-340. 3.
THE ASCLEPIUS 359
trois all processes in the cosmos.t29 These remarks clearly show

that Eternity is not fully independent of God - like the princi-
ple Aici>v in some other Hermetic treatisest3o - although the
nature of this quasi-independence is somewhat obscure. Lucki-
lY, there are other passages which illuminate this question by
ti~scribing Eternity's relation either to the world or else to time,
since not only do the relations of God to the world and to time
and of Eternity to the world and to time coincide but the rela-
tion of God to Eternity is analogous to that of the world to time.
The relation of Eternity to the world is described as follows:
Eternity 'contains' (intra se babens) the world, t:H while the
world 'is vivified by Eternity which is outside it and vivifies
those things which are inside it' (ipse extrinsecus vivificatur ab
aetemitate vivificatque ea, quae intra se sunt).t.u Further-
more. the world 'has been made in the image of the highest God
since it imitates Eternity' (buius dei imago hie effectus est mun-
dus, aeternitatis imitator)133- a statement indicating that the
relations of God to the world and of Eternity to the world are
not separate from one another. The relation of Eternity to time
is described as follows: Eternity is 'beyond the limits of' (sine
definitione) time, t34 and is also 'stable, immobile, and fixed
while the course of time, which is mobile, always returns to
1.29. Ibid. 30, 338, 22-23.

130. The fullest account of Airov is in Corp. Herm. XI, 2 where we have a
slrics of distinct principles- God. Eternity, the world, time, and becoming
- ea<:h of which 'generates (ltm&i:v) the next. Among features which parallel
lhl ..tsclepius arc the notions (i) that Eternity is 'in God' (Ev t!j> 9E!j>), the
world 'in Eternity' (Ev t!j> aici>Vl). time 'in the world' (Ev t!j> K60!l<!l): and (ii)
that Eternity 'is stable around God' (fatllKE ltEpi tov 9e6v) (Corp. Hem1. XI.
2. lt"'. 7-1-iH, 6).
l.H . .lsclep. 31, 339. i-7. At ibid. 30, 337. 20 Eternity is said to be the
'place' (lrJ'11S) of the world.
132. lbifl. .~o ..HH. 3-4. cr. i11itl. 3<>. 337. t9-20.
1.~.~. Ibid. 51, .~39, 7-8.
13-i.lbitl. .31. .Ho. 3--t.
Eternity' (stabilis, in mobilis atque fixa . .. temporis, quod

mobile est, in aeternitatem semper revocatur agitatio).135 Fur-
ther, 'just as Eternity, immobile on its own, seems to move
through the time in which it is, thus even God can be held to
move himself in himself while immobile' (ipsa aeternitas in-
mobilis quidem solt1 per tempus, in quo ipsa est . . . tJideatur
agitari ... sic et deum agitt~ri credibile est in se ipsum eadem
inmobilitate)l36 - a statement revealing that the relations of
God to time and of Eternity to time are in some way equivalent.
Finally, the relation of the world to time is described by saying
that 'the world is the receptacle of time, through whose course
and motion it is sustained' (mundus est receptaculum temporis,
cuius cursu et agitatione vegetatur). 157 This apparently sug-
gests that the relation of God to Eternity is paralleled by that of
the world to time.
135. Ibid. 31. 339. 1113. At Ibid. 30. 339. 1-3 the mobility of time is said
to begin and end in Eternity's immobility.
136. Ibid. 31 ..H9. l-i-20. The whole argument regarding the relation of
Eternity and time is of great subtlety (ibid. 31. 339. 8-18). In brief it runs as
follows: (i a) time is moving, (i b) Eternity is immobile, (i c) since time's mo-
tion is cin:ular it is also immobile in a sense; (ii a) time has a circular motion
from and towards Eternity (held to be a restatement of (i c)), (ii b) Eternity is
Immanent in time. (ii c) Eternity has a circular motion from and towards itself
(resulting from the combination of (ii a) and (ii b)). This argument shows that
the relation between Eternity and time is one containing moments of both
transcendence and immanenl'C: transcendence in (i a) and (i b). immanence in
(ii b), and transcendence: and immanence in (i c). (ii a), and (ii c). Historically
speaking. it represents a combination of the Platonic notion of a transcendent
relation between eternity and time (see Plato: Tim. 37d where the eternity of
the Living Creature is the paradigm of the heavenly bodies' temporal motion)
and the Aristotelian notion of their immanent relation (sec Aristotle: De
Cae/o l, 9. 279a25-2H where eternity is the sum of all time constituted by the
heavenly bodies' rotation). There is no definite literary evidence of the com-
bination of these two texts by the Hermeticist. although either he or his
source has subconsciously made the doctrinal synthesis.
1r. Asclep. 30.338. 11-12.
THE ASCLI:"Pf{fS 361
These passages have clearly revealed that Eternity does not

exist independently of God: indeed, they suggest rather that it is
a certain manifestation of his own highest nature. But what
precisely is this manifestation? In the first place, God as Eternity
transcends the world. This is indicated by his containment of
the latter. since a container must be greater than that which it
contains; it is indicated by the statement that he vivifies the
world jhnn outside; and it is indicated by the aspiration of the
tatter towards him, since the object of desire must lie beyond
the subject. On the other hand, God as Eternity is immanent in
the world. This is also shown by his containment of the latter,
since a container must surround that which it contains; it is also
shown by the statement that he l'ivifies the world from outside:
and it is also shown by the aspiration of the latter towards him,
since the subject of desire becomes progressively like its object.
Thus. God as Eternity is simultaneously transcendent and imma-
nelll in relation to the world.I~H
~.22:\2 SPIRIT AS GOO
The precise status of Spirit is more difficult to determine

since the passages referring to it are extremely brief. At first
sight. these leave uncertainty on two fundamental points: first,
rhe rdation of Spirit to God and secondly, the metaphysical or
physical nature of Spirit.
In nmnection with the earlier question, the Hermeticist does
not express himself as unambiguously as we might like. Thus,
some passages refer to Spirit as that by which all things are
'produced' (miuistrantur), 'vivified' (vegetantur)tW, 'moved'
(tll!,itantur). or 'controlled' (gubernantur)l-fO according to
15H. Tht relation of God as Etc:rnitv to time is of a similar kind. Sc:e n. I ~6.
I W . .lsclejJ. 16. 31 ;, 13-1 'i. . .
lHl./hid.l-.5l'i.22-2-f.
God's design. This leaves it an open question whether we are

dealing with an aspect of God's nature or an instrument
employed by him. Furthermore, the allusion to Spirit as
ungenerated yet having the power to producet.Jt can be
understood in two contrasting ways: either it means that Spirit
is an independent principle distinct from God, or that it is an in-
dependent principle because it is identical with God. However,
some passages clearly suggest that the term signifies not an in-
strument employed by God but an aspect of his nature. Thus,it
emerges that Spirit is 'inherent in God' (inesse deo). H2 or that
God has filled all things with Spirit 'having breathed' (inhalata)
upon each thing according to its nature .I-t.~
The course of discussion so far seems to have provided an
answer also to the second question, for a principle which is
identified with God would need to be metaphysical rather than
physical. t-i-t However, the matter cannot be disposed of quite so
easily since certain passages describe Spirit in a way recalling
the physical pneuma of Stoicism. Thus, it is said to be 'blended
in all things' (jJennixtus cunctis)IH or 'inherent in matter'
(inesse mundo),l46 its role being the determination of 'all Forms
in the world' (omnes in mundo species)147 or 'each thing's
special character' (cuiusque naturae qualitas).l-!H One may
recall that the Stoic pneuma possessed precisely these
111. /hid. li ..~13. 21-22. Ht're, Spirit is declared to ha\'e characteristics

analogous to those possessed by matter.
142./IJid. li, .~13. S-7.
I-!3./IJid. 17. 316, 3--t.
14-t. This metaphysical status is apparently confirmed by ibid. 14. 313. 5-6
'Spirit was inherent in matter, all hough not in the way that il was inherent in
God' (inerat mu11do spiritus, sed 11011 similiter ut den).
I -'iS. 1/Jid. 6. -~03. 5-6.
1.:16. /hid. 1-t. 313. S-6. Mtmdus here dearly signifies matter. Sec n. R3.
147. fiJid. Ji. 315. 22-2.~. Mundus here seems rather to signify the world.
Seen. H'i.
1-iH./hid. 17.316, .~-i.
THE ASCLEP/l!S 363
characteristics of mixture with the passive principle and pro-

duction of the hierarchy of being through degrees of its ten-
sion.l-t9 On this basis it will be necessary to conclude that the
notion of Spirit here represents a transposition of physical into
metaphysical theory. I so
The answers to these two questions provide a reasonable
delineation of Spirit. The first answer indicates that it con-
stitutes an aspect of God, while the second reveals that it
signifies God in an immanent mode .
.:;.2233 LOVE AS GOD
Love is discussed in one passage which is relatively brief but

sufficiently detailed to explain both its relation to God and its
special character. 151
The earlier question is answered by the Hermeticist's
reference to Love as something 'created .and bestowed by that
God who is ruler of all nature' (ex domino illo totfus naturae
deo ... inventum tributumque).IS2 However, with this state-
149. See pp. 101-105 and 113-115.

I <;O. I suspect that the sparing use of Spirit in the philosophical system of
the Asclepius is a sign that its author is aware that many elements in the pure-
ly physical doctrine of pneuma cannot be used. In this respect the treatment
differs from that in Corp. Henn. I. 4, 7. 15ff. where a cosmological process is
described using an elaborate blend of metaphysical and physical ideas. Here.
on the one hand there are concepts like 'intellect' (vouc;) and 'word' (A.6yoc;)
and on the other transformations of elemental qualities, while Spirit is
manifested alternately as 'spiritual word' (7tVEUJ.LQTIK6c; A.6yoc;) and as the cle-
ment of fire. But Scott: op. cit. III, pp. 36-38 holds that there is a similar com-
bination in the Asclepius where he locates traces of the physical interpreta-
tion of Spirit as fire and air. On this doctrine see also Corp. Herm. III, I. 44,
2-9.
I '51. Asclep. 2 I. 321, 18-323, 7. At this point the parallel Coptic version is
also available, enabling us to sec the incre:1sed philosophical technicality of
the Latin Asclepius.
1';2./IJid. 21,322. 11-13.
MIDDLE PLATONISM
ment that Love is created by God must be compared further

assertions that it is an aspect of God's nature. Thus, the
Hermeticist speaks of the union of male and female as an incom-
prehensible mystery I 'i:\ - implying that Love is divine in
character; of 'the divinity of both natures in the commingling of
the sexes' (utriusque naturae divinitas ex commixtione
sexus) I 'i4 - stating explicitly that it is divine; and of God as em-
bracing the fertility of both male and female I 'i'i - indicating
that Love is an aspect of the first principle.
The second question is illuminated in the following ways:
first, Love is described as the means of reproducing to eterni-
ty; I 'i6 secondly, it is explained in terms of the coming together
of the two sexes - it is their 'connection or, more properly
speaking. their unity' (conexio aut, quod est verius, unitas),l 'i7
it is the moment at which each sex passes over into the other's
nature when the climax makes the male weak and the female
vigorous. I 'iH it is their 'commingling' (commixtio); 159 and third-
ly, Love is characterized as an activity of all animal and plant
life.l6o
The implication of these texts is that Love represents an
aspect of God, although it is difficult to draw any conclusions
beyond this. Clearly it does not signify the first principle in its
transcendent mode. since it implies the relation of cause and ef-
fect. However, whether it signifies God in his immanent mode
153.1hid. 21.322. 7; 21,322. 1.3:21. .322, 15; ;md 21.323,3-4.

15-i.lbitl. 21. .323. 3-6.
155. Ibid. 20. 321. 9- I I and 21, .321. 18-19.
l56.1hid. 21. .'\22, I 1-1:\.
I 57. Ibid. 2 I . .32 2. 5-9. The writer adds that it for this reason that one can
,-all the coming together 'C.upid, Venus. or hoth' (site Cupitlinem .~lte
'Venerem site utrumque).
I 58. Ibid. 21. 322, 17-323. 2.
159. Ibid. 21, 323. 5-6.
160. Ibid. 21, .321, 20-21.
THE ASCLEP/l!S 365
or in a transcendent and immanent mode must be left an open

qucstion. 161
:;.22.~4 THE STATUS OF FATE
Despite the significant differences outlined, the principles of

Eternity, Spirit, and Love are similar in possessing a status not
independent of God. With these should be contrasted another
group of principles which are alike in possessing a status which
J(,J. To a great extent this depends upon the interpretation given to God's
bisexuality. On the notion of the 'malc-fem:tle' (appEv69T]A.uc;) sec J. Kroll:
/Jie J.ebren des Hermes Trismegistos (Beitriige zw (iescbichte tier
l'bilusopbie des Mille/alters 1.2 . .2-i) (Munster. 191.~). pp.; 1-S.f; Scott: up.
cit. Ill, pp. 135-1)8; Nock and Festugiere: op. cit. I. p . .20; Festugiere: La
l't'tt!latiml d 'Hermes Trismegiste IV: Le Dieu incomm et Ia gnose. pp. 4 351;
and Fcstugiere: Hermelisme et mystique paienne, pp. 2'57 -260. From the
nidence assembled by these modern scholars. it seems that the notion ap-
pears in at least three contexts: (i) Ancient religions of Egypt and Greece. See
the texts assembled by Scott: op cit. Ill, pp. 135137; (ii) Stoicism. See
l>iogcnes of Babylon in Philodemus: De Plet. 15-17 (DG S48bi4-S50b8 =
SVF Ill Diog. 33): Varro: Logist. Curio fr. 2 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 9 (CCSL
-1-. 19:\-Jl)..j )); and Firmicus Matern us: Matb. V, pr. 3: (iii) Pythagorean ism or
:'1-lcopythagoreanism. Sec ps.-lambl. Tbeol. Aritbm. 53. 21, 4, I. leaving aside
c.atcgory (i) whose position was later interpreted according to the
philosophical views implied by categories (ii) or (iii), it should be noted that
the notion of a bisexual God means something different in category (ii) and
catc.gory (iii) respectively. In the former it signifies the God immanent in the
world. that immanence being inrerpreted as the union of active (male) and
passin (female) prindph:s. In the latter it signifies that God who transcends
and is immanent in the world, the transcendence being represented by the
priority of the. monad (male) to the dyad (female) and the immanence by the
production by the monad of the dyad. Since the Asclepius is a synthesis of
hoth Stoic and Platonic or Pythagorean notions, it is difficult to say which of
thcsl approaches dominates in the Hcrmeticist's mind. The same can be said
of other references to the 'male-female' in later eclectic sources like
Ps Aristotle: nEpi K6o).IOU 7. 40 I b2 ( = Apuleius: De Mundo 37, 372) and
Corp. flerm. I, 9. 9. 16.
is independent in this way. However. before examining the lat-

ter we should consider one principle whose nature is seemingly
of a type transitional between these two categories.
The following passage instantly reveals the ambivalent status
of this principle: 'That which we call "Fate". 0 Asclepius, is the
necessity in all things which occur, each joined to the others in
connective bonds. Fate. therefore, is either the cause of things,
or the highest God, or the god produced as second by the
highest God, or the order of all celestial and earthly things fixed
by divine law' (Quam &iJ.taP~EVTIV nuncupamus, 0 Asclepi, ea
est necessitas omnium quae geruntur, semper sibi catenatis
nexibus vincta; haec itaque est aut ejjectrix rerum aut deus
summus aut ab ipso deo qui secundus effectus est deus aut om-
nium caelestium terrenarumque rerum firmata divinis
legibus disciplina).t62 Two questions must be answered in
order to interpret this rather difficult passage correctly: first,
how many definitions of Fate does it contain and secondly,
what are the historical sources of these definitions? An ap-
proach to the first question is suggested by the apparent con-
trast in the text between (i) definitions of Fate in terms of the
nature of the process, and (ii) definitions in terms of association
with a specific principle.t63 That this contrast is actually en-
visaged by the Hermeticist is indicated by studying parallels to
this discussion in certain other writers of late antiquity: pseudo-
Plutarch, Calcidius, and Nemesius. where an important distinc-
tion is made between consideration of Fate in terms of its 'ac-
162. Asclep. 39. 349, 19-350, 6. Part of this text is preserved in the Greek
by Lrdus: De Mens. IV, 7, 71. 1-4 it tif: Ei~-taPilEVfl tori Kai it Ei~-taptl'J tvpyta
ij autoc; 6 9oc; ij llEt'EKiVfiV TETQYilEVfl Katci 7t<i.VTWV oupaviwv T Kai
tntyEiwv !lEta tftc; tivayKflc; r<i~tc;.
163. In order to simplify the argument I shalllaht:lthe various 'definitions'
as follows: (i a) quam Ei~-taPilEVfiV ... tincta, (i h) effectrix rerum. (ii a) deus
summus. (ii h) lib ipso ... deus. and (i c) omnium cae/estlum ... disciplina.
The reason for my division into type (i) and (ii) is explained below.
THE ASCLEPIUS 367
tivity' (evtpyEta) and consideration in terms of its 'substance'

(ouaia).164 If such a contrast does underlie the structure of our
text, then (i) the definitions of Fate in terms of the nature of the
process can be treated as a single explanation, while (ii) the
definitions in terms of association with a specific principle must
represent separate explanations. 1M On this assumption the se-
cond question can be approached by noting that (i) the defini-
tion of Fate in terms of the nature of its process consists entirely
of elements derived from Stoic theory, since the concepts of
necessity ,166 eternity, 167 connection,16H and order169 are
habitually associated with that of Fate according to Stoicism. On
the other hand (ii) the definitions in terms of associations with a
specific principle seem to involve a combination of Stoic and
Platonic elements, (iia) the definition of Fate as the highest God
being perfectly intelligible according to Stoic theory where it is
simply another manifestation of the Logos or Pneuma, 170 while
(iih) the definition as the second god agrees more with the
164. See Ps.-Plutarch: De Fato I. 158c-d; Nemesius: De Nat. Hom. 38.

7S3Rff.; and Calcidius: In Tim. 143, 182, 5-7. On the doctrinal parallels bet-
ween these three texts see pp. 282-283.
165. That definitions (i a) and (i c) are not really distinct follows from the
fact that hoth refer to Fate abstractly. That (ii :1) and (ii b) are distinct follows
from the identification of Fate with separate principles. The case of (i b) is
problc:matical. although the original terminology dJ.lapti] vtpyEm suggests
that we are dealing with Fate as a process rather than as a principle.
166. See Aetius: Plac. I. 27. 2 (SVF II. 916 = DG 322b6-7): ibid. I. 27. 4
(SVF II. 976 = DG 322a 10-14 ); and Servius: In Aeneid. II. 689 (SVF II. 923).
J(l:'. See Cicero: De Dirin. I. 125-126 (SVF II. 921 ); Gellius: Noel. Attic.
Vll.l,J-.~(SVFII,IOOO);andServius:lnAeneid.III.376(SVFII.919).
168. See Cicero: De Dirin. I. 125-126 (SVF II, 921 ); Servius: In Aeneid. Ill.
~""6(SVF II. 919); and Eusebius: Pmep. Erang. 15. HJ6d (SVF I, 9H).
169. See Actius: Plac. I. 2H, 4 (SVF II, 917 = DG 324al-3); Cicero: De
Dirin. I. 125-126 (SVF II. 921 ); and Nemesius: De Nat. Hom. 37. 7528 (SVF
ll.lJIH).
1""0. See Arius Didymus: Epit. Phl'S. fr. 29 (SVF II. 528 = DG 465. 1-2);
;\68 MIDDLE PLATONISM
Platonic tradition where Fate is sometimes identified with the

world soul. I"' 1
The text setting out the various definitions of Fate only serves
to underline the ambiguity of the notion without providing a
firm delineation of its status. Certain other passages must be
taken into account in order to achieve the latter, and among
these is one which establishes a relation between Fate and the
planetary motions. According to the Hermeticist, for each
celestial motion there must be postulated a higher cause or
'ousiarch' (oucn<ipx.llc;): for the motion of the cosmos as a whole
he posits Jupiter as ousiarch, for that complex motion of the
seven planets he posits 'Fortune or Fate' (fortuna aut
EiJ.LapJ.LEVTJ), and so on.l.,l It is difficult to be sure what the
Hermeticist's doctrine at this point is, but it is probable that Fate
is intended to be a principle independent of the highest God.l73
Another passage to be taken into account in order to deter-
mine the notion of Fate is one where the natures of Fate,
Necessity, and Order are examined. Here, the Hermeticist
argues that these three principles by relating to one another as
inseparable components of the cosmic process 'obey the
necessity of eternal reason (sertiunt necessitati ration is aeter-
nae).li-'~ Although this statement seems initially to reinforce the
view that Fate is a principle independent of the highest God, the
later development of the argument clearly moves in the op-
Seneca: De Benef IV. 7. 1-2 (SVF II, 1024 ); Diugenes Laertius: Vit. Pbi/os.
VII. I ;\';-1 ;\6 (SVF I. 102 and II, ';80); and Alexander of Aphrodisias: De Fato
ll. 191. .'\0 (SVF II, 94';).
171. See Ps.-Plutarch: De Fato 2, S68e; Nemesius: De Nat. Hom. 38.
"1S3Bff.; and Calcidius: In Tim. 144, 182. 16-183. I. On Calcidius' doctrine
see pp. -i"7-i-17S.
172. AsclefJ. 19. :\18, 22-:\19. II. The section dealing with the uusi;~rch
Fate is preserved in Greek at Lydus: De Mens. IV. 7, 70. 23-24.
1"'.~. In this astronomical passage it is clearly Jupiter alone who could
signify the highest God. Fate is contrasted with this Jupiter.
1"1-1. Asc/ep. -tO. 3S I. .~-1-i.
THE ASCLEPIUS 369
posite direction.!"'; Thus, the Hermeticist continues by sug-

gesting that the three principles are 'equivalent to Eternity'
(baec: est aeternitas) because of the continuous circularity of the
cosmic process which they combine in producing.J76 Once
again it is difficult to be certain what the doctrine is, but it seems
likely that Fate is treated ambivalently as a principle indepen-
dent of and not independent of the highest God.
At this point. it is nevertheless reasonable to suggest that a
fairly coherent doctrine of Fate has emerged, since the two in-
terpretations can be identified at least provisionally with parts
of the composite definition furnished by the earlier text. In par-
ticular, the following identifications between these two inter-
pretations and (ii) the definitions of Fate in terms of association
with a specific principle seem to be required. Where Fate is
described in connection with Necessity and Order and shown
by reason of its relation to Eternity to be both independent and
not independent of the highest God, it can be understood as
satisfying the requirements of (iia) the definition of Fate as the
highest God. However, where it is described in relation to the
planetary motions and shown because of its contrast with
Jupiter's relation to the motion of the whole cosmos to be in-
dependent of the highest God, it can be held to satisfy the re-
quirements of (iib) the definition of Fate as the second god.l77
Of these identifications the former is self-evident on account of
the equivalence of terminology, whereas the latter will be
upheld if the source of planetary motions is equivalent to the se-
cond god. Furthermore, that the description of Fate in connec-
tion with Necessity and Order can be understood as fulfilling
the requirements of (iia) the definition of Fate as the highest
I"'<;. In this an:ount of the three principles their relation to Eternity cor-
re'p<mds to their relation to God. God and Eternity are co-extensive.
1-(,. lfJid. -tO, 3'S I. 1-t-22.
I"'"'. See pp. 366-368.
370 MIDDLE I' LA TON ISM
God emerges from the presence of significant Stoic elements in

both cases. That the description of Fate in relation to the
planetary motions can be held to fulfil the requirements of (iib)
the definition of Fate as the second God would follow from the
presence of a mixture of Stoic and Platonic elements in each
case.l7H This last point, however. must be left for a later
demonstration.
The principle of Fate seems therefore to have an especially
ambivalent status within the metaphysical system of this
treatise. since it is described in different passages both as
possessing a status not independent of God and also as possess-
ing a status which is thus independent. Our next task is to ex-
amine those principles which conform entirely to the latter
mode of existence.
5.2235 THE SECOND GOD
In one important passage. the Hcrmeticist refers to 'the God

of highest power who is ruler of one god' (deus primipotens et
unius gubernator del).1 7 9 Although this text presents certain
difficulties of interpretation owing to the survival of a Greek
version which contains a significant variation of meaning, IHO
178. See pp. 366-368.

179.Asclep. 26.330.2-3.
I HO. The Greek text is quoted hy l.actantius: Dit. lnst. VII. I H. 3 (CSEL 19,
641, 2-3) Kai 9eoc; Kai rou TCp<inou Kai i:voc; 9eou cSrn.uoupy6c; . This author
holds that the words tou TCptou (not contained in the: Latin version) indicate
that the second principle is also 'first': in other words that the Hermc:ticist is
postulating a consubstantial relation between the first and second principles.
On such an interpretation the: second god is clearly a transcendent spiritual
principle. Lactantius' interpretation is perhaps supported hy certain passages
in the Greek corpus where the derivation of such a secondary principle is ap-
parently envisaged. See Corp. 1/erm. V. 2, 60, 17 -I H where God is described
as 'not one: hut the: source of one' (oux de;, cl/.)..'aq> 'ou 6 de;. (Comparison with
ibid. II, c;, .B . .f and II. 12 . .'!'"'~ ..,_9 indicates that the: doctrine here is of a first
THE ASCLEPIUS 3'1
since the Latin wording provides a sense consistent with doc-

trines explicitly taught elsewhere in the treatise we may at least
attempt to explain the latter.
The doctrines taught elsewhere are the following. First, the
supreme God is said to have 'created a second god after himself
(a se secundum fecerit) or to have 'produced a first god from
himself as second to himself (hunc fecit ex se primum et a se
seczmdum).lHl The descriptive epithets attached to the latter
principle - that it is the object of sensation, that it is filled with
the goodness of all things, and that God loved it on account of
its beauty - suggest that it represents the physical world.IR2
Furthermore, that this is the case is demonstrated by two
passages elsewhere, one listing three terms: 'God is the first, the
world second, and man third' (deus primus est, secundus est
numdus, homo est tertius), 1 R3 the other stating that the world is
a sensible god.IH4 However, this relatively straightforward doc-
trine is complicated by a second factor, (or in one passage the
writer states that 'the sun itself must be held to be this second
prinl'iplt' transcending intellect and substance giving rise to a second princi-

pk which is intellect and substance)). His interpretation is perhaps also sup-
portl'U hy the phraseology of the Coptic version which here as elsewhere is
closer than the Latin version to the Greek original. However, the wider con-
tnt of the Latin Asclepius itself suggests that the second god is the sensible
cosmos. Thus, the words toii nptou (occurring only in the Greek version)
inllicatc that the second principle is the 'first" in the sense of being the first
prollult of the first principle. On this question see P. Siniscalco: 'Ermete
Trismcgisto. profeta pagano ddla rivelazione nistiana. l.a fortuna di un passo
crmetil"o (Asc:lepius 8) nell' intcrpretazione di scrittori cristiani , pp. 90-93.
I M 1. Asclep. 8. 305, 1 ff.
182./bid. 8, 305,2-8.
183. Ibid. 10. 308, 8-9. Cf. Corp. Herm. VIII. 2, 87, 1-l-18; IX, 8, 99.
15-IH:X. 10, 118,7-IO;X, 12,119. 1-3.etc.
IH-1. Asclep. 3. 299. 3. Two Latin terms are used to signify 'world': (i)
caeltmt (see ibid. 3. 299 ..~; 3. 299. 5: and i. 300, 7), and (ii) mum/us (see
iiJid. 10, .~08, 9; 10, 308, 21; 25, 328. 20; 27. 33.2, -l; anll30. 337, .23). On
another sense of mtmdus (as 'matter') seen. 8.~.
god' (ipse enim sol ... secundum etenim deum bzmc crede).IB'i
What are we to make of this discrepancy?
The answer to this question lies in the association of the
world and the sun according to the Hermetic philosophy. Thus,
that these are not really independent of one another is indicated
(i) by the world's government of all physical processes utilizing
the instrumentality of the sun; 11!6 (ii) by the identity of function
between the two: just as the world is 'dispenser of life' (vitae
dispensator)IB"' so is the sun 'ruler of vital processes' (guber-
nator vitalium); 1ss and (iii) by the analogy of the sun's illumina-
tion of the world and intellect's illumination ofman.IH9 Of these
points the last is especially revealing about the Hermeticist's
philosophical beliefs.
In particular. it is clear that he subscribes to the common
teaching that the world is a 'living being' (animaf),190 and this
implies in its turn that the world consists of a body and a soul.
The latter doctrine is explicitly stated in at least one passage
where God is described as the ruler of the world, its soul. and
the world's contents.l91 Furthermore he assents to the tradi-
tional notion that this soul is 'the container of all sensible
Forms' (receptaculum ... sensibilium omnium specierum), 192
thereby indicating that the principle represents a source of
IR'i. Ibid. 29, .'\36. 16-3.~7. 3. Cf. Corp. Herm. XVI. 6. 234. 4-6: XVI. 12,
235. 25- 236. 3; XVI, 17, 237, 11-14. etc.
186. Asclep. 3. 299. 4-'i and 30. 3:P. 23-338. 2.
IH7. Ibid. 30. 3;\7. 2;H3H. I. Cf. ibid..'\. 299 . ."1-4 and 27. 332,4-5.
lRR.Ibid. 29.337. 12-li.
189. lbitl. 18,317. 1-il'i.
190. Ibid. 29. 337. 'i.
191. IIJid . .'\. 299. 'i-7. The: phrase: meli tem et ips ius emimae here: could
mean either 'of the world and its soul' or 'of the world and the soul itself'.
Howc:\c:r, in hoth cases the reference is to a universal and not an indi\idual
soul. Sc:e also ibid. 2, 298. 12-13 and 3. 298. P -19.
192.1bid. 32. 3-iO, 21-23.
THE ASCLEP/US
knowledge as well as one of life. This epistemological implica-

tion is effectively drawn out in a text where the human
cognitive faculty ascends to that of the world, the world's to
that of eternity .19:\
The last passage, indeed, has yet another significance for our
investigation of the creative activity of the highest God, since
the writer also states that the world can ascend 'to knowledge
of the gods who rank above it' (et deos noscendos, qui supra se
sunt).194 How do these gods fit into the ontological scheme so
far described?
<;.2236 THE HIERARCHY OF GODS
The doctrine of the gods is expounded in a passage couched

in all the terminology of religious revelation. It begins: 'There
are many kinds of gods. and among these some are intelligible
and some sensible19S ... there are gods who rule all Forms, and
these are followed by those whose substance has a ruler. The
latter are sensible gods whose nature reflects their double
origin' 196 (deorum genera multa sunt eorumque omnium pars
llH. Ibid. 32, 341, 9-13. The world soul is des<:ribed with varying ter-
minology: (i) anima [sc. cae/i or mtmdi] (see ibid. 2. 29M, 12; 3. 29H. 19;
and .~. 299, <;-6), (iil sensus mtmdi!sensus mundtmus (see ibid. 32, 340.
21-22; :H. 341. 10; and 32, 342. 2),and (iii) intellectus mtmdi (see ibid. j2,
.~12. 1 ). Regarding (ii) two ohservations are required: first, that sensus is the
translation of the Greek vou~ (see nn. 42 and R<;-R6) and secondly, that
rdlrences 10 the world soul as ljiU"/.J(Iartima and vour:,lintellectus are equally
common in syncretistic literature (see ch. 1, n. 2';<;, ch. I. n. 316 and app .. n .
.~H).
llJ1. Ibid. .U. 342. 1-S.
19'\. Tht: author adds a note saying that we plrcc:ive the intelligihl<: gods
more clearly than the sensible om:s (magis en im ipsos sen tim us quam eos).
IWl. A note is added that the sensihle gods accomplish ;til things in sensi-
hk nature, acting one through another' VJer sensibi/em rwturam conficitmt
om nit~, lifter per alterum):
.374 MIDDLE PLA TONIS~I
intellegibilis, alia vera sensibilis . . . sunt ergo omnium

specierum principes dii. hos consecuntur dii, quorum est
princeps ouaiac;. hi sensibiles, utriusque originis consimiles
suae).19"' Various interpretations of this highly compressed
statement have been proposed, but according to the most
plausiblt: reading it provides the following facts: (i) There are
two orders of gods: (a) intelligible and (b) sensible;l98 (ii) The
nature of (a) is further characterized by their association with
the distribution of Forms; 199 (iii) The gods of group (a) have a
relation of priority to those of group (b) in that they govern
their substance;2oo and (iv) The nature of (b) is further defined
by a combination of intelligible and sensible elements ..!oJ The
passage continues: 'The ousiarch of the world is Jupiter ... the
ousiarch of the sun is Light ... the ousiarch or ruler of those
twenty-six known as the Horoscopes is the god called Pan-
tomorphos or "All Form" ... the seven planets have as their
ousiarchs or rulers that which is called Fortune and
Heimarmene ... the ousiarch of air is the Second ... '.!02 (caeli ...
197./bid. 19,318,5-21.
198. Festuglere: Henm!tisme et m;stique paienne, p. 12S suggests the
possibility that the intelligible gods are distinct from the ousiarchs to be men-
tioned below. This would follow from understanding specierum principes
dii as 'gods who rule (are prior to) substances (transcendent substances)'.
these latter being interpreted as equivalent to the ousiarchs. However,
Fcstugiere: op. cit .. p. 12S, n. 19 and 128, n. 30 rightly rejects this com-
plicating factor not supported elsewhere by the text. In short, it seems clear
that (i) specierum principes dii, (il) princeps ouaia<; (accepting the likely con-
jecture ouaia(<;) of Ferguson), and (iii) ouauipXTJ<; all refer to the same thing
or things.
199. These will he immanent ami not transcendent Forms.
2011. This substance will correspond to their immanent Form.
20 I. That the phrase utriusque originis cons/miles suae indicates that the
sensible gods are constitmed (i) by their dependence upon the intelligible and
(ii) by their association with a material body is convincingly suggested hy
:-.Jock and Festugiere: op. cit. II. p. 375.
202. On the meaning of 'ousiarch' (oumapxTJ<;) see FestugiC:re: Hernu!tisme
THE ASCLEPIUS 375
ouauipxTJ~ est Iuppiter ... so/is ouauipxTJ~ lumen est ... XXXVI
quorum vocabulum est Horoscopi . .. horum ouauipxTJ~ vel
princeps est, quem navt61J.opq>ov vel omniformem vocant ...
septem spbaerae ... babent ouauipxa~. id est sui principes,
quam fortunam dicunt aut EiiJ.apiJ.EVTJV . . . aer vero . . . est
autem ouauipxTJ~ buius secundus . .. )203 From these remarks
the following additional information is obtained: (i) Various
specific examples of (a) intelligible and (b) sensible gods are
given; and (ii) the gods of group (b) are shown to be
astronomical in character.
Modern scholarship has rightly compared the Hermeticist's
theological schema with similar systems expounded by late
Platonic writers - Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Sallustius.2o4
Although the latter often differ in detail, they frequently contain
the two fundamental aspects of the Hermetic hierarchy of gods:
first, they contrast groups of intelligible and sensible gods and
secondly, they establish correspondences between particular in-
telligible and sensible gods.2oc; That the Hermeticist's
theological doctrine agrees with the teachings of such
etmyslique pt~ienne, pp. 127 130. The writer instances some important texts
of lamblichus' De Mysterits which speak of the relation between intelligible
'ctust's (npxai) and the sensible: 'substances' (ouaiat) which they govern. Sec
/Je .~~~st. VIII. I, 260, 14-16 and Vlll. 5, 268, 6-8. These parallels are
\'alidatt'd by the fact that lamblichus is throughout this discussion referring to
thl' Egyptian or 'Hermetic' philosophy. The only difference between
lamblichus and the Latin writer is that the latter interprets oua!a + npxit as
suhst;mct ... ruler' rather than as 'substance ... caust''. Sec Fcstugicre: op.
cit .. p.l21.n.2.
l.O!t.Asclep. 19.31H,22-319,11.
204. See Festugiere: op. cit., pp. 123-125 where parallel texts are listed
and ~ummarized. For our purposes the most interesting among these an~
ptrhaps Porphyry: De Regr. Anim. fr. 6, 33" 7-34" 26; fr. 8, 36" 'i-37" 6:
and Sallustius: De Diis et Mundo S. 10, ; . 6, 12, 23. For the lamblichean
parallel seen. 202.
l.O'i. Fcstugicre: op. cit .. p. 126.
Neoplatonic writers is probably the result of a single influence

over all concerned - the so-called Cbaldaean Oracles.
The validity of these parallels is strengthened by the in-
vestigation of such items of further theological doctrine as are
scattered elsewhere in the treatise. Thus, one passage seems to
make another allusion to the gods of group (a) when it suggests
that the highest gods have 'intellect' (sensus) as their souJ.Z06
This would be consistent with an intelligible status. Other texts
provide further information about the gods of group (b): that
the supreme God has created them,Zo7 that they are constituted
of the purest physical substance,zos and that they inhabit the
celestial regions.Z09 A further passage refers to the dwelling of
the god Pantomorphos in the zodiac according to whose rota-
tion each 'Form' (species) generates 'individual instances'
(imagines).2 10 This implies the relation of an intelligible to a
sensible principle. Finally, there is another item of theological
doctrine which does not strengthen the earlier parallels so much
as it extends the system itself. Thus, one passage refers to Jupiter
who occupies a station between heaven and earth from which
he dispenses life to the various kinds of animate being.z11 This
god may perhaps be the ousiarch of the air whose name was
omitted by the mutilated text of the theological summary.z1z
206.Asclep. 18.317,21:\18.2.
20""./hid. 23. 32'i, 7-H.
20H. /IJid. 22, 321, 6-"" and 23 ..U'i, IH-19. This pr~sumahly rd~rs 10 their
predominantly fiery composition.
209. /hid. :\H, 319.9-10.
210. ibid. 35 ..:\45. 22-24. s~e pp. 353-354.
21 I. /hid. r ..'\:\2. 12-1.~. Th~ text goes on 10 sp~ak of a further 'Piutonian
Jupiter' (/uppiter Pluton ius) who prcsid~s onr earth and s~a.
212. Fcstugiere: op. cit .. p. 12'i.n. 20 and Nock and F~stugier~: op. cit. p.
:\H-t both obser\'c that the Jupitcr(s) mentioned in this passag~ arc sensible
gods contrasting with th~ Jupiter of Asclep. 19, 31 H. 22-23 who is an intdligi-
hlc one. llowenr. Scoll: op. cit. Ill. pp. 107-110 argu~s with equal plausibili-
ty that th~ Jupiter(s) of th~ lat~r passag~ arc int~lligiblc gods equivalent to the
missing ousiarchs of the earlier one.
THE ASCLEPilfS 377
.:;.2237 THE SECOND GOD AND THE HIERARCHY OF GODS
So far we have examined the accounts of the second god and

of the hierarchy of gods as though they were totally indepen-
dent Hermetic theologies. This is justified inasmuch as the
respective descriptions occur in separate sections of the text,
while the account of the second god makes no reference to any
other gods and that of the hierarchy speaks of no god as second.
However, it is impossible for the modern interpreter of this
philosophy to avoid asking the question: how do the two
theological accounts relate to one another?21:\
The careful re-examination of passages previously noted
lt:ads to interesting results. In particular we must conclude that,
since both the world and the sun are described as the second
god in one account, while they represent the first and second
members of the series of sensible gods in the other, then the
world and the sun are second either (i) because the (intelligible)
21:\. The following diagram will assist the distussion here:
IJI:'f :s = DEUS SECUNDUS =
Juppiter Caelum
2. 1./111/('11 Sol
Pa ntrnnorpbos 1/omscopi
lleimarmene VII Spbaenll'

--------------
(luppiter) Secundus
--------------
<>n the lJUestion of luppiter see aho\'1:. If !uppiter P/utrmlus is also to he in-
duul'll in the sd1ema. then a sixth pair of intelligible and sensible gods must
hl adlku.
~78 MIDDLE PLATO:'IIISM
Jupiter is the first and the (sensible) world the second god,ll-i or
(ii) because the (sensible) world is the first and the (sensible) sun
the second god_ll'; However, there are obvious drawbacks since
with (i) the (intelligible) Jupiter considered as the first god, the
sensible sun cannot be described as second but only as third;
and with (ii) the (sensible) world considered as the first god, the
(sensible) world cannot also be described as second but only as
first. Perhaps the only solution, then, is to consider the series of
intelligible gods as a whole as the first god so that either the
(sensible) world or the (sensible) sun can be described as second.
This brings us to the further conclusion that, since both the
world and the sun are described as the second god in one ac-
count. while representing the first and second members of the
series of sensible gods in the other, then the world and the sun
arc both second either (i) because the (sensible) world and the
(sensible) sun are not completely distinct from one another, or
(ii) because the members of the series of sensible gods as a whole
are not distinct from one another. Of these solutions it is (ii)
which seems to he the most compelling since it not only treats
the relations between all members of the series of sensible gods
identically but it considers those relations as analogous with
those obtaining within the series of intelligible gods.
That the series of intelligible gods as a whole can he con-
sidered as the first god and the series of sensible gods as a whole
as the second god is an interpretation which is further sup-
ported by certain minor features of the account. Thus, regar-
ding the intelligible gods, the fact that Jupiter occurs more than
once suggests that the members of the series are not completely
distinct from one another,l16 while the identification of one
211. following thl' horizom:tl sequenn: in the diagram.

2 I';, Following the vertical sequence in the diagram.
216. See p. ~ 76. This might also be suggested by the author's apparent
hesitation on the question whether the seven spheres have one or two ousiar-
chs. Sle pp. P~-~7<;.
THE ASCLEP/US 379
member of the series as Heimarmene indicates that they really

constitute elements of the first God.217 Regarding the sensible
gods, the fact that the sun must occur twice suggests that the
members of this series are not totally separable from one
another,218 while the interpretation of each member of the
series as a celestial motion indicates that they actually represent
elements of the world soul.219.
If this doctrine has been correctly construed, an interesting
metaphysical position emerges: that there is a supreme God or
intellect consisting of a unity in multiplicity which gives rise to
a second god or soul similarly constituted. The most striking
element in this system is the notion that these first and second
principles are unities in multiplicity. Clearly such a viewpoint is
heavily influenced by both Platonism and Stoicism: by the
former in the contrast of the highest God or intellect and the se-
cond god or soul, and by the latter in the notion of a unitary
force underlying the perceived differentiation.220
~.31 THE THEORY OF MAN
The theological doctrine of the Asclepius is therefore one of

considerable complexity and enormous interest. However,
even if this represents the major teaching in the treatise, it by no
means constitutes its only teaching. We must therefore turn to
an anthropological doctrine which complements the
theological one with some strikingly original ideas. In this
respect it provides a notable contrast to the philosophy of
217. Seep. 368.

218. See pp. 373-375. The sun appears as a separate sensible god although
it must inevitably figure also among the seven spheres.
219. Sec p. 372.
220. The Stoic aspects of the theory are explored skilfully by Scott: op. cit.
pp. I 0.,115, although the interpretation of 'substance' (ouaia) there propos-
ed is rightly criticized by Fcstugiere: up. cit.. pp. 126-127.
Apuleius according to which man's separation from God is

mediated by the demons. In the Asclepius it is rather a case of
the material world's separation from God being mediated by
mankind. As we shall see. this difference from the Apuleian
viewpoint is occasioned by the greater prominence of Stoic
writers among its sources.
5.32 MAN'S NATURE
The Hermeticist's teaching is that _man has been created by

God with_ t du<!l n~tyr_e:221 he possesses a divine part and a
human part,Hl an eternal part and a mortal part,223 a psychic
part and a bodily part,22i a 'substantial' part and a material
part_llt; These dichotomies constitute a general analysis of
human nature underlying the whole treatise- th~_appear to
be equivalent to qn~ _'!QQther in most respects - although in
some passages the characters of the two parts are explained in
greater detail. Thus, the writer argues that 'one part of man is
221. Asclep. 7, 301. 2 'man is double' (homo duplex est); ibid. II. 309. 5-6
'that double entity which is man' (id utrumque, id est homo); and ibid. 22,
324. 18 'God made him of both natures' (ex utraque natura amposuit). At
ibid. 22, 323. 2S the writer states that man has been constituted of the two
natures 'in equal proportion' (pari fa11ce).
222. For ditina see ibid. 10. 309, .~; 22, :U3, 2S: and 22. 32-i, 18; and for
hwmma, ibid. S. 302. 3.
223. For aetema see ibid. 8, 306, 4; and for mortalis, ibid. 8, 306, 4; 10 .
.'\09 ..~:and 22.324. 19.
22i. For animus/corpus see Ibid. 6, :~02, 20-303. 5 and H. 306, 2-S.
22S. for oucnti>ST]c;/uA.tK6v- mundammz sec ibid. 1. 304. 2-6 and 8, 305.
I S-:\06. 2. Scott: op. cit. pp. Hand 49 is quite correct in noting that the term
oucnti>STJc; carries a Plawnic connotation here, for the writer is speaking of the
nmjunction of intelligihk (substantial) and sensible (phenomenal) in man.
This Platonism underlies all the forms of the present dualism. However, hy
the same token Scott: op. cit. pp. H7-148 cannot be supported when he
argues that ibid. 22 ..U3. 2:~32-L 4 refers only to the conjunction of higher
and lower kinds of matter.
THE ASCLEP/l!S j81
simple: that which the Greeks call "substantial" and we "form-

ed in resemblance of the divine'', the other part quadruple: that
which the Greeks call "material'' and we "mundane" '.226
Here. the lack of division in the spiritual part is contrasted with
the multiplicity of the material. Elsewhere he states that
'through t})atpart by which..he-is diviru:, consisting of soul, Ln.-_
tdle.ct, sgirit. and reason as certain superior elements, he can as-
cend to heaven; while through that material part, consisting of
fire. earth, water, and air, he remains attached to the earth'.227
In this text the spiritual and material parts are divided equally
and with some degree of structural parallelism clearly intended.
Again. the writer argues that 'one should perceive man to be
composed of four elements in each part: of the hands and feet in
two pairs with which together with other bodily parts he at-
tends to the lower or earthly world; of those four faculties of
soul, intellect, memory, and providence with. which he
understands and contemplates all divine things' .228 Here, the
spiritual and material parts are also divided equally and accor-
ding to a similar parallelism, although the respective elements in
22Cl. ll>id . ...,_ jOi. .2-6 et eius una fUll'S simplex. quae. ut Gmeci aiunt.
oumw&n<;. quam tocamus ditinae simi/itudinis formam; est autem
quadmplex, quod i/AtK6v Graeci, nos 111/IIUitmum dlcimus. For the Platonic
smse ofoumw&n<; sec: also CmtJ. Herm. 11. 'i. j3. 5--J: IX. 'i. 98. 13-1": and
XIII. II. 206. 12- U.
2r . .-lsclep. 10, 308, .23-309. I parte. qua ex anima et sensu. spiritu at-
Cflle raliflllf! ditilllls est. te/ut ex e/ementis superioribus. inscendere posse
l'ideatm in L'tle/um. parte tero mundana. quae constat ex igne et terra,
aqua et ai!re, mortalis resistat in terra.
228. 1/Jid. II. .~09. 2j-_'\ 1o. 3 quatemls eum utriusque partis elementis
cminuulterte esse formatum, numibus el pedibus utrisque bi11is a/Usque
nntmris memiJris. quibus inferior/, id est terreno, mmulo desertiat, i/lis
teru fJartilnts qua/tum anlmi, sensus. memoriae atque prol'identitte,
Cfltarum ralio11e cu11cta ditina norit e1tque suspiciCit. A more: c:laburatc ac-
l'oum of the: rc:lation between c:lc:mc:nts in the higher and luwc:r parts occurs
at Cflrp. 1/erm. I, 1'7. 12 . .20-13. 2.
the two parts differ in comparison with the previous text. Final-
ly. in certain passages the Hermeticist turns from the various
conceivable subdivisions of human nature - which are com-
plementary but not equivalent to one another - to focus upon
Jhe character of the higher part alone. ThY.s. . . b~Jnforms us that
fhe~!oit--ot'-inte!,!et -d~~ends as far as .its twm~ in
h~229 that-7~J:l.QJ_m~.d~JiJ,lJlle.cLtn . ~ror despite its
(~ion with rhe marerjat .z.~o and that its divine character con-
trasts with the purely human intellect based upon the memory
of earthly events.Ht
5.33 MAN'S FUNCTION
That man should have his nature constituted in the way

described follows from the role which God has assigned him
within the order of things. The Asclepius explicitly raises the
question of man's purpose,2:\2 and this is answered as follows.
First, his Quty is._tC? combat the vice resulting from the resence
---
of a materiaLelemciJTinJHs-namre:n3fhis
- -
~ ~----
vice is characterize
as so envious of the immortality denied to it that, by distracting
us from contemplating the true causes of things through an ex-
cessive curiosity regarding the differences, qualities, and opera-
tions of the phenomenal world,l:\4 it strives to encompass man's
229. Asclep. 32 ..HI. 2-:~.

230./bid. 18.317, 18-21.
231. Ibid. ;U, 3~0. 23-341. 2. Cf. ibid. 32. ,:1,41. 6-9.
23.2. Ibid. 7, 30~. 11-13 'Why was it necessary. 0 Trismegistus. that man
should he established in matter rather than live with supreme blessedness in
the region inhabited hy God?' (Quid ergo oportuit, o Trismegiste, bombrem
in mundo constitui et non i, ea parte. qua deus est, eum in summa
beatitudine degere?)
233. Ibid. 11. 310. 8 'retarded by the weighty and excessive vice of the
body' (retarde~tus rero grm.i et nimio corporis rilio); ibid. 22, 324, I 'the
vices blended with bodies' (vitia corporibus commi.:l.'la); etc .
.2;\4. Ibid. II, 310.6-lOand 12. _:1,11, 15-16.
THE ASCLEPIUS .3B.'\
forgetfulness of his higher nature. The means of combating it is

the reason or understanding with which God has equipped man
precisely for this purpose.235 All this clearly implies a negative
assessment of the material element's role.236 Secondly, man'_s
duty j~~t_i~!Y ~he; obliKations imposed by his double origin:
namely to a(_lmire.arulworship heavenly things and tQ cultiv..ate
andadmfnister the ear_thly' .237 This precept requires of man that
he should devote himself to the twin tasks of religious obser-
vance - God's first purpose was to fashion another living
creature who would be able to contemplate his good works23K
- and practical arts - his second purpose being to create a
world which would be ennobled by the presence of agriculture,
architecture, institutions, and so on. 239 Of course, these tasks
ar~ not jndependent of one another, as indicated by the fact that
man imitates the divine reason and activity themselves in his
practice of the arts.z4o All this suggests the complementary
positive view of the material element's role.z4t Thirdly, man's
-----
235. Ibid. 16, 315. 5-9 'intellect, knowledge, understanding ... only with
these . . . can we avoid the deceit, treachery, and vices of evil' (sensu,
disciplina, intel/egentia .. . hisce enim rebus ... so/is possumus ma/ltiae
fraudes. do/os vitiaque vitare). Cf. Ibid. 22. 324, 13-16.
2;\6. See n. 24 I.
Ibid. 8, 306, 4-7 ut ... utraeque origini suae satisfacere possit, et
2.-\"".
mirari at que adorare cae/estiCI et inco/ere atque gubenwre terrena.
238. Ibid. B. 305, 9-12 'Therefore, since God was great and good, he wish-
ed to create another who would be able to contemplate that which he had
generated from himself' (ergo, ut tantus et bonus, esse voluit a/ium qui il-
Ium. quem ex sefecerat, intueri potuisset). Cf. ibid. 9. 307, 1-5.
239.1bid. 8. 306, 10-17.
2'10. Ibid. B. 305, I 1-12 At the same time. God made man as an imitator of
his reason and conlcrn for things' (simu/que et ratirmis imitatorem et
diligentiae fctcit hominem).
2-i I. The present treatise takes an ambivalent position regarding the nature
of mauer: in some texts (see nn. 233-235) it is negative and in others (see nn.
238-240) it is positive. The negative viewpoint predominates in Numenius
dut is to manufact lacing statues in the temples

which can serv~ as rar.thl--Pl~~es of. habitation for the 1vme
for~e~242.'fh"i-;-is possible because these gods are constituted oTa
dual nature and, although man is incapable of fashioning the
higher part, he can e~_<;lViQe_~he material el~ment_which is tO be
conjoined withit.l43 In his manufacture of these gods especial-
ly. man is understood to be imitating the divine creative pro-
cess.H
(see Numenius: fr. 52 (Caki<.lius: In Tim. 296,298. 13-297, 299. II) 'God is.
as Plaw maintains, the beginning and cause of goods, matter of evils ... and if
the world arises from matter. it is surelr made from a nature which was
formerly evil' (Deum quippe esse - ut etiam Platoni 11idetur - initlum et
causam bonorum, si/tam malorum ... Quod si mundus ex silva, certe fac-
tus est de existente olim natura maligna)). The positive viewpoint reflects
the Stoic position (see Cicero: Cato Maior 77 'I believe that the immortal
gods scattere<.l souls into human bodies, so that there might be those who
might tend thl' earth and contl'mplate the heavenly order' (credo deos inmor-
tales spars/sse mtimos in cmtmra lmmcma. ut essen/ qui terrtts tuerentur
quique cae/estium ordinem contemplantes ... )). A similar ambivalenet: oc-
curs in the: Greek Hermetic treatises: for thl' negative: view see Corp. Herm.
VI, 3. 7'1, 6-10: VI, 4. 74, 17-18; and VII, 3. 82,4-6, etc. and for the positive
i!Jid. VI. 2 ... ;\, I 1-12; IX, 4. 98. 4-7. etc The tt."nsion between pessimistic an <.I
optimistil' views of the cosmos in the Hermetictt has been exhaustively
studied hy Festugierc: La retelflfirm d'Hermes Trismegiste ll: Le Dieu cosmi-
que. pp. x-xiii and pe~ssim who traces both tendencies ultimately back 10
Plato.
242. Asclep. 3 7. 34 7. 8-10. Cf. ibid. 2.-\ ..US, 8-1 I.
243. ibid. 23. 325, 20-326, 2 'The forms of the gods which man makes are
composed of two natures: of the divine which is purer and much more
divine. and of that which occurs among men - the matter' (species vero
tleorum, qutts conformal humanitas, e:r: utraque 11t1tura confonnatae sunt;
ex ditina, quae est purior multoque ditinior, et ex ea, quae intra homines
est, id est ex materia) and ibid. 37. 347, 15-18 'Since thev were not able to
fashion souls, they evoked the souls of demons or angeis ami introduced
them into their statues with holy and divine rites' (quoniam animasfacere
mm poterant, etJocatlles ttnimas daemmrum 11el a,ge/orum eas indiderent
imaginihus sanctis ditinisque mysteriis). For further details of this theory
see ibid. 24, 326, 10-15 and 38. 349. 9-1 S.
2'14. Ibid. 23. 325. 6-10.
THE ASCLEPIUS 385
1 ..H MAN'S DESTINY
The effectiveness with which he performs his special func-

tion within the world has a definite impact upon the status of
man's soul in the afterlife for, although every human soul is im-
mortaJ,2-t'i this immortality takes different forms or arises at dif-
ferent times depending upon the nature of its earthly con-
duct.2-t6 The meaning of this qualification is not explained in
detail. but the Hermeticist seems to envisage distinct grades of
immortality. Thus, he speaks of a 'hope of future eternity'247 on
the one hand, apparently referring to a status after death which
only the virtuous will achieve; and of 'eternal punishment'24H
on the other, thereby indicating the status after death which
wiii accrue to the impious. The assignment of the human soul to
one or other of these destinies will be made by a supreme
demon operating as the agent of God. 249 His will be the decision
whether an individual will be restored as pure and holy 'to the
21 'i. Ibid. 2, 297. 17-18 Every human soul is immortal' (omnis humana
inmortalis est anima). The statement reads like a translation of Plato;
Pbaedr. 2..j 'ic 'All soul is immortal' (IJIUX~ ndaa a9civato<;).
216. Asclep. 2, 297, 18-19. Cf. ibid. 25. 329, 5-8.
21"'7. Ibid. 12 ..HI, 8-9 futurae aetemitatis spes. Cf. ibid. 22 ..'n4. 16 and
ibid. 29 . .~:\6, 10-11.
218. Ibid. 28. 335. 2 aeternae poenae.
219. /hid. 28, 334. :\-6 'A~ soon ;ts the soul has departed from its body, it
will pass for judgment and examination of its worth into the power of the
supn:me demon' (cum fuerit ani mae e corpore facta (/iscessio, tunc ar-
fJitrium e.\'amenque meriti eius trm1siet in summi daemonis potestatem).
This passage is one of the few in which demons enter in a structurally signifi-
ctnt way into our writer's system. The reference to a .mmmus dmmwn -
which is not paralleled in the Greek version of the same passage in Lydus; De
.Hem. 1\', 149. 167. I 7-21 -is interpreted hy :'~Jock and Festugicre: op. cit ..
p. -~85 as applying to Mithras. Whatever the identity and role of this divinity
b. then.- is no doubt that he operates strictly under the control of the supremt
<;od, who is ebewhere stated to determine the destiny of souls. See nn. 250
and 251.
nature of its highest part' ,Ho or whether he will be subjected to

a 'migration into other bodies foul and unworthy of the holy
soul'. 2s I This account perhaps explains the meaning of the
qualification mentioned earlier, for the soul of the virtuous will
enter into the transcendent eternity around God himselfl52
whereas that of the impious will enjoy the immanent eternity of
an endless cycle of transmigration.2H
5.35 CONCLUSIONS
From the passages examined it is reasonable to conclude that

the anthropology of the Asclepius differs significantly from that
of second century Platonic writers. The doctrine of man's role
in the order of the world especially constitutes a shifting of em-
phasis. Thus, in place of the Platonic view that man's relation to
the physical world should become transcendent, the Hermetic
writer exalts his immanent relation to the world beneath him. In
one passage he states that if man discharges the task assigned to
him 'he will bring it about that he will be an ornament to the
world and the world an ornament to him; that as a result of this
divine composition of man he will be called a world or more
correctly in Greek a "kosmos" ' (efficit ut sit ipse et mzmdus
uterque ornamento sibi, ut ex hac hominis divina conposi-
tione mundus. Graece rectius K60IJ.O<;, dictus esse rideatur).2">4
250. Asclep. I I. 310, 25 naturae superiuris partis. In this passage God is

implied w be the agem of restoration. Cf. ibid. 12, 311. 4-S and F. :H7,
25-5-IH, I. On the vision of the blessed in the Greek corpus see Cm1J. 1/erm.
X, S. I IS. 8- 1!.
2S I. Asclep. 12, 511. S-6 in corpora alia indiRIUI mtinw smzcto elfmtltl
migratio. If this passage is read in conjunction with ibid. 28. :\.H. 8-53S. 4,
the punishment will be the transmigration itself. This seems to be the line of
thought at Corp. 1/erm. X, 8, 116, 18-117,:\.
252. See pp. 3SfH61.
2'5.~. Sec pp. 559-:\60.
2'54. Asclep. I 0. 508. I 3-15. The text contains a double word-play: in
THE ASCLEPIUS 387
Here, the notion that man's nature is analogous to the world's in

comprising a divine and a human part is also of some
philosophical significance. As we have already seen, the
Hcrmeticist frequently emphasizes the Stoic doctrine that God
is immanent in the world he creates. It is this immanence of the
divine which has been extrapolated from the macrocosmic to
the microcosmic level.
Cireek K60ilO<; = (i) 'adornment'. (il) 'world'. while in latin mundus = (i)
pure'. (ii) 'world'. On the theory of macrocosm and microcosm implied here
scech.l,n.87.
EXCURSUS A
Censorious' De Die Natali
This attractive work was written by the third-century gram-

marian Censorious as a birthday offering to his aristocratic
patron.l Around the general subject of the dies nata/is, it ar-
ranges a sequence of questions for discussion: (i) the nature of
the genius, 2 (ii) the origin of the human race,3 (iii) conception,
gestation, and birth, 4 (iv) the periods of human life,; (v) eternity
and time,6 and (vi) the measurement oftime,7 although there are
some digressions on further topics, for example the nature of
music.s From information provided by the author himself we
can date the composition of this work exactly to A.D. 238.9
1. ~- Sallmann: Censorini De Die Natali Liber ... edklit N. S. (Leipzig,

19H:\ ). There is a recent French translation and commentary: G. Rocca -
Serra: Censorinus, Le jour natal. Traduction annotee par G. R.-S. (Paris,
19HO) which gives details of other editions. For valuable corrections to
Hultsch 's text seeM. Giusta: 'Osservazioni sui testa del De Die Natali di Cen-
sorino . Alii deii'Ac:cademia delle Scienze di Torino, C/asse di sclenze
mora /I, storicbe efilo/ogicbe 110 (I 976), pp. 181-209
2. Censorious: De Die Nat. 2, 1-3. 6 .
.:\./hid. -i, 1-13.
-i./bid. 5. 1-13.6
5./bid. 14,1-15.6.
6./bid. 16,1-17,1.
~. Ibid. J'7, 2-24, 6.
H./bid. 10,1-13.6.
9. Ibid. 21. 6 ff. Censorious' influence in later times seems to have been
fairly restricted. Sidonius Apollinaris used De Die Natali and Cassiodorus
cites De Die Ntlfali, the Fragmet1fum Censoritli (a spurious fragment on
astronomy. geometry, and music attached to Censorious' work which he
took 10 be genuine), and De Accentibus now lost. On these citations see W.
389
;\90 MIDDLE PLATONISM
As a tribute to the erudition of his patron, Censorious selects

his questions from a number of earlier philosophical sources -
there is no claim to originality of speculation I o - and the
treatise is full of references to Greek writers like the
Presocratics, the Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristotle, early
Academics, early Peripatetics, and some Hellenistic thinkers. II
However, it seems likely that this material is derived indirectly
through Latin sources, and here among the authors actually
named Varro and Suetonius seem to have played important
roles.l2 The influence of Varro over Censorious is dominant,
Speyer: 'Zu einem Quellenproblem bei Sidonius Apollinaris (CC~rmen 15,

36-12';)'. Hermes 92 ( 1964), pp. 22';-248; P. Courcellc: LC~te LC~tin Writers
mtd their Greek Sources, translated by H. E. Wedeck (Cambridge, MA, 1969),
pp. 349-350 and 352; and Rocca- Serra: op. cit. pp. 71-72. Censorious' text is
derived ultimately from the eighth-century manuscript Colfm. Bib/. CC~th.
166 from which two ninth century copies were deri\'ed: Vat. (If. 4929 and
Vat. Pa/at. I 588. On the manuscript tradition sec C. W. Barlow: 'Code."(
Vaticanus /atinus 4929', Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome 15
( 193H). pp. H"'-1 z.l; Giusta: op. cit. pp. 181-209; and Rocca- Serra: op. cit., p.
71.
10. Censorious: De Die Nat. I. 6 says 'I have chosen some little questions
from the writings of learned men' (e.\ philologis commentariis qtmsdmn
qtwestiumutas delegi).
II. For the Prcsocratics sec ibid. 4. 3-7, 7; for the Pythagorcans ibltl. 4, 3;
7. 5; 9, 1-3: 10, 7-8; II. 1-3. etc; for Plato Ibid. -i, 3: 10. 7; 14. 12; 15, I; for
Aristotle ibid. 4, 3; 6. 1-2; 7, ';-7; 14, 7; etc.; for Xenocratcs ibid. 4, 3; 15. 2;
for Theophrastus ibid. -!, .i; 12, II; and for the Stoics ibid. 5. 4-6. 2.
12. The citation of Suetonius at ibid. 20. 2 has suggested the idea that his
encyclopaedic work Pmtum was an intermediary between Varro ami Cen-
sorinus. Since Suctonius' work is lost, the hypothesis cannot be tested.
However. it is treated skeptically hy P. Wissowa: 'Censorinus', p,m~s
Realencydopiidie der k!C~ssiscben Altertumsuissenschaft 3/2 (Stuttgart,
1899), col. 1908-10 and F. Franceschi: 'Ccnsorino c Varrone', Aetum 28
( 195-i ), pp. 4 14-4 17. The question to what extent Censorinus may have used
various unnamed Greek and latin doxographers independent of Varro is dif-
ficult to answer. H. Diels: Doxographi Graeci. Co/legit recensuit pro-
legomenis imlicibusque instru:-.:it H. D. (Berlin, I 879). p. I 86 ff. noted the
CENSORINUS 391
and in addition to the works explicitly cited - the Logistorici

Atticus de Numerisl3 and Tubero de Origine Humana, J.J and
the Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum 15 - there are good
grounds for thinking that the former's Disciplinae tc. have been
used. as well as other less known texts.t7
It seems likely that, if Censorinus is so heavily under the in-
~trikin~ parallels between De Die Nat. 4-13 and the fragments of Actius'
Placita and, since the former text seemed to him excerpted from Varro's
t.ngistoricus Tubero de Origine Humana, postulated an earlier doxography
upon which both Varro and Aetius depended: the 'Vestusta Placita'. The ex-
istence of :1 doxographical source prior to Censorious and Aetius seems nr-
t:tin. although the precise relation to Varro's lost text is unclear. On the dox-
ographers see pp. 242-244.
1~-This work is quoted at Censorious: De Die Nat. 2, .2. ~othing further is
known about it, and it is possible that its subtitle should be de Muneribus.
The l:mer would certainly fit better with the context of Censorious' citation.
IL This work is quoted at ibid. 9. 1. judging from the agreement between
its tilll- and the subject matter of Censorious at this point. Dicls: op. cit., p.
IH6 ff. concluded that the work was the source of De Die Nat. 4, 1-13.6 as a
wholl". The debt to Varro is acknowledged by most modern scholars,
although there is some debate about Its precise extent within the section con-
cc:rnnl. Among recent discussions see Franceschi: op. cit., p. 417; H.
Dahlmann und R. Heisterhagen: Varronische Stud/en l. Zu den Logistorici
fAhbandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in
.llainz. gei.~tes- unci sozialuiss.-K/asse 19')7/4) (Wicsbadcn, 1917), p. 24: ).
H. Waszink: 'La creation des animaux dans Lucrcct:'. Rezue beige de
fJIJi/o/ogie et d 'histoire 42 ( 1964 ). p. ')I ff.; ). Mansfcld: The Pseudo-
lliPJmn-Citic Trctcl n&pi ti}60J.IIi6wv cb. /-II emd Cireek Pbi/osopby (Assen.
llJ-1 ). p. IHS ff.; and Rocca-Serra: up. cit., pp. ix and 42-4 3.
1<;. This work is quoted at Censorious: De Die Nell. 17, IS. Parallel
testimony in Augustine suggests that much of the argument at ibid. 17. 2 ff. is
derived from it. Sec Franceschi: op. cit .. p.594 ff.
I Cl. The: hypothesis is advanct:'d hy Rocca - Serra: op. cit. p. ix that the
digression on music at Censorinus: De Die Nat. 10, 1-15, 6 is dl"rived from
I his work.
1"'. Al'l'ording to Franceschi: op. cit., pp. 59+407 certain passagt:'s in Cen-
\orinu': De Die Nat. f"1, 2 ff. have bt:'en influenced by Varro's De Lingua
/.a/ina.
fluence of the distinguished encyclopaedist, he will reflect that

author's philosophical tendencies in his own work. Modern
scholarship has revealed the extent to which Varro was in-
fluenced by the revival of Pythagorean notions of number I!! and
also by the prevalence of Stoic-Platonic ideas about the
macrocosm and microcosml9 in his own day. We should
therefore not be surprised to find that many arguments of De
Die Natali reflect one or both of these doctrinal positions.
The philosophical doctrine described by Censorious indeed
consists in the first place of the belief in the role of number as
the principle of reality. In the course of his discussion of con-
ception, gestation, and birth the writer comments that he will
have to examine questions of astronomy, music, and arithmetic
in order to explain this topic,.zo and towards the end of the same
discussion he considers the nature of music and its role in the
cosmos at some length.21 Obviously number is the basis of all
three of these sciences, and elsewhere in this argument Cen-
sorious explores its significance in two basic ways. In the first
place, number governs the spatial and temporal extension of ex-
isting things, the former role being manifested in the 'distances
corresponding to musical intervals' (interval/a musrcrs
diastematis congrua) between the heavenly bodies- a theory
which the writer elaborates in considerable detail and attributes
to the teaching of Pythagoras22 -,the latter in the stages of em-
18. On this aspect of Varro see A. Schmekel: De Oridiana Pytbagoreae

doctrinae adumbratlone, Diss. (Greifswald, 1885), pp. 76-87: K. Praechter:
'Eine Stelle Varros zur Zahlentheorie', Hermes46(191l), pp. 407-413; L. Fer-
rero: Storia del pitagorismo nel mondo romano dalle origin/ alia fine della
Repubblim (Torino, 1955), pp. 319334.
19. On this aspect of Varro (where he was under the influence of his
teacher Antioch us of Ascalon) see the full discussions on pp. I 0 1-118 and
837-840.
20. Censorinus: De Die Nat. 7, I.
21./bid. 10, 113,6.
22. Ibid. 13. J-6. Here he is probably citing Pythagoras through Varro. as
CENSORINlJS 393
hrvonic development which 'have the same relation to one

an~Jther as those sounds called "consonant" in music' (inter se
conlatos rationem habere earn, quam voces habent, quae in
musice cn)J.l.q>OOVot vocantur) - here the writer refers to the
Pythagorean doctrine explicitly set out in Varro's Tubero.23
secondly, number governs both the psychic and corporeal
levels of reality, as indicated by the fact that the square of seven
has a special relation to the 'body' (corpus) while that of nine
has a special relation to the 'soul' (animus)- this viewpoint is
attributed by the author to the majority of writers24 - and that
music occurs not only in 'sound' (vox) but also in the 'motion of
the body' (corporis motus) and in the 'motion of the soul'
(animi motus)- at this point the author includes a short dox-
ography which is probably derived from the musical section of
Varro s Discip/inae. 25
The second component in the philosophical doctrine
reported by Censorinus is the belief in the interdependence of
macrocosm and microcosm. Also in the course of his discuss-
sian of conception, gestation, and birth the writer describes the
H. Dahlmann und W. Speyer: Varroniscbe Studien II (Abbandlungen der

.lcltulemie der Wissenscbaften uml der Literatur in Mainz, geistes- und
.mzic1ill'iss. -Kiasse 1959/11) (Wiesbaden, 1960). pp. 48-51 suggest. On the
mu~ic of the spheres in Censorious see further W. Burkert: 'Hellenistische
pseudopytbagorica', Pbllologus 105 (1961). pp. 28-43 and L. Richter:
'(iril:chische Traditionen im Musikschrifttum der Romer. Censorious: De die
lltllali. Kapitel 10', Arcbir fur Musikwissenscbaft 22 ( 1965). pp. 69-98. The
theory henJmes very popular in late antiquity, and one should compare the
~imilar treatments in Calcidius. Macrohius, and Marrianus Capella.
2~. Censorious: De Die Nat. 9. 1-3. The relation of number to temporal ex-
ltnsion is also manifested in the stages of human life, and in the days,
months, and years of the world's history.
2-!. /hid. l.:i, 13. The reason given is that seven is associated with Apollo
who prt:sides over medicine and nine with the Muses who govern the art of
music.
25. Ibid. 12. I. That Censorious is probably dependent on Varro's
Oisciplinae here is ar~ued hy Dahlmann und Speyer: op. cit. 11, pp. 49-51.
MIDDLE PLATONISM
Chaldaean theory that human life is controlled by the heavenly

bodies and the heavenly bodies in their turn by the sun, and
then explains that this is why the latter is said 'to give us a soul
hy which we are governed and to have the greatest power and
influence over us' (animam nobis dare, qua regamur, poten-
tissimumque in nos esse moderarique).lC. To this, despite the
apparent contrast which Censorious goes on to make between
the Chaldaean doctrine and the teaching of the Tubero, 27 there
are numerous parallel discussions in Varro concerning the rela-
tion between the sun as ruling principle of the world and the
soul as that of man. For example, we have the statement in the
Antiquitates Rerum Dil'inarum that the aether is the force per-
vading the cosmos as the soul is that pervading the human
body,2H and the quotation in De Lingua Latina of Epicharmus'
view that the sun is the source of the human soul.Z9 These in-
dicate that Varro's own philosophical position was in a general
sense consistent with that attributed to the Chaldaeans, so that
it remains likely that some work of the great encyclopaedist is
the source of this materiat..~o The same belief in the in-
26. Censorious: De Die Nat. 8, 1-3.

27. Censorious goes on to report the Pythagorean theory regarding the
periods of gestation through the intermediary of Varro's work.
2R. Varro: Antlqu. Rer. /Jivln. fr. 227 (Augustine: Cit'. Dei VII, B (CCSL
-47, 203-205)). VamJ speaks of the aether as the ruling principle in the world
rather than the sun in this passage, hut the Swks seem traditionally to have
interpreted the i)y&J.10vtK6v from both these viewpoints. tht important fact
being that the ruling principle was fiery or pneumatic in nature:. For a detail-
ed discussion of these questions see pp. 94-99 and especially ch. 1. n. 146.
29. Varro: De Ung. /.at. V. ')9 (Epicharmus: fr. SO). What Epicharmus may
have intended by this statement is not clear. but hy Varro's time the notion
had become embedded in the Stoic-Platonic doctrine of the fiery pneuma,
:tnd of course it became extremely widespread in late antiquity. For a discus-
sion of similar ideas in Porphyry and Macrobius seep. 555 ff.
311. Censorious does not specify who these Chaldac:ms arc: although they
may be identifiable with those cited hy writers like Vitruvius and Pliny the
Elder. See Rocc:a- Serra: op. cit .. p. 4R.
CENSOR! NUS 395
terdependence of macrocosm and microcosm underlies the

author's remarks towards the end of the discussion of concep-
tion. gestation. and birth where Pythagoras' view of the divine
power of music and his reasons for chanting to the lyre arc
described. Thus, he concludes that 'the minds of men are
divine, despite Epicurus' objections, and recognize their own
nature through music' (hominum quoque mentes et ipsae.
qmmuis Epicuro rec/amante, diz,inae suam natu ram per cmz-
tus agnoscunt).3 1
There is not much more philosophy besides this in De Die
Natali. except perhaps some comments on the nature of the
human genius. If the writer is a follower of Varro to the degree
that seems likely, then he presumably connected the
Pythagorean notion of number with the Stoic-Platonic ideas
about the macrocosm and microcosm according to the latter's
theory, namely by understanding the numbers as aspects of the
fiery pneuma diffused from the world to man.32 However, there
is no clear evidence that Censorious' interests were sufficiently
abstract to consider such questions at length .
.~ I. <:msorinus: /Je /Jie NCII. 12, ;\-4.

52. Varro had interpreted the Platonic Forms in this way. See pp. 831-835.
EXCURSUSB
The Doxography of Ambrose,
Hexameron I, 1, 1-4.
At the beginning of his Hexameron, Ambrose sets the stage

for a discussion of the single true doctrine of Moses regarding
the origin of the world by describing the many discordant
beliefs of the pagans on the same question. He writes: I 'To such
I. Amhrose: Hexam. I, I, 1-4 (CSEL 32/ I. 3-4) Tantumne upiniunis ad-

sumps/sse homines. ut a/iqui eorum tria principia constituerent omnium.
deum et exemplar et mater/am, sicut Plato tliscipulique eius, et ea incor-
rufJtct et increata ac sine initio esse adseverarent deumque non tamquam
erect to rem materiae, sed tamquam artificem ad exemplar, hoc est ideam in-
tenclentem fee/sse mundum de materia, quam toeant iiA.11v, quae gignendi
causas 1ebus omnibus dedlsse adseratur, ipsmn quoque mundum incorrup-
tum nee creatum aut factum aestlmarent, alii quoque, ut Aristote/es cum
suis disputandum putavil, duo principia ponerent, mater/am et spedem, et
tertium cum his, quod operatorium dicitur, cui subpeteret competenter ef-
ficere quod adorlendum putasset. quid igltur tam lncorwenlens quam ut
aetemitatem operis cum dei omnipotentis coniungerenl aetemitate tel ip-
sum opus deum esse dicerent, ut caelum et terram et mare d/t1/1lis prose-
querentur honor/bus? ex quo factum est ut partes mrmdi deos esse
crederent, qrumwis de ipso mundo non mediocris inter eos quaestio sit.
nam Pythagoras unum mundum adserlt, alii immmerabiles dicrml esse
mrmclos, ut scribit Democritus, cui plurlmum de physicis auctoritatis
tetustas detulit, ipsumque mu11dum semper fuisse etfore Aristote/es usur-
pat dicere: contra autem Plato non semper fulsse et semper fore praesumit
mlstruere. plurimi vero non fuisse semper nee semper fore scriplis suis
testificantur. inter has dissensiones eo rum quae potestveri aestimalio, cum
alii mtmdum ipsum deum esse dica11t, quod ei mens divina ut puta11t lnesse
tideatur, alii partes eius, alliutrumque? in quo nee quae figura sit deorum
397
MIDDLE PLATONISM
lengths has human conjecture gone that some, like Plato and his
followers, have established three principles of all things: God,
the archetype, and matter. They assert that these are incorrupti-
ble, uncreated, and without beginning; that God is not the
creator of matter but, by looking towards the archetype, that is
to say the Idea, after the manner of a craftsman, he made the
world from matter- this matter which they call UAfl being said
to have provided the causes of their becoming to allthings;2 and
that the world also is incorruptible and neither created nor
made. Furthermore others, like Aristotle in discussions with his
disciples, have postulated two principles: matter and form, and
together with these a third called ''the efficient" to which it was
permitted serviceably to accomplish whatever task he thought
should be undertaken. But what is more inappropriate than to
connect, with these thinkers, the eternity of his work with the
eternity of the omnipotent God; or to declare that the work
itself is God so that divine honors are conferred on the heaven,
the earth, and the sea? From this it follows that they should hold
the parts of the world to be gods, although concerning the
world itself there is no shortage of dispute among them. Thus,
Pythagoras asserts that there is one world, while others main-
tain that there are innumerable worlds, as Democritus writes, a
thinker to whom the ancients assigned the greatest authority in
nee qui rzumerr1s nee qui locus aut vita possit aut cura conprehendi, si-
quidem mtmdi aestimatione vo/ubilem rutundum ardentem quibusdam
incitaltlm motibus sine sensu deum comeniat intellegi, qui alieno. non suo
motu feratur. This Latin text bristles with ambiguities which I have attemp-
ted to resolve in my translation. although at certain points it is difficult to ad-
vocate any single rendering with confidence. There is another English ver-
sion in J. ). Savage: Saint Ambrose. Hexameron, Paradise, and Cain a1ld
Abel (The Fathers of the Church 42), translated by].]. S. (Washington. DC,
1961).
2. The translation of Savage: op. cit. p. 3 reads: 'to have given the power of
creation to all things' but is probably incorrect. In most philosophical tr:tdi-
tions known to Ambrose matter does not confer an aclite power on things.
AMBROSE W9
natural science. Aristotle presumes to say that the world has ex-
isted and will exist always, Plato however venturing to con-
clude that it did not always exist but will always exist. Yet many
writers testify in their works that the world did not always exist
and will not always exist. What estimate of the truth can there
he amidst such disagreements of the philosophers? For some
state that the world itself is a god - since it seems to contain ac-
cording to their view a divine mind, while others maintain that
the world's parts are gods,3 still others that both these notions
are correct. But with such theories one can comprehend neither
the form of these gods, nor their number, nor their place, nor
their life, nor their concerns. Indeed if we conceive the world
thus, we must view it as a god who rotates, is spherical, is fiery,
and impelled somehow to motion; and one who is devoid of
understanding and driven by an external force and not his
own':i
3. The translation of Savage: op. cit., p. 4 reads: 'Some, indeed, state that
the world itself is God, inasmuch as they consider that a divine mind seems to
he within it. while others maintain that God is in the parts of the world;
others still, that He is in both - in which case it would be impossible to
<.ktnmine what is the appearance of God. or what is his number, position.
life. or activity'. By interpreting these different views as varieties of
monotheism the translator appears to achieve :1 consistency with earlier
remarks in the text, yet the Latin genitive plural deorum ncar the end of the
passage shows that at lcast one of the views must he polytheistic.
-~- On Ambrose's own Christian theory of first principles - which he
dnelops as a rt:sponsc to the pagan ones- see the following studies: J. C. M.
\'an \'\'inden: st. Ambrose's Interpretation of the Concept of Matter.
l'iglliae Cbristiarzae 16 ( 1962), pp. 205-215; 'In the Beginning. Some Obser-
vations on the Patristic Interpretations of Genesis I, I'. ibid. 17 ( 1963), pp.
IO'i-121; some Additional Observations on St. Ambrose's Concept of Mat-
ter', ibid. IR (1964). pp. 144-14'i:J. Pepin: 'Echos de theories gnostiques de
Ia matiere au debut de l't:\ameron de saint Ambroise'. Romanitas et Cbris-
licmitas. Studia I. H. Waszink oblata, ediderunt W. Boer, etc. (Amsterdam.
I<r 3) pp. 2'i9-27 3 and 'Exegese de In principio ct theorie des principes dans
l'Examermr (I. 4, 12-16)', Ambrosius Episcopus (Alii del Congresso 11lterna-
In this curious doxography, it is the doctrines attributed to

Plato and the Platonists which primarily concern us, and their
content can perhaps be summarized as follows:
(i) The identity of the principles. There are three 'principles'
(principia) of all things: 'God' (deus), 'the archetype' (ex-
emplar), or 'the Idea' (idea), and 'matter' (materia, uA.nP
(ii) The nature of the principles. These principles are a) 'un-
created' (increata, sine initio) and b) 'incorruptible' (incorrup-
ta).6
(iii) The relation between the principles. God is a) 'not the
creator of matter' (non creator materiae) and b) not the creator
of the archetype or Idea.'.
(iv) God's mode of creation. God made the world a) 'by look-
ing towards the archetype' (ideam intendens) and b) 'from mat-
ter' (de materia).B
(v) The nature of the world. This world is a 1) 'neither
created nor made' (nee creatum aut factum) but a 2) 'did not
always exist' (non semper fuisse); and b 1) 'incorruptible' (in-
corruptum) and b 2) 'will always exist' (semper fore).9
zionale di Studi Ambrosiani nel XVI cenlePJario della e/evazione di

sant'Ambrogio alia cattedra episcopale, Milano, 2-., dicembre. 19"74) I. a
cura diG. Lazzari (Milano, 1976), pp. 427-482.
5. On the tradition of such threefold schemata in late antiquity see pp.
241-250.
6. These notions arc commonplaces in middle Platonism and
Neoplatonism. For illustrations see my discussions of Apukius on pp. 320
and 326 and of Calcidius on pp. 4 36-4 39.
7. Here the relation to time is not actually specified. Tenet b) is not stated
explicitly by Ambrose, :.tllhou~h it dearly follows from ii a) ;md ii b).
8. These notions also are commonplaces in Middle Platonism and
Neoplatonism. For illustrations sec mr discussions of Cicero on pp. 146-149
and of Seneca on pp. I H 1 ff. and 188 ff.
9. Here. the relation to time is actually specified. The inconsistency bet-
ween tenets a I) and a 2) is probably the resull of Ambrose's contl;uion of dif-
ferent sources.
AMBROSE 401
J. Pepin has used the whole of this doxography as the starting

point for a profound study of late ancient thought entitled
Theologie cosmique et theologie chretienne (Ambroise, Exam. /,
1. J-4).10 In this work he attempts not only to identify the
various philosophical doctrines contained in it but to explore
their significance in a wider historical context. II Since Pepin's
investigation of the doxography will remain definitive. the pre-
sent author may content himself with making a brief summary
of its conclusions. t 2
Regarding the Platonic elements in the doxography. Pepin
has demonstrated that these are expressed in a manner more in
agreement with the school traditions of late antiquity than with
the teachings of Plato's dialogues. This is especially revealed by
the penetration of pronounced Aristotelian notions into the
theory- the emphasis upon a schematic list of 'principles'. the
disjunction between God and the Idea, the use of the term
u'Anlmateria for the receptacle. the reference to the world as
uncreated, and so on - thereby generating an eclecticism very
typical of such writers.t3 Also regarding the Platonic elements,
10. Paris, 1964.

I 1. Pepin: op. cit., pp. 1 and 13-14. The writer is concerned with explor-
ing the intellecmal background of the entire doxography. He concludes that
its doctrinal core stems from Aristotle's lost early work nepi q>lA.oaoq>tac; but
that there are additions and transformations by one or more intermediate
~ource~. See Pepin: op. cit .. pp. 513-S33. His conclusions regarding the
specifically Platonic component in the doxography are those summarized in
my text below.
12. i.e those which concern us.
1.'\. Pepin: op. cit .. pp. I H-4H. i8, ; 13 and i33. Acceptance of this conclu
sion docs not prcscind the possibility that Ambrose has recourse to Plato's
own works elsewhere. On this question see the varying opinions of W.
W'ilbrand: Ambrosius und Plato' Romlscbe Quartalscbrift fiir cbristlicbe
0
0
Altertumslmnde tmdfiir Kirchengeschicbte 2i (1911)o pp. -12 49; F. H.

Duddcn: The Life mul Times of St. Ambrose I (Oxford, 193i). pp. 131'1; P.
Courcelle: 'Nouveaux aspects du platonisme chez saint Amhroise' Retue des
0
Pepin has demonstrated that, although there are numerous

features which reflect the handbook traditions in general, there
is one point which parallels the Phi/osophoumena of Hip-
polytus alone: the deduction from the eternity of matter to that
of the world. A further piece of evidence is provided by
Jerome's statement that Ambrose's interpretation of the Chris-
tian doctrine of creation was influenced by Hippolytus', a fact
suggesting that our doxography is derived from one analogous
to that presented hy the Philosophoumena and contained in
Hippolytus' scriptural commentary. 14
etudes latines 34 ( 1956), pp. 220-239; P. Hadot: 'Piaton c:t Plotin dans trois
sermons de saint Ambroise', ibid. 34 (1956), pp. 202-220; and G. Madec:
Sai111 Ambroise et Ia philosophie (Paris, 1974), pp. 109-132. However,
whatever may be the case elsewhere, the opening chapters of the: Hexameron
seems to present doxographical Platonism only.
14. Pepin: op. cit .. pp. 45-58 and 533. The relationship between the dox-
ographies of Ambrose and Hippolytus had also been noted by M. Klein:
Meletemata Ambrosiana: M.ythologica de Hippolyto, doxographica de Ex-
amerifontibus, Diss. (Konigsberg, 1927). On Hippolytus' doxography seeR.
E. Witt: Albin us and tbe History of ;'t/kldle Pillion ism (Tremsac:tions of the
Cambridge Philological Society 7) (Cambridge. 1937). pp. 96-97; C.
Moreschini: Apuleio e II Plutonismo (Firenze, 1978), pp. 178-185; and J.
Dillon: Tbe Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism 80 B. C. to A. D. 220
(London. 19"'7), pp. 4 10-414.
EXCURSUSC
Augustine's De Diversis Quaestionibus
LXXXIII, Q.46
Among the responses to various philosophical and religious

questions raised by the members of the monastery at Tagaste,
later collected to form the work De Diversis Quaestionibus
J.XXX/1/,l one stands out as having particular interest for later
students of Platonic thought: quaestio 46 'De Ideis' .2 It reads as
follows:
i a) 'It is Plato who is first said to have given the Ideas their
name. Not that because that name did not exist before he
I. The text is that of A. Mutzenbecher (CCSL HA. 70-7.:\) (Turnhout,

l'r'i ). For an English translation see D. L. Mosher: St. Augustine, Eighty-
71JI'('(' Different Questions (The Fathers of the Cburch 70), translated by
D. L. M. (Washington, DC, 1982). There is a French version by J .-A. Beckaert
in: Oeutres de saint Augustin 10. Melanges Doctrinau:l(: texte de /'eclition
fu!m;dicline. lntroducthms, traduction et notes par G. Hare~)'. f.-A.
/l(ckaert . .f. Boulet (Paris, 1952). Of course, the Iauer follows a text slightly
different 10 that utilized below.
2. On the influence of the quaestio in later times seeM. Grabmann: 'Des hi.
Augustinus Quaestio de ideis (De ditersls quaestlrmihus LXXXI/I, qu. 46) in
ihrer inhaltlichen und geschichtlichen Bedeutung'. Philosophiscbesjahrhuch
der Gr)rresgesel/schaft 43 (1950), pp. 297-307; 1.. M. de Rijk: 'Quaestio de
ldeis. Some Notes on an Important Chapter of Platonism'. Kephalaion:
Studies in Greek Pbilosopb) ami its CcmlillUCitioll offered to C.]. de Vogel,
t'llitcd by J. Mansfeld and L. M. de Rijk (Assen, 19"S), pp . .204-21.:\; and J.
Marcnbon: From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre. Logic,
11Jeulogy, and Pbilosopby in tbe EarZl' Middle Ages (Cambridge. 191-1 I). pp.
:1-. 1.2--tS. '5:\. S6. etc.
40.:\
himself introduced it, the things themselves which he termed

"Ideas" did not exist or were not understood by anybody, but
probably they were called by different names among different
people.:\ It is permissible to bestow a name of one's choice upon
anything which is known but has no agreed terminology, and it
is unlikely that there were no men of wisdom before Plato or
that they did not understand those things which Plato, as I have
argued. calls "Ideas" whatever they may be. In fact, a power of
such magnitude resides in those things that no man can be wise
who has not understood them. Undoubtedly there were wise
men of other nations besides Greece, a fact which Plato has not
only certified by his travelling abroad in order to perfect his
wisdom but also reports in his writings. One should not think
that such men, if there were such men, did not understand
those Ideas, even if they perhaps called them by another name.
(i b) Enough has been said on terminology. Let us examine the
thing which so much demands consideration and
understanding, leaving each man from the viewpoint of
nomenclature with liberty to call that which he has understood
whatever he chooses.
(i c 1) We can therefore call the Ideas "forms" or "species" in
Latin so that we may appear to translate the term literally. If we
should call them "reasons", we deviate from exactitude of
translation, for reasons are termed A.6ym and not Ideas in Greek.
However, if anyone should wish to use that word. he will not
veer from the thing itself.
(i c 2) For Ideas are certain primary forms or reasons of
things, stable and immutable, which are themselves not formed
and therefore eternal and always self-identical, and contained in
the divine intellect. And whereas they themselves do not come
into being or perish, everything which can come into being and
3. I han: di\'ided this text into sections and subsections according 10 prin-
ciples to be justified below.
AUGUSTINE 'lOS
perish and everything which does come into being and perish is
said to be formed in accordance with them.
(i c 3) Funhermore, the soul cannot contemplate them unless
it is rational and unless by that part of it through which it excels
- the mind or reason itself - as if by some interior and
intelligible face or eye. And even as far as the rational soul itself
is concerned, it will not be each and every one but only that
which has become holy and pure that is described as suitable for
this vision, in other words that which holds that very eye by
which those things are seen healthy, whole, serene, and similar
to the things which it aspires to behold.
(ii a) What man who has religion and is imbued with the true
religion would dare deny, indeed would not confess, even if not
yet capable of contemplating such things, that everything which
exists - that is everything which is contained in its genus by a
specific nature in order that it should exist - was made by God
the creator; that through his agency everything which lives has
life; and that the universal preservation of things and the order
itself by which that which is subject to change maintains its
temporal course in a definite measure are contained and
controlled by the laws of the highest God?
(ii b) When this has been established and agreed, who would
dare to say that God has made everything irrationally? And if
that cannot truly be said or believed, it only remains that
everything was made according to reason. Not that a man was
made according to the same reason as a horse - for that is
ridiculous to believe - but each individual thing was created
according to its proper reason.
(ii c I) And where could these reasons be thought to exist ex-
cept in the very mind of the creator? For he did not contemplate
anything lying outside himself so that he might produce what he
produced in accordance with it - to believe such a thing would
indeed be blasphemous. Thus, if these reasons of all things to be
created or already created are contained in the divine mind, and
if nothing can exist in the divine mind which is not eternal and
immutable, and if Plato called these primary reasons of things
Ideas; then not only do the Ideas exist but they exist truly
because they are eternal and remain self-identical and im-
mutable, while it comes about by participation in them that
everything which has existence exists whatever its precise
nature may be.
(ii c 2) But the rational soul, among those things which were
made by God, is superior to everything else. It is closest to God
when it is pure. and as much as it adheres to him in charity so
much is it suffused in a certain way by him with that intelligible
light and having been illuminated perceives those reasons not
through corporeal eyes but through that ruling part of itself by
which it excels - that is through its intellect - and becomes
most blessed in the vision of them.
(ii c 3) As we have said, these reasons may be called Ideas,
forms. species, or reasons. it being granted to the many to call
them whatever they wish, but to the very few to see what is the
truth' .4
4. Augustine: De Dit. Quaest. LXXXIII, 46/deas Plato primus appellasse

perhlbetur. Non tmnen si hoc nomen antequam ipse lnstituerel mm erat,
ideo rel res ipsae non erant. quas ideas tocat,it, vel a nullo erant intellec-
tae; sed ttlio fortassis tttque alio nomine ab a/lis atque allis mmcupatae
sunl; licet enim cuique rei cognitae, quae nullum babeat usittttum nomen,
quodlibet nomen imponere. Nam mm est t'erislmi/e sapientes tmt mtllos
fuisse ante Platonem aut lstas quas Plato, ut dicttttn est, ideas vocal,
quaecumque res sint, mm intel/exisse. siquidem tanta in eis vis con-
stituitur. ut nisi his intellectis sapiens esse nemo possil. Credibile est etiam
pmeter Graeciam fuisse in alii.~ gentibus sapientes. quod etiam Plato ipse
mm solmn peregrinando sapientiae perficiendae causa satis testatur, sed
etiam in libris suis commemorat. Hos ergo, si qui fuerunt, non existiman-
dum est ideas ignorasse. quamr,is eas a/lo fortasse nomine tocitar.oerint. Sed
de nomine bactenus dictum sit. Rem tideamus, quae mttxime ,onsidermlda
atque noscendtt est, in potestate constitutis rocabulis, ut quod 110/et quisque
appellet rem quam cogtwterit. ltletlS igitur La title possumus tJe/ form as tel
species dicere. ut terbum e terbo tra,ls{erre tideamur. Si autem rationes
AUGUSTINE 407
eas l'ocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedimus - rationes

enim Graece )..6yot appellantur non ideae -. set/ tamen quisquis hoc
1rJCalm/o uti tm/uerit. a re ipsa non abhorrebil. Stml namque ideae prin-
cipales quaedam formae lief rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles.
quae ipsae formatae non sunt ac per hoc: aeternae ac semper eodem modo
sese habentes, quae divina intel/egentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque
oriantur neque intereant, .~enmdum eas ramen fomUiri didtur omne quod
oriri et interire potest et onme quod orilur et interil. Anima tero negatur
eas intuerl posse nisi ratimwlis. ea sui parte qua excel/it, id est ipsa mente
atque ratione, qtwsi quadam facie tel ocu/o stm inter/ore atque in-
te/legibili. Et ea quidem ipsa rationalis anima non onmis et quaelibet, sed
qmu sancta et purafuerlt. htlet asserilur i/li tisionl esse idonea. fd est quae
ilium ipsum oculum. quo videntur isla, sanum et sincerum et serenum et
simi/em bis rebus. quas tidere intentlil, habueril. Quis autem religiosus et
tera religimte imbutus, quanwfs 110ndum baecpossil intueri, negare ltlfllen
audeat. immo non etiam profiteatur. omnia qum! stml, id est qtwecumque
in suo genere propria quadam natura nmtinentur ut sin I, auLtore tleo esse
procreata. eoque auctore omnia quae rlvtmt tillere, atque 1mitersalem
rerum incolumitatem ordlnemque ipsum. quo ea qtwe mutantur suos tem-
pora/es curs us cerro moderamine celebrant, summi tlei legibus cmzlineri et
gubenwri? Quo conslituto atque concesso, quis audeat dicere deum i1zra-
tiwwbiliter omnia condidisse? Quod si recte die/ t'el credi mm potest. restat
ut omnia ratione sint condita, nee eadem ratione homo qtw equus; boc
enim absurdum est e:..:istimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata ra-
tirmilms. Has autem rationes ubi esse arhitrandmn est ni.~i In ipsa me1zte
Cl't'atoris? Non enim e:-.::trtl se quidquam posllum intuebatur, ut secundum
id constitueret quod conslituebat; nam hoc opinarl sacri/egum est. Quod si
btw rerum omnium c1eandarum creatarum1'e rationes dit>ina mente con-
linentur. tleque in ditbul mente quit/quam nisi aeterman atque incom-
mutafJile f)(J/est esse. atque bas rationes rerum principales ttppellat ideas
Plato. mm solmn sunt ideae. sed ipse~e tJertle sunt. quia aeternae stmf et
tiustlem modi atque incomnmtabiles manetl/. Qtwrum parlicipatirme fit
111 sit quidquid est, qtwquo modo est. Sed anima ralirmalis inter ee~s res,
quae sunt a deo conditae, omnia superat et deo proxima est. quando pwa
est; eique in quantum caritate cohaeserlt, in tantum ab eo lumine i/lo in-
tellegihi/i perfusa quodammodo et inlustrata cernit non per corporeos
ncu/os. sed per ipsius sui princ:ipale quo excel/it, id est per intellegentiam
swtm, istas rationes. quarum tisione fit beatlssima. Quc1s rationes, ut dic-
tum est. sit'e itleas site fonnas site spedes sire ratirmes licet tocare. et
11 11tltis cometlitur ti/JfJellare quod libel, setl /Jtllll'issimis titlert quotllerlltll
est.
408 MIDDLE PlATONISM
Some remarks are necessary on the structure of this quaestio

which seems a good example of the famous Augustinian laxity
of composition, and in the first place we have to ask why the
description of the Ideas' nature is repeated in almost exactly the
same terms in sections i c and ii c, there being in each case a
division into subsections on terminology (i c 1, ii c 3), ontology
(i c 2, ii c 1), and epistemology (i c 3, ii c 2). s The answer is clear-
ly that the two descriptions of the Ideas represent conclusions
of different lines of argument, a closer examination of the text
revealing that these arguments contrast with one another from
several viewpoints.6 Thus, section i a is a historical argument
for the existence of the Ideas: all philosophers have understood
that these exist although they have not applied a fixed ter-
minology to them - this proof being expounded in a non-
Christian context... On the other hand, section ii a is a
cosmological argument for the Ideas' existence: any truly
religious man reflecting on the existence, life, and order in the
world will realize that it has been created according to reason-
this proof being expressed in primarily Christian terms.H In this
<;. For studies of the doctrinal content of the quaestio see the following: H.
Meyerhoff: 'On the Platonism of St. Augustine's Quaestio de Jdeis', New
Scholasticism 16 (1942) pp. 16-4<; and A. Sollgnac: 'Analyse et sources de Ia
Question De ldeis'. Augustinus Magister (Congres International Augusti-
n len, Paris. 21-24, septembre I 9 54) I (Paris, 1954 ), pp. 307-31 <;.
6. As parallel examples of the way in which Augustine will argue to the
same metaphysical doctrine successively from different viewpoints see De
Ord. II, <;, 16 (CCSl 29, II ';-116) and De Vera Relig. 24. 4';- .~8. 71 (CCSL 32.
21 '5-234). In these cases the doctrine of the Trinity is the culmination of
philosophical and Christian philosophical arguments respectively.
7. The notion that one can deduce a philosophical truth from the univer-
sally held bdiefs of mankind is Stoic in origin. Augustine could have found it
in texts like Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II. 5 - where the existence of the gods is
demonstrated- and Cicero: Tusc. Disp l, 36- where it is the soul's survival
after death which is shown.
8. The notion that one can argue from a charalteristic of the microcosm to
AUGUSTINE 409
way we perceive that Augustine's quaestio is in actual fact con-

structed quite logically, leading from a historical explanation
through a transition (i b) on the contrast between names and
things to a first description of the Ideas, and then from a
cosmological explanation through a transition (ii b) on the ra-
tionality of God's creation to a second description.9
Turning now to the content of the two descriptions of the
Ideas, we may perhaps summarize Augustine's whole theory as
follows. First, among the different terms possible they may be
called Ideas (ideae), forms (fonnae), or species (species) with
equal accuracy (i c 1, ii c 3 ), 10 although the description of them
as reasons (rationes) - which the writer himself clearly favors
- must be employed with greater caution, since this would be
more correctly applicable to the Greek A.6ym (i c 1)11 whose
precise difference in relation to Ideas is not explained. Second-
ly. from the ontological viewpoint the Ideas are themselves not
an analogous one in the macrocosm is also Stoic in origin. Augustine could

have found this in texts like Cicero: De Leg. II, 16- where the characteristic
is the presence of rationality. That Augustine's use of the argument from
microcosm to macrocosm is peculiarly Christian is shown by (i) the reference
to the man 'imbued with the true religion' and (ii) the implicitly Trinitarian
rekrence to God as the source of existence, life, and order in section ii a.
9. Other scholars have analyzed the content of the quaestio in slightly dif-
ferent terms. Usually section i a is detached as a historical introduction, whilt:
section i b-e is called the 'a priori argument' and section ii a-c the 'a posteriori
argument'. However, in actual fact this agrees with the approach advocated
by the pn:sent writer. Sel' Meyerhoff: op. cit .. p. 32 and Sollgnac: op. cit., pp .
.~09-310.
I 0. Cf. Aetius: Plac. I. 9. -l (DG 308a7 and b7); I. 19, I (DG 3l"a2 and
b2-i ); Plotinus: Enn. 1, 1 /53/7, 15; V. 9 /5/ 3, 7; etc.
II. Cf. Cicero: De Rep. Ill, 33; De Leg. 11, 8; Plotinus: Eml. V, I /10/5,
15-1-l; VI, 8/39/ 17, 14-16; etc. Augustine is perhaps alluding to the fact that
A.6ym have a role in Stoic philosoph}' as material principles in the cosmos.
and that it was essentially Plotinus who transposed them into the:
metaphysical status required by his own argument.
formed (ipsae formatae non sunt) (i c 2); 12 they are eternal

(aeternae, quidquam aeternum) (i c 2, ii c 1) and more precise-
ly do not come into being or perish (neque oriantur neque in-
tereant) (i c 2); 1.~ they are contained in the divine intellect
(divina intellegentia continentur, in ipsa mente creatoris,
divinll mente continentur) (i c 2, ii c 1); 14 they are truly exis-
tent (verae sunt) (ii c 1); 1'\ they are immutable (incommutabiles,
quidqullm incommutabile) (i c 2, ii c 1) and more precisely self-
identical (semper eodem modo sese habentes, eiusdem modi
manent) (i c 2, ii c l ); 16 they are sources of form to transitory
things (secundum eas tamen jormari dicitur omne quod oriri
et interire potest, quarum pllrticiplltionefit ut sit quidquid est)
(i c 2, ii c 1).1.., Thirdly, from the epistemological viewpoint the
Ideas are perceived by the soul's rational part (ipsa mente atque
ratione, per intellegentiam suam) (i c 3. ii c 2); 18 they are
perceived by a soul which is pure (quae sane/a et pura fuerit,
quando purll est) (i c 3. ii c 2); 19 they are perceived by the soul's
12. Cf. Hippolytus: Pbilos. 19 (DG 567, 14-15). Apuleius rna) have drawn
the same t:ondusion from this doxo~raphy or its sourt:e. Sl'C p. 2H9 and t:h. 4.
n. 25:\.
13. Cf. Cicero: Om/. 10; De Rep. Ill. 33; Arius Didymus: Epit. PIJys. fr. 1
(DG 447a8-9 and b7-8); Plotinus: Emz. Ill, 7 /45/3, l-2; IV, 7/2/8, 42-43; etc.
The Plotinian passages cited in this and the next few notes refer explicitly to
Intellect and therefore implicitly ;1lso to the Ideas.
14. Cf. Cicero: De Leg. ll, 8; Aetius: Plac. l, 3. 21 (DG 288a4-6 and b4-6); I,
10, 3 (DG 309a 1-i}.
15. Cf. Plotinus: Enn. l. 3 /20/ 4. 9-12; III, 9/13/ I, 8-10; etc. On the Ploti-
nian citations see n. 1.~.
16. Cf. Cicero: Oral. 10; De Rep. Ill, 33; Plotinus: Emz. Ill. 7/45/3. 15-17;
IV, 7/2/8, 42-43; etc. On the Plotinian citations seen. 13.
17. Cf. Cicero: Orat. 10; Aetius: Plac. I, 10, 1 (DG 308bl7-20); Arius
Didymus: Epit. Phys. fr. 1 (DG 447a3-4 and b2-3); Plotinus: Enn. l, 2 /19/2,
3-4; V, 8/31/7, 23-24; etc. On the Plotinian citations seen. 13.
18. Cf. Cicero: Oral. 10, 101; Plotinus: Enn. Ill, H 13015, 10-12; V, 3/49/
3. 9-13; etc. On the Plot in ian citations seen. I 3.
19. Cf. Plotinus: Enn. I. 2 /19/4, 13-15; V, 3 /49/ 3. 9-13: etc. On the Ploti-
nian citations seen. I.-\.
AllGlJSTINE 411
eye (ilium ipsum oculum quo videntur ista, non per corporeos
oculos) (i c 3. ii c 2);20 they are perceived by a soul which is
similar to them (simi/em his rebus quas videre intendit, deo
proxima) (i c 3. ii c 2).21 Finally. among examples of these Ideas
are included the species of man and horse (ii b),22 perhaps
together with their individual instances (singula igitur propriis
sunt creata rationibus) (ii b)23 and presumably together with
other natural species, these last two points however not being
stated with the clarity we might desire.
This interesting quaestio contains some peculiarly Augusti-
nian features although it is primarily a compilation of doctrine
from earlier sources, these being identifiable with virtual cer-
tainty as at least three in number: Cicero,2-J doxographic.l';
20. Cf. Plotinus: Eml. V, I /10/ I, 32-33; VI. H /39/ 19, 1-3; etc. On the
Plotinian citations seen. 13.
21. Cf. Hippolytus: Philos. 17 (DG S69. 14-1 S). On the importance of Hip-
polytus doxography for Augustine's predecessor Ambrose see pp. 401-402.
22. Cf. Actius: Plac. I, 10, I (DG 308bl8-20); Arius Didymus: Epil. Phys.
fr. I (DG H7aS-16 and b4-8); Plotlnus: Eml. V, 9/5/ 12, 1-3; VI, 7 /38/8, S-8;
etc.
2.'\. Cf. Plotinus: Enn. V. 7 /18/ I, 18-21; V, 9/S/ 12. 3-10; etc. It is not cer-
tain whether Augustine is saying that each individual has an inditidual
rlason or simply a specific one. If the former is the case his theory is definite-
ly influenced by Plotinus ar this point.
2. On Augustine's use of Cicero sec M. Testard: Saim Auguslfn et Ciceron
111 (Paris, 1958) and H. Hagendahl: Augustine and tbe Latin Classics uith a
Contribution on Vm.,.o by B. Cardarms (Goteborg. 1967). pp. i79-58R.
Thesl writers are mainly concerned with explkil citations of Cin:ro rather
than unacknowledged doctrinal influences. but it is obvious that an ahun-
dann of the former makes the frequency of the latter very likely.
25. See P. Courcelle: Late Latin Writers and tbeir Greek Sources,
translated by H. E. Wedeck (Cambridge. MA. 1969) pp. 192-194; Solignac:
Analysl' et sourn:s de Ia question De /deis', pp. 313-315 and 'Doxographies
tt manul'ls dans Ia formation philosophique de saint Augustin'. Recherches
writers. and Plotinus.26 From the first source come the ap-
plication of the term 'reasons' to the Ideas, and the notions that
they are eternal. contained in the divine intellect, immutable,
sources of form to transitory thing, and perceived by the soul's
rational part.2 7 Parallels in the doxographers can be found to
the description of the Ideas as forms; to the notions that they
are themselves unformed, eternal, contained in the divine in-
tellect, sources of form to transitory things, perceived by a soul
which is similar to them; and to the inclusion of natural species
among the Ideas.2s From the last source come the hesitancy
regarding the application of the term 'reasons' to the ideas; the
notions that they are eternal, truly existent, immutable, and
sources of form to transitory things; that they are perceived by
the soul's rational part, by a soul which is pure, by the soul's eye
and by a soul which is similar to them; and the inclusion of
natural species among the Ideas and also their individual in-
augustiniemw.~ I (1958). pp. 113-148. Augustine himself refers to specific

duxographers: at Contra Acad. II, 2. 5 (CCSL 29, 20) to 'Cclsinus'. at Soli/. I,
12. 21 (PL .U. 881) to 'Cornelius Cclsus', and at De Haeres. pr. (CCSL i6,
288) to 'Cclsus' and there has been some controversy over the identity of this
author or authors. Courcelle: op. cit., pp. 135 and 192-194 concludes that
the first and third are the same: namely a Celsinus who was the author of a
work Omnium Philosopborum Opiniones, later translated into Latin by
Manlius Theodorus; but Sulignac: 'Doxographies ct manuels dans Ia forma-
tion philosophique de saint Augustin', pp. 126 and 14..,1'18 suspends judg-
ment. However, that Augustine resorted to doxugraphies of some description
is nut in doubt.
26. For summaries of earlier bibliography on Augustine's use of Plotinus
sec J. J. o Me:ara: Augustine and Neoplatonism . RecberdJes augustiniennes I
(Paris, 1958), pp. 81-111 and A. Solignac: Oeuvresdesai11t Augusti'z 13. Les
Confessions I: texte de /'edition de ,'r/. Skutelltl. Introduction et notes par A.
S. Trmluction de E. Trehorel et G. Houissou (Paris. 1962 ), pp. I I 0-1 12. The
scholarly energy expended on this theme has been absolutely immense.
27.Seenn. ll.I;\-J.f.l6-H!.
28. Seenn. 10. 12-14. 17. 212.2.
AUGUSTINE 413
stances.29 Of course, it is possible that the number of parallels

would be increased if more works of Cicero and especially of
the doxographers were extant,30 but even those which can be
drawn show how much Augustine depends upon established
doctrines, albeit integrated into a personal synthesis ..\""
29. See nn. 11. 13. 15-20, 22-23.

30. There are naturally also parallels with Plato. But where doctrines of
the latter reappear- and there are many examples of this- they are clearly
transmitted via Cicero, the doxographers, and Plotinus. For this reason the
method of Meyerhoff: op. cit. pp. 16-45 in comparing Augustine and Plato
directly is methodologically unsound. That of Solignac: 'Analyse et sources
de Ia question De Jdeis , pp. 307-315 is a better model.
.~I. Thus. Augustine's emphasis on the metaphysical transcendence of the
Ideas contrasts with Cicero, his stress on the epistemological aspects of the
doctrine supplements the doxographers. and his emphasis on the Ideas rather
than Intellect their container contrasts with Plotinus.
SELECTED WORKS BY STEPHEN GERSH
Kinesis Akinetos. A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy

of Proclus (Philosophia Antigua XXVI), Leiden: E. J. Brill 197.3.
From lamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the

Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition
(Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mit-
telalterlichen Philosophic VIII). Lei den: E. J. Brill 1978.
'Omnipresence in Eriugena. Some Reflections on Augustino-

Maximian Elements in Periphyseon', Eriugena. Studien zu
seinen Que/len. Herausgegeben von Werner Beierwaltes,
Heidelberg: Carl Winter 1980, pp. 55-74.
'Platonism - Neoplatonism - Aristotelianism. A Twelfth-

Century Metaphysical System and its Sources', Renaissance and
Renewal in the Twelfth Century. Edited by Robert L. Benson
and Giles Constable, Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard Univer-
sity Press 1982, pp. 512-5.34.
PliBLJCATIONS IN MEDIEVAL STUDIES
THE MEDIEVAL INST!Tl'TE
liNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
EDITED BY
RALPH MciNERNY
A Series Formded by PhilipS. ,Hnm-e, C. S.C. t.]nseph N. Ganin, C.S. C. t.

and .4. /.. Gabriel
- - - - - - - - - - XXIII/2 - - - - - - - - - -
STEPHEN GERSH
MIDDLE PLATONISM AND

NEOPLATONISM
THE LATIN TRADITION
VOLUME II
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS

NOTRE DAME, INDIANA 1986
Contents
PART II Neoplatonism 419
Chapter 6 CALCIDIUS 421
6. I I The Commentarius in Timaeum 434
6.2 God, Matter. Form 436
6.21 The Nature of God 439
6.22 The Nature of Matter 445
6.23 The Nature of Form 451
6.24 The Three Principles 457
6.25 The Relation of God to Matter 457
6.26 The Relation of God to Form 460
6.27 The Relation of Form to Mauer 467
6 ..3 Products of God, Matter, Form 471
6.311 The World 471
6.312 The Creation of the World Soul 474
6.313 The Structure of the World Soul 475
ix
U>NTENTS
6.314 The Self-Motion of the World Soul 479
6.315 The World Body 480
6.32 Macrocosm and Microcosm 482
-----6.331 The Nature of the Human Soul 483
-6.332 The Structure of the Human Soul in the Body 486
_6.333 The Creation of the Human Soul 488
Chapter 7 MACROBIUS 493
7.111 The Saturnalia 498
7.112 The Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis 500
7.12 Macrobius' Sources 502
7.121 Greek and Latin Sources Explicitly Cited 503
7.122 Greek and Latin Sources Not Explicitly Cited 513
7.123 Sources Explicitly and Not Explicitly Cited 516
7.2 Macrobius' Philosophical System 522
X
CONTENTS
7.21 Rational Philosophy 523
7.211 Repertory of Texts 523
7.212 The Three Hypostases 530
7.213 The First Hypostasis: God 530
7.214 The Second Hypostasis: Intellect 535
.J.215 The Third Hypostasis: Soul 538
7.216 Macrobius on the Three Hypostases 543
-1.217 The Plotinian Parallels 543
7.218 Plotinus or Porphyry? 545
7.219 A Porphyrian Parallel 546
-7.22 Physical Philosophy 547
7.221 The Demiurge 548
7.222 The World Soul 551
7.223 The Relation of the Demiurge to the World

Soul 552
7.2231 Cosmological Functions of the Higher

World Soul 552
7.2232 The Higher Soul and the Sun 555

xi
C<>NTENTS
7.2233 Plotinus. the Cha/daean Oracles, and

Porphyry 558
7.2234 Solar Theology 560
7.2235 The Higher and Lower Souls 562
7.2236 Cosmological Functions of the Lower

World Soul 564
7.2237 Plotinus, Porphyry, and Macrobius 565
7.2238 The Lower Soul and Arithmetic 568
7.2239 Solid Numbers, Ratios, etc. 570
7.23 Ethical Philosophy 571
7.231 Repertory of Texts 572
-7.232 The Human Soul 579
7.233 The Transcendence of the Soul 579
7.234 The Descent of the Human Soul 582
7.235 The Immanence of the Soul 587
7.236 Macrobius on the Human Soul 589
7.237 The Numenian Parallels 590
7.238 Numenius or Porphyry? 592

xii
CONTENTS
7.239 The Porphyrian Parallels 593
Chapter 8 MARTIANUS CAPELLA 597
8.11 The Allegory of De Nuptiis 601
8.12 The Meaning of the Allegory 603
8.13 The Allegory and its Symbolism 605
8.2 Martianus' Philosophical System 606
8.21 Theological Doctrine 608
8.211 The Gods as Intellects 609
8.2111 The First Hypostasis 610
8.2112 The Second Hypostasis as a Plurality

of Intellects 615
H.2113 The Second Hypostasis as a Plurality of Forms 622
8.212 The Gods as Heavenly Bodies 624
8.213 The Gods as Spirits 627
8.2131 The Argument of De Nuptiis II. 150-157 629
xiii
C<>NTENTS
8.2132 The Arguments of De Nuptiis I. 45-61 and

II. 150-157 637
8.22 Psychological Doctrine 638
-8.221 The Human Soul 639
8.222 Philology as the Soul 640
8.223 The Palanquin as the Soul 643
8.224 Psyche as the Soul 644
Chapter 9 BOETHIUS 647
9.11 The Influence of Platonism 655
9.2 Boethius' Philosophy 658
9.21 Theology 664
9.2111 The Doctrine of the School Writings 666
9.2112 The Doctrine of the Theological Tractates 668
9.2113 The Doctrine of De Consolatione Philo-

sophiae 671
9.212 The Divine Attributes 675
9.2121 God as Intelligible 677

Xi\'
CONTENTS
9.2122 God as Existence 679
r2123 The Attribute of Beauty 684
9.2124 God as Unified Plurality 685
9.2125 God as Form 689
9.2126 The Attribute of Mind 690
9.2127 God as Providence 694
9.2128 God as Activity 695
9.2129 The Attribute of Volition 697
9.213 God as Immutable, Non-Spatial, etc. 698
9.2131 The Influence of Plotinus and Porphyry 699
9.2132 The Influence of lamblichus, Syrianus, and

Proclus 701
9.2133 The Influence of Augustine 705
9.22 Psychology 707
9.221 The Ontological Aspect 709
9.222 The Epistemological Aspect 714
Excursus D MARIUS VICTORINUS' COMMENTARIUS

IN CICERONJS RHETORICAM 719
X\'
CO :'II TENTS
Excursus E FIRMICUS MATERNUS' MA THESIS 729
Excursus F FAVONIUS EULOGIUS' DISPUTATIODE

SOMNIOSC/PIONIS 737
Excursus G SERVIUS' COMMENTARIIIN

VIRGILII CARMINA 747
Excursus H FULGENTIUS' MITOLOGIAE AND

EXPOS/T/0 VIRGILIANAE CONTINENTIAE 757
Excursus I PRISCIANUS LYDUS' SOLUTIONES EORUM

DE QUIBUS DUBITA VIT CHOSROES
PERSARUM REX 767
Note on Priscianus Grammaticus 777
Conclusion 779
Appendix VARRO 809
X.ll Introduction 809
X.l2 The Antiquitates Rerum Dil,inarum 811
X\"i
COi\JTENTS
X.21 Varro's Monotheism 818
X.22 Varro's Polytheism 822
X.2.3 Varro's Philosophy of Nature 825
X.24 Jupiter and Juno 828
X.25 The Deities of Samothrace 831
X.26 Janus, Saturn, Apollo and Others 835
X.27 The Relation of Macrocosm to Microcosm 837
Bibliographical Note 841
Bibliographies 843
Bibliography 1 845
Bibliography 2 855
Bibliography 3 859
Bibliography 4 861
Bibliography 5 869
Bibliography 6 871
xvii
6
Calcidius
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In turning from the author of the Latin Asclepius to

Calcidius,t we leave the context of inspired religious revelation
for the totally different one of systematic scholastic commen-
tary. However, the Hermeticist and the translator and commen-
tator on Plato's Timaeus have this much in common:2 that their
precise identities and dates are unknown to us.
1. The form Calcidius (rather than Chalcidius) is adopted- following the

best manuscripts- by Waszink, van Winden, and other modern scholars.
2. The influence of the most importam translator and commemator of
Plato's Timaeus has never been mapped in detail by a single scholar. In par-
ticular two factors have always impeded and will alwars impede this task.
First, since the influence of Cicero's translation was insignificam. it was
Calcidius whose name was primarily associated with the dialogue. Thus, the
history of Cakidius in the Middle Ages is virtually indistinguishable from the
history of the Timaeus. Secondly. since the study of Calcidius was usually
linked with that of other writers of similar philosophical persuasion like
Macrobius and Martianus Capella, doctrines are often derived from these
works as a group rather than individually. Thus, the influence of Calcidius in
the Middle Ages overlaps with the influence of Platonic writers in general. As
a result of these factors almost every modern scholarlr work on the Platonic
tradition refers to Calcidius passim, although the following studies comain
mJterial of special value: P. Duhem: Le systeme dumont/e. Histoire (/es doc-
trines cosmologiques de Platona Copernlc II (Paris, 1914), pp. 417-426 (a
survey of physical doctrines together with placing in the mediaeval sdentific
tradition as a whole); R. Klibansky: Tbe Continuity of the Platonic Tradition
during the Middle Ages (London. 1939) (notes on Calcidius' role within the
transmission of Platonism in general); and E. Jeauneau: 'L'hcritagc de Ia
421
NEOPI.ATONISM
Regarding Calcidius, there are three kinds of argument pro-

viding some clues: first, the identification of a certain Osius who
is the dedicatee of Calcidius' work; secondly, the analysis of
linguistic style in both the translation and the commentary; and
thirdly, the identification of those named and unnamed sources
which Calcidius employed. Of these arguments, the first seems
to hold out the most promise of immediate results, for certain
manuscripts contain indications that Osius was bishop of Cor-
doba and Calcidius his archdeacon.3 Since this Osius is known
by independent evidence to have been active during the first
half of the fourth century - he played a role in the councils of
Nicaea and Sardica- Calcidius must have composed his Com-
mentary on the Timaeus at some point within these
chronological limits. The identifications of Osius and Calcidius
made by these manuscripts have been accepted by the majority
philosophic: antique durant le haut moyen age', Settimane di studio del Cen-
tro Italiano di Studi sui/'Aito Medioel'O 22 (La cultura antica nell'occidente
Iatino dal VII all" XI secolo, Spoleto 18-24 aprile 1974) (Spoleto, 1975), pp.
17-54 (notes on Calcidius' position in the mediaeval Platonic tradition in
general). On the diffusion of manuscripts and references in library catalogs
see E. Mensching: 'Zur Calcidius-Oberlieferung'. Vigi/iae Cbristianae I 9
( 1965), pp. 42-56 and M. Gibson: 'The Study of the Timaeus in the Eleventh
and Twelfth Centuries', Pensamiento 25 ( 1969), pp. 183-194. for specific
periods see P. Courcelle: Ambroise de Milan et Calcidius'. Romanitas et
Cbristianilas. Studi" I. H. Waszink obla/(1, edidenmt W. den Boer. etc.
(Amsterdam. 1973). pp. 45-53; G. Mathon: 'jean Scot Erigene. Chalcidius et le
probleme de l':lme universe lie (A propos des Annotationes in Martianum 7.
I 0)', L 'hom meet son destin d 'apres les penseurs du moyen age (Acres du fer
Ctmgres lnternatimwl de Philosopbie Medierale. Loutaiu-Bruxel/es 28
amit--1 septemb,e /')58) (lou,ain/Paris, 1960), pp. 361-3 7'5; T. Gregory:
Plutonismo Mediel'ale. Studi e ricerche, (Roma, 19'58), pp. '53-I SO; and
M.-D. Chcnu: La theologle au douzieme slecle. 3me edition (Paris, 1976). pp.
IIH-128.
-~- See especially the manuscripts Escorialensis S. Ill, 5 (eleventh century).
Vatic:mms 3815 (ele\'enth century), etc.
CAI.CIDil!S
of modern scholars;' although an important observation by R.

Klibansky has now seriously weakened their position. This
writer noted that Isidore of Seville, who always made great ef-
forts to record the achievements of Spanish intellectuals and
was also deeply interested in scientific literature of all kinds,
reveals absolutely no knowledge either of the man or of his
work.~ Acting upon this suggestion). H. Waszink has concluded
that, although the evidence of the author's Christian allegiance
presented in the text might be sufficient to permit this iden-
tification, and although an analysis of the scientific and
philosophical sources utilized by the treatise allows its dating to
the first half of the fourth century, the attribution to an author
active in Spain cannot be upheld.6 This argument from silence
has gained the support of at least one other prominent modern
scholar,"' although a reaction in favor of what still remains the
majority viewpoint has been made by J. M. Dillon. The latter
maintains that Calcidius' work, in which the Christianity if pre-
sent at all plays a surprisingly insignificant role, might for this
~- Thus J. Wrobel: Platcmis Timaeus interprete Cbalcidio. cum eiusdem

co111mentmio. edidit}. n:. (Leipzig, IH96), p. x; B. W. Switalski: Des
Cba/cidius Kommellfar zu Plato's Timaeus. Eine bistoriscb-kritische l!nter-
.mcbung (Beitriige zur c;escbichte de, Pbilosopbie des Mittelalters ?t/6)
!Munster. 1902). pp. 3 and 6: V. C. de Clercq: Ossius of Cmdova
(\Xashington, DC, 195-i), pp. 69-75; and). C. M. van Winden: Calcidius mz
Matter. His Doctrine ami Sources. A Chapter in the Histm)' of Platonism
(l.eiden. 1959). p. 2.
5. R. Klihansky: lluion Anulemique lnternatimwle. Compte remlu
11961 ).
6 . .J. 1-1. Waszink: Timaeus a Calcidio translatus ammzemarioqm instruc-
t us, in societatem operis nmitmcto P. }. jnsen. etlidit }. H. \F. (Plato
!.a linus IV) (l.ondon/l.eiden. I 962). pp. xiii-xiv. This is the negative part of
Waszink's analysis. Atop. cit., p.ix,n. 3 and p.xvi he suggests another Osius
who was an imperial functionary in Milan around 395 as the possible
dedicatee.
"'. ThusCourcelle: op. cit .. pp . .f5-5.'\.
i 2-t :'1/EOPLATONISM
reason quite naturally have been consigned to obscurity.s

Among these arguments, it is clear that both the testimony of
manuscripts and the absence from the historical record are of
considerable weight, with the result that we should probably
suspend judgment regarding the identity and date of Calcidius.
But perhaps the second argument: that from the examination
of linguistic style will lead to more conclusive results? The study
of Calcidius' literary idiom has so far not advanced beyond the
elementary stage. yet already there are results of considerable
interest. Thus. Waszink has demonstrated that the specialized
vocabulary of the commentary has most in common with
writers of the late fourth and early fifth centuries: terms like
Aristote/icus being shared with Macrobius, exemplaris with
Macrobius, existentia with Marius Victorinus, hyle with Marius
Victorinus, immobilitas with Rufinus and Augustine, incor-
poratio with Jerome and Ambrose, silvester with Macrobius,
and so on.9 Furthermore, he has shown that general conclusions
regarding style would point to the same dating: the ornate
language of the prologue and translation contrasting with that
used by writers of the early and middle fourth centuries - it is
closer to Claudianus Mamertus and Sidonius Apollinaris -
while the form of the metrical clausulae differs from that cur-
rent among late fifth and early sixth century authors. IO In short,
the analysis of Calcidius' linguistic style points to a dating of his
activity to the late fourth and early fifth centuries.
Of the three arguments, it is the last which raises the most in-
teresting issues for a student of the history of philosophy, since
it has been adequately demonstrated that Calcidius depends
upon various earlier sources for his material. These sources are
li. ). M. Dillon: Tbe Middle Platonists. A Stm(J' of Platonism 80 B. C. to

A. D. 220 (London, 1977). pp. 40 1-402.
l). waszink: op. cit .. p. xiv.
10. \\'aszink: op. cit.. p. X\'.
C.ALCIDil!S 425
partly cited by name and partly not cited by name in the com-
mentary, while their employment is partly direct and partly in-
direct on the author's part. The following are of special
significance: 11
(i) Sources cited by name
a) Plato
Leaving aside the base text of the commentary, the passages
drawn from Plato's dialogues include: 1) from the Theaetetus.
the comparison of the mind to a wax tablet; 12 2) from the
Parmenides, a statement about the participation of things in
Forms; 13 3) from the same work, a statement that the world of
Forms is both one and many; H 4) from the Phaedrus, the argu-
ment that all soul is ungenerated and indestructible because it is
self-moving; 1; 5) from the Theages, the description of Socrates'
1 1. In the discussion of the next few pages I have confined myself to

noting those passages for which sources can be positivc:ly identified. (My con-
clusions regarding the presence of 'Porphyrian' passages in Calcidius might.
however, be contested by certain scholars: sec Dillon: op. cit .. pp. 40 1--WH).
Of course. one can extrapolate from these passages 10 the conclusion that
such and such sources were employed elsewhere in the treatise where no
names arc mentioned, and indeed modern Quellenforscbung has not been
slow in pursuing various opportunities of demonstrating that much of the
work is 'Numenian' or 'Porphyrian'. (The notes and apparatus of Waszink:
op. cit. are especially rich in suggestions of this kind). However. since these
conclusions arc more speculative, I have left them for examination until rele
\':.tnt specific texts occur.
12. Plato: Theaet. 194c-d at Calcidius: In Tim. 32H. :\22. IH-323, 6
(paraphrase).
!.'\.Plato: Parm. 132c-133a at C.alcidius: In Tim . .H<;. 32H. 12-1.'\ (allu-
sion).
14. Plato: Parm. 129b-c and 136a ff. at Calcidius: In Tim. 272. 276, !<;
-2"'7, 3 (allusion). Calcidius' reference seems to imply an interpretation on his
part. so the identification of Plato's text is tentative).
I<;. Plato Phaetlr. 24 <;c- 2-f6a at C.alcidius: In Tim. <;7. I O"f. I H-1 O<;. I H
(quotation) and ibid. 22H, 2-!3, 14-15 (allusion).
426 NEOPLATONISM
demon as a voice calling him back from some action; 16 6) from

the Republic, the analogy between the sun and the Form of the
Good; 17 7) from the same work, the description of intellectual
illumination as the escape from the cave; 18 8) from the same
work, the analogy between the divided line and four levels of
consciousness; 19 and 9) from the Laws, the classification of
bodily and psychic motions into ten types. zo There seems little
doubt that Calcidius had direct access to the original texts when
composing his treatise2t since, although the majority of these
passages are paraphrased, on occasion he is found quoting at
length from the dialogues in his own accurate if uninspired
translations.22
b) Aristotle
The passages taken from Aristotle's works include: I) from
the Physics, the argument that the old physicists' dilemma about
becoming can be resolved by distinguishing non-being per se
(privation) and non-being per accidens (matter) or by con-
trasting potentiality and actuality, and that the former pair of
notions was confusedly expressed in Plato's doctrine of the
16. Plato: Theag. 128d :It C:alcidius: In Tim. 2"i"i. 26;\, 20-264. 2 (quota-
tion).
17. Plato: Rep. VI "iORb-c at C:alcidius: In Tim. 242. 2"iR, 7-9 (allusion).
18. Plato: Rep. VII, "i14a ff. at Calcidius: In Tim. 349. 340. 11-14 (allu-
sion).
19. Plato: Rep. VI, "i09d-"i lie and VII. "i33d-"i3.fa at C:dcidius: In Tim.
3.:i2, 334. 20-335.4 (paraphrase).
20. Plato: Leg. X. H93h ff. at Calcidius: In Tim. 262, 268, 19-269.4.
21. In addition. the following points should be noted regarding Calcidius'
citations of Plato: (i) Passage "i) is incorrectly cited as being from the
Euthydemus; (ii) There arc: citations of Plato: Sopb. 263e at Calcidius: In Tim.
104, 1"i.'\, 23-24 and Symp. 202e at Calcidius: In Tim. 132. 174. "i-7 without
mentioning the texts by name:; and (iii) At ibid. 128, 171, .j and 2"i-t. 262. 21
the Epinomis is apparently cited as Plato's Pbilosopbus.
22. For a complc:tc: (:tllhough not annotated) list of citations of Plato sc:c
Switalski: op. cit .. pp. 1-I-18.
CALCIDIUS 427
'Great and Smali';H 2) from the Meteoro/ogica, a statement

about the physical process of light's retlection;.Z-i 3) from De
Anima, the definition of soul as the actuality of a natural
organic body: actuality, since of the three kinds of substance-
matter, form, and the composite- soul constitutes form; of an
organic body, since this - equipped with the means of nutri-
tion, reproduction, and other functions - uniquely has the
capacity for life;2'5 4) from De Somno, the description of a kind
of dream which arises from the recollection of sensory images
from the waking hours;26 and 5) from De Partibus Animalium,
the statement that the seat of life, motion, and sensation is
located in the heart.27 Whether Calcidius made use of the
original texts is not easy to determine with certainty for,.zs
although one passage includes a word for word quotation in
Latin translation, most of these extracts are paraphrases in
which there is much transposition and interpolation of
material.29
2.3. Aristotle: Pbys. l, 8, 191a23-l, 9, 192b4 at Calcidius: In Tim. 283.286,

1-286, 291. 7 (paraphrase with interpolations and quotation from Phys. l, 9,
192a.3-34 at Calcidius: In Tim. 286, 289, 12-291, 7).
24. Aristotle: Meteor. Ill, 4, 373a32ff. at Calcidius: In Tim. 2';7. 26'5,
16-19 (allusion).
2'5. Aristotle: De Anim. II, I, 412a3-b3 at Calcidius: In Tim. 222. 2.~'5.
H-223. 238, 13 (paraphrase with transpositions and interpolations).
26. Aristotle: De Somn. 3. 462a29-31 at Calcidius: In Tim. 2'50, 260, 10-13
(allusion).
27. Aristotle: De Part. Anim. Ill. 4, 66'5al0 ff. at Calcidius: bz Tim. 22L
l.3H. 172.'\9, I (paraphrase).
28. Regarding Cakidius' citations of Aristotle the following remarks
should also be made: (i) He invariably quotes from Aristotle without mention-
ing the texts by name; (ii) There are citations of Aristotle: Protr. fr. 17 Walzer
at Calcidius: In Tim. 208, 22'5. 21 ff. and 209.226, 13-15; and (iii) Passage 3)
gradually diverges from direct dependence upon Aristotle in favor of
Peripatetic or even Platonic formulations.
29. For another analysis of the material deri\ed from Aristotle by Cakidiul>
see Switalski: op. cit., pp. 18-28 and especially p. 19,n. '5.
-!28 NEOPLATONISM
c) Philo Iudaeus
One passage is taken from Philo: from De Opificio Mundi,
the interpretation of the scriptural phrase 'In the beginning God
made heaven and earth' as signifying that, just as he first created
an intelligible man and then according to that archetype the
bodily man, God made certain incorporeal and intelligible
substances as the Forms or exemplars of the visible firmament
and earthY' This passage accurately portrays Philo's teaching
but, since it is paraphrase rather than quotation and moreover
the only Philonic citation in Calcidius, it is impossible to say
whether it is taken directly from the Greek.31 However, since
the passage is embedded in a discussion which the commentator
has probably drawn from a Christian exegete, modern scholars
without exception consider it to be an indirect citation.32
d)Numenius
One passage is drawn from Numenius: from an unidentified
work, a discussion of first principles in which the Stoic theory is
refuted by using the combined Pythagorean and Platonic doc-
trine. This latter posits as parallel sets of contraries: monad and
dyad, God and matter, good and evil, providence and necessity,
and good and evil souls; the nature of each pair being coeternal
and together productive of things, the relation within each pair
a combination of the resistant and cooperative.33 Whether
Calcidius made use of the original text is difficult to determine
with any certainty, since of Numenius' own work only a modest
collection of fragments now remains.3 .. It is for this reason that
:\0. Philo lu<.laeus: /Jc Ofnf Mundi I. I '5-I (, and 46. l.~.:i at Calcidius: /n
Tim. 2-.8. 282, 8-11 (paraphrase).
:\I. The title of Philo's work is not mentioned hy Calcidius.
:\2. That exegete is Origen. See Switalski: np. cit .. p. 45; van Winden: op.
cit .. pp. 60-66: and Waszink: op. cit .. p. 280.
-~-~- Numenius: fr. 52 = Calci<.lius: /11 Tim. 29'5. 2'P . ..,-299. 301. 20
(paraphrase or qumation).
:\i. Numenius' principal work w:ts entitled nepi t'ciya8ou (see Eusehius:
PraC'fJ. Etang IX.-.. I).
CALCIDilJS -129
modern scholarly opinion is divided: one authority suggesting

that the explicit mention of Numenius' name. the parenthetical
cross-reference to the Timaeus, and the literary style of the
passage point to Numenius' own text;35 another that the explicit
mention of Numenius' name, the parenthetical cross-reference
to the Timaeus, and the introductory note on the author point
to some intermediary paraphrase.36
e) Origen
One passage is taken from Origen: from the Commentary on
Genesis, the exegesis of the phrase 'In the beginning God made
heaven and earth according to which the various elements are
interpreted as follows: 'Beginning' is shown by comparison
with a passage of Proverbs to signify the Wisdom made by God
before other things; 'Heaven and earth' are revealed by com-
parison with later verses of Genesis to signify things perceived
by intellect alone.37 That Calcidius had direct recourse to this
work is virtually certain since, although the latter's loss
prevents us from actually comparing its text, the chronological
proximity of the two writers makes use of an intermediary
unlikely ,38 However, since Origen is only named at the beginn-
ing of the passage, scholars have expressed doubts regarding the
~<;.van Winden: op. cit., pp. ~6-37, 104-105, and 116-117. According to
van Winden, the explicit mention of Numenius' name here shows that - in
contrast to other passages where he is cited through an intermediary - his
actual text is being used by Cakidius.
36. J. H. Waszink: Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Ca/cidius 1. Die
crstf! Hiilj~e des Kommelllars (mit Ausnahme der Kapital ii/Jer die Wcltseele)
(Leiden, 1964 ), pp. 24-25. According to Waszink, since Calcidius does not
normally name his immediate sources. the explicit reference to Numenius
here indicates that an unnamed intermediary is being used.
:\7. Calcidius: In Tim. 276, 280, 1-278, 283, 16.
:\H. That the source is Origen's Commentary on Genesis is shown by cir-
cumstantial evidence. At Calcidius: In Tim. 2..,7. 281, 16-282, 6 there is a
rderen<.e to the doctrine explained at Origen: De Prine. II, ~- 6. The latter
text in its turn refers to a more detailed treatment in the Commentary.
430 NEOPLATONISM
precise extent of the citation. Fortunately, the quotation of

parallel versions of the Bible at both the beginning and end of
the text seems to imply that all the material contained between
these limits is a literary unity ..w
(ii) Sources not cited by name
a)Adrastus
A number of passages are based upon the Commentary on the
Timaeus by the Peripatetic philosopher Adrastus, an important
fact which emerged as a result of the following process of
scholarly investigation. First, it was noted that substantial sec-
tions of Calcidius' treatise. especially the discussions of har-
mony and number in the world soul40 and of the motions of the
fixed stars and planets, -i were verbally paralleled by similar
passages in Theo of Smyrna.4l How could one explain this
agreement of texts? The initial suggestion that Calcidius was
39. The parallel versions are those of the Septuagint, of Aquila, and of
Symmachus. the collection of which had been accomplished in Origen's Hex-
apia. For a full discussion of the significance of their quot:ltion hy Calcidius
see van Winden: op. cit., pp. 52-ii.
40. Calcidius: In Tim. 44. 92.6-50. 100. 2.
J,J.Jhid. 59.106.17-91. 144.12.
42. To illustrate the relation between these two texts. the following sum-
mary of Plato's astronomical theory may he studied. (Calcidius: In Tim. 7.'\.
121,6-122,2 cf. TheoofSmyrna: Expos. Rerum Math. 143. 7-17):
Plato etium in /me ipso Timaeo nA.at(J)V Of: btl TEAl tiic:; noA.tteiac:;,
primam allitudinem a terra us- Atyrov <'i~ova llEV nva ~ui toi:i n6A.ou
que ad lunarem circulum. secrm- onjKovta o{ov Kiova, htpav Of:
dam usque ad so/em /iquido iJAUKUTTJV Kai <'itpaKTOV, toile; OE
dimensus est, etiam in Polilia ttvac; nepi toi:itov KoiA.ouc:; i;v
mm o1'dinafi(mem modo com- ciA.A.tlA.mc; iJPJ.LOOJ.Utvouc; aq>ovo6A.ouc;
memorans planetum, sed tcic; tv <'iatprov aq>aipac;, ~ J.LEV tv
si11gu/orum magnitudines nA.avroJ.Ltvrov, &Ktoc; ~f: J.Liav tv
te/ocilates, etiam co/o,-es. hoc: est cinA.avv &vtoc:; autiic:; 7Ipttxouaav
splendores ac serenitates. notans, tac; <'iA.A.ac; OTJA.oi of: tftv ta~tv tv
axem cae/item fuso circu/osque aq>mpv lita t toi:i J.LEyt9ouc; tv
a.wm ambie11tes tam extimos et <'iatprov &Kaatou Kai ota toi:i
CALCIDillS 4.31
dependent upon Theod was quickly replaced with the

hypothesis that both writers followed the same source since -
a fact not utilized by the earlier interpreter - Theo if not
Calcidius had identified a source for his mathematical and
astronomical doctrine in referring to Ad rastus the Peripatetic. 4-I
But did Calcidius depend upon the latter directly or indirectly?
The hypothesis that Porphyry is the transmitter of this material,
for which there are certain arguments;l'i has now been dis-
counted in favor of the view that Calcidius depends directly
upon Adrastus, on the grounds that the excerpts are too exten-
sive to have been transmitted by the Neoplatonist, that
Calcidius follows Adrastus rather than Porphyry on certain
points where the two are known to have disagreed, and that the
Latin writer is more likely to have been silent regarding an in-
termediate than a distant source.-16
b) Porphyry
Two passages are based upon the Commentary on the
l'icinos polis quam medios tres XPW(.latoc; eKUOTOU Kai &n c5ui toi'i
rerticu/is comparans. raxouc; tftc; ni til vavtia tcj> navti
cpoptic;
A l'omparison of these texts shows that Theo makes no reference to the

Timaeus (as in Cakidius) while Cakidius makes less explicit use of the myth
of Er.
1.~. By T. Martin: Tbeonis Smymaei LiiJer de Astronomia cum Sereni
fragmento. Textum prim us edidit ... T. M. (Paris. 1849). p. 74 ff.
H. This hypothesis was advanced by E. Hiller: 'De Adrasri Peripatetki in
Platonis Timaeum commentario'. Rbeinisches Museum, Neue Folge 26
< IH'"'I). pp. '582-'589. It was adopted by Switalski: op. cit, pp. '58-91 and by
later scholars. That the precise source is Adrastus' Commemary on the
Timaeus is not stated by Theo, although circumstantial evidence indicates
that this is the work in\'olved. Cf. Porphyry: In Ptol. Ht~rm. 96. 1-6.
-1'5. As reviewed by Waszink: Studien zum Timaioskommentar ties
Calcidius I. Die erste Halfte ties Kommentars (mil Ausnahme der Kapite/
iiherdie Wellseele). p. 22.
16. Waszink: op. cit., pp. 22-2.3. Cf. Waszink: Timaeus a Ctllcidio
translatus commentarioque instructus. pp. c-ci.
432 NE(>PLATONISM
Timaeus by the Neoplatonist Porphyry, namely: 1) an argument

that Plato's doctrine of transmigration teaches not the reincar-
nation of a human soul in the body of a beast as punishment for
vice but only its reincarnation in the body of a more bestial
man, -i7 and 2) an argument that Plato's teaching about the
disorderly motion in the Receptacle does not signify that matter
itself is subject to instability but only the bodies arising from the
initial imposition of form. -is In neither case does Calcidius iden-
tify this Neoplatonist as his source, yet the peculiarly Por-
phyrian character of both doctrines is attested by other ancient
writers. -t9 Furthermore, that Calcidius had direct recourse to the
treatise of Porphyry would follow from the chronological prox-
imity of the two writers to one another. ;o
In investigating the writers who influenced Calcidius' com-
mentary - those cited by name: Plato, Aristotle, Philo,
Numenius, and Origen, and those not cited by name: Adrastus
and Porphyry - we have concluded that they are sometimes
direct and sometimes indirect sources. The relation between
these writers themselves can also be determined since we know
47. Calcidius: In Tim. 198.219.4-9.

iR.Ibid. 301.302, 17-19.
49. For passage I) (whose doctrine is known primarily from Porphyry's De
Regressu Animae. although its occurrence also in the commentary on Pla!O
selms likely) see F.. Steinheimer: Untersuchungen iiber die Que/1m des
Cba/cidius (Aschaffenburg. 1912), pp. 32-34; For passage 2) (whose doctrine
is explicitly associated with Porphyry's Commentary on the Timaeus by an-
cient testimony) see Waszink: Timaeus a Ca/cidio trans/atus, commentarlo-
que instructus, p. xci and van Winden: op. cit., pp. 25 1-2<;2. There Is a third
passage whose Porphyrian origin is only slightly less certain. Seep. 469 and
n. 216.
iO. My remarks on the intluence of Porphyry over Calcidius have been
concerned with the former's role as an independent philosopher. In connec-
tion with Porphyry's role as a transmiuer of doxographical information there
is less that can be stated with certainty.
CALCJDJliS
that Plato and Aristotle figured among the sources of both

Numcnius and Adrastus, while Plato, Aristotle, Numenius, and
Adrastus were all employed by Porphyry. c; I Such a genealogy
has the obvious consequence of placing Calcidius' literary ac-
tiYity at some point from the early fourth century onwards.
The foregoing analysis is sufficient to indicate that the ques-
tions of this writer's identity and date are not easy to settle.
However, even though the biographical information is of
doubtful value, the study of linguistic style suggests a dating in
the late fourth century, with which the analysis of philosophical
sources need not conflict. c;2 The question of Calcidius' religious
affiliation can be settled more easily for several reasons.
Although the character of his literary culture might seem to imp-
ly a pagan affiliation, his definite knowledge of both the Old
and New Testaments indicates his Christianity, as does his occa-
'i I. In addition to the remarks above regarding Philo and Origen. the
following testimonies should be noted: for Numenius and Aristotle, Eusebius:
Pmep. Ettmg. XIV. 'i. 8: for Adrastus and Plato: Porphyry: '" Ptol. Harm.
'J6. 1-6: for Porphyry and Numenius: Proclus: bz Tim. l, 77, 21-24: and for
Porphyry and Adrastus: Porphyry: '" Ptol. Ht~rm 7, 24-8. 'i and 96, 1-6.
Tlu~r~ is also som~ evidenc~ for Orig~ns knowledge of Numenius and Por-
phyry's ofOrigen. All these relations may be tabulated briefly:
'i2. Waszink: Timaeus a Ca/cidio translatus commentarioque instructus,

pp. xii-xiii and X\' opts for :1 dating a little after A.D. -iOO. Courn~lle: op. cit ..
pp. l 'i'i.:\ would bring this forward about two decades.
..f.H NEOPl.ATONISM
sional usc of purely ecclesiastical terminology. 'i.~
6.11 THE COMMBNTARIUS IN TIMABUM
Calcidius' Commentary on the Timaeus begins with some in-

troductory chapters in which the author first explains his
reasons for composing such a work, and secondly makes some
general remarks about the subject-matter of Plato s dialogue.
The reason for writing such a commentary is that the Timaeus
itself is so difficult a text, since it deals with each of the sciences
with which it is concerned by using the appropriate technical
terminology, and previous commentators have not made suffi-
cient efforts to clarify such obscurities as arise. 'i4 The content of
the Timaeus is explained on the one hand in terms of its relation
to that of the Republic- the cosmological text is related to the
political one in that the investigation of natural justice sup-
plements the examination of positive justice5'i - and on the
other by an inventory of the various topics which are discussed
listing twenty-seven items- (i) the generation of the world, (ii)
the origin of soul, (iii) modulation or harmony, (iv) numbers, (v)
the fixed stars and the planets, (vi) the heaven, (vii) the four
kinds of living creature, (viii) the origin of the human race, (ix)
the reasons why some men are intelligent and others
unintelligent, (x) vision, (xi) images, (xii) the value of vision,
(xiii) matter, (xiv) time, (xv) the first material elements and their
processes, (xvi) the various bodily humors and phlegm, (xvii)
the senses of smell and taste, (xviii) the differences of colors and
their changes into one another, (xix) the seat of life, (xx) the
soul and its parts and locations, (xxi) bodily limbs and joints,
S3. The evidenu~ for Calcidius' Christianity is conveniently summarized

hy Switalski: op. cit .. pp. S-6 and \X'aszink: op. cit .. pp. xi-xiii. This religious
affiliation does not enter significantly into his philosophical expositions.
S-1. Calcidius: In Tim. l, S7. 1-f. S9. l.
<;<;.Ibid. S. S9. 36, 60, 3.
CALCIDJliS 435
(xxii) the nations of the world, (xxiii) sickness of the body,

(xxiv) sickness of the soul, (xxv) the healing of both substances,
(xxvi) the world itself and all its contents, and (xxvii) the in-
telligible God. <; 6
In our investigation of the philosophical ideas contained in
this commentary, it seems best not to proceed chapter by
chapter studying each significant question as it arises. This ap-
pro:tch has already been pursued with convincing results by
J. H. Waszink.s']. C. M. van Winden,58 and). den Boeft,<;9 and
one can add little to the study of Calcidius by attempting to
summarize their conclusions. On the other hand, it may perhaps
he useful to investigate the philosophical content of the com-
mental")' from a synthetic viewpoint, proceeding from doctrine
to doctrine according to the natural articulation of the system as
a whole. This method will have the advantages not only of pro-
viding a complement to the interpretative studies mentioned,C1o
hut of making Calcidius' relation to earlier Platonic thinkers
more immediately apparent.
i6. Ibid. 7, 60, 4-61, 9. This list seems to comprise a series of topics for
possible discussion - which suggest themselves as one reads through the
Timaeus - rather than a structured analysis of a work already composed.
Thb is indicated by the fact that Calcidius book terminates at topic (xiii).
whill: the: dedicatory letter implies that the break was due to the author
himsdf. A more detailed analysis of the discussion of topics (i)- (xiii) has been
made: hy van Winden: op. cit., pp. 10-28.
ii. Waszink: Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius I. Die erste
1/iiljte des Kommentars (mit Ausnahme der Kapitel uber llie Weltseele) -
rc:).:arding chapters 8-25, 32-50. and 92-118.
iH. \'an Winden: op. cit.- regarding chapters 268-3ii.
ilJ. J. den Boeft: Calcldlus on Fate. His Doctrine and Sources (Leiden.
19-tl)- n:garding chapters 142-190. and Calcidius on Demm1s (Commen-
tarius cb. Irr-J 36) (Leiden. 1977)- regarding chapters 127-136.
60. J. R. O'Donnell: 'The Meaning of Silt'CI in the Commentary on the
1"itnaeus of Plato by Chalcidius', MedlaetJa/ Studies i (194i), pp. 1-20 is a
study of a single doctrine in this way.
436 NEOPI.ATONISM
6.2 GOD, MATTER, FORM

This relation is indicated by the prominent position which
the writer assigns to the triadic schema of 'God' (deus), 'Matter'
(silva), and 'Exemplar' (exemplum) so characteristic of the
Platonism reported by doxographic authorities.6t However,
Calcidius' account of the three principles is more elaborately
constructed than similar descriptions in earlier writers in that he
justifies his selection of precisely these three principles in terms
of the definition of a principle itself.62 A 'principle' (initium),
he argues, is the origin of other things. As such it must have the
characteristics of being (i) 'simple' (simplex): otherwise it would
not differ from the things arising from it, (ii) 'without quality'
(sine qualitate) - what possesses quality must be a combina-
tion of matter and accident, and (iii) 'eternal' (perpetua): other-
wise it would require something to produce it at a certain
time.63 According to these criteria it is the members of the
Platonic triad which best deserve the title of principles,64
whereas the four elements of the physicists are discounted at
least because of the requirement of simplicity.6'i Calcidius' ac-
61. See p. 24 2 ff. for a detailed analysis of the three principles in dox-
ographic writers (with special reference to Apulcius).
62. Calcidius: In Tim. 307,308, I.f-309, 2.
63. Ibid. 30';, 306, 11-306, ;\07, 19. With Calcidius' account of a principle
should be compared Aristotle's analysis at Metapb.!:l. 1. 10 12b34- 2; 10 13b3
from which certain concepts have been derived (especially the notion that a
principle is a 'limit' (7t&pac;- limes}). Calcidius' notion that a principle must be
eternal is derived perhaps from both Plato: Pbaedr. 24<;d and Aristotle: Pbys.
I. 6. 189a30-31 and Metapb. B, L 1000h26-27.
M. Calcidius: In Tim . ."107, 308, 2-13. In this passage Calcidius adds two
subordinate points to tht" argument: first, that principles should not arise
from something else or from one another; and secondly. that principles have
traditionally been held to comprise one active and one passive. With the first
point should he compared Aristotle: Phys. l, ';, 188a27-28, and with these-
cond ibid. I. <;, 188a 19.
65. Calcidius: In Tim. 307, 307,20-308, 2.
CAlCIDIUS 437
count of the three principles is also more carefully developed in

that he makes some attempt to explain how we come to unders-
tand them. In philosophical discussions, he contends, two kinds
of argument are possible: the 'syllogism' (syllogism us) pro-
ceeding from prior to posterior and the 'resolution' (resolutio)
from posterior to prior.66 This latter kind of argument, now
defined further as a movement from (i) sensible to intelligible.
(ii) temporal to eternal. (iii) prior for us to prior in nature. and
(iv) posterior in nature to posterior for us, must be used to reach
principles.< 7 Yet there is still more to Calcidius' theory, for in
discussions of the principles themselves, he continues, there are
two kinds of argument employed.68 These are the resolution as
described earlier and the 'composition' (compositio) following
(J6 IIJid. ;o2. 303. 9-15. Calcidius' distinction of syllogismus and

reso/utio seems initially to be influenced by Aristotle's contrast of
ouHoytOJlO~ and bmyroyi) at Anal. Pr. l, 1, 24b 18-22; Top. l, 12, lOS a 10-19;
EtiJ. Nic. VI. 3. 1139b18-34; etc. In other words we are concerned with the
processes of deduction and induction respectively.
6-. Calcidius: /u Tim. 302. 303, 15-304, 17. With the details of this argu-
ment should be compared Aristotle: Pb)'S. l, 1, 184a 10-184b 14 (from which
espnially the notion of a movement from 'things knowable to us to things
knowable by nature' (fJJliV yvroplJlWT&pa ... tfj lj)UCJ&l yvroptJlWT&pa) seems to
he derived).
<H. According to van Winden: op. cit.. p. 134 the pair com-
/}(Jsiliolreso/utio is equivalent to the earlier pair syl/ogismuslresolutio.
llowner. this interpretation runs into the immediate difficulty that Calcidius
h:.1~ previously stated that resolutio alone is proper to the investigation of
principles (see Calcidius: In Tim. 302, .~03, 15-304, 2) while compositio is
here described as a method of discovering principles. It therefore seems more
likely that compositio represents a third argument to be added to the pair
syllogismuslreso/utio and allied to the latter. This position may even have
hcen stated explicitly when Calcidius said that the investigation of principles
Cl'lJUired not resolulio but arguments 'flowing from resolution' (e.Y resolu
tione mananlia (ibid. 302. ;o.f. 1-2)). For further interpretation one may
cite Alhinus: Didasc. 5, 5 and 10, 5; and Origen: Contra Cels, VII, 44 as
parallels.
438 NEOPLATONISM
upon it, their relation to one another being analogous to that

between separation and unification.69 The former kind of argu-
ment, now explained as a process in which the mind abstracts
the qualities, quantities, and shapes from sensible objects, is the
one which brings us to perception of Matter;71) while the latter
kind, now explained as a process in which the percipient ex-
trapolates from the order inherent in those objects to the ex-
istence of a transcendent mind endowed with intellect, will lead
us to understanding of God and the Exemplar.7J Calcidius'
reference to the triadic schema therefore recalls the traditional
69. Calcidius: In Tim. 304, 305. 17-18. Calcidlus' distinction of reso/utio

and compositio seems to be influenced by Aristotle's contrast of (upaip&<nc;
andnp6o8&atc;atDeCae/olll.l. 299ai5-17;Metapb. M, 2. 1077b7-ll;etc.
These signify the processes of abstracting or combining the various proper-
ties of physical objects mentally.
70. Calcidius: In Tim. 303. 304, 18-305, 16. With the details of this argu-
ment it is Aristotle's understanding of cupa{p&atc; which must be compared
and contrasted. Aristotle's a<paip&au; is normally concerned with
mathematical objects: it represents the abstraction of sensible qualities until
only the quantitative and continuous (in one. two, or three dimensions) is
left. See Aristotle: Metapb. K. 4. 1061a28-b3 together with Anal. Post. I. 5.
74a32-b4: I. 13. Rib.:\: and De Anim. Ill. 4, 429bl8. Calcidius' reso/utio on
the other hand represents the process of abstraction leading to matter. The
closest parallel to this is perhaps Aristotle: Metapb. z. 3. 1029a 16-19 'But
when length, breadth, and depth are abstracted. we see nothing left except
that which is bounded by these: so that to those who consider this question
matter alone must seem to be substance' (ai..i..a J.lliv a<patpou~tvou ~ftKouc; Kai
ni..atouc; Kai po.eouc; ou&f:v 6pw~EV U7tOAEt7t6~EVOV, nAi]v d ti ott tO
6pt~OJ.LEVOV uno totrrwv, Wert& ti]V UAT)V avayKT) <paiv~:aGat ~6VT)V ouaiav oiitw
OK07tOUJ.lEVOtc;).
-.I. Calcidius: In Tim. :\04 ..iO"i, 17-306, 10. With the details of this argu-
ment it is Aristotle's understanding of np6a8&mc; which must be compared
and contrasted. Aristotle's np6a8&crtc; is usually concerned with physical ob-
jects: it represents the addition of sensible qualities until the complete natural
object is revealed. See Aristotle: Metaph. M. 2. 1077b4-1 I together with De
Caelo lli. I, 299a 15-17. Calcidius compos it io however extends this process
from the reconstituted object to its higher cause.
CALCIDiliS 4.W
accounts of Platonism found in the doxographies, although the

detailed elaboration goes beyond those accounts. This elabora-
tion betrays definite Peripatetic influence.
6.2ITHENATUREOFGOD
Regarding the first of these three principles - God -

another passage speaks as follows: 'In the first place, all things
and the world itself are sustained and governed principally by
the highest God, who is the supreme Good, beyond all
substance and all nature, above all appraisal and intellect,
towards whom all things strive, while he himself possesses total
perfection. not needing the association of another' .n We might
perhaps summarize the content of this passage by saying that
Calcidius lists seven attributes of the first principle: that it is (i)
the Good, (ii) the One, 7.~ (iii) transcending substance, (iv)
tr<mscending intellect, (v) perfect, (vi) cause of all,74 and (vii)
end of all. Of these attributes the majority are standarized in
Platonic descriptions of God from the first century A.D. on-
~2. C.akidius: In Tim. 176, 204, S9. In order to facilitate the ensuing
analy~is. the text can he divided into seven basic statements:
(vil P1incipin cumta quae stmt et ipsum mundum c:ontineri regique
fJrincipaliter quidem a summo deo,
(i) qui est summum bonum
(iii l u/trt1 omnem substantlam omnemque twturam.
(iv) aestimtltione intellectuque melior.
(vii) quem cuncta expettml,
( ,. J cum ipse sit plentle perfection is
(ii Jet nullius societatis indiguus.
~.~. A! ibid. .:\9. 88, 1117 God is described more explicitly as 'unity'
<singularitas).
~.!. Cf. ibid. 39. 88, 11-17; 188, 213. ';;and 319, 31';, 20. AI ibid. 188,
2 12. 22-213. 2 God is described as the source of substance to other things
Whik soul is called '!he third substance' (tertia substantia) after God and
pro,idencc. The clear implication is that God is substance here.
440 NEOPLATONISM
wards,7s although two perhaps represent innovations as far as

the Latin philosophical tradition is concerned and therefore re-
quire brief comment.
The statement (iii) that God transcends substance could be in-
terpreted in various ways depending upon whether essence and
existence - both signified by the term 'substance'76 - are
distinguished or not. If they are, the transcendence of the first
principle indicates that it is not an essence although it is exis-
tent;77 if they are not, the first principle's transcendence must
signify that it is not an essence and therefore not existent.7R
Since there is no other passage in Calcidius dealing with this
question, it is difficult to decide which of these is the correct in-
terpretation, although the earlier would have seemed more
75. Cf. the descriptions of Apuleius (pp. 266-272) and the Ascleplus (pp.
343-344). Whereas Calcidius seems to present a systematic survey ofdivine
auributes - suessing his positive transcendence (i. ii). his negative
transcendence (iii, iv), the basis of his causality (v). his efficient (vi). and final
causality (vii)- the earlier accounts are confined to literary reminiscences of
Pla10.
76. van Winden: op. cit.. p. 221 also distinguishes a third sense of substan-
tia in Calcidius: 'substratum'. But that is obviously not a possibility at this
point in the argument.
77. This would correspond to the teaching of Plotinus and other
Neopla!Onists. Plotinus often speaks of the One as beyond 'substance' (ouaia)
without specifying whether it is essence or existence which is being denied.
See l:.'tm. lll, 8/30/10, 26-32; V, 1/10/7, 17-24; V. 3/~9/10, 34-39; V, S /.U/
6, 1 ff.; etc. However, other passages clarify the position by stating that it is
possible to speak of the One as existent provided that this is done in :1 non-
predicative manner. See l:'nn. V, 3 /49/ 13. 24-31; V. S /32/ 6, I ff.; V. S /32/
13. 11-13; and VI. 7/38/38. 1-9. This Plotinian interpretation of the One's
transcendence of substance is developed by Porphyry: In Pe~rm. XII. 22-27
and Marius Victorinus: Adt'. Arium lll, 7, 9-17.
78. This would reflect an uncritical reading of Plotinus and other
Neoplatonists. It might also reflect an interpretation of earlier
Neopythagorean referenles to the One's transcendence of substam:e whose
exact meaning was perhaps as unclear to Calcidius as it is to us. Seen. 80.
CALCIDIUS 441
readily tenable. But what was the inspiration behind this

philosophical view? To say that it is derived from Plato's state-
ment that the Good is 'beyond being' (entK&tva tfic; ouaiac;) is
not to answer this question, 7 9 since it remains the case that Latin
pJatonists had for centuries ignored this aspect of their master's
teaching. To point to the occurrence of the doctrine in certain
:\eopythagoreans,Ho the Hermetica,Ht and the NeoplatonistsR2
in general (who were drawing on an interpretation of Plato
which can perhaps be traced back to Speusippus83) constitutes a
more productive line of investigation. Two of these classes of
writers are represented among the clearly documented sources
-9. Plato: Rep. VI, ';09b. This pa~sage is often interpreted by the
:'ljcoplatonists in conjunction with Plato: Parm. 1-llc. Sec Plotinus: Em1. V, I
/101!~. 12"'.
HO. See Moderatus at Simpllcius: In Pbys. I, 7. 230, 34 ff. and Brontinus at
syrianus: In Metapb. N, I, 165. 33 ff. The wording of these passages suggests
that Moderatus and Brontinus - following a tradition which circumstantial
l"\'ilkncc has traced back to Eudorus (first century B.C.) - combined the
Pythagorean theory of the One and the Dyad with Plato's teaching. Among
tht many modern works of scholarship on this question see especially: E. R.
Dodds: 'The Parmenides of Plato and the Origins of the Neoplatonic One',
Classiml Quarter~y 22 (1928), pp. 129-143; A.-J. Festugiere: La reVI!Iation
d'Hermes Trismegiste IV: Le Dieu inconnu et Ia gnose (Paris, 1954), pp.
I H:\ I; J. Whittaker: "EntK&tva vou Kai otiaiac;. Vigiliae Cbristianae 23
II %9). pp. 91-104; 'Neopythagoreanism and Negative Theology', Symbolae
Osloenses -44 ( 1969). pp. 109-125; 'Neopythagoreanism and the Transcen-
<knt Ahsolutc', ibid. 48 (1973), pp. 77-86; and Dillon: op. cit., pp. 115-135
and :\H-:\51.
Hl.SccCmtJ. Herm.ll.'i.33.-i;ll.12.37.'-9;Vl,-l.7-t,21-7'i.1:andXIl,
I. l-1. 1-2.
H2. Stc nn. "''7. "'H and 79.
H.~. Sec Spcusippus: fr. 3-le (Aristotle: Metapb. N, 5. 1092a9 ff.) 'The One
it~t'lf is not even an existent thing' (J.lTJlif; ov tt &ivat to fv atito) and in Proclus:
111 Parm. interpr. G. de Moerbeke -tO. 1-2 'They think that the One is higher
than hc:ing' (Le unum enim me/ius ente putantes). However, concrete
nidtnl'c for linking Speusippus with the Neopythagorc:ans of the first cen-
tury A.D. b totally lacking: sec Dillon: op. cit .. p. 12.
442 NEOPI.A T<>NISM
of our commentator, for NumeniusH4- the Neopythagorean-

and Porphyryso; - the Neoplatonist - were perhaps the most
important of his named and unnamed sources respectively.
The assertion (iv) that God transcends intellect could also be
interpreted in several ways since the term 'intellect' has both a
microcosmic and a macrocosmic sense.R6 In the first case, the
84. See Numenius: fr. 16 (Eusehius: Praep. Etlmg. XI, 22 ..'\-'i) 'It is suffi-
cient for the Good to he the principle of being ... the demiurge of being will
certainly be the Good itself' (CxpKEi tO aya9ov ouaiac; ElVa! CxPX.~ .. -~ 7t01J fatal
Kai 6 tile; ouaiac; 5TJJ.UOUpyoc; autoaya9ov). We must observe that - in addi-
tion to amhi\'alences in the passage already quoted - other Numenian texts
identify the Good and being. See Numenius: fr. 17 (Eusehius: Praep. Etang.
XI. 18, 22-23) 'the first intellect which is called "Being in itself'' (6 l.lEVtOl
nprotoc; voiic;, oanc; KaA.Eital auto6v). The account of the relation between
the Good and being in fr. 2 (Eusebius: Praep. Er. ang. XI. 21. 7-22) perhaps
mediates this contradiction. On Numenius' theological system as a whole see
H.-C. Puech: 'Numenius d'Apamee et les theologies orientales au second
siecle', Melanges]. Bidez II (Bruxelles, 1934), pp. 745-778; E. A. Leemans:
Studie over den Wijsgeer Nume,zius van Apamea met Uitgave der
Fragmenten (Brussel, 1937). pp. 34-43; R. Beutler: 'Numenios', Paulys
Realencyclopadie der klassisc:ben Altertumsurissenscbaft, Suppi.-Band 7
(Stuttgart, 1940), col. 664-678; Festugiere: op. cit.. pp. 123-132; E. R. Dodds:
'Numenius and Ammonius', Les sources de Plotin (Fondation Hardt, Entre-
liens sur I'Antlquiti c/assique 5) (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1960), pp. 1-61; G.
Martano: Numenio d' Apamell. Un precursore del neoplatonismo (Napoli,
1960), pp. 21-49; H.). Kramer: Der Ursprung der Geistmetapbysik. Unter-
suchungen zur Gescbicbte des P/atonismus zuiscben Platon und Plotin
(Amsterdam, 1964), pp. 63-92; D. ). O'Meara: 'Being in Numenius and
Plotinus. Some Points of Comparison', Pbronesis 21 (1976), pp. 120-129;
and Dillon: op. cit., pp ..'\61-:n9.
85. See Porphyry: Sent. 26, I 5, 9-1.'\ 'the non-being which is above being'
(to im&p to ov I..! it ov) and In Purm. XII, 'i 'The higher is the One without be-
ing' (KCxKEivo 1.1EV v civoumov). Porphyry employs a special term for this
transcendence of being- interpreted along the lines described in n. 77 -
namely 'priority to being' (to npooumov ). See 111 Parm. X, 23-25.
86. den Hoeft: Calcidius 011 Fate. His Doctrine and Sources, p. 89 also
distinguishes a third sense of inte/lectus in Calcidius: the (hypostasis of) In-
tellect. But this is not really distinct from the second sense in this context.
CALCIDil!S
transcendence of the first principle would indicate that it can-

not he comprehended intellectively by us although it might still
he comprehended intellectively by itself;!r7 in the second case,
the first principle's transcendence would signify that it not only
cannot be comprehended intellectively by us but cannot even
he comprehended intellectively by itself.BB Although there are
other passages in Calcidius referring to this question, none of
these goes beyond the present example in endorsing one inter-
pretation or the other, while it remains quite possible that the
two senses are conflated. But what was the source of his
philosophical viewpoint here? If the first interpretation is cor-
rect. we are dealing with a doctrine which occurs in Plato's
Parmenides, Symposium, Timaeus, and Epistula VJJ.H9 As
adapted by various Greek and Latin Platonists of the first three
centuries, our commentator could easily have been inspired by
this teaching, as also in its various developments by
Neopythagoreans, 90 Hermeticists, 91 and Neoplatonists. 92 If the
H""'. Seen. 92.

HH. St:t: n. 96.
H9. These texts of Plato, together with their interpretation by Albinus and
Apuldus, have been discussed on pp. 266-272.
90. See the passages cited in n. 80 and also Numenius: fr. 17 (Euscbius:
Pmep. HNmg XI, 18, 22-23) where the highest god is 'totally unknown'
t ltUVtcinamv ayvoOUJ.U:vov). Numcnius' position is apparently identical with
that of Albinus and Apuleius in that his first god is (i) unknown (ibid.), (ii) in-
tdligihle (fr. 7 (Eusebius: Praep. E11ang. XI, 10, 9-11) and fr. 8 (Eusebius:
Praep. Emng. XI, 10, 12-14)), and (iii) knowable intuitively (fr. 2 (Eusebius:
Pmep. Et{lflf.(. XI, 21, 7-22)). For bibliograph)' on the unknown god see titles
listed inn. 80.
91. St:c Corp. Hemz. XIII, 6, 202. 16-17 and Asclep. :H. 344, 24-2<; (both
tnts making it quite dear that microcosmic unknowability alont: is involv-
nl.)
92. St:t: Plotinus: l:'mz. Ill, H /!o()/9, 19-23; V, I /10/ 10, 1-10; V, 3 /!9/ 11,
1-20; and V, 5 /32/6. 17-21. Porphyry: Setll. 2<;, 15, 2 argues that the One 'is
lomemplated by the absence of intellection which transcends intellection'
IOr.o>pr.itat cSi: CtVO'lOiQ. KpEittovt voJiar.wc;). Cf. /n Parm. II, 14-31; VI, 2.3.31;
444 NEOPl.A TONISM
second interpretation is correct, we are concerned with a

theory developed in opposition to Aristotle's De Anima and
Metaphysic~-~. Since this position is not presented by the earlier
Greek and Latin Platonists, the commentator could hardly have
acquired it from their writings, although he could have found it
in Neopythagorean,94 Hermetic,95 and Neoplatonic texts.96 For
IX. 24-26; and IX, 34- X, 16. Porphyry has a special term for this
transcendence of intellection - parallel to that used for transcendence of be-
in~- namely 'pre-intellection' (npoEVVOEiv,npotvvma). See Se11t. 26. I 5, 8-9.
93. Especially the notion of intellect which is object to itself at Aristotle:
De Anim. III. 4. 430a8-9 and Metaph. A. 7, 1072bl9-20. For Plotinus'
specific response to this seen. 96.
94. See Numenius: fr. 22 (Proclus: In Tim. Ill, 103, 28-32) 'Numenius iden-
tifies the first god with the "Living Creature itself" and says that it has in-
tellection by operating in conjunction with the second god' (NoulltiVlo<; li
tov 11v npciltov Kata to '6 tan ~<j)ov' tattEl Kai IJlTIOlV tv npoax.ptiaEl toil
liwtpou voEiv). Numenius dearly indicates that the first god is not intellec-
tive in its essential nature, although elsewhere he adheres to the more con-
ventional Platonic doctrine of his day that the first god is 'intellect' (voil<;).
See Numenius: fr. 16 (Eusebius: Praep. Evang. XI, 22, 3-5), etc.
95. See Corp. Henn. II, 5 .H. -4-8 and II, 12. 37. 2-9 (the former passage
containing the interesting doctrine that God is unknowable macrocosmically
and knowable microcosmically because there is no duality in relation to
himself but duality in relation to man).
96. See Plotinus: Enn. V, I, /1019. 7-9: V. 3 1491 II, 25-30: V, 6 12-41 .~.
20-H: VI. 7/38/ 37. 1-32; and VI, 9/9/6,42-57. Porphyry: Se1lf. 43. 54.7-11
argues that 'it is necessary for the One to precede multiplicity. That Intellect
is multiple is clear, since it always has intellectual objects which are multiple'
(npo li tcilv noHcilv ClVIi.'YKTI Eival tO fv. <'>n li nona 6 VOU<; liJiA.ov. VOEi yap
aEi tO. VOtlJlata OUX, &v <'Svta ). Cf. Porphyry: In Pann. V, 9-10. For both
writers it is the duality of the intellective process (even when subject and ob-
ject are identical as in Aristotle) which makes it incompatible with the One's
nature. However, both also maintain that the One has an absolutely simple
form of self-awareness transcending this. See Plotinus: Enn. V. 4 /7/ 2. 15-19:
VI. 7 /38/ 39. 25-26; and VI, 8 /39/ 16. 30-35. Porphyry: In Parm. V. 8-35
speaks of a 'knowledge beyond knowledge and ignorance' (yvcilm<; &~ro
YVWOE(I)<; Kai ayvoia<;).
CAI.CIDILJS 445
hoth these interpretations therefore we are sent back to those

dearly documented sources of Calcidius: Numenius - the
Ncopythagorean -and Porphyry- the Neoplatonist.
6. 22 THE NATURE OF MATTER

Calcidius' doctrine regarding the second principle - Matter
- is considerably more complicated, and the longest section of
the Commentary on the Timaeus is devoted to its exposition.9"'
This discussion falls into three distinct parts: a running com-
mentary on the text of Timaeus 47e - 53c;98 a historical survey
of various theories of matter - those of the jews, the
Prcsocratics, Aristotle, and Hellenistic writers- proceeding ac-
cording to types of doctrine;99 and a systematic treatment of the
doctrine of matter. too Our procedure in summarizing this com-
plex discussion will be first, to examine the interpretation of
matter itself by combining the systematic treatment with
material drawn from the running commentary; and secondly, to
investigate the sources of this interpretation by comparing the
systematic treatment with statements made in the historical
survey.
Calcidius' interpretation of matter contains much which is
traditional among Platonic writers of earlier generations
alongside certain innovations whose significance requires com-
mem.tot The traditional elements include the reading of Plato's
9"'. The structure of this section of the commentary has been admirably
lksnihld hy van Winden: op. cit .. pp. 24-28.
IJH. This section is divided and placed at the beginning (Calcidius: In Tim.
26H. r.~. "'-2'74, 2'79, 7) and end (ibid. 321. 316. 14-354. 3.f5. 16) of the
Llbcussion.
IJIJ. This section runs frGm ibid. 2'75, 279, R-307, 309, 2.
100_ This section runs from ibid. 302, 303,9-320, 316. 13.
I 0 I. Apuleius doctrine of matter (derived from the doxographical tradi-
tion) should be compared. See pp. 318-321. At that point we noted the texts
from Plato's Timaeus relevant to the development of the theory.
4-i6 NEOPI.ATONISM
text in such a way that it postulates a matter which is neither

sensible nor intelligible 1o2 - to be either of these it would have
to possess form, quality. and so on, whereas matter clearly lacks
all of these characteristics.I03 It is therefore perceptible only by
'conjecture' (suspicio).l04 Here, Calcidius adds that, although
this principle cannot be grasped directly by sensation of itself, it
can be approached indirectly by 'co-sensation' (consensus) from
the objects arising within it, this latter being illustrated by two
analogies: darkness is 'seen' through our consciousness of the
light which is absent, and the consonants in spoken words are
'heard' in conjunction with the vowels.JOS Furthermore,
although matter cannot be grasped directly by intellection of
itself it can be approached indirectly through the abstraction of
forms.oc. All this represents the subjective approach to the
nature of this principle, but there is necessarily an objective
theory in addition to it. Thus, Calcidius begins by arguing that
matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeaJI<r:' - to be the
former it would have to possess form and quality and therefore
be perceptible by sensation. and to be the latter it would have to
be incapable of becoming a body and also be perceptible by in-
tellection, ws whereas matter has none of these attributes. It is
rather potentially both corporeal and incorporcaJ.I09 Next, he
shows that this principle is 'everlasting' (perpetua) because it is
the foundation of all things,IIO and 'infinite' (infinita) because
I02. Calcidius: In Tim. ;\20. ;H6, 8- I I. (Cf. ihid. :\21, 516, 21-2.'\ and 554.
328, 10-11 ). Texts drawn from the running commentary are noted in curved
parentheses ( ).
103. (ibid. 522. 3I7, 19-21).
IIJ.i. (JIJI'd. 34"'. 3.W. 3-6).
IO'i. (Ibid. 34'S. 336, 14-338, 6).
106. (1/Jid. 2"74. 278. 13-16).
Ill"". ibid. ;\19.311, J'7-19.Cf.i/Jid ..U0.3I6,II-13.
I08. Ibid. 3I9. 3I4. I9-520, 5I6. 1.~.
109./IJid. 520,516, I 1-1;\.
I 10. /hid. 3I2, 3 I I. 10-II.
CALCIDIUS -447
it is not subject to bodily limitation, II I thereby indicating that it

is free of boundaries in both the temporal and spatial senses of
that term. Finally, Calcidius notes that matter is formless and
qualitiless -when it appears to have substance, quality, quanti-
n. relation, and the other categories, this is the result of the
f;Jrrns entering into it rather than any determination of the
substratum itself. 112
That there are elements in this doctrine which have not been
traditional among Platonic writers of earlier generations is in-
dicated by the commentator's handling of the question: is mat-
ter immutable or mutable?ll3 To this he gives the seemingly
paradoxical answer that it is both, since it is on the one hand
'impassive' (impetibi/is)ll4 -as the substratum of all changes,
it must not itself be subject to those changes which it
underlies lie;- and on the other 'passive' (patibilis)116- as the
suhsrratum of all changes, it can itself be described as subject to
those changes which it underlies.ll7 If Calcidius' theory served
simply to explain the substitution of various determinate forms
above the immutable substratum during the temporal (post-
cosmogonical) phase of existence, it could still be paralleled in
some of the earlier philosophical literature.tts However, this
I I I. IIJid. 319, 315, 4-6 and 322 ..H 7. 20-21.

112./bid. 319.314.19-315.1.etc.
I 13 Ibid. 308, 309. 14 ff.
I I . (Ibid. 351. 342. 13- 14 ). This is Plato's view. See Tim. 50b 'It never
lltparts at all from its own character' (EK yap ti\c; &auti;c; to 1tapa1tav OIJK
,;~ioru rat 5uv<i~Ewc;).
I 15. Calddius: /11 Tim. 3 I 3 . .312 . .3-.31-l, .H 2, II.
116. (Ibid. 268, 273, 16). This is Aristotle's position. See De Gen. et Corr.
I~ ..U .. b 18 'matter qua matter is passive' (i]5'ui..11U uA.11 7ta911TIK6v).
I 1:. (Calcidius: In Tim. 329,323.8-1 1).
I IH. See Aetius: Plac. l, 9, 3. 308al-3 and b3-4 (postulation of a material
principle which is 'impassive' (0:7talh'lc;)); ibid. l, 9, I. 307al9-21 and b5-7
( nenl for a substratum of change); ibid. I, 9, 2, 307a24 and b I I (postulation
ol a material principle which is 'changeable' (~Etai3Alltti)); and ibid. I, 9, 4-5,
448 NEOPI.ATONISM
theory also serves to explain the fluctuation of certain rudimen-

tary qualities within that immutable substratum during the
atemporal (pre-cosmogonical) moment of existence, thereby
constituting a clear deviation from the standpoint of previous
philosophical traditions. 119 Thus, Calcidius observes that the
original motion of the Receptacle is an 'impulse from outside'
(alienus pulsus) although its disorderly character 'accords with
the nature of matter' (secundum naturam silvae) itself.12o Un-
doubtedly such a statement adds a striking clarification to the
notion that matter is both impassive and passive from different
points of view.
Some progress towards identifying the sources of these doc-
trines can be made with recourse to the historical survey which
has been conveniently provided by the commentator. The most
important part of this survey is the final section dealing with
Plato's theory where the existence of various schools of inter-
pretation is discussed, some exegetes (i) maintaining that their
master postulated a matter which was 'generated' (generata), 121
others (ii a) that he understood it to be 'ungenerated but
308a4-9 and b5-8 (need for the substratum to change). The fragmems of
Aetius chapter on matter do not allow us to parallel Calcidius' theory exact-
ly. yet the 'Platonic and Aristotelian' doctrine of the last passage comes very
close.
119. This doctrine was apparemly unique to Porphyry. See Philoponus: De
Aetern. Mundi XIV. ;\, 546, 5-11 'Porphyry in his commemary on the
Timaeus ... says that it is not matter which is moved with the traces in a
discordant and disorderly way ... but the bodies which ha,e already arisen
from matter and form' (6 youv nopq>upwc; tv toic; Eic; TOV TillatOV U7toll-
VTill<JlV ... ou tilv iiJ..11v Q>llalv ll&ta nov ixv&v to 7tAllllll&J..wc; &ivm Kal
(ltQKtroc; KlVOUil&VOV ... aHa l"Cx 1)511 f.~ iiJ..11c; Kai &iliouc; y&V61l&Va allata).
The importance of this parallel was first noted by Waszink: Timaeus a
Calcidin translatus cnmmentarioque instructus, pp. xci and 302 and van
Winden: op. c:it.. p. 251.
120. (Calcidius: In Tim. 352.342. 17-343. 20).
121. [Ibid. _l,OO, 302, 1-2]. Texts drawn from the: hiswrical survc:y are
noted in straight paremhcses [].
CALCIDilJS 449
animate' (sine generatione, sed anima praedita),l22 and others

(ii b) that he considered it to be ungenerated and having the
following attributes: it is 'immutable' (incommutabilis),
formless' (injormis), 'inanimate' (exanimis), and lacking
goodness. I.!:\ It is immediately apparent that some of these at-
trihutes are identical with those explicitly linked with matter in
the systematic treatment - the immutability and formlessness;
others supplementary to those affirmed in that connection -
the inanimateness and lack of goodness; and one identical with
an attribute implicitly postulated in the systematic treatment -
the lack of generation.IH On this basis, sources identifiable for
the interpretations of Plato listed in the historical survey are
likely to include those by whom the commentator was most
markedly influenced when speaking propria persona, these
sources being: for interpretation (i) certain Neopythagoreans
whose doctrine of the indefinite dyad produced by the monad
is the only close parallel mentioned in this commentary,12; and
for interpretation (ii a) Numenius whose doctrine identifying
matter with the evil world soul of Plato's Laws- described a
few paragraphs before the present discussion - corresponds at
all points to the theory of matter outlined here.I26 Regarding in-
terpretation (ii b) some more detailed observations are required.
122. [/bit/. 300, 302. 2-11].

123. [Ibid. 301, 302, 1'7-303. 8]. II should he no1ed 1ha1 Calcidius does
no1 c:xplicilly s1a1e 1ha1 1hese exegeles posiUiate an ungenerated matter
although the structure of his dassification requires this assumption.
I 21. See p. i:\6.
12'i. See [ibid. 29'i. 297, 16-19]. This doctrine is attributed to the
l'ythagoreans hy Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Pbilos. Vlll, 2<; (citing Alexander
l'olyhistor). to Eudorus hy Simplicius: In Pbys. I. <;, 181. 17-19. to Moderatus
hy Simplkius: In Pbys. I. i. 23 I. <; ff. (citing Porphyry). to the Hermeticists
hy lamhlichus: De Myst. VIII. .'\. 26<;, 6-10, and to the Orphics and
Hc:rmeticists hy Proclus: In Tim. I. 38<;, 18-386, 13.
126. Sec: [Calcidius: /11 Tim. 297, 299. 14-17 and 298.300, 1<;-17]. The
source of the Numenian position was Plato: Leg. X. 896e.
NEOPLATONISM
That Porphyry is the source of the last doctrine reported in

the historical survey is implied by the appearance of the tenet
that matter is immutable because the confused and disorderly
motion in the Receptacle during the pre-cosmogonical phase is
not in matter but 'in the materials and bodies which are called
"principles and elements of the world" ' (in materiis et cor-
paribus ... quae initia mundi atque elementa censentur).ll7
The peculiarly Porphyrian character of this theory is indicated
not only by the conceptual division of the Receptacle into a
totally bare substratum and a level of disorderly qualities but
also by the presence of the terminology initia mundi applied to
these qualities which recalls the KOOJ.l.OU cipx.ai similarly
employed in Porphyry's extant fragments.11.s This naturally
raises the question whether other aspects of the last doctrine of
matter- and therefore elements in Calcidius' own systematic
treatment where these correspond - are also derived from the
great Neoplatonic writer's work. Such a situation is quite possi-
ble since the latter mentions most of the same attributes in his
own treatises when he states that matter is 'impassive' (outE
n6.0'X,El), 11.9 'formless' (civEi5Eoc;), 130 'inanimate' (a~rooc;), 131 and
'an evil' (KaK6v).l31. There is certainly one point on which
12"7. [Calcidius: /t1 Tim. ~111. ~0.2. 17-~0;\. -il.

12H. See n. 119. For the notion that the disorderly qualities are 'principles
of the world' (KOCJJlOU apxai) see Porphyry: In Tim. fr. 47 (Philoponus: De
Aetern. Mundi VI, 1-4, I 64, 18-16'5, 6) ;md Philoponus: De Aetern. Mundi
XIV. ~. '546. 5-11. Regarding many aspects of the doctrine of matter Por-
phyry :tgrces with his teacher Plotinus, yet on this point the Iauer proposes a
somewhat different interpretation. See Plotinus: f:"m1. Ill, 6/.2617. Iff.
129. Porphyry: Sent . .2 I. 12. H-1 I. Cf. Plot in us: 1:'1111. Ill, 6 /26/ 9 . .20-44:
Ill. 6/26/ 10, 1-27: Ill, 6/26/ II, I 'HH: and Ill, 6 1261 12, 51-'57.
I~~~. Porphyry: Sent . .20. I I. I and 2 I. 12. 9. Cf. Plotinus: Erm. I. 8 /'5 I I I 0.
9-11: II. S /2.'5/ 4, 11-1-J: and Ill. 6/2.6/7, H.
I~ I. Porphyry: Sent. 2.0, 10, 13. Cf. Plotinus: Enn. Ill. 6/26/7. 7-8.
l.U. Porphyry: Sent. 311. 2 I, 3-S and ~2., 26, 12. Cf. Plotinus: Enn. I. 8 /'5 I I
~.12-16andlll,2/47/5 . .25-.26.
CALCIDIUS 451
catcidius and Porphyry seem to disagree: the former speaks of

matter as ungenerated whereas the latter attacks the view (of the
Platonist Atticus) that matter is 'ungenerated by a cause'
(aytvrrrov O.n'aitia~).l:l.~ which may explain Calcidius' hesitan-
cy in induding this attribute within the last doctrine's tenets.' :1 ..
(l.2.~ THE NATURE OF FORM
Regarding the last of the three principles - Form - the com-

mentator repeats much of the traditional teaching of the
schools: l.~i he speaks alternately of the 'intelligible world'
(intel/egibilis mundus), 1:16 'Forms' (species), 1:17 and 'Ideas'
( ideae); I.~H he emphasizes the transcendence of these principles
hy referring to their simplicity, 1.39 incorporeality, 14o and eterni-
ty,., 1 - the last being carefully distinguished as atemporality
from perpetual duration; 142 he explains their causality by
I.H. Porphyry: In Tim. fr. ')I (Proclus: In Tim. I. .391, ') ff.) and fr. S6
(Prod us: In Tim. l, 456, 31-457, 11 ). Cf. Plotinus: Enn. I. 8 /') 1/7. 17-23; II,
1"'-19: III. -i/15/1. 8-17: and IV. 3/27/9.23-26.
'i /25/ 'i.
I:H. Sec n. 123. There is also a curious reference to matter obtaining its
~uhstance' (substantitt) from Form at Calcidius: In Tim. 344. 336. 7 which
nuy ht an undigested remnant of the true Porphyrian theory.
135. See accounts in Apuleius (pp. 286-292) and the Asclepius (pp.
5'i 1-354).
U6. Calcidius: In Tim. 25. 75, 1'7; 25. 76, 5-6; 105, 154. 10-11; and 119.
161. II.
1.~-. Ibid. 29. "'9. 9: 273. 278, S: 329. 323. 2-l; .3.37. ;HO, '); .337, 330, 16;
.~.~H . .'.~I. 6: .3W. 3.32. S: 339. 332. 11: :HI. 333. 19:3-43. 33S. 11-12: .3-t-i .
.~.~h. 6: .~f-. 339, 2: and 349, .HO. 10.
1:\H.Ihid. 272.276, 15:304,306. 6; 329.323. 12; 329,323, 25; .329, .324,
.~: .~:10. 32-i. IS; 335, 328, 13: 339. 332. II; 340. 333. 16; 344. 336.6: and
.~ .. - ..H9. 1.
I :W. /hid . ."d8 ..-\:12, I.
loJO.!IJid. 3:W. 332.8: 3-H. 336. 8; and 3-49. 340, 7.
It I. Ibid. 23. 74, 14-IS; H. 7S, 17; .U9. 323. 11-13: 330. 32S. 6-8; 339.
:I.U. 10: and .HO, 333. 14.
142./bid. 2S, "'~5.14-76.6and lOS, 154.10-20.
452 NEOPLATONISM
describing them as 'paradigms' (exempla)t43 or 'archetypes' (ar-

chetypa)l44 of sensible things; and he identifies such principles
as corresponding to the four elements Hs and living
creatures.t46 However, Calcidius' theory does include certain
innovations as far as the Latin philosophical tradition is con-
cerned.
Two texts are important in this connection. The first reads as
follows: 'The first element of the universe is matter, unformed
and without quality. So that there might be a world, intelligible
Form shapes it. And from these two - matter and Form - pure
and intelligible fire and the other of the four real substances
arise. From these in turn come the sensible bodies: fiery,
watery, earthy, and airy. However, pure fire and the other real
and intelligible substances are the Forms which are paradigms of
bodies, called "Ideas" '.147 Calcidius' theory here is relatively
straightforward, namely that both form and matter exist on two
levels: form consisting first of the highest Form t4s and secondly
of the Forms of the four elements, and matter consisting first of
a matter to combine with the highest Form and secondly of a
matter to combine with the Forms of the four elements. In ac-
cordance with this scheme, the process of generating physical
14~.1bid. 2'i, 75. 14: 2'i. 75. 17; IO'i. l'i4. II: 105, 154. 17; 272.276, 15:
~04.306,7:330,325,6;339.332, IO;and340,333. 17.
144.1bid. 329,323. 12; 329.323. 14; and 349. 340.23.
145.1bid. 272.276, 12-l'i.
146.1bid. ~04, 306. 7.
li7. Ibid. 27 2, 276, I 0-15 Quippe primum elementum tmit,ersae rei silt'a
est informis ac sine qualitate quam, ut sit mtmdus, format intel/egibilis
species; ex quibus, silta t1ide/icet et specie, ignis purus et intel/egibilis
ceteraeque sincerae substantiae quattuor. e quibus demum bae materiae
sensiles. igneae aquatiles terrenae et aereae. Ignis porro purus et ceterae
sincerae inte/legibilesque substarztiae species sunt exemplar/a corporum.
idelle cognominatae.
148. The circumstantial evidence would suggest that this 'intelligible
Form' (inte/legibilis species) corresponds to the Form of the Good.
CALCIDillS 45.'\
hodks has two distinct phases: first, the highest Form combines
with matterl-i9 to produce the Forms of the four elements, and
secondly the Forms of the four elements combine with matter
to produce the four physical substances. Although this exten-
sion of the traditional theory of Forms does not occur in any
Latin writers prior to Calcidius, it goes back ultimately to Aristo-
tlc:'s reports of Plato Iso- where the One performs the function
of the highest Form, the 'indefinite dyad' (ci6ptotoc; ouac;) that
of matter on both levels, and the Form-Numbers that of the
Forms of the four elements - and was later revived by certain
:\"eopythagoreans, Is I the Cha/daean Orac/es,152 and the
:'\eoplatonists.IS~ The commentator's documented interest in
Greek philosophical writers adequately explains his deviation
1-19. Calcidius refers to an analogous 'intelligible mauer' (intel/egibi/is

sill'a J in connection with a report of Philo's doctrine. See ibid. 278, 283.
H-11.
I ')O_ According to Aristotle: ;'t/etapb. A, 6. 988a7-14, Plato employed as
I he two fundamental causes 'that of the essence and the material cause. The
Form~ are the cause of the essence of other things. and the One the cause of
I he essence of the Forms'. And it is clear 'what the underlying mauer is- of
whil:h till Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things and the One in
the Glsc: of the Forms- namely the: Dyad or the: "Great and Small" (Tij n:
roG Ti EOTI Kai Tij KUTQ Ti]v UAT]V (Ta yap EiOT] TOU Ti eanv ainu toi~ cii..Am~.
roi; o'Ei'oEm To v). Kai Ti~ ti ul..n ti u7toK&q.u:VT] Ka8'f(~ Ta &ion JlEV bci Tv
uioOntv TO 6'&v f.v TOi~ Eili01 Aty&TUI, on UUTT] 6ua~ eon, TO JlEYU Kai TO
~m:pov). Thl closest parallel to this in Plato's dialogues is the doctrine of
'limit' !7ttpa~) and 'infinity' (ci7t&tpov) at Pbileb. 23c.
I 'i I. Sec: Nicomachus: lntrod. Arltbm. l, 4, 9, 9 ff.; II, 18, 114,9 ff.; etc.
I Sl. Orac. Cbalcl. fr. 8 (Proclus: In Crat. 51, 27-30) 'And the dyad was
placed ncxt to him, for he has both functions: to contain the intelligihles with
hi~ intellect and to introduce sensation into the worlds' (oua~ napa T<i)li
KriOT]tat'/cill(jlOTEPOV yap f):1, v<i) JlEV KUTEXEIV Til VOT]Ta,/aia8T]OIV 6'enay&IV
1\(lOIJOlc;).
I S3 See Plotinus: Enn. V, I /I 0/ 5. 6-19 and V. 4 /7/ 2. 7-11. The Platonic
donrinl' is combined with Aristotelian tenets at Plotinus: Em1. II, 4 /12/ 3.
H.:~'>- Cf. Porphyry at Simplicius: In Pbys. Ill. 4, 453.22-454, 16.
454 NEOPLATONISM
from the tradition of his own culture, and here once again it is
the influence of Numenius I'H and Porphyry I 55 - who identify
154. Most of the elements in Calcidius doctrine can be paralleled in

Numenius' 0Epi t'aya9ou: (i) For the highest god as Form see :-.lumenius: fr.
I "i (Eusebius: Praep. Emng. XI, 18, 20-21) 'The first is concerned with the
intelligibles' (6 JlEV ouv npto~ nEpi ta VOTJtci); fr. 20 (Eusebius: Pmep.
Etang. XI, 22, 9-10) 'The first intellet:t will be an Idea. since it is "the Good
itself" ' (iOta c'iv EiTJ 6 7tpto~ vou~, wv autociya9ov); and fr. 22 (Prod us: In
Tim. Ill. I 03. 28-j2) 'Numenius makes the first god correspond to "the Liv-
ing Creature itself" (NouJ.Ll\vto~ lit tov JlEV 7tptov Kata to o em ~cpov'
tcittEt). (ii) For the second god as the plurality of Forms sec Numenius: fr. 16
(Eusebius: Praep. Etang. XI, 22, 3-5) 'The second god makes his own Idea' (6
yap OEUtEpo~ ... autonotEi tl\v TE iOtav tautou) and fr. 18 (Eusebius: Praep.
l:'r'fmg. XI. 18-24) 'He rules the harmony. governing by means of Ideas' (TiJv
apJ.lOViav o'i9UVEt, tai~ !Mat~ oiaKi~WV). (iii) For the highest Form generating
the plurality of Forms see Numenius: fr. 20 (Eusebius: Praep. Etang. XI, 22,
9-10) 'Just as men arc said to he modeled by the Idea of man ... thus
reasonably if the Demiurge is good by participation in the first Good ... '
(WOitEP yap av9pW7tOl JlEV Uyovtat TU7tW9EVTE~ UltO tfi~ av9p<imou iOta~ .. .
OUT(J)~ Kai EiKOT(J)~ 6 OTJJ.ltOupyo~ Ei1tEP ati JlETOUOir;t TOU 7tprotou aya9ou
aya96~). (iv) F_9r the plurality of Forms combining with matter to produce
sensible bodies sec Numcnius: fr. II (Euscbius: Praep. Etcmg. XI, 17. 11-18)
'But the god who is second and third is one. Associating with matter which is
dyadic, he unifies it but is divided by it' (6 9E6~ JlEVTOt 6 OEUTEpo~ Kai tpito~
&ativ E{~' OUJ.l(jlEPOJ.lEVO~ 0& tl} UAlJ ouciot OUOlJ tvoi JlEV autl\V, axi~Etat OE
(m'autfi~) together with the previous passage. The only element in Calcidius'
doctrine not specifically stated here is the notion that the highest Form com-
hines with matter to generate the plurality of Forms. However, this may be
the implication of Numenius: fr. 46b (Syrianus: /n Metapb. M. 4, I 09, 12-13)
'For Numenius. Cronius. and Amelius both the intelligibles and the sensibles
as ;t whole participate in Ideas' (NOUJ.lTJvltp JlEV ouv Kai KpoviV) and fr. 46c
(Prod us: bz Tim. Ill, 33, 33-34) 'As Ameli us writes and before him Numenius,
there is a participation even in the intelligibles' (ro~ 'AJ.LEAtO~ ypcicpEt Kai 7tpO
'AJ.lEAlOU NOUJ.ltlVIO~, J.LE9EE,i~ ott Kav toi~ VOTJTOi~). If the intelligibles par-
tkipate in something they must also contain a materiatc or dyadic clement.
155. Porphyry's exegesis of the Cbaldaean Oracles - which taught a
theological doctrine very close to that of Numenius- is perhaps the crucial
clement here. According to Lydus: De lllens IV, 53. 110, 18-22 Porphyry
CALC I DILlS
rhe Platonic One and indefinite dyad with the Aristotelian form
and 'intelligible matter' (uA.n vontit)- which is perhaps domi-
n;~.nt.
The second text can be presented in a summary fashion: (i)
Primary Form is a) 'without quality' (neque qualitate praedita),
and b) 'with quality' (neque sine qualitate). Since it is simple, it
cannot participate in a quality, and therefore it is a); but since it
docs not involve a privation, it is therefore b). (This last point is
compared with the case of a stone which has no privation of
fear. since fear or its absence have no relation to such an in-
animate object). Furthermore, since this Form is the cause of
quality in other things, it is therefore b). (This notion is il-
idcntifkd the Chaldacans' first god (the 'Once Beyond' (c'iTca~ tntKEtva)) with
the (;ood and their second god (the 'Twice Beyond' (Sic; tnEKEtva)) with the
lkmiur~e. Further, later Neoplatonic testimony indicates: (i) that the
Chaldaeans' Twice Beyond was dyadic (Psellus: H_vpot. 9. 74. 20-21 'It is call-
nl "Twice Beyond" bec.:ause it is dyadic' (KQAEitat of: oic; tnEKEIVQ, Ott
tiual\tK6c; tan)), (ii) that the Twice Beyond contained the plurality of Forms
(i!Jid. 9. 74. 17-20 'The "Twice Beyond" ... established the model of the
Forms for the world' (6 5& Sic; tntKetva ... npo0911KE t6v tli>v !Sewv tunov tcj>
KOO!l(!))). and (iii) that the plurality of Forms had a dyadic element (Orac.
O~t~ld. fr ..~I (Damascius: Dubil. et Solut. II, 63. 21-23) 'From these two
flows the bond of the first triad which is not really the first but that where the
intdli~iblcs arc measured' (t~ Ctll<poiv 1\i] tli>vSe pEEl tptdl\oc; Mila
npliH11-;/oua11c; oil nprot11c;, c'.tH 'ou ta VOTJtci llEtpEitat)). It therefore seems
likdy that Porphyry also used the Chaldaeans' theory to show that the
I hmiur~c was dyadic and embraced the plurality of Forms. On this basis both
Porphyry and the Ch"ld(letm Oracles - probably in agreement with
'\umcnius - must ha\'c believed in a dyadic clement in the Forms
lhlmscl\'cs. For discussion of these problems sec W. Theiler: Die
chaldiiiscben Omkel und die Hymn en des S_vnesios (Halle. 1942). pp. 1-9:
Fcstu~il-rc: /.(l revelation d'Hermes Trismtfgiste Ill. Les doctrines de l'dme,
pp. 'il-';9 and IV. I.e Dieu inconnu et Ia gnose. pp. I.U-1 :\';; H. Lewy:
Cba/daecm Oracles cmd 1'heurgy. Mysticism. Magic and Platonism in the
l.ater Roman Empire (Recherches d'archtfologie, de fJbilologie et d'histoire
I-~ HCairo, 19% ). Nouvt:llc edition par M. Tardieu (Paris, 19'H), pp. Ill';- I 1'7:
:tnlf P. Hadm: PorphJre et Victorinus (Paris, 196H). pp. 2SS-272.
NEOPLATONISM
lustrated by the cases of soul which is animate only in the sense

that it provides animation to other things. and of matter which
is material only in the sense that it provides materiality to other
things). (ii) Primary Form is a) 'without form' (informis) and b)
'with form' (nee infonnis). Since it is simple, it cannot par-
ticipate in a form. and therefore it is a). (This last point is con-
trasted with the case of a statue which is complex because it is
bronze participating in the form of a god). Furthermore, since
this Form is the cause of form in other things, it is therefore
b). I S6 This passage is largely self-explanatory. although at least
two observations should be made regarding the text itself and
its sources respectively. First, the identity of the 'primary Form'
(principalis species) described by Calcidius is somewhat am-
biguous. The general context of the argument suggests that this
is a collective term for the transcendent Forms from which the
immanent Forms of sensible objects are. derived. I S7 although
comparison with the passage previously discussed would imply
that it precisely signifies the super-transcendent Form from
which the transcendent Forms of those objects are derived. I 58
This ambiguity brings us secondly to the question of Calcidius'
sources. Thus, if the primary Form is a collective term for the
transcendent Forms, the theory proposed regarding its lack of
156. Cah.:idius: In Tim. 338, 331. 5-332. -i.

I 57. Not~ ~specially the wording of the previous chapter in which (i) the
term e:r:emplum is clearly used collectively (sec ibid. :\.P. :\:HI. I ~-1 S A dou-
ble Form can be seen in the Paradigm of things' (in exemplo rerum gemtna
species nmsideratur)). (ii) exemplum is equated with species principa/is (sec
ibid. 337. 330. 9-10 'The Paradigm ... which is the primary Form' (ex-
emplum ... quod sit species principt~lis)), and (iii) the transcendent Forms arc
called 'primary' and th~ immanent Forms 'secondary' (s~c ibid . .:H7. 330.
17-18 'The form impos~d on matter is secondary. the primary being the one
after the image of which the secondary is made' (est imposita quidem si/tJtle
species secunda, prima rero ilia. ad cui us haec secunda similitudinem fac-
ta est)).
158. Seep. 451 ff.
CALCIDilJS 457
quality and form is a development of established tenets in the

doxographical tradition; IW but if it precisely signifies the super-
transo:ndent Form, that theory represents a deviation from the
traditional doctrines of Latin Platonists once more perhaps
under the influence of Numenius and Porphyry. 16o Of course,
calddius may have intended the primary Form to have both of
these meanings deliberately.
6.2! THE THREE PRINCIPLES
The doctrine of the three principles stated in these texts pro-

vides an interesting supplement to the standard teachings of late
ancient Platonists, yet elsewhere there are various further
elaborations of the schema which need to be considered. Here,
it is a question not so much of the nature of these principles in
themselves but of their relations to one another. We shall study
these elaborations by considering each of the possible relations
in turn: those of God to Matter, of God to Form, and of Form to
Matter respectively.
6.2<; THE RELATION OF GOD TO MATTER
The relation between God and matter appears in Calcidius

mainly in the guise of the relation between 'providence'
(jJrol'identia) and 'necessity' (necessitas). 161 Since the latter
I 'i9. Seep. 286 ff.

I60. For the notion of a highest Form which transcends the Forms in
'lurnenius M~e the passages cited inn. l'i4, Similarly Porphyry: bl Parm. XII.
~ 1 -~-~ refers to the One wh kh is above being. and is itself being in a transcen-
d,lnt sense. and in some war the "Idea" of being' (to ov to bttKEtva i:v, tou
r.IVUI ov TO Ct7tOA.utOV Kal wcmEp iSta tOU OVTO~). See Hadot: op. cit. I. pp.
1 .~11~2andll,p. I07,n.3.
1(,1. In the passages whkh follow, Calcidius applies varying terminology
111 <;od. He b (i) 'mind' (mens (see In Tim. 268. 273, 8; 268, 273, II; 269,
4SH :-./EOPLATONISI\1
provides the basis for an important structural division of both

the dialogue's and the commentary's text, where the earlier part
of the argument is concerned with the role of providence and
the latter part with that of necessity in each case ,162 its inter-
pretation is central to the understanding of these two authors'
metaphysical and methodological intentions. Calcidius explains
the relation between providence and necessity by using two
kinds of argument which can be characterized as literal and
figurative respectively.
The literal approach is illustrated by the statement that 'the
divine mindt63 forms matter by penetrating it totally, not in the
way that the arts apply form only to the surface, but as nature
and soul vivify all things by permeating solid bodies'
(penetratam siquidem eam usque quaque divina mens format
plene. non ut artes formam tribuentes in sola superficie, sed
perinde ut natura atque anima so/ida corpora permeantes
universa vivificant).IM This passage is interesting in that it
represents one of the few examples in Calcidius of that Platonic
and Stoic syncretism - the nature of the divine mind reflecting
the former and its operation the latter tradition of philosophy
- which has been so prevalent in works like the Apuleian De
.274. 10; 269, 271, 12; :md 3S4, 3H. IS)). 'intelligence' (intellegenthl (see
ibid. 269. 214, 4 and 270. 274. IS)). 'intellect' (intellectus (see ibid. 268,
2':'3. Hand 270, 27!, 16)). and 'will' (1'0/tmltl.~ (see ibid. 3S4. 344. 19 and
3S4, 54S, IS)); (ii) 'providence' (jJml'idf!lltitl, prospicientia, pr01idus (sec
ibid. 26H. 2~3. H: 26H, 273. II; 26H. 273. 13-14; 269, 274. R; 269. 274. 10;
3S4, 344. 19: and 3S'-1, 34S. 6)). On the metaphysical significance of
substituting such terminology for 'God' (deus) seep. 460 ff.
162. This division occurs at Plato: Tim. 47e where the previous material is
called 'the things crafted by mind' (til 5ta voii 5&5TU.ll0l/P"fll~Eva) and what
follows 'the things which arise from necessity' (tel 61'av6.yKT]c; y1yv6~eva).
The corresponding place in Calcidius is at In Tim. 268, 273, 7.
163. Seen. 161.
164. Calcidius: In Tim. 269.274, 12-14.
CALCIDiliS 459
.Hundo and the Hermetic Asclepius.l65 The literal approach is

further illustrated in an argument where the divine wi1Jl66 is
said to operate upon its object in two phases: first, it acts in rela-
tion to matter described as a 'vestige' (vestigium) or 'potentiali-
rv (potentia) of body and secondly, it acts in respect of the
disorderly qualities characterized as vestiges or potentialities of
the clements.167 This text is equally interesting in providing an
example of Calcidius' habitual tendency to synthesize Platonic
and Aristotelian teachings - the notion of a vestige recalls the
former and that of a potentiality the latter system - in this case
represented by the Timaeus itself and the Metapbysics.l61l
The figurative approach is exemplified in the somewhat an-
thropomorphic account of the cosmogonical process which
takes place 'with the deliberation of the provident mind'l69
(consultis providae mentis) to which matter 'offers itself will-
ingly for adornment' (exornationique se facilem praebente),
the activity of the former being compared to that of a beneficent
ruler caring for his subjects and the passivity of the latter to that
of a patient who trustingly submits himself to the hands of his
physician.l7o Most of this seems to be an elaboration by
Calcidius of Plato's notion that mind exercises 'persuasion'
(rtEiSetv) over necessity. PI The figurative approach is also ex-
16i. Sc:epp. 273-277 and 361-363.

16(J.Sc:c:n.l61.
16"'. Cakidius: In Tim. 3'54, 344, 18-345. S.
16H. Sec: Plato: Tim. S3h 'vestige:' (ix_vo.;). Aristotle:: Metapb. 0, S, I OPh.'\ I
'potentiality' (MVaJ.Lt<;), etc.
I 69. Sec n. 16 I.
1"'0. Calcillius: In Tim. 269 . .27-i. :\-14 anll.270 . .274, 1'5-.27'5, 9.
1"'1. Plato: Tim. 48a. According to van Windc:n: op. cit., pp. 34-37 there
arc: :'llunwnian influences on Calcidius' description of the rc:lation between
providence: and necessity (he compares some of the phraseology with that
c:mployc:ll in Cakidius' exposition of Numc:nius at In Tim. 29'5. 297, '7 ff.)
llowc:vc:r. the non-Numcnian character of most of Calcidius' doctrine of mat-
460 NEOPLATONISM
emplified in the scarcely less anthropomorphic description of

matter awaiting the operation of the divine willJ7l where,
because of the presence of disorderly qualities, it is said to
manifest 'ugliness and deformity' (squalor ac deformitas)
together with a natural capacity for beauty and adornment. 173
This represents a rhetorical intensification of Plato's statement
that matter was in a state 'which one would expect of anything
when God is absent' (rocmep ElKO~ EX,ElV cl7tQV Otav cmij nvo~
9e6~).I74
6. 26 THE RELATION OF GOD TO FORM
In studying the relation between God and Form, the com-

mentator also describes the former as providence, intellect, or
mind, and it is now appropriate to ask why he should do this.
The answer is that he views the first principle in several distinct
ways: namely (i) as transcendent, (ii) as immanent either in mat-
ter (a) or in the Forms (b); t7o; and that in case (i) he prefers to
describe it as God while in cases (ii a) and (ii b) he prefers to
adopt the titles of providence, intellect, and mind. This is suffi-
ciently illustrated by a number of texts.
First, Calcidius indicates that the first principle is immanent
in the Forms by speaking of it as a mind which contains them as
its thoughts. Sometimes he refers to a thought in the singular,
for example when he describes a Form as 'an "Idea" which is
the eternal thought of the eternal God.' (idea, quae intellectus
ter would suggest that any such influences will be of a predominantly literary
rather than doctrinalldnd. See pp. 445-451.
172. Seen. 161.
173. Calcidius/11 Tim. 35-i. 345,5-10.
174. Plato: Tim. 53b.
175. For interpretation (i) see pp. 4-HJ-445: for (ii a) sec pp ... 57-459. Inter-
pretation (ii b) is the subject of the present section.
CALCIDil'S 461
dei aeterni est aeternus),I76 or as 'the perfect thought of God'

(perjectus intellectus det), 177 or as 'that which the God who
created the world conceived in his mind and which Plato nam-
ed an "Idea" ' (quam mundi opijex deus mente concepit, earn-
que idean cognominavit Plato); I7R sometimes he refers to
thoughts in the plural, for example when he characterizes the
Forms as 'God's thoughts which we call "Ideas" ' (intel/ectus
eius, quas ideas vocamus).I79 In all this the commentator
follows the usual interpretation of the theory of Forms transmit-
ted to the Latin tradition by the doxographers,IRO a fact con-
firmed by a striking verbal parallel between the argument in
which the second quotation occurs and a discussion of God's
relation to the Forms in Albinus' Didascalicus, IBI since the lat-
1-6. Call'idius: In Tim. 330. 324, 24-325, I. At ibid. 340, 333. 16 he refers
to 'the Form of the intellect which is called the "Idea" {fntellectus species,
quae idea dicitur).
1""..,. fiJid. :\39. 332. 7. The statements in this and the previous passage that
Ideas arc eternal and perfect thoughts are perhaps significant, since at ibid.
162. 19 S. 1-18 God is said to know all things according to the nature of the
objects' (/Jm natura sua ipsorum): eternal things stably and transitory things
mUiahly. This theory contrasts with the view of later Neoplatonists that
things arc known according to thc nature of the subject. Sec Boethius: De
Cunsol. Philos. V, pr. 6, 13.
I""H. Calcidius: In Tim. 27 3. 278, 5-6.
l ... lJ. 1/Jid. :H2. 334. 2,'\-24. Cf. ibid. 349, 340,9-10. Obviously the notion
that thc first principle as a unity is equivalent to a single Idea is less pro-
hkmatic- given that Ideas are real existents- than the notion that as a uni-
ty it is t"quha1ent to a multiplicity of Ideas. On Calcidius' awareness of this
situation sec n. 20_11.
180. See pp. 252-264.
1HI. Sec Alhinus: Didasc. 9, I and Calcidius: In Tim. 339. 332, 510 where
iota I principalis species is defined in the same five ways: (i) we; ~&v npoc;
8E:ov VOTJOI<; autoO I iu:~:ta deum vero perfectus intellectus dei, (ii) we; 5& npoc;
llJ.Hic; VOTJtov nprotov 1 iuxta nos quldem, qui intel/ectus compotes sumus,
/Jrimum intel/egibile, (iii) we; 5& npoc; tliv UAT]V J,LEtpov I iuxta silvam modus
IJII'NS/11'llqllf! rerum corporearum atque Sill'eSirium, (iv) W<; 5& 7tpoc; tOV
nioSTJtov K6o~ov napa5&ty~a 1 iuxta mundum vero exemplum sempiter-
462 NEOPLATONISM
ter work has been shown to depend heavily on the dox-

ographies of Arius Didymus and others by modern scholar-
ship.U12
In another passage Calcidius indicates that the principle
which is immanent in the forms- here styled providence, in-
tellect, and willis consequent upon a higher principle- for
which the title of God is reserved. Regarding the second princi-
ple he writes: 'Next, IIH all things are ruled by providence which
holds a second rank after that supreme God and which the
Greeks call "noys". It is an intelligible substance, imitating
goodness through its tireless reversion to the highest God - it
derives goodness from him, by which it is as much adorned as
are the other things embellished by his agency. This will of God,
therefore. because it is the wise protector of all things, is called
"providence" by mankind- not as most believe because it an-
ticipates in seeing and understanding future events, but because
it is the characteristic of the divine mind to understand, which
is the characteristic activity of mind. And the mind of God is
eternal, so that the mind of God is an eternal activity of
understanding'. IR4 Presented in summary form, this passage
1111111 omllillm quae /UitUrtl progenuit, and (\') W~ OE 7tp0~ QUTTJV

tl;&ta!;,O)lEVTJ oua{a I iuxta ipsam llero speciem incorporea substantia causa-
que eorum omnium quae ex ea similitudinem mutuantur. This is perhaps
the only parallel which might suggest that Albinus is among Calcidius'
sources. However, since the presentation reflects the terse formulae of the
doxographers, it may well be that both writers are simply drawing from the
same handbook. The parallel is adduced by van Winden: op. cit., pp.
210-2 I I.
182. See pp. 220-227.
183. This passage follows immediately upon that quoted on p. 439.
184. Calcidius: In Tim. 176, 204, 9 - 205, 8. In order to facilitate the ensu-
ing analysis, the text can be divided into a number of basic statements:
(i h) Delnde a fJrtll'idenlla, quae est posl ilium summum sectmdae
emi11entiae.
(i a) quem noyn Graeci l'ocant;
(ii d) est autem i11tellegibi/is
CAI.CIDILJS
provides the following information about the secondary princi-

pk: (i) As to its names. It can be described as a) intellect or mind,
h) pro,idence, and c) will. (ii) Regarding its nature. It is a) eter-
nal. h) substance, c) activity, and d) intelligible. (iii) Regarding its
relation to other principles. It a) reverts upon the Good, b)
derives goodness from the prior principle and c) transmits
~oodness to posteriors.tss The sources of this complex doctrine
arc only to be found in the Greek tradition and, since even
within that there seems to be no single author whose teaching
exactly parallels Calcidius', we will have to investigate the in-
tellectual precursors of each separate tenet in turn.
(ii h) e.~sentia
(iii b) aemulae bonitatis
(iii a) propter indefessam ad summum deum conversionem,
(iii b) estque ei ex illo bonita tis haustus, quo tam ipsa ornatur
t iii c) quam cetera quae ipso auctore bonestantur.
(i c) Hanc igftur dei voluntatem, tamquam sapientem tutelam
rerum omnium,
(i h) prrwidentiam homines t'ocant, non ut pier/que aestimant, ideo
dictum, quia praecurrit in t'idendo atque intellegendo proven-
tusfuturos, sed quia proprium
(i a) dlvinae mentis intellegere, qui est proprius mentis
<ii c) actus.
(i a) Et est mem del
Iii a) aetetna:
(i a) est igitur mens dei intellegendl
(ii a) aeternus
(ii l') actus.
lHS. With this account should be compared a curious report of Aristotle's
tllt'ology in which Form is described as a secondary principle consequent
upon (;od. Sec ibid. 2H7, 291, I 1-12 'He praises Form as a divinity, similar to
the highest God. dependent upon the complete and perfect Good. and
therl'fort ;m ohjcct of striving' (Speciem laudm ut summi dei simi/em
di1initatem plem> perfectoque nixam bono ideoque appetibilem). Here.
Cakidius is assimilating Aristotle's doctrine to the kind of Platonism which
ht himself espouses.
464 NEOPI.A TON ISM
Numenius 186 has often proved to be an important source in

the past, and the same seems to be the case with the present set
of doctrines. Thus, tenet (ii b) can be paralleled by his statement
that the second god is 'substance' (ouoia),18"7 (ii c) by his
description of the latter as 'moving' (KtVOUJ.U:voc;),IB!I (ii d) by his
assertion that it is 'intelligible' (vont6v),l!l9 (iii b) by his state-
ment that the second god is the 'imitator' (~1~11ti)c;) of the
first,190 and (iii c) by his description of the second god as
'imitated by' (nc; ~i~n~a) the third.l91 However, tenet (i a) con-
flicts with Numenius who does not regard 'intellect' (vouc;)
specifically as the title of the secondary principle. Another ma-
jor source has often proved to be Porphyry. and this seems once
again to be the case with the doctrines under review. Thus,
tenet (ii b) can be paralleled by his statement that the second
hypostasis 'contains the really existent' (ev ell oft ta ovtroc; ov-
ta),192 (ii c) by his account of the latter as 'having its activity in
186. The possible sources of this discussion have been investigated by a

number of scholars. See Kramer: op. cit., p. 278; W. Theiler: Forschungen
zum Neuplatonismus (Berlin, 1966), pp. <;6 and 260; van Winden: op. cit.,
pp. 30. 89-90, and 110-111; Waszink: Timaeus a Calcidio translatus com-
mentarioque instructus, pp. lxi and xci-xciii; Studien zum Timaioskom-
mentar des Calcidius I. Die erste HiUfte des Kommentars (mit Ausnahme der
Kapitel fiber die Weltseele), pp. 73-74; 'Calcidius' Erklarung von Tim. 41e2-
42a4', Museum Helvetlcum 26 ( 1969). p. 278; den Boeft: Calcidius on Fate,
His Doctrine and Sources, pp. 85-98; and Dillon: op. cit., p. 404. My remarks
below arc an attempt to develop some ofWaszink's suggestions.
187. Numenius: fr. 16(Eusebius: Praep. E1ang. XI. 22, 3-';).
I HH. Numenius: fr. I<; (Euscbius: Pmep. ENmg. XI, I H, 20-21 ).
1H9. Numenius: fr. 16 (Eusebius: Praep. Evang. XI. 22, 3-5). Cf. fr. II
(Euseblus: Praep. Etang. XI, 17, 11-18) and fr. 16 (Euscbius: Praep. E1ang.
XI, 22, 3-5).
190. Numenius: fr. 16(Eusebius: Praep. E11ang. XI. 22, 3-"i).
191. Numenius: fr. 16(Eusebius: Praep. ENmg. XI, 22. 3-';).
192. Porphyry: Hist. Pbllos. fr. 18 (Cyril: Contra Julian. I (PG 76, 552
8-C)). Cf. Porphyry: Sent. 22, 13, 13 and 43. <;4, 16. Cf. Plotinus: Enn. V, 5 I
32/5, 16-27;V.6/24/6, 13-26;etc.
CAl.CIDil!S 465
itsdf' (f:v autcT> f>t. KEK'tTJ'tat to E.w:py&tv),193 (ii d) by his asser-

tion that it is an intelligible to itself (autcT> liv &iTJ VOTJt6v), 194
(iii b) by his statement that secondary principles 'derive benefit
from' (anoA.au&tv) the first principle, 195 (iii c) by his notion that
di\'inity proceeds as far as Soul' (iixpt yap \JIUXftc; titv 9&6tTJta
npo&A.9&iv),1'>6 (i a) by his assertion that 'Intellect' (vouc;) is
specifically the title of the second hypostasis, 197 (i c) by his
st:ucmcnt that 'will' (voluntas) is a phase in the latter's deriva-
tion from the first principle,198 (ii a) by his description of it as
'etcrn:tJ. single, and timeless' (OlOOVlOc;, J.16voc; KOl axp6vroc;
(mocmxc;). 199 and (iii a) by his assertion that secondary prin-
ciples have a 'reversion to the first principle' (npoc; to np<inov
avayroyit).2oo Only tenet (i b) departs from Porphyry who does
not associate 'providence' (np6vma) with the second hypostasis
in any extant text.
Finally, there are certain texts in which Calcidius seems to
reconcile the viewpoints that the first principle is immanent in
19.'\. Porphyry: Sent. 41, 53,4-5. Cf. ibid. 36, 41, 12-13 and 36, 42,3-4.
<T l'lotinus: Emz. 1, 8/51/2, 21-23; V, 2/11/l, 16-18; V, 4/7/2, 3-4; etc.
19-!. Porphyry: Sent. 44, 57, 8. Cf. ibid. 43, 54, 12-16. Cf. P1otinus: Enn.
\'. 3 I -49 I'>. 21-48; V. 3 /49/8, 35-42; etc.
19'). Porphyry: Sent. 30, 20, 14-16. Cf. Porphyry: Hist. Pbilos. fr. 15
(Cyril: Contra lulian. I (PG 76, 549A-B)). Cf. P1otinus: Enn. I, 7 /54 I I, 1-19;
V. 6 I 241 '), 8-9; etc.
196. Porphyry: Hist. Pbilos. fr. 16 (Cyril: Contra /ulian. VIII (PG 76,
916B)). Cf. Plotinus: Enn. V. 8/31/12, 7-15; VI, 5/23/4, 13-17; etc.
19"'. Porphyry: Sent. 12, 5. 7. Cf. ibid. 31. 21, 9-16; Hist. Phi/os. fr. 16
!Cyril: Omtra lu/imz. Vlll (PG 76. 9168)) and fr. 18 (Cyril: Contra /u/ian. I
( P<i ...,6, 5528-C)). Cf. Plotinus: Enn. V. I I 10 /7. 1-5; V, ; I 32 /9, 26-32; etc.
198. Porphyry: De Regr. Anim. fr. 7, 35 25-29. Cf. Plotinus: Enn. VI, 8/
W 19. i2-48; VI. 8/39/13, 1-59; VI, 8/39/21, 8-19; etc.
_ 199. Porphyry: Hist. Pbilos. fr. 18 (Cyril: Contra lulfan. I (PG 76,
..,_'>28-C)). Cf. Porphyry: Sent. 44, 58, 8-9 and 44, 58, 23-24. Cf. Plotlnus:
l:nn. Ill.""! 14; /6, 1-12; V, 1/1014. 13-25; etc .
. 200. Porphyry: Sent. 30. 20. 13-14. Cf. Ibid. 13. 5, 10-11. Cf. Plotinus:
bm. V. 1/10/6,50-53: V. 6/2415. 12-19; VI, 9/9/2, 40-43; etc.
466 NEOPI.ATONISM
the Forms and called mind, and that the principle which is im-
manent in the Forms and termed providence, intellect, or will is
consequent upon a higher principle described as God. Thus, he
suggests a relation between God and mind involving both iden-
tity and subordination in referring to 'causes which are percep-
tible to divine providence' (causae, quae sunt perspicuae
divinae proz,identiae),2111 in his statement that 'God's finest
work is that which he thinks' (optimum dei opus est id quod in-
tel/egit),20l and by arguing that 'God's works are his thoughts
which are called "Ideas" by the Greeks- these "Ideas" being
the paradigms of natural things' (opera vero eius intellec.:tus eius
sunt, qui a Graec.:is ideae vocantur; porro ideae sunt exempla
naturalium rerum).l03 This combination of the notions that
the Forms are God's thoughts and therefore identical with him
and that the Forms are his works and thus subordinate to him
represents something of a deviation from the simpler theory
transmitted to the Latin tradition by the doxographers. On the
other hand it seems to echo certain doctrines of the Greek tradi-
20 I. Calcidius: In Tim. 2 4. 7 4. I I 1.2.

202.1hid. 26o, 267, 1~.
20;. Ibid. ;o.f. ;o6. 'i-7. The complexitic:s of this theory stem from a real
philosophical problc:m: how can God as a unity embrace a multitude: of
divine Ideas? Cakidius clearly understands that this issue is central to
Platonism as a whole although the Timaeus itself is only concerned with it in
passing. Thus, he remarks a till Tim. 27 2, 276, I '527i, H that Plato defers the
question 'whether there is a single archetypal Form common to all existent
things or rather innumerable Forms according to the number of things that
arc ... or whether indeed the same Form is both one and many as he teaches
in the Parme11ides (unane sit arciJetypa species eorum quae sunt communis
()11/llium, m1 i11numerabi/es et pro rerum existe111ium numero ... (l11 11ero
idem 111111111 puriter et m11lta sint, ut docet in Parmenide) because that
would be an 'epoptk' rather than :1 natural scientifk matter. For <.;alcidius
therefore:, the: first two hypotheses of the P(trmenides explain the transccn
dent and immanent relations of God to the Forms respectively. Sec p. 460 ff.
CALCIDllJS 467
tion such as Numenius' theory that the first god 'thinks by using
the second god additionally' (v npoaxpftcn:t mu cSwttpou
voEiv).!tH and Porphyry's interpretation of the Cba/daean
( Jracles according to which the first principle is both 'secreted
from (ap1t<ioat tautov EK) its secondaries and has 'power and
intc:llc:rt co-unified in its simplicity' (MvaJJ.tV ... Kat vouv f:v tfj
a7tAO't'TJ't't autou aUV11Vroa9at).20S In other words we are once
a~ain brought back to the favorite sources of Calcidius'
theological doctrine.
6.r THE RELATION OF FORM TO MATTER
The relation between Form and matter is explained by

Calcidius mainly in terms of an elaborate simile involving three
dements: 'father' (pater), 'mother' (mater). and 'offspring'
cproles).lO<> Since this simile occurred in Plato's own text, where
it was employed to describe the relation between the Paradigm,
.!0-1. Numcnius: fr. 22 (Proclus: In Tim. Ill. 103, 28-32). Cf. fr. 21 (Proclus:
In lim. I. 303, 27-304, 7) 'The Demiurge of the world is double according to
him: thl' first god and the second' (6 Kat'a\rrov cSruuoupyo<; cS1tt6c;, o t&
rrptinoc; O&oc; Kai 6 cS&tit&poc;) .
.!O'i. Porphyry: In Parm. IX. 1-8. Calcidius' description of the intt:lligiblc
world as 'self-produced' (ex se genilus) at In Tim. 119, 164. II perhaps in-
nc:asls the likelihood that Porphyry is the crucial influence behind these doc-
trinn. The notion that spiritual principles arc self-originated seems to have
l'lllc:rt"d into tht' serious philosophical tradition with him. See especially Por-
phyry: flist. Pbllos. fr. 18 (Cyril: Contra luliatl. I (PG 76, S52 B-C)) where
lntt'llt'ct proceeds from the One as 'self-generated and self-paternal'
(UllTOYEVV11'!0<; wv Kai auto7tcitrop). On this doctrine see s. Gersh: From
lamiJiicbus to Eriugena. An Investigation of tbe Preblstory a11d El'olution
o( I be Pseudo-Dio1l)'Sian Tradition (Studietl zur Problemgescbicbte der an-
liken tuul mitle/alt~rlicben Pbi/osopbie 8)(leiden, 1978), pp. 305-307.
2 06. Calcidius: In Tim. 273. 277. 13-278, 7 and 330, 324. 19-23. The in-
lrodunion of thl' third term here indic;ues an important structural division in
<.alciuius' commentary as well as in Plato's text.
468 NEOI'LATONISM
the Receptacle, and the sensible Form,207 it naturally emerged

as an especially authoritative piece of doctrine. From our point
of view, Calcidius' reference to all three elements in the simile is
important in showing that Form does not combine with matter
directly.
The father's20R relation to his offspring is described in the
following way: he 'joins' (conectere) sensible Form to matter,209
and provides not only the former's 'substance' (substantia) but
also its 'similarity' (similitudo).210 The mother's relation to her
offspring is indicated by the statement that sensible Forms 'can-
not exist alone, in themselves, and without support from that
thing which sustains them' (sola et per se ac sine suscipiente
eadem essentia esse non possunt), 211 this support being provid-
ed by matter which 'is moved by the concourse of Forms enter-
ing into and informing it and moves those same Forms in turn'
(ingredientium formantiumque earn specierum commeatu
movetur et easdem invicem movet species).212 The offspring
itself is described as follows: since it is a generated Form it
stands between 'the really existent' (vere existens) and that
which 'is not among existent things' (nihil est eorum quae sunt)
207. Plato: Tim. 48e - 49a and 50c-d. Calcidius expresses himself am-
bivalently regarding the nature of the third term, sometimes identifying it as
'body' (corpus) and sometimes as 'Form' (species). See Calcidius: In Tim.
273, 277, 17 and 330, 324, 2 3. C. Baeumker: Das Problem der Materie in der
grlechiscben Phi/osophie. Eine historisch-kritische Untersuchung (Munster,
1890), p. 126 ff. notes that a similar ambivalence occurs in Plato's own text.
208. In the passages which follow, Calcidius sometimes interprets the
'father' as a single Form and sometimes as a plurality. This accords with the
philosophical principle discussed on pp. 455-457.
209. Calcidius: In Tim. 316, 313. 2. Cf. ibid. 3.~7. 330. 10-3:\ I, 4. In both
texts we find the father identified as the 'Demiurge' (opifex).
210. Ibid. 349, 34 I, 5-6 where the father is interpreted as the plurality of
Forms. Cf. ibid. 344, 336, 5-6 where he is understood as the primary Form.
211./b/d. 273.277, 17-18.
212./bid. .U9. 32j, 18-20.
CAlCIDilJS 469
as an existent in a sense' (esse aliquatenus).lt!t These doctrines

arc derived from the usual mixture of sources employed by
calcidius, the account of the relation between higher and lower
Form reflecting the doxographical elaboration of Platonism
which occurs in writers like Apuleius,2t4 that of the relation bet-
wt:cn matter and sensible Form being derived more directly
from remarks in the Timaeus itself: for example the statement
that 'it is moved and shakes them in turn' (KtVOUIJ.EVllV 8'au
rrciA.tv EKEiva aEiEtv).2t s Finally, the account of the sensible Form
itsdf reflects the teaching of Porphyry who is known by in-
dependent testimony to have described it as standing between
'the really existent' (ovnoc; ov) and that which 'is not among ex-
istent things' (llllBEv 8 dvat trov ovtrov) as 'an existent in a
scnst:' (IJ.Tt anA.roc; gvat).216
21~.1bid. 330.324.23-325.8.
2lL See pp. 292-301.
.! I 'i. Plato: Tim. ';2e. Plato is referring to the Receptacle and the disorderly
qualitit's whereas Calcidius is concerned with matter and Form. However.
Plato's original notion occurs at Calcidius: In Tim. 352. 34.'\, I S-20.
2HJ. Simplicius: In Pbys. I, 3. 135, 1-9 'Porphyry ... showed that what real-
ly is is the Idea and that this is really substance, while the ultimate, primal,
~hapeless. and formless matter from which all things arise is indeed but not
among things which really are. It is conceived on its own and is potentially all
thing~ hut nothing in actuality. The composite of Form and matter, inasmuch
a~ it participates in Form is something and can be named according to its
Form. hut inasmuch as it depends upon matter and for this re;tson is in con-
tinuou~ tlux and change is not simply or stably' (6 nopqn)pto<; ... TO j.lEV yap
I~VTW<; OV Ct7tEq>JivaTO EtVal TTtV lotav Kai taUTTJV 6VTWI; Efva1 ouaiav, TTtV OE
U\'(!)!(i_rw 1tPWTTJV Uj.lOpq>ov Kal avEili&ov UATJV &!; ~<; Ta navta EOTiv Eivat J.lEV,
~ll]<'ii:v f>t Eivai TWV OVTWV. atmi yap eq>'taun;c; E7tiVOOUj.lEVTJ ouvaj.l&l j.lEV 7tav-
TU i:cniv, t.vEpyEi(,l 0& ouo&v. TO o& EK TOU Eioouc; Kai Tii<; UATJI; a7tOTEA&Oj.la
Kutroaov J.lEV Eioouc; J.lETE)'Et, KaTa ToliTo &ivai tt Kai 7tpoaayopEuEa9at KaTa
til cioo.;, Ka8'6aov of: Tii<; iiATJ<; Kai ota TaUTTJV tv auvEX.Ei puaEt Kai J.1Etal3oAlj
n,YXc.iw:t, 7tdl..tv wit imA<il<; llTJM13EI3aiwc; Eivat). It is clear that when Porphyry
t harannizes each of the three levels, he contrasts the existential and
Prtllil:ative senses of the verb 'to be'. This enables him to formulate a defini-
-170 NEOPLATONISM
The: c:mphasis which Calcidius places upon the: simile of

father, mothc:r, and offspring underlines the fact that Form does
not combine directly with matter but generates a lower Form,
styled variously an 'image' (imago)21 7 or a 'reflection'
(simulacrum)211! of the higher, which appears in the substratum
in order to produce a sensible body. The writer does not con-
ceal the fact that it is difficult to visualize how this process oc-
curs. although the analogy of the sculptor impressing the forms
of objc:cts which he: sees into clay is suggested.219 Furthermore,
the notion that Form does not combine directly with matter
leads to the revision of part of the Platonic theory, for the
physical object itself is said to consist 'of a participant and a par-
ticipated' (e.'\: participante et ex participabilt} which are here
explicitly identified with matter and sensible Form respective-
ly ..un On all these points Calcidius is elaborating interpretations
of Platonism after the manner of first and second century dox-
ographical writers ..UI
tion of matter- which 'is' (Elvat 1-1tv- predicativc) and 'is not' (llTJliEv 5
Efvat tci>v ovtrov - existential) at the same time - without expressing a
paradox. Although Calcidius follows this definition of matter precisely: it 'is'
(est quidem) and 'is not' (nibil est eorum quae sun I), by failing to distinguish
the prcdicativc: and existential senses he leaves the paradox intact. That he
docs not distinguish these two senses is indicated by his alteration of those
clements in the Porphyrian doctrine which arc strictly predicativc to an ex-
istential sense. Thus, Ka9'oaov j.lEV Eiliouc; llEttXEI, Katli mum Eivai n Kai
7tpoaayopEuEa9at Katli to Eilioc;- in the first half of Porphyry's definition of
the composite - becomes cum enim sit imago tere existentis rei. tidetur
esse a/iquatenus - in the first half of Calcidius' definition of the sensible
Form. For purposc:s of comparison I have translated Porphyry's argument as
though it only contained the existential sense of Eivat in my main quotation.
The dose: relation between the Greek and Latin writers here was dislovcrcd
hy Badot: op. cit., pp. 163-16'5.
217. Calcidius: In Tim. 273. 278, 7; 349. 340, 21; etc.
218. Ibid . .U9, 323. 14; .U9. 323. 24: 337, .~30, 3: 344. 336.9: etc.
219.1bid. 329.324, 1-6.
220./IJid. BH. 331, 2.~-332, I. Cf. iiJid. .HS. 32H. 1213.
221. Sec pp. 292-301 and 3'5 1-354.
CALCIDH'S -!71
(l .." PRODUCTS OF GOD, MATTER, FORM
This completes our study of the traditional Platonic doctrine

of the.. three principles as understood by Calcidius. We have
seen that the Latin writer repeats much of the material which
occurs in the doxographers, although he adds significant in-
no\'ations under the influence of various later Greek sources, of
which the most remarkable is perhaps the new account of the
relation between God and intellect. Here, the beginning of the
distinction between the first and second hypostases of the
~eoplatonists appears (a notion which is set out more clearly in
the writings of Macrobius) since the two principles are describ-
ed as prior and posterior even though they are not yet distinct
from one another. In following these developments we have
heen concerned primarily with the second half of the Commen-
ltli:J' 011 the Timaeus, but now it is time to turn towards the first
half of the same work, in which there occurs much of similar
philosophical interest. Here, the results of the three principles'
interaction with one another in the cosmogonical process will
he studied for the first time and, in order to summarize the prin-
cipal doctrines in the briefest possible account, these will be
described roughly in the following order: the world, its soul, its
body, man, his soul, and his body. Once again we shall find
Calcidius repeating much of the material which occurs in the
doxographers together with significant additions drawn from
certain more technically advanced Greek sources.
6.511 THE WORLD
A few chapters are devoted to considering the world as a

whole, and Calcidius begins with an argument that, since the
Works of God are not temporal, and since the world is the sensi-
ble..- work of God, then 'the world's origin is causative and not
472 NEOPI.A TON ISM
temporal' (origoque eius causa/iva est, non temporaria).l22

Two points are worthy of note here: first, when the writer
speaks of the world's origin as being causative and not tem-
poral, he means to indicate that the world is causally dependent
upon God in a relation of ontological but not chronological
priority. This explains why he is able to say in the same argu-
ment that the world is both 'made' (factus, institutus) and 'eter-
nal' (indissolubi/is, aeternus), the former term showing its on-
tological posteriority to God and the latter its lack of
chronological posteriority .2H It also explains why he can argue
elsewhere that the world was made 'in one single moment' (uno
eodemque momenta), this expression indicating that the
creative process took place in the first instant of time which was
itself not temporally extended.224 The notion that Plato's ac-
count of the world's coming to be did not signify a temporal
process was dominant among the exegetes of late antiquity,
while the specific version of this interpretation stating that the
world's coming to be indicated its dependence upon a prior
cause occurs in Taurus and Albinus.zzs The second point to note
is that Calcidius statement that the works of God are not tem-
poral implies a strictly transcendent notion of divinity, since the
222. Calcidius: /11 Tim. 23. 74. l'i-19. A similar argument is made regar-
ding the divine genera at ibid. 26. 76, I I -.,..,.H.
223. Ibid. 23. 73. 6-7 and 23. 74. 20. The wider context of this argument
should be noted. Cakidius demonstrates that the world is without end with
three arguments: (i) its relation to its cause is ontological and not
chronological. (ii) there is no material left outside to destroy it. and (iii) it is
fashioned according to an eternal paradigm. It is dear that arguments (i) and
(iii) also prt)\'e that the world is without beginning. this point being indicated
by the final conclusion of ibid. 2'i. 76. 6 that it 'always was. is. and will be'
(semper fuit est erit).
224. Ibid. lOS, 154. IH. Cakidius comments that the world's and time's
beginnings arc simultaneous at ibicl. 10 I. IS 2. I I- I 3.
225. According to Produs: In Tim. I. 277, H- 10, this version originated
with Crantor and was also supported by Plotinus, Porphyry. and Iamblichus.
CAI.CIDil!S
,arious processes of the physical world, which are temporal,

111 ust therefore be dependent upon some lower cause, God's
own role being confined to the atemporal establishment of
those causes to be operative in time. That this does represent
thl' commentator's opinion is indicated by an earlier paragraph
which states that 'all things existing are the works either of God,
or of nature, or of the human artificer imitating nature' (Omnia
enim quae sunt vel dei opera sunt vel naturae vel naturam im-
itantis bominis artificis).226 In the context of this statement we
find not only a distinction of higher and lower causes. with
nature functioning as the requisite secondary cause, but an ex-
plicit indication that the lower causes produce their effects
within the temporal sequence of physical growth and decay .227
The contrast of things which are works of nature and things
which are works of the human artificer imitating nature is
Aristotelian. although the contrast of things which are works of
God and things which are works of nature is not typical of that
writer ..!lK It therefore seems likely that the threefold contrast
rather echoes the Neoplatonic doctrine that 'Nature' (q>umc;)
constitutes a level of reality immediately below the hypostases
of God, Intellect, and Soul.l29 In fact, Calcidius may have drawn
his entire argument about the generation of the world from Por-
phyry's commentary.
We have already seen inch. 3, n. 25 that it was one of the four specific ver-
'iom of the: ~enc:ral thesis that the world's coming to be is non-temporal ad-
\ocatc:d by Taurus . .See also Albinus: Didasc. 14. 3.
226. Calciuius: In Tim. 23. 73. 10-12.
2r. Ibid. 23. ""3. 12-74.:\.
22H. See Aristotle: Phys. II. 2, 194a21-22.
229. See Porphyry: Sent. 12, 5. 6-8 'There is one life: of a plant, another of
an l'nsouled being. another of an intellectual one:; one: life of Nature, another
of ~out. another of Intellect, another of the Bevond' (iiAATJ yap ~coil q>Utoii,
~D. A.l] CJ.IIJIUXOU, iiA.A.n VOEpoii, iiUn q>UOECO<;,
ann \j/UXfi<;, aA.A.n voii, liAATJ tOii
f:ltf.I\Etvu). It goes without sayin~ that Calcidius' theory recalls the simple
'lholastk formulations illustrated above rather than the: complex doctrine of
474 NEOPl.ATONISM
6.312 THE CREATION OF THE WORLD SOUL
Since the world is a living creature, and a living creature con-

sists of a soul and a body, then the world is endowed with a
soul..Z.~o This soul is described by Calcidius as 'having been made
by God' (jactam esse a deo)- here, he notes that this does not
conflict with Plato's teaching elsewhere that souls are
everlasting, since the reference to it as 'made' is simply a way of
indicating that its status is inferior to God's.231 It is also describ-
ed as the 'third substance' (tertia substantia) - here, he adds
that soul also represents the second mind presumably since pro-
vidence is considered to be the first mind in the hierarchy of ex-
istents.2.:12 Putting these two statements together, we must con-
clude either that God is identified with providence and pro-
duces soul (thereby placing the emphasis upon the first state-
the lower phases of Soul occurring in Plotinus' Enneads. That Porphyry is

the crucial source here is argued by Steinheimer: op. cit., pp ..~ l I - the
arguments of R. M. Jones: 'Chalcidius and Neoplatonism , Classical Philology
13 (1918), p. 19'> against Steinheimer being less forceful on this occasion-
whereas Waszink: Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instruc-
tus. pp. Jx,ilxvii and xcii favors Numenius via Porphyry.
230. Cakidius: In Tim. 9.3. 146,20-21.
231. Ibid. 26. 76, 7-77, 8. Cf. ibid. 40, 89, I '>-16 and ')-i, 102. 9-11 where
the control exercised hy God over the world soul is stressed.
232. Ibid. 188, 213, 1-2. A note is required on the relation between soul
ami 'fate' ifatum) since Calcidius identifies these in 1exts like ibid. I '>2. I 87.
13: 178, 207, l-4: and 188. 213. 1-6 hut distinguishes them in passages like
ibid. J77. 206. I-'>. The reason for this ambivalence is that fate is considered
in two ways- (i) in terms of its 'substance' (substantia) and (ii) in terms of
its 'activity' (czctus). mode (i) signifying its division into three parts (ibid.
IH. 182. 16-18.-\, 6) and mode (ii) its manifestation :1s the Jaw of physical
processes (ibid. 144. 182, 11-16 and 148, 18'> . .3 ff.)- and whereas soul is
identical wilh fate in the first case il can be viewed as distinct from it in the
second. The doctrine expounded here is similar to one found in Pseudo-
Plutarch: De Fctto and Nemesius: De Natura Hominis and is discussed at
length by den Hoeft: Calcidius 011 Fate. His Doctrine and Sources. pp. 9-1.3.
CAI.CIDillS 475
ment),l5.~ or that God as distinguished from providence pro-

duces first providence and then soul (thus placing the emphasis
upon the second statement),H4 or that God's activity is to be
understood simultaneously in both of these ways. Whichever is
the case, the interpretation of soul developed here is clearly
derived from the Numenian and Porphyrian background, the
source of the interpretation of mind also.HS
6 ..~ 1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD SOUL
After describing the basic nature of soul, the commentator,

proceeds. according to the order of topics dictated by the
Timaeus itself, to study its composition. This is described in the
following way:
233. For God as identified with providence see pp. 457-462.

234. For God as distinguished from providence see pp. 462-463.
235. See pp. 466-467. The connection with Numenius at least is
strengthened by (i) the descriptions of the second god as 'lawgiver" (Ialor
lel{is) and of the third substance as guardian of the law' (custos legis) at
Calcidius: In Tim. 188. 212, 23-213. 2. Numenius: fr. 13 (Eusebius: Praep.
Erang XI, 18, 13-1-1) speaks of his second god as 'lawgiver' (vo~to9ttTJ<;)
cf. fr. 31 (Porphyry: De Antr. Nymph. 23, 22, 2 ff.); and by (ii) the descrip-
tion of the third god as 'mind' (mens) or 'intellect' (intellectus) at Calcidius:
In Tim. 1'77, 206.3 and 188,213. 1-2. Numenius: fr. 22 (Proclus: In Tim. Ill,
10."1. 28-:U) states that the second god is an 'intellect" (vouc;) which employs
the third god additionally to become a 'discursive mind" (otavooUIJ.EVO<;) -
d. fr. II (Eusehius: Praep. Ercmg. XI. 17, 11-1!~); fr. 16 (Eusebius: Praep.
l:'totmg XI. 22. 3-5 ); etc. Regarding (ii) it is worth noting that Numenius'
description of his third principle as intellect conflicts with Porphyry's
teaching that the third principle is strictly soul. and that Cakidius may have
heen striving to reconcile his authorities In referring to Vesta at In Tim. 278,
20'"". 1 as 'the soul of the whole world and the mind of that soul' (anima CrJr-
fJoris unit,ersi mensque eius cmimae). On the sources of the doctrine of soul
as third substance see Waszink: Timaeus a Ca/ddio translatus commen-
tarioque instructus, pp. lx-lxii and xc-xcii and 'Calcidius' Erklarung \'On
Tim. -ile2-42a4'. pp. 276-278.
476 NEOPLATONJSM
(i) 'Plato teaches us that substance or, as Cicero says. essence

is of two kinds: one indivisible and the other divisible among
bodies. The indivisible substance is that which embraces all
those eternal and incorporeal things which are called in-
telligibles; the divisible substance is that which is responsible for
the existence of bodies .... Thus, he states that the demiurgic
god has blended a third kind of essence from these two and
placed it in the middle between them' .236 Why Plato should
describe soul as an intermediate principle between the higher
and lower realms is explained by Calcidius with recourse to an
epistemological argument: since it is generally assumed that
knowledge arises because of the similarity between subject and
object, and since soul is known to perceive both the realm of
the intelligibles and that of sensibles, this principle must consist
of elements similar to both the former and the latter.237 The
original statement of the theory of soul's division and the
epistemological explanation of it represent elaborations which
could have occurred to any Platonist, although the references to
Pythagoras and Empedocles contained in the latter have led one
modern scholar to detect Numenian influence here also.23H
(ii) The intermediate substance of soul resulting from the pro-
cess of blending now becomes the subject of a further process of
division, but Calcidius points out that the parts into which the
Demiurge divides the substance of soul according to Plato's
236. Calddius: In Tim. 27. 7H, 2-11 Docetnos substantiam sfte, ut C'h'em
dicit, essentiam duplicem esse, unam inditiduam, alteram per corpora
dirltluam. Et imliriduam quidem esse eam, cui us generis sunt omnia aeter-
na et sine corpore. quae intellegibi/ia dinmtur. ditidutmt vero, quae cm-
poribus e.'\istendi causa est ... lgitm ex bis dualms ail opificem deum ter
tiwn genus essentiae miscuisse ldque medium /ocasse inter essentiam
utramque. This is an elaboration of Plato: Tim. ;\'ia.
2.'\7.Calcidius:/n Tim. 51. IOO,H-Jl).
238. See Waszink: Timaeus a Calcidio transltlfus commentarioque in
structus. pp. xci\' and 100. He suggests the possibility of Porphyry as an in-
termediary.
CAI.CIJ)J!IS
argument are not 'parts' in the normal sense of the term. Since
soul is a simple and incorporeal thing one cannot divide it into
physical parts at al1,239 the so-called 'division' representing
rather 'an analysis of its powers and the arrangement, so to
speak, of its faculties, activities, and functions' (consideratio est
tirium ordinatioque veluti membrorum actuum eius of-
ficiorumque).24o It is in this light that we are to understand the
more complex mathematical account which now follows, for
the parts of the psychic substance taken by the Demiurge as 1, 2.
3. 4, 8, 9 and 27 times the basic unit- which Calcidius arranges
along two sides of a lambda24t - represent two geometrical
series of four terms each namely 1, 2, 4, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27 times
the basic unit,242 Furthermore, the fact that these series are
geometrical is of great significance, since such progressions
represent the law according to which a geometrical point leads
by fluxion - the point moves to produce a line, the line a sur-
face, and the surface a solid - to generate three-dimensional
physical bodies, such bodies being those which soul itself has
been created to animate.243 The source of Calcidius' account
239. Calcidius: In Tim. :H. 82, 18-20 .

.HO. Ibid. 32. HI, 25-82 ..~. Cf. ibid. 51, 100. 3-5.
2-i I. The figure was traditionally drawn as follows:
The: usc of this figure to set out the series of numbers goes back to Crantor.
Sc:e Plutarch: DeAnim. Procr. 29, 1027d.
2-!2. Calcidius: lt1 Tim. 32. 82, 3-8.
2i3./bid . .H. 82,9-83. 19. Cf.lbid. 53. 101, 1-i-102, 8.
NEOPl.ATONISM
here is identifiable with certainty. since the general notion that

soul's division signifies its functional relation to the animated
body as well as the detailed mathematical interpretation of that
division together with the 'lambda figure' (A.ciPowJ.la) are
verifiable by independent testimony as teachings of the
Peripatetic commentator Adrastus.H-1 That this material has
been derived indirectly through Porphyry is rendered possible
by the latter's similar adherence to the general view that soul's
division indicates its functional relation to the animated body,
although Porphyry's known objection to the use of the lambda
figure makes it more likely that the Latin commentator is direct-
ly dependent upon his Peripatetic source at this point.24'i
2-h. For th~ first point s~~ Prod us: In Tim. II. liO, I:;. Hi where Adrastus'
argum~nt that 'Plato, having r~gard for the n:ttur~ of things. compos~d soul
from allth~s~ int~rvals so that one might reach th~ cubic numbers. since soul
was to preside over bodies (nA.anov tiE npo~ nv qll)mv 6pv <nv IVuxnv EK
7tQV!WV !OUtrov auv&atllO&V, iva npofl] llEXPl tv at&p&ci>V apt81lci>V, cit&
arolllitrov aollEV11 npoatlitt~ ). For the second see ibid. II, 171, 4-9 'Adrastus
proceeded in this way. However. others rejected the lambda figure ... This is
the opinion of Porphyry and Severus' (Kai outro~ 6 Alipaato~ n&noillK&V.
clAAOl &f: nv A.a~8o&t8ii napu<tiaavto Kataypaq~i)v .. - OUt(l) M: Kai nopq~upto<;
Kai l:&uiipo<; a~toiiat ). The dependence of Calcidius upon Adrastus is careful-
ly discussed by Waszink: Studie11 zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius I.
Die erste Hii/fte des Kommenlt~rs (mit Ausmtbme der Kapite/ iiber die
\Veltseele). pp. 1-30.
2iS. For the first point see Porphyry: 111 Tim. fr. 67 (Macrobius: In Somn.
Scip. II, 2. 14) where Plato is said to have included cubic numbers in soul to
indicate that it. although an incorporeal. 'fills the world's solid body' (mwuli
solidum corpus imp/ere). The doctrine here recalls Porphyry's general thesis
regarding incorporeals that thcy are (i) in themselves 'everywhert and
nowhere' (navmxou Kai ouliallOU) but (ii) 'by a certain disposition' (Ota8ta&t
toivuv 7t0l~) present in a specific body. Sec Porphyry: Sent. 27. 16. 1-16. For
the snond point see the passage cited in n. 244. Regarding the first point it
should also be noted that Porphyry's agreement with Adrastus is only super-
ficial sinle his full theory states that the indivisible is preSl'nt to the dividld
both indivisibly and dividedly while the divided is present to the indivisible
CALC)() II IS 479
6.) 1-i THE SELF-MOTION OF THE WORLD SOUL
Calcidius' discussion of soul naturally includes reference to

it~self-directed motion which is explained as follows: 'That this
soul reverts upon itself should certainly not be understood in
terms of the accomplishment of a corporeal rotation but of the
turnings and windings of thinking and recollection which are
obeyed by its body .246 The commentator assumes that this self-
directed motion is equivalent to the self-originated motion men-
tioned in Plato's Phaedrus. Thus, he quotes from the latter the
entire argument that soul is immortal because it is always in mo-
tion and soul is always in motion because it moves itself, and
that soul is immortal because it is the source of motion in other
things, and so on. z.p The combination of texts is interesting in
that it underlines the non-spatial character of the self-originated
motion when considered in abstraction from body. Both the in-
terpretation of soul's self-directed motion and the adducing of
the second text would have been natural for any Platonic ex-
egete, although one modern scholar has felt justified in identify-
ing Numenius again as the specific influence.24H
hoth dividedly and indivisibly. See ibid. :B. ~6. 12-:\7. S. This explains the
apparently contlkting theory at De Abstin. II. 37. 2 where soul is s;1id to he.
:1lthough an incorporeal. three-dimensional in its own nature. For a more
dct:1iled discussion of the relation hetween soul and body in Porphyry see p.
c;; I ff.
2-t6. Cakidius: In Tim. S I. I S2, ~-S !psam tero animam in semet cotl
tertclc non utique corpora/i cmwersimw fcuta intellegendum. sed cogittl
tirmis recordatirmisque KJ'ris et anfrttctibtts parente sibi corfmre. This is an
dahoration (with quotation) of Plato: Tim. ~6e.
2-i'''. Calcidius: In Tim. 57. 101, Ui-HIS. IH. The translation b of Plato:
PIJaeclr. 21'h: li6a ami should he compared with Cit:eru's \'Crsion. Sec ch.
1. n. s-.
2-JH. See Waszink: Timtteus tt Ca/cidio trmulatus commemmioque in-
structus. p. 104.
4RO NEOPLA TON ISM
6.315 THE WORLD BODY
Since the world is a living creature, and a living creature con-

sists of a soul and a body. the commentator must also explain
their interrelation. He begins this by describing how God has in-
terwoven soul from the center of the world body to the
periphery and then around its circumference- this is done 'in
order that it might be animated by life-giving force both from
within and without' (ut intra atque extra vitali vigore
jfweatur)2~'> - but explains that God does not thereby project
the vital power of soul from the earth to the rest of the cosmos.
It is not from the middle of the world body: the earth that this
power is spread through the universe but from the center of life:
the sun, the fact that it is not the earth but the sun which is the
source of life being indicated by the complete immobility of the
former and the perpetual motion of the latter.zso That this argu-
ment is taken from Adrastus seems to be indicated by the
presence of a parallel discussion in Theo of Smyrna. zc; Calcidius
continues his account of the interrelation between the world
soul and world body by connecting certain aspects of the
metaphysical division of soul with specific parts of the physical
cosmos. Thus, the composition of soul from elements of
249. Calcidius: In Tim. 99. 151. 8.

250./IJid. 100. Iii. 12-152,2.
2<; I. This passa~c: has been much discussed by supporters of Adrastc:an and
Porphyrian inlluc:nce respectively. Sec: Stcinhcimt:r: op. cit .. p. 38; Jones: op.
cU .. pp. 199-200; Waszink: Timac:us a Calcidio trans/a/us commentarioque
instructus. pp. lx\'ii and 151 and Studien zum Timaioskommc:ntar des
Ca/cidius I. Die erste Hiilfte des Kommentars (mit Ausnabme der Kapitel
uber die Weltseele). pp. 57-61. Howevt:r, the parallel with Tht:o is conclusivt:
evidence for the former rather than the latter viewpoint. See my discussion
of the source question on pp. 430-434. On Calcidius' notion of tht: life-giving
force set: W. Theil~:r: Vita lis tigor bei Calcidius'. Romanitas et Cbris-
tianitas. Studia /. H. Waszink ... oiJ/ata, edited by W'. dt:n Bot:r, etc.
(Amsterdam. 1973). pp. 311-316.
CALC lOll'S 481
'sameness' (idem) and 'difference' (diversum) permits it, having

first been formed into a strip and then into intersecting strips,2S2
w produce a configuration in which an outer circle of identity
encompasses inner circles of diversity. The former has its
physical manifestation in the simple and uniform motion of the
sphere of fixed stars while the latter is manifested physically in
the complexity of the various planetary motions.2S:\ The
mathematical analysis of the divided substance of soul into the
series: 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27 (containing seven terms in all) has as its
physical counterpart the distances between the orbits of the
moon, the sun, Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn (which
wtal seven planets).2S4 Finally, the composition of soul from
elements of sameness and difference permits it to have, in addi-
tion to its physical manifestation,2ss a further psychological
aspect in the combination of elements of reason and emotion.
The brief remark that the sphere of fixed stars corresponds to
reason while the planets correspond to emotions like anger and
cupidity suggests that an exact correlation is intended between
astronomical circles and psychic states.256 Although parallels
2S2. Calcidius: bz Tim. 92. 144, 12 ff. The following illustrative diagrams
arc provided br the manuscripts:
X
Plato's full doctrine is that soul is composed of indivisible and divided
substance, and of sameness and difference. See Plato: Tim. ~Sa.
253. Calcidius: In Tim. 92. 145,4-146, H.
lS-i. Ibid. 95. 147. 26-14H, 9.
25S.Ibid. 95. 1-48.9-11.
256. Some of Calcidius' remarks ahout the human soul will add to our
understanding of this theory. See pp. 488-490.
4H2 :"JEOPLATONISM
with Theo of Smyrna do not exist for all these passages. the
dependence upon Adrastus seems well established here as
elsewhere in the account of the world souJ..257
6.32 MACROCOSM AND MICROCOSM
The creation of the world together with its constituent soul

and body represents one half of the product of the interaction
between God, Matter, and Form, the other half of this product
of the interaction between the three principles being the crea-
tion of humanity together with its components of soul and
body _.25H Calcidius is not reticent in stressing the analogy bet-
ween macrocosm and microcosm which the Timaeus implies,
and he employs this latter argument in three contexts: that of
the location of reason, that of the tripartition of the human soul,
and that of elemental composition. In the first of these contexts
he observes that reason is enshrined in the human head whose
sphericity is analogous to that of the cosmos.259 In the second
he develops a much more elaborate argument in which the
three parts of the human soul are connected by an analogy of
their respective functions - that of reason to command, that of
irascibility to execute, and that of desire to obey- to the three
levels of living creature found in the world.26o In the third con-
2'P. Sc:e Switalski: op. cit., p. 69; Waszink: Timac:us a Ca/cidio trcms/atus
nmmwntarioque instructus, p. 144 and Studien zum Timaioskommentar
des Calcidius l. Die erste Hiilfte des Kommentars (mit A usnahme der Kapitel
iJber die Weltseele), pp. 32.~6. Sec: also pp. 430-4 31.
2'5H. I shall nm examine in detail Calcidius interpretation of the: composi-
tion of the world body. This hegins :11/n Tim. 6. 61. 10 and ends at ibid. 22.
73 . .f. It includes both arithmetical' and 'geometrical' expositions which are
dependent upon Ad rastus. For the source question see Waszink: Studien zum
Timaioskommentar des Calcidlus I. Die erste Hiilfte des Kommentms (mit
Ausnahmeder Kapitel iJberdie Weltseele), pp. 31-36.
2'59. Cakidius: In Tim. 231. 21'5. :\-6. Cf. ihid. 2:\.:f. 24':'. 17-llJ.
260. Ibid. 232. 2i6, 92:H. 247. 12.
CALCJI>JliS
tl'Xt he notes that the four clements which compose the human
body are analogous to the physical constituents of the
cosmos.Z61 Most of these ideas are drawn from Plato's own text,
although the analogy drawn from the human soul's three parts
not simply to the political but to the cosmological realm is of a
kind favored by Stoic writers, while the description of man as a
small world' (mum/us bret,is) is derived from Aristotle.262.
6.~~ITHENATUREOFTHEHUMANSOUL
As a living creature. man is a composite of soul and body, the

soul being--theruHng part: caicidius t:tier"dore devotes con-
siderable attentio.rf to the investigation of the human soul,
stressing the superiority of Plato's doctrine to that of all other
philosophers,Z6~ and uses this analysis as an opportunity for a
detailed discussion of the ontology of soul as such. The section
dealing with the human soul forms a miniature treatise in its
mvn right, and the commentator begins by rejecting the idea
that soul is corporeal on the grounds that its union with body
would have to be conceived as that of one body with another.
None of the traditional ways of interpreting the latter relation,
he continues, would be adequate to explain the union of body
and souJ..ZM Furthermore, Aristotle's doctrine that 'soul is the
26l.lbid. 202.221,20-222, '5.

2c12. Ibid. 202.222, 6. Cf. Aris!OIIe: Phys. VIII. 2, 2'52h26-27 ~mall world'
... 'large world' (J.ltKpO<; KOOJ.lO<; ... J.lE)'a<; KOOJ.lO<;). For !his intluemiallhemc
sec pp. 77-79 and ch. I, n. 87.
26:\. Cakidius: In Tim. 214. 229. 3.
26-i. Ibid. 221, 2:~4. '5-2,:\'i, 7. Cakidius observes 1ha1 bodies can he said 10
unilc wilh one anolher in lhrcc ways: (i) hy 'juxlaposilion' (tlfJplicaUo), (ii)
hy 'mixwrc' l.permixtio). and (iii) hy 'fusion' (concretio). He imerprels (i) as
~ignifying 1hc placing of one body bcsilk anmher. (ii) as indicating 1he bkn
lling of 1wo bodies by 1he mutual interposition of !heir parlicles, and (iii) as
~ignifying 1hc Iota! union of one body with another. He rejects (i) on !he
grounds that soul could not animate body by mere contiguity, (ii) bcc;tusc
484 NEOPLATO:'IIISM
first actuality of a natural organic body having the capacity for

life' (Anima est prima perfectio corporis natutalis organici
possibilitate vitam babentis)265 - Calcidius attempts to ex-
plain each part of this definition in turn: actuality, natural body,
organic body, and capacity for life266 - clearly demonstrates
that soul 'is not something corporeal or sensible but rather
something intelligible and incorporeal' (neque corporeum quic-
quam esse tel sensile sed intellegibi/e potius et sine corpore).Z6-:
However, since the doctrine that soul is entelechy is open to
serious objections in other respects: such a soul would in-
evitably be corrupted together with the body, it would also
have to be possessed by things normally considered as soulless,
soul's unity would prncnt its blc:nding with body by interposition of par-
tides. and (iii) on the grounds that soul could not exist independently in such
;1 union. Of these three types of union (i) corresponds to the napci9EOl<;, (ii) to
the J.Li/;1<; or Kpdcn<;. and (iii) to the ounuot<; of Stoic theory. See pp. 101-105.
The parallel between this text and Priscianus l.ydus: So/ut. ad Chosr. I, 44,
15 ff. suggests a common source, this latter being in all likelihood the
Neoplatonist Porphyry. Porphyrr is known for his interest in the use of the
Stoic theorr of mixtures in ":onnection with the problem of relating the in-
corporeal and corporeal. Thus. at Sent. 33, 38. 1-5 he writes: 'This is neither
blending nor mixture nor association nor juxtaposition, but is a relation dif-
ferent to these' (OUtE OUV Kpdcrl<; f\ J.Li/;1<; f\ cruvooo<; f\ napa9EOl<;, aA.A.'~tEpo<;
tp6no<;). Porphyry's interpretation of this special relation which he derived
from Ammonius Saccas is reported by Nemesius: De Nat. Hom. 3, 592A -
608A. On these questions see H. A. Wolfson: The Philosophy of the Church
Fathers I. Faith, Trinity, Incarnation (Cambridge, MA, 1956), pp. 400-407;
E. R. Dodds: 'Numenius and Ammonius', Les sources de Plotin (Fondation
Hardt, Entretiens sur /'Ant/quite c/assique 5) (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1960),
p. 25; W. Theiler: 'Ammonios und Porphyrins', Porphyre(Fondalion Hardt,
Emretiens sur I'Antiquite classique 12) (Vandoeuvres-Geneve. 1966),
p. 104 ff.; H. Diirrie: Porphyrios' Symmikta Zetemata. lhre Stelltmg in
-~Jstem und Geschichte des Neuplatonisnms nebs/ einem Kommentar zu den
Fmgmenten (Miinchen, 1959), p. 5i; and Hadot: op. cit., pp. 3H and 4H5.
265. Calcidius: In Tim. 222,235,8-10.
266./bid. 222.235. 10-237.9.
267./bid. 1.23. 237. 10-l,'l,.
CAI.<:IDllfS 485
it could not be subject to the increase in perfection which ac-

companies growth, and it could not be understood as being
susceptible to motion in its own right; it is best to adopt Plato's
interpretation of soul instead.26H This states that soul is 'a ra-
tional substance which is incorporeal and self-moving'
(substantia carens corpore semet ipsam nuwens ra-
tionabilis).26<J Although this precise formulation of Plato's doc-
trine cannot be paralleled in his extant works, there is strong
evidence to suggest that Porphyry is the source of the elaborate
encounter between Stoicism, Aristotelianism, and Platonism
which forms this miniature treatise on the human soul.27o Thus.
Porphyry is reported by Suidas to have written polemically
against the doctrine of the entelechy, 271 although making exten-
sive use of Aristotle and his commentators in formulating his
own teachings,272 and on at least two occasions has left precise
parallels to arguments employed by Calcidius.2'.~ If this is cor-
268. Ibid. 225, 240, 2-241. 2. The final argument is paralleled in Por-
phyry: De Anim. ad Hoeth. fr. 6 (l:usehius: Pmep. Etmzg XV. II, I) 'Against
him who states that soul is entelechy and understands that it is totally unmov-
l'd we should say that it moves' (npoc; lit tov EVTI:Atxemv tflv 'lfi.J'Xflv Ein6vta
Kai UKivrrrov 7tU VTEI..wc; ouaav Kl vEiv U7tEIAT\(jl6ta PTJTEOV) .
.!69. Calcidius: In Tim. 226.241.8-9. Cf. ibid. 262.268, 16-17.
2"70. Porphyry's definition was apparently shorter. See De Anim. ad
Hoeth. fr. 6 (Eusebius: Praep. Etang XV, II. I) 'self-moving substance'
(UtJTOKivrrroc; ouaia). Cf. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 14, 19.
r I. Suidas mentions a book of Porphyry entitled: Opoc; 'AptatotEATJV,
m:pi tou dvat tflv 'lfUXflv vteA.txemv (Porphyry was here following the lead
of Plotinus who had attacked the entelechy at Etm. IV. 7 /2/ 8\ 1-50). Other
t<:xts showing th<: influence of Porphyr)"s polemic are Nem<:sius: De Nat.
limn. 2. 560 B ff. and Prisdanus t.ydus: Solut. tid Cbosr. I, 44, .29 ff.
2"7.2. For this reason. Calcidius' quotations of Aristotle on p. 427 and nn .
.!<;and 28 may well he via Porphyry.
27.3. See nn. 264 and 168. The Porphyrian basis of the whole discussion is
d<:monstrated by H. Krause: Studia neoplatonica (leipzig, 1904), pp ..H-.34
and \l'aszink: Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus.
-186 NEOPLATONlSM
rect, we have a significant new indication of the influence of

this Neoplatonist over the Latin commentator.
6.332 THE STRUCTURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL IN THE BODY
Calcidius' discussion of the human soul includes, besides a

section on the ontology of soul as such, some detailed analyses
of its division.2'1-4 The latter begins within the higher soul itself
which is held to be composed as follows: 'Its power is twofold,
the one part understanding and the other opining, according to
which wisdom together with learning and prudence together
with right opinions have effect' .27'; The nature of these two
contrasting powers of understanding (wisdom) and opinion
(prudence) is explained elsewhere where it is argued first, that
the former contemplates the immutable substance whereas the
latter has opinions regarding mutable and generated things;276
pp. lxxv-lxxvii, xci-xcii. and 240-241. (Krause held that Porphyry's Quaes-
/i(mes Commixttle were used here, Waszink his Commefllary on the
Timaeus when~ doctrines from the Quaestiones Commi:'l:tae and De Anima
ad Hoetlmm were repeated). For a less convincing ar~umcnt that Calcidius
has drawn his material from an earlier Platonic source sec Dt>rrie: op. cit., p.
:Hand n. i.
2"'4. Since Calcidius says a great deal about divisions of the soul. he feels it
necessary to defend Plato against those detractors who accuse him of incon-
sistency. These argue that the Pbtledrus postulates a simple soul hut the
Timaeus a composite one (see Calcidius: In Tim. 228. 243. 13-18). Calcidius
replies that the division in the soul is a conceptual one only, somewhat
analogous to the presence of a ratio in a musical sound (see ibid. 228, 243,
18-244. 10). Thus, the situation with the soul is similar to that in the case of
the world. Sec pp. 471-473.
27S. Ibid. 213. 228, 18-20 cuius duple."< virtus. a/tera intellegens,
opinatrix a/tera. iuxttl qut1s sapie111ill cum disciplina et item prudentia
cum reclis opinionibus cont'lllescunt. Cf. ibid.. 140. 181, 1-3; 203, 222,
20-21; 207, 22S, .3-1.3; and 231. 24S. 13-14.
276.1bid. 137. 177. 14 ff.
Cr\LCJ[)JliS
secondly, that the former consists of a simple motion while the

latter contains a multiplicity;2T' and thirdly, that the former
represents the theoretical aspect of mind whereas the latter is its
practical application.27R Most of this doctrine is taken directly
from Plato's own account of the human soul or derived by
analogy from his remarks about the world soul.
The division of the human soul just described applies strictly
to its higher part - that which operates independently of the
body - and the commentator now continues with divisions
which encompass both its higher and lower parts. However, it
would be a mistake to conclude that what follows applies simp-
ly to the human soul in conjunction with body, since the rela-
tion between man's spiritual and corporeal parts is multi-
faceted, and the diversification of the human soul requires a
dependence upon body only in a certain sense. Calcidius' fur-
ther divisions encompassing higher and lower parts are : (i)
twofold into a) 'reason' (ratio) and b) 'vigor' (zigor)279 or a)
'deliberative' (de/iberatil'a) and b) 'appetitive' (appetendi);2Ho
(ii) threefold or fourfold into a) 'reason' (ratio), b) 'irascibility'
(iracundia), and c) 'desire' (cupiditas);2HI or a) 'the rational
part' (rationabilis pars), b) 'vigor' (t'igor), and c) 'desire'
(cupiditas)2H2 or a) 'intellect' (intel/ectus), h) 'opinion' (opinio),
c) 'irascibility' (iracundia), and d) 'desire' (cupiditas);2H.~ and
multiple into a) 'reason' (ratio). b) 'imagination' (imaginandi).
ctc.2H-i or a) 'reasoning' (ratiocinandz), b) 'irascibility' (iraczm-
2"'-. Ibid. 140. I HO. I S-2 I.

2"'H. Ibid. IHO. 20H, 22-209, 2.
2"'9. Ibid. 267. 272. 2.~-2-L
2HO. !IJitl. 2:\0, H4. 21-2!'5. 2.
2H I. Ibid. I H7. 212. 11-20.
2H2.1bid. 2.U. 2'i7, 7-12.
2H~. Ibid. 2.2'5, 241. 2-5. The first two parts mentioned here are. of course
tquivalent to the two parts of the higher soul discussed earlier.
2Hi.IIJid. 51, 102. 1-i-19.
488 NEOPl.ATONISM
dia), c) 'sensation' (sentire), etc.2BS He provides some informa-

tion regarding the relation of these various parts to the body by
noting that reason has its place in 'the citadel of the whole
body' (totius corporis capitolium), the vigor 'in the barracks of
the heart' (in cordis castris), and the desire is 'hidden in the
nether regions' (inferioribus abditum);2R6 yet that it is the ac-
tivities of the soul's various parts rather than their substances
which are spatially located is indicated by the definition of
sense perception as 'a passivity of the body to certain things
placed outside and variously affecting it, this same passivity
reaching the seat of the soul' (JJassio corporis quibusdam extra
positis et pulsantibus varie, eadem passione usque ad animae
sedem commeante).2B7 These texts reveal divisions of the
human soul when considered in conjunction with the body
although, since a certain independence of the two is apparently
maintained even in the case of sense perception, one must
assume that such divisions retain some validity when an abstrac-
tion of the body is made. That this is so is confirmed by the
commentator's remarks about the creation of the soul and its
transmigration into different bodies.
6.333 THE CREATION OF THE HUMAN SOUL
Regarding the creation of the human soul, Calcidius states

that God was only directly responsible for the fashioning of the
higher parts while he delegated to the subordinate gods the task
of making the lower: 'the appetitive part which is divided into
irascibility and desire' (appetitus, qui dividitur in iracundiam
et cupiditatem) as he says in one passage,2B8 and 'the appetitive
2HS.Ibicl. 182, .209. 16-210. -i.

286.1bid. 2.U. 247,7-12.
21i7. Ibid. 199. 216,9 ff.
288. Ibid. 20 I. 220, lli-221. 9.
CALCIDilJS 489
aspect of the senses, local motion, and the part which nourishes
bodies' (appetitus sensuum locularis motus quaque corpora
nutritmtur) as he says in another.289 Since (i) human souls are
placed at their first creation in the heavenly bodies,290 (ii) the
planets are equivalent to the secondary gods to whom the task
of fashioning the lower parts of souls was delegated,291 and (iii)
the heavenly bodies are associated with psychic states in the
\vorld soul,292 we must therefore conclude that the lower parts
of the soul are acquired from the latter's planetary origin and
must also exist in the soul prior to its entry into any given ter-
restrial body. The counterpart of this thesis can be
demonstrated by considering the transmigration of the human
soul. Regarding this topic, Calcidius states that souls undergo
cycles of death and rebirth according to which each one can
either return to its celestial origin or enter into a higher or lower
state, 293 for a rational soul this elevating or debasing only taking
place within the range of human characters; 294 and that the en-
try into the lower state consists of 'the body's conjunction with
the remnants of vice: an incarnation made more brutal by in-
creasing the soul's blemishes from its previous life' (ad
titiorum reliquias accedente corpore incorporationem auctis
2H9. Ibid. 137, 177, 18-178, 7. At ibid. 255, .264, 11-14 Cakidius states
that God acted through intermediaries here because 'he could have no
assodation with matter' (nulla esset sibi cum corpore cond/iatio). See Plato:
Tim . .. lc.
290. C:alddius: In Tim. J:ll, 181, 9-12 and 200. 220, 10-17.
2<.J1./1Jid. l:\9.179.11-lland201..220. 18.
292. Sec pp. 481-48.2.
29:\.lbill. 196.117, 2';-.218, 7.
294. Ibid. 198. 219. 4-5. Here. he states quite deliberately that 'Plato does
not hold that a rational soul can assume the appearance and visage of an
animal lacking reason' (Plato mm putat rutimwbilem animam l'Ultum at-
tflle r1s ratione carentis anima/is induere). There is. however, no such state-
ment in Plato.
490 NEOPlATONISM
animae vitiis efferari ex instituto vitae prioris).295 Since (i) the

body is said to unite with a soul already marred by the conse-
quences of its previous career,296 and (ii) the vices of the soul
can only occur in its lower parts,Z97 we must infer that the soul
retains these lower parts after its departure from any given ter-
restrial body.
6.334 CONCLUSIONS
Calcidius' account of the human soul's division raises in-

teresting questions regarding his use of earlier sources. Much of
the analysis is derived from cross-references in the Timaeus
itself, although at significant points this material is sup-
plemented by teachings drawn from other dialogues,298 and
there is at least one passage in which Aristotle's De Anima is
also used as a source of information.299 However, as always it is
not the commentator's use of the ancient philosophical texts
which is most revealing about his own method of writing but
his references to thinkers nearer to his own time, and among the
latter must be placed the explicit statement that Plato rejects the
transmigration of human souls into animals which reflects an in-
terpretation verified by ancient testimony as peculiar to Por-
295./hid. 198.219.5-6.
296. See above.
297./bid. 139, 179, 19-180,2 and 187.212. 10-11.
298. In connection with the divisions of the human soul, the commenta!Dr
also makes use of Plato: Rep. IV, 4.~9d ff. on the tripartition Into 'rational'
o. oytO'TtKOV), 'spirited' (9UJ.10Et&&c;). and appctilin' (btt9UJlT)tlKOV). Sec nn.
281-282.
299. In connt:ction with the human soul's divisions. the commentator also
alludes 10 Aristotle: De Anim. II, 414a; 1-32 on the powers of the soul called
'nutrition' (9pE7tttK6v). appetition (OpEKTtKOV), 'sensation (aloennK6v).
and 'locommion' (KtVT)nKov Kata t6nov). Seen. 289.
CALC IDillS 491
phyry .-~~~~~ If this minor detail is incontestably Porphyrian, the

question naturally arises whether the whole account of the
higher and lower soul is also derived from him, regarding which
one final point is worth making. The argument that human souls
acquire their lower parts from association with the heavenly
bodies has its exact parallel in Porphyry's teaching that the
souls, before their entry into terrestrial bodies, acquire a series
of pneumatic envelopes which are partly psychological and
partly material, as they descend through the heavenly
spheres.:\01. It is known that Porphyry was influenced by the
Chaldaean Orac/es3112 and perhaps also by Numenius in the for-
mulation of this doctrine,3113 and so it is possible that our com-
.-\00. See Augustine: Ci11. Dei X, 30 (CCSL 47, 307-308) and Aeneas ofGaza:
Theophr. (PG 8';, 892B-893A). lamblichus and Hierocles also held this view,
hut these arc later writers not at issue here. On the question of transmigration
sec W. Stettner: Die Seelenuanderung bei Griechen tmd Riimern (Stuttgart,
193-j), pp. 72-7'; and H. Dorrie: 'Kontroversen urn die Seelenwanderung im
kaiscrzcitlkhen Platonismus', Hemres8'; (1957), p. 4.23.
30 I. The fullest description is at Porphyry: Sent. 29, 19, ';-13 where the
soul is said to have, according to its degree of purity, (i) when it is rational 'a
body close to immateriality and aetherial' (tyyuc; toii MA.ou Oci>lla, OnEp toti
TO ai8EplOV), (ii) when it resorts to imagination 'a soliform body' (to
i]l..tOEto&c;), (iii) when it becomes excited by sensible form 'a luniform body'
(TO OEAllVOEto&c;). and (iv) when it is attracted to the formless 'a body made of
moist vapors' (~ (ryprov civaeulltciaEwv auvEOtllK6ta). Cf. Porphyry: Ad
Gaur. II, 49, 14-21 and De Antro Nymph. 11. IL I ff. On the history of this
donrinc sec R. C. Kissling: 'The <'>XllllU-nVEUJlQ of the Neoplatonists and the
De lnsomniis of Synesius of Cyrene', American journal of PbiloiOg)' 43
( 1922), pp. 318-330 and E. R. Dodds: Proc/us, The Elements ot Theology. A
Retised Text uoftb Translation, Introduction cmd Commentm:v. Snond Edi-
tion (Oxford, 1963). Appendix II. pp. 313-.U I.
.~02. See Proclus: In Tim. Ill, 23L 18-:\2 .
.~03. Whether Numenius hdd this doctrine or not depends upon the inter-
pretation of (i) Numcnius: fr. B (Stohacus: Flori/. l, .-\74-37';) whlre evil i~
said to arise in the soul 'from its external attachments' (rmo tli>v f~w8Ev npo-
OIJlUOilEVWV). The meaning of this statement is uncertain unless the: 'at-
tachments' are to he understood in the light of (ii) Macrobius: In Sonm. Scip.
492 NEOPI.ATONISM
mentator has adopted the teaching from any one of these three
sources or a combination of them. However, the presence of the
definitely Porphyrian doctrine that rational souls cannot
migrate into animal bodies in a closely related context provides
strong circumstantial evidence that the notion of human souls
acquiring their lower parts from association with the heavenly
bodies is also derived from Porphyry here.304 Such a conclusion
certainly permits the hypothesis that Calcidius' entire account
of the higher and lower soul is Neoplatonic, although at this
point we are no longer in the realm of demonstrable certainty.
I. II. 12 where the soul 'puts on another aetherial envelope in each of the
spheres which lie below the heaven' (in singulis enim sphaeris quae caelo
subiectae sunt aetheria obr,olutione l'eslitllr). The diffit'ulty here is that
there is no agreement among scholars whether it is the teat'hing of :'llumenius
or Porphyry which is being reported. See pp. S 16-S 18.
304. Numenius agreed with most other Platonists- including Plotinus-
that transmigration into animal bodies was possible. See Numenius: fr. 49
(Aeneas of Gaza: Theophr. (PG 85, 8928)).
7
Macrobius
i. I INTRODUCTION
With Macrobius. the author of two works of the greatest in-

terest to mediaevalists: the Saturnalia and the Commentarius
in Somnium Scipionis, we finally come to a Neoplatonist in the
fullest sense of the word. I Although the presence of dox-
I. Since Macrobius was one of the most widely read pagan authors during
the Middle Ages, the task of describing his influence throughout this period is
of a magnitude to deter scholars. However. among the significant (although
partial) surveys already undertaken. the following should be consulted. M.
:\1anitius: Gescbicbte der lateiniscben Literatur des Mittelalters 1-111 (Miin-
chen. 19 I I- I 93 I) mentions Macrobius many times in connection with
specific mediaeval writers; P. Duhem: Le systeme du monde. Histoire des
doctrines cosmologiques de Pia ton a Copernic Ill (Paris. 191 S), pp. 62-71
describes the impact of the cosmological doctrines; M. Schedler: Die
Pbilosopbie des Macrobius und ibr Einfluss auf die Wissenscbaft des
christlicben Mittelalters (Beitriige zur Geschicbte der Pbilosophie und
71Jeologie des Mittelalters 1311) (Munster. 1916) studies the influence of the
metaphysical theories; W. H.Stahl: Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of
Scipio. Translated with an Introduction and Notes (New York/London,
19';2). pp. 39-55 summarizes the earlier scholarship together with occasional
further observations; P. Courcellc: 'La postcrite chrctienne du Srmge de Sci-
flion ', Revue des etudes latines 36 ( 1958), pp. 205-234 traces Macrobius' in-
lhttnce in late antiquity; E. .Jeauneau: 'Macrobe source du platonisme char-
train'. Studi /Hedieta/1 I ( 1960). pp. 3-24 provides further information regar-
ding the influence upon the later Middle Ages; and H. Silvestre: 'Note sur Ia
sunic de Mac robe au moyen age'. Classica et Medit~etalla 24 ( 1963 ). pp.
I ~0-1 HO examines the writer's influence during the earlier and central Middle
Ages. From among the results of these researches. it is cmly possible here to
note those concerning (i) definite uses of Macroblus (evidenced by actual cita-
493
194 NEOPLATONISM
tual citation of the author's name or texts te,batim), (ii) references to his
strictly philosophical theories (as opposed to the more frequent appeal to his
astronomical and cosmographical teachings), and (iii) uses of either the
Saturnalia or the Commeutarius (in contrast to the grammatical treatise De
Differentiis). a) In late antiquity. Macrohius is quoted in connection with
arithmetic hy Boethius. b) In the Carolingian period. He is used by the com-
mentators on Martianus Capella- Eriugena. for the philosophical interpreta-
tion of mythology. for the exegetical notion of OKon6c;. for arithmetic. and
for the theory of the human soul; Martin of Laon. for the philosophical inter-
pretation of mythology; and Remigius of Auxerre, for the doctrine of the
hypostases. for arithmetic, and for the theory of the human soul - and by
the Ciceronian excerptor Hadoard, for the teaching regarding types of
mythical narrative (see B. Bischoff: 'Hadoardus and the Manuscripts of
Classical Authors from Corbie', Didascalltle. Studies in Honor of A.
Albareda, edited by S. Prete (New York. 1961), pp. 15-57). c) During the
tenth and eleventh centuries. He is employed by Pseudo-Bede: De Mundi
Constitulione, for the doctrine of the hypostases and for the theory of the
human soul (see E. Garin: Stud/ sui plutonismo medievale (Firenze, 1958).
pp. 36-4 3 ); by Bovo of Coney. for the doctrine of the hypostases. for
chemistry, for arithmetic, and for the theory of the human soul (see P.
Courcellc: La Consolation de Philosophic dans Ia tradition /itteraire.
Antecedents et posterile de Boece (Paris. 1967), pp. 292-295); by the
anonymous adapter of the Commentarius in the manuscript Bruxellensis
10066-7':1, for the analysis of the virtues (see H. Silvestre: 'Une adaptation du
commentaire de Macrobe sur le Songe de Scipion dans un manuscrit de Brux-
elles, Archives d'histoire tloctrinale et lftteraire du moyen dge 29 ( 1962),
pp. 93-101 ); and by Manegold of Lautenbach, for the doctrine of the
hypostases, for the theory of the human soul, and for the analysis of the vir-
tues (see T. Gregory: Platonismo medievale. Studt e ricerche (Roma, 1958),
pp. 17-30). d) During the twelfth century. He is cited by William of Conches,
for every aspect of his teaching in the first full scale commentary on his work
(sec E. )eauneau: 'Gioses de Guillaume de Conches sur Macrobe. Note sur les
manuscrits', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litterai,e du moyen dge 27
(1960), pp. 17-23: 'La lecture des auteurs dassiques :ll'ecole de Chartres
durant Ia premiere moitic du X lie siecle. Un temoin privilegic: Les Glosae
super Macrobiu m de Guillaume de Conches'. Classical Influences on Euro-
pecm Culture A. D. 500-/500, edited by R. R. Bolgar (Cambridge, 1971 ), pp.
95-102; P. Dronke: Fabula. Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval
Platonism (Mittellclfeinische Studien rmd Texte 9) (Leiden/Koln, 1974), pp.
I :~78); by Bernard Silvestris, for the teaching regarding types of mythical
narrative and for the theory of the human soul; by Abailard for the teaching
MACROBIUS 495
ographical extracts at various points in these works indicates

that their author is not unaware of earlier and different tradi-
tions of philosophy, Macrobius' primary adherence to the final
and dominant tendency in later ancient thought is amply
rl"garding types of mythical narrative, for the doctrine of the hypostases, for
the theory of the human soul, and for the analysis of the virtues; by Hugh of
St. \'ktor, for arithmetic and for tht: theory of the: human soul; by John of
Salisbury. for the interpretation of dreams; hy Alan of Lille, for the doctrine
of the hypostases, for arithmetic, and for the theory of the human soul; by
\'im:ent of Beauvais. for the theory of the human soul; and by many other
writers of the same period. According 10 criterion (i) above, we must exclude
from the list the tadt use of Macrobius in Ambrose and Jerome suggested by
P. Courcelle: 'Nouveaux aspects du platonisme chez saint Ambroise', Re11ue
ties etudes latines 34 (1956), pp. 220-239 (results which have in any case
been seriously questioned b}' M. Fuhrmann: 'Macrobius und Ambrosius',
Pbilologus 107 ( 1963). pp. 30 1-308), and the possible dependence of Servius
Danielis upon him maintained by E. Tuerk: 'Les Saturnales de Macrobe,
source: de Servius Danielis', Revue des etudes /ati11es 41 ( 1963 ). pp. 327-349.
\'fithout the application of criterion (ii), it would be necessary to discuss
writt:rs such as Bede, Dungal, Helperic of Auxerre, Regino of Priim, Abbo of
Fleury, Byrhtferth, Gerbert, and Adalbold of Utrecht; without the application
of criterion (iii), it would be necessary to discuss grammarians like Sedulius
Scott us. Of course, the importance of a writer during the Middle Ages can be
gauged not only by citations in other authors but by the manuscript tradition
of the writer's own works. On this latter aspect of Macrobius the following
may hl" consulted: A. La Penna: 'Studi sulla tradizione dei Saturnllli di
:\tacrohio', Annali della Scuolll Normtlle Super/ore di Pisa, Serie 2, 22
( llJ'5.-\), pp. 225-252; J. Willis: 'De Macrobii codice Montepessulano',
Rbeiniscbes Museum 97 ( 1954), p. 287 and 'De codicibus aliquot manuscrip-
t is Macrobii Saturnalill continentlbus', ibid. 100 ( 1957), pp. 152-164. Two
points regarding this manuscript tradition are worthy of note here: a) The
l"ditorial work of the Carolingian scholar Lupus of Ferrieres is happily
preserved in one manuscript of the Commentarius (see A. La Penna: 'Le
Parisinus latinus 6.P'O et le texte des CommentarU de Macrobe'. Retue de
fJbilologie et d'bistuire 24 ( 1950), pp. 177 -187); b) John of Salisbury's cita-
tions of the Sllturnalia show that he possessed an edition of the work more
lomplete than that now extant (see C. C. Webb: 'On Some Fragments of the
\'uturntllia ', Classical Review II ( 1897), p. 441 ).
496 NEOJ>LATONISM
demonstrated by his explicit quotation and paraphrase of

Plotinus and Porphyry. Like Apuleius and Calcidius, this writer
declares himself to be a follower of Plato's thought, but unlike
them he emphasizes the contribution of later exegetes to this
tradition. Like the author of the Asclepius and Calcidius, he
reflects the teaching of the Neoplatonic interpreters of
Platonism, but unlike them he gives the latter a status outrank-
ing that of their original source. All these circumstances endow
the two treatises with a special significance for students of later
thought, since they will become among the most influential
pagan Platonic works in the Middle Ages.2
The identification of Macrobius himself presents considerable
difficulties. The oldest manuscripts describe him as vir
clarissimus ac illustris and, since such a title was restricted to
holders of the highest imperial offices, scholars have generally
identified our author with a 'Macrobius' who is apparently men-
tioned three times in the Theodosian Code: as pretorian prefect
in Spain during A.D. 399-400, as proconsul of Africa in A.D.
410, and as chamberlain of the imperial household in A.D. 422.3
However, that the holder of these three offices is one and the
same person and that the latter is identifiable with the author of
the famous Neoplatonic treatises are assumptions which have
been brought seriously into question in recent years.4 The prin-
2. For general introductions to Macrobius' thought one should consult:

Schedler: op. cit., pp. 6-102; T. Whittaker: Macrobius or Philosophy, Sciet~ce
atld Letters ;, the Year 400 (Cambridge, 1923); P. Wessner: 'Macrobius',
Pau~vs Realencyclopiidie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft 14 (Stut-
tgart. 1928), col. 170-198; Stahl: op. cit., pp. 9-39; M. Bevilacqua: lntrodu-
zione a Macrobio (Leece, 1973); and ). Flamant: Macrobe et /e
neop/atonisme latin ala fin du /Ve siecle (Leiden, 1977). Flamant's study.
owing to its enormous scope, has largely superseded earlier treatments.
3. Sec for example Stahl: op. c:il., pp. 6-9.
4. Primarily by A. Cameron: 'The Date and Identity of Macrobius' ,journal
of Roman Studies 56 ( 1966), pp. 25-38. This author rejects the identification
MACROBil IS 497
cipal modern scholar of this question has therefore concluded

that the pretorian prefect, the proconsul, and the chamberlain
were three distinct individuals, and that the pretorian prefect is
probably not and the chamberlain definitely not identifiable
\Vith the writer for various reasons. 5 Fortunately, for the
hiswrian of philosophy the correctness of these identifications
is not a crucial question.
Of potentially greater significance, however, is the matter of
dating the Saturnalia and the Commentarius. A starting point
for the dating of the former work is presented by the fact that,
since Servius the grammarian, who is one of the characters in
the narrative, is depicted as having the reputation of the mature
Virgilian scholar, Macrobius could hardly have been writing his
narrative before roughly A.D. 408-410.6 A further deduction
can be made from this that, since the author's preface states his
aim to collect material beneficial to the education of his son,
who must therefore have been at least fifteen years old,
Macrobius himself must have been not younger than thirty-five
at the time of writing. 7 Fragile as these conclusions are, they are
more: secure than any which can be drawn regarding the dating
of the latter work, about which we can only guess. Since this
also includes prefatory material referring to his son's education,
and since its content is of a more technical and more advanced
nature, it seems probable that it was composed at a somewhat
later point in time. Accordingly a date after A.D. 410 has been
proposed as consistent with the chronological criteria
dahorated earlier.H
with all three Macrobii of the Theodosian Code, proposing instead that with
a "Theodosius" who was pretorian prefect in A.D. 4.30.
~- Flamant: op. cit., pp. 96-126.
(,. Flamant: op. cit .. pp. 79-H.3.
-. Flamant: np. cit., pp. H7-91.
H. Flamant: op. cit .. p. 9 I. It should he noted th;u the dates suggested for
the composition of the two works are strictly dates after which they would
498 NEOPLATONISM
7.111 THE SATURNALIA
The Saturnalia takes the form of a dialogue in which various

prominent Roman intellectuals are depicted as gathering to
celebrate one of the most important festivals in the ancient
calendar.9 A remark by one of the characters indicates that
Macrobius consciously compares his own work with Plato's
famous .~J'nlfJosium, I o although the direct literary influence
seems to stem from more recent works in a similar genre by
Plutarch. Gellius. and Apuleius. 1 I In this kind of writing various
characters are portrayed as meeting and discussing one or more
topics - usually a mixture of the more and less serious- and in
the present instance the literary criticism of Virgil provides the
main theme around which other subjects are gathered. I2 Thus,
the whole work is divided up as follows: (i) The eve of the Satur-
nalia: discussion of the calendar and grammar; I 3 (ii) First day of
the Saturnalia: examinations of the origin of Praetextatus'
name, H of the history of the Saturnalia (with digressions on the
legends of Saturn and Janus), I'; of the nature of slavery, I6 of the
have been wrinen. This seems to be as far as one can proceed using imernal
criteria. Further arguments have been based upon the presence of political
conditions which would make the dissemination of manifestly pagan texts
possible. These are seemingly more speculative and suggest even later dates
for the treatises. See Flamant: op. cit .. pp. I 27- I .j I.
9. J. Willis: Ambrosii Tbeodosii Macrobii Saturnalia, apparatu critico
instruxit I. W. (leipzig, 1970). Cf. P. V. Davies: Macrobius, The Saturnalia.
Translated U'itb an Introduction and Notes (New York/london, 1969)
(made from the edition of Eyssenhardt).
10. Macrobius: Satum. II. I. 6.
I I. On the influence of these writers upon Macrobius see pp. <;I 1-i 1;.
12. On the symposium genre in late antiquity see Flamant: op. cit ..
p. 172 ff.
1.3. Macrobius: Satum. I. .3-i.
J.l. Ibid. I, 6.
li. Ibid. I. 7-10.
16. Ibid. I, I I.
MACROBJllS -499
cdcndar, I"' and of solar theology; IK (iii) After-dinner conversa-

tion on the same day of an anecdotal nature;t9 (iv) Second day
of the Saturnalia: discussion of Virgil's knowledge of pontifical
law:lo (v) After-dinner conversation on various minor topics;ll
(d) Third day of the Saturnalia: examinations of Virgil's method
of depicting the emotions,.22 of his employment of the four
kinds of rhetorical style,2:\ and of his dependence upon earlier
Greek and Latin writers;24 (vii) After-dinner conversation on the
same day in an anecdotal manner,2<; The unifying idea behind all
this material is the view stated early in the work that Virgil is an
authority on all branches of learning,.26 and in the course of the
discussions various participants evaluate the poet's knowledge
of philosophy, astronomy, pontifical Ia w, and rhetoric .2'7 For
the historian of Platonism it is naturally the philosophical
theories attributed to the poet by Macrobius - together with
the interpretation of solar theology included among the
preliminary topics of the first day's discussion- which present
potentially the most interesting feature in the whole narrative ..zs
It is therefore particularly unfortunate that the part of the text
dealing with these questions has been lost, although to some ex-
tent the deficiency can be made good with material drawn from
the other major treatise.
1"'. IIJid. I. 12-16.

IH.Ibid. I. 1""-24.
19. lbifl. II. There is a lacuna after ibid. II. 8.
20. Ibid. III. 1- I 2.
2 I . Ibid. III. 13-20.
22. Ibid. IV. There arc lacunae hcforc ibid. IV, I and after il>ld. IV. H.
2.~. Ibid. V, I.
21. Ibid V. 2 VI. There is a lacuna after Ibid. VI. 9.
2:; ll>id. VII.
26. ll>id. I. 16, 12'
2"'. The topics arc listed at ibid. l. 24.
2H. It is clear from remarks :u ibid. I. 24. IH: I. 24. 11: and V. 2. I that the
di-.lu~sion of Vir~il as philosopher was to come first in the sequence. This
'l'ction is therefore lost in the lacuna before Ibid. III. I.
500 NEOPLATONISM
7.112 THE COMMENTAR/US IN SOMNIUM SCIPIONIS
The Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis is a running

philosophical commentary upon the final section of Cicero's
treatise on the ideal commonwealth, namely Scipio Aemilianus'
report of his dream in which the destiny of human souls in rela-
tion to the whole cosmos is revealed.29 The form of Macrobius'
treatise can be paralleled by a number of other Latin commen-
taries surviving from late antiquity - these in their turn reflec-
ting Greek models.~o- examples being Calcidius' commentary
on Plato's Timaeus, Servius' on the Aeneid of Virgil, and
Favonius Eulogius' on Cicero's Somnium Scipionis. In all these
instances we find first an introduction in which certain general
points about the original work's genre, purpose, narrative con-
text, and so on are made,3I and secondly a main discussion in
which sections of the base text are taken in the original order
and explained with commentaries of varying length.32 In
Macrobius' introduction, the following general points are con-
sidered: (i) The relation between the Ciceronian and Platonic
treatises on the ideal state; (ii) The reason for Cicero's inclusion
of a dream in his work and Plato's inclusion of Er's revelation;
(iii) Epicurean objections to the Platonic narrative; (iv) The
kinds of treatise where philosophers include or exclude
29.). Willis: Ambrosii Tbeodosii Macrobii Commcmarii in Somnium Sd-

pionis, edidit I. W. (Leipzig, 1970). Cf. W. H. Stahl: Macrobius, Commentary
on the Dream of Scipio. Translated with a'l Introduction m1d Notes (New
York/London, 195 2) (based primarily upon Jan's edition).
30. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, 4, I acknowledges this debt.
31. See Calcidius: In Tim. I, 57 ,I - 4. 59,2; Servius: In Aeneid. I, pr. 1 ff.;
and Fa von ius Eulogius: Disp. de Somn. Scip. 1, I.
32. On the systematic form of the introduction see Flamant: op. cit., p. 148
ff. See further A. Rabe: Prolegomenon sylloge (Leipzig, 1931) (for antiquity)
and E. A. Quain: 'The Medieval Accessus ad Auctores. Tmditio 3 ( 194 5 ), pp.
215-264 (for later influence).
MACROBILIS 501
mythical material; (v) The kinds of dream which are possible

wgc:ther with their significance or lack of it; (vi) The relation of
Scipio's dream to such a classification; (vii) The appropriateness
of this dream to be received by him; (viii) The purpose of
Scipio's dream; and (ix) The location in the heavens where the
action of the dream is perceived to take place.3:i In the main sec-
tion of the commentary, Macrobius discusses in sequence: a)
The: nature of number;34 b) The ambiguity of prophecy;3'; c) The
classification of the virtues;36 d) The nature of the human soul
from the viewpoints of the soul's knowledge of itself,:i7 the
'death of the soul interpreted as its entry into body ,38 the opi-
nions of various philosophers on its descent,W the opinions of
the Platonists regarding its descent, 4o the death of the body
represented by its separation from the soul, 4t and the soul's
relation to the universe;42 e) Questions of cosmography and
geography;4:i f) The eternity of the world;-14 g) The temporal
cycles of history;iS h) The nature of the human soul from the
vie,vpoints of the soul's divinity ,46 Plato's demonstration of the
55. "acrobius: In Srmm. Scip. I. 5, I. Points (vi), (vii), and (viii) com:s-
pond w the traditional criteria of the 'genre' (&iooc;). 'subject-matter' (UA11).
and 'purpose:' (OK07t6c;) mc:ntiont"d In introductions .
.~-1. Ibid. I. 5-6 .
.~'i. /hid. I.....,
0
.~6. IIJid. I. 8.
r. Ibid. 1. 9. This and the next fivt" chapters represent the first connected
1n::umcn1 of the soul.
:\8. /hid. I. I 0 .
.~9. /hid. I. I I.
10.1/Jid. I. 12.
I I. fiJi d. I, J:\.
12 Ibid. I, li.
1.~. IIJid. I. 15 - 11.9. Cosmography is discussed first, followed by
gl'ography.
H. /hid. 1!. 10.
l'i. IIJid. II. II.
16. 1/Jid. II. 12.
502 NEOPLATONISM
soul's immortality from its self-motion, 41 primary and sup-

plementary arguments of Aristotle against this demonstration, 4R
the Platonists' reply to Aristotle's primary argument,49 and the
Platonists' reply to Aristotle's supplementary arguments;so and
i) The various subdivisions of philosophy. 51 The implicit aim of
the work is to show that Cicero's narrative presents a coherent
exposition of the Platonic doctrine of the human soul 52 and can
he interpreted with reference to the writings of later thinkers
like Plotinus and Porphyry. 53 For this reason it is the Macrobian
passages dealing with psychological questions which hold the
greatest interest for the modern reader. However, since this
treatise is a running commentary upon a text rather than an in-
dependent systematic exposition of a problem, its complete
teaching regarding the human soul cannot be extracted from
any single connected passage.
7.12 MACROBIUS' SOURCES
The question of the precise sources from which the writer

has derived his doctrine is as difficult to settle in the case of the
Saturnalia and the Commentarius as it is with regard to the
other major philosophical treatises of late antiquity. This is once
again because, so many probable sources being no longer ex-
ti./bid. II. 1;\.

lR. /hid. II, I-I.
llJ. Ibid. II, I<;.
50. Ibid. II. I 6. This and the pre\'ious three chapters <:onstitute the second
nmnected treatment of the soul.
51./bld.ll. 17.
52. That Cicero's text can only he understood adequately hy interpreting it
in the light of Pl;ttonic philosophy is txplicitly stated at ibid. II, 2. I and II, 2.
2.'\. Furthermore. objections to Plato's doctrine are automatically applicable
to Cicero's alcording to Ibid. I. 2. <;.
53. On the use of these writers seep. 507 ff.
MACROBillS
tant, it is often impossible to compare texts.'H However, since

the evidence is sufficient for us to draw certain limited conclu-
sions, a few preliminary remarks are worth while regarding the
three kinds of source: (i) those explicitly cited for the passages
in quesrion; (ii) those not explicitly cited in any passage; and (iii)
those explicitly cited but not for the passages in question. In
each case it will be convenient to discuss first the Greek and
secondly the Latin authors.
7. 121 GREEK AND LATIN SOURCES EXPLICITLY CITED
Among the Greek writers explicitly cited by Macrobius in cer-

tain passages, Plato occupies the primary position.-;-; The
Phaedo is cited for the notion that philosophy is a meditation
upon death, 56 the depiction of the soul's confusion upon enter-
ing into the body, ';7 and the notion of our varying rewards and
54. The following studies are the main general accounts of Macrobius'
sources: (i) For the Saturnalia. H. Linke: Quaestiones de Macrobii Satur-
naliorum fontibus, Diss. (Breslau, 1880); G. Wissowa: De Macrobii Satur-
naliorum fonlibus capita tria, Diss. (Breslau, 1880); G. Logdberg: In
Macrobil Saturnalia adnotatlones (Uppsala, 1936); and E. Tuerk: Macrobius
tmd die Que/len seiner Saturnalien. Eine Untersucbung iiber die
lli/dungsbestrebungen im Symmacbus-Krels, Diss. (Freiburg i. Br., 1962). (ii)
For the Commentarius. H. Linke: 'Uber Macrobius' Kommentar zu Ciceros
.\"omnium Scipionis . Phi/ologlscbe Abbandlrmgen, M. Hertz zum "'0.
(ieburtstage (Berlin. 1888), pp. 240-256 and K. Mras: 'Macrobius' Kommen-
tar zu Ciceros Somnium. Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte des 5.
Jahrhunderts N. Chr. . Sltzungsbericbte der Preussiscbetl Akademie der
Wissenscbaften, phil.-hist. KlliSse 6 (Berlin, 1933 ). pp. 232-286. (iii) For both
works. P. Courcclle: Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources. translated
by H. E. Wedeck (Cambridge,MA, 1969), pp. 13-47. Unfortunately, much of
this scholarship- especially the older- confuses fact and speculation.
55. See Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 6, 2 and II, 2, I.
56. Ibid. l, 13.5 (to Plato: Phaetl. 62a-c, 64a. and 67d).
57. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, 12,7 (to Plato: Pbaed. 79c).
S04 :"IIEOPI.ATONISM
punishments in the afterlife;'iH the Pbaedrus for the teaching

that soul is a self-moving principle;'i9 the Gorgias for the notion
of man's varying rewards and punishments in the afterlife;M the
Republic for the doctrine that the soul must endure many
periods of incarnation,6t the description of the Sirens assigned
to the heavenly spheres, 62 and the teaching of Er's narrative as a
whole/>3 the Timaeus for the notion that the world is subject to
periodic destruction,64 the account of the interrelation of
elements within the world body, 6'i the notion that the indivisi-
ble and divided constitute the psychic substance,66 the analysis
of the numerical structure within the world soul,6~ and the no-
tion that the heavenly motions can be measured by means of the
sun's light;6H and the Laws for the doctrine regarding the dif-
ferent species of motion.69 Modern scholarship has been divid-
SR. Macrobius: In Somn. Sdp. l, I. 6 (to Plato: Pbaed. IIOh-1 14c).

S9. Macrobius: In Somn ..kip. II. 15. 6 (to Plato: Pbaedr. 2-i5c-246:1). The
tit It: of the dialoRue is not given.
60. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, I. 6 (to Plato: Gorg. 523a-526d).
61. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. II, 17, 13 (10 Plato: Rep. X. 615a-h). The ti-
tle: of the: dialogue is not given.
62. Macrobius: In Somll. Scip. II, 3. I (to Plato: Rep. X. 6I7b).
63. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, I. 7 (to Plato: Rep. X, 6I4b-62Id). The tl
tie of the dialogue is not given.
64. Macrobius: In Smmz. Scip. II, to. 14 (to Plato: Tim. 22c-23c).
M. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. 1, 6, 23; I, 6, 24: and I, 6, 29-31 (to Plato:
Tim. 31b-32c). The first passage does not name the dialogue:. while: the: third
consists of a translation from the Greek.
66. Macrobius: In Somll. Scip. I. 12. 6 (to Plato: Tim . .~"ia).
67. Macrohius: In Sonm. Sclp. l, 6, 2: I. 6, 4; I. 6. -iS: II. 2, I; II. Z., 1-i; II, 2.
15; II. 2, 20: and II, 2, 22 (to Plato: Tim. 35b-36h). The: fourth and seventh
passages do not name: the di:1logue, while: the: sixth comprises a translation
from the Greek.
68. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 20. 2 (to Plato: Tim. 39h). This passage:
consists of a translation from the: Grt:c:k.
69. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. II. 15. 25 (to Plato: Leg. X. 89.fb-896a). In
the Saturntl/ia, onlr one passage: of philosophical significanle is taken from
Plato: the account of the procession of the gods in the Pbaedrus. See Saturn.
MACROIJilJS ;oc;
ed on the question whether these citations of Plato have been

made directly from the original text or derived through the in-
termediary of later commentators. The suspicion that they are
only indirect has been aroused by the fact that references to the
Phaedo have been combined with others to Plotinus and to cer-
tain discourses 'on the return of the soul' (de animae reditu) in
one passage,'o and that references to the Timaeus are juxtapos-
ed with one to those books in which Porphyry 'cast some light
upon the obscurities of the Timaeus' (Timaei obscuritatibus
non nihillucis infudit) in another."'' It is perhaps unwise to ex-
pect any definitive answer to this question to emerge, since the
Latin writer's reading of Plato in conjunction with later com-
mentary and his ability to consult the original seem equally pro-
hahle .... l
I. 2~. c; (to Phaedr. 246e-247a). Here the dialogue is not cited by name
although the Greek text is translated directly. Elsewhere in the Saturnalia
Wl' find only references to the dramatic settings of certain dialogues - see
Saturn. I, I, 3;1,1,5-6;1, 11,41;11, 1,2;andVJJ, 1,13;aselectionofanec-
dotes- see ibid. II. 8. 4-8; VII. 15. 3; and VII, 15, 15-16; and some
etymologies- see ibid. I, 17, 7; I, 23, 5; and I, 23, 7.
"'0. Macrohius: In Smmz. Scip. I. 13, 16. The anonymous treatise mention-
ed is almost certainly to be identified with Porphyry's De Regressu Animae.
According to F. Cumont: 'Comment Plotin detourna Porphyre du suicide',
Rezue ties etudes grecques 3 2 ( 1919), pp. 113-120 and Courcelle: op. cit., pp.
r--W the material from the Phaedo is derived indirectly. However, P. Henry:
Plotin eti'Occitlerzt. Finnicus Matenzus, Martus Victorinus, saint Augustin
et .\/aerobe (Lou vain, 1934 ), pp. 163-182 holds that the opposite is the case.
-I. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. II, ~. 15. The reference is dearly 10 Por-
phyry's Commentarius in Timaeum. The pervasive influence of this work
on the Latin writer has heen underlined hy Schedler: op. cit., p. 85, n. 6;
Mras: op. cit .. pp. 238-251, 261-262, 265-268, 269-27~. and 281-282;
Courcelle: op. cit .. p. :f.f; Stahl: op. cit.. p. 197. n. ~I: Flamant: op. cit., pp.
ltH. 1-o ..~21-~22. 5555-ll. 561-562,l'tC.
"'2. It has been demonstrated that some of the citations of Plato in the
Satunw/i(i are derived through an intermediary. Thus, the reference at
Saturn. VII, I, 13 is via Plutarch: Quaest. Cmwit. 613d and that at Saturn.
'506 NEOPI.ATONISM
The role of Aristotle in Macrobius' writings is much more

restricted. We find him cited for his attack upon Plato's defini-
tion of soul as a self-moving principle,7:1 for the notion that the
soul is an 'actuality' (evn:MXEtCI),74 and for his description of the
pleasures attendant upon the senses of taste and touch. ~'5 That
these passages are not taken directly from Aristotle is clearly in-
dicated by the occurrence of the last also in the analogous con-
text of Gellius' Noctes Atticae,-:6 the blatantly doxographical
character of the reference to the soul's actuality, 77 and by the
interpolation of the first with counter-arguments advanced by
'those who prided themselves in the name of Platonists' (qui se
Platonicos dici gloriabantur). 7H There is in fact no evidence of
direct recourse to the original anywhere in Macrobius. 79
II. 8, 4-8 is via Gellius: Noel. Attic. XV. 2, 3. But this fact does not preclude
direct access to the original in addition, nor does it prove anything about the
usage in the Commentarius.
73. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. ll, 14,4 ff. (to Aristotle: Phys. Vlll,3.253a24
ff.) The title of Aristotle's work is not cited.
74. Macrobius: lnSomn. Scip. I. 14. 19.
7'5. Macrobius: Saturn. II, 8, 10-H (to Aristotk: Problem. 28, 7, 949b37-
950a 12). The title of Aristotle's work is not cited. There are various other
references 10 Aristotle in the Saturm1/ia- mostly in connection with minor
questions of physics- see Saturn. V, 18, 19-20; VII, 3. 24; VII, 6, 15;
VII,12,2'5-26; VII,l3.19-20; and VII,l6,34.
76. Sec Gcllius: Noel. Attic. XIX, 2, 5.
77. For a discussion of doxographies in late antiquity see pp. 242-244.
78. Macrobius: In Sonm. Scip. II, I 5, I ff. There has been considerable
scholarly debate on the identity of these Platonists. The most likely
hypothesis is that the reference is to Porph)ry whose De Anima ad Boetbum
(of which some fragments are preserved in Eusebius' Praepar,ltiO
l:'tangelial) was directed against the Peripatetic position. This is the view of
Schedler: up. cit .. pp. 54-65; Mras: op. ell., pp. 2"77-278; Courcelle: op. cit ..
p. i3: and Flamant: op. cit .. pp. 640-642.
79. It has been proven that certain other citations of Aristotle in the Satur-
nalia are derived through an intermediary. Thus. the reference at Saturn.
VII, 6. I '5 is \'ia Plutarch: Quaest. Comit. 650a and that at Saturn. VII, 13,
19-20 is \'ia Plutarch: Qtwest. Comit. 627a-b. This makes it seem that all
MACROBIL'S
Of the Greek Platonists who lived between the classical

period and the rise of Neoplatonism, only one is cited on a
significant doctrinal point by the Latin writer.Ho This is
Numenius whose philosophical interpretation of Apollo - he is
called 'Delphian' because he is one, and oeA.q>oc; means 'one' in
the archaic language- is quoted in support of Macrobius' solar
monotheism. HI There is no way of determining whether such a
brief citation is direct or indirect since, although Numenius'
writings were available to some later Latin authors, he was also
extensively reported by Porphyry.H2
Plotinus is explicitly cited on a number of occasions in both
Macrobian works.83 Thus, Ennead I. 1: On tbe Animate and tbe
Man is cited for its examination of the question which human
functions are to be assigned to the soul and which to the com-
bination of the soul and the body;B4 Ennead I. 2: On tbe Virtues
for its theory of a systematic classification of virtues;B5 Ennead
~uch citations could be explained in the same way were the rele\'ant in-
u:rmcdiaries extant.
HO. Macrobius occasionally refers to 'Piatonists' (Platonic/) in general -
sec In Somn. Scip. I. I I . 4; I. I I, 9; II, 3. 14; etc. - and once each to Speusip-
pus- see Saturn. I. 17. 8 - and Xenocrates -see In Somn. Scip. I. 14. 19.
81. Macrobius: Satum. I. 17. 65 (Numenius: fr. 54). There is also an anec-
dote regarding Numenius' dream in which he was admonished for revealing
the Eleusinian mysteries through his philosophical interpretations. See
Macrobius: lnSomn. Scip.l, 2. 19(Numcnius: fr. SS).
H2. Macrohius' approximate contemporary Calcidius seems to have known
:"<<umcnius both from the latter's own works and from citations embedded in
Porphyry's. See pp. 42H-429.
H:\. See Macrobius: In Som11. Scip. I. 8, S where Plotinus is placed in a
special c:uegory amon~ philosophers together with Plato himself.
Ht. Ibid. II, 12.7-10 (to Plotinus: Em1. I. I /'HI I: I, I IS3/4-5; and I. I IS:\1
- ~- The Porphyrian title of this treatise Quid a11ima/, quid btmm (ti TO ~<j)ov
Kai tic; 6 tiv9pronoc;) is quoted.
HS. Macrobius: /11 Somn. Scip. I, 8. 3-11 (to Plotinus: Em1. l, 2 Ill) I I; I. 2
119/ 3: and I. 2 1191 6-7). The Porphyrian title De llirtutibus (m:pi ap&twv) is
4UOtcd.
iOH NEOPl.ATONISM
I. 9: On Suicide for its discussion of the question whether

suicide should be permitted or not;B6 Ennead II, 1: On the
Heaven for its argument that the elements themselves are in-
destructible;B7 Ennead II, 2: On the Motion ofthe Heaven for its
examination of the question why the heavenly sphere has a
perpetual and circular motion;BB and Ennead ll, 3: On Whether
the Heavenly Bodies are Causes for its doctrine of those bodies'
purely revelatory role in relation to an individual's destiny.B9
Modern scholars have shown their ingenuity in attempting to
discover whether these Plotinian citations are taken directly
from the original or indirectly through Porphyry,9o not-
withstanding the fact that Porphyrian texts covering the same
topics, which might enable us to determine where he disagrees
with Plotinus, are mostly lost. In fact, the only tangible
evidence seems to be the following: (i) That Plotinus is being
cited indirectly is indicated by the doctrinal content in the cita-
tion of Ennead I. 2: On the Virtues where the more systematic
nature of the classification generally as well as certain details
point rather to the use of Porphyry's Sententiae ad ln-
telligibi/ia Ducentes. This is the only occasion on which the
Plotinian and Porphyrian treatments of the same question can
be compared;9t (ii) That Plotinus is also being cited directly is
H6 . Macrobius: In Sonm. Scip. I. 13. 9-20 (to Plminus: Em1. I, 9/16/). The:
Porphyrian title: De voluntaria morte (nEpi t~aywyij<;) is quoted.
H7. Macrohius: In Smnn. Scip. II. 12, l~li (to Plotinus: Em1. II, I liO/ I
and II. I /40/3).
HR. Macrohius: In Somn ..kip. I. 17, H-11 (to Plotinus: Enn. II,.?. /14/ I).
H9. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 19. 27 (to Plotinus: Emz. II, 3 /52/3 and II .
.~ /52/ I 0). The Porphyrian title of this treatise: Si facitmt astra (Ei notEi tci
liotpa) is quoted. Cf. Macrobius: Saturn. I, 17. 3.
90. For the passages mentioned sec: Mras: op. cit .. pp. 2i l-2i3. 2i7-2iH.
260, 262. 273-27~: Henry: op. cit .. pp. 146-192: Courcdlc:: op. cit .. pp.
32-33, 37-38; and Flamant: op. cit .. pp . .399-400. 4ii-457. '56H-i73.
';90-591. 607-608, 634-63i.
91. A careful comparison of Macrobius' text. Plotinus: Em1. 1,2 /IW and
MACROBIUS
suggested by the selection and range of the quotations - En-

neads I, 1-2; II, l-3 - which are manifestly restricted to the
shorter treatises and those from the beginnings of the respective
Porphyrian groups. All this suggests a hasty perusal of the
original texts typical of a Roman man of letters, rather than a
systematic exposition of doctrine typical of a professional
Greek philosopher.<J2
In the chronological sequence, the latest writer to be cited is
Porphyry. His authority is invoked for an explanation of the
lorphrry: Sent. 32 was undertaken by Henrr: op. cit., pp. 154-162. He noted
that whereas Plotinus simp!)' interprets virtues such as wisdom. temperance.
~tc. on different levels, Porph)'r)' attempts to fashion a systematic order of
progression. Macrobius is closer to the latt~r. Furthermore. he noted the
following details occurring in both Porphrrr and Macrohius: (i) The notion
that the lowest virtues are political'. (ii) Phrases such as ad ration is nonnam
= m:pi to A.oytl;6JJVOV (Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 8, 7/Porphyry: Sent. 32.
25. 8-9), quod semper idem est = taut6tllc; (Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 8,
Hl/Porphyry: Sent. 32, 29, 6) instead of auA.6tllc; (Piotinus: Enn. I. 2 /19/7,
5 ). and prudenti" est mens ips" divina = oo~pia &e ytvrooKrov 6 vouc;
(Macrobius: 111 Somn. Scip. I. 8, tO/Porphyry: Sent. 32. 29, 4). This
lkmonstration is decisi\'e and - since it runs somewhat against his own
th~sis of a dominant Plotinian influence upon Macrobius - remarkably ob-
j~<.'tin. For a further comparison of the Plot in ian and Porphyrian discussions
of the virtues see H.-R. Schwyzer: 'Piotinisches und unplotinisches in den
'A~popJJai des Porphyrios', Plotino e II Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Oc-
cidetlle (Atti del Convegno 11lternazimlale, Roma 5-9 ottobre 19""0 = Ac-
cademi" Nazionale de Lincei, Quaderno 198) (Roma. 1974), pp. 221-252.
For Macrobius' own treatment of this topic see C. Zintzen: 'Romisches und
neuplatonisches bei Macrobius. Bemerkungen zur 7tOA.tttK1) aptft in Comm.
in Somn. Sc:ip. l, 8'. Polite/a und Res publica, Beitriige zum Verstiindnis
tmt Po/itik, Rec/Jt utld StC~at in der Antlke, dem Andenken R. Stmks.
hlrausg~geben von P. Stc:inmetz (Wi~shaden. 1969). pp ..'\57-376.
91. This thesis is abl)' formulated by Flamant: op. cit., pp. 'i71-'i73. The
argument of Henry: op. cit., pp. 1'i3-l 'i4 that Macrobius' reference to the
ll'rs~ Plotinian style in itself proves direct knowledge of the original is in-
conclusive. since the latin writer could easily have derived this notion from
Porphyr(s Fila Plotini, as a comparison of the following texts indkat~s:
Manobius: In Som11. Scip. ll, 12, 7-8 P/otlnus, magis quam quisqtwm ter-
510 NEOPI.ATONISM
distinction between true and false images in dreams, 9:i for the
doctrine that the presence of mathematical structure in the cor-
poreal realm reflects the prior mathematical constitution of its
animating soul, 94 and for an interpretation of Minerva as signify-
ing that power of the sun which furnishes intellection to human
minds.9i Since with this author we approach a date closer to
Macrobius' own, it seems less necessary to entertain the
hypothesis that he has been transmitted through an in-
termediary .96 The only candidate for such an intermediate role
would be a Virgilian commentator dependent upon Porphyry,
although it cannot be demonstrated conclusively that this
much-discussed commentator ever existed.9 7
borum parcus ... sufJ copiosa t'erum densitClle dlsseruit = Porphyry: VltCI
Plot. 14 tv Of: t<!> ypciq>Etv auvtolloc; yf.yovs Kai noA.uvouc; J3paxuc; n: Kal
VO'IJI-\QCJI nA.EOvci~wv. Se~: the: rc:marks of Flamant: op. cit .. p. 569 on this
point.
9.'\. Macrobius: In Somn ..\"cip. I. 3. 17. Th~: title of the work from which
the citation is made is given as the Commentarii. Since Porphyry's point is
made in conjunction with the exegesis of a Homeric text. most scholars con-
clude that the reference is to the Porphyrian Qtwestiones Homeriale which
are extant only in fragmems. See Mras: op. cit .. p. 238: Courcelle: op. cit., p .
.'\i: and Flam:mt: op. cit .. p. 163.
94. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. II. 3. 1 S ( = Porphyry: In Tim. fr. 72). The
title of the work is givc:n.
95. Macrobius: Sa tum. I. 17. 70. The title of the work from which the cita-
tion is made is not given. However, since the passage is embedded in a con-
text strikingly parallekd by Senius: In Buco/. S. 66 who actually quotes the
title of his Porphyrian source. most scholars now believe that the reference is
to the: no longer extant treatise entitled Sol. Sc:c Courcelle: op. cit .. pp. 28-.'\ I;
F. Altheim: A us Spiitantike und Cbristentum I. 'Porphyrios' Schrift iiber den
Sonncngott' (Tiibingen. 195 1). pp. 1-25 and 138-152; F. Althcim und R.
Stiehl: Die Amber in der a/ten Welt Ill: Anfiinge der Dichtung, Der Son-
nengott. Huchre/iglonen (lkrlin. 1966). pp. 198-24 3: and Flamant: op. cit.,
pp. MS-66H.
96. Porphyry died around A.D. 325-326.
l)":". The :1uthorship of such a commentary h;ts bc:c:n at v:trious times :tsslgn-
ed to Marius Victorinus and Cornelius Labeo. See pp. S 15-516.
MACROHillS <; I I
Among the Latin authors explicitly cited by Macrobius at cer-

tain points. Varro plays the primary role. Many of his works are
mentioned by name,'>H the most important being the Anti-
tJUifates Rerum Divinarum which are cited for the interpreta-
tion of the three Penates as physical substances,'>'> and for the
notion that Apollo and Liber represent aspects of a single divini-
ty .wo together with some relatively insignificant details of
religious cult.IOI The precision with which Macrobius can make
most of his citations - he locates them in specific parts of the
treatises named 102 - indicates direct access to the original
texts, although his hesitancy regarding the Varronian pro-
venance of certain ideas, which on one occasion is curiously
paralleled by other contemporary writers,~~~~ suggests that his
quotations are sometimes indirect.
98. Thus, Varro's De Re Rustica is named at Macrobius: Saturn. III, 13, 1;

lll. 13. 14-15: and III, 15, 6, his Antiqtlitates Rerum Ht~manartlm at Ibid. l,
3. 2: I, 3. 4: III, 4, 7; and Ill, 16, 12, his SCI ttl rae Menippeae at ibid. I, 7, 12: I,
II. 42; II, 8, 2: Ill, 12, 2: and V, 20, 13, his Logistorici GC~IIus at ibid. Ill, 15,
H, Ce1/o at ibid. Ill, 6, 5, and Marius at ibid. Ill, 18. 5. Since the first mention-
ed work is extant, we have the opportunity of observing the accuracy of
Mac.:rohius' quotations.
99. Macrobius: Saturn. Ill, 4, 8 (Varro: Antiqu. Rer. Divin. fr. 205).
AlthouKh the title of Varro's work is not actually mentioned here (nor indeed
\';1rro's name), the precise origin of the citation can be identified on the basis
of parallel testimony. Seen. I 03.
100. Macrobius: Saftll'n. l, I H, 3-4. The title of Varro's work is not actually
mentioned. However. the doctrinal content suggests that this citation is from
the Anliquitutes Rerum Dlvim1rum.
101. See Macrobius: Saturn. l, H, 1: I. 9. 16; Ill, 2, H; Ill, 2, II; Ill, 4, 2; Ill,
(,, 10; and VI. 4. H.
102. See Ibid. I. 9, 16 1/bro quinto rerum dl1inarum. Ill, 2, II in /lbro
quinto decimo rerum dit>inarum, and so on.
10;\. The citation at iiJid. Ill."!, H (Varro: Antiqu. Rer. Di1in. fr. 205) is in-
troduced simply by the words sed qui diligenlius eruunt teritatem and
follows immediately upon an explicit citation of Varro's Antiquilates Rerum
llumanarum. However, betause of the parallel testimony - the same doc-
'512 NEOPI.ATONISM
The use of Apuleius in Macrobius' works is on a less signifi-

cant scale. We find him cited for his employment of myth in a
manner unsuited to philosophers to4 and as an authority for the
inclusion of lighter subjects within the banquet genre.IOS These
citations are so allusive that it is impossible to determine
whether they are direct or indirect, although Apuleius' later
date makes the hypothesis of indirect quotation less probable in
his case.
Of the Latin Platonists who gained prominence in subsequent
generations, only one seems to have played an important role in
influencing Macrobius' thought. This is Cornelius Labeo whose
Fasti were cited for the interpretation of Maia as the physical
substance of earth to6 and De Oraculo Apollinis Clarii for the
notion that Hades, Zeus, the sun, and lao represent aspects of a
trine is cited explicitly from the Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum by

Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 28 (CCSL 47, 210-211 (VlJrro: Antiqu. Rer. Divin. fr.
206))- we can be certain about this citation's provenance. But this leaves
unexplained why Macrobius should present the passage in such an ambiguous
manner. The possibility that he is writing negligently is excluded by further
parallel testimony - of Servius Danielis: In Aeneid. II. 296 and Arnobius:
Adt. Nat. Ill, 40 (CSEL 4, 138)- in which a similar anonymity of attribution
occurs. The most likely solution is that all these writers are following a single
intermediate source who reported the Varronian theory in this elliptical man-
ncr. For a convincing argument that this intermediary was Cornelius Labeo
see P. Mastandrea: Un neoplt~tnnico Iatino, Cornelio Lttheone (testimo-
11itmze e frammenti) (Leiden, 1979). pp. 113-1 16.
104. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 2, 8. The title of the work is not men-
tioned, although the Metamorphoses dearly fits the description.
10'5. Macrobius: Satrtrn. VII. 3, 24. The title of the work is not mentioned
but. since the reference is clear Iy to a writing in the banquet genre, it must
correspond to the Quaestiones Cmwitiales cited elsewhere. See Sidonius
Apollinaris: Epist. 9. 13 ..~.
106. Macrobius: Saltlrn. I. 12. 20-21 (Cornelius l.abeo: Ft~sti. fr. '5). The ti-
tle of Labeo's work is not actually mentioned. However, the doctrinal con-
tent indicates that this citation is from the Fasti. Furthermore Macrobius:
Saturn. I. 16, 29 (Cornelius Labeo: Fasti, fr. I) docs mention its title.
MACROHHIS
single divinity. 11r:r. On the question whether these citations are

direct or indirect, the same remarks could be made as in the
previous instance.
7. 122 GREEK AND LATIN SOURCES NOT EXPLICITLY CITED
Among the Greek writers employed by Macrobius as sources

but not explicitly cited on any point, Plutarch occupies an im-
portant position. lOll That Saturnalia VII has drawn much of its
subject matter from him was demonstrated by scholars like H.
LinkelO'> and G. Wissowa, 11o arguing on the basis of close tex-
tual parallels between Macrobius' work and the partially extant
Quaestiones Com,iviales. The extent of such borrowings can be
seen by consulting the indices of the various modern editions
and translations.
More important from the philosophical viewpoint is the Latin
writer's probable recourse to an earlier Greek arithmological
treatise for certain chapters of the Commentarius in Somnium
Scipionis.lll This was suggested by the independent studies of
F. E. Robbinsll2 and K. Mras, 113 who showed that Macrobius'
treatment of number shares not only precise verbal expressions
but also a definite order of topics with the 9eoA..oyoUJ.1.EVa
107. Macrobius: Saturn. I. IH, IH-21 (Cornelius Laheo: De Orac. Apoll.

Clm.. fr. I H). There: is one: further citation of l.abeo at Macrohius: Saturn. Ill.
i. 6(Cornc:lius Labeo: DeDiisA11im., fr. 12b).
IOH. Plutarch's name: is mentioned at Macrohius: Saturn. VII. J. 24.
although nothing specific is taken from his writings.
I 09. Linke:: Qmwstiones de MtlcroiJii S:uurnaliorumfontihus. pp. i6-'i I.
ItO. Wissowa: op. cit., p. 3. That Macrohius does, however. show some
independence in handling his source was shown by K. Hubert: 'Zur in-
direkten Uberlieferung dcr Tischgcsprache Plutarchs". Hennes 73 ( 1938). pp.
Wr-317.
Ill. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 'i-6.
112. F. E. Robbins: 'The Tradition of Greek Arithmology'. Classical
l'hilology 16 ( 1921 ), pp. 97-123.
II;\. Mras: op. cit .. pp. 238-2'i I.
s lf NE< >PLAT< >NISM
'AptSJJ.rrnKi'jc; of Pseudo-Iamblichus.ll4 Immediately the ques-

tion arises whether Macrobius is following Pseudo-Iamblichus
or both Macrobius and Pseudo-Iamblichus the same earlier
source. This seems to have been settled by the scholars men-
tioned and others, who have shown that the Macrobian discus-
sion includes a number of passages not contained in the
9eoA.oyouJJ.eva 'AptSJJ.TtttKi'jc;, and also derives material from on-
ly one of the two earlier sources from whose conflation the lat-
ter arose. 115 The one source is Nicomachus of Gerasa whose lost
treatise on arithmology must therefore be the basis of the
discussion in the Commentarius.
Among the Latin authors employed by Macrobius as sources
but not explicitly cited in any passages, Gellius plays a special
role.ll6 That in the preface as also elsewhere in the Saturnalia
11-4. As illustrations of verbal parallelism we may note the phrases: -of

the monad - mas idem et femina ~ apaEV09fiAUV (Macrobius: In Smmz.
!kip. I. 6, 7/Ps.-lamblichus: Tbeol. Aritbm. 5. -l, I):- of the interstices bet-
ween the clements - interstitia ... inter aerem vero et ignem Oboedientla
~ UIIJE't'U~UtfltEc; ... IJETU~U l)f: atpoc; Kai !tUpoc; nEt9c:i> (Macrobius: ,, Somn.
Scip. I. 6, ;\6-;\9/Ps.-lamblichus: Tbeo/. Aritbm. SO. 67. 2-14):- of the hep-
tad - apud t'eteres enim CJEJttac; t'ocilabutur, quod Graeco nomine
testabatur t1eneratimzem (/ebitam numero = ri)v t!:Jttal>a oi nu9ay6pEtot ...
CJEI}aOIJOU (j)QCJIV a~iav cliJE/..El CJE!ttal>a !tpOOfi'YOPEUOV autiJv (Macrobius: In
Srmm. Scip. I. 6, -!'5/Ps.-lamblichus: Tbeo/Aritbm. 4:\.57, 1:\-15). Foranex-
ampk of parallelism in the order of discussion one should compare the
respective treatments of the relation between the number 7 and the stages of
human de,elopment at Macrobius: bz Sonm. Scip. I. 6, 65-76/Ps.-lamblichus:
Tbeo/. Arilbm. 16, 62. H - c; I, 68, 7. Here. i phases in the embryo's develop
ment are described according to Straw and Diodes. followed by an account
of the physical occurrences at the "th hour. day, month. year, and at the
multiples of 7 years after birth.
II S. SeeM. L. d'Ooge, F. E. Robbins, and L. C. Karpinsky: Nicomacbus of
Gerasa, lrttroduction to Arithmetic uilb Studies in Greek Aritbmelic (New
York.l926).p.8,'\ff.
116. The Ciellius mentioned ;n ~bcrobius: Sutum. I. 8, I and I. 16. 21 is
not the author in question.
MACROBH'S SIS
lhere is a considerable amount of subject-matter stemming from

him was also demonstrated by H. Linketli and G. Wissowa,ttll
rhe demonstration in this case being rendered exceptionally
precise by the convenient survival of many of the relevant
passages in the Noctes Atticae. We have already seen that it is
from this author that Macrobius has drawn some of his informa-
tion about philosophy and philosophers.
Of special importance for understanding the Latin writer's in-
terpretation of Platonic philosophy would be the probable
dependence of certain chapters of the Commentarius in Som-
nium Scipionis upon a Roman Neoplatonic commentary on
Virgil.lt<J This was suggested by scholars like F. Bitsch,t2o P.
Courcelle,t2t and P. Hadot,t22 who noted that Macrobius'
discussion of the embodied soul not only includes more cita-
tions of Latin writers than usual but also especially frequent
references to Aeneid VI. t2~ Here, we must ask whether
I 17. Linke: Quaestiones de Macrobil Saturnaliorumfontibus. pp. 46-51.

118. Wissowa: op. cit., p. 3. The relative independence which Macrobius.
however. shows in relation to his source is underlined by E. Tuerk: 'Macrobe
etles Nuils Attiques', latomus 24 (1965). pp. 381-406.
I I'>. ~tacrublus: In Somn. Scip. I, 9-10.
120. F. Bitsch: De Platonicorum quaestionibus quibusdam Vergilianis
(Berlin. 1911), pp. 21-47.
121. P. Courcelle: 'Les Peres de l'Eglise devant les cnfcrs virgiliens'. Ar-
cbites d'hlstolre doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 22 (19S5). pp. S-74
and 'Interpretations neo-platonisantes du Livre VI de l'Eneide', Recherches
wr Ia tradition platoniclenne (Fondatlcm Hardt, Entretlens sur I'Antlquite
class/que 3) (Vandoeuvres-Geneve. 195S ). pp. 9S-136.
122. P. Hadot: Marius Victor/nus. Recbercbes sur sa tie et ses oeutres
(Pari~. 197 I), pp. 21 S-231.
12.~. In addition to the Virgilian passages. there are citations or at least
rtminisnnces of Lucretius: /)( Rerum Nat. 111. 9"8 ff. (:It Macrobius: In
\'fJ/1111. Scip. I. 10. 12); Cicero: Tusc. Dlsp. IV, 35 (:II Macrohius: In Som11.
ScijJ. I. I 0, 15) and V, 61-62 (at Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 10. 16); Juvenal:
\atir. XI. .2'7 (at Macrohius: /11 Smn11. Sclp. I. 9. 2) and Xlll, 2-.'> (at Macrohius:
In Srmm. Scip. I. 10, 12); and Persius: Salir. I." (at Macrohius: In Somn. Scip.
516 NEOP!.ATONISM
Macrobius is inserting these quotations himself or has adopted

them from an earlier writer. This question is answered by the
scholars subscribing to the thesis, who have pointed out that the
Macrobian treatment contains more quotations than the Cicero-
nian text could possibly have needed for its elucidation, and
also includes illustrations totally irrelevant to the discussion in
hand.l24 Such features would indicate that the whole context
has been taken over from some earlier source.
7.123 SOURCES EXPLICITLY AND NOT EXPLICITLY CITED
Among the Greek writers explicitly cited by Macrobius but

not for the passages in question, Numenius occupies an impor-
tant position. 125 At one point there occurs a discussion of the
human soul's descent from its station at the periphery of the
heaven through the various planetary spheres to its incarnation
in an individual body, 126 and this doctrine is associated with the
names of Numenius and his disciple Cronius in certain parallel
texts of Porphyry's De Antro Nympbarum and Proclus' Com-
mentarius in Rempub/icam. 127 All modern scholars agree that
I, 9. 3). The passages from Aeneid VI are used (i) In Macrobius: /n Somn. Scip.
I, 9: to describe the soul's departure from the body (Virgil: Aeneid. VI, 736).
its astral origins and incarnation (Virgil: Aeneid, VI, 640-64 I), and its attach-
ment to passions after death (Virgil: Ameid. VI, 653-655); (ii) In Macrobius:
In S(mm. Scip. I, 10: to interpret the devoured liver (Virgil: Aeneid. VI.
598-600), lxion's wheel (Virgil: Ae11eid. VI. 616-6I7), and other torments
(Virgil: tleneid. VI, 7-4.'\) as allegorical accounts of the soul's embodiment.
Hadot: op. cit., pp. 218-.230 has produced some evidence to suggest that the
author of this Virgil ian commentary was Marius Victorious.
12-i. Sec Flamant: up. cit., pp. 576-580 and 6.22. This writer accepts the
thesis of a Latin source for Macrobius discussion with certain reservations.
12';. According to the classification of sources offered on pp. ;02-503,
some of the writers in the first category will also appear in the third.
126. Manobius: In Somn. Scip. l, 11. 10- I. 1.2. I H.
127. The exact references are Porphyry: De Antr. lVympb. 21. 22.2-24.
MACROBILIS <;17
Macrobius is tacitly employing Numenius as a source for his

discussion of the human soul's descent. However, there has
been enormous controversy on the question how much of this
account is purely Numenian: whether it is simply the notions of
the soul's station at the periphery of the heaven, and of its entry
into the latter through the portal of Cancer and exit from the lat-
ter through the portal of Capricorn as described in the first part
of the text; W! or also the account of the soul's descent through
the planetary spheres, and of its transformation into the
geometrical shape of a cone and by the acquisition of partially
material envelopes as described in the continuation, which are
from Numenius.129 Controversy has also raged on the question
through which intermediary Macrobius has derived his
2-L .~and ibid. 28, 26. 26-28. 28. 6: Proclus: In Remp. II, 128. 26- 130. 1-4
an <.I iMd. 1.~ I, 8-14.
128. Macrobius: bl Somn. Scip. I, 12, 1-3. That this section alone is Nume-
nian is contended by R. Beutler: 'Numenios'. Paul;s Realencyclopadie der
klassiscben Altertumswlssenscbaft. Suppi.-Band 7 (Stuttgart, 1940), col.
(l-:o6-677; A.-J. Festugiere: /.a rer,elation d'Hermes Trlsmegiste III: Les doc-
trim!s de l'dme (Paris, 1953). p. 42, n. 2: J. H. Waszink: Timaeus a Calcldlo
translatus commentarioque instructus (Leiden, 1962), p. lvii, n.1; Studien
::um Timaioskommentar des Calcidius 1: Die erste Halfte des Kommentars
(mit Ausnabme der Kapltel iiber die Weltseele) (Leiden, 1964), p. 13. n.l;
and 'Porphyrios und Numenios', Porpbyre (Fonda lion Hardt, Elllretiens sur
l'..tntiqulte class/que 12) (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1966), p. 77: W. Theiler:
'Ammonios und Porphyrios', ibid. p. 122; M. A. Elferink: La descente de
/'{/me d'apri!s Mt1cro1Je (Leiden, 1968), pp. 8-28; P. Hadot: Porpbyre et Vic-
tor/nus I (Paris, 1968), p. 182, n. I :and E. des Places: Nmnenius. Fragments.
Tt.Yte etabli ettradult par E. des P. (Paris. 1973). pp. 84-8<;.
129. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 11, 10 and I, 12, 4-18. That this material
(IO~lther with ibid. I. 12, 1- 3) is Numenian is argued by E. A. Leemans: Studie
rJter den Wljsgeer Numenlus van Apamea met l!itgave der Fragmenten
IBrussel. 1937) pp. H-<;4 and I 04-1 I 0; E. R. Dodds: 'Numenius and Am-
monius'. Les sources de Plotin (Fmulatlon Hardt, Entretiens sur /'Ant/quite
classique <;) (Vandoeuvres-Geneve. 1960), pp. 8-10: H. de Ley: Mc1aobius
ancl Numenius. A Study of Macroblus. In Somn. I, c. 12 (Bruxclles, 1972),
pp. 2':"-';0: and Flamant: op. cit .. pp. S12-Sl3. <;46, and S49. n. 92.
'i1H NEOPLATONISM
teaching: whether it is from Porphyry's De Antro NJ'mpharum

itself that the material is taken, 130 the hypothesis of a direct
reading of the earlier Greek writer being generally discounted
hy modern scholars for reasons which are not really adequate;
or from his Commentarius in Rempub/icam or perhaps his
Commentarius in Timaeum. both of these works being known
to have provided the Latin writer with material on other occa-
sions. I.~ I Since the first Porphyrian work mentioned only
parallels the earlier part of Macrobius' account of the human
soul's descent, the solutions to these two controversial ques-
tions are not unconnected.l32
The role of Plotinus in Macrobius' works is even more promi-
nent. In one passage we find a discussion of the hierarchy of the
three hypostases - the One, Intellect, Soul - which is so
characteristic ofNeoplatonic thought,133 and this has been iden-
tified positively through linguistic and doctrinal parallels as
dependent upon Plotinus: Ennead V, 2: On the Origin and
Order of the Beings after the First. 1.~4 In brief, the notions that
the One is the cause of all things, that it produces the next
hypostasis through the overflowing of its power, that Intellect
reverts upon the One, that Soul reverts upon Intellect. and that
it also reverts upon the lower, are common to the two
130. See for example Mras: op. cit., p. 25'i and J. Pepin: 'La fortune duDe
Antm Nympbarum de Porphyre en Occident'. Plotino e II Neoplatonismo in
Oriente e in Occidenlt (Alii del Cmne.~no lnternazimwle. Rom a 5-IJ ollobre
197fJ) (Roma. 197-4), pp. 527-530.
131. See for example: de Ley: op. cit .. pp. I 'i-25 and Flamam: op. cit.. p.
'i52- for the Commentarius in Rempub/icam; Leemans: op. cit., pp. 47-48
and Elferink: op. cit., pp. 4-5 and 40- for the Commellt~lriu.~ in Timaeum.
That both Commentarii (together with De Antru Nympbarum) were used is
suggested by Courcelle: op. cit .. pp. 4 1-4 2.
1.32. Examination of the weight of these different solutions will have to
await the detailed analysis below. Seep. 571 ff.
13.-\. ~lacrobius: /uSmrm. Scip. I. 11, 5-~.
134. P1otinus: Etm. V. 211 II I. 1-22.
MACROBillS
authors.t3S Furthermore, towards the end of this passage

Macrobius introduces a hierarchy in the powers of Soul - the
rational, the sensitive, the vegetalt36 - which is expressed in
identical terms in Plotinus: Ennead III, 4: On the Demon
Assigned to Us. t3 7 However, despite these striking parallels bet-
ween the two writers, there are sound reasons for believing that
a subsidiary source has also played a role. Thus, the earlier
passage includes certain features which deviate significantly
from the usual Plotinian theory of the hypostases: especially the
notions that Intellect's reversion to the One is the basis of its
similarity to the prior principle rather than of its causality in
relation to Soul, and that Intellect's reversion to Soul rather
than its similarity to the One is the basis of its causality in rela-
tion to the posterior.t.~H all of which are more characteristic of
:--Jumenius. The explanation seems to be that the Latin writer has
l'ither interpreted Plotinus in the light of his own reminiscence
l.~i. The closeness of the doctrinal parallc:ls is indicated hy the following

CljUivalcnCeS of terminology: omnium ... princeps ef Origo = ClpX,t) yap JtQVT
wv (Plotinus: Enn. V. 2 /II I I, I); superabtmdtmti maiestatisfecundilate ...
cremit = oiov un:&p&ppuTJ Kai TO un&pnA.iip&c; auTOii n:&noiTJK&V (ibid. V. 2 II 11
I. H-9); qua patrem inspic:it = npoc; auto PMnov (ibid. v. 2 /1 II I, 10);
/Jtlfrem qua intuetur induitur = EK&i jlEV ouv PA.tn:ouaa, o8&v tytv&TO,
7tATJPOUtat (ibid. V, 2 II II I, 19-20}; regrediente respectu = npo&A.8ouaa ot
Ei;; tdVT)atV lii..A.TJV Kai tvavtiav (ibid. V. 2 /I I I I, 20). These parallels were
first noted by Henry: op. cit.. pp. I Bi- 190.
I ~6. M:u.:robius: In Somn. Scip. I. 14. 7.
I.P. Plotinus: Em1. Ill, 4 11<;12, 4. The Plotinian source was identified by
Courcclle: op. cit .. p. :H.
I ~H. These distinctions are underlined by the following contrasts of ter-
minology: qua patrem inspicit, plenam similitudinem sertat auctoris vs.
rtpoc; auto PA.tn:ov Kai voiic; outoc; ... tn&i ouv ~OTT) npoc; auto ... outoc; ouv rov
olov EKEivoc; til OJ.IOIQ n:mEi (Piotinus: Enn. V. 2 II II I, I 0-14 ): animam tem
de se creal posteriora respiciens \'S. outoc; ouv rov olov EK&ivoc; til OjlOlQ 1t01Ei
... Kai QUTTJ EK tiic; ouaiac; tvtpy&lQ lj!UX.iic; TOUTO jlEVOVtoc; EKEivou YEVOilEVTJ
UIJid. V. 2 /I II I, I~- 17). These disagreements h:l\'e hccn noted hy Henry: ofJ.
cit .. pp. 18H-189 and Hadot: op. cit .. p. H9, n. 2.
'i20 NEOPL.ATONISM
of Numenius I:W or is following another source in which Ploti-

nian and Numenian doctrines run side by sidc.l-to
Of the Greek Platonists who lived between the rise of
Neoplatonism and the end of antiquity, only one influenced the
Latin writer in significant areas of doctrine. This is Porphyry
who, although he cannot be identified as a source in as many
passages as some modern scholars have maintained, I-ll is clearly
the unspoken authority on certain occasions. Thus, the refuta-
tion of Epicurean objections to Plato's employment of myth 142
can be attributed to this writer on the basis of a parallel discus-
sion in Proclus' Commentarius in Rempublicam where he is
explicitly cited; IH the classification of types of virtue on the
basis of precise textual similarities with Porphyry's extant
Sententiae; IH and the interpretation of the world's nature as
simultaneously created and eternalH; on the basis of references
139. For a discussion of the relation between Numenius and Macrobius

here see pp. 538 and 542.
140. This source would be Porphyry. The evidence for his intervention is
twofold: (i) He is known to have combined Numenian and Plotinian
teachings (especially in his commentary on the Cbaldaean Oracles). See ch.
6, n. 155; (ii) He frequently combined different Plotinian texts in order to ex-
pound a doctrine (as In the Sententiae). That Porphyry is the source here is
maintained - although, It seems, without adequate argument - by Beutler:
'Porphyrios . Paulys RealenC)'Ciopiidie der k/assiscbetz Alter-
tumswissenschll/1 22 I I (Stuttgart, 1953). p. 303 and Theiler: op. cit .. pp.
97-100. For a better defense of this position see Hadot: op. cit .. p. 459, n. 2.
14 I. Courcelle: op. cit., pp. 32-44 perhaps goes too far in this direction.
l-i2. Macrobius: lnScmm. Scip. I. 2, 4-IH.
l-i3. Proclus: In Remp. 11, IO'i, 24- 109, 3. The source is Porphyry's own
Ccmunenhlrius in Rempublicam. See Mras: op. cit .. pp. 236-237: Courcelle:
op. cit., p. 3-+; J. Pepin: Mytbe et Allegol'ie, Les origines grecques et les con-
testationsjudeo-cbretietmes, 2me edition (Paris, 1976), p. 210: and Flamant:
up. cit., pp. 159-162. Another passage perhaps dependent on Porphyry's
Commentarius is Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. 11. 3. 1-3 on the Sirens.
144. Seep. 508 and n. 91.
145. Macrobius: In Sonm. Scip. 11. 10. 5-16.
MACROBitJS 521
in Proclus' Commentarius in Timaeum, Philoponus' De Aeter-

nitate Mundi Contra Proclum, 146 and elsewhere. That Por-
phyrian treatises have been used directly as sources would
follow from arguments already advanced, the only serious can-
didate for an intermediary being excluded by the nature of the
present subject matter.l-i7
Among the Latin writers explicitly cited by Macrobius but not
for the passages in question, Varro plays an important role. That
we should attribute to the influence of his Antiquitates Rerum
/Jit.inarum the philosophical interpretation of Juno as air14H is
indicated by the parallel testimony of Augustine and Servius; 1-49
and that we should assign to their influence the similar inter-
pretations of Janus as the world 150 and of Saturn and Ops as fire
and earth lSI is demonstrated by the parallels in Tertullian,
l..t6. Proclus: In Tim. I, 382. 12 - 383, I, Philoponus: De Aetern. Mundi

VI. 14, 164, 18- 165. 6 and as-Sharastani: De Sectis Relig. et Phil. 345. The
~ourcc is Porphyry's own CommetiiCirius it1 TirtiCieum. See Mras: op. cit., pp.
l(JlJ-27 3; A. R. Sodano: 'Quid Macrobius de mundi acternitatc senserit
quihusquc fomibus usus sit', L 'Antiquite c/Cissique 32 (1963) pp. 54-55: J.
P~pin: Tbeologie cosmique et tbeologie cbretlenne (Ambroise, Exam. /, I, 1-4
(Paris, 1964), pp. 86-89: and Flamant: op. cit., pp. 629-633. Other passages
perhaps dependent on Porphyry's CommentCirius are Macrobius: ltl Somn.
Scip. I. 5. 5-7 on the incorporeality of limits; ibid. I, 6, 25-28 on the
dements; and ibid. II, I, S-7 on the music of the spheres.
l.f'7. In addition to the two commentaries on Plato and the SententiCie, the
following Porphyrian works seem to have textual parallels in Macrobius: the
I'ita /~JtbagoricCI 20. 27, 14-21 on the tetractys at In Somn. Scip. I. 6, 4 I, the
Commentarius in PbCiedonem (at Olympiodorus: In PbCied. 84, 21-85, 25)
on the philosophical interpretation of Bacchus at /t1 Som11. !kip. 1, 12. 7-12,
these similarities having been noted by Courcelle: op. cit.. pp. 36-37 and 42.
For the possible echoes of the Porphyrian De Regressu Ani,ICie and De
:lnima ad Boetbum in Macrobius seep. 506.
ltH. Macrobius: /nSomn. Scip. I, 17, 15.
I ilJ. Sec Augustine: Cit. Dei IV. I 0 (CCSL 4 7. I 0610H (Varro: A11tiqu.
Rer. Ditin. fr. 28)) and Ser.ius: /t1 Aeneid. I, .f7.
I 50. Macrohius: Saturn. I, 9. I I.
I 'i I. /hid. I. I 0. 20.
522 NEOPLATONISM
Augustine, and lohannes Lydus.l'i2 As in the case of explicit Var-

ronian citations, Macrobius could have obtained his material
both directly and indirectly.
7.2 MACROBIUS' PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM
It has been necessary to dwell upon the question of

Macrobius' sources because of the enormous attention which
scholars have paid to it; in fact the major portion of nineteenth
and twentieth-century scholarship on this writer is composed of
source study which is sometimes valuable but often speculative.
However, on the completion of these preliminaries it is now
possible to examine the content of Macrobius' philosophical
theories. The most convenient way to approach this material is
perhaps to take the division of philosophy into (i) ethical, (ii)
physical, and (iii) rational appended to the Commentarius in
Somnium Scipionisl53 as our starting point- Macrobius con-
cludes by noting that all three subjects have been discussed in
the course of his work. However, we should study that division
in the reverse order (i) rational, (ii) physical, and (iii) ethical
more appropriate to the Neoplatonic adaptation of the tradi-
tional scheme. 'i.J in which rational philosophy has come to em-
brace the central questions regarding God and the intelligibles.
152. For the first passage see Augustine: Cit. Dei VII, 7 (CCSL 47, 191-
192); ibid. VII, 28 (CCSL 47, 210-211 (Varro: Antiqu. Rer. Divin. fr. 230 and
fr. 263)); and Lydus: De Mens. IV, 2, 64, 18-65, 3 (Varro: Antiqu. Rer. Divin.
fr. 20 I ) - the last parallel including the title of Varro's work. For the second
passage see Tertullian: Adt. Nat. II. 12, 18 (CCSL I. 62 (Varro: Antiqu. Rer.
Ditin. fr. 2-lO)).
I B. Macrobius: In Sumn. Scip. II, 17, IS- 17. See Schedler: op. cit. , pp. 6-9
who also uses this schema as the hasis for a discussion of Macrobius'
philosophical doctrine.
I 54. On earlier uses of the tripartite schema see pp. 74-77 and 227-228.
Whereas earlier writers include the study of God and the Forms in the
physical branch of philosophy. Macrohius places it in the rational.
MACROBiliS 51:\
Since their sources have already been examined in a preliminary

manner, we may now concentrate on the internal consistency
of Macrobius' doctrines themselves. However, it should be
stressed that such a procedure does not represent support for
the thesis that there is an original contribution to philosophy in
his writings: rather it connotes appreciation of a sophisticated
and professional compilation of material from the best Greek
authorities .
...,.21 RATlONALPHlLOSOPHY
Macrobius defines this branch of philosophy as the investiga-

tion of things which are incorporeal and perceived by the mind
alone.l'iS In actual practice, it centers upon the Neoplatonic
doctrine of the three primal hypostases of the One, Intellect,
and Soul, as described in the following texts: JS6
'7.211 REPERTORY OF TEXTS
(i) 'We should realize, however, that philosophers do not per-

mit the use of myth in all their discussions, even when the myth
is of the acceptable kind. They are accustomed to use them
when they are discussing Soul, the aerial or aetherial powers, or
the other gods. But when the investigation aspires to elevate
itself to the highest and supreme of all the gods, called taya96v
Macrobius: In Somn. Sclp. II, 17, I 5.

I "iS.
156. I have decided to present the important passages complete at the
outset, since the: only previous English translation is defective at crucial
points. For example, St:thl: op. cit .. p. 1-!5 translates ex sumnw deo mens. e.\
mente anima fit, anima l'ero et condat et tita compleat omnia as 'Mind
emanates from the: Supreme God and Soul from Mind. and Mind. indeed,
forms and suffuses all below with life', thus confusing the second and third
hypostases. Obviously with such a translation before: us. a correct interprc:ta
lion of doctrine is not possible.
NEOPLATONISM
and npcinov ainov by the Greeks, or to Intellect which the

Greeks call vouc;, generated and proceeding from the highest
God, and containing the originative Forms of things known as
iMat; when indeed philosophers discuss these, the highest God
and Intellect, they totally avoid mythical narrative. If they wish
to attribute something to these principles which transcend not
only human expression but human thought, they resort to
analogies and similes. Thus, when Plato was moved to speak
about tciya96v but did not venture to say what it was, knowing
only one thing about it namely that it was unable to be known in
its essential nature by man, among visible things he found only
the sun similar to it and by using this as an analogy opened a
way for his discourse to be elevated to things which surpass
comprehension. For this reason, the ancients made no image of
the Good when they were fashioning statues of the other gods,
for the highest God and Intellect generated from it are above
both Soul and Nature, and it is sacrilege to approach them with
myths'.J~7
I 'P. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, 2. 13- 16 sciendum est tamen mm in

omnem disputationem pbilosopbos admittere fabulosa vellicita: sed his uti
soletll cum tel de anima l!el de t~eriis aetheriiste potestatibus tel de ceteris
dis loquuntur. ceterum cum ad summum et principem omnium deum. qui
apud Graecos raya96v, qui rrprotov ainov mmcupatur, trt~ctatu.( se cmdet
attollere, t'el ad mentem, quem Graeci vouv appeflcmt. origh1ales rerum
species. quae lotat dictae sunt. continentem, e.\' summo natam et profectmn
deo: cum de bis inquam loquuntur summo deo et mente. nibil fabulosum
penitus attingunt. sed siquid de his ad~ignare conantur quae non ser-
monem tantum modo sed cogitationem quoque humcmam supercmt. atl
simllitudines et e.wmpla confugitmt. sic Plato cum de taya9<!J luqui esset
animatus, dicere quid sit non ausus est, boc solum de eo scierzs, quod sciri
qua/e sit ab bomine mm possit. solum tero et simillimum de tisi/Jilibus
so/em repperit, et per eius similitmlinem tiam sermoni suo t~ttoflemli se cui
mm comprebemlendtl patefecit. ideo et nuflwn ei simulcu,um. cum dis
aliis constituerentur. fhz:"<il antiquitas, quia summus deus nataque ex eo
mens sictll ultrll aninwm ita suprll mt/uram sun/, quo nibil fas est de
fabulis pert,enire.
MACROUIUS '52'5
(ii) 'This monad, which is the beginning and end of all things
but itself knows neither beginning nor end, is applied to the
highest God and distinguishes our understanding of him from
the plurality of things and powers subsequent to him. Nor
would you seek this monad in vain among the ranks below God,
for it also corresponds to Intellect generated from the highest
God which, unaware of temporal changes, exists always in that
single eternity co-extensive with it. Although the monad is itself
not numbered, since it is a unity, it nevertheless generates from
itself and contains within itself innumerable Forms of things.
Furthermore, by turning your mental vision a little you will
discover that this monad is applied to Soul, since the latter is
free from the contamination of physical matter and, being
dependent only upon its prior cause and upon itself in the
simplicity of its nature, admits no division into its unity when it
pours forth to the animation of the whole universe. You
observe how this monad, sprung from the first cause of things
and everywhere complete and always undivided, has maintain-
ed its continuity of power as far as Soul'. 158
(iii) 'The possession of extraordinary powers has accrued to
the number five because it alone embraces all things which are
and seem to be. We say that the intelligibles "are" and that all
15H. Ibid. l, 6, H-9 haec monas initium finisque omnium, neque ipsa
principii aut finis sciens. ad summum refertur deum eiusque intellectum a
sequenfium numero rerum et potestatum sequestrat, nee in inferiore post
dettm gradu frustra eam desidermeris. haec ilia est mens ex summo enata
deo, quae l'ins tempon11n nesciens in uno S('tl/fU!r quod adest nmsisfit
(l('l'fJ, cumque utpote una notl sit ipsa numerabilis. innumeras tamen
generum species et de se creal et intrc1 se nmfinet. inde quoque aciem
[wu/u/um cogitation is inc/inans bane monada reperies ad an imam referri.
anima enim aliena a siltestris contagione materiae. tan tum se auctori suo
ac sihi debens, simplicem sorfitanaturam. cum se a11imandae immensitafi
tmitersitatis infundat. nullmn init tamen cum sua unitate clitortium.
l'ides ut baec mona.~ orta a prima rerum causa usque aclanimam ubique
integra et semper inditi/dua crmtinuationem potestatis obtineat.
:'IIEOPLATONISM
corporeals "seem to be" whether the body which they possess

is divine or mortal. Thus, this number simultaneously
designates all things in the higher and lower spheres. It cor-
responds to the highest God, or Intellect generated from him in
which the Forms of things are contained, or the Soul of the
world which is the source of all souls, or the celestial region ex-
tending down to us, or the terrestrial realm. In this way the
number five is present in the whole of reality' .l'i9
(iv) 'The whole world is appropriately called the temple of
God in order to enlighten those who believe that there is no
other god than the heaven itself and the celestial bodies which
we see. He called whatever is subject to human vision the tem-
ple of that god who is perceived by intellect alone, so that he
might indicate that the omnipotence of the highest God can
hardly be understood and never seen, and so that those who
venerate the visible things as temples may yet owe the greatest
reverence to their creator and that whoever enters into this
temple will realize that he must live as a priest. We are also
given unmistakable testimony to the fact that so great a divinity
is immanent in the human race that it ennobles all men through
their affinity to the heavenly mind. One should note that Cicero
here employs the term "mind" in both the proper and the im-
proper senses. "Mind" is properly equivalent to Intellect which
nobody denies is more divine than Soul, yet sometimes we use it
as an equivalent for Soul. Thus, when he declares that "minds
have been given to men from those eternal fires" he means us to
I ';9. Ibid. l. 6. 19-20 ille1 tero quinario mtmero pmpriettls excepta poten-
tiae ullra ceteras eminenlis etenil quod so/us om11ie1 quaeque sunt quaeque
l'identur esse complexus est. esse autem dicimus intellegibilia. tiderl esse
corpora/ia omnie~ seu dit1i11um corpus babeant seu caducum. bic ergo
numerus simu/ omnia et supera et subiecta designat. aut enim deus sum-
mus est aut mens e.\' eo nata in qua rerum .~pecies crmli7le7llur. aut mundi
anima quae tmimarum omnium fims est, aut cae/estia sun/usque ad nos.
autterrena natura est. et si(' quinarius rerum omnium numerus impletur.
MACROBJliS
understand Intellect which we alone have in common with the

heaven and the stars. But when he says that "your mind must he
kept in the custody of the body" he is referring to the soul
which is imprisoned in the confines of the body to which the
divine Intellect is not subject. Now let us explain how, accor-
ding to the theologians, mind or rather Intellect is common to
us and the stars. God, who both is and is called the first cause, is
the unique originator and source of all things which are and
seem to be. He produced Intellect from himself with the
overflowing fertility of his power. This Intellect which is called
vouc; preserves a complete likeness of its cause as long as it con-
templates its father, but it produces Soul from itself when it
turns towards lower things. In its turn Soul is filled from its
father as long as it contemplates him, but it degenerates. incor-
poreal though it is. into the production of bodies when its vi-
sion is gradually diverted. It therefore derives that purest reason
called A.oytK6v from Intellect by which it is generated, but
receives those beginnings of providing sensation and growth
called a.io9rrnK6v and q>unK6v respectively from itself. Of these
the first faculty or A.oytK6v which comes to it through its deriva-
tion from Intellect, since it is truly divine, is joined only to the
divine. The other two faculties namely the a.io9TJnK6v and
<PUTtKOV, since they are more remote from the divine, are ap-
propriate for mortal things' .160
160. Ibid. 1, 1i. 2-8 bene autem unhersus mundus dei lemplum zocatur
pmpter i/los qui aestimmzt nibil esse a/iud deum nisi caelum ipsum et
n~t/estia isla quae cernimus. ideo ut summi omnipotentiam dei ostenderet
posse ti.'l: intel/egi. numquam tideri. quicquid bunwno su/Jicitur aspectui
hmplum eius toetltit qui sola mente com:ipltur, ut qui haec teneratur ut
temp/a, cultum tamen maximum de/Jeat c:ondilori. sciatque quisquis in
ustmt templi huius imluL"itm ritu sibi tit.rmlum .mcerdotis. untie et tflltlsi
quodam JntiJiia) praec:onio tantam bumano generi dirrillilclfem inesse
lestatur. ut unilersos siderei animi cognatimw tWIJilitet. twlcmdum est
lflloc/ boc loco animum et ut proprie el ut a/Jusire dicilur posuil. animus
528 NEOPI.ATO;\IISM
(v) Accordingly. since Intellect derives from the highest God

and Soul from Intellect, while Soul produces and vivifies all
things subsequent to it - this single splendor illuminates all
things and is reflected in all, like a single face reflected in many
mirrors placed in a row-, and since all things follow on in con-
tinuous succession and degenerating stage by stage to the lowest
point of descent, the close observer will find a single bond of in-
terlocking and unbroken connection from the highest God to
the lowest sediment of the universe. This is the golden chain of
Homer which, as he reports, God ordered to hang down from
heaven to earth'.t6t
(vi) 'When Cicero called the outermost sphere which
revolves in the way described the "highest god", the latter is
enim proprie mens est. quam dirliniorem anima nemo dubitat/il: sed non
nunquam sic et animam usurpantes vocamus. cum ergo dicit, bisque
animus datus est ex ill is sempiternis ignibus. mentem praestat intellegi, quae
nobis proprie cum caelo sideribusque communif est; cum tero aft, retinen
dus animus est in custodia corporis, ipsam tunc animam nominal, quae
tincitur custodia corporali, cui mens ditina non subditur. mmc qua/Iter
nobis animus. it/ est mens. cum slderibus communis sit secmulum theologos
disseramus. deus qui prima causa et est et NJcatur, wms omnium quaeque
sunt quaeque tltlentur esse princeps et origo est. hie superabtmdanti
maiestatisfecunditate de se mentem creavit. haec mens, quae vouc; rocatur,
qua patrem inspicit, plenam similltudinem senat auctoris, animam tero
de se creat posterlora respiciens. rursum anima patrem qua intuetur in-
duitur. ac paulatim regrediente respectu in jabricmn corporum incorporea
ipsa tlegenerat. habet ergo et purisslmam ex mente, de qua est nata, ra-
ticmem quod A.oy1K6v tocatur et ex sua natura accipit praebendi sensus
praebendlque incrementi seminarium, quorum tmum aia6T]nK6v alterum
(ji\Jt!K6v nuncupatur. sed ex his primum id est A.oy1K6V quod innatum sib/ ex
mente sumpsit, sicut rere divinum est, ita soils dhinis aptum; rellqua duo,
aia6T]nK6v et (ji\Jt!K6v, uta ditin is recedmtt, ita contenientia sunt caducis.
161 . Ibid. I. 14. IS seetmdu m hctec ergo cum e.\ summo cleo mens, ex
mente anima fit, cmima re,o et condat et titct compleat omnia quae se-
qmmtur, ctmctaque hie wms fulgor illumine/ et in tmirersis appareat. ut
in muftis specztlls per orclinem positis l'Uitus unus. cumque omnia nm-
tinuis succession/bus se seqmmtur degenerantla per ordinem ad imum
MACROBIUS "i29
not to be understood as though it were equivalent to the first

<:ause and that God who is omnipotent. For this sphere itself
which is the heaven is a product of Soul, while Soul has pro-
ceeded from Intellect, and Intellect is generated from God who
is truly highest. Indeed he called it "highest" in relation to the
system of other spheres below it, as shown by the words "con-
fining and containing the others'' immediately following; he
called it "god" not only because it is a living being which is
everlasting, divine, and filled with the reason imparted to it by
that purest Intellect, but because it itself produces or contains
all the powers which are subsequent to the omnipotence of that
highest being. The ancients called this sphere Jupiter, and accor-
ding to the theologians Jupiter is the soul of the world. Hence,
our poet has written: "With Jupiter we begin, 0 Muses, for all
things are filled with him", a sentiment derived by other writers
from Aratus. When about to describe the stars, Aratus realized
that he would have to begin with the heaven in which they are,
and therefore stated that Jupiter had to come first. Similarly,
Juno is called the sister and wife of Jupiter because she is inter-
preted as the air, sister since the air is produced from the same
seminal causes as the heaven, wife since the air is subject to the
heaven' ,162
111'cmdi: i1wenietur press/us intuenti a summo deo usque ad ultimam

rerum Jaecem una mutuis se vinculis re/igans etnusquam interrupta con-
''xio. et haec est Homer/ cate11a cmrea, quam pendere de ,aelo in terras
deum iussisse commemoral.
162. IIJitl. I. J7. 12-1; quod em/em bunc istum exlimum gloiJum, qui ita
toltitur. summum deum tocavil. mm ita acclpiendum est, ut ipse prima
causa et deus ille omnipote111issimus aeslimetur: cum globus ipse, quod
ca'/um est. animae sit fabrica. anima e:..: mente processerit, mens ex cleo,
qui tere summus est. prucreata sit: sed summum quidem dixit ad
cetemrum ordinem, qui subieLfi smlf. untie mo.\ subiecil arcens et con-
tinc.ns ceteros, deum tero quod 11011 modo immorlale animal ac divinum
sit et plenum itulltae ex llltt purissinw me11te rcllifmls. sed quod et tirlutes
fmmes, quae illam primae omnipotenliam summitatis sequuntur aut ipse
NEOPLATONISM
7. 212 THE THREE HYPOSTASES
Taking these texts together with the briefer referem:es

elsewhere. we can assemble a reasonably coherent picture of
the three hypostases of Neoplatonism. as understood by
Macrobius. Perhaps the most convenient way to summarize this
teaching is to interpret it in terms of the conceptual categories
previously used to explain the Middle Platonic doctrines of
God. the Forms, and Soul- namely those of subjective and ob-
jective, of negative and positive, and of transcendent and causal
respectively 16.3 - noting that in certain cases the tensions bet-
ween these conceptual categories arc resolved by the distinc-
tions among the hypostases themselves and in others they are
repeated within each separate hypostasis. This can most easily
be accomplished by collecting everything which Macrobius says
about the three hypostases in these texts, starting with his
description of the first principle.
7. 213 THE FIRST HYPOSTASIS: GOO
The first principle is described from the subjective or

epistemological viewpoint as follows: it 'can hardly be
understood' (posse z1ix intellegi), 16-i it is among those things
'which transcend not only human expression but human
thought' (quae non sermonem tantum modo sed cogitationem
facial aut ipse con tineal. ipsum (/enique lmem t'eteres tncmerunt. e/ aptul
lholol!,OS luppiter est mwuli anima. him illud est, Ah Jon~ prindplum.
Musac, lovis omnia plt:na. quod de tlmto poetae alii mutuati sunt. qui de
sideribus locuturus a cttelo In quo sunt sidera e:-.:ordium .~umendum esse
decernetls, ttiJ lme incipiendum esse memnrtll'it. hinc et /uno soror eius et
cmtiun.\' tocatur. est autem Juno aer. el dlcitur soror qui isdem seminibus
quibus caelum eliam aer fJrrJL't'eatus est, C(miun.\ quia aer subieclus est
caelo.
163. for these categories sec pp. 266272 and 338 ff.
16L Macrohius: Ill Smnn. Scip. I. 1-i. 2 (wxt i\').
MACROBilJS S:\ I
quoque humanam superant), tM and it is 'unable to be known

in its essential nature by man' (sciri quale sit ab hemline non
possit).l66 The statement that this principle is not accessible to
either thought or language indicates a refinement or modifica-
tion of earlier Platonic doctrine, for example that of Apuleius.
according to which God's nature is inexpressible in words
although accessible to cognition.t67 The assertion that the first
principle can hardly be understood is not a qualification of this
refined or modified position. but probably a restatement of the
thesis that it cannot be known in its essential nature: in other
words we know that it exists although we can grasp nothing
about the manner of its existence.t6H So far, Macrobius has been
describing the negative aspect of the subjective interpretation,
hut now he complements this with the equally important
positive aspect. Thus, the nature of this principle can be in-
dicated with reference to that visible object which is most like
it: the sun. for it is possible 'to open a way for discourse ... to
things which surpass comprehension' (viam sermoni ... ad non
comprehendenda patefacere) by means of this analogy.t69
16';. Ibid. I. 2, l.f (text i). See Plotinus: Enn. V, 3/-i9/ 17. IS-.:\H; V, 6/2.f/
6, .U-35: Porphyry: DeAbstin. Ill. II. 3: In Parm. I. 32:11,3-4: II. 16-Ji: II.
Z2-2S; IV, 22-26 for denial of thought regarding the first principle:: sc:e
Plotinus: Enn, V, 5/32/6, 17-37; VI. 8/39/ 19, 1-6: Porphyry: De AIJstin. II.
3~. 2: Hist. Pbilos. fr. IS (Cyril: Contra /ulian. I (PG 76. S:i9A-B)): In Ptlrm.
I. 2-6: IX. 20-26 for denial of both thought and expression regarding it.
166. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 2. 1'5 (text i).
167. See pp. 266-269.
16H. See Plotinus: Enn. V. S 13216. 19-21; V.:; 1321 l:\. 11-17: VI, 8/39/
11.2S-26: Porphyry: In Parm. II . .f-8: IV, 7-9: IV. 19-22: Xl1.26-2"". We: can-
not enter into the subtleties of the: Plotinian and Porphyrian notions of the:
first principle's existence nor into the probable diffc:rc:n<:c:s between their
rc:sptnive views.
169. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 2, I S-16 (text i). Sec: Plotinus: Enn. Ill. H
1.~01 I 0. 32-3S: V, I /10/6. 8-1 S: V. 3 /-i9/ H. ~-H: VI. 8 /391 H. 1-6: VI. H /,1,9/
I I. - -H: VI. 9 /9/ S. 32-.H; Porphyry: His f. Pbilos. fr. IS (Cyril: Contm
S:\2 NEOPLATONISM
Here, we find a remarkably careful formulation of Plato's simile

which is so beloved of all his followers in later centuries, since it
is clearly the simplicity of the symbol which gives it its
cognitive value in relation to the first principle, as indicated by
the prohibition of allegorical complexity when speaking of the
highest philosophical truths.I70
From the objective or ontological viewpoint the first princi-
ple is described as 'the highest God' (deus summus, 171 princeps
omnium deus), 172 as 'the Good' (tciya86v), 173 and as 'the One'
(monas, 174 so/itarfus, 175 unus), 176 the first being Macrobius'
most frequent nomenclature, the second and third occurring in
contexts where exegesis of Plato and Neopythagorean
arithmological doctrine respectively are uppermost in his mind.
The relative frequency of the different terms is perhaps not
Julian. I (PG 76, S49 A-B)) for the notion that the first principle can be
known indirectly through its consequents. See Plotinus: Enn. V, 3 /49/ 12,
39-44; V, 5 I 3218, 7-8; VI, 7 I 38 I 16, 24-35; Porphyry: De Abstin. III, II, 3;
De Simul. fr. 2, 2 14-3 6 for specific use of the solar analogy in this connec-
tion.
170. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, 2, 16 (text i).
171. Ibid. I. 6, 20 (text iii); I. 14. I c; (text v): I, 17. 12 (text vi).
172. Ibid. l, 2, 14 (text i). Plotinus describes the first principle as 'God'
(9e6c;) in about twenty passages. Sec J. H. Slc:eman and G. Pollet: Lexicon
Plotinianum (leidenllouvain, 1980), s. v. 9e6c; c). For Porphyry's usage
which is perhaps more influential over Macrobius seen. 179.
173. Macrobius: hi Somn. Scip. I, 2, 14 (text i). 'The Good' (niya96v) is
one of the two most common titles of the first principle in Plotinus. See
Sleeman and Pollet: op. elf., s. v. aya96c; d). See Porphyry: His/. Phllos. fr. 15
(Cyril: Contra Julian. I (PG 76, 549A-B)); fr. 16 (Cyril: Colllra lulicm. VIII
(PG 76, 9168)); fr. 18 (Cyril: Contra Julltm. I (PG 76, S52B-C)).
174. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 6, 8 (text ii).
175. Ibid. I. 6, 18.
176. Ibid. I, 14, 6 (text iv). 'The One' (TO fv) is the second of the two most
common titles of the first principle in Plotinus. See Sleeman and Pollet: op.
cit., s. v. Elc; a). See Porphyry: De Abstin. I, S7, 3; II. 49, I; His/. Phi/us. fr. 15
(Cyril: Contra Julian. I (PG 76, 549A-B)); In Parm. I. 3-35.
MACROUIUS
without significance since, although divinity, goodness, and

unity are all attributed to the supreme principle in both Middle
Platonism17"' and Neoplatonism, 178 the special emphasis placed
upon the first is more characteristic of the earlier school (or Por-
phyry's revival of its teachings) than of the later.1"'9 Besides
these attributes which imply the first principle's transcendence
in relation to lower realities there are others which indicate its
causality in relation to them. Thus, it 'produces from itself (de
se creare), 180 by means of its 'omnipotence' (omnipotentia), 181
and by means of 'the overflowing fertility of its power'
177. See pp. 269-272 and 34 3- :H4.

178. See nn. 172-173. 176.
179. A numerical count of passages indicates that Porphyry describes the
first principle most frequently as 'God' (9&6c;). See Porphyry: De Abstin. I,
-;~. 1-2; II, :H. 2-3; II, 43, 3; II, 49, 1-3; II, 52, 4; III, 5, 4; De Antr. Nymph.
27, 26, 14-17; Ad Gaur. 12, 50. 21-22; Hist. Phi/os. fr. 1'5 (Cyril: Contra
lt11ian. I (PG 76, 549A-8)); fr. 16 (Cyril Contra /ulian. VIII (PG 76, 9168));
fr. 18 (Cyril: Cmztra Julian. I (PG 76, 5'528-C)); In I'arm. I, 5. IV, '5; De Regr.
Anim. fr.8,36* 15-17;fr.I0,37*11-38*'5;Sent. 30,20,15-16;31,21,9-22,
.~; DeSimul. fr. I, t 1-5. Macrobius' preferences regarding the terminology
applicable to the first principle would therefore seem to coincide with Por-
phyry's. However, it should be noted that Plotinus does likewise in one of
the treatises explicitly cited by Macrobius- see Enn. JI, 3 /52 I 18, 8-13-
and so it is possible that the latter has formulated a general usage on the basis
of a limited acquaintance with the Greek text of his source.
180. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 14, 6 (text iv). See Plotinus: Emz. I. 8 /51
12, 1-7; III, 6/26/6,28-29: V, 1/10/6,22-23: V, 1/10/7, 1-'5; V, 1/10/8,
6-8: V. 2 I II I I, 7-9: V. 4 /7 I I, 34-41: VI 7 I 38 I 16. 27-31: VI 7 I 38 I 23.
18-2-l; VI. 8 I 39 I 19. 14-16; Porphyry: Hlst. Phi/os. fr. 18 (Cyril: Contra
Julian. I (PG 76. 5528-C)); Sent. 31. 21, 16-22, I.
181. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 6, 18; I, 14, 2 (text iv); I. 17, 12 (text vi).
St.t: Plotinus: Emz. V, '5 /32/ 12, 37-39; VI. 8 /39/9. 4-i the first principle as 'all
power' (<'iUVUJ.uc; ncioa): ibid. II. I /12/ I';, 1'-20: V, <; /32/ 10, 22-H: Por-
phyry: In !'arm. I. 25-26 combination of 'infinity' (ci7t&tpov I an&tpia ) and
power: Plotinus: Emz. V. 2 /II/I. 13-16: V. 3/49/ 16. 1-'5: V. 4/7/1.23-26:
\'1. () 191 6. 10-11 tht: first prindplt.-'s 'great power' (c'iUVUJ.llc; noA.AiJ, clJ.nix-
avoc;. ere). Cf. i!Jid. Ill. 8/30/10, 1-2: V, 111017.9-11.
NEOPI.ATONISM
(superabtmdans maiestatis jecunditas), 1s2 being 'complete

and always undivided' (integra et semper individua)IH3 in the
process. Furthermore, the first principle's relation to lower
realities is indicated in the statements that it is 'everywhere'
(ubique), IHi and manifests a 'continuity of power' (continuatio
potestatis), IH~ as symbolized by the Homeric 'golden chain'
(catena aurea).lR6 All this represents an excellent account of
the usual Neoplatonic theory, according to which the supreme
principle while unchanged in substance causes by diffusion of
its power. although its substance is not distinguishable from that
power in the last analysis.tH 7 There is no real parallel to this in
182. Macrohius: In Somn ..kip. I. 1-4, 6 (text iv). See Plotinus: E'nn. VI. 8
/39/10. 32-.~'; 'fullness of power' (um:p~o/..i] tij<;liuvliJ.LEffi<;): ibid. V, 2/11/1,
..., -9 'it has overflowed and its supcrahundan(.c has produced another'
(unepeppun Kai to unepnJ..iipe<; auwu nenoiTJKEV c'iJ../..o): ibid. V. I /I 0/6, 4-8:
VI. 8/39/18, IR-22 'overflow' (EKpeiv, EK)(Eiv, etc.)
I 8;11. Macrobius: In Smnn. Scip. I. 6, 9 (text ii). Sec Plotinus: E'nn. I. 6 /1/7,
2';-28: I. 8 /';1/2, 21-22; V, I /10/6,22-28: V. 2 /II/I, 17-18: V, 3/49/12,
.H-38: V, '; /32/5,2-13: VI. 8/39/10, 18-21: VI, 8/39/16. 14-16: VI, 8/39/
16, 29-:Hl: VI, 9 /9/9, 4-6: Porphyry: De Abstin. ll, .\7, I: Hi st. Pbilos. fr. 1S
(Cyril: Contra lulicm. I (PG '76 S-49A-B)): Sent. 24. 14. ';-12.
184. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 6. 9 (text ii). See Plotinus: E'nn. I. 6/1/9,
18-Zl: III, 8 /30/9, 24-28: Ill, 9/13/ i. 1-9: V. '; /.U/ 8. 22-27: V. '; /32/9,
.~3-35: VI, 8 /39/ 19. 10-12: VI. 91914. H-26: Porphyry: Ad Gaur. 12. 50.
21-22: Sent. 31. 21. 9-1-i; ?II. 22, 2-8.
185. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 6, 9 (text ii). See Plotinus: Emz. II. 4 /12/
IS. 17-28; V, .~ 1'191 16, 1-';; V, 8/31/ I. 26-30 for the notion that there are
de~rees of powtr derived from the first principle. Porphyry: Sent. 3S. 40,
22-'f I. 3 alludes to the 'connection' (ouvantElV) between different levels so
dttermined.
186. Macrohius: In Smmz. Scip. I. l'l. 15 (text\'). A source for Macrohius'
application of this image cannot he found in either Plotinus or the extant
works of Porphyry. However. the fact that Proclus: In Tim. I, 262. 16-25: I.
314, 13-19; II. 2'1, 23-31; II. 112, 3-6 uses it in a similar way indicates its cur-
rency in ~coplatonic circles. He probably took this interpretation from Por-
phyry who is therefore likely to ha,e been Macrohius' source also. See Mras:
op. cit., pp. 2';8-2<;9.
187. See nn. 180-18';.
MACR<>BIUS
Middle Platonism, where the mechanism of causation is largely

left unexplained, and the relations of emanation and im-
manence are not synthesized into a consistent theory .1 HH
7. 214 THE SECOND HYPOSTASIS: INTELLECT
The second of the three primal hypostases- 'Intellect' (vou<;.

mens) - is described from the ontological viewpoint in various
ways. Considered as the effect of the prior level of being, it is
'generated from the highest God' (ex summo enata deo, IR9 ex
deo procreata),l90 and it 'preserves a complete likeness of its
cause as long as it contemplates its father' (qua patrem inspicif,
plenam similitudinem servat auctoris).l9l Here, Macrobius ex-
plains the derivation of this principle in terms of the correlative
moments of procession and reversion into which the
Neoplatonists divide every causal operation.l92 Considered
from the aspect of its transcendent nature, Intellect is 'unitary'
(monas), 193 it 'is not subject to the confines of body' (custodia
188. See pp. 272-273. 345-.HS, etc.

189. Macrobius: In Somn ..5cip. I, 6, H (text ii). Cf. ibid. I. 2. 1-l (text i); I. 6,
.W (text iii): I. 1-i. I<; (text ,. ).
190.1bid. I, 17. 12-13 (text vi). See Plotinus: Em1. V, 1 I 10 I 5. 3-19: V, I I
1016,37-45;V,l/10/7,1-5;V,lii018,4-10;V,2/ll/1.'Hl;V ..'\1491
12, 25-34; V, 4 I 7 I 2, 33-49: V, S I 32 IS, 14-27; Porphyry: In Parm. XI,
23-XII, 3: Xll, 14-35; XIV, 16-21; De Regr. Anim. fr. 8, 36 15-17; fr. 9. 37
"7-9;Sent. 14,6, 13-14.
191. Macrobim: In Somn. Scip. I, lL 6 (text iv). See Plotinus: Etm. Ill, H
/.~0111, 6-8: V. 2 Ill/ I, 91.~; V, 31i9111. 1-16: V. 1 1"'12 . .~"': V. 612il ';,
H-19: VI, 7/38/ IS. l-41"': VI, 7/38/16,9-3';: VI,., /38/17, H-17; Porphyry:
In Parm. XIV, 16-21 Intellect 'looks at' (JH.i7tEtv, 6pnv, OIJil<;. etc.) the prior
principle: Plotinus: Enn. V, 2/1111, 9-1-i: V, 6/2~/i, i-5: V. 6/24/5,8-19:
Porphyry: In Parm. XI. 19-21 Intellect is 'similar to' (OJ.lOlO<;, aya6o&tot1<;,
tw:umvi~&a6at) the prior principle.
I 9 2. See nn. 1911- I 91.
19.">. Malrohius: In Sonm. ScifJ. I. 6. R (text ii). Sec: Plotinus: l:'nn. III. 21-l"'l
((,, 29: Ill.: 1-i'il.'\, .H-38: V, 51-1916. 12-IS: \'1, 214:\1-l. 16-17; \'I. 2/t.'t/
NEOPLATONISM
corporali ... non subditur),t94 and it is 'unaware of temporal

changes, existing always in that simple eternity co-extensive
with it' (vices temporum nesciens in uno semper quod adest
consistit aet,o)l9S - these being characteristics attributed by
Middle Platonic writers to Intellect understood as the first prin-
ciplet96 but only by the Neoplatonists to Intellect interpreted as
the second hypostasis.t'>7 Considered from the aspect of its
transcendent nature, Intellect 'generates from itself the Forms
of things' (generum species ... de se creat), t9R it 'contains the
originative Forms of things known as iMat' (originates rerum
species, quae iMat dictae sunt, continens),l99 and produces 'in-
II. 1-49; VI, 4 /22/4, 1-3; Porphyry: /11 Pamz. XI. '5-XII, 23; XIV, 10-15;
Sent. 44. 58. 6-9; In Tfm. fr. 56 (Prod us: In Tim. I, 456, 31--i 57, II).
194. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 14, 4 (text iv). See Plotinus: Eml. ll, 9
/33/17, 6-8; Ill, 2/-17/1, 26-30; Ill, 6/26/6, 29-49; IV, 1/211 '5-7; IV, 2/4/1,
17-29; V, 2 /Ill 2. 19-20; V, 8 /31/9. 10-14; V. 9 1'51 '5, 29-32: V, 9 1'51 5.
i 1-4'5; V, 9/S/10, 9-10; Porphyry: Sent. 42, 53. 17~20; 43. 56,7-10.
19'5. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 6, 8 (text ii). See Plot in us: Enn. Ill, 7 /!'5/
3. 1-39; Ill, 7/4'5/6, 1-.~6; Ill, 7/4'5111. 1-20; IV,.~ /27/2'5. 13-17; V, 1/10/4,
10-30; V, I I 10/ II. '5-13; V, 9 1'51 5. 1-'5; Porphyry: Sent. 44. '57. 21-'58. 9
absence of temporal changes; Plotinus: Em1. IV. 3 /27/ 25, 13-17; IV. 4 /28/
IS. 2; V. I /I 0/ 4, I 0-30; V. I /10/ II. 5-13; V, 9 /'51 '5. 1-4; V. 9 lSI 10, 9; Por-
phyry: Sent. 44, 57, 21-58. 9 connection of 'eternity' (a!wv) and lntellt:ct;
Plotinus: Em1. Ill,"'! IHI 3. 1-:\9; Ill. 7 /4';/6, 1-36; Ill, 7/4';/ II. 1-20; VI, 2
1431 16, 6-7; Porphyry: In Tim. fr . .~I (Produs: /11 Tim. I, 2S7, 2-8) connec-
tion of eternity and Being; Plotinus: Enn. Ill, 7 /-iS/ 6. 1-36: Ill, 7 /4S/ II.
1-20; Porphyry: Sent. l-i, '58, i-9 the unity of content.
196. See pp. 266-272 and 343-344.
197. See nn. 193-19'5.
198. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 6, 8-9 (text ii). See Plotinus: Enn. V,
/10/7, 27-38; V, 3/49/7, 30-3<;; V, 3/i9/11. 1-:~0; V, R 1.~11 cj, H-1""; V, 9/'5/
S. 1-7; V,9 1'51 5. 19-29; VI, 2113121. 39-43; VI. 21-i:\122, 26-28; VI. '1581
3'5, 30-33: Porphyry: In Tim. fr. S I (Proclus: In Tim. I. .WL 2-8).
199. Macrobius: In Sonm. Scip. I. 2. 14 (text i): I, 6, 20 (text iii). Sec:
Plotinus: Enn. I. 6 /1/9. ~4-.:\7; I. 8 /5 II 2. I '5-21; II. 9 /35/ 17. 5-6; Ill. 8 /50/
H. 40--t8; Ill, 8 /30/ <J, 5S-5<J: V, 7 /18/ I, 1-26; V. 7 /18/3. 202:~; V, 9/S/ '5,
1-48; V, 9/516, 1-10; V. 9/6/8, 1-V. 9/6/ 14, 22; VI, 2 1-i.~l 2116-58; VI, 2
MACROBiliS 'i:\7
numerabk Forms of things although it is itself not numbered'

(cumque ... non sit ipsa numerabilis, innumeras tamen
generum species ... ).Zoo - these again being characteristics
assigned by the Middle Platonists to Intellect interpreted as the
first principlelot but only by Neoplatonic writers to Intellect
understood as the second hypostasis ..zo2 Finally, considered as
the cause of the posterior level of being. it 'produces Soul from
itself when it turns towards lower things' (animam vero de se
c:reat posteriora respiciens),203 and provides the latter with 'the
A.oytK6v which comes to it through its derivation from Intellect'
(A.oytK6v quod innatum sibi ex mente sumpsit).l.0-1 Here,
J..f!,/22, 1-3: VI, 7 /3H/2, 1-;6; VI. 7/38/3.22-33: VI, 7/3H/ H. 'i-32: VI, 7/38/
9. I-VI, 7 /3H/ II. H; VI."' /.'\8 12, 1-4: VI. 7 /38/ H. 11-23: VI, 7 /38/ 18,
1-'il: Porphyry: Sent. 10, .j, 7-8:22, 1.'\. 1.'\-16: 43, 'i4, 7-11: i3, 'i6, i-15; In
Tim. fr. 'i I (Proclus: In Tim. I, 394, 2-8).
200. Macrobius: In Sonm. Scip. I, 6, 8-9 (text ii). See PIOlinus: Emz. II, 9 I
33/1, 45-54; Ill, 7/45/3, 4-23; Ill, 8/30/8, 1-8; III, 8/30/8, 40-45; V, 6/
2.j /1,4-14;V,9/5/6,1-25;V,9/5/8, I-V,9/5/9,15;VI,2/43/2,1-3;
VI. 2/43/3, 20-25; VI, 2/43/20, 1-29; VI, 2/43/22, 6-11; VI, 7/38/8,
17-32: VI, 7/38/14, 1-23; Porphyry: hz Parm. XII, 4; Setrt. 22, 13, 13-14;
H. 57. 1-16; In Tim. fr. 52 (Proclus: In Tim. I, 422, 15-20). The Greek
Ncoplatonic doctrines presented here and in the previous notes are con-
siderably more complex than the Macrobian teachings which parallel them.
See P. Hadot: 'Etre, vie, pensce chez Plotin et avant Plotin', Les sources de
P/otin (Fondalicm Hardt, Entretlens sur I'Antiquite c:ltlssique 5)
(Vandoeuvres-Genhe, 1960), pp. 105-141; W. Beierwaltes: Plotin, Uber
Ewigkeil und Zeit (Enneade Ill, 7), ubersetzt, eingeleltet und kommenliert
(Frankfurt a. M., 1967). pp. 11-49; A. H. Armstrong: 'Eternity, Life and Move-
ment in Plotinus' Accounts of voii<;', Le Neoplatonlsme (Colloque lnterna-
titma/ du Centre Nalimwl de Ia Recherche Scientifique, Royaumont 9-13
juin 1969) (Paris, 1971). pp. 67-74: and K. Wurm: Substanz und Qualitat.
/:'ill Beitrag zur lnterpretalicm der plolinlschen Traktate VI, I, 2 und 3
<Berlin, 1973). p. 221 ff.
20 I. See pp. 286 ff and 3'; 1-354.
202. See nn. I 98-200.
20.'\. ~tacrohius: In Somn. Scip. I, J.j, 6-i (text iv). For the Plotinian and
Porphyrian parallels seep. 54 3 ff.
201. JIJid. I, 1-L: (text iv). See Plotinus: Enn. V, I /10/3. 12-16: V, ~ /'!9/
NEOPI.ATONISM
Macrobius explains the productivity of this principle in terms of

a departure from the contemplation of its prior which parallels
the demiurgic activity of the second god according to the
philosophical system ofNumenius.2o'l
7.215 THE THIRD HYPOSTASIS: SOUL
The third of the three primal hypostases - 'Soul' (anima)-

is also described from the ontological viewpoint in various
ways. Conceived as the effect of the prior level of being, it
H. H-1';; V. 3 li91 H. l.Z-:\';; V. ;\ 1~919. 1-j<;; V. 9 1<;1 .-\. l0-.Z4: V, 9 1<;1 ;\,
.H-3<;: V. 915/'"!. 1-12: Porphyry: /JeRe~w- A11im. fr. 10. ;\7 21-24.
20<;. ArnmHn~o: to Numenius, the serond god or intellel't exists in two
modes: (i) as a unity- it remains direlted to itself and the prior principle, (ii)
as a dyad - it turns to the posterior which it simultaneously unifies and is
divided by. The transition from mode (ii) to mode (i) is tkscribcd in
Numcnius: fr. 12 (Eusebius: Praep. Etcmg. XI. 18. 6-10): 'When the god
looks and turns towards carh of us. it happens that our bodies arc quickened
and vivified by his attentive dispensations; but when the god returns to his
dtadcl, these things arc extinguished' (I}Abtovtoc; J.lCV ouv Kai bt&atpaJ.lJ.lEVOU
npoc; tlJ.lWV EKaatov toO S&ou auJ.113aiv&t ~Tjv t& Kai 13taK&a6at t6t& ta
aJ,lata Kllc5&uovta TOU 6&ou toic; aKpoi}OAIOJ.lOic;' J.l&Taatptq>ovtoc; eSt &lc; titv
autou 7t&plW7tltV TOU S&oii taiita J,li:V anoal3tvvua6at). It is mode (ii) which
corresponds precisely with the account of lntellert's production of Soul at
Macrobius: /11 Sonm. Scip. I. 14, 6-7 (text iv). Anording to Plotinus. Intcllcrt
remains dircned to itself and the prior principle and by so doing (mode i =
mode ii) generates the posterior. The inseparability of the two modes is
described in Plotinus: Emt. \'. l l l Ill. 1.-\-ll 'Sinrc it stands towards the One
in order to see it. it hcromes simultaneously lntellelt and Rdng. By thus
beroming like it, it repeats the latter's neative art' (E7t&i ouv l:atll npoc; auto,
iva iBn. OJ.lOU vouc; yiyv&tal Kai OV. outoc; ouv <i)v ofov &K&ivoc; Tel OJ.lOta 710l&i)
and ibid. V. -~I 49 I 7, 18-27 'By knowing itself, lntellert has its activity in
relation to itself and towards itself. If anything arises from it, this follows
from its own self intention. First it is intent on itself, and then it gives of itself
to another' (Eautov lipa vowv oiitw npoc; autc!> Kai ⁣ &autov titv &vtpy&tav
iaX&l. Kai yap &i tl &E, autOU, tel> ⁣ autOV tv tautc!>. &c5&t yap npwtov tautc!>,
&ita Kai ⁣ li).).o). In both these texts Plotinus goes on to contrast Intellect's
MACROHiliS
'derives from Intellect' (ex mente Jif,.Zo<> ex mente pm-

cesserit),207 it is 'filled from its father as long as it contemplates
him' (patrem qua intuetur induitur),lOH and it 'is dependent
only upon its prior cause and upon itself (tantum se auctori
suo ac sibi debens),l09 this final statement indicating that it con-
tributes to its own hypostatization in a manner to be explained
below. In these passages, Macrobius understands the derivation
of this principle in terms of the correlative moments of proces-
sion and reversion postulated by the Neoplatonists..zo Conceiv-
ed from the aspect of its transcendent nature, Soul is 'unitary'
(monas),lll it is 'incorporeal, free from the contamination of
unchanging production of Soul with Soul's production of its posterior by mo-

tion. Macrobius' deviation from Plotinus was perhaps occasioned by a hasty
reading of texts like ibicl. IV, 8 I 6 I 7, 17-32 which seems to suggest a 'des-
cent' (Katlif3aau;) of Intellect along Numenian lines. Seen. 138.
206. Macrobius: In Somn. Sdp. I. I .f. I '5 (text v ).
207. /hid. I. 1", 12 (text vi). See Plotinus: Enn. Ill, 3 l.f81 .~. 20-22: Ill, '5
/'50/.~. 3-'5: Ill, '5 /'50/9, 29-37: IV. 3 /27/ '5, 8-18; V. I /10/ .~. 6-1 '5; V, I /1016.
Ht'5; V, I /10/7, 3'5-37; V, 2 111/1, 16-17; V, 3 /49/9. 1'5-17; V. 9 /'5/ .~.
5:\-5'5: VI, 2 1131 22, 26-28; Porphyry: Ad Gcmr. 16, '57, 3-6: /11 Tim. fr. 69
(Prod us: In Tim. II. 214. 9-10).
208. Macrobius: lt1 Sonm. Scip. I. 14,7 (text iv). Sec Plotinus: Enn. I, 7 I 54
12, 6-8; I, 8/51/2,23-25: II, 3152/18, 8-13; II. 9/33/2, 10-18; III. 5/50 I
2. 30-3'5; Ill, 5 I '50 /9, 30-3'5: V. I I 10 I 3. 16-21: VI. 2 /43 I 22, 1-4 for Soul
'looking at' (fjA.t7tElV, 9&ropEiV, opuv, EVOPUV, Ka9opuv, 9ta, etc.) the prior
principle; ibid. II, 3 /52 I 18, 8-13; Ill, '5 I '50 19. 30-35; Porphyry: Sent. 37.
-1'5, 6-9 for Soul as 'filled from' (7tl..f1poua9al, 7tl..~pflc;) its prior. Sec Plotinus:
l:'mz. II, 3 I 52 I 18, 10-11 where Soul 'strives towards the intelligible nature
and God. being filled' (lEJ.ltVTtv 11poc; tliv vof1tliv q>umv Kai tov 96v,
1tAflPOUJ.1tVTtc; l)t auttic;) with the two notions closely linked.
209. Macrobius: In Scmm. Sdp. I, 6. 9 (text ii). For the Plotinian and Por-
phyrian parallels to this statement seen. 22-i.
210. See nn. 207-208.
211. :\htrohius: /11 Somn. Snp. I. 6. 8 (text ii). Sec l'lotinus: Emz. IV. 5 /27/
2. '58-IV, 3/2'7/ .... :\:IV. 3/2'7/ '5. 1... 18: 1\',., /2/ 12. 14-IS: IV . ., 1211 .... 6-8:
\'1, 2 1-1:\11, 21-22; VI, 214:\1 '5. I- VI, 2/ ... 3/6. 20: VI, 21 ... :\1 II ..-\-12: Por-
phyry: Sent. 37, i:\, 9-11; In Tim. fr. '52 (Produs: In Tim. l, 422, 17-20); fr.
S40 :-.IEOPI.ATONISM
physical matter' (incurporea, 1.11. aliena a silvestris contagione

materiae),1.13 and it is 'immortal' (immortalis)ll-1- these being
qualities assigned by Middle Platonic writers to Soul understood
as the second principlell s but only by the Neoplatonists to Soul
interpreted as the third hypostasis.J.I6 Conceived from the
aspect of its transcendent nature, Soul is 'the source of all souls'
(animarum omniumfons),1.17 is divided into 'the purest reason
and the beginnings of providing sensation and growth'
(jJurissima ratio ... praebendi sensus praebendique incrementi
seminarium),21H and it 'admits no division into its unity as it
S6 (Proclus: In Tim. I. 4';7, 1-4); fr. 70 (Proclus: In Tim. II, 247, 21-2;\); fr.
75 (Prod us: In Tim. II, .~06, 8-11 ).
212. Macrohius: In Sonm. Scip. I. 14, 7 (text iv). Cf. ibid. I, H, 20; I. li, 9.
Sec Plotinus: Enn. I, 7 /51/ 3. 7-8; IV, 7 121 2. I-IV, 7 /2/ HI, 25; IV, I /2/ H~
43-46; IV, 7121 10. 1-2; Porphyry: Sent. 29. 18. IS-19, 4 contrast of Soul's
mode of existence with body's: Plotinus: Enn. IV, 7 /2/ 14, 6-H; Porphyry: De
Abstin. II, .P. 2; Sent. 17, R, 6-7 Soul as 'incorporeal' (aaw'-wm<;, c'iuA.o<;). Cf.
Plot in us: Enn. III, 6/26/18, 26-29.
213. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 6, 9 (text ii). See Plotinus: Etm. I, B /51/
4, 25-28; Ill, 6/26/1, 1-111,6/26/5.2 Soul free of'matter' (UATI); ibid. II, 9
/33/7/ 11-18; Ill, 6/26/1, 1-111,612615, 2; IV, 4/2H/2.:\, 1-48; IV, 6/-41/2.
1-25; Porphyry: DeAbstin. I, 30, 1-2; I. 31, I; Sent. I, 3. 4-5; 111 Tim. fr. 18
(Proclus: In Tim. I. 156. 26-31) Soul free of 'passhity' (nli911, nliaXElV,
ana9ti<;, anli9Eta, citpElttO<; etc.); Plotinus: Eml. I. 8/5114.25-28 Soul free
of 'evil' (KaK6v).
214.Macrohius:lnSomn.Scip.ll.l2,5.Cf.ibid.l.li,20;ll.13, 1-H.Sec
Plotinus: Enn. I. I /'i.~/ 2, 9-10; IV, 7 12/9, I 0-12: IV, 7 121 10, 24-2-:'; IV. I /2/
12, l-20; IV. 7121 14, 1-.:\; V, 1/10/1, 10-12; VI. I /22/10, 2H-:~0: Porphyry:
DeAbstitl. l, 30. 4-5; Setlt. 17. 8. 6-7.
215. Sec pp. 308-309.
216. Sec nn. 211-214.
217. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 6, 20 (text iii). See Plotinus: Etm. II, 9
/3.:\/3, 1-3: Ill, 5/SO/-L 9-13: III, 7/45/13.66-61 : Ill, 9113/3. 1-7: IV,.'\ 121/
I, I-IV, 3/27/ H. 60: IV, 3/27/ P, 12-28; IV, R /6/1,26-33: IV. 9/Rii, 6-H: V,
9/5/1-4,20-12: VI. 5/23/9, 12-13: Porphyry: DeAIJstiu. ll, :\H, 2: Sent ..-\i,
-i 3. 9-1 I.
21H. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. l, 14,.., (text i\'). Sec Plotinus: l:'nn. Ill. -i
11516. 21-45: IV, I /21/14-22: IV. 21-i/2. 1-4: IV, H 1612. 1-53: IV. H /6/6.
MACROBiliS S41
pours forth (cum se ... infundat, nullum in it tamen cum sua

zmitate dil'Ortium)ll<J - these again being qualities attributed
by the Middle Platonists to Soul interpreted as the second prin-
cipJe22o but only by Neoplatonic writers to Soul understood as
the third hypostasis.22J Finally, conceived as the cause of the
posterior level of being, it 'degenerates into the production of
bodies when its vision is gradually diverted' (jJaulatim regre-
diente respectu in fabricam corporum ... degenerat),lll it
'provides life to all living things' (viventibus omnibus vitam
ministrat),ll~ and it 'governs the body while it moves itself'
6-16: IV, 8 161 ..,, 1-7: IV, 81617. 23-32: IV, R 161 R. 11-16: IV, 91RI 3. 10-16:
V. 111013. 17-20: V, 1110/7,42-49: V, 211111. 1R-2R; V. 612411, 16-IH; VI.
.., 13RI s. 21-25: Porphyry: De Regr. Anim. fr. 10. :n 21-21: In Tim. fr. 69
(Produs: In Tim. II, 214, 4-2IS. S).
2 19. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 6, 9 (text ii). Cf. ibid. II, IS. 11-12. See
Plotinus: Enn. I, I I 53 18, 9-23: II, 9 I 33 I 2, 4-1 0; Ill, 4 I IS 16, 30-45; Ill, 81
,'\015, 10-16; IV, 1121/8-21; IV, 214/2, 1-S5; IV, 312713. 7-29; IV, 31271
19. 1-.34; IV. 7 I 2 I 5, 35-38; IV, 7 I 2 I 13, 119; IV, 91812, I -IV, 91813,
29: IV, 91815. 1-28; V, I /1012, 35-38: V, 2111 II, 22-27; VI, 2143 16,
1-20; VI, 2/-i3122, 29-36: VI, 4122114, 1-5; VI, 713816, 1-21; Porphyry:
Sent. 31, 21, 9-15; 37, 42, 13-45, 8; In Tim. fr. 61 (Proclus: In Tim. II, 104,
30- lOS, 6). The Greek Neoplatonic doctrines presented here and In the two
previous notes arc considerably more complex than the Macrobian teachings
which parallel them. See H.). Blumenthal: 'Soul. World-Soul, and Individual
Soul in Plotinus', Le Neoplatonisme (Colloque International du Centre Na-
timzal de Ia Recherche Scientifique, Royaumont 9-13 juin 1969) (Paris,
1971 ), pp. 5S-66; 'Nous and Soul in Plotinus. Some Problems of Demarca-
tion', P/otino e i/ Neoplatmzismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Atti del Con-
tegno l'llernazirma/e, Roma 5-9 ottobre 19..,0) (Roma, 1974), pp. 203-219;
and W. Heileman-Elgersma: Soul-Sisters. A Comme1llary on Enneads IV. 31
1- I 1-H of P/otirws (Amsterdam, 1980), p. S7 ff.
220. See pp. 308-309 and 315- 31H.
22l.Scenn. 217-219.
222. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. 1, 14, 6-7 (text iv). For the Plotinian and
Porphyrian parallels seep. 543 ff.
2.n. Ibid. II. 3. II. Cf. ibid. I, J.f,.., (text iv); I, l:f. 15 (text v): Satum. VII.
'J. I"'. See Plotinus: Etm. Ill, R 1301 i. 10-IJ; IV ..-\ 127110 ..~S-i I; IV. 7/213.
:'IIEOPLATONISI\I
(regat et ipsa corpus. dum a se animatur),nA this last statement

explaining how it could have been asserted above that it con-
tributes to its own hypostatization. In these passages, Macrobius
understands the productivity of this principle in terms of a
departure from the contemplation of its prior which again
parallels certain formulations in the philosophical system of
Numenius ..w;
6-~5: IV. 7 /2/lJ. 10-13; VI. 2/1.~/6, 6-1 ~:VI. i /~8/4, .~;-~6; Porphyry: Sent.
1.1' 1~. 8-12.
22-t. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. ll, 12. 10-1 I. Cf. ibid. I. 1-i. 19: II. 1.~. "7 -8;
II. 15, 12; II, 16,21-22. Sec Plotinus: Em1. 111,7/-15/13 ..~8; IV, 7/2/9, 1-9;
IV, i /2/11. 13: V, 1/10/1.6: Porphyry: DeAbstin. II. ~7. 1-2: Ad Gaur. 4,
~9.2~-25:-1.~1.2-i:Sen/. 19, 10,8-11:21.1~.6-12.
225. According to later testimony. Numenius ht:ld that soul's relation to
body as such involved degradation or corruption of the former. Thus,
Numenius: fr. 48 (1amblichus: De Anim. in Stobaeus: Flori/. l, 380) states that
among the three reasons for which souls descend to body - to purify lower
things, to amend their own characters. and w endure punishment- 'some of
the more recent thinkers make no distinction and, taking no account of the
purpose of these differences, conflate the incarnations of all the souls, by sug-
gesting that these are all evils. This is especially the case with the followers of
Cronius. Numenius, and Harpocration' (nvt<.; l>E tci.lv vErottprov oux outro<.;
litaKpivoucnv, OUK EXOVTE<.; lit OK07t0V ti;<.; Btacpop6TTJTO<.; Ei<.; taUTO auntoum
ta<.; EVOCilltaTWOEl<.; Tci.JV ()f..rov, KaKa<.; t'dvat naaa<; lillOXUPi~OVTat Kai
BtacpEp6vtro<.; o{ nEpi Kp6vt6v TE Kai Nou~tt1vtov Kai ' ApnoKpatirova ). The
doctrine stated at Macrobius: ft1 Somn. Scip. l, 14, 6-7 (text iv) that it is Soul's
downward motion and its degradation which is associated with its relation to
body seems to carry the same implkations. According to Plotinus, Soul's rela-
tion to body as such docs not involve degradation or corruption of the
former. Thus. Plotinus: Em1. II.~ /52/ 18. 8-1 ~: II. 9 /B/ 2. 10-18: 11.9 l!d/4.
1-22: II, lJ /~3/ -:-. 11-27: Ill . .j /15/ ~. 21-2"': Ill . ..j /15/-i. 2-7: IV,~ /P/9,
20-51 :trgue~ th:ll Soul :md human souls in their higher mmk generate the
posterior hy turning not towards them hut to the prior. It is true that texts
such as ibid. Ill. I /15/ I. 1:~: \', ~ 1-il)l"'. 25-:~~ contr:tst the relatively static
productivity of Intellect with the relati\'ely dynamic manner of Soul and ibid.
\', 2 Ill/ I. 18-28 even spe:tks of a 'desire for the lower' (npo9u~tia toG
XEipovo<.; ) in the Iauer case. Furthermore. there is an apparently mediating
MACROHWS 'H.'\
7 . .216 MACROBIUS ON THE THREE HYPOSTASES
This analytical survey of the relevant texts has demonstrated

that Macrobius draws a reliable picture of the doctrine of the
three hypostases advocated by Greek Neoplatonic writers. In all
respects, we have found that his philosophical position differs
from the Middle Platonic teachings regarding God, the Forms.
and Soul in precisely the same way that Plotinus and Porphyry
deviate from the viewpoints of their predecessors. The only ex-
ception to this rule occurred in connection with Macrobius' in-
terpretations of the productivity of Intellect and Soul respec-
tively, where the notions of descent and degradation played a
role analogous to certain elements in the philosophical system
of Numenius.226 However, it is worth considering briefly
whether the Latin writer's account of the three hypostases
reveals anything about his preferences in employing Plotinus
and Porphyry as sources .
..,,217 THE PLOTINIAN PARALLELS
It can be said with confidence that every aspect of the Macro-

bian theory can be paralleled in one or more passages of
Plotinus. and that many features especially bring to mind the
text of Ennead V, 2: On the Origin and Order of the Beings
'~fter the First. 22"" This latter gives considerable support to the
thesis proposed some years ago by P. Henry that the aforemen-
tioned treatise was one of Macrobius' most important unnamed
position bttwet"n tht'~e contrasting viewpoints expressed at ibid. Ill. 2 /.j.., I:.
211-28: 1\',: 121 1~. lllJ. Howc,er. Plotinus' dominant ,icw of the tausal
relation between Soul ;md it~ constquents i~ txprtssed in the first group of
passages.
226. Set: pp. "i;\8 and 5-.12.
2r.scenn.IHO-IH3.190-Il)l,ll)4,205.207.21H-21l).etc.
NEOPLATONISM
sources.ns The following parallel which was fir~t advanced in

this connection and which draws togethe~ van?us .scattered
parallels generated by the present writer's d1scuss10n IS worthy
of special attention: 229
deus qui prima causa et est
et vacatur, unus omnium
quaeque sunt quaeque tO f!v mivta Kai oueSt fv' apx.ti
t'identur esse princeps et yap mivnov ou mivta ... ov
origo est. hie superabundan- yap tEAElOV tc!> !!115tv ~11tEiv
ti maiestatis fecunditate de
1111cSt ex.etv 1111cSt 5eia9at o{ov
se mentem creavit. haec unepeppu11 Kai to
mens, quae vouc; vacatur, U7tEp7tA.i'jpec; autou 7tE1t0l11KEV
qua patrem inspicit, plenam ciA.A.o to eSt yev61J.evov elc;
similitudinem servat auc- auto E7tECJtpaq>11 Kai
toris, animam vero de se snA.11pro811 Kai hveto npoc;
creal pasteriora respiciens. auto PA.nov Kai vouc; 0\Jtoc;
rursum anima patrem qua ... OUtOc; OUV OOV ofciV1Keivoc;
intuetur induitur, ac ta 5~J.ma notEi Mva!J.tv npox.
paulatim regrediente respec- eac; noA.A.t1v . . . it eSt ou
tu in Jabricam corparum in- !J.EVOUaa 7t01Ei, aA.A.a
corporea ipsa degenerat. K1V119Eiaa Eywa Ei'ISCOAOV
habet ergo et purissimam ex EKEi 11tv ouv PMnouaa, Mev
mente, de qua est nata, ra- EYEVEtO, 1tA11POUtat, 7tpO-
tion em quod A.oytK6v eA.9ouaa eSt eic; KiVllmv ciA.A.11v
vacatur et ex sua natura ac- Kai EVaVtiav YEWQ. Ei5COAOV
cipit praebendi sensus auti'jc; aia81101V Kai q>UCJlV tllV
praebendique incrementi tv toic; q>utoic;.
seminarium, quorum unum
aia9rrnK6v alterum q>unK6v
nuncupatur. 230
228. Henry: op. cit .. JlP 187190. .

229. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. 1, J.i, 6-7 (text iv) and P1otmus: Em1. V. 2
/11/1.1-21.
230. The emphasized words are Henry's.
MACROUillS
The fact that so many parallels appear in a single text suggests

that there is a definite relation of literary dependence between
the Latin and Greek authors, although the embedding of these
parallels in somewhat different terminology in the two cases in-
dicates that the Macrobian version is no mere unthinking repeti-
tion of its forbear.
7.218 PLOTINlJS OR PORPHYRY?
The question whether the Latin writer is dependent upon

Porphyry as well as Plotinus for this doctrine is more difficult to
answer. Regarding Plotinus, we can say that the explicit cita-
tions of his treatises by their titles elsewhere in Macrobius231
and the occasional parallels of phraseology between Latin and
Greek in the discussion of the hypostases itself make the
hypothesis of a direct dependence convincing. Regarding Por-
phyry, however, we must admit that, although there are explicit
citations of his works by their titles elsewhere in Macrobius,z:u
no parallels of phraseology between Latin and Greek in the ac-
tual discussion of the hypostases have appeared to reinforce the
hypothesis of a similar dependence. For this reason, the in-
fluence of Plotinus seems more likely and that of Porphyry less
likely on the Macrobian formulation. A further difficulty regar-
ding the possible dependence of the Latin writer upon Porphyry
for his Neoplatonic doctrine is provided by the fact that the lat-
ter seems to have advocated conflicting doctrines in different
works.2.B He follows the teachings of Plotinus fairly closely in
texts such as the Sententiae ad lntel/igibilia Ducentes where
the latter's text is virtually paraphrased and in the Vita
231. See pp. S07-S09.

232. See pp. S09-S 10 .
.255. On this question see .J. Ridez: Vie de Porpbyre. Le pbilosopbe nen-
fJlatrmicien (Ghent, 1913). pp. I.U-I:B and P. Had<>t: Porpbyre et Vic
torim1s(Paris, 1968). pp. 87-RH.
NEOPI.AT<>NISM
Plolini.l..~~ He deviates somewhat from his master's doctrine in

texts like De Regressu Animae where material from
theosophical writings is combined with that derived from
Plotinus and in the Commentarius in Parmenidem.H'i Thus,
there is in the latter case alone a criterion for identifying
specifically Porphyrian influences on Macrohius.
7.219 A PORPHYRIAN PARALLEL
That Porphyry has specifically influenced the Macrohian doc-

trine can perhaps only be maintained on the strength of one
passage interpreted in a certain way. Thus, Macrobius' descrip-
tion of the monad - ad summum refertur deum eiusque in-
tellectum a sequentium numero rerum et potestatum se-
questratH6 - could be translated 'it is applied to the highest
God and distinguishes his intellect from the plurality of things
and powers subsequent to him _1.37 According to this interpreta-
tion the first principle can be classified as an intellect, with the
result that the Neoplatonists' first and second hypostases lose
the basis of their differcntiation.1.3H This significant deviation
from the Plotinian system can be paralleled in certain extant
234. The arguments of A. C. Lloyd: The later Neopla!Onists', The Cam-

hridge 1/istm:v of Later Greek wul t:arly :Hedieta/ Phi/osopby. Edited by A.
H. Armstrong (Cambridge. 1967). pp. 2H'7 -29:'1 that the Sententiae <:ontain a
significant revision of Plotinianism have heen adequately refuted hy A. Smith:
Porphyry's Place in tbe Neoplatrmic Tradition. A Study in Post-P/otinian
Neoplatrmlsm (The Hague. 19"14). pp. '5-6 and -f7, n. 10.
23'5. The dependenle of the former upon the Cba/daean Oracles was
demonstrated hy W. Theiler: Die chaldiiischen Orake/ und die Hymn en des
(ll:tlle (Saak). 19!2) pp. 7-9.
.\:)'III!Si(}S
2;\6. Manohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 6, H (text ii).
2:\:. This is the interpretation of Theiler: op. cit., pp. 6--:' and flamant: (}/J.
cit .. pp. 330331 .
.23H. According to the J>lotinian system. it is only tht setond hypostasis
which can he termed 'intellel't' (voii~).
MACROBJl!S
texts of Porphyry as well as in passages from Marius Victorious

and Synesius apparently influenced by him,z.w and it seems to
have resulted from Porphyry's attempts to interpret the
Cbaldaecm Oracles in terms of Plotinian theory by stressing the
latter's debts to Numenius.z.to Yet it must be admitted that
Macrobius' description of the monad could also be translated 'it
is applied to the highest God and distinguishes our understan-
ding of him from the plurality of things and powers subsequent
to him' with the somewhat ambiguous phrase eiusque inte/lec-
tumlo~t signifying not his (God's) understanding of other things
but our understanding of him (God).z .. z According to this inter-
pretation the first principle need not be construed as an in-
tellect, so that the first and second hypostases of Neoplatonism
retain the usual basis of their differentiation.Z.U Since this is the
only passage in Macrobius' discussion which might reflect a
specifically Porphyrian formulation and even this is ambiguous
in its interpretation, it is clearly unwise to draw too extravagant
conclusions from its occurrence.
7.22 PHYSICAL PHILOSOPHY
The second branch of philosophy according to Macrobius'

classification is called 'physical' (naturt~/is). This is defined as
the investigation of divine bodies - by which he means the
l.~9. The rdev:mt Porphyrian works are De Regressu Animae and the
Comme11farius in Parmenidem. Sec Hadot: op. cit., pp. 461--i""~.
2!0. In both the Cbaldaecm Omcles and :'1/umenius the first two principles
were intcllntivc. See Badot: op. cit.. pp. 9H. 1.!2-l .. o. 255-r 2. and
182-485.
2ll. \lacrohius: In Somn. SciJI. I. 6. H (text ii).
242. This is the interpretation of Stahl: op. cit .. p. 10 I and the present
author, p . .:;25.
2-t;\. Plotinus: Emz. \'l. H /39/ 16. 15-16 will only dcsaihe the first
hypostasis as 'like an intellect' (oiov vouc;).
NEOPI.ATONISM
bodies of the fixed stars and the planets - although it can

reasonably be extended to cover the invisible proximate motor
causes of those bodies.244 Our analysis of this part of Macrobius'
system will begin by considering the Demiurge and the world
soul as proximate causes of the cosmos as a whole.
7.221 THE DEMIURGE
A number of texts contain references to a principle named

'the creator god' (opifex deus),2-tc, 'the god who is artificer and
creator of the world's substance' (deus mundanae molis artifex
conditorque),246 or 'the god making all things' (deus omnium
fabricator).247 In most of these passages, explicit references to
the words of Plato's dialogue or its context indicate that
Macrobius is referring to the 'Demiurge' (OTJJ.Uoupy6c;) of the
Timaeus,248 although the writer does not explain how this prin-
ciple fits into the scheme of the three hypostases which is
described elsewhere in his work. However, it is possible to
reconstruct his view regarding the latter question by noting
first, that Macrobius' statement that Intellect 'produces Soul
from itself when it turns towards lower things' (animam vero
de se creal posteriora respiciens)249 when combined with his
assertion elsewhere that the production of Soul takes place 'at
the creator's command' (imperio creatoris)2c,o would seem to
244. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. II. 17. 1'; .

.2-:1';. Ibid. I, 6, 2';.
246. Ibid. I, 6, 24. Cf. ibid. ll. 10, 9.
247. Macrobius: Saturn. VII,';, 20. Cf. In Somn. Scip. I. 6, .ill.
2-t8. At Macrobius: lt1 Somn. Scip. I, 6 . .:\0 the text of Plato: Tim . .:\I h-e is
presented in his own Latin translation. At Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 6,
24-2S and I, 6, 30 it is Plato's theory that the Demiurge arranges the clements
in harmonious proportion which is under discussion.
249. Ibid. I, 14, 7. Sec pp. 'i27, 5.'\7 and c;44.
2'i0. Ibid. I. 6, 46.
MACROBiliS
require that the artificer coincides with the second hypostasis;

and secondly, that Macrobius' argument that Soul 'degenerates
into the production of bodies when its vision is gradually
diverted' (jJau/atim regrediente respectu in fabric:am cor-
porum ... degenerat)25l when combined with his general tenet
that philosophers speak of the supreme God and Intellect
'without any recourse to mythical narrative' (nihil fabulosum
penitus attingunt)2"i2 would conversely suggest that the ar-
tit'icer coincides with the third hypostasis. This ambivalence
seems also to have characterized his Greek sources' approach to
the same problem since on the one hand Porphyry contended
that 'the highest God is the Good, after him the Demiurge is se-
cond, and the world soul the third' (Etvat of: tov IJ.EV avomitro
9Eov taya96v, IJ.Et'autov ot Kai OEUtEpov tov OTJIJ.toupy6v,
tpitTJV of. TftV tOU KO<JIJ.OU wuxtiv)253, a position which he
defended in his interpretation of the Tinweus according to Pro-
clus25-t and in that of the Chaldaean Oracles according to
251. Ibid. 1, 14, 7. See pp. 527. 541 and 544.

252. Ibid. I. 2. 1:\-15. The 'likely story' (&iKci><; llii9oc;) presented in the
Timaeus would presumably l'ome in the forbidden cate~ory and must
therefore not he concerned with the suprt'mc God or Intellect.
253. Porphyry: Hist. Pbi/os. fr. 16 (Cyril: Contra Julian. VIII (PG 76,
91613)). As we shall sec below, Porphyrian parallels will often come to mind
more readily than Plotinian ones in l'onnection with Macrobius' physical
philosophy. This is clearly in accordance with the explicit admission at
Macrobius: In Sumn. Scip. II, :\. 15 that Porphyry's Commentarius In
Timaeum has ht'en used as a source. Seep. 505.
254. Proclus: In Tim. I, 391. 4-396. 26 (Porphyry: In Tim. fr. 51) lists a
number of Porphyry's arguments against Atticus' theory of creation. The
fourth argument is that 'in which he demonstrates the manner of the
demiurgic process which the divine Intellect accomplishes by its substance
alone' (Ev <!> -rov tp6nov EltlO&lKVU&l ti'jc; O'JlJ.llOupyiac; au-r(il T(il dvat -rov 9Eiov
voiiv EltlT&I..oli!J.EVOV ). The identification of Dcmiurge and Intellect is perhaps
also implied at Porphyry: De Antr. Nymph . .U. 30. 20-29; De S/mul. fr. 3. 3
H-9; fr. 10. 18" 10-15; In Tim. fr. 69(Proclus: In Tim. 11,214. 9-10).
';50 :'liE< >PI.ATONISM
Johannes Lydus;25S on the other hand Porphyry 'assigns to the

Demiurge a rank inferior to the intelligible, since he postulates
as the creative cause of the world a supercelestial soul and
places the archetype of things coming to be in Intellect'
(U<PEliJ.EVT]V t<!> cST11J.10UPY<!> cSicSrocn t<i~tv napa to VOTJt6v' IVt>XilV
yap unepoup KOOIJ.q> 7t01TJttKilv tv t<!> v<!> to
nap<icSEtYil ti9tat ni>v ytyVOIJ.EVrov) according to the testimony
of Proclus,2<;6 who comments in similar passages elsewhere that
the earlier writer believed himself to be in agreement with
Plotinus in identifying the Demiurge with SouJ2<;7 and that such
a viewpoint manifestly contradicts Plato's own position that the
Dcmiurge is identifiable with Intellect.HH It is not clear from
these sources how Porphyry reconciled these two positions,
although it seems likely that he appealed to the notion that
25'i. lydus: De Mens. IV, <;.2, 110, 18-.22 'In his commentary on the
Oracles. Porphyry holds that the God worshipped by th<. Jews corresponds
w the "Twke Beyond" or the Demiurge of Wholes. For the Chaldaean the
Iauer is second to the "Once: Beyond" or the Good' (6 J.IEVTOI nopcptiptoc; tv
n!J UltOJ.IVtiJ.Ian nilv A.oyirov TOV oic; EltEKEtva TOUT&an TOV TWV OA(I)V
OTJJ.Itoupyov Tov napa 'Jouoairov TlJ.IWJ.IEvov Eivm a~10i, ov 6 Xal..cSaioc;
OEUTEpov Q1t0 TOU Qlt(l~ EltEKElVa, TOUTE<JTl TOU aya9oii, ewA.oyEi ). Plotinus:
Enn. II, 3 15.2/9, 6-": II. 3 /S2118. 8-16: V, 915/5, 19-.29 also identifies the
lkmiurge and Intellect.
.256. Proclus: In Tim. I. 431 . .20-2.~ (Porphyry: In Tim. fr. 53) .
.25 .... Proclus: Ill Tim. I. .~06. 31-.'\0.... , .. (Porphyry: Ill Tim. fr ... I) reports
that 'after Amclius Porphyry. bdic:ving that he was in agreement with
Plotinus. applies the term "Demiurge" to the superldc:stial soul. and the
term "l.iving Creature in ltsdf" to its intellect to which it reverts. as though
the paradigm of the Demiurge were to be located in this intellect' (J.IETQ o&
TOV 'AJ.IEAlOV 6 nopqn)ptOc; oi6J.IEVOc; T<!> nl..roTtV(J> auvQ.OElV, n'w J.IEV 11/UXJiV TJiV
imEpK60J.UOV llltOKai..Ei 011J.UOUpy6v, TOV o& voiiv aim;c;, npoc; ov E7tEOTpa7tTat,
TO (lUTO~<!>ov, we; dval TO ltapaOElYJ.I!l TOU OTJJ.IlOUpyoii KQTcl TOUTOV TOV voiiv ).
W'ith some hesitation Plotinus: Emz. Ill. 9 I 131 I. 1-37 concludes that the
Demiurge is a phast: of Soul.
2SH. Proclus: Ill Tim. I. :\.22. 1-7 (Porphyry: In Tim. fr ... 2).
MACROimiS
Soul's highest phase was 'intellective' and therefore a mediating

term.Z'\9
7.222 THE WORLD SOUl
Other passages in Macrobius contain references to a principle

named the 'world soul' (mundi anima, 260 anima mun-
dana).26t In these passages also, explicit references to the
words of Plato's dialogue or its context indicate that Macrobius
has in mind the 'world soul' (ti tou navtoc; \iiUXti) of the
Timaeus,2u2 while the writer's use of the term reveals clearly
how this world soul fits into the scheme of the three hypostases
mentioned elsewhere. Thus, in one passage Macrobius speaks of
'the highest God or Intellect generated from him in which the
Forms of things are contained, or the soul of the world which is
the source of all souls' (aut enim deus summus ... aut mens ex
eo nata in qua rerum species continentur, aut mundi anima
quae animarum omnium fons est),26.~ demonstrating by the
placement of the world soul immediately subsequent to the first
and second hypostases and by its identification as the source of
all other souls in the cosmos that the world soul and the third
hypostasis can be equated with one another. Furthermore, in
another passage Macrobius connects the fact that Virgil 'assign-
259. This interpretation is plausibly advanced by W. Deuse: 'Ocr Demiurg

hei Porphyrios und Jamblich', Die Pbi/osopbie des Neuplatunismus (Wege
der Forscbung 186). herausgegeben von C. Zintzen (Darmstadt, 1977). pp.
2.'\H-25.~ and 276-.2':1~ although it is n01 explicitly stated in any ancient tc:xt.
.260. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 6 . .20; I. I"'. 1-l; II. 2, I; II . .2. 1-1-15: and
II..~. II.
26l./1Jid.l.6.15;l.I"'.H;andll ..~.ll.
26.2. At ibid. II. .2. 15 the tc:xt of Plato: Tim. j<;h-;\6:1 is presented in
~t;u:rohius' own Latin translation. At ihid. I, 6, 45-.t~; II . .2. I; and II, 2. 1116
the: discussion concerns Plato's doctrine that the world soul has a numcrh.:al
n>mposition .
.26.'\. IIJid. I. 6, .20.
NEOPlA TON ISM
ed a soul to the world' (mundo animam dedit) with the

Homeric notion of a chain suspended from heaven to earth by
means of a description of the three hypostases: God, Intellect,
and SouJ.264 That the world soul should be interpreted in this
way is no occasion for surprise since the evidence suggests a
similar viewpoint on the part of Porphyry who is probably the
Latin writer's main source here as elsewhere.26'i
7.223 THE RELATION OF THE DEMIURGE TO THE WORLD
SOUL
From the evidence of all these passages, the best conclusion
seems to be that Macrobius understands the artificer God as cor-
responding to the higher phase of Soul or the world soul. Other
texts indicate that this soul relates to its body as omnipresent (in
respect of space)266 and as coeval (in respect of time).u,- In
order to trace the further development of Macrobius' theory,
we must now examine the precise cosmological functions
which he assigns to the higher and lower phases of Soul or the
world soul respectively.
7.2231 COSMOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE HIGHER
WORLD SOUL
The cosmological function of this higher soul is described in
264./bid. I, 14, 14-16. The texts being interpreted hy Macrobius arc Virgil:
Aeneid. VI, '72-1 ff. and Homer: Iliad. H, 19.
26'i. Sec Porphyry: Hlst. Pbilos. fr. 16 (Cyril: Contra Julian. \'111 (PG 76.
9168)) as cited inn. 2S3. Plminus generally proceeds without distinguishing
the world soul and the hypostasis of Soul, although in a few passages he
develops a systematic distinction. For the Iauer see Emz. 111, S /SO/ 3. 22-111. S
/SO/ -1. L IV. 3 1271 2, S-l-"i9; IV. 3 1271 4.. 14-21; IV. 4 1281 32, H-11; IV. lJ 181
-t, IS-18. The importance of such texts is emphasized by Blumenthal: soul.
World-Soul. and Individual Soul in Plotinus'. pp. S"i-63. and Heileman-
Elgersma: op. cit.. pp. ;\2-88. Given more ext:lnt evidence the Porphyrian
position might turn out to he equally complex.
26(!. Mac:robius: In Somn. Scip. I. I"'. II.
267./bid. II. 10. 9.
MACROilll IS
the following passages: (i) 'Soul therefore created and fashioned

bodies in itself, for the physical world begins from that soul
which those who know about God and Intellect call vou~. It
animated those divine and heavenly bodies called the celestial
sphere and the planets - which were its first productions -
from that clear and purest fountain of intellect which, at birth, it
drew off from the abundance of its source. Divine intellects
were infused into all bodies which had been formed into a
round shape after the manner of a sphere' (anima ergo creans
sibi condensque corpora - nam ideo ab anima natura incipit
quam sapientes de deo et mente vouv nominant- ex il/o mero
ac purissimo fonte mentis, quem nasc:endo de originis suae
hauserat copia, corpora ilia divina vel supera, caeli dico et
siderum, quae prima condebat, animavit, divinaeque mentes
omnibus corporibus quae in formam teretem, id est in
sphaerae modum, formabantur infusae sunt).J.6H Here, we
should observe that it is Soul in its highest phase of equivalence
to Intellect which is specifically involved in the creative pro-
cess, very conveniently from the viewpoint of interpreting the
Ciceronian text at this point,269 since the element transmitted to
the products of the creative process can be understood as in-
tellective rather than psychic.27l> (ii) 'By these words it becomes
clear that of all earthly creatures man alone has a common share
268. Ibid. l, 14, 8. For intellect as the highest phase of Soul see Porphyry:
In Tim. fr. 70 (Produs: lt1 Tim. II, 247, IR-23) where the Egyptians are said
to have used the letters X and 0 as symbols of this principle, indicating by the
former 'its dyadic procession' (Ji 5uo&t5itc; np6o5oc; atrriic;) and by the latter
'its monadic life and its intellectual circular reversion' (Ji llOVO&t5Jic; ~roft Kai Ji
Kata KliKA.ov vo&pov &motpoqn\). Cf. ibid. fr. 75 (Produs: In Tim. 11. 306,
l-2S); fr. 76 (Proclus: In Tim. II, 309, 7-23). The same doctrine occurs in
Plot in us: Enn. IV. 8 /6 I R. 13-16. etc.
269. For the reconciliation of Macrobius' Neoplatonism with the Stoicism
of Cicero seep. S'iS ff.
2:o. At J\bnohius: In Smnn. Scif1. I. I'"'. 12-1 'i the celestial sphere is :tgain
tlescrihed as possessing an intellect.
:-.!EO I' LA TO:'~! ISM
of intellect or mind with the celestial sphere and the planets.

And this is why he writes: "a mind was given to them from
those eternal fires which you call the fixed stars and the
planets". This is not to say that we are animated by those
heavenly and eternal fires themselves - a fire even if divine is
still corporeal and we could not be animated by a body even if
divine -but by that from which those bodies which are and
seem to be divine are animated, namely by that part of the
world soul which we have declared to consist of pure intellect'
(his ergo dlctis solum hominem constat ex terrenis omnibus
mentis, id est animi, societatem cum caelo et sideribus habere
communem. et hoc est quod ait, hisque animus datus est ex illis
sempiternis ignibus, quae sidera et stellas vocatis. nee tamen ex
ipsis caelestibus et sempiternis ignibus nos dicit animatos -
ignis enim licet divinum, tamen corpus est, nee ex corpore
quamvis divino possemus animari - sed unde ipsa ilia cor-
pora quae divina et sunt et videntur animata sunt, id est ex ea
mundanae animae parte quam diximus, de pura mente con-
stare).27l From this text, we learn that the heavenly sphere and
the planets transmit an element which is intellective to their
2 7 1. Ibid. I. 11. 16-IH. For the celestial sphere and planets as ensouh:d bc-
in~s sec Porphyry: De Ahsti11. II. 37. 3 where he refers to the fixed stars and
planet~ as ,isibh: gods compostd of hody ;md soul' (&K TE ljiUXfi~ Kai
CJWjlaTO~ OVTE~ 6patoi 8Eoi). Other Porphyrian texts expound more complex
theories which arc consistent with Macrobius' view: sec /11 Tim. fr. <;2
(Produs: In Tim. I. 422. l.f-423. 7) where each heavenly body possesses a
particular 'intellect' (vou~) having a definite relation - the simultaneous
sameness and otherness obtaining between intelligible whole and parts- to
uninrsal lntcllc<:t; and ihitl. fr. 7 9 (Produs: In Tim. Ill. 6-l. H6c;, 7) where
the different courses of the heavenly bodies result from the wars in which
their 'intclh:ns' (VOE<;)- in accordance with their mode of partidp:uion in
being, life, :md intellect - revert upon the prior principles. Porphyry ;tgrecs
with Macrobius in speaking of intellects rather than souls since it is the in-
tellectual phase of Soul which is their source. For the Plotinian equivalent to
this doctrine sec Enn. II. 9 I 3 3/ 16. 9-1 I. etc.
MACRO BillS
products, a notion made possible by the introduction of aspects

of Neoplatonic doctrine ,2n since these are themselves not simp-
ly bodies but bodies animated by the world soul. Taking hoth
the passages together, a complete picture of the cosmological
function of the higher soul emerges.l"'.:\
7.2232 THE HIGHER SOUL AND THE SUN
Macrobius' understanding of the cosmological function of the

higher soul is further illustrated by his notion that the sun is the
'intellect of the world' (mens mundi). At first this seems to be a
metaphorical way of saying that the sun is responsible for the
orderly processes of change in the cosmos - the reference to
the notion in Cicero is handled in this relatively uncomplicated
wayr:.. - although an examination of certain parallel
developments in the Saturnalia where an elaborate solar
theology is expounded quickly dispels such an illusion. Here, in
the course of Praetextatus' lengthy explanation that the many
divinities of classical mythology constitute aspects of the sun's
activity, the discussion turns to the interpretation of Dionysus
and Minerva. Regarding the former he comments: 'The
physicists explain Dionysus as "the intellect of Jupiter" since
they hold that the sun is the intellect of the world while they
call that heaven which is termed the world Jupiter. Hence
Aratus writes when about to describe heaven: "From Jupiter let
us begin" ' (physici ~t6vuoov ~toe; vouv , quia so/em mundi
mentem esse dixerunt. mundus autem l'OCatur caelum. quod
appellant lovem. unde Aratus de caelo dicturus ait: EK ~toe;
27 2. For the reconciliation of Cicero's Stoicism with Macrobius'

Neoplatonism see below.
273. There is a straightforward causal sequence from the hypostasis of In-
tellect to intellect of the world soul to intellects of heavenly bodies to human
intellects.
2 .. -f. Mauobius: In Sonm. Scip. I. 20, 6. Cf. ibid. I, 20, I.
SS6 NEOPLATONJSM
apx,roJ,u:a9a);275 and regarding the latter: 'For Porphyry also

testifies that Minerva is the power of the sun which bestows
right judgment upon human intellects. This is why the goddess
is said to have been born from the head of Jupiter, in other
words to have issued from the highest part of the aethcr whence
the sun takes its origin' (et Porpbyrios testatur Minert,am esse
virtutem so/is quae bumanis mentibus prudentiam sub-
ministrat. nam ideo haec dea lovis capite prognata
memoratur, id est de summa aetberis parte edita, unde origo
so/is est).276 In these passages where Dionysus/the sun is jux-
taposed with the heavenly sphere he seems to be interpreted
metaphysically as the source of that sphere's intellection, just as
where Minerva/the sun is juxtaposed with man she is clearly
understood metaphysically as the source of human intellection.
In contrast, where Minerva/the sun is juxtaposed with the
heavenly sphere she is clearly interpreted physically as the
emanation of that sphere's substance. Thus, it seems that
Dionysus/Minerva/the sun has a metaphysical and a physical
role as transmitter of intellection and heat respectively .2n In
fact, the whole scheme can perhaps best be summarized as con-
taining three stages: Dionysus/the sun is the intellect of the
heavenly sphere or Jupiter, a metaphysical relation; the heaven-
ly sphere/jupiter is the producer of Minerva or the sun, a
27S. Macrobius: Saturn. I. HI. IS.

276. Ibid. l, P, 70.
277. Various texts of Porphyry provide instances of the same divinity be-
ing interpreted in both a metaphysical and physical way. Cf. Porphyry: De
Simu/. fr. H. 12" S-6 and In Tim. fr. 16 (Proclus: In Tim. I. 147, 67) where
Hephaestus is explained as 'the power of fire' (nupoc; ~ ouva~ouc;) and 'the ar-
tisan intellect' (0 tEXVIKOc; vouc;) respectively; d. Porphyry: De Antr. 1\'ympb .
.U ..~0. 20-29 and In Tim. fr. 22 (Proclus: In Tim. I. 16S, 16-19) where
Athene is interpreted as 'the mind of God' (q~p6VTJcnc; 9Eo0) and as 'the moon'
(ev OEATtVIJ) respectively. Of these examples. the explanation of Hephacstus as
an intellect and the metaphysical interpretation of Athcnc arc l"spcdally
significant for our present thesis.
MACROBILIS
physical relation; and Minerva/the sun is the intellect of human

beings, a metaphysical relation again.278 What Praetextatus has
to say about these divinities during his elaborate discussion of
solar theology is of special importance to our investigation. In
particular, it shows that the reference to the sun as mens mundi
is not simply a metaphorical way of saying that it is responsible
for the orderly processes of change in the cosmos - although
the aspect of its activity with which Cicero was perhaps
primarily concerned is not to be ignored - but attributes to it
various connotations which are simultaneously metaphorical
and literal. Thus, a brief reference in the Commentarius has
proved to be important evidence about the cosmological func-
tion of the higher soul.
27fJ. These: rc:Iations might he: expressed in diagrammatical form:
Dionysus =
sun ( as vouc; 1 )
1
Jupiter Minerva
heaven ( p h y s i c a l ) - - - - - - - - - - - - - + a) sun (physkal)
h) sun (as vouc;!)
1
man
Vc:rtkal arrows indkatc: mc:taphyskal relations. horizontal arrows physkal

ones.
'i'iH :'liE< >I'I.AT< >NISM
7 . .2233 PLOTINUS, THE CHALDAEAN ORACLES, AND POR-

PHYRY
The meaning of this doctrine can be further elucidated by a

threefold comparison between Plotinus, the Cbaldaean
Oracles, and Porphyry. At one extreme of the philosophical
spectrum, Plotinus elaborates the notion of the sun's physical il-
lumination of the visible world as an analogy for the
metaphysical process of the One's production of lntellect2 7 1J
while at the other. the Cbaldaean Oracles interpret the theory
of fire's physical production of the visible world as not essen-
tially different from the metaphysical process of the paternal in-
tellect's production of Forms and other intelligible objects.2BO
Porphyry appears to take a middle course between these two
positions by arguing on the one hand that 'nobody can slip
through to an understanding of God, although hy comparing
the sun's functions we may agree to the view that he is intellec-
tual and rational' (ou&& yap 8sou tu; Ei~ tov vouv &taouvat
&Uvatat' EK && tci>v Epyrov tou tiA.iou OUVIJVEOallEV tot~ voepov
Kat A.oytKOV aUtOV cl1tO(j)TJVallEV01~ ),281 and on the other that
'the divine is of the nature of light subsisting in the diffusion of
aetherial fire' (q>rotOElOOU~ ot. OVtO~ tOU 8Eiou Kai tv nupo~
ateepiou 1tEP1XUOEt &ui:yovtoc; ).2R2 That Porphyry should adopt
a mediating position is perhaps not surprising in view of his
279. See Plotinus: Emz. V, 3/49/12. 39-'i2; V, 'i /32 17, 16-3'i: V, 5/32/
H. '7-13; V, 6/24/4, 14-20; VI, 7/38/16, 22-35; etc.
280. See Orac. Cbald. fr. 3 (Psellus: Comm. (PG 122, ll44A)); fr. 6
(Simplicius: In De Cael. II. I, ~~7'i. 19-21); fr. 10 (Psellus: Cnmm. (PG 122,
114'iA)); fr. _H (Produs: In Tim. I, 420, 13-16); l'tc.
281. Porphyry: DeAbstin. Ill. II, 3.
282. Porphyry: De Simul. fr. 2, z 1-3. Porphyry gols on 10 say that this
light 'is ln\'isible to sensation en<:umhercd hr mortal life' (ciqmvou~ TE
TUYXclVOVTO<; aio9l'JOEI ltEpi 9VTJTOV j3iov clOXOA(!) ). hut hy this he prohahly
means simply that it is invisihk when not diffused through :1ir. In fact. thl'
MACROBiliS
tendency to synthesize Platonic and Stoic teachings,21H for ex-

ample when he adapts elements not only of the Stoic theory of
mixtures to explain relations between the intelligible and sensi-
ble worlds2H-4 but also of the Stoic classification of concepts to
reveal God's transcendence of both being and non-being,2HS to
which attention was first drawn by H. D<>rrie2H6 and later by W.
Theiler2H7 and P. Hadot.2H8 However, Porphyry's opportunity
to pursue a middle course between the two positions in ques-
tion is increased by his explicit distinction between (i) the sun's
'intellect' (vou~) or 'wholeness' (6A.6tll~. oA.ov ) in which the
physical substance of the heavenly body participates289 and (ii)
'the sun' (ilA.to~) which is the physical substance of the heavenly
body itself2<Jo stressed or unstressed according to the exegetical
whole doctrine of irradiating power in De Cultu Simulacmrum is elaborated

on the border line between metaphysics and materialism. Cf. ibid. fr. I 0. 21
11-13.
283. On the importance of Porphyry as a source of Macrobian solar
theology see pp. 509-510 and n. 95. For Porphyry, Plotinus, and the
CbaldC~ean Oracles see pp. 545-547.
281. See Porphyr~: Ad Gaur. I 0, P. 21-25; Qlltii!SI. Comm. 69 (Ncmesius:
De Nat. Hom. 3. 59'7A); andSe111. 33. 37. 19-3H. 5.
2HS. Sec Porphyry: Sent. 26, IS. '7-13.
286. H. D6rrie: Porpbyrios' Symmikta Zetemata. lbre Stel/ung in System
zmd Cieschicbte ties Neii/Jiatrmismus nebs/ einem Kommentar Zll den
Fragmenten (Zetemata 20) (Miinchen, 1959). pp. 24-35 and 159-161.
2H'7. Thl'iler: Ammonios und Porphyrins'. pp. I 04-106.
28H. Hadot: PorfJbJre et Victorinus. pp. 89-90. I 'i9-16J. I:-.. 1'76.
20.~-204, 222-BO. 2-40. 312. and 4H9-i90.
289. See Porphyry: In Tim. fr. 20 (Prod us: In Tim. I. I 'i9. 25-27) and fr.
52 (Prod us: In Tim. I. i 22. 14-26). Porphyry goes on to argue that 'the sun is
being .. . Venus is intellect ... Menury is life' (iiAIO~ !!EV yap ouaia ...
'AcppoliitnM vou~ ~tEV ... ' EP~til~ /if: ~wit ~tEv) :u ibid. fr. 79 (Prod us: In Tim.
Ill. 6i. I 'i Pl. However. by this ht simply inll'nds w show th:lt the sun is a
~uhstantial intelkct. Venus :m intellcctu:1l one. and so on. For the notion of
planetary intelle<:ts in the Commentarius in Timaeum seen. 2-1.
290. Sel: i/Jid. fr. 52 (Produs: In Tim. I. -!22, 16-21-!). Porphyry probably
dahorated this position under the influence of the Cba/tlaean Oraci'S. Sec
560 NF.OPLA H >N ISM
needs of a given situation. Thus, it becomes possible to agree

with Plotinus' analogy between physical and metaphysical
causation by preserving the distinction between the sun's in-
tellect and the sun itself,291 and also with the Chaldaean
Oracles combination of physical and metaphysical causation by
downplaying the distinction between the intellectual and
physical suns.292 There seems little room for doubt that this
represents the conceptual framework within which the lost Por-
phyrian treatise Sol examined the different functions of the sun
and which the Latin writer appears to have adopted from this
source.
7.2234 SOLAR THEOLOGY
If Macrobius' notion that the sun is the mens mundi can be

clarified by examining features of Praetextatus' discussion of
solar theology, then it may be relevant" to add some further
observations about the content of this remarkable document of
ancient religious theory.29~ Here, the main aim is to
demonstrate that all the divinities worshipped in the Greek,
Roman, and Egyptian religions can be interpreted as one god:
the sun, the arguments for this interpretation being drawn from
the etymologies of their names, their roles in mythical nar-
Pscllus: Expos. (PG 122. ll52A) 'And they postulate :m archk sun dcri\'cd
from the solar source and an arch angelic sun. and a sour<:c of sensation' (c:paai
lit Kai CtPXIKOV i;A.tov Ct1t0 tiic; ~AIUKiic; 1t11Yiic; Kai cipxayyEAIKOV, Kai 1tl1YiJV
aia9itaEroc; ) where their doctrine is summarized. Using :1 certain latitude of
interpretation. Porphyry might also have found inspiration In the writings of
his teacher. Sec Plotinus: Enn. IV. 3 f2if II. H-21 where 'thc highcr sun (6
EKEi fiA.toc;) is linked to 'the sun of this realm' (o1hoc; 6 fiA.toc; ) hy Soul. For
similar elahoratiuns in Martian us Capella see pp. 618-620 and n. 72.
291. Sec Porphyry: In Parm. Ill, 13-30.
292. There is. however. no extant Porphyrian text which testifies to this
reading of the Cbaldaean Ol'tlcles.
293. Macrubius: Saturn. I. 17. 1-1,23. 22.
MACROIUUS <;61
ratives, and the character of their visual representation.29-4 As

examples of the first kind of argument we have the explanation
of Dionysus as the intellect of Jupiter' (~to<; vouc;)29S and of Pan
as 'the ruler of all material substance' (universae substantiae
materia/is dominator);296 as illustrations of the second kind
could be mentioned the interpretation of the myth of Juno's
hostility to Latona at the birth of Apollo as the physical interac-
tion of air and earth in relation to the heavenly body,297 and
that of the myth of Jupiter's visit to Ocean at the head of the
gods as the physical process of the sun's replenishment from
water;29R and as examples of the third kind we have the ex-
planations of Minerva's serpentine cloak299 and Mercury's wing-
ed sandals.300 In these passages, the interpretations of Miner-
va/the sun, Dionysus/the sun, and Mercury/the sun are based
upon metaphysical functions of the divinities. since it is the
sun's role as source of 'right judgment' (jJrudentia).30l
294. When Praetextatus comments at ibid. l, 17. 4 'Just as Virgil's remark

about Juno alone "What divine power has been offended?" indicates that the
various activities of one god can be regarded as different divine powers, thus
the various powers of the sun have provided gods with names. For this
reason the leading philosophers have proclaimed "all things are one" (et
slcut Mclro, cum de tmtl lunrme dicere/: quo mmtine laeso, ostendlt tmius
del effectus rarios pro tariis censemlos esse numinibus, ita diversae vir-
lutes so/is nomina dis dederunt. tmde fv to ndv sapientum principes pro-
diderunt) he is setting out the program for the entire theological discourse.
295. Ibid. 1, 18, I 5. For an interpretation of Dionysus as the sun see Por-
phyry: DeSimu/. fr. R, 13" 18- 14" I. See pp. 5<;<;-557.
296. Manobius: Satum. I. 22. 2-6.
2<n. Ibid. I. 17. 5.~-5i. For ;tn interprttation of Apollo as the sun see Por-
phyry: De Simul. fr. H. 12 12-1 :\" 2.
2lJH. Macrobius: Stllttrn. I. 2~. 1-2.
2lJ9. Ibid. I. P. 70.
;'\00. Ibid. I. 19 . .., -9 .
.~o I. Ibid. 1. Ji. 70. This interpretation is ~:ontained in the same pass;tgl'
which des~:ribed Minerva's visual representation.
'i62 :-./EOPLATONISJ\1
'intclh:ct' (voOc;), and 'language' (sermo)!>Ol which is being

stressed; however, the explanations of Apollo/the sun, Pan/the
sun, and Jupiter/the sun are based upon physical functions of
those deities, for it is the sun's nature as obscured by air, ruler of
all material substance,W.~ and replenished by water which is be-
ing emphasized. This indicates that the attempt to demonstrate
that all the divinities worshipped in various religions can be
understood as aspects of one god moves on two levels: the
metaphysical and the physical. and that whereas the Stoics of
earlier days had been content to reduce all the gods to a single
material substance the Neoplatonic revival of their thought
repeats this procedure in both the intelligible and sensible
spheres.!>O.f Thus, Praetextatus' discourse documents an impor-
tant new development in later ancient thought in addition to ex-
plaining a doctrine of the Commentarius often ignored by
scholars ..~o'i
7.22.35 THE HIGHER AND LOWER SOULS
At this point it may be useful to attempt a summary of the
302. Ibid. I. 19. ""-9. This interpretation is contained in the same passage
which described Mer<:ury"s visual representation.
303. IIJ/d. I. 22, 2-6. Of course, this interpretation of Pan does not exclude
a metaphysical role also.
304. For the nature of this distinction between the two levels see pp.
S'iR-560. The ancient systems of philosophical monotheism differ from one
another in the following ways: (i) Varro: Antiqultates Rerum Divinarum. All
divinities reduced to one substance, that substance being material: the 'spirit'
(1tVEUJ.Ia). See pp. 822-825. (ii) Macrobius ( = various Porphyrian works). All
divinities reduced to one substance, that substance being a) intelligible: the
'solar intellect' <ftA.taKoc; vouc;) and b) sensible: the sun. (iii) Porphyry: De
Cultu Simulacrorum. All divinities reduced to one substance, that substance
being ambivalently immaterial and material: the 'generative power' ('YOVIJ.IOc;
&UvaJ.Itc;). See pp. '55H-560. It is the fact that there are striking similarities bet-
ween these systems which enables details from one to be transposed into
another, as in the example mentioned inn. 295.
50'5. It may he useful to present a diagrammatical t;tlmlation of the inter-
1\lACROIJil :s
Macrobian doctrine of Soul or the world soul as it has emerged

so far. According to our reconstruction, it seems that this princi-
ple consists in the first place of a higher soul which transmits an
intellective dement to the heavenly bodies which in their turn
transmit this intellective aspect to human beings ..:\06 Further-
more, it transpires that the higher soul transmits this intellective
element to the lower realm specifically through the in-
termediary of the sun. w- Naturally, if this represents Macrobius
interpretation of the higher Soul or world soul, and if the third
hypostasis h~ls two compkmentary phases)OH it is likely that he
pretations of divinities mentioned in this section:
Minerva
+--~---------J1---------~~
Mercury
Dionysus
a) the sun (as voiic;)
b) the sun (physical)
Pan 1
Apollo
....,.. Jupiter
These interpretations arc consistent with and supplement those mentioned in

11. 278.
306. See pp. 552-555.
307. See p. 555 ff. The sun is selected as the particular vehicle for the
transmission of intellection because of its regulatory role in relation to all the
processes of the visible realm.
308. See pp. 538-'H I and 552. During the remainder of this discussion. I
shall invariably call the 'higher soul' the intellective phase and the 'lower
soul' the rational, sensible. and vegetative phases. However, it should be
noted that Macrobius is not always consistent in maintaining this distinction,
so that (i) in some passages he means by the 'higher soul' the intellective -
see bz Somn. Scip. I, 14. 8: I. 14. 17-18- while (ii) in others he means by the
'higher soul' the rational- see ibid. I. 14, 7. This ambivalence also ()(.'Curs in
Plotinus wlwre as examples of (i) one might mention E'mr. I, I I 53 I 2. 25-27:
I, I I 52 I 10. 7-1 I; III, 9 I 13 I 6, 1-9; IV, 3 I 27 I 18, I 7; IV. 4 I 28 I I 1, 11- 13;
<;64 NEOPI.ATONISM
has an equally complete theory of the lower Soul or world soul.

Indeed as we shall see below, it is this lower soul which
transmits non-intellective aspects to the heavenly bodies which
in their turn transmit these non-intellective aspects to human
beings.309 In addition, it will appear that the lower soul
transmits these non-intellective elements to the lower realm
through the intermediary of the seven principal heavenly
bodies.-~ o
7.2236 COSMOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE LOWER

WORLD SOUL
The cosmological function of this lower soul emerges from

the following passage: 'In the sphere of Saturn our soul obtains
reasoning and understanding which they call A.oyuntK6v and
9eropTJttK6v; in Jupiter's sphere the power to act called
7tpaK-nK6v; in the sphere of Mars the boldness of spirit named
9Uf.UKOV; in the sun's sphere the substance of sensation and im-
agination which they call aia9TJttK6v and q>avma-nK6v; the mo-
tion of desire called m9UIJ.TJtlKOV in the sphere of Venus; the
ability to express and interpret thoughts called EPJJ.TJVEUttK6v in
Mercury's sphere; and it exercises the q>UtlKOV or the function of
producing and increasing bodies on entering the sphere of the
as examples of (ii) one might quote ibid. Ill, 6 I 26 I 2, 29-34: Ill, 8 I 30 I 5.

10-16; V, 3 149 I 3. 1-18; V. 3 149 19, 1-3i. Plotinus attempts w reconcile
this conflict at ibid. l, 1153 I 8, 1-3; IV, 3/27 I 18, 7-24; V, 3 /49 I 3. 18-45.
Finally, Porphyry is also inconsistent in maintaining this distinction, referr-
ing (i) in some passages w a 'higher soul' which is intellective - see In Tim.
fr. 70 (Proclus: In Tim. II, 247, 18-23): fr. 75 (Produs: In Tim. II, 306, 1-25);
fr. 76 (Proclus: In Tim. II, 309, 7-23)- and (ii) in others to a 'higher soul'
which is rational- see De Absti7l. Ill, 26, 10; Sent. 29, 19, 6-13.
309. Seep. 565 ff.
310. See pp. 565-S68. These heavenly bodies will include the sun which
also transmits a non-intellective as well as an intellective element.
MACROBIUS
moon' (in Saturni ratiocinationem et inte/legentiam. quod

A.oytottK6v et 9EOOPTJttK6v vacant: in Iavis vim agendi, quod
npaKttK6v dicitur: in Martis animositatis ardorem, quod
9uJ,nK6v nuncupatur: in so/is sentiendi opinandique naturam,
quod aio9TJttK6v et q>avtaottK6v appellant: desiderii vero
motum, quod m9Uj.l.TJttK6v vacatur, in Veneris: pronuntiandi
et intetpretandi quae sentiat quod SPJ.l.TJVEUnK6v dicitur in
orbe Mercurii: q>unK6v vera, id est naturam plantandi et
augendi cmpora. in lngressu globi lunaris exercet).!>~ 1
Although this passage deals specifically with the human soul's
acquisition of a different psychic faculty as it descends through
each of the seven planetary spheres, it also indicates that each of
the spheres is itself endowed with the faculty which the human
soul acquires there.:H2 This is consistent with Macrobius' doc-
trine that Soul produces the visible world in turning from the
contemplation of the prior principle, and during this process of
detachment also unfolds into a hierarchy of lower faculties.:H3
The passage does not explicitly state how the faculty with
which each of the seven planetary spheres is endowed relates to
that which the human soul acquires there, although it seems
likely that the faculty associated with each of the spheres is an
inchoate version of its counterpart in the human sou)} 14
"'.2237 PlOTINUS. PORPHYRY, AND MACROBIUS
The meaning of this doctrine can also be elucidated by a
:\II. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 12. H-1 <; .

.~ 12. For furthcr dis<:ussions of the: fac:ullics SC:l' ibid. I. 6. -t2 where: thl'
~oul is dividc:d into 'rt:asoning' (ratio - ).oytanK6v). spiritc:dncss'
lllllimositas- 9u~HK6V), and 'dcsirc' (cupiditas- bn9ut.n'('nK6v)- the: Platonk
tripartition; and ibid. I. 1-t. HI-I~ whcrc: it is divided into reasoning. 'scnsa-
tion (Se11tire). and 'growth (crescere) in man, into sensation and growth in
animals. and into growth in plants - a mixture: of Platonk and Aristotelian
notions .
.'\ 1~. Sc:c p. 538 ff.
~ 14. See the passages noted on pp. 538-542.
';66 :'IIEOPLATO:'IIISI\1
threefold comparison between Plotinus, Porphyry, and

Macrobius. Plotinus definitely states that the human soul ac-
quires its spiritedness, desires, and lower phase from the
heavenly bodies, although he is extremely cautious in drawing
from this the conclusion that the latter are themselves endowed
with the faculties which they impart to others ..H<; Thus, on the
one hand he will contend that the heavenly bodies are not sub-
ject to any psychological disturbances,.H6 yet on the other he
argues that the world soul's various faculties are distributed
among the sphere of fixed stars and the other planetary or-
bits ..H"' The reconciliation of these two apparently contradic-
tory positions seems to reside in his teaching that the world soul
is equipped with sensation, vegetation, and the lower phase but
in a manner concordant with its own elevated nature ..iiR In Por-
~ 1';. Plot in us: Enn. II. ~ /';2 I 9. 6-9 'In the Timaeus the creating god
hc:swws the: origin of Soul, the gods moving in the: heaven the: dread and
nen.ssary affections - anger. desire. pleasure and pain - and that other
phase of soul in which !hose: affections arise' (fv t Ttllaiq> eeoc; ll&V 6
non'taac; ttiv apxtiv tftc; wuxftc; BiBromv, oi l)t q>Ep6J.1EVOI 9Eoi tel BEIVcl Kai
avayKaia 1tQ9Tl, 9UJ.lOUc; Kai &7tt9UJ.llQc; Kai i!oovac; Kai AU1tac; au, Kai \j/UXftc;
c'iUo dooc;, aq>'ou tci na9ftllata tauti ). Cf. ibid. II, 3 /52/10, 1-3; II, 3/52/
II, 1-13 .
.~ 16. Ibid. II,~ 1521 ~. 21-2';; II, 3 /;2/ -4, 1-~; IV, 4 /28/-42. 1-29. AI iiJid.
Ill. '; /SO/ 6. 7-13 he makes the hask distinction hetwc:en gods and demons
thl ahsence or presence of affections' (na9nJ. The heavenly hodic:s arc for
Plminus the visihle gods.
31 '7. Ibid. 111, 4 /I';/ 6. 2 1-2'; 'We must realize that there is nO! only an in-
telligihle world in our souls hut also a distrihution of phases like that in the
world soul. The Iauer is distrihuted 10 the sphere of fixed stars and the
planets according to its diffc:rem facuhks' (XPli yap oiea9m Kai K60J.lOV dva1
f.v t(l wuxu tillV llli J.lOVOV vont6v, ana Kai wuxiic; ti;c; KOOJ.lOU OJ.lOEIBii
Bt6.9Emv VEVEJ.lllllEVllc; OUV KCtKEiVllc; Eic; t tiJv a1tA.avi; Kai tcic; 1tAQV(I)J.lEVac;
Kara Buv<illEtc; &taq>opouc;)
~IH. lbicl. \'1,; f.J.,H/ 6. 1-2. At ibid. Ill. f /!';/ f, '"'-lf Plotinus states that
the faculties of sensation and growth are 'prc:sem and not presem (n<ipeattv
... ou 7tapov) the world soul. In other words they arc presem in inchoate
form.
MACROBHJS
phyry we find a doctrine which is more elaborately articulated

and less hesitant in its formulation. This writer explicitly states
that 'powers descend from the celestial sphere and from the
planets' (Katiacn cS& cSuva~Etc; E~ oupavou Kai ano tei>v nA.avro-
~EV(I)V ).H9- these vary in their effects, according to Chaldaean
astrologers, in relation to the precise moment of emanation.uo
-and that 'a spirit which it had collected from the spheres ac-
companies the human soul' (to 7tVEU~a ouvo~aptEi, o EK ni>v
oq>mprov ouvEAt~ato) ..UI That Porphyry was prepared to draw
the logical conclusion from this that the heavenly bodies were
themselves endowed with the faculties which they impart to
others emerges clearly from Augustine's rebuke of his treatise
De Regressu Animae for attributing human failings to the
aetherial regions of the cosmos.322 Finally. the writer argues
that the human soul has when it descends from reason to im-
agination 'a solar spiritual body' (to i)A.toEtcSEc;)323 and when it
inclines from imagination to sensation 'a lunar spiritual body'
(to oEA.nvoetcSEc;);32-t while 'the realm of Mars presides over
spirited human souls' (f) ~EV 'ApEtKiJ tac; 8u~OElcSEottpac;)325
and 'that of the moon is associated with life' (oeA.riVIl eSt E7ti
~roiJv).326 Macrobius also definitely states that the human soul
acquires its lower faculties from the heavenly bodies,32 7 inter-
preting this in conjunction with the notion that the world soul
is equipped with a lower phase in a manner concordant with its
own elevated nature.328 Moreover, he combines this with an
:U9.Porphyry:DeAiltr.A:vmpb. 16.18, P-19 .

.UO. Porphyry: At/ Gaur. Ill. ;: ..-\13.
321.Porphyry:Sen/. 29. 18.6-7 .
.U2. Porphyry: De ReJ!.r. Anim. fr. 6 ..'\i 22-2- .
.U3. Porphyry: Sent. 29. 19.6-8.
324.Porphyry:Sm/. 29.19.910 .
.US. Porphyry: In Tim. fr. 21 (Prod us: /11 Tim. I. 162. 33 16.~. IS) .
.U6. Porphyry: /11 Tim. fr. "'9 (Produs: /11 Tim. Ill, 6i. R 6'i. -) .
.U7. See pp. 564-565.
328. See pp. 548-SS2.
NEOPLATONIS!\1
elaborate doctrine that the human soul acquires a differem

faculty from each of the planetary spheres}29
7.2238 THE LOWER SOUL AND ARITHMETIC
Macrohius understanding of the cosmological function of the

lower soul is further illustrated by his notion that this soul has a
definite arithmetical composition. Thus, it is his declared con-
viction that the astronomical references in the Ciceronian text
can be most appropriately explained by the doctrine of Plato's
Timaeus that the world soul is composed of various numbers
and ratios ..:\.:\0 This latter theory is expounded in several
passages: (i) 'Hence the Timaeus of Plato reports that the god
who fashioned the world soul imerwove even and odd, two
and three, in its composition. Thus, he alternated the even and
odd numbers going from two to eight and from three to twemy-
seven. The first cubes arise from both these series. Among the
even numbers two times two, which are four, produce a surface
while two times two times two, which are eight, make a solid.
Among the odd numbers three times three. which are nine, pro-
duce a surface while three times three times three or three times
nine, which are twenty-seven, make the first cube of the other
series' (binc et Timaeus Platonis fabricatorem mundanae
animae deum partes eius ex pari et impari, id est duplmi et
triplari numero, intertextuisse memoravit; ita uta duplari us-
que ad octo, a triplari usque ad l'iginti septem stc1ret alter-
329. See pp. 564-565. It is the presence of this last feature which suggests
that Macrobius follows Porphyry rather than Plotinus.
330. Macrobius: In Sumn. Scip. II, 2, I. Cf. Ibid. I, 6, 4. Macrobius' discus-
sion of the numbers and ratios in the world soul should be compared with
corresponding passages in Calcidius' Commentarius in Timaeum. See pp.
475-478. The similarities between Macrobius and Calcidius are perhaps main-
ly to be explained on the basis of both authors' dependence upon Porphyry.
Sec nn. 334 and _'\37.
MACROB!liS
natio mutuandi. bi enim primi c_:ybi utrimque nascuntur; si

quidem a paribus his bina. quae sunt quattuor, superficiem
fac:iunt; his bina his, quae sunt octo, corpus solidum fingunt;
a dispari rero ter lerna, quae sunt norem, superficiem red-
dunt, et ter lerna fer, id est ter novena quae sunt riginti
septem, primum aeque cybum a/terius partis efficiwlfp.~l To
the information contained in this passage that there are two
series of numbers, that these comprise even and odd respective-
ly, and that these two series produce solidity, a later text adds
the complementary details that the total number of integers is
seven, that these are divided into even and odd, and that the in-
tegers are arranged in a lambda figure.:B2 (ii) 'This number is
now called bnac; although - with the archaic use of an initial
letter o - it was named the oe7ttac; in ancient times. The Greek
word testified to the veneration owed to the number. It was by
this number first of all that the world soul was produced accor-
ding to the teaching of Plato's Timaeus. With the monad
located at the apex, two series of three numbers descended
from it on either side, on one the even and on the other the odd.
That is, after the monad on one side came two, then four, and
then eight, and on the other three, then nine, and then twenty-
seven. It was the interweaving of these numbers which produc-
ed the generation of the soul at the artificer's command' (hie
numerus 1ttac; nunc vacatur, antiquato usu primae litterae,
apud veteres enim oe7ttac; vocitabatur, quod Graeco nomine
testabatur renerationem debitam numero. nam prima om-
nium hoc numero anima mundana generata est. sicut
Timaeus Platonis edocuit. monade enim in vertice locata, ter-
ni numeri ab eadem ex utraque parte fluxerunt, ab hac pares,
ab ilia ilnpares; id est post monadem a parte a/tera duo, inde
quattuor, deinde octo. ab altera rero parte tria, deinde
-~-~I . .\lal'rohius: In Somn. ScifJ. I. 6. 2-5.

j_U. S_'t: ibid. ll. 2. I 6-1"" for a paralh:l statc:ment of the same dol'trine.
'i70 NI:OJ>I.ATONISi\1
1wtem. et inde tiginti septem. et ex his numerisfacta crmtextio

generationem animae imperio creatoris effecit)Y?r In the con-
text surrounding these passages Macrobius explains the
cosmological reason why Plato selected this particular
arithmetical structure for the lower soul by stressing two
features of the latter's relation to its body. It is to this explana-
tion that we should briefly turn our attention.
7.2239 SOLID NUMBERS, RATIOS, ETC.
In the first place, the solidity of the numbers indicates the

lower soul's function as the principle of three-dimensional
bodies. Thus, the writer notes that Plato inserted numbers pro-
ducing cubes into its structure 'not signifying by this that it has
some corporeal nature. Rather, in order that it might pervade
the universe with its animating power and fill the world's solid
body it was constructed from solid numbers' (non quia aliquid
significaret illam habere corporeum, sed ut possit univer-
sitatem animando penetrare et mundi solidum corpus im-
p/ere, per numeros so/iditatis e.ffecta est).?r.H In the second
place, the ratios between the numbers correspond to the
distances between the planetary spheres. This emerges from a
more elaborate argument in which Macrobius begins by asking
'whether the balanced dimensions of the world's body itself
also maintain these intervals in the incorporeal soul which are
apprehended by reason alone' (haec interval/a, quae in anima
quippe incorporea sola aestimantur ratione ... utrum et in ip-
so mzmdi corpore dimensio /ihrata servaverit);33S continues by
5.H. Ibid. I, 6. -ii-Ul .

.'\:H. lbhl. II. 2, 1-i. Th~ sam~ thing is sl;llnl in difft-renl words at ibid. II.
2. 1-. Th~ 1hr~~-dimensional charact~r of physical hody is discuss~d at ibid.
I. 5. i-H; I. 6, 5'>-56. For C;tkidius' us~ of th~ argum~m ahout the solid
numh~rs see pp. 476-478 .
.-\.H./bid. II, .i. 12-1.~.
MACRORiliS 'i"" I
noting the view of the Platonists that (i) the distance from the
earth to the sun is twice that of the earth to the moon, (ii) the
distance from the earth to Venus is twice that of the earth to the
sun, (iii) the distance from the earth to Mercury is four times
that of the earth to Venus, (iv) the distance from the earth to
Mars is nine times that of the earth to Mercury, (v) the distance
from the earth to Jupiter is eight times that of the earth to Mars,
(vi) the distance from the earth to Saturn is twenty-seven times
that of the earth to Jupiter;336 and concludes by citing Por-
phyry's opinion that 'these intervals in the world's body which
are filled with sesquitertians, sesquialters, superoctaves,
semitones, and a lemma imitate the fabric of its soul' (ad im-
aginem contextionis animae haec esse in corpore mundi inter-
val/a, quae epitritis, bemioliis, epogdois, bemitoniisque com-
plentur et limmate).337 These interpretations of the solidity of
the numbers and the ratios between them therefore place the
discussion squarely in the context of late ancient Platonism.
7.23 ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
Macrobius defines this branch of philosophy as the investiga-

tion of the highest perfection in moral conducU.~H For a
Neoplatonic writer, this is tantamount to the study of the
human soul's descent and ascent, as described at length in one
important passage:339
:\:\6./bid. II. 5. 1)-1~.

557./bid. II.-~ 1-il'i. That th~s~ ratios producc an ;IUdibk musk ofthc:
sphc:rcs is statc:<.l at i!Jid. II, I. 7; II. 5. 1-,'\; II,,'\. 12; II, -1. I. for Calddius' usc
of this argum~nt about thc: ratios between numbers sec pp. 480 ..HU.
5.~R./1Jid. II, 17. I 'i .
.H9. I shall present this passage in extenso hccausc of its fundamc:ntal im-
portance for our discussion. Howc:vcr. in order to simplify the analysis whkh
will follow its presentation, thl text will be: dividc:d into five: consecutive stl
tions. On the previous translations of Macrobius sec n. I 56.
572 NEOPLA TON ISM
7.231 REPERTORY OF TEXTS
(i) 'Another group of writers- for we noted earlier that there

were three different opinions current among philosophers -
divide the world into two parts like the first group but not into
the same two parts. These writers maintain that the heaven
which is called the cinA.avi)~ sphere is one part, and the seven
spheres which are known as errant together with the space bet-
ween them and the earth and the earth itself the other part. Ac-
cording to this group w which reason is more friendly, the
blessed souls which are free of all bodily contamination possess
the heaven. But the soul which from its lofty pinnacle and eter-
nal radiance disdains the striving after the body and this so-
called earthly life but thinks of these things with a hidden long-
ing, gradually slips down to the lower realm under the very
weight of this earthly thought. It does not suddenly take on a
defiled body from a state of complete incorporeality but
gradually sustaining imperceptible losses and an increasing
decline from its simple and absolute purity it swells up with cer-
tain increments of its astral body. In each of those spheres
which lie below the heaven it becomes clothed with another
aetherial envelope so that it may gradually be reconciled to this
earthly garment as it moves through them. Thus, through as
many deaths as the spheres which it crosses, it reaches the state
which is called life here on earth. 3-iO
340. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, II, 10-12 alii tero- nam Ires esse inter
eos senterrliarum ditersitates ante slgntwimus - in duas quidem el ips!
partes slcut primi faciunt, sec/ mm istlem terminis dil'idtml mundum. bi
enim ccwlum quod anA.avi)c:; spluwru I'Ocitatur partem unam. septem tero
spbaeras quae tagae toccmtur et quod inter illas ac terram est terramque
ipsam altertmz partem esse zoluertmt. secundum bos ergo. quorum sectae
amicior est ratio. animae beatae ab omni nn'uscumque amtagione ,or-
ports libertle cae/um posside1/l, qtme tero appetentimn corporis et huius
quam in ferris tilmn 1'0Ctl111l1S ab ilia specula ti/lissima et perpetua /uce
MACR081l IS 'i7:\
(ii) 'The sequence of the descent itself. by which the soul slips
down from heaven to the infernal regions of this life, can be
described as follows. The Milky Way encircles the zodiac, its
own circle obliquely crossing the circle of the latter, so that it
intersects it where the two tropical signs of Capricorn and
Cancer are located. The physicists called these points the por-
tals of the sun because the sun's progress is checked at the
solstices on either side where it retraces its course to that part of
the belt whose limits it never crosses. The souls are believed to
pass through these portals when going from heaven to earth and
again from earth to heaven. For this reason, one is called the
portal of men and the other the portal of gods: that of men be-
ing Cancer, since through it takes place the descent to the infer-
nal regions; that of gods being Capricorn, since through it souls
return to the abode of their rightful immortality and to the com-
munity of the gods. This is also what Homer in his divine
wisdom signifies by his description of the cave at Ithaca.
Pythagoras also holds that the empire of Pluto begins with the
Milky Way and extends downwards, because the souls which
fall away from it seem already to have withdrawn from the
higher realm. He says that milk is offered as the first nourish-
ment to newborn children because their first motion when slip-
ping into earthly bodies begins from the Milky Way. This is why
Scipio was told, when the Milky Way was shown to him that
blessed souls "proceed hence and return hither" '.541
despicie11s desiderio /atenti cogitmerit, pmulere ipso tene~we cogitalionis

fuwlatim in i11feriora delabilur. nee subito a per.fecta incorporalillliL'
luteum corpus induilur sed sensim per tacita detrimenta et lrmgiorem
simp/ids et absolutissimae puritalis recessum in quaedam siderei corporis
ilu.,.ementa turgescit: in singulis enim spbaeris quae caelo subiectae sunt
aetberia obtolutione te~titur, ut pereasgradalim societati Jnlius indumen
ti testei concilietur et ideo totidem morlibus quot spbttercls lrtmsit, ad lumc
j>ertenit qut1e in terris tita tocitatur.
:\i I. Ibid. l, 12, 13 descensus tero ipsius, quo anima de cae/o in huius
l'itae infenla delabitur. sic ordo tligerilur. zotliacum itt1 /acteus circulus
;\/EOPLA H lNISM
(iii) 'As long as the souls which are on the downward path re-
main in Cancer, since in that position they have not yet left the
Milky Way, they are still in the company of the gods. But when
they arrive at Leo in their descent, they enter upon the first
stages of their future condition. Since the beginnings of birth
and certain primary elements of human nature are found in Leo,
and Aquarius is in opposition to Leo hy setting just as it is rising.
the festival of the dead is celehrarcd when the sun is in Aquarius:
that is the sign which contains what is contrary or hostile to
human life. From this point where the zodiac and the Milky
Way intersect, then, the descending soul is protracted from the
sphere which alone is the divine form into a cone by emanation;
and just as a line is derived from a point and passes from the in-
divisible into length, so the soul turns into a dyad which is the
first protraction from its point which is a monad. This is the
substance which Plato in the Timaeus called both indivisible
and divisible when he was speaking about the construction of
the world soul. For souls whether of the world or of individual
men will be found now unacquainted with division if they are
thinking of the divine nature's simplicity, but now also suscepti-
oh/iquae circumjlexirmis occursu amhiendo complectitur. ut eum qua duo

tmpica .~igna CttfJricornus et Cancer fenmtur intersecel. btls so/is portas
fJbJsid tocmertml. quia in utmque olnicmle solstitio ulterius so/is in-
bfbetur accessio, et Jft ei regress us ad zonae ticlm cui us tennitms numquam
relinquit. per bas portas cmimae de caelo in terms meare et de ferris in
caelum remeare creduntur. ideo bominum una. altera deorum tocatur:
lmminum Ctmcer cjttia per lnmc in inferiora desceusus est. Capricoruus
deorum quia per ilium animae in pmpriae immortalitatis sedem et In
deorum numerum retertuntur. tt boc est quod Homer/ tlltina prtultntia in
cmtri ltbacensis desuipfl'one signlficat. bfnc et Pytbagoms putttt tl /adeo
circulo tleorsum incipere Ditis imperium. quia auimac intlc lctpsae l'iden-
tur i(lm a superis recess/sse. ideo primam twscentibus o.fferri ail /actis
ulimoniam, quia primus eis motus " lucteo incipit in corpora tenena
lahentihus. llltde et Scipimti cle animis heatorum osteuso /acteo dictum cst,
him: profc::cti hue revc::rtuntur.
MACROBH 'S
ble to it when diffused through either the world's or a man's

parts' ..H2
(iv) 'When the soul is drawn towards the body. in that first
protraction of itself it begins to experience a material distur-
bance. namely the uA.n rushing towards it. And this is what Plato
refers to in the Pbaedo by speaking of the soul as shuddering
with a sudden intoxication as it is drawn into the body. wishing
to indicate a new draught of that material inundation by which
the soul is besmeared and dragged down. A further indication of
this mystery is the location of the constellation of the Bowl of
Bacchus in the region between Cancer and leo, which shows
that intoxication overcomes descending souls with the influx of
matter for the first time. while forgetfulness the companion of
intoxication also begins to steal into souls at this point. If souls
were able to bring down to their bodies the memory of those
divine things of which they had knowledge in heaven, there
would be no disagreement about divinity among mankind.
However, all souls imbibe forgetfulness as they descend, some
to a greater and some to a lesser degree, so that although the
-~i2. /bit/. I. 12. '1-6 ergo descensume cum eulhuc in Cancro stmt,
cjtumictm illic positae necdum lacteum reliquertmt, adlmc in 11Wm!ro sunt
deorum. cum tero ad Leonem labendo pert'etterint, illic condicirmis
jilfurae mtspicantur exordium. et quia in Leone sunt rudimenftl nascendi
et quaedam bumanae n11turae tirocinia, Aquarius autem adtersus Leoni
est et il/o oriente mo.\' occitlit, ideo cum sol Aquarium tenet. McmiiJus
futrentatur, utf)()/e in signo quod buman11e tilae contrarium te/ cultersum
j(ratur. illinc ergo id est a confinio quo se zrJdit~cus lacteusque nmtingunt,
anima descent/ens atereti. quae solttforma ditina est, in comon defluendo
prruludtur. sicut a fJtmcto nasdtur linea et in lrmgum ex inditiduo pro-
cedi!: i!Jique a puncto suo, qtwtl est mrmas, t'ellit i11 t~}'ttdem. quae est
prima protractio. et baec est essentia quam illtlil'iduam eandemque
tlitiduam Plttlo in Timaeo cum de mundmwe animae fttbriat loqueretur
e.\pressil. tmimtle enim, sicut mwuli. i/11 et bominis uniu.~. modo tlitisirmis
reperientur ignartte. si tlitinae naturm simplicilas 'O!(iletur, modo
capaces. cum ilia per mtmdi. baec per lmminis memb,-a di{{tmdiltt1'.
S76 :'IIEOPLATONISM
truth is not evident to all men on earth all men have opinions,
since the failure of memory is the beginning of opinion. Those
who have drunk less of forgetfulness have more grasp of the
truth because they easily recall what they have previously
known above. This is why the equivalent of the Latin word for
reading among the Greeks is one which means knowledge
regained, since when we are learning the truth we recognize
those things which we naturally knew before the influx of mat-
ter intoxicated our souls as they approached their bodies.
Moreover, this is the matter which is imprinted with Forms and
produced the whole body of the world which we perceive
everywhere. Its highest and purest part by which divine things
are sustained or generated is called nectar and believed to be the
drink of the gods, whereas the lower and more turbid part is
believed to be the drink of souls and was called the river Lethe
by the ancients. The Orphics interpret Bacchus himself as signi-
fying the vouc; UAlK6c; since he is generated from that indivisible
principle but is himself divided into separate parts. In their
religious rituals this god is depicted as being torn apart by the
angry Titans, buried in separate places, but rising again single
and whole, since that vouc; which we have stated to be Intellect,
by offering its indivisible substance to be divided and by return-
ing again from its dividedness to the indivisible, both discharges
its worldly function and does not forsake its hidden nature' ..~15
343. Ibid. I, 12, 7-12 anima ergo cum tmbitur ad corpus, in bac prima
sui protlucti(me slltestrem tumu/tum id est ili..nv it~{luentem siiJi incipit ex-
periri. et boc est quod Plato notmit in Phaed(me animam in corpus trabi
nota ebrietate trepidantem. tolens twttl111 potum materia/is allmionis in-
tel/egi, quo tlelibuta et gral'tlla deducitur. arcani lmius indicium est et
Crater Uberi patris il/e sidereus in regione quae inter Cancrum est et
Leonem /ocatus, ebrietatem illic primum tlescensuris animis etenire silta
inj7ue1lfe sign~ficans, unde et comes ebrietatis ob/il'io 11/ic animis incipit
lam /atenter obrepere. tu1m sf an/mae memoriam rerum dil'inarum,
qtwrum in caelo erant consdae, ad corpora usque deferrettl. nulla irtter
lmmines foret de ditinitate dissensio: sed oblitionem quidem omnes
MACROBIUS
(v) 'The soul which has sunk down under this first weight
from the zodiac and the Milky Way as far as the spheres lying
beneath, not only acquires the aforementioned envelope of a
luminous body as it passes through each sphere but produces
the individual motions which it will later exercise. In the sphere
of Saturn the soul obtains reasoning and understanding which
they call A.oytcHtK6v and 9eroprrnK6v; in Jupiter's sphere the
power to act called npaKttKOV; in the sphere of Mars the
boldness of spirit named 9UJ.1tK6v; in the sun's sphere the
substance of sensation and imagination which they call
aia9TJnK6v and cpavtaattKOV; the motion of desire called
E7tt9UJ.1TJ'ttKOV in the sphere of Venus; the ability to express and
interpret thoughts called EPJ.1TJVEUttK6v in Mercury's sphere; and
it exercises the q>UttK6v or the function of producing and in-
creasing bodies on entering the sphere of the moon. This last
faculty is in us and all earthly things the first just as it is the fur-
thest removed from the divine, since our body is the first
substance of the animal just as it is the last remnant of the
descendendo lmurltmt. a/iae 11ero magis. minus allae. et Ideo In ferris

terum cum non omnibus liqueat, /amen opinmztur omnes, quia opinion is
ortus est memorlae defectus. bl tamen hoc magis intenitmt qui minus obli-
tionis bausertml, quia facile reminisctmtur quod i/lh allle cogmwerint.
binc est quod quae aputl Latinos /ectlo, apud Graecos tocatur l'epetita
cognitio, quia, cum tertl tliscimus, ea recognoscimus quae natura/iter
twteramus, prius quam materia/is influxio in corpus tenientes em/mas
ebrie~ret. haec est autem by/e. quae omne corpus mumli quod ubicumque
ce1nimus ide is impressa fonnatit. sed a/tlssimtl et purissima pars eius, qua
te/ sustentantur ditina tie/ constant, nee:tar vocatur el L'reditu r esse pottts
deorum, inferior vero atque turbid/or potus animarum. et lmc est quotl
l'eleres Letbcteum .f7twium tocaterunt. ipsum au/em Liberum patrem Or
pbaici voi:iv ui..tKov suspicantur intellegi, qui ttb il/o lndiriduo natus in
singu/os ipse dividitur. ideo in il/orum sacris traditur Titania furore in
membra discerptus el frustis sepultis, rursus unus el integer emersisse, quia
voi:ic;. quem diximus mentem toatri, ex inditiduo praebendo se ditiden-
dum, et rursus ex ditiso cui inditidutmt retertemlo et mundi implel officia
et naturae suae arcatwtzrm deseril.
:-.IE< >PLATONISM
divine. And this is the difference between earthly and celestial

bodies - I mean the heaven, the stars, and the other elements
- namely that the latter have been drawn upwards to the abode
of Soul and have gained immortality from the very nature of
that region and from the imitation of its transcendence, whereas
the soul is drawn downwards to these earthly bodies and is
believed to be dead when it is imprisoned in the transitory
realm and the abode of mortality' ..~.ft
(vi) 'You should not be disturbed if we frequently speak of
death in relation to the soul which we have declared to he im-
mortal. Indeed the soul is not destroyed by its own death but
merely overwhelmed for a time, nor is its privilege of immor-
tality taken away in its temporary descent. For when it has been
perfected and has deserved to be purged of the vices' pollution,
it will be restored to the light of eternal life and return to its
wholeness. The distinction between the life and death of the
soul which the learning and wisdom of Cicero drew forth from
.H4. /hid. I. I 2, 13-16 !Joe ergo primo poudere de zodiaco et lacteo ad

subiectas usque sphaeras anima tlelapsa dum et peril/as labitur, In singulis
non solum. ut iam dixlmus. /uminosl torporis cunicitur accessu, sed et
singulos motus. quos in e.wrcitio est bahitura, pmducit: in Saturn/
ratiocinationem et intellegentiam. quod A.oytottK6v et 9EWPTJt!K6v toccmt:
i11 lotis l'im clgem/1, quod npa Kt!K6v clicitur: in <llartis cmlmositatis ar-
dorem. quod 9UJ.l!K6v nuncupatur: in so/is senliendi opinandique mlturam,
quod aio9T)ttK6v et cpavtaonK6v appellant: desiderii tem motum. quod
nt8UilT)t!KOV tocatur, in Veneris: prrmuntiantli et inte1pretandi quae sen-
fiat quod EPilTJVEUt!K6v clicitur in orht Mercurii: cpunK6v /'em. id est
IW/uram plantcmdi etaugendi corpora. in ingrtssu glohi lulwrls exetcet. et
est haec sicut a ditittis ultima ita in nostris terrenisque omnihus prima:
cm1ms enim !Joe. sicut fae_,. rerum ditinarum est. ita anima/is est Jlrlmu
suiJstanlia. etbaec est differenlicl lnterterrena corporcl et supera. (.'(lf!/i dico
L'l siderum aliorumque elementorum. quod ilia quidem sursum arcessita
sun/ ad animae sedem et immortalltatem ex ipsa natura regirmis et
suhlimitatis imitalirme meruerunt: ad haec tero terrena corpora anima ip-
sa deducitur et ideo mori creditm cum in caducam regimwm et in sedem
nwrtalitatis includilllr.
l\IACROBil~S
the sanctuaries of philosophy is. in my opinion, now perfectly

clear.:w;
7.232 THE HUMAN SOlJL
Placing these together with the briefer references elsewhere.

we can assemble a reasonably lucid account of the Neoplatonic
doctrine of the human soul, as understood by Macrobius.
Perhaps the most convenient way to summarize this teaching is
to interpret it in terms of the conceptual categories previously
used to explain the doctrine of the three hypostases- especial-
ly those of transcendent and causal respectively.H6 - although
the peculiar characteristics of the soul according to the
Neoplatonists also necessitate the introduction of further
categories. This can most easily be achieved by collecting
everything which Macrobius says about the human soul in these
texts. starting with his description of its transcendence.
7.233 THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE SOUL
The human soul is described according to its transcendence

in the following ways: it is 'free of all bodily contamination' (ab
omni cuiuscumque contagione corporis libera),3~"' it has
:\"iS. Ibid. I. 12. J'7 -1 H nee te mmeat quod de anima. quam esse inmlm-
talem dicimus. mortem totiens nomitutmus. et enim sua morte anima non
extinguitur sed ad tempus nbruitur. nee tempora/i demersione beneficium
pet1Jetuit,llis eximltur, cum rur.ms e corpore. ubi meruerit nmtagitme
l'itiorum pen it us eli mala purgari, ad perennis titm! lucem restituta in in-
tegrum retertatur. plene ut arbitror de ti/(1 et mnrte animae definitio li-
quet, quam de (U~)'Iis pbilosophiae dmtritw et sapient/a Cicemnis e/icuil.
.'H6. For these categories seep. 530.
3-17. Ibid. l, I I. I I (text i). See Numenius: fr. 4 7 (Philoponus: In de Anlm.
I pr. 9. 35-39); Plotinus: Enn. l. 7 I 54 I:\. 7-8: I. 8 /51 114. 32-33: IV. 1 I 21 I
:\-4: VI. 4 I 22 I 14. 17-21; Porphyry: De Abstin. I, .H. 1-4; De Regr. Anim. fr.
II I 3. 41 13-17; fr. II /5, 41 28-32.
580 NEOPLATONISM
'simplicity' (simplicitas),34B it is 'divine' (divinap49 it enjoys

'blessedness' (beatitas),.iso it is 'intellectual' (mens),:m and it
'possesses the heaven' (caelum possidereps2 Most of this cor-
348. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 12, 6 (text iii). See Numenius: fr. 39
(Proclus: In Tim. II, 153, 17-25); Plotinus: Enn. I. I /53/8, 9-18; IV, I /21/
8-22; IV, 2 /4/ 2, 1-55; IV, 3 /27/ 19. 27-.H; IV, 9 /8/ 2, 24-28; VI, 2 /43/ 5,
I-VI, 2/H/6, 20; VI, 2/43/11, 9-12; VI, 9/9/1. 17-i:'; Porphyry: DeAbstin.
I. 30, 6-7. All the Numenian and Plotinian passages agree in (i) not
distinguishing universal and particular souls regarding the question of unity,
(ii) considering simplicity and multiplicity as correlative aspects of both
universal and particular souls. See nn. 211 and 3fl3.
349. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 12, 6 (text iii). See Plotinus: Enn. I, 6/1 I
6, 13-16 'wholly of the divine' (<'>All tou 9&iou); II, 9 I 33 I 17, 21 'souls being
divine' (IVUXai 9&i:a! ouam); IV, 2 I 4 I I, 4-7 'of the divine kind' (tile; 9&iac;
~toipac;); IV, 7 /38/10, 1-2 'akin to the more divine nature' (tij 9&\0tEp~ q>ua&l
auyy&Vl\c;), etc. The divinity of human souls is also implied in Numenius: fr.
31 (Produs: De Antr. Nymph. 23, 23, 18-23); fr. 35 (Produs: In Remp. II,
129. 13-21) where the portal of Capricorn is described as their route to the
gods. On the relationship between Numenius and Porphyry here see pp.
516-518.
350. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 4, I. This blessedness of human souls is
suggested at Plotinus: Enn. I, 4 I 46 I 3. 23-1, 4 146 14, 8; I, 5 I 36 /7, 20-24;
VI, 9 19 I II, 1-51. See Numenius: fr. 35 (Proclus: In Remp. II, 131. 9-14)
'happy souls' (ai &uoai~tov&c;); Porphyry: De Regr. Anim. fr. 1115, 41" 31-32
'they are held in blessedness' (beatae ... teneantur); ibid. fr. II /5, 41 34-35
'blessedness' ife/lcitas).
351. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, IL 3-5. See Numenius: fr. 42
(lamblichus: De Anim. in Stobaeus: Flori/. I, 458); Plotinus: Eml. I. I /53/ 8,
1-6; Ill, 8130/6, 21-26; IV. 3/27/18. 1-24; IV, 4 /28/ I. 1-16; IV, 6/41/3.
10-16; V, 3 /49/3. 1-45; V, 3 /19/ 9. l-2fl; VI, 7/3815. 2'-30; Porphyry: De
Abslin. I, 28, 3; I, 30, 6; I, 48, I; Ad Gaur. 12, 50, 10-15; De Reg,. Anim. fr.
10, 37" 11-21; Sent. 40, 50, 16-21; In Tim. fr. 18 (Proclus: b1 Tim. l, 156,
26-31 ). The Plotinian passages actually postulate a more complex doctrine in
which intellect is (i) the human soul's highest phase, and (ii) transnnds that
soul's highest phase. See nn. 204, 218 and 308.
352. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. II. II (text i). Cf. ibid. I. 14. 4 and I. 21,
34. Sec Numenius: fr. 32 (Porphyry: De Anlr. Nympb. 28, 28. 13); fr. 35
(Prod us: In Remp. II. 129, 2 1-26 ); Plotinus: Enn. IV, 3 1271 12, -l-5; IV. 3 /271
MACROBilTS ';HI
responds to the tr~tditional description of the disembodied soul

in Middle Platonic3S.~ and Neoplatonic writers3'i4 - even the
notion of a principle which is free of body yet manifests its ac-
tivities there being paralleled3S'i - although the points cor-
responding specifically with the account of the disembodied
soul in Numenius are most suggestive.3s6 Other Macrobian texts
characterize the human soul's transcendence more precisely by
saying either that it has a 'heavenly origin' (origo caelestis)3S7
and that it 'is returned to heaven after its incarnation' (post cor-
pora caelo reddt)3iH - here the transcendence is shown to
precede and follow temporally the soul's contrasting moment
of immanence; or that 'it seems never to have left the heaven
which it possessed in a relation and in its thoughts' (nee
deseruisse umquam cae/um videtur, quod respectu et cogita-
tionibus possidebat)359- where the transcendence is indicated
to be simultaneous with the soul's contrasting moment of im-
manence. These precisions of the doctrine reveal that the
transcendence of the human soul is not simply something to be
realized between incarnations according to Middle Platonic
teaching,360 but also something which can be achieved by the
12. 26-.~0; IV,~ /2'7/1';. 1--4: IV.~ /27/17, 1-2: IV.~ /2"1/18. 1~-1';: IV. -fi2RI
';, I 1-1 ~;Porphyry: De Antr. 1\)mpb. 29. 28. 16-21.
~5~- Sec pp. ~ 13-318 and ~85-387.
354. See nn. 347-352.
355.Seepp. 315-318.
~56. On the importance of Numenius as a source of Macrobius' doctrine of
the human soul see pp. 516-5 IR.
357. Macrobius: In Smnn. Scip. I. 21. .~4. Cf. ibid. I. 9, I; I. 9 ..-\. Macrobius
belic\'es that the human soul can undergo a serit:s of incarnations and can
transmigrate into animals. See ibid. I. 9. 5-6. This follows the traditional
Platonic doctrine and runs counter to Porphyry who denied transmigration
into animals. See pp. 490-492. The question is discussed by Flamant: op. cit.,
pp. 620-622 and 624 .
.~58. Macrobius: In Sonm. Scip. I. 4, I. Cf. ibid. I. 9. 3 .
.H9. IIJid. I, 9, ~-
~60. Sec n. ~53.
iH2 NE<lPLATONISM
process of contemplative detachment during an incarnation

described by Plotinus and Porphyry ,361
7.234 THE DESCENT OF THE HUMAN SOUL
The next stage in the investigation of Macrobius' doctrine of
.:\61. The Neoplatonic doctrine of descent and ascent of the human soul
takes \'arious forms. It represents (i a) the entering into the body at birth and
(i b) the departure from the body at death; and (ii a) the concern for the body
during life and (ii b) the detachment from the body during life. For (i a) see
Plotinus: Emz. lll, 2 147 I 15, 21-29; III, 2 147 I I5, 47-62; IV, .3 127 112,
1-12; IV, 816 I 5. 16-33; Porphyry: Sent. 8, 3. 6-8, 4, 2; for(i b) see Plotinus:
Enn. Ill, 2 147 I 15, 21-29; III, 2 147 I 15, 47 -62; IV, 3 I 27 I 12, 1-12; IV, 8 I 6
I c;, 16-33; Porphyry: Sent. 8, 3. 6-8. 4, 2; 9, 4. 3-6; for(ii a) see Plotinus: Enn.
I. 8 I 5 I I l.:\, 1-1. 8 I 5 I I 14, 54; III. 2 I 47 I 8, 9-16; IV, 8 I 6 I 5. 16-33; Por-
phyry: Sent. 7, 3. 4-5; 8. 3. 6-8. 4. 2; 9. 4, 3-6; for (ii b) see Plotinus: Enn. I, 8
I'; I I 1.:\, 1-I, 8 I'; I I 14, 54; III, 2 I 4718, 9-16; IV, 816 I 5. 16-33; Porphyry:
Sent. 7. 3. 4-5; 8, 3. 6-8, 4, 2. Plotinus contends that the soul has a further
phase accompanying (i a) and (ii a) in which it simultaneously remains on the
higher level. See Plotinus: Enn. I, 4 146 I 9. 10-1, 4 I 46 I 10, 6; II, 9 I 33 12,
4-10; III, 4 I 15 I 3. 21-27; IV, 3 I 27112. 1-12; IV, 3 I 27 I 30, 7-16; IV, 816 I
4. 25-35; IV, 8 I 6 I 8. 1-23 (where the author stresses the novelty of his view);
V, I I 10 I 12. 1- 10; VI. 4 I 22 I 14, 17-22. The Plotinian doctrine is discussed
by J. M. Rist: 'Integration and the Undescended Soul in Plotinus', American
jounzal of Philology 88 ( 1967), pp. 410-422 and C. Steel: The Changing Self
A Study on tbe Soul in Later Neoplatmzism: lamblicbus, Dmnascius, and
Prise/anus (Brussel, 1978), pp. 34-38. Whether Porphyry also believed in the
further phase accompanying (i a) and (ii a) is not absolutely clear from the
available testimony. Here, we must perhaps contrast De Abstitl. I, 30, 6; Sent.
32. 30. 1-5 with De Abstin. I, 39. 1-1, 40, 2. For differing interpretations of
Porphyry's position see Smith: op. cit., pp. 25-26, 41 and C. Steel: 'Por-
phyrius' Reactie tegen het Amoralisme van de Gnostici', Tljdscbrift mor
Fllosofie 37 (1975). pp. 211-22i. At all events. Macrobius' reference to the
fact that the soul seems never to have left the heaven which it possessed in a
relation and in its thoughts' indicates first. that he is aware of the existence of
(i a) and (i b) and (ii a) and (ii b) since he refers to the soul's transcendence
cogitation/bus; and secondly, that he belie\'es in the existence of the further
phase accompanying (i a) and (ii a) since he states that the soul nee: deseruisse
umquam that transcendence.
MACROBJliS
the human soul must be prefaced with some remarks about his
handling of the transition from transcendence to immanence.
This latter aspect of the soul, which enters into the picture
because of its relation to the temporal process. is described as
follows: the souls in their transcendent state experience a 'lqog-
i.os for rhe hooy' (deside1ium corporis, appetentia corporis).~6l.
~~<;.ause~!hef1! to_ 'flow dO'Y.!lJ.rorn _tht;.I:t~aven' (manare de
caelo),363 this descent taking place at the tropical sign of
Cancer: the so-called 'portal of men' (porta hominum)YH or
more precisely at the point where Cancer is replaced by Leo.
The descent of the soul is, of course, complemented by its as-
cent: h~re_tlu:.soul in its immanent state 'is freed from the sweet
ent~ap~oLthe..de.sir~-~a-q~--~ll9.~h~.f..,ga..~~ic)ris; (citpiditatum
dulces insidias reliquasque omnes exuitwpassiones)365 so that
.'\62. M;u.:rohius: In Sonm. Sclp. I. 9. 10. Cf. Ibid. I. II. II (text i); I, 12. 16
(text v). See Plotinus: Enn. IV, .~ /17/ 1.3. 17-20 'They go forth neither willing
nor tompelled. hut with a naturallc:ap, as in the desire for sexual intercourse'
(iacn 0& olin: EKOUOat OUt& 7ti:J.1<j)9eiaat ... aAJ..'w<; tO 7t11MV Katil (jliJO!V, fjrrpo~
y<i)..lrov q>ucnKac; rrpo9u)..liac; ): Porphyry: Sent. 29. 19. 9-10 'becoming subject
to the allure of corporeal form' (rra9atVOJ..lEV11 rrpo<; to d.So<;). Sec also Por-
phyry: De Antr. Nymph. 1S. 16, 17-19, 20, 20 where honey is interpreted as
symbolizing the plc:asure associated with the descent.
36.3. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 9. I. See ~umenius: fr. 30 (Porphyry: De
:lntr. Nymph. 10. 12, Il-lS); fr . .31 (Porphyry: DeAntr. ,'1/ympb. 28, 28. 1-.~):
fr ..~S (Proclus: In Remp. ll. 129. 26-1.30, 1): fr. _3"7 (Proclus: In Tim. I...,..,_
15-1 <; ); fr. 18 (lamhlichus: De Anim. in Stohaeus: Flori/. I. 380) 'descent into
becoming' (ei~ ytvecnv Kanvat, K<i9o.So~). Sec Porphyry: De Antr. I 'f. I 6.
2-3:19.18. 2.326:AdGaur. 16. S6, 28-S7. 15: DeSimul. fr. S . .,.I 1-8"2: De
Regr. Anlm. fr. I I. w 4-"7; fr. 11/4, 41 12-23: 111 Tim. fr. 16 (Proclus: 111
Tim. I. 147, 6-24): fr. 18 (Proclus: 111 Tim. I. IS6, 26-.31): fr. 22 (Produs: In
Tim. I. 16<;, 16-23) .
.~64. Macrohius: In Scmm. Scip. I. 12. l (tc:xt iii; I. 11. <;(text iii): I. 12. 8
(lc:xt iv). Sec Numenius: fr. 3 I (Porphyry: De A11tr. Nymph. 21. 22. 2 24. 24.
:\); fr. 52 (Porphyry: De Anlr. Nymph. 2H. 26. 26-18, 28. 6): fr. 5S (Produs:
In R'mfJ. II. 128. 26-130. 14 ). This doctrine has no c:xact parallel in Plotinu!>.
3M. Macrobius: In Somn ..kip. I. 13. 6. Cf. ibid. I. 8, 8 and I. 9, 5. Sec:
Plotinus: Emz. I. 2 I 19 I r;, 5-19 'The soul maybe collects itself in a kind of
i84 NEOPI.ATONISM
it is 'raised aloft after incarnation and returned to the place from

which it descended' (post corpus evecta eo unde descenderat
reportatur),366 this ascent taking place at the tropical sign of
Capricorn: the so-called 'portal of gods' (porta deorum).367
This account of the human soul's transitions between
transcendence and immanence parallels traditional Middle
Platonic368 and Neoplatonic doctrine,369 although Macrobius'
emphasis upon eschatological and astronomical questions sug-
gests that his specific models are Numenius and Porphyry.37(l
place away from body, becoming quite impassive to it ... It will certainly
have no desire of the base: none of food and drink for the relief of the body,
none of sex' (ano f.l~V 51) arof.latoc; raroc; f.l~v Kai toic; olov t6nmc; auvciyouaav
taun'Jv, ncivtroc; f.lftV ana6roc; npoc; auto fxouaav ... S7tl6Uf.l{av ot; 5n f.ltV
l.lTJli&voc; lj)QUAOU, liijA.ov' aitrov 5~ Kai 7tOtcl>v npoc; clV&OIV OUK autit f~&l' oulit
tcl>v alj)pOlilairov lit ); Porphyry: Sent. 32, 32, 11-J4 'He is involved in the
pleasures or pains of the senses with eagerness and a sympathetic inclination.
From this condition he must especially be purified' (npoanaaxrov lit taic; tcl>v
aia6TJI.llitrov l'Jliovaic; ii AU7talc; aov 7tp09Uf.li~;t Kai &7tlV&UO&l OUJ.17ta9&i. cllj)'ftc; liit
f.lciAlOta lim9ta&roc; autov npoat\K&l Ka9aip&lV ). See also Porphyry: De
Abstin. I, 30, 1; I. 30, 6: II, 45, 4; De Regr. Anim. fr. 11/2, 41 1-3.
366. Macrobius: In Scmm. Scip. I, 9, 3. See Numenius: fr. 31 (Porphyry: De
Antr. N_ympb. 22, 22,14- 23,23); fr. 35 (Proclus: In Hemp. II, 129. -l-8); fr. 37
(Proclus: In Tim. I, 77, 6-9); fr. 60 (Porphyry: De Antr. Nymph. 6, 8, 13-15)
'ascent 10 the gods' (⁣ 6&ooc; clVlEVal, civolioc;, avay&a9m). See Porphyry: De
Regr. Anim. fr. 1111, 40 14-16: fr. I 1/4 . .J I 2225: fr. I 1/5, 41 28-32;
Sent. 29. 19.14- 20,6; In Tim. fr. 10 (Produs: In Tim. I, i7, 6-9): fr. 16
(Proclus: In Tim. 1, 147. 6-24 ).
."167. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I. 12, 2 (text ii). Sec Numenius: fr. 31 (Por-
phyry: De Antr. N_ymph. 21. 22,2 - 24. 24.3): fr. 32 (Porphyry: De Antr.
Nympb. 28, 26.26- 28,6); fr. 35 (Prod us: In Remp. II, 128.26 1.'\0,14 ). This
doctrine has no exact parallel in Plot in us.
368. See pp. 3 13-318 and 385-387 .
.~69. See nn. 362-.~67.
370. On the importance of Numenius and Porphyry among Macrobius'
sources (and the relationship between Numenius and Porphyry) see pp.
516-522.
MACROBJllS
This also seems true regarding the following developments of

the theory:
Macrobius describes the descent of human souls in terms of
elaborate metaphors and by dividing the process into temporal
phases. In the first place, the s~ul is said to descend because of
its_:weight' (pondus),!>7J this process being one in which it ex-
periences 'a material disturbance namely the UATJ rushing
towards it' (silt,estris tumultus id est UATJ injluens sibt)372 and in
which it 'swells up with certain increments of its astral body
and in each of these spheres which lie below the heaven
becomes clothed with another aetherial envelope' (in quaedam
side1ei corporis incrementa turgescit: in singu/is enim sphaeris
quae caelo subiectae sunt aetberia obvolutione vestitur).373
Using another metaphor, the writer adds that 'intoxication
overcomes descending souls with the influx of matter'
(ebrietatem ... descensuris animis evenire silva influente).374
Furthermore, the soul is said to descend when 'it turns into a
;PI. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, II, II (text i); I, 12, 13 (text v). Sec
Plotinus: Enn. IV. 3/27/ 1';, 4-7 'wei~ht' (j}apuvat~); Porphyry: Sent. 29, IH.
14 'the heavy spirit' (to j}apu nv&ulla ); 29. 19. 16 'grows heavy' (j}ap&ia6at).
372. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, 12,7 (text iv). See Numenius: fr. 33 (Por-
phyry: De Anlr. Nympb . .H. 32. 13-21 ); Plotinus: t:mz. I, H /';II 4, 14-22; I, 8
/51114, 17-50; Porphyry: DeAbslin. I. 30. 4; II. 43. 3; Ill. 27. ';;Sent. 37. 4S.
1-9: In Tim. fr. 13 (Prm:lus: In Tim. I. IIi. 5-8). For the accumulation of mat-
ter by the disembodied soul explicitly see Porphyry: De Abstin. 11. 38. 2-4.
3..., 3. Macrohius: In Srmm. Scip. I. I I. 12 (text i). Cf. /IJ/d. l, 12. 13 (text v).
See Plotinus: Emz. Ill. 6 /26/ ;, 22-29 'spirit' (1tV&UilU); Porphyry: Sent. 29,
18. 6-..., 'The spirit which it has collected from the spheres accompanies it' (to
nv&ulla auvo1-1apt&i, o EK tV aq>atpv auv&M~aro); In Tim. fr. 80 (Prudus:
In Tim. Ill. 2.-\4. 18-26) 'The vehicle and the irrational soul ... they are com-
pounds derived from the he:tvenly spheres which the soul has collected in its
descent' (tOUt& OXiJilato~ Kai tfi~ aA.6you 11/Ulfi~ ... q>upciJ.tata 5 &iva! taUta
EK tv oupaviwv aq>atpv Kai Kanouaav aura auA.My&lV ri)v 11/UXiJV ). For a
fuller documentation of this question seep. 592 ff .
.F ... Macrohius: In Sonm. Scip. I. 12. 8 (text iv). Descending souls are
descrihed as growin~-t wet hy Numenius: fr. 30 (Porphyry: De Antr. Nympb.
SH6 NEOPI.ATONISM
dyad which is the first protraction from its point which is a

monad' (a puncto suo, quod est monas, venit in dyadem, quae
est prima prutractio)37S and when 'it is protracted from the
sphere which alone is the divine form into a cone by emanation'
(a tereti, quae sola forma divina est, in conum defluendo pro-
ducitur) .... ~6 In another metaphor, Macrobius states that 'a!L
~ouls imbibe forgetfu~~ss as the_y <!_e~cend' (oblivionem quidem
omnes descendendo hauriunt) ...,-: ... Finally, the soul is said to
10. 12. 12-2';); Porphyry: DeA1ltr. Nymph. II, 14, 1-12, 14. 24; Sem. 29, IH,
lf-19. 4; In Tim. fr. 13 (Proclus: In Tim. I, I 16, 27-1 Jl. I H).
:\7';. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 12, '; (text iii). See Numenius: fr. 39
(Proclus: In Tim. II. I S3. 17-25) 'Some say that the soul is a number. produc-
ing it from the monad as the undivided substance and the indefinite dyad as
the divided ... Aristander's and Numenius' followers and many other com-
mentators subscribe to this view' (oi IJEV apt91J(>V autilV Ein6vn:~ EK IJOV<i6o~
7tOlOUOlV, W~ QIJEpiatOU, Kai til~ ciopiatOU 6u<i6o~, W~ IJEptatil~ ... KOi til~
1-1E:v npottpa~ Eiai 6o~il~ oi 7tEpi 'Apiatav6pov Kai Nou1Jl\vtov Kai ciHm
7tAEiCJtOI tli>V E~TIY'ltWV ),
376. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 12, 5 (text iii). See Numenius: fr. 39
(Produs: In Tim. II, 153, 17-25) 'Others say that the soul is a geometrical
substanle composed of the point and the line. the former being the undivid-
ed substance ;md the latter the divided ... Severus subscribes to this view' (oi
6'w~ YEWIJEtplKtlV im6ataatv ouaav EK CJTIIJE!OU Kai 6taatciOEW~. toG IJEV
ciiJEpoii~. til~ 6& IJEptatil~ ... til~ 6& 6wttpa~ U:uilpo~ ). Since this doctrine
parallels Macrobius in providing a geometrical interpretation of the soul, and
is apparently contrasted with the Numenian position described in the
previous note, it might be argued that Macrobius is following a source other
than Numenius in repeating it. Thus, Beutler: 'Numenios', col. 676-677;
Elferink: op. cit., p. H ff. Two points may be made against this thesis: (i) The
parallel between Macrobius' and Severus' theories is not really that close.
since: the former speaks of the: protraltion of a sphere into a cone: and the lat-
ter of the protraction of a point into a line; (ii) It is a mistake to place
disproportionate emphasis upon a small piece of evidence when the over-
whelming tenor of Macrobius' account of the soul's descent is Numc:nian. See
de: Ley: op. cit., pp. 2'"'-';0; Flamant: op. cit., pp. 5 11-513.
37 .... Macrobius: In Sonm. Scip. I. 12. 9 (text iv). Cf. ibid. I. 10. 10 and I.
12. 10-11 (text iv). Descending souls are said to grow forgetful by Plotinus:
MACROBiliS
descend when 'it dies ~_Q~_i_Dg_g~~~p~ue_d (ro_m t!:te s_imple and

undiyided s~l!ffe q_nr~_nrul:lre_~hrg_~_ghJ>.o.~HY qr~gs.' (mori ...
cum a-iimplici et individuo fonte naturae in membra cor-
porea dissipatur)37H and when it undergoes 'as many deaths as
the spheres which it crosses' (totidem mortibus quot sphaeras
transit),379 this process representing its gradual sustaining of
imperceptible 'losses' (detrimenta)!>Bo as it approaches its ear-
thly habitation. In all of this doctrine, the writer closely follows
Numenius perhaps through the intermediary ofPorphyry.3MI
7.235 THE IMMANENCE OF THE SOUL

The human soul is described according to its immanence in
Enn. IV, 3/27/1 ';, 4-7; IV, 31271 26, S0-5';; IV, 4 /28/ ';, 22-26: Porphyry: De
Abstin. I. 28, 2: De Regr. Anim. fr. 11/1. 39 19-22; De Simul. fr. 5. 7
10-8 I.
378. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, II, I. Cf. ibid. l, 12. 17 (text vi). See
Plotinus: Enn. l, 8 /'; 1/ 13. 2 1-2'; And its death is. while still immersed in the
body, to sink down in matter and be filled With it' (Kai 6 9avato<; autfj Kai l:tt
EV t<!) OCilllatt J3eJ3an:ttOI!EV1J EV UAlJ EOti KataMvm Kai 7tATj09ijvat autfi<; ');
Porphyry: In Tim. fr. 13 (Proclus: In Tim. I. 117. 5-8) 'And it is immersed in
the inundations of matter, which is the other death of intelkctuaJ souls' fKai
J3an:ti~Etal tote; tile; UATJ<; PEUI!QOI, Kai aA.Ao<; OUtO<; ljiUXWV ni>v VOEpv
9avatoc; ). However. neither passage refers to the death of the disembodied
soul explicitly.
379. Macrobius: In Srmm. Scip. I. II, 12 (text i). There seems to be no
parallel in any extant Greek source to the statement that the crossing of seven
spheres is equivaknt 10 seven 'deaths' of the soul. Howevt'r. il is clt"arly a
consistent development of the norion expressed at Plotinus: Enn. I. 6 II/ S,
:'d-39 that the soul's involvement with maHer is a 'multipk death' (n:oA.uc; 6
8avatoc; ). The doctrine that the soul undergot"s seven 'deaths' as it crosses
the spheres Is juxtaposed with further interpretations of death as (i) freeing
the soul from the body by contemplation, (ii) freeing the body from the soul
hy physical annihilation. Sec Henry: op. cit .. pp. 163-182.
380. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, II, 12 (text i ). See Plotinus: Etm. I, 8 I 5 I
I 14, 113: I, 8 I 5 I I 14, 44-50; III, 5 I 50/7, 19; Ill, 5 I 50/9, 45-';7; Ill. 6/
26 I 14, 4-18; Porphyry: De Abstiu. Ill, 27, 35; Sent. 37. 4';, 1-9: 40. 51,
-~12.
381. See nn . .P2, 5!4-.'\"'6.
'588 NEOPLATONISM
the following ways: it is 'imprisoned in the confines of the

body' (zdncitur custodia corporalt),3H2 it is 'susceptible to divi-
sion' (divisionis ... capax),3H3 it is subject to the passions- the
'underworld' (infert)3H4 of the poets symbolizing the embodied
state itself, the rivers Lethe and Phlegethon tl,l~~
fulness of its higher nature and its tendencv _!Q.anger-respective-
ly )R'5thevarious tortures depicted by the poets the tribulations
of human life.~86 -.it is characterized by 'opinion which is born
of memory's failure' (opinari ... quia opinionis ortus est
memoriae defectus),.~w and it is 'diffusecU_hrough a ~parts'
(per hominis membra diffunditur).3HH Most of this parallels the
382. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 14, 4. Cf. ibid. I. 10, 10. See Plotinus:
Enn. II, 9 /33/7. 911: III, 6/26/ '5, 19-22; Porphyry: De Abstin. I. 33. 2; I. 34,
4: Ad Marc. 33. 36, ll-16; Sent. 7, 3. 4-'5: 8, 3. 6-8. 4, 2.
383. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 12. 6 (text iii). See Numenius: fr. 39
(Proclus: In Tim. II. 1'53. 17-25): Plotinus: I:.'nn. I. I /53/8, 9-18: IV. I /211
8-22; IV, 2 /4/2, 1-55: IV, 3 /27/ 19. 27-34: IV, 9 /HI 2, 24-28; Porphyry: Ad
G(mr. l.~. 53, 3-6; 13. 53. II. All the Numenian and Plotinian passages agree
in (i) not distinguishing universal and particular souls regarding the question
of multiplicity, (ii) considering simplicity and multiplicity as wrrelative
aspects of both universal and particular souls. See nn. 211 and 348.
384. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. l, 10, 9 and I, 10, 17. This interpretation of
the underworld is suggested at Plotinus: l:.'nn. I. I /53/ 12. 24-39: IV. 3 /27/
26, 50-56; IV. 3 /27/ 27. 7-23. See Porphyry: De Regr. Anim. fr. 5, 7 II
-8 I.
385. Macrohius: In Somn. !kip. I. 10, 10-11. These interpretations cannot
he paralleled exactly in Greek Ncoplatonic writers, although this may simply
he because so much material is now lost. For the possibility that Macrobius is
dependent upon an earlier Latin commentator see pp. 515-516.
386.1bid. l, 10, 12 ff. Sec n. 385.
387. Ibid. l, 12,9 (text iv). See Plotinus: l:.'nn. II, 2/14 I 3. 1-6; Ill, 8/30 I
7, 3-4: IV. 7 12 /8, 1-10; IV, 8/6/8, 1-3: V, 3 /49/9, 28-32: V, S I 321 I,
1-2: VI, 2 /43/1, 1-5: Porphyry: Ad Gaur. 4. 40, 11-19. The Plotinian inter-
pretation of 'opinion' (56E,a) (i) contrasts it with the higher faculty of
knowledge and the lower faculty of sensation and (ii) applies it to judgments
which are true and to those which are false.
388. Macrobius: In .Somn. Scip. I. 12. 6 (text iii). See Numcnius: fr. 52
MACROBilJS SH9
traditional interpretation of the embodied soul in Middle

Platonic.'\89 and Neoplatonic writers,.'\90 although the resort to
allegorical exegesis is perhaps an original Macrobian contribu-
tion.39t One further text characterizes the human soul's im-
manence more precisely by saying that it 'is exiled here accor-
ding _!o__ the law of temporal residence (lege tempoi-7iTis
bospita/itatis hie exu/at) ..'\92 TfiTsstaiement could mean either
that it is embodied for a period of time - here the immanence
would be understood as preceding or following temporally the
soul's contrasting moment of transcendence-; or t~~!~ er:n-
bQ.Qi_ed _i~tem.poralit.)' jtself- where the immaJKnce would !Je
intt!Preted as simyltane.o.JJ..~ wi!h t_he soul'.!-, co_!ltrast!_rlg_!Tlo_ment
of transcrodence.... - although these two views could
presumably be held in conjunction ..W.i A predominant concern
for the first would reflect Middle Platonic interests,39-i a
predominant concern for the second those of Plotinus,39S and
an equal concern for the first and second those of Porphyry .396
7.236 MACROBIUS ON THE HUMAN SOUL
This analytical survey of the important texts has shown that
(Cakidius: In Tim. 29"", 299, IH-300, 3); Plotinus: l:.'nn. IV. 2 1412, 155; IV,-~
12"'13. 1-29: IV, 3127/19. 27-.H: IV, 3127/20, I-IV, 3/27/23.47: IV. 9/H/ 3.
10-29; Porphyry: Ad Gaur. 1.~. S.~. 7-27: Sent. 31. 43. 11-16.
389. See pp. 315-318 and 380-384.
,WO. Sl'l' nn. 301HHl and .~H":'-3HH.
391. Sc:enn.3HS-3H6.
W2. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 21, 34 .
.W.~. The statements elsewhere that the: human soul lan achine eternal
bliss must be: interpreted in accordance with the sense adopted here. Sec ibid.
I. J. I ami I. 12. I"' (text vi). According to the first sense ofimm;menl'e, the
perpetuity of the: soul's bliss would require a final escape from transmigra-
tion. but according 10 the second sense. this postulate is not necessary. The
question is discussed by Flamant: op. cit.. pp. 624-627.
394. See nn. 3S3 and .~60.
WS.Seen.361.
396. Sec n. 361.
-;l)O ;\IEOPLATOi'\IS~1
Macrobius furnishes a reliable account of the descent and ascent

of the human soul advocated by the Greek Neoplatonists. In
most respects, we have found that his philosophical position
differs from the Middle Platonic viewpoint regarding the origin,
temporal life, and destiny of the soul in the same way that
Plotinus and Porphyry deviate from the teachings of their
predecessors. However, significant exceptions to this rule oc-
curred in relation to Macrobius' account of the origin of soul,
where the description of its passage from the tropical sign of
Cancer through the seven planetary spheres contained various
definitely un-Plotinian elements.:\9'7 It is therefore worth con-
sidering briefly what these reveal about the Latin writer's
employment of sources in his account of the descent and ascent
of the human soul in general.
7.237 THE NUMENIAN PARALLELS
There is considerable evidence showing that certain

astronomical details in Macrobius' account were furnished by
Numcnius either alone or in conjunction with a later writer.
This evidence consists of texts in Porphyry's De Antro Nym-
pharum and Proclus' Commentarius in Rempublicam which
reveal Numenius synthesizing an elaborate doctrine from
elements in Homer, Plato's 'Myth of Er', and astrology.:\9H We
might summarize Numenius' doctrine as presented by these
sources under the following headings:
(i) There are two points in the heaven of particular
astronomical significance: the constellation of Cancer in the
north, and that of Capricorn in the south.
(ii) Cancer and Capricorn are the two ends of the Milky Way .
.w~. St:t: cspcl'ially nn. :\6f. :\(J". 373. and ;-9.

59R ;\lumcnius: fr ..~I (Porphyry: De Antr. :Vympb. 21. 22. 2-2-4. 2-t. 3 ): fr.
.32 (Porphyry: De Antr. Nympb. 28, 26, 26-28, 28, 6): fr. :\5 (Proclus: In
Remp.Il. 128, .26-IW. l..fan<.lll. 131.8-I.f).
MACROBIUS ';91
(iii) Cancer and Capricorn are the two tropics of the sun -
the points of the summer and winter solstices respectively -
and therefore called 'the gates of the sun' (itA.iou nuA.at).:\99
(iv) There are correspondences between the signs of the
zodiac and the planets according to their various distances from
the earth. Thus,
a) proceeding from Cancer to Capricorn: Leo is the house of
the sun. Virgo that of Mercury, Libra that of Venus, Scorpio that
of Mars, Sagittarius that of Jupiter, and Capricorn that of Saturn;
b) proceeding from Capricorn to Cancer: Aquarius is the
house of Saturn, Pisces that of Jupiter, Aries that of Mars, Taurus
that of Venus, Gemini that of Mercury, and Cancer that of the
moon.-ioo
(v) Two constellations in the heaven also have an
eschatological function: that of Cancer in the north, and that of
Capricorn in the south.
(vi) Disembodied human souls are congregated along the
Milky Way -which is bounded at its two ends by Cancer and
Capricorn- and called 'the people of dreams' (cSihwc; oveiprov).
(vii) Human souls descend and ascend through Cancer and
Capricorn respectively ..JOI
.~99. Thcst ideas occur in ;all three Numenian fragments and arc bastd
upon the exegesis of two Hor.-=ric texts (Odyss. XIII. 109-112 and XXIV.
12-15). For a detailed comparison between Numcnius' doctrine and the
material presented hy M;tcrohius sec l.eemans: up. cit .. pp. 14"'- I <;2.
100. This doctrine appears only in the senmd fragmenl. Its soun:e is
astrological.
HI I. These ideas occur in all three Numenian fragments and are based
again upon the two Homcrk texts. :'llumenius' doctrine also comains variou~
notions derived from Plato (Rep. X. 614b-621d)- (i) The location of judges
for the disembodied souls between heaven (the sphere of fixed stars) and the
underworld (the seven planetary spheres). and (ii) The disembodkd souls'
journey of twelve days from the center (through earth. w;lter. air. ;and the
seven pl;anetary spheres) 10 the sphere of fixed stars - which arc not
repeated hy Macrohius.
NEOPLATONISM
A glance at this summary instantly reveals many similarities

between the doctrine attributed by the later Greek writers to
Numenius and that presented in the chapter of Macrobius' Com-
mentarius in Somnium Scipionis discussed earlier. This gives
rise to the important question: did the Latin author derive his
material simply from Numenius or also from a later report of his
teaching? Unfortunately, despite the endeavors of various
modern scholars to draw dogmatic conclusions at this point,
there seems no possibility of determining with certainty
whether an actual treatise of Numenius was available to
Macrobius when composing his own work. -io2
7.238 NUMENIUS OR PORPHYRY?

The doctrine of the human soul's passage through the
tropical signs of Cancer and Capricorn therefore represents a
definitely Numenian element in Macrobius' theory which was
perhaps simply derived from Numenius or perhaps also found
by the Latin writer in Porphyry. That Porphyry adopted this
doctrine from Numenius is clearly indicated by the testimony
considered above, although it also seems certain that he was in-
fluenced by the Cbaldaean Oracles, since at one point he at-
tributes a similar astronomical teaching to 'the Chaldaeans' (oi
XaA.5at01).-'~0:\ The doctrine of the soul's passage through the
seven planetary spheres on the other hand constitute~ a
definitely Porphyrian element in Macrobius' theory which was
402. See pp. o; 16-o; 18.

403. Porphyry: Ad Gaur. 16, 57. 3-14 'And the Chaldaeans say that a
divine and intelligible emanation comes from Eternity in the eastern parts of
the heaven ... thus each part situated near this eastern region, which is the
gate of souls and the respiratory channel of the universe, is filled with power'
(Kai ni.Jv Xa:\Saiwv tu:lilla !leiov t~ aiwvoc; vo'ltov yevto!lat IPUilEvwv Kata ta
avaTOAIKcl llEP'l TOU oupavou .. . nlioa ouv llOipa ')'tyVOilEVll 7tEpi TOV
avaTOAIKOV TOUTOV t67tOV, 6c; ECITI \IIUXWV 7tUA'l Kai EiCI7tVOla TOU navt6c;,
Suvallolitat).
MACROBil iS
perhaps simply adopted from Porphyry or perhaps also found

hy the Latin writer in Numenius. That Porphyry derived this
doctrine from Numenius is possibly suggested by the testimony
to he considered below, although it seems certain that he was
influenced by the Cha/daean Oracles once again, since Proclus
associates his espousal of this eschatological theory with the in-
terpretation of 'the oracles' (ta A.6yta):H14
7.2.39 THE PORPHYRIAN PARALLELS

There is considerable evidence to indicate that these
astronomical aspects of Macrohius' account were provided by
Porphyry either alone or in conjunction with the earlier writer.
This evidence comprises passages in Porphyry's De Abstinentia
and other treatises where the doctrine of the 'spirit' (7tVEli~a.
spiritus), the 'garments' (X.ttci:JvEc;), or the 'vehicle' (OX.TJ~a) is
elaborated:IO'i We might summarize Porphyry's doctrine a~
-HH. I, rod us: In Tim. Ill, 23'1. 26-30 (Porphyry: In Tim. fr. 80) 'And Por-
phyry's disciplc:s think that they are following the Omcles when they say that
the soul in its descent collects a vehicle by taking 'a portion of aether, "of
sun, of moon. and of what is borne on air" ' (Kai 5oKoliatv fn&a9at toi~
l..oyim~ t.v tij Ka965q> TftV ljiUXftV Atyouat aui..Uy&lV auto Aaj.1j3avouatv ai9pTJ~
llEPO~ 'T)&I..iou t 0ATJVQiTJ~ t Kai oaaa I T)tpt auvvnxovtat').
Hl5. The doctrine em he: reconstruned from twelve texts:
(i)DeAbslin. I. :\1. 3--t.
(ii) /hid. II. 3R. 2-11. 39. 2.
(iii) /hid. II. -t6, I.
(iv)DeAutr. Nympb. II. li. 5-11.
(\')Ibid. 1-i. 16. 11-1.~.
(vi)AdGttur. II. ~9. lf-21.
(Vii) Ibid. 6, 4.2, 'i-1 'i.
(viii)DeRegr. Anim. fr. 2. 28'.~-29'"
(ix) /hid. fr. ~. :\2 23-25.
(x)//Jid. fr. "'. _~:; 1:\-li.
(xi) Sent. 29. 1"'. 11-20.6.
(xii) In Tim. fr. HO (Proclus: In Tim. Ill. 2.'\L IH-30). These passages will he
identified hy their numhers in the: dislussion below.
NI:OPLATONISM
presented by these sources in the following way: As the human

soul descends it collects a spirit from the planetary spheres
(xi):W6 the spirit or vehicle has a composite nature (vi, xi, xii); it
is both corporeal and incorporeal from different viewpoints: it
is corporeal (ii. iv)i07 since it is constituted of physical elements
like fire and air (vi, xi), and since its constitution is on the
physical continua between light and dark or dry and wet (iv,
xi);Wil since it is manifested in space (xi),-W<J and since its ex-
istence is limited in time (ii, xii);-J 10 it is incorporeal (ii, iv)ill
because it corresponds to the psychic faculties of imagination
(ii, vii, viii, xi) . and because its activity is subject to the control
of the higher psychic faculty or not subject to it (ii), 412 because
~06. Porphyry's theory of the spiritual vehicle combines Plawnic notions

(the disembodied soul) with Aristotelian (the soul which is strictly the 'ac-
tuality' (evn:A.Ext:ta) of some body) and Stoic ones (the rarefied material soul).
On this point see E. R. Dodds: Proclus, The Elements of Theology. A Revised
Te:~:t with Translatim1, Jutroduction and Commentary. Second Edition (Ox-
ford. 1963). pp. 316-31"" and Smith: op. cU .. pp. 15<;-1<;6.
40'. (ii) 'In so far as it is corporeal. it is passiblc and l'Orruptiblc' (U J.lEV eatt
awj.lanK6v, na9T]nK6v an Kai cp9apt6v).
-HIH. (xi) The presence of the dark element enables it to be equivalent 10
the mythological Hades (At&TJ~ = at<'ii)~). In fact, for Porphyry the entire life
of the soul together with its semi-corporc;tl envelope corresponds to the
journey through the underworld described by Homer. Virgil. and othtr
poets. In accord;mce with this. the various components of the envc:lopc an:
interpreted ;ts signified by the infernal rivers. 1he tortures inflicted upon the
souls. and so on. Seen. 3H4.
-i09. EV T07t<!J.
-tiO. (ii) 'Its form remains for a lung time but is not thert'fore t'ternal' (TO
d&o~ atmiiv <'itaj.lEVElV 7tAEiW :;(p6vov, 00 J.liJV eanv aiwvlOV).
-111. (ii) 'The souls arc not dothtd in a solid body' (oo yap atEpEOV mi>J,la
7tEptJ}EJ3ATJVTQI ).
-112. It is here perhaps !hat the notion of a purificuion of 1he semi-
corporeal envclopt' by lheurgy enlers in10 the picturt'. In differem passages
Porphyry slates th;u !his tan be purified (ix) by theurgy and (xii) by
philosophical conlt'mplation.
:VIACRORIUS 59S
it is essentially non-spatial (xi),41~ and because its nature has an

a temporal aspect (xii). 4 J.i Furthermore, it can be understood as a
multiplicity of garments on the human soul (i, iii, iv, v); these
garments are returned to the planetary spheres as it ascends
(xii).H'i It should be obvious to the reader of this summary that
the doctrine expounded hy Porphyry and that presented in the
chapter of Macrobius' Commentary discussed earlier have
many points of similarity. This gives rise to the important ques-
tion: did the Latin author derive his material simply from Por-
phyry or also from an earlier source of the latter's teaching? Un-
fortunately, the extant material is not sufficient to indicate
whether Porphyry was following an earlier writer in the
elaboration of this doctrine, although the existence of some cir-
cumstantial evidence suggests that this was actually the case-1 16.
1.:\. oux on ... EV t6notc; yivEmt.

I
11. (xii) 'Th~ vehicle and irrational soul will both exist and not ~xist. for
I
they will no longer r~main in thdr indi\'i<.luality' (Kai Elva1 mOra Kai J.lli
dvm, aura (It; SKaara JlTJK&t'&ival).
4 Is. The bibliography on Porphyry's theory of th~ spiritual v~hicl~ is quite
extensive. See Bidez: op. cit., pp. 88-97; R. C. Kissling: 'The c)xT]Jla- 7tVEUJla
of the Neoplatonists and the De lnsomniis of Synesius of Cyrene', America"
journal of Philology 43 (1922), pp. 318-330; Dodds: op. cit., pp. 313-321; R.
Beutler: 'Porphyrios'. Pau(vs Realencyclopiidie der klasslscben Alter-
lllmsuissenscbaft 22 I I (Stuttgart. 1953) col. 307-310: Hadot: op. cit., pp.
18""-189: Smith: op. cit .. pp. 152-158; and). Bouffartigueet M. Patillon: Por-
piJyre, De l'abstin~nce. fltlroduction pm]. B. elM. P .. Utre 1: Iexie tflaiJ/i el
traduit par}. B. (Paris. 1977), pp. xlvii-xlviii and 37-41.
-1 16. That Numenius taught this <.loctrine seems very likely. since he ap-
parently agreed with Porphyry that the mythological underworl<.l cor-
rcspon<.led to the planetary sph~r~s. Sec nn. Hll and 408. Such an interpreta-
tion woul<.l scan:cly he possible without postulating ~orne passihlc tlement :It
tachcd to the disembodie<.l human soul.
8
Martianus Capella
8. 1 INTRODUCTION
There is considerable justification for linking Martianus

Capella, the Latin writer who is described in his own words as
'Felix Capella' and in the subscriptions to the manuscripts as
'Martianus Min(n)eius Felix Capella', with the Platonic tradition
of late antiquity. This justification is provided by the content of
his De Nuptiis Pbilologiae et Mercurii, a work comprising (i) an
allegorical setting (books I-11), and (ii) a sequence of treatises on
each of the liberal arts (books III-IX).t Although the second part
I. For the text sec Martianus Capella, edidit }. WU/is (Leipzig 19tH).
There is an English translation of A. Dick's earlier edition (Leipzig 192';) in
\li'. H. Stahl, R. Johnson. and E. L. Burge: Martian us Capella and tbe Sezen
Uberal Arts II: Tbe Mt~rriage of Pbilnlogy ami Merczu:.J' (~ew York. 19'7i).
Thc::re is an Italian translation and running commentary on part of the trc::atise
in 1.. Lenaz: Mt~rtiani CClpellae De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Liber
Sccundus. lntroduzi(me, trClduzione e commento (Padova. 19'7i ). For
general introductions see P. Wessner: 'Martianus Capella'. Pau~}'S Realen-
(l'clopiitlie tier klassischen Altertumsll'issenscbaft l.f (Stuttgart. 19~0), col.
2003-.20 16; M. Cappuyns: 'Capella (Martianus)'. Dictimmaire tl'bistoire et de
geograpbie ecc.:tesiastiques I I (Paris. 1919). pp. H~';-R4R; W. H. Stahl. R.
Johnson, and E. L. Burge: Martian us Capella mul tbe Sezen Liberal Arts I:
The Quadrizium of Martimms Capella. l.c1tin Tmtlitions in the.'
.Hatbematical Sciences 50 B.C. to A.D. 1.250. zl'ith a Stutly of the Allegm:.1
and the Verhtll Disciplines (New York/London, 1971 ); F. Le Moine: Mar-
timws Capella, A l.iterm:.J' Re-F.za/uation (Munchen, 19'7 2); L. l.c:naz: 'Mar-
ziano Capella', Cultura e sc:twla 44 (1972). pp. i0-i9: and J. Willis: ~tar
tianus Capella und die mittclalterlichc: Schulhildung'. Altertum 19 ( 19"' 3 ). pp.
16i . 1'7 .j.
';9i
'ilJH NEOPLATONISM
of Martianus' work is based upon sources which are not primari-

ly Platonic in their philosophical orientation, the first part con-
sists entirely of theological, cosmological, and psychological
doctrines extracted from Platonic and Neoplatonic writers.
There is in fact considerable evidence for this author's acquain-
tance with Apuleius' Metamorphoses and the Cbaldaean
Oracles, to mention only those sources which modern critical
scholarship has been able to identify with certainty. 2 Martian us
Capella was active between A.D. 410 and A.D. 439, these dates
having been suggested by certain statements in the work itself,
and was therefore an approximate contemporary of Macrobius.
2. The intluente of Martianus Capdla upon the Middle Ages has been in-
\'lstigated in the following works of modern slholarship: (i) Gen1..ral studies
of his intluence. M. Manitius: Geschicbte der lateinischen Litem fur des Mit-
telalters 1-111 (Miinchen. 1911-19:\1). indins: \'\1essner: op. cit .. col.
.W 12-20 1_-\; Cappuyns: op. cit .. pp. H-H-H-i' (containing a useful classifica-
tion of the kinds of influence); C. Leonardi: 'Nota introdutti\'a per un'in-
dagine sulla fortuna di Marziano Capella ncl Medioe\'o'. Hollellitw dell'
lstituto Storico Italiano peril Medio Eto e Architin ,"trfuratoricmo 67 ( 19'i'i).
pp. 26'i-2HH; Stahl. Johnson. :tnd Burge: ofJ. cit. I. pp. 'i'i-' I: and Willis: op.
cit .. pp I '1-1"" -t. (ii) Studies of :\lartianus' influence based upon the diffusion
of m:tnuscripts. C. I.eon:1rdi: I ~..-odid di :\l:1rziano Capella I', Aetum .H
(19'ilJ), pp. H;\--tl-19: 'I codid di Marziano Capella Jl', ibid. :\-1 (1960). pp.
1-99 and i ll-'i2L ). Prcaux: 'Les manuscrits prindpaux du De Nuptlis
Pbilologiae et Mercurii de Martianus Capella', Lettres latines du moyen clge
et de Ia Renaissance. recueil cditc par G. Cambier. C. Deroux et ). Prcaux
(Bruxdks, ll)""'H ), pp. ""6-128. (iii) Sllldics of his influence based upon the
production of tommentaries by mediae\'al writers. E. Narducd: 'lntorno ad
un comento incdiw di Remigio d'Auxerrc al Satyrinm di Marziano Capdl:1',
llullettino tli bibliogmfia e di storia delle scienze matematicbe e fish-be I 'i
(I HH2), pp. 'iO'i-'iHO: ). Willis: Marlianus Capella tmd bis Early Commen-
tatms. Diss. (London, llJ'i 2 ); :tnd C. Lutz: Martianus Capella, Catalogus
Translationum et Commentariorum: Medietal and Renaissance Latin
1'rtmslations ami Cmnmentaries ll. l'dited by P. 0. Kristdler and F. E. Cranz
(Washington. DC. 19""'1) pp. ;\6''-381. (i\') General studies of the influence of
books 1-11. <i. Nuchdmans: 'l>hilologia l't son mariagl' a\'cc Menurc jusqu'ii Ia
fin du XIll sicdc'. /.atom us 16 ( 19'ii ). pp. Hi- Hl7. Proceeding in
MARTIANl!S CAPELLA
chronologkal s~qu~nc~. wt find tht following nrifiahlc ~xamplts of his in-

tluen<.T upon later writers: a) In la11: antiquity. Fulgt:mius m:1kes us~ of th~
allegorical m:uerial. and ps.-lsidor~ of S~\ilk: De Numeris of th~ arithmetic:JI
cont~m of hook VII (s~~ C. Lt:cmardi: 'lmorno al Libe1 de Nu meris di lsidoro
ui Si\'iglia', Bulle/finn defl'lstltuto Storico ltctlimw per if Medio EI'O eAr-
ciJil'io Mumtorimw 6H ( 1956). pp ..20~-23 I). He is m~ntiont:d hy nam~ in
<:a~siodorus and Gr~gorr of Tours. th~ form~r howev~r admitting that h~ has
not gained acc~ss to De Nupliis. A suhsniption in ahout tw~my manuscripts
rd<.rs to the t:dition of his work in the mid-sixth ct:mury hy a rht:toridan
namnl Sen1rus Melior Felix (s~t .f. Prcaux: s~turus Melior Felix. l'ultime
( Jl'lltllr f lrbis Romae . Cormw G'raliarum. Miscellanea patristica. bistorica
et /itm:~ica 1:'/igio /Jekklrs O.S.B. XII lustra complenti ob/ata II
(Hrug<.s-s'Grav~nhage, 19"7')), pp. 101-121). b) In th~ Carolingian pt:riod-
thl' lit~raturt on this topic is so ~xtensiv~ th:u only the most recent and im-
portant studil's can be noted. For a general ass~ssmem of Marti:mus' impor-
tant:~ Sl'l' G. !\Iathon: Lt:s form~s ~t Ia signification d~ Ia pl'dagogil' des arts
lihl'raux au mili~u du IXe sit:d~. L'enscignem~nt palatin d~ .J~an Scot
J::rigl-nc'. Arts liberau.\' et pbilosopble tilt moyen dge (Actes du /Ve Crmgri!s
lntemalional de Pbilo.wfJbie Mtfditftale (Mrmtrea/ 2H ttotU-2 septembre
/IJ(J~)(Montrl'ai/Paris. 1969), pp. ~7-6'1. Th~ most significant mt:diaeval com-
nwntaril's date from this period: for that of Martin of Laon st:c C. E. Lutz:
/Juncbad. (i/ossae in Mart/anum. edited hy C. E. L. (l.anctstt:r.PA. 19-f-l)
(th~ transfercnn of authorship from tht: mystc:rious 'Dunchad' to Martin was
proposed hy .J. l'rc:mx: 'I.e <.omm~nt;tirc d~ Martin de l.aon sur !'oeuvre de
Martianus Cap~lla'. Latomus 12 ( 19'i3). pp. --1~7-'1')9 and has gt:ncrally hc~n
a<.'t'tptcd. Sec howl'\'~r J. J. Contreni: A Not~ on th~ Atlrihution of a Mar-
tianus Capella Commentary to Martin us Laudun~nsis'. Catalog us Transla-
liiJ/IIIm et Crm11nentarlorum. Medittetttl and Renttissance Ltttitt Trttns/a-
tinns am/ Commentaries Ill. ~dited by P. 0. Kristcller and F. E. Cranz
( \'\'ashington. DC. I 976), pp. -1 'i 1-.f 'i2); for that of Eriug~na see C F. Lutz.
/1!/Jmmis Sc11tli. Annotationes in Marcimwm. ~ditnl hy C. E. L... Camhridg~.
~1:\. 19.i9) (edition of the \'t:rsion in Paris. /Ubi. llttf. lat. /21)60) and E.
.kaumau: Quatre tb'mes erigeniens (Montreal/Paris. llr:'H) (tdition of of th~
\'l"rsion in 0.\'.fon/, Bod/. Auct. T. 2. /I)); ;md for that of R~migius of Aux~rrc:
~l'l' C. E. Lutz: RemiRii 1l11tissiodorensis (.'ommelltum in Jlartittmtm
CttfJellam ( Ll'id~n. 1962-196')) (togt:thc:r with th~ import:ant studies of C.
l.<.onardi: 'I commenti altom~dic:\'ali ai classici pagani. Oa Sev~rino Bot:zio a
lkmigio d'Auxc:rre', /.a cu/lura mttica nel/'occidente Iatino da/ VII ttii'XI
SeciJ/o (Settimane di stmUo del Centro llttlimw di Studi su/1'.4/lo /IJedioetcJ
221 (Spolcto, llJ"''il. pp. l'i9-'iOH and 'Rtmigio d'Auxtrrc: c: l'~rt:dit;i d~lla
~naola carolingi a. I classici nel medioeto e ne/l'unumesimo. Jliscel/anea
600 NEOPI.ATONISM
filulogim (Cic:nova. lt)7';), pp . .r' I-.2HH). The: prc:dsc: literary rdationship

hc:twec:n these Ius hc:t:n the: suhjc:ct of a controvc:rsr summarizc:d in \X'. 11.
Stahl: 'To a lkllc:r l 'ndc:rstanding of Martianus Capdla'. Speculum -tO (I W1'; ).
pp. I 02-11 'i and G. Schrimpf: zur Fragt: dt:r Autht:ntizitatunsc:rc:r Tc:xtc: \'on
Johannc:s Scouus' Amwtatirmes in Martianum . 71Je Mint/ r~{ l!riug(na
fPapers of a Colloquium. Dublin I.J-I8.fU(I' llJ""~O). tditc:d hy J. J. 0':\k;tr;t
and 1.. Bider (Duhlin. It)...,_~). pp. 1.2';-I.W. Among sllldic:s of the:
philosophical and sdc:milk notions drawn from l\lartianus hy writc:rs of this
pniod sc:c: E. \'On Erhardt-Sic:hold and R. von Erhardt: Tbe rlstnmomy of
.fobmmes Scotus Erigena (Ballimort. ltJfO): Co.mwlogy intbe Annotationc:s
in Mardanum. ;"'ore l.i/l,bl on t:rige1w's rlstrmwmy (Ballimore. ltJ-fO): H.
l.khcschiitz: 'Zur Gc:schiduc: dc:r F.rkHirung dc:s Martianus Capdla hc:i
Eriugcna. Pbi/ologus 10-f (ltJ60). pp. 127-I:P: G. Mathon: 'Jc:an Scot
Erigcnt:. Chakidius ct It prohlcmc: de l';imc: uni\'c:rsdk <A propos des An-
notalirmes in Martianum 7. I 0)'. I. 'lmmme et .wn destin d 'apri!s les
penseurs du moyen dge (rlctes du Premier Omgri!s lntenwlional de
Phi/o.wpbie Mrldir!t'llle, l.outain!Hru.wlles .28amU--1 septemhre It) 58) (l.ou-
\'ain/Paris. 1960), pp. ;\61-;\'';: U. l.ichcschiitz: 'Wt:stc:rn Christian Thought
from Boc:thius lll Ansdm'. 71Je CmniJridge llistory of /.a fer (;reek and l!arly
Medieml Pbilosopby. c:dited hy A. H. Armstrong (Camhridgc:. ltJ67). pp.
'i"'~6-'i""~H: _1. Prt'aux: 'l.'hymne i"t.Jupiter dt Valt'rius de Sora. 1/ommct/l,eS it /1-/.
De/court (Bruxc:llc:~. lt)":O), pp. IH.2-ltJ'i: II. l.ieheschiitz: 'The Place of tht:
Martian us Glossae in the Dt:\'elopmc:m of Eriugena's Thought'. Tbe .Wind of
l:'riugena (Papers of a Colloquium. /JuiJiin l-i-18.fu(J' llJ~O). editc:d hy _1. _1.
O'Meara and 1.. Bidt:r (Dublin. I t)7 .'\ ). pp. -flJ-'iH: .J. Prt'aux: ',lean Scot c:t Mar-
tin de l.aon tn face du /Je NufJtiis de l\tani;mus Capdla ,Jean Scot l:'rigi!ne et
/'bistoire de Ia pbilosopbie (Col/oque lntenwtional du Centre iValirmal de
Ia Recbercbe Scient({ique. /.arm "'-/.2 juilletlcr<;) (Paris. I tJ77 ). pp. 161- J!O:
<i. St:hrimpf: 'johannes Sconus Eriugena und die Rezeption de~ Manianus
Capella im karolinJ,:ischen Bildungswesen'. l!riu~ena. StiU/i(n zu seinen
Qtw/len (l'ortriige des Ill. lntemalimwlen Eriugena-Co/lrJtfUiums. Freifmrg
i. fir . .2...,-.W All/l,IISI llJ~O). herausgegehen \'on \'C Rcierwahes ( Uc:iddhcrg.
I tJHO). pp. I;\';- lfH. l') In the (;Her Middle: Agc:s. Notker J.ahlo translated
hooks 1-11 together with some of Rc:migius' commentary into Old High Ger-
m;m (sec K. Schulte:: /J(IS Verbiiltnis ton i'llo/k(rs De: nuptiis Philologiac: t:l
:\krlurii zum Krm1me11f(/r des Remigius Alllissiodorensis. Diss. (.\1iinster,
I tJ I I)). In the: twelfth ccmury. Addard of Bath is inlluencc:d hy the allegory.
Thierry of Chartres' HefJittteudJrm makc:s ust of the allq~ory and hooks \'
and VII (see A. Clt:rval: 'l.'c:nscignc:ment dt:s ans lihcraux :i Chartres cl a Paris
dans Ia premiere moilit' du Xllt sil:dc: d'aprt:s l'llefJittfellcbrm dt Thic:rry de
Chartrt:s'. Crmgri!s scientifique intemalimwl des catlmlicJites tenu ci Paris II
MARTIANtJS CAPELLA (l()J
H. II THE ALLEGORY OF DE NUPTIIS
Since the allegory will be the principal focus of our investiga-

tions, we may perhaps begin by summarizing its content as
follows: Mercury desires to marry but, since his earlier attempts
to court Sophia, Mantice, and Psyche have been frustrated. he is
uncertain whom now to approach. Virtue suggests that Apollo
should be consulted, and this god proposes Philology - a
maiden whose knowledge encompasses both the heights of
heaven and the depths of the underworld- as a fitting consort.
Naturally the permission of Jupiter must also be sought, and so
Mercury, Virtue and Apollo ascend through the cosmos to his
palace, to the accompaniment of harmonious sounds from the
planetary spheres. Apollo argues for the marriage of Mercury
and Philology but, although Juno is inclined to grant the request
immediately, Jupiter himself expresses concern that such a mar-
riage could impede Mercury's other duties. Pallas thereupon
suggests that a council of all the gods should be assembled to
consider the matter, and so the gods gradually convene from
their abodes in various parts of the cosmos at Jupiter's invita-
tion. Jupiter now urges that the marriage be permitted to take
fl';tris. 1888). pp. 277296; F.. Jc:;umc:au: 'l.c: Prologus in Eptatbeunm c.k
Thkrry de Chartres', Medkteta/Studies 16 (19S.f). pp. 171-17S). thc:rc: is a
cornmc:ntary hy Rc:rnard Silvc:stris on Book I ( sc:c: F.. jc:aunc:au: Note: sur
l'l'colt: de: Chartrc:s, Studi medietali, tc:rza sc:rit: S ( 196-!), pp. HSS-86-!),john
of Salishury's Meta/ogicon c:mploys the: allt:gory and cc:rtain passagc:s in the:
latcr hooks (sc:c H. Lkhc:schi.itz: Meclictetal llunumism in tbe l.ife and
lr'riNngsofjobu ofSalisbm:l'(l.ondon. 19';0). pp. 8-i-HS: R. Klih;tnsky: 'The
Rock of Parmc:nidc:s. Mc:diac:val Vkws on the Origin of Dialt:ctil"'. Medimta/
and Reuaissance Studies I ( 19-!l-19-!~). pp. 178-186). and Godfrey of St.
\'ictor i~ intluctKcd hy the allegory. William of Conches also dcdarc:s that hl
was the: author of a commentary (sec P. Oronkc: Fabu/a. t:xplort~tions into
tbe f!ses r~(Mytb in Mediel'ttll'/atonism (.'1-fitte//tlteiniscbe Stutlien und Texte
II )(l.cidcn/Ki)ln. 19"'-t). pp. 161-IH_-\).
602 NEOJ>LATONISM
place provided that Philology, in order that her mortal origin

might be no obstacle to her future status, be granted the gift of
divinity. The gods agree to this unanimously, adding that the
same privilege be given to all mortals who invite it by their ac-
tions, and Philosophy has the decree cut in bronze. The scene
now shifts to Philology's earthly domicile. Here, the maiden is
suffering trepidation at the thought of marriage to a god for,
although she loves Mercury, she is apprehensive that her mortal
frame will he consumed by the fiery nature of her bridegroom's
domain. However, she is able to allay her fears somewhat by
calculating the numerical values of their two names, for she
discovers that Mercury's number is three and hers if four which
together produce the harmonious number seven. Various
characters now attend upon Philology in preparation for her
marriage: her mother Phronesis brings the bridal gown, the
Muses sing hymns in her honor, the Virtues come to reassure
her, the Graces bestow upon her their gifts. and finally
Athanasia appears to guide her ascent to heaven. Before she
goes to the ceremony, Philology must vomit up a mass of books
and documents which are clogging her breast - this material
being collected by the Arts, the Sciences, and the Muses Urania
and Calliope - and then drink a potion contained in an egg-like
vessel provided by Athanasia's own mother Apotheosis. On the
completion of these formalities, Philology steps into a palan-
quin which is horne aloft by Labor, Amor, Epimelia and Agryp-
nia, with the Muses leading the procession in the front and
Periergia and other attendants coming in the rear. juno Pronuha
now comes forth as the guide for the celestial journey hut first,
in response to the maiden's earnest petition, she describes the
many spirits which inhabit the different regions of the cosmos.
After this, the palanquin rises through the seven planetary
spheres until the Milky Way is reached, where the gods are
assembled to celebrate the marriage of Philology and Mercury.
MARTIANl'S CAPELLA 60.~
8.12 THE MEANING OF THE ALLEGORY
Opinions have been divided regarding the inner meaning of

the narrative which begins De Nuptiis. One school of thought
has maintained that since Mercury's number is three and
Philology's four, and there are three arts in the trivium and four
in the quadrivium, the marriage of Mercury and Philology sym-
bolizes the combination of literary and scientific studies. This
interpretation suggests that the purpose of Martian us' allegory is
w advocate the ancient educational ideal - originally for-
mulated in Cicero's De bwentione and in Marius Victorious'
commentary on that work:i - whereby the cultivated man must
pursue the two kinds of study in conjunction with one another.
As G. Nuchelmans has shown, the mediaeval commentators on
De Nuptiis invariably understood its significance in this way. 4 A
second school of thought has argued that, since Mercury is a
di\'ine being and Philology a mortal one, and the characters
are paired on account of their outstanding intellectual abilities,
the marriage of Mercury and Philology symbolizes the deifica-
tion of the human soul through the exercise of its intellect. This
interpretation implies that Martianus' allegory is designed to
signify the Platonic ethical ideal - central to the thinking of
Plotinus' Enneades and various writings of Porphyryc; - in
which man's soul can escape the embodied state by rendering
:\. Cicero; De lm. I. 1 'Wisdom without eloquence is of little USl' to socie-

ty. but eloquence without wisdom is usually very harmful and never useful'
(sapientiam sine e/oqmmtia parum pmdesse cil'itatibus, elnquentiam tero
sine sapieulia nimium obesse plerumque.juotlesse nunuJtltlm). Marius Vk-
torinus: /11 Cicero. Rbet. l, 169. 34-;\9 refers to a 'union' (cnniungere) of the
arts of eloquence and wisdom.
I. :'>/uchelmans: op. cit .. pp. 90-106.
:;, The relation hctwel'n the doctrines of Greek philosophical writers ami
~hrtianus Capella will be discussed in more detail on p. 606 ff.
NEOPLATONISM
itself intellectual. Some modern writers like: P. Fc:rrarino,6 L.

Lenaz, .. and J. PreauxH have understood the significance of De
Nuptiis along these: lines. In the face of such a difference of opi-
nion there are a few observations which are perhaps worth
making.
If it were: possible to demonstrate: that Mercury and Philology
are the symbols of the divine and human intellects respectively,
their marriage would naturally be interpreted to signify the
deification of humanity through its intellect. Fortunately, such a
demonstration seems quite feasible since Jupiter's address to the
divine conclave includes a striking reference to Mercury as one
whose affinity with Jupiter's 'intellect' (vou~) provides him with
a unique knowledge of the number of the gods.<> It is true that
the character of Athene who appears elsewhere in De Nuptiis
would provide an equally appropriate symbol of the divine in-
tellect.JO However, since there is an additional mediating or in-
6. P. Ferrarino: 'La prima, e l'unica, Reductio omnium artium ad

pbilologiam. II De Nuptiis Pbilologiae et Mercurii di Marziano Capella e
l'apoteosi della Filologia', ltt~lia medioetale e umanlstica 12 ( 1969), pp.
1-7.
7. L. Lenaz: Martian/ Capellt~e De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Liher
Secundus.pp.101-120.
R. ). Prcaux: 'Jean Scot et Martin de Laon en face du De Nuptiis de Mar-
tianus Capella, pp. 161-162.
9. It may he useful to present Martianus' descriptions of Mercury and
Philology together in order to reveal the parallelism clearly intended. (i) Mer
cury. Martian us Capella: De Nuptiis l, 92 'He is the interpreter of my mind-
the sacred intellect -and he alone can give the number of gods' (interpres-
que met~e mentis, 6 vouc; st~cer. I bic so/us numerum promere cae/itum); (ii)
Philology. Ibid. l, 22 'Glowing thunderbolts cannot conceal from her the will
of .Jupiter ... With her learned industry she can anticipate everything which is
permitted the gods to foreknow' (occultare ... nee lot is t~rbitrium ruti/antia
fulmina posstmt ... quae Jmssit docta tot ton praetertere cura I quod superis
pmescire datum). This parallelism is obviously inu:nded 10 show that both
Mercury and Philology arc intel/ects. Stc n. 'i I.
Ill. See ibid. VI, 'i6-::'-'i7-!.
MARTIANllS CAPF.LLA 60<;
terpretative function in Mercury's case, II it seems likely that

Martianus has opted for the latter as the symbol to carry this
connotation. Furthermore, the demonstration seems quite
viable since Apollo's reply to the inquiries of Mercury and Vir-
tue contain an analogous description of Philology as one whose
anticipation of the gods' foreknowledge makes her privy even
to the will of Jupiter (Iovis arbitrium).12 It is undeniable that
the character of Psyche who also appears in De Nuptiis would
provide a more obvious symbol of the human intellect.13 But
she is described as being uncultivated until she received the at-
tentions of Philology, 14 and so it is probable that Martian us has
selected the latter as the symbol to bear this meaning. In conclu-
sion, there seems little obstacle to interpreting Mercury and
Philology as symbolizing the divine and human intellect respec-
tively and their marriage along the lines indicated by this sym-
bolism.
8. 13 THE ALLEGORY AND ITS SYMBOLISM
Before concluding our investigation of this allegory, it may

be useful to say something about the kinds of symbolism
employed by the author. At the risk of some simplification, the
method of the first part of the narrative which main! y concerns
the gods might be characterized as one where individual sym-
bols signify a plurality of notions. Thus, Jupiter appears in dif-
ferent contexts as (i) the sacred intellect which has Mercury as
the unique interpreter of its thoughts - here he is understood
II. See ibid. I. 92 ir~terpres. There was a traditional Greek etymology: 'Ep-
llTJ~ = tpJ.1TJV&U&lV
1.2. Martianus" description of Philology has already been presented in con
junltion with that of Mercury in n. 9.
I;. See ibid. I, 7.
li. See ibid. I, 2; i11cu/ta. Of course, 'Psyche' ('1/UJ(Tt ) corresponds to soul
in Greek.
NEOPI.ATONISM
primarily as an intellectual principle; (ii) the sixth planet whose

temperament emits vital energy and whose rotation produces
the Phrygian sound - when he represents an astronomical and
therefore physical object; and (iii) the ruler of those spirits
which Juno describes as inhabiting the region between the sun
and the sphere of the fixed stars - here he is understood mainly
as a psychic principle. A similar plurality of signification, which
naturally supplements the literal and anthropomorphic level of
the narrative, occurs in the cases of Athene. the sun, and Mer-
cury. In contrast to all this, the method of the second part of the
allegory dealing primarily with the human soul might be
characterized as one where an individual notion is signified by a
plurality of symbols. Thus, the human soul appears in different
contexts as (i) the maiden Philology who undergoes a ritual of
purification and ascends in the palanquin to her marriage with
Mercury - here it is clearly the intellectual part which is em-
phasized; (ii) Psyche the daughter of Endelichia and the sun who
had become cultivated through the attentions of Philology -
where the psychic principle is apparently referred to as a whole;
and (iii) the palanquin bearing Philology aloft to her marriage
with Mercury in the hands of attendants which include
members of each sex - here it is perhaps the lower part which
is stressed. This plurality of signification, which again sup-
plements the narrative's literal and direct references to the same
principle, occurs only in the case of the human soul. It is impor-
tant to understand the implications of this complex symbolic
technique, since any survey of the author's philosophical
system will otherwise appear to be ambivalent or confused.
8.2 MARTIAN US' PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM
In attempting to summarize the philosophical tenets of Mar-

tianus Capella. the most fruitful approach wiJI undoubtedly be
to analyze them under the two headings of theology and
MARTlANllS CAPELLA 607
psychology. This division. which approximately corresponds to

that between the first and second books of De Nuptiis
Pbilo/ogiae et Mercurii. has one advantage: it reveals the
dependence of the writer's conception of the world upon the
traditional theme of macrocosm and microcosm. IS However,
since Martianus' philosophical doctrines are expressed in a
somewhat allusive manner, the allegory which contains them
being only a preface to the books dealing with the liberal arts. it
will be necessary to attempt reconstructions of the wider doc-
trinal contexts where they are relevant. This can only be achiev-
ed by supplementing the material in the Latin text itself with
that contained in his probable sources, the most important of
which are Apuleius, 16 the Cha/daean Oracles,,~ and Porphyry's
15. For this theme see pp. 99- t 00 (Cicero), t 79-180 (Seneca). 380-382 (the
Asclepius). 482-483 (Calcidius), etc.
16. The influence of Apuleius over Martianus has been detected in three
areas: (i) linguistic style. (ii) the allegorical marriage itself (cf. the episode of
Cupid and Psyche in Apuleius' Metamorphoses). and (iii) philosophical doc-
trine. For (i) see C. Weyman: Stud/en zu Apuleius und seine11 Nachahmern
(Sitztmgsbericbte tier Bayerlscbe11 Akademie tier Wissenscbaften 1893. 2)
(Miinchen, 1893). pp. 374-375: C. Morelli: 'Quaestiones in Martianum
Capell am', Studt italian/ dl filologla clt~ssica 17 ( t 909), pp. 2 56-260; and
Wessner: op. cit .. pp . .2006-2007. For (iii) sec my remarks in nn. HI. 90. etc.
li. The doctrines of the Cba/daean Oracles have heen examinl'll. as far ;1s
the fragmentary remains allow. in the following works: \V. Kroll: De
Oraculis Cba/tlaicis (Breslau. IR9l; repr. Hildesheim, 1962); H. Lewy:
Cba/daea11 Omc/es and 7'/Jeurgy. Mysticism, /Hagle ami Platonism ill tbe
l.ater Roman Empire (Recherches d'arcbeologie. de philologie et d'histoire
1;\) (Cairo. 19'Hl)- wgether wilh a review: E. R. Dodds: 'New I.ight on the
Cha/daecm Om des. Hmtard Tbeo/ogica/ Retieu 5i ( 1961 ), pp. 263-27 3
-: ami t des Places: Orachs Clmldaiqms. te.\'11! tfta/J/1 et trmluit (Paris,
l'r I). In :1 paper included in I he corrccled reprinl of LLwy's hook (Paris.
llJ~H ), P. H:1do1 has summarized the results of tht: modern scholarship on
lhcse oracles, nolin~ lhl' ~reat uncertainties whkh remain in many anas
( Rilan e1 perspeltives sur les Oracles Chaldaiques'. pp. 703-7 20). For discus-
sion of lheir influence upon varius hiler writers, both Greek and Latin. the
608 :'llf:OI'LATONISM
commentary upon the latter. IS
8.21 THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE
In accordance with the triple signification of the names of the

gods described earlier- they may symbolize intellects, heaven-
ly bodies, or spirits - the theological doctrines of Martianus
Capella are of three kinds. Our method will be to examine each
of these theologies in turn and to describe the manifestations of
the various gods in each category, beginning with the intellec-
tual and metaphysical.
following works may b~ consull~d: W. Th~i ler: Die cb(l/diiischen Omkeluml

die Hymnen des Synesios (Halle/Saale. 19-12); P. Hadot: Porphyre et Vic-
wrinus (Paris, 1968), pp. 2';';-272: and F. W. Crem~r: Die cbtildiii.~chen
Omkeltmd jamblich De mysteriis (Heitriige zur k/assiscbcm Philologie 26)
(Meisenheim am Glan. 1969).
18. By 'lommenrary is meanrthe work or works in which Porphyry inter-
preted the Cb(l/d(lean Oracles. Although there is no doubt that he quotes
these in his Commenf(lrius in Pannenidem and De Regressu Animae. con-
siderable difficulties remain in connection with (i) the references to an ap-
p:tr~nrly srstematic commenrary on the Cb(l/daetm Oracles in the Sudtt s.n.
noptpuplO<;. Lydus: De Mens. IV. B. I 10. 18-22. and Aeneas of Gaza:
Tbeophr.. PG 8';. 961A. Are these references to a single work (see). Bidez:
Vie de Porphyre. Le philosopbe neoplatonicien (Ghent. 191.:\; repr.
Hildesheim. 1964). pp. u and 70")? Is this work to be identified with De
Regressu Animtle (See l.ewy: op. cit .. pp. 4i9-452)?: (ii) the fragmenrs of Por-
phyr(s De Philosophiu ex Oraculis Htluriend(l transmined by Eusebius,
Augustine. ~tc Ar~ these fragmenrs drawn from the singk work menrioned
above (contrast Lewy: op. cit .. pp. 8-M with Dodds: op. cit. pp. 264-267)? Is
this work to be idcnrified with De Regressu Animtle (contrast J. ). O'Meara:
Porpbyry's Pbilosophy from Oracles in Augustine (Paris. 1959). pp. 7-46
with P. Hadot: 'Citations de Porphyre dans Augustin'. Revue des etudes
tmgustiniennes 6 ( 1960), pp. 205-2-H )? Fortunately. since Porphyry's
employment of the Cbaldtletln Ort1cles is certain in the two works noted. the
term 'commentary may be employed without specifiying any solution to the
additional difficulties.
MARTIANlJS CAPEllA 60l)
8.211 THE GODS AS INTELLECTS
The starting point for an examination of Martian us' intellec-

tual theology is provided by the description of Philology's ar-
rival at the sphere of fixed stars, where she alights from the
palanquin which has borne her through the cosmos in order to
address the unseen principles. Here, the writer states that
Philology 'prays to a certain "Maiden of the Source" and- also
according to the mysteries of Plato - to the powers "Once and
Twice Beyond" (quandam etiam Jontanam virginem
deprecatur, secundum Platonis quoque mysteria ana~ Kai oi~
En:EKEtva potestates).19 The terminology of this passage is so
unusual that modern scholars have been able to identify its
source with certainty as the Chaldaean Oracles..w According to
the doctrine expounded in these writings, there exist as first
principles of reality a 'paternal intellect' (n:atptKO~ v6o~)21 -
also called 'Once Beyond'22 - a 'secondary intellect'(v6o~
OEUtEpo~)23- also called 'Twice Beyond',24 and a 'primal soul'
19. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. ll, 204-205.

20. Thus J. Bidez: 'Note sur les mysteres neoplatoniciens', Revue beige de
philo/ogle et d'histoire 7 (1928), pp. 1477-1481; P. Courcelle: Late Latin
Writers and their Greek Sources, translated by H. E. Wedeck (Cambridge.
MA. 1969), p. 216; and l. lenaz: Martian/ Capellae De Nuptiis Philologiae et
Mercurii liber Secundus, pp. 27-32.
21. Orac. Chald. fr. 39 (Proclus: In Tim. II. 54, 10-16). Cf. Orac. Chald. fr.
22 (Proclus: In Parm. 1091. 6-8); fr. 36 (Proclus: In Crat. 58. 14-15); and fr.
37 (Proclus: In Pam1. 800. 20-80 I. i) vouc; natp6c;.
22. Orac. Cha/d. fr. 169 (Proclus: In Crat. 59. 20). Cf. Proclus: In Tim. l.
415, 30; Damasclus: Dubit. et Solut. II, 152, 23; lydus: De Mens, II, 4, 21,
16: Psellus: Expos (PG 122. 1152A): etc. later Neoplatonic testimonia should
be used cautiously since the original 'Chaldaean' principles are integrated in-
to more elaborate metaphysical schemata. See lewy: op. cit .. pp. 67-76 and
181-486.
23. Orac. Chald. fr. 7 (Psellus: Comm. (PG 122, 1140C)). Cf. Orac. Chald.
fr. 8 (Proclus: In Cmt. 51, 27-30).
24. Orac. Chald. fr. 169 (Proclus: In Crat. 52, 1-2). Cf. Proclus: In Tim. I,
610 NEOPLATONISM
(\IIUX.lJ apX,tyeve9A.o~)2S- also called 'Hecate, the always virginal

source' (EK<iTTt ... 1t11Yit ... TO 7tap9vov ou 7tpo'(e1aa).26 If Mar-
tianus did compose the prayer of Philology to the unseen prin-
ciples with his eye upon the Cha/daean Ortlcles, the reference
to the mysteries as 'Platonic' rather than as 'Chaldaean' suggests
that he found those oracles in a Neoplatonic commentary.
8. 2111 THE FIRST HYPOSTASIS
Of the three hypostases mentioned, it is the first to which

Martianus pays the greatest attention. He describes this- from
the subjective or epistemological viewpoint- as 'having reced-
ed even from the gods' knowledge' (ab ipsa etiam deorum
notitia recessisse).l"' However, it can be perceived by Philology
'when she concentrates her whole mind's vision' (tota mentis
acie coartata)2H and utters certain words with the voice of her
mind only. Martianus also describes the first hypostasis - from
the objective or ontological viewpoint - as 'having passed
beyond super-mundane blessedness' (extramundanas
408. 14-15; Damascius: Dubit. et Su/ut. I, 315, 22; 11, 152. 23: Lydus: De
Mens. IV, 53. 110, 9; etc. On the later Neop1atonic testimonies seen. 22.
25. Orac. Cbald. fr. 5 I (Prod us: In Remp. 11, 201, 14-16). Cf. Omc. Cbald.
fr. 96 (Psellus: Comm. (PG 122. 1141C)) .
.26. Orac. Cha/d. fr. 5.2 (Psellus: Comm. (PG 122, I 136A)). Cf. Orac.
Cbald. fr. 32 (Produs: In Tim. I. i.ZO, 1:\-16); fr. 35 (Damascius: Dublt. et
Solut. II. 135. 3-6); and fr. 50 (Damascius: Dubit. et So/ut. 11. 164. 19) .
.27. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. 11, .20.2. Cf. ibid. II, 185 'unknown father'
(ignotus pater ) and ibid. IX, 922 'inconceivable creator' (incogitabilis ef-
figientia). Cf. Omc. Chald. fr. I (Damascius: Dubit. et Solut. I, 154, 1626)
'that intelligible ... subsists beyond intellect' (to vontov EKEivo ... v6ou f~w
(mlip;(El); Porphyry: De Abstin. Ill, II, 3: In Pamz. II, 431 and X. 11-29 .
.28. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II, .ZO:\. Cf. Orac. Cba/cl. fr. I (Damascius:
Dubit. et Sol. 1, 154. 16-26) 'flame of intellect ... eye of the soul' (v6ou cpA.6~
... OJJJJQ 11/UXfi<;); fr. 49 (Prod us: In 1'im. Ill, li. 31 0) 'flower of intelle<.'l'
(v6ou iiv6o<;); and Porphyry: In Pann. II, 14-2"'.
MARTIAN US CAPELI.A 611
beatitudines transcendisse),l<J and as being a truth artsmg

from the non-existent' (ex non existentibuspo Furthermore, it
inhabits a 'fiery world' (empyrius mundus),31 can itself be
understood as 'fire' (ignis)3Z or as the 'flower of fire' (jlos ig-
nis),33 is associated with infinite 'depth' (profunditas),34
29. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II, .202. Cf. ibid. IX, 910 'supermundane
intdlcct' (extramtmdcma intellegentia). Cf. Urac. Cbaltl. fr. 18 (Produs: In
oat. 'ii. 2'i) 'the supermundane paternal depth' (6 imtpKOOI.lOc; natptKoc;
pueoc;): fr. 3 (Psellus: Comm. (PG 122 II44A)) 'The father has removed
himself' (6 natftp ilpnaaa&v ~aut6v); fr. 5 (Produs: In Tim. II, 57, 30-58, 2)
'the fire beyond' (nup E7tEK&tva); Porphyry: In Parm. IX, 1-3 'Others say that
it has removed itself from all things derived from it' (oi lit apnciaat autov EK
ncivnov nov autou &in6vt&c;): and Sent. 10, 4, 9-10 'the beyond' (to
E7tEK&\VQ).
30. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II, 206. Cf. Porphyry: In Pann. XII, 22-25
'The One which is heyond substance and being is neither being nor substance
nor activity' (to EV TO E7tEK&IVQ ouaiac; Kai Ovmc; Bv llEV OUK ~anv oulit ouaia
ouM tv&py&ta) and Sent. 26. I 'i. 9-13 'the non-being which is prior to being'
(to imtp to ov llTt Ov).
31. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II. 202. Cf. Orac. Chald. fr. 'i (Proclus: In
Tim. II, 'i7, 30-'i8 . .2) 'the craftsman of the fier-y world' (6 K60ilOU texvitnc;
nupiou). Cf. Prod us: In Tim. II, 57, 9-12 'They divide all things into the fiery,
the aetherial. and the material' (Tii ncivta litatp&ia9at &lc; Ell7tUptov aletptov
uA.aiov). Cf. Produs: In Tim. II, 58. 6-9; In Crat. 76, 2-3: Damascius: Dubit.
el Solut. II, 88, 18-24: and Psellus: Expos. (PG 122, 1149C-11 'i2A).
52. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. IX, 910. Cf. Urac. Chald. fr. 3 (Psellus:
Comm. (PG 122. 11HA)) 'He did not include his own fire in his intellectual
powl'r' (ouli 'tv ~fj liuvcill&l VOEP~ KA&iaac; ilitov nup): fr. 5 (Prod us: In Tim. II.
'i~ ..~O-'i8. 2) 'the fire beyond' (nup E7tEK&tva); fr. 6 (Simplicius: In De Caelu
II. I, 37'i, 19-.21) 'the primal fire'(nup nprotov); and fr. 36 (Proclus: In Crat.
';8, 14-1 'i) 'the implacable fire' (tlll&iAIKtov nup) .
.H. ~lartianus Capl'lht: /)t NufJt. II. .206. Cf. Omc. Om/d. fr. :r:" (Proclus:
lu Parm. HOO . .20-1-101. .:; ) intcllec!llal thoughts whkh pluck the abundant
llowlr of fire from thl' paternal sourle (~vvotat vo&pai 7tfi'Yiic; 7tatptKf(c; ano,
rrouA.G lip&7tTOilEVat nupoc; av9oc;) ;md fr. I :\0 (l'roclus: In Tim. Ill. .266.
I'J-2:\) 'The soul plucks the soul-sustaining flower of the fiery fruits whkh
lbnnd' (IVUXTt Kanovtwv/Cil7tUpiwv l)p7t&tat Kapnrov IVUXOtpOIJIOV av9oc;).
:\.f. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II, 204. Cf. Orac. Chald. fr. 18 (Proclus:
612 NEOPLATONISM
relates to all things as 'father' (pater})'S and can also manifest

itself as 'power' (l'is).~6 or 'intellect' (inte/legentiap-:r Finally, he
describes the first hypostasis as 'containing the whole world'
(unit,ersum tatum coercere)?IH and as being a truth which is 'ex-
istent' (existens).?l9 Taken as a whole, this account includes
some elements which can be paralleled only in the Chaldaean
Oracles, others which can be paralleled in the Chaldaean
Omcles and in Porphyry. and others which can be paralleled
In Crat. 57. 25) 'the supermundane paternal depth (6 (mtpKOOJ.LOc; natptKoc;

13u96c;). Cf. Proclus: In Tim. I. 312, 7: Damascius: Dubit. et Solut. l, 27L 8:
and Simplicius: In Pbys. 6IL 6. Cf. Porphyry: De Regr. Anim. fr. 6. 3.-\'
I 1-13 'his height and depth (altitudo eius profunditasque).
35. Martianus Capdla: De Nupt. II. 204. Cf. Omc. Cbald. fr. 3 (Psellus:
Comm. (PG 122. 1144A)); fr. 7 (Psellus: Comm. (PG 122. II40C)); fr. 22
(Proclus: In Parm. 1091. 6-8); fr. 29 (lydus: De Mens. II, 8, 28, 7); etc. Cf.
Porphyry: DeRegr. Anim. fr. 4, 32" 23-25; fr. 6. 33' 9-24; fr. 8, 36' 15-17;
fr. 9, 37' 7-9: fr. II I I. 39' 4- 40' 16; etc.
36. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II, ISS. Cf. Orac. Clmld. fr. I (Oamascius:
Dubit. et Solut. I. 1S4. 16-26); fr. 49 (Proclus: In Tim. Ill. 1-4, 3-10 'force'
(cii..Ktl): fr. -4 (Proclus: 111 A/cib. 37. 14): fr. 5 (Proclus: In Tim. II. S7. 30-SB, 2)
'power' (OUVaJ,nc;); fr. 37 (Proclus: In Parm. 800. 20-80 I. 5): fr. 77 (Psellus:
Comm. (PG 122, 1149A) 'will' (13oul..tl)): Porphyry: In Parm. IX. 1-8 'power'
(ouvaJ,nc;); and De Regr. Anim. fr. 7, 35 26-29 'will' (mluntas) .
.'\7. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. IX, 910. Cf. Orac:. Cba/d. fr. 4 (Proclus: In
Alcib. 37. 14); fr. 5 (Proclus: In Tim. ll, S7, 30-58, 2); fr. 20 (Produs: In Tim.
III. 102, 10-11); fr. 37 (Proclus: In Pann. BOO, 20-801, 5); etc. Cf. Porphyry:
In Parm. IX, 1-8; De Regr. Anim. fr. 7, 35 26-29; fr. 8, 36' 15-17; fr. 9, 37'
7-9; fr. 10, 37' 21-24; etc.
38. M:trtianus Capella: Dt lVupt. II. 20.'\-204. Cf. Omc. Clmld. fr. 21
(Damascius: Dubit. et Sulut. l, 147, 27) 'He is all things, hut intelligihly so'
(ncivt'Eati yap, aHa VOlltc;): Porphyry: Sent. 10, 4, '-10 'They arc in the
beyond in an unintdligihle and superessential way' (EV Of: tl(l E7tEK&tva avev-
vonroc; t& Kai U7t&pouairoc;); and Sent . .-\I, 21, 9 'God is en~rywherc because
he is nowhere' (6 eeoc; navmxou <"m OUOaJ.IOU).
39. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II. 206. Cf. ibid. VII. 731 'The monad
:~lone exists' (monas ....mlum ipsam esse). Cf. Porphyry: In Parm. XII. 2S-27
'He is himself hcing who is hefore heing' (Kai auto TO &Ivai TO npo TOU ovtoc;).
MARTIANlJS CAPELLA
only in Porphyry.4o In the first category come the notions that

the supreme principle is located in a fiery realm and can itself be
viewed as fire or the flower of fire: these quasi-material inter-
pretations of its nature also occur in the Cbaldaean OracleS4 I
but are generally avoided by Porphyry. 42 In the second category
must be placed the doctrines that the supreme principle
transcends knowledge although it is accessible to a certain in-
tellectual faculty; and that it lies beyond all things, is
characterized by infinite depth, and contains the world, such
statements implying a simultaneous transcendence and im-
manence of the principle being equally typical of the
10. Anempts to draw parallels with Martianus' other main philosophical

source: Apuleius will prove to yield fewer results. Although Apulcius refers
to an intellective faculty called 'the eyes of the mind' (oculi mentis) (De Plat.
I. 6. 193). to the first principle as 'father' (genitor. parem. pater) (Apol. 64:
De Deo Socr. 3. 124; De Plat. I. 5. 190; De Mundo 30. 357) and so on, the
fact that these are commonplaces of the Platonic tradition - the former no-
tion derives from Plato: Rep. VII, 53 3d and the Iauer from Plato: Tim. 2Rc-
limits their validity as indications of Martian us' direct philosophical sources.
Furthermore. Apuleius and the later writer differ on certain crucial points of
terminology: for example 'supermundane' is ultramundanus at Apuleius: De
Plat. I. II. 204 but extramundanus in Marti anus.
41. See nn. 31-33. These ideas are discussed by Lewr: op. cit .. pp. 77-78
and Lenaz: Martian/ Cclpellae De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii Liber Secun-
dus. pp. 39-4 I.
42. Porphyry: De Regr. Anim. fr. 2, 29" 1-7: fr. 4. 32" 23-25: and fr. 6,
3-f 24-25 speaks of a 'fiery' (empyrius) realm. By this he me:ms. in accor-
dance with the teaching of the Cbaldllean Orllcles. the periphery of the
physical cosmos. However, he differs from the latter in understanding this as
the abode of the highest embodied souls rather than of God - these souls
have ascended as high as possible while still embodied in their semi-material
vehicles; furthermore, their ascent to this level has been achieved by theurgic
purifications - and by identifying it with the 'aetherial' (aetherius) region
rather than contrasting it. Porphyry's restriction of the Cbaldaean Oracles'
original sense. which also perhaps underlies his account of the soul's vehicle
at Sent. 29, 18, 14-19, 13. results from his greater concern for distinguishing
metaphysical and physical levels. See pp. 558-560.
6J.i NEOPLATONISM
Cba/daean Oracles~3and Porphyry. H In the second category

should also be placed the doctrine that the supreme principle
relates to other things as a father and is also manifested as power
and intellect: these accounts suggesting that the principle is ac-
tually triadic in nature conform to a doctrine which occurs in
both the Cba/daean Orac/es45 and Porphyry.46 In the third
category comes the notion that the supreme principle is a truth
which arises from the non-existent although it is itself exis-
tent47, such ambivalent indications of its ontological status not
occurring in the Cba/daean Oracles but being fairly common in
Porphyry. <t8
43. See nn. 27-29, .Hand 38.

44. See nn. 27-29, 34 and 38.
15. See nn. 35-37. These ideas are discussed by Lewy: op. cit., pp. 78-83
and Hadot: Porpbyreet Victorinus, pp. 261-262 .
.:16. Since Martianus refers to the three terms only in passing and in scat-
tered passages. it is impossible to determine whether he understands them
within the simpler schema of the original Cbaldaecm Oracles or within Por-
phyry's more elaborate one. The original schema seems to have visualized the
following series of higher principles:
triad I father power intellect
triad 2 second intellect
triad 3 the Forms
Interpreting this scheme in terms of certain Neoplatonic metaphysical ideas:
(i) that of identifying the triad of father, power, intellect with the triad of be-
ing, life, intellect; and (ii) that of repeating the triad of father, power, in-
tellect with different predominances of its constituent clements, Porphyry
seems to have arrived at the following series:
triad I father power
being life intellect
triad 2 father power
being life intellect
triad 3 father power
hdng life intellect
It should be noted that Porphyry's aim was to systematize the various details
already present in the tradition.
47. Sec nn. 30 and .'\9.
iR. Sec nn. 30 and 39.
MARTIAN ITS CAPEl. LA 6IS
H.2112 THE SECOND HYPOSTASIS AS A PLURALITY OF IN-

TELLECTS
The second of the three hypostases mentioned in the passage

cited earlier - the so-called 'Twice Beyond' (Sic; f:n&KEtva) -
corresponds to the secondary intellect of the Chaldaean system
and the Intellect of its Neoplatonic version. According to both
doctrines this hypostasis is not simply a unity but a unity in
plurality, a feature which seems to be reflected in Martianus'
own development of these ideas. 49 Thus, when Philology
alights from the palanquin by the sphere of fixed stars and
finishes her silent prayer to the supreme god, she addresses the
presiding gods of the intellectual world and their attendants
who are venerated by the powers of the sensible sphere'
(intellectualis mundi praesules dei eorumque ministri sen-
sibilis spbaerae potestatibus venerandr), c;o before completing
-t9. For the multiplicity of intellect in the Clm/daemr Omc/es sec Omc.
Chait/. fr. I (Damascius: Dubit. et So/ut. I. I S4. 16-26) where the power
derived from the father is 'tl:tshin~ot with intellectual divisions' (VOf:paic;
cnptintouaa tOJ,1aimv) and fr. 37 (Proclus: In Ptlnll. 800, 20-80 I, S) where
lhl Forms emanating from the father were divided into other intellectual
Forms having been separated br intellectual fire' (EJ.1Epia9T]aav voep<jl nupi
J.101pl]9&iaat/eic; ciA.A.ac; voepti:c;). For the same doctrine in Neoplatonism sec
Porphyry: SePII. 22, 13. 13-16 'Thc intcllcctual substance has simihtrity bet-
ween whole and parts. so that the beings exist both in the particular and in
the l'omplcte intcllect. But in the universal intclkct en:n particular things cx-
ist universally. in the particular intellect even universal things particularly' (tl
VOEpa ouaia OJ.10lOJ.1EPt'lc; tanv, ci>c; Kai tv t<\Jj.!EptK<\J v<j> dvat tO. ovta Kai F.v
HlJ 7tQVti:J,Ei(!)' ai..A'f.v J.1t':V t<\J Ka90AOU KOi tQ J.lEptKQ Ka90AIKWc;, EV Of: t<\J
J.lEptK<jl Kai tQ Ka96A.ou J.1EptKWc;).
SO. Martianus Capclla: De Nupt. II, 203. The reference to a multiplicity of
intellects has madc this passage one of the pieces of e\'idencc adduced by sup-
pontrs of the thcsis that Marli:mus is influenced by the Neoplatonist
lamblichus. SeeR. Turcan: 'Martianus Capella et Jamblique', Rerue des etudes
Ia tines :\6 ( 1958) pp. 235-254. It is testified that lamblichus wrote a commen-
tary upon the Cha/daean Oracles in at least twenty-eight books (Damascius:
616 NEOPI.ATONISM
her invocation to the three gods of the Platonic mysteries and

turning towards the Milky Way. Martianus' description clearly
indicates that he visualizes a number of intellectual principles,
and this is borne out by the frequent references to the gods as
intellects elsewhere in his text. The most important of those
references, which I shall cite by grouping them according to the
particular god mentioned, are the following:
(i)]upiter. In one passage. Jupiter describes Mercury as the in-
terpreter 'of my mind, the sacred intellect' (meae mentis, 6 vouc;
sacer). 'It The reference to an intellect in the Greek technical
language seems to reflect the important function of this term in
both the Chaldaean'l2 and Neoplatonic'l.'\ systems, while the allu-
sion to an intellect associated specifically with Jupiter recalls the
Porphyrian doctrine of intellects relating to each of the
planetary spheres.'~"~ In another text, the monad is identified
Dub it. et Solut. l, 86, S-6 and I, 154. 13-14) and therefore possible that Mar-
tian us found his oracular texts embedded in this treatise. However, the argu-
ment (Turcan: op. cit.. p. 253) that the occurrence of the term intellectualis
in the present passage shows lamblichean influence is inconclusive. since the
corresponding Greek word voEp6c; is used extensively in the writings of Por-
phyry (see Porphyrii Sententiae ad 11llelligibilla Ducentes, edidlt E.
Lamberz (Stuttgart. 1975). index verborum s. v.). It is simpler to postulate the
influence of Porphyry whose philosophy was widely known in the Latin
West and is mentioned explicitly by Firmicus Matcrnus, Macrobius.
Augustine, and others. See Courcelle: op. cit., pp. 217-219 and n. 74. A fur-
ther passage where some scholars have appealed to the influence of
lamblichus will be discussed inn. 124.
<;I. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. I. 92. Willis mist:1kcnly reads lmnos.
52. Sec pp. 609-610.
S3. Sec pp. <;3<;-538.
54. Sec Porphyry: In Tim. fr. 20 (Proclus: In Tim. I. 159. 25-27) 'the in-
tellect of the moon ... the intellect of the sun' (vouc; I:EA11V1aK6c; ... HA.laKoc;
vouc;). At iiJid. fr. 52 (Proclus: In Tim. I. 422, 5-26) Porphyry states regarding
the planetary intellects that 'in them the part is a whole, for all things which
are in the whole universally arc in each individual particul:uly, owing to the
unification of intclligibile Forms' (v KEivmc; to J.LEpoc; oA.ov ati' mi.vta yap
MARTIANlJS CAPELLA 61""
with Jupiter the father of all things because of 'the causative

power of its ideal and intellectual form' (idea/is illius intellec-
tualisque speciei vis causativa). '5'5 Here, the association of the
ideal and the intellectual reflects the doctrine common to
Chaldaean, '56 Neopythagorean, 57 and Neoplatonic'5H writers that
the plurality of Forms is contained within the intellect, although
the association of those terms with the monad seems to recall
the Neopythagorean version of this teaching more precisely.
(ii) Atbene. Book VI of Martianus' work begins with a lengthy
aretology of this divinity which provides us with some useful
information. In the course of this, it is revealed that Athene is
'the summit of reason and the sacred intellect of gods and men'
(ration is apex divumque bominumque sacer nus). '59 Once
again the inclusion of the Greek technical term for an intellect
seems to reflect the central role of this concept in both the
Chaldaean6o and Neoplatonic61 systems, although the reference
to an intellect associated particularly with Athene recalls the
Neoplatonic interest in the Hellenic pantheon62 rather than the
tanv tv CKQOTQ> J.lEPIK<i:Jc; oaa tcj> 6/..Q> navtEI..<i:Jc; 6u'.t tijv fvwmv t<i:JV VOllTWV
Ei6<i:Jv) thereby applying to planetary intellects the principle discussed in n.
19. At ibid. fr. 79 (Proclus: In Tim. III, 64, 8-65, 7) a more complex schema
relating each of the planets to 'being' (ouaia). 'life' (~wi)). and 'intellect'
(vouc;) is expounded.
55. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. VII, 731.
56. Seen. 49.
57. See Nicomachus ofGerasa at Ps.-lamblichus: 11Jeol. tlrithm. 5, f. Iff.
The innuence of Nicomachus (directly or indirectly) upon this part of De
Nuptiis has been summarized by Stahl: M"rtianus Cape/let tt1UI tbe Sete!l
Ubeml Arts I. pp. -18-49.
SR. See pp. 535-538.
';9. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. VI, 567. At ibid. VI. 5"' I she is characteriz-
td as 'the nower of fire' (ignisflos).
60. See pp. 609-610.
61. See pp. 535-538.
62. For the interpretation of At hcne in :"1/eoplatonism see Porphyry: De An-
tr. Nymph. 31. 30. 11-33. 32. -:-r. In the Porphyrian system Athene seems to
618 NEOPlATONISM
Chaldaean preoccupation with oriental divinities.6.1 In the

course of the aretology, it is also revealed that Athene is the
'intellect and understanding of fate, the mind of the world'
(mens et so/lertiafati, I ingenium mundi)M- the statement in-
dicating that the goddess corresponds to the intellect of the en-
tire cosmos which performed a major role in StoicM and
NeoplatonicM thought; and that she is 'the circle of the blazing
aether' (/lammantis circulus aethrae'f'' - these words sug-
gesting that the goddess is equivalent to the intellect of the out-
most sphere in the Varronian theology. 6H
(iii) The sun. During her ascent through the planetary spheres
have played at least two specifically astronomical roles: (i) At Macrobius:

Saturn. l, 17. 70 she is a 'power of the sun' (L'irtus so/is) and (ii) at Porphyry:
In Tim. fr. 22 (Proclus: In Tim. l, 165, 16-23) she is 'in the moon' (tv
cn:i..itvu). in addition
to her regular function as a source of rationality. For the
reflection of these notions in Martianus see J. Preaux: "Pallas, tertia Lunae',
I.e m(mde grec. Pensee, litterafllre. blstolre, documents. Hommages ci C.
Pteaux, cdites par J. Bingen, G. Cambier, et G. Nachtergael (Bruxelles, 1975 ),
pp. 34.'\-352.
63. Athene and the other Hellenic divinities play no role in the extant
fragments of the Cbaldaean Oracles, although they naturally enter into the
later Neoplatonic exegeses of these texts. The principal dhinities of the
Chaldaean system are the oriental ones: Aion. the sun, and Hecate. On the
role of A ion see l.ewy: op. t'it., pp. 99-105, on that of the sun Lewy: op. cit ..
pp. 1;\7-IS7, and on that of Hecate Lewy: op. cit., pp. 83-98. It therefore
seems likely that Martianus' descriptions of the classical Greek gods derive
not from the Cbaldaean Orades but from some Ncoplatonic text, although
one cannot exclude the possibility that he harmonized the various
theological systems himself.
64. Martian us Capella: De Nupt. VI. 567.
65. See pp. H18-822.
66. Sec pp. 548-551.
67. Marti;mus Capella: De Nupt. VI, S67.
68. Sec Varro: Antiqu. fr. 20S (Macrobius: Sclfllrn.llJ, .f, 8) and fr. 206
(Augustine: Cil.. Dei VII, 28 (\.CSl 47, 2 I 0-211 )). The influence of Varro
upon this part of De Nuptils has been discussed by Stahl: Martianus Capella
and tbe Seten Liberal Arts I, pp. 44-48.
MARTIANt IS CAPELLA 619
to the conclave of the gods, Philology stops in prayer to the sun

who occupies the middle position in the celestial system. Her
prayer refers to the sun as 'the source of intellect' (mentisfons),
as the being 'whose three letters form the sacred name and sign
of intellect' (cui littera trina I conformal sacrum mentis
cognomen et omen), and as 'the father of intellect' (pater men-
tis).61.J Although the Greek technical term for an intellect is not
actually included in this passage, the corresponding Latin title of
this Chaldaean'O and Neoplatonic71 principle is prominent. Fur-
thermore, the reference to an intellect associated specifically
with the sun recalls the Chaldaean72 and Neoplatonic73 teaching
that the visible sun depends upon a prior intellective one.
Philology's prayer also speaks of the sun as 'the power of the
unknown father' (ignoti vis patris), as his 'first offspring'
(prima propago), as 'alone in honor after the father' (so/us
honore post patrem), and as 'the countenance of the father'
(l!U/tus paternus)"'4 - a group of statements indicating that the
intellect of the sun possesses that closest relation to the first
principle which characterizes Aion in the Chaldaean system7s or
69. Martianus Capdla: De Nupt. II. 193 (uncertain reading).

70. Sec pp. 609-610.
71. Sccpp. 535-538.
:2. The Chaldaean doctrine of the higher sun is menth>nl'd hy Prod us: In
Tim. 111, 83. 11-17 and Psellus: Expos. (PG 122. 115lA). At Produs: In Tim.
III. 36. 17-22 this principle is described as 'the time of time' (x_povou x_povoc;).
therehy implying that il is equivalent to the Chaldae:m divinity Aion which is
similarly characterized. The latter is described at Orac. Chald. fr. 49 (Proclus:
In Tim. 111. 1-!, 3-1 0) in language closely mirroring Martian us' prayer to the
sun. The doctrine of the higher sun and its relation to Aion has been fully
discussed hy l.ewy: op. cit .. pp. 99-105 and 1-!9-155.
i 3. An attempt to reconstruct this doctrine in its Porphyrian form has been
made in connection with Macrohius. See pp. 555-562.
~-I. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. 11. 185. 188. and I'H.
~5. An:ording to the Chaldaean system. Aion is the highest principle after the
fathlr. his power. and his imdlect. See l.ewy: op. cit .. pp. 99-105. This expl:tim
why it can he described by Orac. Cbald. fr. -i9 (Prod us: 111 Tim. 111. H. 3-10) a~
6.W NEOPLATONISM
at least the intellectual sun in Porphyry's solar theology."'<> The

prayer finally refers to the sun as that which 'the whole world
invokes under various names' (rario cunctus ... nomine con-
meat orbis), giving a selection of names like Osiris, Mithras, and
Attis as illustrations.7 7 Although the doctrine that all the gods
can be interpreted as aspects of a single principle is not stated in
the extant Chaldaean fragments, it seems to have been
employed by the contemporary writer Numenius who often
parallels their teaching.-:-s In addition, the notion that all the
gods can be interpreted as aspects of the sun specifically is the
basis of the Porphyrian treatise reported at length by
Macrobius. "'9
(iv) Mercury. In one passage, the Muse Thalia describes Mer-
cury as the divinity through whom 'the alert and comely in-
tellect of the mind fills the remotest depths' (vigil decensque I
nus mentis ima complet).HO Once again the reference to an in-
'alone having plucked abundantly the flower of intellect from the father's powt'r
and ahlt tu percei\'c the paternal intellect' (nol..u yap ll6voc; EK rrarpoc;
uhf]c;/cSpEijiQjlEVoc; v6ou iiv9oc; E;(EI TO voEiv 1tUTptKOV VOUV). Here. there arc the
Mriking parallels With Marti:mus' address to the sun: 1tUTpoc; ai..Kf]c; = 1is patris.
narpoyevtc; =prima pmpago. jlovoc; =so/us. etc. Smh similarities of expression
lend further support to the thesi~ that the intdlecti\e sun of Marrianus is
tquivalcm 10 the Aion of the Cba/dcwtm Orades. On the doctrine of Aion in late
:mtiquity sec A.~J. fcstugiere: L(l nlt.ilaticm d'Het7nes Tristtufgiste IV: Le Dieu in-
cmmu et Ia (;noS' (Paris, 19'H ). pp. I '52-199.
76. Sec n. 7_-\.
-n. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II. 191-192.
7H. This reduction of polytheism to monotheism is implied in Numcnius:
fr. S-4 (Macrohius: Saturn. I. 17. 6S) where Apollo's name cStl..qHoc; is held to
signify the unity of tht' divint' realm. It presumably also un<krlit's tht' inter-
pretations in Numcnius: fr. '57 (l.ydus: De Mens. IV. HO. I ~2. 11-1 S). etc. of
Ht'rmts. Htphacstus. and Nt'mt'sis. Howevt'r. thert' is no cvidcnct' 10 suggest
th:u this reduction of polytheism to monotheism postulates a prim:try roll'
for the sun.
79. Sc:c n. - ~-
80. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. ll. 126. The writer actually altrihutes
MARTIANUS CAPELLA 621
rellect in the Greek technical language seems to reflect the cen-

tral role of this term in both the ChaldaeanBI and Neoplatonic82
systems, while the allusion to an intellect associated particularly
with Mercury recalls Porphyry's doctrine of intellects cor-
responding to each of the planetary spheres.H.~ In another text,
Mercury is related to Jupiter as the latter's 'trust. speech.
beneficence and truthful genius' (/ides, sermo, benignitas I ac
terus genius).H-4 Here, the association between the two
divinities reflects the doctrine shared by Chaldaean and
Neoplatonic writingsso; that the various intellects are parls of a
single whole.
Our examination of the descriptions of the various gods has
revealed a number of suggestions that Martianus does not
understand these principles as being disconnected from one
another. Thus, Jupiter and Mercury interrelate as thought and
expression, Athene is described as the intellect of all the gods,
and the sun is identified as the bearer of all the gods' names. An
even dearer indication of this situation is contained in a
reference to Athene as 'alone completing the nine, a single in-
tellect for all the Muses' (sola no11em complens, Musis mens om-
nibus una).B6 In other words, we are informed that the in-
tellects of the nine Muses are united not only with one another
but also with the intellect of Athene. That the various divine
these characteristics to Mercury and Philology, but this fact does not
diminish the validity of the present conclusion.
81. See pp. 609-610.
82. See pp. 535-538.
83. Seen. 54.
84. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. 1.92.
85. Seep. 615 ff.
86. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. VI, 574. Since ibid. I. 27-28 associates the
nine Muses with the sphere of fixed stars, the:: seven planets, and the earth. we
must understand Athene as representing a universal intellect which embraces
a plurality of planetary intellects. This helps to confirm the conclusion of nn.
5f and 83. On the Muses as interpreted by the present author sec J. Preaux:
622 NEOPLATONISM
principles interrelate in this way results from the derivation of

the whole scheme from the Chaldaean and Neoplatonic
background. According to their teachings the second hypostasis
is not simply a unity or simply a plurality but a unity in plurali-
ty.ti"'
8.2113 THE SECOND HYPOSTASIS AS A PLURALITY OF

FORMS
The second of the three hypostases mentioned in the passage

quoted earlier - that described as the 'Twice Beyond' (oic;
enEKElVa) - has a further aspect according to the Chaldaean
and Neoplatonic systems. This is its function as the container of
the transcendent Forms according to which the visible world
has been patterned by the creator god.HH Martianus seems to
underline this further aspect of the second hypostasis in a
passage where Jupiter is depicted as tracing out on a sphere em-
bossed with figures all the events which he will bring to pass.
More precisely this object is described as 'a kind of sphere
engraved with a multiple variety ... it had been compounded
from all the elements ... on it were the entire heaven, the air, the
seas, and the diversity of the earth ... all types of living creatures
in hoth species and genus ... this sphere seemed a kind of image
'Le culte des Muses chez Martianus Capella'. Melanges de pbilosopbie, de

litterature, et d'bistoire ancimne offerts a P. Royanci (Rome, 1974), pp.
5"79-614.
87. Sec n. -49.
HH. For intellect as container of Forms in the Cbaldaean Oracles see the
passages cited inn. -19. For the same doctrine in Neoplatonism see Porphyry:
Sent. .:i 3. i6. 12-1 i 'If the intelligibles arc a plurality- for Intellect knows a
plurality and not simply one - then lntcllel't is itself nelessarily a plurality'
(Ei fl 7tOAAcl tel VOfltU - 7tO;l..Aci yap 0 vouc; VOE\ Kai OUX EV -, 7tOAAcl av Eill tl;,
avciyKflc; Kai aut6c;). This represents the conclusion of a lengthy argument
beginning at ibid. -t3, i4. 7.
MARTIAN! IS CAPELLA
or idea of the world' (quandam sphaeram ,caelatam tJarietate

mulliplici ... ex omnibus compacta fuemt elementis ... i/lic
coelum omne, aer. jieta diversitasque tel/uris ... cunctarum-
tflll' series aninumtum tam in specie quam in genere ... quae
quidem spbaera imago quaedam videbatur ideaque mzmdi).89
This brief text contains many features which help to place it in
rdation to the philosophical tradition. In the first place, the
reference to the visible world's pattern as a sphere seems in-
debted to the Neoplatonic notion of the intelligible cosmos as a
sphere (crcpaipa )90; secondly, the presence of the four elements
and the living creatures among the figures engraved upon the
sphere accords with the prevailing tendency of late antiquity to
restrict the traditional Platonic Forms to precisely these two
categories91; and finally, the reference to the visible world's pat-
tern as an image involves a curious use of terminology perhaps
only paralleled in Apuleiusn. The depiction of Jupiter as tracing
out events on an embossed sphere is not the only allusion to the
transcendent Forms in Martianus, for elsewhere he praises the
qualities of the number three by saying that it corresponds to
the perfection of the universe. This is demonstrated to be the
case because 'we associate the monad with the creator god, the
dyad with the generative matter, and the triad therefore with
the ideal Forms' (monadem fabricatori deo, dyadem materiae
procreanti, triatlem idealibus formis consequenter ap-
tamus)93. This passage also contains various features which
hdp to place it in relation to the earlier philosophical tradition.
H9. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. I, 61-1. The: logical function of Forms (;ts
genera and species) is discussed at ibid. IV. 3h-34S.
90. Sc:e Plotinus: Emz. V, I /10/1'1, 11'1-22; VI. c; /23/4. 20-2';; Marius \'il"
tori nus: Adz. Arium I. 60. I. 131: and Damasdus: Dubit. et Solut. I. .:\0 I.
2H-;'102, I.
91. See pp. 290-292.
92. See ch. 4, nn. 286 and 302.
9:t M:lrlianus Capella: De Nupt. VII. 7;'13. Thl production of Forms from
the: monad (equivalent to Jupiter) is also described at ibid. VII. 7 .~I.
NEOPLATONISM
In the first place, the reference to the first principles as a triadic

schema consisting of God, Matter, and the Forms is clearly in-
debted to the doxographical tradition of late antiquity94:
secondly the interpretation of the first principles in terms of the
arithmetical notions of monad, dyad, and triad recalls certain
doctrines of the Neopythagoreans9'i, the Chaldaean Oracles%,
and the Neoplatonists97 . It must be admitted that neither of
these two passages dealing with the transcendent Forms ex-
plicitly states that these are contained within the second
hypostasis. However. their close involvement with Jupiter's
providential activity and their causal dependence upon the
monad and dyad suggest that this is the case.
8.212 THE GODS AS HEAVENLY BODIES
The second kind of theology occurring in Martianus Capella

is astronomical, and this can be summarized in a much less ex-
tensive discussion9H. Scholars like J. Seznec have demonstrated
how the tendency to interpret the classical gods as heavenly
bodies, which is quite restrained in the time of Plato and Aristo-
tle, gradually increases in later antiquity under the influence of
94. See pp. 242-246.

9';. Scc Nil'omachus of Gcr:tsa at Ps.-lamhlkhus: Tbeo/ . .-lrilhm. I<;, 17. I ,j
ff. and Moderallls of Gades at Simplkius: /11 Phys. I, 7 2.~0. ~ ... ff.
96. Sn Orac. 0Jald. fr. ~I (D:unascius: IJu!Jit. el Solut. II. 6:\. 21-2~1 'From
thtsc two tlows the bond of thc t1rst triad. whkh is not actually thc 11rstlnn that
in whkh the imdli~ihlcs arc measured' (i:~ c'.q.upolv Bti t<i.lvOE p&Et tpiaooc; OEJ.la
npcinrtc;loiiortc; ou 7tpWtrtc;. aU'ou til VOrttii jlEtpEitat). Tht notions of monad.
dyad. and triad otcur frequcmly in th~: Cba/daean Oracles as dots tht notion
thatthl' Form~ arc triadil'. Sec Ltwy: op. cit .. pp. 10~-1 1"'.
97. See Plotinus: Enn. V. 1/10/ <;, 6-19; V. 417/2, 7-12; VI, 6/~4/4, 1-24;
etc.
9H. It will perhaps he noted that our discussion of the intellectual theology
has only dealt with two of the three hypostases. This is h~:causc there arc no
passages ~iving us any further information about the third hypostasis: Soul.
MARTIAN US CAPELLA 62<;
oriental religious ideas99. That Martianus is a typical example of

this later tradition is indicated by countless details not only in
the mythical narrative but also in the astronomical discussion of
Book VII
Astronomy begins her address to the assembled gods by
stressing her diffidence in expounding the various motions of
the heavens to those who perform those motions, thereby
showing not just that the heavenly bodies are divine but that
they correspond to the divinities who figure in the narrative roo.
The same fact emerges from other parts of the text, for example
from the account of Philology's ascent through the cosmos to
the conclave of the gods. Here, the maiden rises successively by
one semitone to the circle of the moon-beholding a spherical
body which reflects various images in its shining surfacelllt-,
by a semitone to Mercury's circle102, by another semitone to the
circle of Venus where the goddess appears in human forml03,
by an interval of one and a half tones to the sun's circle where
she sees a fiery ship emblazoned with the images of a cat (the
symbol of the moon), a lion (signifying the sun itself), and a
crocodile (the symbol of time), and then prays to the sun as con-
troller of all the other planetary gods' motions because of its
median position in relation to their orbits ro4, by one semi tone
to the circle of Mars-observing the place from which the river
Phlegethon flows to the underworld wo;_, by a semi tone to
99. Sec). Sczncc: La surtitcmce des diell.\' allfiques. Essai sur /e 1'(1/1! de Ia
traditirm mytbologique dans l'bumanisme et dans /'art de Ia Renaissance
(London, 1940), pp. 3540.
100. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. VIII, 812.
I 0 I. Ibid. II, 169170.
IO.l.lbid. II, 171180.
I 03. Ibid. II, 181. This appc:uancc in the anthropomorphic mode docs
not, given Martianus' way of writing, preclude the goddess' simultaneous
manifestation as a planet.
IIH.Ibid. II, 182193.
105.1bid. II, 194-195.
616 :'IIEOP!.ATONISM
Jupiter's circle 106, by another semitone to the circle of Saturn

where the god also appears in human formlo:, and by an inter-
val of one and a half tones to the fixed stars' circle where she
surveys the decans, the eighty-four attendants (astral spirits),
and the celestial circles, and then prays to the invisible Father
who administers the whole cosmos from his abode in the em-
pyrian realmlos_ That the heavenly bodies are divine and
specifically correspond to divinities who take part in the
dramatic action is also suggested elsewhere, for example in the
passage where Mercury and Apollo arc actually depicted as be-
ing transformed from the anthropomorphic to the planetary
state IO<J.
This interpretation is easily confirmed when one compares
the descriptions of the sun at the council of the gods and in
Philology's prayer respectively, for many of the same features
are stressed in both the anthropomorphic and non-
anthropomorphic accounts. Thus, in the former the sun is said
to irradiate light from his head and in the latter to be the origin
of light; Ito in the former he wears jewels symbolizing the other
heavenly bodies and in the latter his ship is emblazoned with
their animal symbols; 111 in the former the sun's jewels also sym-
bolize the four seasons and in the latter his chariot is guided by
the four horses corresponding to them; 112 in the former the ir-
radiating light conceals his head from the onlookers and in the
latter his derivation from the unknown Father.ll3 Of course,
106. /hid. II. 196.

107. Ibid. II, 197. On th~ app~ar:mce uf the god in an anthropomorphic
mod~ set n. 105.
IOH. Ibid. II, 19H-206.
I 09. /hid. I. .~0.
110. /hit/. I. '73 and II, IHS.
111./hitl. I. '7'; and II, IH3.
I 12. Ibid. I. "'S and II. I HlJ.
115. Ibid. I. "'Sand II. IHS.
MARTIANlJS CAPELLA
there are differences between the two accounts, when the

former depicts the sun as having winged feet, being dressed in a
scarlc:t cloak flecked with gold, and carrying a torch 11-1 -
features which do not recur in the latter; and when the latter
describes him as obeyed by the circle of aether, holding a mid-
dle course in the cosmos, and controlling the other heavenly
hodies11'i- features which did not occur in the former. Never-
thdess. the descriptions of the sun at the council and in
Philology's prayer obviously apply to the same divinity, thereby
revealing a duality of symbolism which underlies much of Mar-
tianus' text. 116
H. 213 THE GODS AS SPIRITS
The starting point for a consideration of Martian us spiritual

theology is provided by a description of the different regions of
the heavens to which jupiter's messengers are dispatched in
order to summon the gods to the divine conclave. Here, the
writer states that there are sixteen regions of the heavens of
which the first contains the homes of Jupiter, the 'conciliar
gods' (dii Consentes) or Penates, the Lares, janus. and others;
the second the homes of Jupiter, Mars Quirinus, the 'military
Lar' (Lar militaris), and further divinities; and so on.J 1., Much
of the detail in this account is obscure, although a survey of the
divinities named suggests certain facts. First. some of the gods
appear several times: Jupiter in the first. second, and third
regions. Mars Quirinus in the second and sixth regions, the Lares
I 11. Ibid. I, 76-77.

I I';. Ibid. II. UiSIIP.
I I Cl. for a survey of the scientific details of Martianus' astronomy stc W.
H. Stahl: Roman Science. Origins. Derelopment and Influence to tbe Later
,\fidclle Ages (Madison, WI, 1962), pp. I 79- I89.
I I~. Martianus Capdla: De Nupt. I. 4<;-61.
628 NEOPLATONISM
in the first, second, fourth, and ninth regions. liB If one inter-
prets the conciliar gods as comprising the traditional list and
allows for the alternative names of single divinities. then the
repetition in the whole scheme is further increased. Secondly,
the gods are classified according to their abodes in sixteen
regions of the heaven, clearly suggesting that they are
distributed through the four cardinal points of the compass. An
examination of similar discussions in Cicero,lllJ Pliny's
Natura/is Historia, 12o and Servius 121 indicates that the
Etruscans had arrived at a division of the heaven into sixteen
regions by multiplying the compass points. Thirdly, the ar-
rangement of the gods seems to imply a hierarchy: thus, Jupiter
and the conciliar gods appear in the first, second, and third
regions, while the lower ranking gods are mentioned in the fif-
teenth and sixteenth regions.l22 However, since there also
seems to be a hierarchical arrangement within each group of
four regions. the whole scheme is already more complex than a
simple descending sequence from beginning to end. Naturally, a
passage so abundant in religious lore has attracted the attention
of modern interpreters. Among those, S. Weinstock has provid-
ed the most convincing explanation by comparing the reference
to similar doctrines expressed elsewhere in De Nuptiis and in
other Latin writers. He therefore suggests that the sixteen
regions of the heavens are numbered in sequence from north to
east, to south, to west, and back to north in a spiral descent
IIH. For somc suggestions why thcsc gods arc rcpcatcd scc G. Dumczil:
'Remarques sur les trois premieres regiones caeli de Martian us Capella'.
Hom mages it M. Niederman II (Col/ectionl.atomus 2.l,) (Rruxcllcs. 19')6). pp.
102-107.
Ill). Ci<:cro: DeDitin. II, 8789.
120. Plin}': Nat. Hist. ll. 143.
121. Scrvius: b1 Aeueid. VIII, 427.
122. for some suggestions regarding the principles of hierarchy in the first
three regions sec Dumczil: op. cit .. pp. I 02-107.
MARTIANLJS CAPELLA 62l)
from heaven to earth.ll3 However, some of the details do not fit

with this account, and so a measure of uncertainty about Mar-
tianus' intentions will remain.
8.2131 THE ARGUMENT OF DE NUPTJIS II. 150-157
The world of spirits is also described from another point of

view by juno in response to Philology's request that the secrets
of the heavens should be revealed to her. In this passage the
goddess divides the spirits into the following categories: IH
(i) 'Those who descend from the aether itself and the circuit
of the highest sphere as far as the sun's orbit' (ab ipso aetbere
123. S. Weinstock: 'Marrianus Capella and the Cosmic System of the

Etruscans', journal of Roman Studies 36 (1946), pp. 101-129. An earlier
discussion can be found in C. Thulin: Die G"iilter des Martian us Cape/1(1 und
die Bronzeleber von Piacenza (Religionsgeschicbtliche Versuche tmd
Vorarbeiten 3/l) (Giessen, 1906).
124. It seems best to use the term 'spirit' as a generic term for something to
\Vhich Martianus himself gives various names: (i) They are collectively termed
'powers' (potestates) at De Nupt. II, I 50; (ii) The first group are called
'divinities' (numina) at ibid. II, 149 while the other groups are termed 'living
beings' (animantes) at ibid. II. 149. beings endowed with 'souls and in-
tellects' (an/mae ... mentes) at ibid. II, 156, and 'souls' (an/m(le) at ibid. 11,
165- 166. The possible sources of this excursus have been extensively discuss-
ed. Dick: op. cit., p. 64 maintained that Varro was the source; Turcan: op.
cit .. pp. 241-249 argued for lamblichus. That neither of these views is ade-
quate has been demonstrated by Lenaz: op. cit.. pp. 93-lJ4 (Varro) and 94-9'5
(lamblichus). It is not necessary to repeat the details of this demonstration
\Vith which the present author is substantially in agreement. However, one
could add that Lenaz has perhaps taken insufficient notice of the many
par;tllels between Porphyry and Martianus at this point. In particular, it is
possible to parallel the fivefold classification of spirits by combining
fragments of Porphyry's De Regressu Animae and Commentarius in
Timaeum- see nn. 133. 146-147, 162, 164, etc.- while these two works
arc known to have made a similarly extensive use of material from the
Cha/daean Oracles. Thus, Martlanus may have been following a Porphyrian
exegesis of the latter in this excursus as elsewhere.
NEOPLA TON ISM
sphaeraeque superioris ambitu usque solarem circulum de-

meantes).ll5 These are a. 'of fiery and flaming substance'
(ignitae substantiae flammantisque), 126 b. 'impassive'
((ma9Ei~). 127 (c. the greatest in virtue), 12s and d. 'arrange the
secrets of hidden causes (causarumque /atentium arcana
componzmt).l29 Furthermore, they are e. 'under the rule of
Jupiter' (il/ic fm,em regnare),130 and f. called 'gods and heaven-
ly ones' (dii ... caelites).l31 (Such spirits would include the
Penates and other higher divinities mentioned in Martianus'
earlier accoum).l32 Some of these ideas can be paralleled in
earlier writers: thus, Porphyry alludes to certain aetherial gods,
although these are not stated to dwell specifically between the
aether and the sun.l33 The notion that the highest spirits are of
fiery substance accords with the usual teaching of the
Chaldaean Orac/esl34 and Porphyry; 135 the notion that these
125. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II. 150. In order to make the structure of
this spiritual hierarchy clearer, the attributes of each rank will be lisred in the
same sequence. This sequence will be: first, the region inhabited; secondly,
their nature- divided into a) substance, b) impassivity or passivity, c) moral
status. and d) function; thirdly, their hierarchical position- divided into e)
their ruler and f) their collective name; and fourthly, the spirits included in
the class.
126. Ibid. II, 150.
I 2'7. Ibid. II, I 50.
128. This characteristic is determined by extrapolation from Ibid. II, 155.
These 'extrapolated' characteristics - which can be deduced from Mar-
tianus' logical and symmetrical scheme- will be noted in parentheses().
129. Ibid. II. 150.
I :\0. Ibid. II. 150.
131. !IJid. II. 150.
132. By extrapolation from Ibid. II. 151 ff.
I :H. Porphrrr: !:'pist. ad A neb. 2-3 and De Regr. Anim. fr. 4. 32" 25.
I.H. Set pp. 551-1-560, 610-61-i. and nn. 31-jj.
135. See pp. 551-1-560. 610-6J.j. and n. 42.
MARTIANUS CAPF.LI.A 6~1
are impassive is a fundamental tenet of Apuleius 1:\6 and Por-

phyry.l:\"'
(ii) Those 'between the pathway of the sun and the orb of the
moon' (infra Solis meatum usque /unarem g/ohum).I.~H These
are a. 'considered to be of less shining and brilliant nature than
the celestials, yet they are not sufficiently corporeal to be visible
to mankind' (minus /ucidae splendentisque naturae quam illi
caelestes ... approbantur; nee tam en ita sunt corpulenti. ut
bominum capiantur obtutu), 139 (b. have a degree of passivi-
ty),lto (c. hold a lower rank in virtue), 141 and d. 'arrange pro-
phecies, dreams, and portents' (per quae tamen vaticinia som-
niaque ac prodigia componuntur), 'protect the souls and
minds of all men and announce the secrets of their thoughts to
the higher power' (animos omnium mentesque custodire ...
cogitationum arcana superae annuntiare potestatt), and 'are
assigned as a universal guardian of all men and as a particular
genius to individual mortals' (et generalis omnium praesul et
specialis singulis mortalibus Genius admmeri).1-i2 Further-
more, they are (e. under the dominion of]upiter), IH and f. call-
ed 'angels, demons, or intermediates' (Angelus ... daemones ...
Medioximi).144 The Lares are said to be included in this second
category of the spiritual world according to Martianus.IH Some
of these ideas also are paralleled in earlier writers although their
exact combination seems to be unique: thus, Porphyry J.t6
1:\6. Seepp. 231-232.

137. Porphyry. De Abstin. II, 38. 2; II, 43. 3; II, 45. 4; etc.
1.-\H. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II, 15 I.
1.''>'-J. Ibid. II. 1S.f.
ltO. By extrapolation from 1/Jitl. II, I 50 :md II, 16i.
lo.i I. By extrapolation from ibid. II. I;; and 11, 16i.
lt2.11Jid. 11, 151-15~.
1-t.-\. By extrapolation from ibid. II. ISOandll, 161.
I +t. Ibid. 11, I 53- I 54.
li 5. Ibid. 11, ISS.
lt6. Porphyry: De Regr. Anim. fr. 2. 29" 3 'The aetherial or empyrian is
6.U NEOPI.ATONI.S,\1
speaks of a class of angels which inhabits the aetherial region

and, since these are contrasted with the class of demons dwell-
ing below the moon, 1-i"' the aetherial region must therefore be
understood as extending to the lunar sphere. That there is a
subordinate rank of spirits associated with prophecy is stated by
Apuleiusl-tH and many other writers, that they are com-
municators between higher and lower can be documented in
most ancient sources, 1-i'> and that they are assigned as guardians
to mankind and to individual men is argued by Varrolso and
others. Since Porphyry's doctrine interpreted the class of angels
as being distinct from that of demons, I 'i I some other tradition is
being followed at this point in identifying the two: possibly that
of earlier Latin writers like Cornelius Labeo.ISl
(iii) Those inhabiting 'the higher portion of the space bet-
ween the lunar orbit and the earth' (a lunari circulo usque in
terram ... superior portio) and therefore the higher part of 'the
expanse of air below the moon (aeris a /una diffusio ). I 'i3 These
are (a. of airy substance), l'i4 (b. have a degree of passivity), ISS (c.
hold a lower rank of virtue), 156 and d. 'are born in human form
the place of angels' (aetheria tel empyrill ... angelorum).

1-47. Porphyry: De Regr. Anim. fr. 2. 29 1-j 'He therefore distinguishes
angels from demons' (itaque discenwt a daemon/bus angelos).
148. See pp. 309-311.
149. This function is obviously implied in the etymology of ciyy&J..o<;. On
angclology in pagan writers of late antiquity see F. Cumont: 'Les anges du
paganisme romain', Ret,ue de l'histoire des religions 72 ( 19 I 'i ). pp. I 59-182
and W. Bousset: 'Die Damonologie der spateren Antike', Anhit fiir
Religionswissenschaft 18 ( 191 'i ), pp. I j.f-172.
I 50. Seep. 839.
I 5 I. As noted above. This is the on(t' point on whil"h there is a conflict bet-
ween Martianus' and Porphyry's demonology.
152. Seepp. 512-513.
I 53. Martian us Capella: De Nupt. II, I S6 and II, 161.
I 'ii. By extrapolation from ibid. II, I 54.
I 'i'i. By extrapolation from ibid. II, I 50 and II. 16'"'.
I 56. By extrapolation from ibid. II. I 55 and II. 16..,.
MARTIANUS CAPELLA
to benefit the whole world' (sub humana effigie in totius num-

di cmnmoda procreantur).l'i 7 Furthermore, they are e. 'under
the power of Pluto where the moon who presides over this air is
called Prosperpine' (sub Plutonis potestate ... hie Luna, quae
buic aeri praeest, Proserpina memoratur), l'iH and f. called
'demigods or "semi-gods" (hemithei ... Semones aut
Semidez). t S9 Such spirits are said to include Hercules, Dionysus,
Osiris. lsis, Asclepius, and similar figures.t6o Once more there
arc various parallels in earlier writers: for example, the
Chaldaean Orac/est6t and Porphyry t62 postulate an in-
termediate rank of spirits in the region between the moon and
the earth although, since the former only seemed to visualize
these as evilt63 whereas the latter interpreted them as good,
relative, and evil, tM it is the Porphyrian doctrine which clearly
J'P.Ibid. II, 156.

I 'i8. Ibid. ll, 161.
l59.1bid. II, I <;6.
160. Ibid. II, 157-158.
161. According to the Cbaldaean Oracles, the demons are associated with
Hecate, nature, and the moon. Sec Proclus: In Tim. l, II, 19-21 and III. 271.
2-17 (Hecate = nature); Proclus: In Remp. II, 133. 15-20 (nature= the
moon): and Psellus: Comm. (PG 122, 11.~6c- 1137a) (nature, the moon. and
the demons). For the association between the demons and the air see Orac.
Omit/. fr. 91 (Oiympiodorus: In Phaed. 230, 32). See Lewr: op. cit . . p.
269 ff.
162. According to Porphyry. the demons are allocated specifkally to the
sublunary regions. See Porphyry: De Abstin. II. 38. 2 and In Tim. fr. 17
(Proclus: In Tim. l, 152. 10-28). For the association between the demons and
the air see Porphyry: At/Gaur. 6, 42,5-11 and DeRegr. Anim. fr. 2. 29" 1-3.
16.3. For bad demons see Orac. Cbald. fr. 89 (Psellus: H_ypot. 2.3) and fr. 90
( Psellus: Comm. (PG 122, I 1408)). The apparent reference to good demons
:.u Orac. Chtlld. fr. 88 (Psellus: Comm. (PG 122. 1137A)) is actually to their
delusive power to appear thus. See Lewr: op. cit., p. 263 and n. 14.
164. For this classification see Porphyry: In Tim. fr. 10 (Prod us: In Tim. I,
...,..,, 10-13) 'According to them there arc three kinds of demons. For they
maintain that the first kind is that of divine demons. the second is the relative
kind consisting of those partial souls attaining the demonic rank. the third
6:\l NEOPLA TON ISM
corresponds more closely to that presented in the present text.

The notion that these spirits are under the rule of Pluto can be
documented in Porphyry, IM as also the notion that they include
Dionysus. Osiris. and lsis.l66
(iv) Those dwelling 'from the middle part of the air down to
the borders of the mountains and the earth' (a medietate 11ero
aeris usque in montium terraeque conjinia).l69 These are (a. of
airy substance), 1611 (b. have a degree of passivity),169 (c. hold a
lower rank of virtue),17o and d. 'are assigned to bodies at that
time when they arc first conceived and are attracted by those
same bodies after their life is ended' (corporibus il/o tempore
tribuuntur, quo fit prima conceptio, etiam post vitam isdem
corporibus delectantur), and can either 'be assisted by the
goodness of their previous life or corrupted by their sojourn in
body' (vitae prioris adiuti fuerint honestate ... autem
depravantur ex corpore).l11 Furthermore, they are (e. under
kind is that which is wicked and injurious to souls' (nap'o[c; 6 .SaiJ.LOOV tptxwc;
Kai yap &ivai cpaot tO J.LtV 9Eirov lialJ.LOVOOV yevoc;, tO lit Kata OXEatV, 0 IJ.EplKai
oUJ.17tATJpoiim IJIUX,al SatJ.Loviac; tuxouaat A.iji;Eroc;, to .Sf: noVTipov ciAA.o Kai
A.uJ.LaVnKov t&v IJIUX,WV). That Martianus agrees with Porphyry and disagrees
with the Cbaldaea11 Oracles on this point is a piece of evidence in favor of
the thesis that Martianus read the Iauer embedded in the former's commen-
tary.
16';. Porphyry: De Philos. ()rae. p. 147 'And the god Sarapis is identical
with Pluto, being for this reason chietly the ruler of the demons' (o autoc; lit
tc:i> nA.oUt(I)Vl 6 8E6c;, Kai O!Ct toiito J.LQAlota lialJ.LOV(I)V apxrov).
166. Porphyry: De Simul. fr. 10, 19" 13-20" 6 'They addressed Isis as the
power of the "heavenly earth" and of the terrestrial one ... Dionysus ...
Osiris .... (t~c; <'it oupaviac; yiic; Kai lie; x.Soviac; titV OUVQIJ.lV 'lmv rrpooEinov
... .1t6vuooc; ... "Omptc;).
167. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. II, 160.
161-1. By extr;1polation from ibid. II, 154.
169. By extrapolation from ibid. II, 150 and II, 167.
170. By extrapolation from ibid. II, 155 and II, 167.
1"'1./hid.ll, 162-163.
MARTIANliS CAPELLA
the dominion of Pluto), tn and f. called 'demigods and heroes'

(Hemithei Heroesque).li~ The Manes, Lemures, Larvae, Maniac,
and Furies are said to be included in this fourth category of the
spiritual world according to Martianus. 1"?4 Some of these ideas
also are paralleled in earlier writers although perhaps not all in a
single predecessor: thus, Porphyry speaks of those spirits who
represent the divine force contained in the lower air, moun-
tains. and tcrrestial region,t ;r; and also of a class of spirits which
are relative: neither as elevated as the divine ones nor as debas-
ed as the evil ones,t76 although it is unclear whether these two
classes of terrestrial and relative are formally identified. That
there is an inferior rank of spirits which can manifest itself in
various ways depending on whether its earthly life was good or
had is stated by Apulei us. p; Finally, Porphyry seems to have
postulated a class of spirits corresponding to heroes who were
not as elevated as demons but more exalted than souls, t78 these
1""'2. By extrapolation from ibid. II. 161.

!""'~.Ibid. II. 160.
!!.f./hid. II. 162-164.
l""''i. Porphyry: De Simul. fr. 6. H" 3-8 'The ruling part of the terrestrial
power was called Hestia ... they addressed Rhea as the power of rocks and
mountains. Demeter as that of the plains' (Kai to J.lEV iJYEJ.lOV\1\0V tii~ xeovia~
bUVUJ.lEW~. Eotia K1\;l,.llta\ ... titv of:. Ptav npooEinov titv tii~ ltEtpoooou~ Kai
OpEiou Yii~ <'iuvaJ.liV, titv 0 1:\ilJ.l'ltPaV titv tii~ ltEOIVi;~).
1""'6. Porphyry: In Tim. fr. I 0 ( Proclus: In Tim. I, 77. II) 'the relative kind'
(tO Kata oxtmv). Seen. 16.f.
1""'7. Sec pp. 233-2.:\'i.
PH. Psellus: Hypot. 20-21 mentions a hierarchy of 'angels' (liyy~:;l,.m).
'demons' (oaiJ.lOVE~). and 'heroes' (i\PWE~) which also seems to be implied in
Sync:sius: Hymn. I. 266-.308. This hierarchy is derived from the Cbu/daean
( Jmc/es at least in Porphyry's exegesis. Sec Theiler: op. cit., p. 29; I.c:wy: r1jJ.
cit .. p. 162. n. ;\6'i; and Hadot: op. cit .. p . .:\97. It is possihlc: that Martianus
came: across the: two classifications of Porphyry - good demons. relative
demons, bad demons; and demons, heroes. souls- and therefore responded
by placing 'demigods' in divisions (iii) and (iv) of his own scheme.
NEOPI.ATONISM
spirits being clearly distinct from the corresponding ones in the

classification above.
(v) Those whose souls coming out of their bodies are struck
by 'the air around the sphere of the earth itself which is agitated
by the heat from above and the exhalation and moisture from
below' (circa ipsum t'ero tenae circu/um aer at/ore supero
atque exhalatu madoreque infero turbidatus).I 7 <J These are (a.
of airy substance),IRO h. 'die like men after an extended lifespan'
(post prolixum aevum moriuntur ut homines), IIi I (c. of an evil
nature),IH.Z and d. 'have an outstanding capacity for
foreknowledge, assault, and injury' (et praesciendi et incursan-
di et nocendi habent praesentissimam potestatem). IIi~ Further-
more, they are (e. under the dominion of Pluto),IH4 and (f. call-
ed evil spirits).IHc; Such spirits are said to include Fauns, Satyrs,
Nymphs, and other beings.IR6 Some of these ideas can be
paralleled in earlier writers: thus, the Hermetic Asclepius, IH"' the
Chaldaean Oracles, 188 and PorphyryHI<J allude to certain spirits
in the turbulent air surrounding the earth, the Asclepius' ac-
count coming perhaps closest in its detail to the present one.
The notion that the lower spirits arc wicked is in accordance
179. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. ll, 165.

180. By cxtrapol at ion from ibid. II. I S-i.
lBl.lbid. II. 167.
182. By extrapolation from ibid. ll, 166.
185.1/Jid. II, 16"'.
184. By extrapolation from ibid. II, 161.
ISS. By extrapolation from ibid. II. 166.
186.1bid. II, 167.
187. Sec pp. 38S-386.
ISH. Orac. Chuld. fr. 90 (Pscllus: Comm. (PG 122, 11iOB)): fr. 91 (Oiym-
piodorus: In Plmed. BO. 32)): fr. 157 (Psdlus: Comm. (PG 122. llillA)): fr.
161 (Pscllus: Comm. (PG 122, 1141A)): and fr. 162 (Pscllus: Comm. (PCi 122.
1 1-iSB)). Pst:llus: Comm. (PG 122. I 1tSB) explains the applic;uion of tht
various oracles to tcrrcstri;tl demons.
189. Porphyry: De Abstin. II, .'\H. 1-40. -i: In Tim. fr. 10 (Proclus: In Tim.
I...,..,, 6-24) and fr. 24 (Produs: In Tim. I. 1'74, 24-28).
MARTIAN US CAPElLA 6:\"7
with the doctrine of the Chaldaean Oraclest9o and Por-

phyry; 191 the notion that these include the Nymphs and Satyrs
also occurs in Porphyry.l92
8.2132 THE ARGUMENTS OF DE NUPTIIS l, 45-61 AND II.

150-157
Three general points are perhaps worth making in connec-
tion with Martianus' spiritual theology. The first is that the
spiritual beings described in the two passages are to be
distinguished ontologically from the gods as intellects who ap-
pear elsewhere in the treatise. This distinction is indicated by
the references to the spirits of the second passage as having
'souls and intellects' (animae ... mentes) or 'souls' (ani mae), t93
whereas the references to the gods as intellects make no men-
tion of souls associated with the intellects or of souls alone.194
That the terminology is different in the two cases implies an on-
tological diStinction since, within the context of the Chaldaean
and Neoplatonic philosophy by which the author is influenced,
souls represent the next level of being derived from and depen-
dent upon intellects.l9'5 The second point is that the spiritual be-
ings described in the two passages must be distinguished on-
tologically from the gods as heavenly bodies which are men-
tioned elsewhere in De Nuptiis.t96 This distinction is shown by
190. Orac. Cha/d. fr. 88 (Psellus: Cmnm. (PG I 22. I 1)7 A)); fr. 90 (Pscllus:
Comm. (PG 122. 11408)); fr. 161 (Psellus: Comm. (PG 122, 114 lA)); and fr.
162 (Psellus: Comm. (PG 122, I 1458)).
191. Porphyry: DeAbstin. ll, .:\8. 1-40, 4; DeRegr. Anim. fr. s..u 28-.H
I; and In Tim. fr. 10 (Proclus: In Tim. I, 77. 6-24).
192. Porphyry: De Antr. Nymph. 10, 12. 121.'\; 1), 14, 2529; and De
Simu/. fr. 7. 11 11-1.3.
I 9.3. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. ll, I 56 and II, 165-166.
194. See pp. 615-622.
195. See pp. 535-542.
I tJ6. l.enaz: op. cit., pp. 81-82 dues nul setm to have n<>lkcd this distinc-
tion.
6:\H NEOPI.ATONISM
the restriction of the highest spirits to the region above the

sun,l97 since gods as heavenly bodies would also be below the
sun; by the description of the second rank specifically as
demons and angels only; t9H and by the confinement of the three
lower ranks of spirits to the region below the moon,l99 since no
equation with gods as heavenly bodies could apply here. The
third point is that the spiritual beings described in the two
passages may be identified ontologically with one another. This
identification is suggested by the references to the spirits of the
first passage as inhabiting 'separate places' (discreti loci) around
the heaven,.wu while the references to those of the second
passage mention a spatial distribution in relation to the heavenly
bodies.2o1 The presence of these features would also preclude
any alignment with the gods as intellects or as heavenly bodies,
since in the former case there would have to be no spatial
distribution at all and in the latter no spatial distribution of the
kinds visualized. Moreover, this lack of alignment shared by the
two passages indicates that they are concerned with a single
theological doctrine.
8.22 PSYCHOLOGICAL DOCTRINE

In accordance with the threefold symbolism applied to the
soul in Martianus' allegorical narrative - it is depicted as
Philology. as Philology's palanquin, and as Psyche - we find
that there are three kinds of figurative psychological doctrine.
However. since the soul is a reality depicted by a number of
symbols rather than a symbol depicting a number of realities,
the psychological theory of De Nuptiis is also expressed in the
form of a literal narrative of events.
197. Sec pp. 629-631.

198. Sec pp. 631-632.
199. Seep. 63 2 ff.
200. Martianus Capella: De !Vupt. I, H.
201. Sec pp. 629-637.
MARTIANllS CAPELLA
8.221 THE HUMAN SOUL
Martianus repeatedly states that human souls will be

ddfied,202 this deification being the ultimate destiny of those
who have earned it by their merits.-W3 while the fate of those
who have used their mortal lives badly will be everlasting tor-
ment in the region of Pyriphlegethon.2o4 Among those who are
said to have earned deification are mentioned heroes like
Aeneas and Romulus,2o<; the writers Homer and Virgii,206 and
philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle.zo.. That these souls will
be deified is made possible by the marriage of Philology and
Mercury,2o11 for through their combined agency intellect209 and
the capacity for self-knowledge can descend to mankind.210
Since most of this doctrine represents standard Platonism of late
antiquity. no further illumination will be provided by the
mustering of parallel texts. However. one observation is
necessary regarding the function of Philology's and Mercury's
marriage in producing the deification of the human soul, if our
thesis that Philology herself is not distinct from this last but
equivalent to it is correct. As we shall see from the analysis to be
pursued below. Philology is not simply identifiable with the
soul but specifically with its intellective or rational part. Thus, it
is through the joining of this part to the divine that the deifica-
tion of the human soul as such takes place: in other words the
soul plays a role in its own elevation to heaven.
202. Mania nus Capella: De Nupt. I. 'HlJ6; 11. 125: anllll. I~ I.

20!o.lbid.l,lJ-llJS;II,I2S:andii,I.'H.
20 1. Ibid. II. 165166.
lOS. Ibid. I. lJS.
206. IIJid. ll, 212.
zo-.lbicl.ll, 12S;md 11. 212-21~.
lOR. Ibid. I. 32; I. 93: II. 125126; and II, 131.
209. Ibid. II, 126.
210. Ibid. II. 12;.
640 NE< >PlATONISM
8.222 PHILOLOGY AS THE SOUL
Turning now to the first of the figurative references to the

human soul: that contained in the description of Philology. we
find repetition of ideas already discussed together with certain
new elements. In the first place, Philology is said to have 'an
earthly origin (terreus ortus)lll which makes her fear what will
befall her mortal substance as she passes through the planets'
fiery spheres.lll Despite this limitation, however, she will be
exalted to obtain 'the shining aether, the abodes of the gods,
and the society of Jupiter' (aetbram fulgidam I dil1umque sedes
ac kwis consortia).2l.~ The doctrine that Philology will be
deified, which exactly parallels the teaching regarding the
human soul,214 is now supplemented by an account of the
method of deification itself. This seems to consist primarily of
an intellective process, since the maiden is praised for being
'most learned as the confidant of Mercury' (doctissima ... con-
scia Parrbasio)2l'5 and for having 'the world subject to her since
it was founded on rational principles' (subditur orbis/ra-
tionibus ante repertus),ll6 while it is the exercise of intellect
which permits the attainment of heaven.2J'1 The deification of
Philology seems to consist secondarily of a purification rite
comprising two stages: the bringing up of a vomit which 'turns
into a stream of writings of all kinds' (in omnigenum copias
2 I I. /IJifl. I. 9 :L Cf. ibid. II, I 09 'mortal limbs (mort ales art us).
212. Ibid. II. I 09. Cf. ibid. II. l.ci2.
21.~. IIJid. 11. 120. Philolo~y seems tu achine '<kification' (apotbeosis) at
ibid. II. 206.
2 14. See above.
215. Martianus Capella: De Nupt: I. 22. At ibid. I. 93 and II, 126
Philology's learning is said to surpass that of Mercury.
216. /fJid. II. lB. Cf. ibid. I. 21. 'She forces the gods to obey her com
mands' (deos urgens in iussa coactos). It is predicted that Philolo~y will
herself assign causes to the planetary motions at iiJid. II, II H.
21..,. Ibid. II. 120.
MARTIANl!S CAPELLA 6-11
convertitur litterarum),218 and the drinking from a round and

living sphere which has the appearance of an egg inside'
(globosa animataque rotunditas .. . ipsa species ovi in-
terioris).219
Since the ritualistic component of the deification process has
attracted much attention of modern scholars, who have drawn
attention to parallels with other types of initiation in late an-
cient re1igions,22o have demonstrated the cosmic symbolism of
the egg221 and suggested its ritual function in the. mysteries of
Dionysus,222 and speculated on the philosophical significance
of the vomiting forth of arts and sciences,n~ it only remains to
218./bid. II, 136.

219./bid. II, 140.
220. See Lenaz: op. cit .. pp. 6-26. The writer persuasin:ly compares many
other details in the narrative of De Nupliis II with elemems in religious
rituals of the period. Thus. he examines the nmions of (i} the vigil (ibid. I. 22
and II, 99); (ii) the photagogic rites (ibid. II, 99): (iii) the leap (ibid. II, 99); (iv)
initiation as a death (ibid. II, 100); (v) the enrobing (ibid. II, 114-11 ';):(vi) the
presence of the Muses (ibid. II, 117-126): (vii) the sacred dance (ibid. 11, 132);
(viii) the palanquin (ibid. II, 133; II, 143-146: II, 169; etc.); (ix) the consump-
tion of the egg (ibid. II, 140-14 1); (x) the crowning (ibid. II, 14 1); (xi) the in-
itiatory trials (ibid. II, 142); etc. Many of these parallels are of an extremely
general character and cannot be used to demonstrate Martianus' actual
dependence on a single religious ritual. However, they indicate that he is
drawing on a wide knowledge of contemporary religious ceremonies in
fashioning his imaginative account.
221. Sec P. Royance: 'I lne allusion a l'oeuf orphiquc'. Melanges d 'arcbeo/ogie
et d'bistoire de /'Ecole Frmu;e~ise de Rome ';2 (193';), pp. 9'i-112: R. Turcan:
'L'oeuf orphique ct lcs qu:ttre elements', Retue tie l'bisloire des re/igio/IS 160
( 1961), pp. 11-2;'>; and l.en:tz: ofJ. dt .. pp. J.i-16. As these scholars han: shown.
there are references to an egg S)'mholizing the cosmos in various earlier Latin
writers. See Varro in Probus: /11 VetR. flue (,, .">I; Petronius: Satyr. 3lJ;
Ps.-Ciement: Recogn. X, 17 and X. 30; and Macrohius: Saltl/71. \'11, 16. '5-H.
There is a useful collection of these tcstimoni:t Wglther with a number of
mediaeval ones in Dronkc: op. cit .. pp. I Si-166.
222. See Boyance: 'Une allusion a l'oeuf orphiquc', pp. 95-112 and Lenaz:
op. cit., p. 1';.
223. See Lenaz: op. cit., pp. 23-25. The wrircr argues that this feature can-
NEOPLATONJSM
observe that the egg probably corresponds to the engraved

sphere mentioned earlier in the text.ZZ4 However, the relation-
ship between the interpretation of the human soul as Philology
and the general psychological doctrines of the Neoplatonists
needs a considerably greater emphasis than has hitherto been
placed upon it.
In the first place, the notion that Philology has an earthly
origin but is destined to attain divinity agrees with the teaching
of Plotinus and Porphyry that the human soul is of a double
nature. Thus, the former writer speaks of its derivation from
'reason' (A.6yoc;) and 'non-reason' (ou A.6yoc;),Z2'i the latter of the
combination of 'its fullness of power' (to nA.fjpec; auri;c; Kata
ri)v MvaJ.UV) and 'the emptiness of its proper power' (tfjc;
oiKEiac; ouv<iJ.lECOc; KEvrocnc;),2Z6 and both writers of its concep-
tion as Love from the intercourse of Poros and Penia in the
garden of Zeus. according to the allegory of Plato's Sym-
posium227 Furthermore, the Neoplatonists also supplement the
not easily be paralleled in other religious rituals of the period which are
known. He therefore suggests that Martianus himself invented a symbol for
the Neoplatunic notion of approaching God through the abandonment of all
dist:ursive knowledge.
224. See pp. 62.2-623. That this correspondence is intended is suggested by
the allusions to the presenn: of the four elements in both the sphere and the
egg. those elemt:nts being understood as Forms in the case of the sphere and
;1s physical substances in that of the egg. Cf. Porphyry: De Simu/. fr. 10. 18"
1619 'They say that this god brings forth from his mouth an egg. from which
is born the god whom they call Phtha and the Greeks Hephaestus. They inter-
pret the egg as the cosmos' (tov ot 8Eov toiitov EK toO at6j.lato<; npoiEa8ai
!pUOlV WOV, e; OU yEVVci08UI 8EOV OV autoi npoaayopEUOUOI cJ)8ci, Ol OE
"EAA.nvEc; "H!paaatov EPilllVEuoumv ot tov o>ov tov K6aj.IOV). Since Porphyry
et1uates the Egyptian god Kneph described here with the Demiurge of
Platonism. the bringing forth of the egg must represent the instantiation of
the elemental Forms.
2.2'5. Plotinus: Enn. Ill, '5 /'50/7. 9-1 '5.
2.26. Porphyry: Sent. j7. 4'i, '5-9. Cf. DeAbstin. Ill, 2-:', .v;.
22:. Plotinus: Enn. Ill. 5 /'iO/ 7. 1-IIl, '5 /50/9, '57; Porphyry: De Abstitl.
MARTIANliS CAPELLA
doctrine that the human soul has a dual nature with an account
of the method by which it may be elevated to the higher state.
for just as Philology can attain divinity partly by an intellective
process and partly by the performance of a purificatory ritual,
so does Porphyry explain the elevation of the human soul as
taking place both by means of philosophy and by means of
'theurgy' (tbeurgia). According to Porphyry's teaching, intellec-
tive activity elevates the human soul by specifically perfecting
its higher part - this process leading to God himself,HH -
whereas theurgic activity elevates the human soul by specifical-
1y perfecting the lower - this process leading to the empyrian
rcalml!'> -, the two kinds of activity however being not
necessarily pursued in conjunction with one another.2.:\0
8.223 THE PALANQUIN AS THE SOUL
It seems likely that the palanquin on which Philology ascends

ro her celestial marriage is also intended as a figurative allusion
ro the human soul. This vehicle is described as 'a litter bedecked
with stars' (lectica interstincta sideribus),HI unlawful for any
mortal to touch,232 of seemingly great height,233 which is car-
ried aloft by 'Effort' (Labor) and 'Love' (Amor) holding the
front23-i and by 'Attention' (Epimelia) and 'Vigilance' (Agryp-
Ill. 2"'.-! and Sent. :\7. 4S, S-9. Th~ passage which provides the exegetical
basis for this theory is Plato: Symp. 20:\h ff. It is p~rhaps no accident that the
latter also d~picts a marriage.
228. Porphyry: DeRegr. Anim. fr. 2, 2s 10-13 and fr. 7, 3s 26-29.
229./bid. fr. 2. 28 3-10; fr. 3. 31 H-32 I; and fr. -1. 32 23-21.
2:Hl. Ibid. fr. 7, 3S 13-1 S. For a r~c~nt discussion of Porphyry's attitude
to theurgy see A. Smith: Porphyry's Place in tbe Neoplatonic Tradition. A
Slue~}' 111 Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism (The Hague, 1974), pp. 128-141.
2:\ I. Martian us Capella: De Nupt. II, I.H.
2.U. Ibid. II, 134.
233.1/Jid.ll.l-f."'.
2:\-1. Ibid. 11. 1-f 3- llf.
NEOPI.ATONJSM
nia) holding the rear. He; Two interpretations of the palanquin

have been proposed by modern scholars. The first draws a
parallel with the Roman custom of transporting the image of the
deceased emperor upon a litter during the ceremonies which
celebrate his deification.2.~6 In this case, Philology's palanquin
plays a largely decorative or literary role in the present nar-
rative. The second sees it as an allusion to the Chaldaean and
Neoplatonic notion that the human soul has a semi-corporeal
vehicle which transports it through the cosmos between
periods of earthly incarnation.23 7 In this case, the palanquin of
Philology has a real philosophical function for the writer. That
the vehicle is said ro be untouchable ro mortals and elevated to a
great height can possibly be viewed as evidence for the first in-
terpretation, and that it is said to be bedecked with stars can
possibly be taken as support for the second. However, a judg-
ment in favor of either view of the palanquin is consistent with
one indisputable fact .23R This is that the reference to the four
personified psychological characteristics of 'Effort', Love', 'At-
tention', and 'Vigilance' as its bearers indicates that we are now
dealing with a symbolic description of the human soul itself.
8.224 PSYCHE AS THE SOUL
The last of the figurative references to the human soul is con-

tained in Martianus' description of Psyche, although the mean-
ing of the Greek name implies that this reference is not
figurative in the fullest sense. Psyche is described as the
25<;. /IJid. II. li<;. The palanquin is also mentioned at iiJid. II. 169 and II,
200.
B6. Sec Len;lz: op. cit., pp. 15-li who quotes lierodian and Dio Cassius as
his evidence.
257. See Courcelle: op. cit .. pp. 215-216. On the doctrine of the human
soul's 'vehicle' (~XTU.La) sec pp. 490-492 and <;79 ff.
25R. Of course. ~lartianus might vaguely have intended both.
MARTIANUS CAPELLA
daughter of Endelichia and the sun;.239 as having been endowed

at birth with a diadem taken from Eternity by Jupiter, with the
power of prophecy by Apollo, with a mirror in which to know
herself and her origins by Urania, with the pleasure of the senses
by Aphrodite, and with a swiftness of mind which memory
restrains by Mercury;.24o and as formerly uncultivated yet refin-
ed by Philology .241 Two elements in this account require special
comment. First, the statement about Psyche's parentage gives a
dear indication of the soul's nature, since her relation to
Endelichia - a name applied to the cosmic soul which is the
source of lower souls in the earlier philosophical tradition.2'+2 -
shows that she signifies the individual soul, while her relation to
the sun - which is the most important of the heavenly bodies
according to the doctrine of our writer.2H - indicates that this
individual soul has a celestial origin. Secondly. the assertion
about Psyche's education provides a further definition of the
soul's nature, since her relation to Philology, who signifies the
rational or intellective part of the soul in particular,.244 shows
23CJ. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. I, 7. Dick and Willis were mistaken in re-
jc:cting the testimony of the best manuscripts and re:tding ente/ecbill here and
~~~ ibid. ll, 213. Sec n. 242.
2-tO. Ibid. I, 7.
HI. Ibid. I, 23.
242. At Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, 22 the term vliEA.tXEta is used to signify the
world soul equivalent to aether in a doctrine combining Platonic.
Aristotelian. and Stoic ideas. As J. Pepin: Tbeo/ogie cosmique et tbeologie
clmJtienne (Ambroise, Exam. I, I, 1-4) (Paris. 1964). pp. 206-216 has
demonstrated, this term is probably not a confusion of the standard
Aristotelian technical term for soul - the vtEI..tXEta of De Anim. ll, I,
i 12a27. etc. - but a genuine element in the cosmological doctrine of the ear-
ly Aristotle. That Martianus has in mind the same doctrine as Cicero is in-
dicated by De Nupt. ll, 213 where Aristotle is depicted as pursuing Endelichia
'through the heights of heaven' (percaeli ... culmina).
243. Seepp. 618-620.
244. See pp. 640-643.
NEOPI.ATONISM
that she corresponds to the individual soul as a whole. Other

elements in the account seem to confirm the conclusions deriv-
ed from the statements about Psyche's parentage and education:
for example, the bestowal of gifts by the gods suggests a celestial
origin, the endowment with sensual pleasure an element of in-
dividuality, and so on.
9
Boethius
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Since Boethius is undoubtedly the most well known of the

philosophical authors studied in this book. there is no need to
introduce his thought with the biographical information sup-
plied by works of reference. As preface, we shall simply
underline the two facts which justify his inclusion in our
survey: first, that Boethius is primarily a Platonist and secondly,
that Christianity often plays merely an indirect or subordinate
role in his discussions.!
I. It is a daunting task to summarize the intluence of Boethius during the

~1iddlt: Ages, even if we l'Oncentrate on bibliographical citation rather than
on historical analysis. However, the following survey, which is designed
with special emphasis upon the: influence of the Bocthian doctrint:s selected
for examination in this chapter may serve as an introduction. In order to
simplify the presentation it will be broken down into the following
cmgorics: I. The Middlt: Ages as a whole, 2. From the Carolingian period to
the c:leventh century, 3. The twelfth century; and A. Influence of Boethius'
works in general, B. Influence of the scientific writings, C. Influence of the
logical writings. D. Influence of the theological tractates. E. Influence: of De
Crmsoltttione PbilosofJbiae. lA. V. di Giovanni: Seteri'w Boeziufilosofo e i
stwi imitator/. Stud/, (Palermo, IH80); R. Murari: Dante e Boezlo. Con-
trihuto allo studt'o delle fonti dantescbe (Bologna, I 90S); H. R. Patch: Tbe
haditio" of Boetbius. A Study of his Importance in Medletal Culture (New
York/Oxford, 1935); F. Sassen: 'Boc:thius, Lec:rmeester der Middc:lc:euwc:n',
.\tudia Catholica ll (llJ3H), pp. 97-122 and 216-230; and 0. Viscardi:
Boezio c: Ia conservazionc: c: trasmissionc: dell' c:rcdita dc:l pensic:ro :tntico'. I
Goti in Uccldente(Settimamt dl studio del Centro Italiano di Studi suii'Aito
Jfedioel'tl 3) (Spoleto, 19"i6), pp. 323-34 3. I B. l.. Obertc:llo: 'Boc:zio, lc
scknze del quadrivio e Ia cultura mc:dievalc:', Atti dell' Accademia LiRure di
NEOPI.ATONISM
Scienze e Lettere 28 ( 1971 ). pp. 152-170; A. White: 'Boethius in the Medieval

Quadrivium', Boetbius. His Life, Thought and Influence, edited by M. Gib-
son (Oxford, 1981), pp. 162-205 and M. Masi: 'Boethius' De lnstitutione
Arithmetica in the Context of Medieval Mathematics', Atti del Congresso ln-
ternazimra/e dl Stud/ Boezicmi (Pmia, 5-8 ottobre 1980), a cura di l.
Obertello (Roma, 1981 ), pp. 263-272. 1 C. C. Prantl: Geschichte der Logik im
Abendlcmde I (leipzig, 1855; repr. Graz, 1955), pp. 679-722;J. Reiners: Der
e~ristotellsche Reallsmus in tier Friihschole~slik (Aachen. 1907) - dealing
with the influence of the commentaries on the lsagoge -; and Der
Nominalismus in tier Friibscholaslik. t:i11 Beitrag z11r Geschichte der
llnit 1ersa/ienfrage im Mitte/alter (Beitrage zur Gescbicbte der Philosophie
des Mittelalters 815) (Munster, 1910)- dealing with the influence of the
commentary on the Categories-; A. van de Vyver: 'les ctapes du dcvelop-
pement philosophique du haut moyen :lge', Revue beige de philo/ogle et
d'histoire 8 ( 1929), pp. -125-452; J. Isaac: Le Peri Hermeneias en Occident de
Boece a Saint Thomas. Histolre litteraire d'un trailff d'Aristote (Paris, 1953)
-dealing with the influence of the commentaries on De lnterpretatlolle -;
l. Minio-Paluello: Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle (Amsterdam. 1972)- deal-
ing with the transmission of the translation of tht: Organum -; and 0.
lewry: 'Boethian logic in the Medieval West', Boethius. His Life, Thought
uml Influence, edited by M. Gibson, pp. 90-134. I D. G. Schrimpf: Die Ax-
iomenschrift des Boetbius (De hebdomadibus) als pbilosopbiscbes Lehrbuch
des Mitte/a/ters (Studien zur Problemgeschichte der (tnt/ken und mit-
tele~/terlichen Philosophie 2) (leiden. 1966) and M. Gibson: 'The Opuscula
Sacra in the Middle Ages', Boethius. His Life, Thought mrd It~fluence. edited
by M. Gibson, pp. 214-234. IE. K. Burdalh: 'Die humanistischen Wirkungen
der Trostschrift des Boethius im Mittel alter und in der Renaissance', Deutsche
Vierte/j,lhrsschrift fiir Literaturwissenscbaft rmd Geistesgeschichte 1 1
(1933). pp. 530-558; P. Courcelle: La Consolation de Philosophic duns Ia
tradition lltteraire. Antecedents et posterite de Boece (Paris. 1967); G.
Mathon: 'La tradition de Ia Consolation de Bocce', Rel!ue des etudes augusli-
niennes 14 (1968), pp. 133-138 - a propos Courcelle's study -; P.
Courcelle: 'Saint Augustin ct Bocce. La survie de leurs deux chefs-d'oeuvre',
Comptes-re,ldus des seances de I'Acadernie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres
(Paris, 1968), pp. 526-534: H. Silvestre, 'La Consolation dt: Bocce et sa tradi-
tion littcraire'. Rel'Ue d'histoire ecc/esiastique 64 ( 1969), pp. 23-36- :1 pro-
pos Courcellc's book -; and J. Beaumont: 'The latin Tradition of the De
Console11ione PIJilosopJJiae . Boethius. His Life, Thought and Influence,
edited by M. Gibson. pp. 271-1-305. 2A. G. d'Onofrio: 'A proposito del
magnificus Boelius. lJn'indagine sulla presenza degli Opuscultl st1cra e della
Consolatio nell' opera eriugeniana', Eriugena. Stud/en zu seinen Que/len
BOETHJliS (Hl)
(Vortrage des Ill. Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums. Freiburg I. Br..

.2--30 August 1979), herausgegeben von W. Beierwaltes (Heidelberg, 1980),
pp. 189-200; 'Giovanni Scoto e Remigio di Auxerre: A proposito di alcuni
commenti altomedievali a Boezio'. Stud/ Mediezall. Serie 3. 22 ( 1981 ), pp.
5H7-693; 'Agli inizi della diffusione della Consolatio e degli Opusculll sacra
nella scuola tardo-carolingia: Giovanni Scoto e Remigio di Auxerre', Alii del
Congresso llflernazionale dl Stud/ Boeziani (Ptwia, 5-8 ottobre 1980), a
cura di L. Obertello, pp. 343-354. 28. M.-E. Duchez: 'Jean Scot Erigene
premier lecteur duDe institutione musica de Boece?', Eriugena. Stud/en zu
seinen Que/len (Vortrage des 111. lnternatlonalen Eriugena-Colloquiums,
Freiburg i. Br., 27-30 August /979). herausgegeben von W. Beierwaltes, pp.
165-187 and U. Plzzanl: 'The Influence of the De lnstitutlone Muslc:a of
Boethius up to Gerbert d'Aurillac. A Tentative Contribution', Boethius and
tbt Ubeml Arts, edited by M. Masi (Berne.etc .. 1981), pp. 9..,156. 2\.. C.
Baeumker und B. Sartorius Freiherr von Waltershausen: FriiiJmitteltllterliche
Glossen des angeblichen ]epa zur lsagogc des Porphyrius (Beitrage zur
Geschlchte der Phllosophie des Mittelalters 2411) (Munster, 1924)- text and
notes on Carolingian glosses perhaps by Hucbald and drawn from Boethius'
commentaries -; G. Schrimpf: 'Wertung und Rezeption antiker Logik im
Karolingcrreich', Logik, Ethik, Theon'e der Geisteswissenschaften (XI.
Deutscher Kongress fur Philosopbie, Gottingen, 5"-9 Oktober /975) (Ham-
burg, 1977), pp. 451-456; andJ. Marenbon: From the Circle of Alcuin to the
Scbool of Au;"c:erre. Logic, Theology and Philosophy In the Et1r~v Middle Ages
(Cmnbridge Studies in Medlet,al Life and Thought, Third Series, 15) (Cam-
bridge, 1981). 20. E. K. Rand: johamzes Scottus (Que/len tmd Unter-
.wchungen zur lt~teinischen Philo/ogle des Mittelt~lters 1/2). (Miinchen,
1906)- text and notes on the Carolingian glosses on the theological tractates
falsely attributed by Rand to Eriugcna -; M. Cappuyns: 'Le plus ancien com-
mentaire des Opuscula sacra et son origine'. Recherches de theologie an-
cienne et medtet1ale 3 (1931), pp. 237-272; and E. K. Rand: 'The Supposed
Commentary of John the Scot on the Opuscula Sacra of Boethius', Revue
neoscolastique de philosophie 36 (1934) (Hommage aM. de Wulj), pp. 67-77
- revision by the author of his earlier view regarding the authorship of the
Carolingian glosses. 2E. H. F. Stewart: 'A Commentary by Remigius
Autissiodorensis on the De Consolutione Philosopbit~e of Boethius' .]ounral
of 71Jeological Studies 17 (I 915-1916 ), pp. 22-4 2; E. J. Daly: An Early Ninth
Century Manuscript of Boethius', Scriptorium 4 (1950), pp. 205-219; H.
Silvestre: 'Le commentaire inedit de Jean Scot Erlgene au metre 9 du livre Ill
duDe Conso/atione Pbilosophiae de Boece'. Re1111e d'histoire ecclesiastlque
17 (1952), pp. 44-122; R. B. C. Huygens: 'Mittelalterliche Kommentare zum
0 qui perpetua', Sacris Erudiri 6 (1954), pp. 373-427; E. T. Silk: 'Pseudo-
650 NEOPLATONISM
Johannes Scottus. Adaibold of Utrecht and the Early Commentaries on

Bocthius'. Mediet''ll and Renaissance Studies 3 ( 1954 ). pp. 1-40; H. Silvestre:
A propos de nouvelles editions de comment aires ilia Consolation de Boece',
Scriptorium (1955). pp. 278-28I; G. Mathon: 'Le commentaire du pseudo-
Erigene sur Ia Consolatio Phi/osophi,le de Boece', Recherches de theologie
ancienne et medievale 22 ( 1955) pp. 213-257; F. Troncarelli: 'Per una ricerca
sui commenti altomedievali al De Con.mlatione di Boezio'. Miscel/mzea in
Memorie~ diG. Cencelti (Torino, 197.3). pp. 363-380; V. Brown: 'Lupus of
Ferrieres on the Metres of Boethius', Le~tin Script and Letters A.D. 400-900,
Festscbrift Presmted to L. Bieler. edited by j. ). O'Meara and B. Naumann
(Leiden, 1976), pp. 63-79; D. K. Bolton: 'Rcmigian Commentaries on the
Consolation of Phi/osopby and their Sources', Traditio 33 ( 1977), pp.
381-394: and 'The Study of the Consolation of Philosophy in Anglo-Saxon
England'. Arcb/t1es d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen dge 52
( 1977). pp. 33-78. 3A. M.-D. Chenu: La tbeologie au douzieme siec/e,
troisiemc edition (Paris, 1976), ch. 6: 'Acras Boetiana', pp. 142-158 and G.R.
Evans: 'Thierry of Chartres and rhe Unity of Boethius' Thought', Stud/a
Patristica 17, forthcoming. 38. G. R. Evans: 'A Commentary on Boethius'
Arithmetica of rhe Twelfth or Thirreenth Century', Annals of Science 35
( 1978), pp. 131-14 1. 3 C. M. Grabmann: 'Bearbeitungen und Auslegungen der
aristotelischen Logik aus der Zeh von Peter Abaelard bis Petrus Hispanus',
Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil. -hist.
Klasse (1937, 5); E. Jeauneau: 'Le Prologus in Eptatheucon de Thierry de
Chartres', Medier,al Studies 16 (1954), pp. 171-175; l. Minio-Paluello:
Twelfth Century Logic. Texts and Studies I-II (Rome, 1956- I 958); M.
Tweedaie: Abai/ard on Universals (Amsterdam, 1976); N.). Green- Pedersen:
'The Doctrine of maxima propositio and locus differentia in Commentaries
from the Twelfth Century on Boethius' Topics', Stud/a Mediewistyczne 18/2
(1977), pp. 125-163; and E. Stump: 'Boethius' Theory of Topics and its Place
in Early Scholastic Logic', Atti del Ccmgresso lnternazionale di Studi Boe-
ziani (Pavia, 5-8 ottobre 1980). a cura di l. Obertello (Roma, 1981), pp.
249-262. 3D. W. jansen: Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu
Boethius De Trinitate (Bres/auer Studien zur hislorischen Theologie 8)
(Breslau, 1926); S. Ouo: 'Augustinus und Boethius im 12. )ahrhundert.
Anmerkungen zur Entstehung des Traktates De Deo Uno. Wissenschaft und
\Veisheit 26 ( 196.3). pp. 15-26; N. M. Haring: Life and Works ofCiarembald
of Arras. A Tuelfth Ce11tury Master of tbe School of Chartres (Toronto,
1965); The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers (Toronto,
1966); Commeflfaries on Boethius b_y Thierry of Chartres mzd his School
(Toronto, 1971)- rhese last three works are fundamental collections of the
texts of twe1frh century commentaries on the theological tractates-; G. R.
BOETHJl!S 6'il
That Boethius should be considered primarily as part of the

Platonic tradition follows from a consideration of both his aims
and his achievements. On the one hand, we have his projected
but never completed program of translating with commentary
all of Aristotle's writings on logic. ethics, and physics; of
translating with commentary all of Plato's dialogues; and of
demonstrating that the two philosophers are in agreement on
the most fundamental questions ..z This program should be
understood in terms of the Alexandrian Neoplatonic one, in
which Aristotle's works were studied not for their own sake but
as introductions to Plato's philosophy.:\ On the other hand, we
Evans: 'More geometrico. The Place of the Axiomatic Method in the Twelfth-
Century Commentaries on Boethius' Opuscula sacra. Archive intema-
timzale d'histoire des sciences 27 (1977), pp. 207-221; and S. Gersh:
Platonism, Neoplatonism, Aristotelianism. A Twelfth-Century Metaphysical
System and its Sources', Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century,
edited by R. L. Benson and G. Constable (Cambridge,MA, 1982), pp. 512-534.
3E. C. Jourdain: 'Des commentaires inedits de Guillaume de Conches ct de
:-.Jkolas Triveth sur Ia Consolation de Ia Phi/osophie de Boece', Notices et e."C-
tmits des manuscrlts de Ia Blbliotbeque Imperiale 20 (1862), pp. 40-82-
contains extract from the commentary of William of Conches-; A. Wilmart:
Reg lat. "'2 (f. I 10126): Commentaire de Ia Consoltltion de Boece', A,lalec
Ia Reginensia 9 (Stud/ e Testi 59) (Citta del Vaticano, 1933), pp. 259-262; E.
T. Silk: Saeculi Noni Auctoris in Boetii Consolationem Philosophiae Com-
melltarius (Roma. 1935)- contains text of a twelfth-century commentary
mist:tkenly attributed by the editor to Eriugena -; ). Hatinguais: 'En marge
d'un pocme de Bocce. L'interpretation allegorique du mythe d'Orphee par
Guillaume de Conches'. Cm1gres de Tours et de Poitiers 1953. Actes du Ve
Cong,i!s de /'Association G. Bude (Paris, 1954 ), pp. 2R'i-2R9; N. M. Haring:
Four Commentaries on the De Consolatione Pbilosophiae in MS.
Heiligenkreuz 130', MedlaetJa/ Studies 31 (1969). pp. 287-316; and E.
Jcauneau: 'Un commentaire inedit sur le chant 0 qui perpetua de Boece', Lec:-
lio Pbilosophorum. Recberc:hes sur /'Ecole de Chartres (Amsterdam, 1973),
pp. 311-3.~ I. Other brief surveys of Boethius' influence in the Middle Ages
can he found in some of the general studies of his thought listed inn. 13 .
.?.. Boethius: In Delnterpr. ed. II. 2 ..~. 79. 180, 17.
3. See for example Elias: In Categ. pr. 123.7-11.
NEOPLATONISM
have the extant work De Consolatione Philosophiae which in-

dudes not only frequent allusions to passa~es in Plato's
Gorgias, Meno, Republic, and Timaeusl but also references to
Plato as a profound philosophical authority.~ This should be
contrasted with the same work's relatively limited appeal to
Aristotle's Protrepticus and Physics.6
But Boethius was also a Christian, and this immediately leads
to the question: how did he reconcile Platonism and Christiani-
ty? Here the influence of Augustine, who is explicitly cited on
one occasion as a source, 7 is perhaps the crucial factor. Indeed,
Boethius seems to have fashioned the synthesis along his
-i. Sec Bocthius: De Consol. Philos. IV. pr. 2. I ff. (to Plato: Gurg. -i66 a ff.
on the respective powers of the good and tht> wicked); ibid. I. pr. 2. 13-1-i (to
Plato: MenoR I c ff. on karning as recollection); ibid. I. pr. 4, 18-21 (to Plato:
Rep. V. 47:k-d on the need for philosopher-kings); ibid. Ill, pr. 9. 99-10 I (to
Plato: Tim. 27b on the need to pray for divine assistance); ibid. Ill, pr. 12.
II 0-112 (to Plato: Tim. 29b on language and reality); and ibid. V. pr. 6, 31 ff.
(to Plato: Tim. 37d on the perpetuity of the cosmos). On the passages in this
work influenced by Plato see P. Courccllc: Lllte Latin W'rile1s and their
Greek Sources, translated by H. E. Wedeck (Cambridge. MA, 1969), pp.
296-297 and J. Gruber: Kommentar zu Boetbius De consolatione
philosophiae (Texte und Kommentare 9) (Berlin/New York. 1978), p. 36.
5. In the passages mentioned above Philosophy refers to 'our Plato' (Plato
noster), to 'Plato's decree' (Pia tone stmciente). and so on.
6. See Boethius: De Crmsol. Pbilos. III. pr. 8, 23 together with lamblichus:
Protr. H. 47. 13 (to Aristotle: Protr. on theeyesoflynceus); ibid. V. pr. I, 35
ff. (10 Ariswtle: Pbys. II. 4. 195b 31 ff. on the relation between causation and
chance); and ibid. V, pr. 6. 18-22 (10 Aristotle: De Caelo II, I, 2R3b26-3I on
the world's eternity). On the passages in this work influenced by Aristotlt: see
Courcclle: La Consolation de Philosophic dans Ia traditimz litteraire.
..tnttfnJdents et posttfrittf de H()ike, pp . .25-.26 and 1.2-i-125; :md Gruber: op.
cit., pp. 36-37.
7. At De Trill. pr. 31-32 Boethius asks the addressee: 'You should however
examine whether the seeds of argument from Saint Augustine's works have
horne any fruit in my writing' (Vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum est.
llll ex beati Augustin/ saiptis semiml rationum aliquos in nos l'enientia
fructus e.xtulerint).
BOETHillS
predecessor's lines, realizing clearly that this involved both a

responsibility and an opportunity.
In the first place, only those aspects of Platonism consistent
with the Christian teaching could be adopted.H Thus, Boethius
made no place in his theory for the order of henads postulated
by Proclus; he combined the first and second hypostases of the
Neoplatonists: the One and Intellect, in order to remove a
subordinationist element from the divinity; and he found little
use for the Platonic doctrine of the world soul.9 In requiring
these modifications of the doctrine derived from contemporary
philosophical schools, Christianity played an indirect role in
determining the character of the system which finally emerged.
In the second place, it was possible to pursue Platonism in-
dependently of Christian teaching from a methodological view-
point.to This was demonstrated when Boethius employed
philosophical theories as additional support for dogmatic posi-
tions in De Trinitate and Contra Eu~ychen et Nestorium, 11 and
in detachment from theological dogma in De Consolatione
Philosophiae. 12 In permitting such elaborate discussion of
philosophical questions to take place, Christianity assumed a
subordinate role at least in the presentation of material.
H. Cf. Augustine: De Vera Relig. 4, 7 (CCSL 32. 192-193) where it is stated

that the Platonists could become Christians by changing a few words and opi-
nions. The kinds of modification required :tre described in texts like Conf
VII, 9 (CSEL 3311. 154-157); Cil. Dei. X, 30 (CCSL 47. 307-308); etc.
9. These doctrines will he discussed in detail below.
10. Cf. Augustine: De Ord. II, 5, 16 (CCSL 29. 115-116) where two
separate methodological routes to the doctrine of the Trinity arc postulated:
that of reason and that of faith. That the first method is prior in reality ;md
th~: Iauer prior in time is stated at ibid. II, 9, 26 (CCSL 29. 121-122).
II. In accordance with this approach. certain chapters like Boethius: De
Tri,l. 2 and 4; Contra Eutycb. et Nest. 1-3 are free of explicitly Christian con-
tent.
12. In accordance with this appro;tch, the only indisputahll- sniptural cita-
tion is that of Sap. 8: I at Boethius: De Crmso/. Phi/ns. III. pr. 12. 63-64.
6'if NEOPLATONISM
That he is primarily a Platonist and that Christianity often

plays merely an indirect or subordinate role in his arguments are
two facts which make it imperative to include Boethius in our
survey of the pagan philosophical tradition in late antiquity. In
describing his teaching, we shall therefore take our starting
point from its relation to the philosophic~ll tenets of the pagan
schools, although sometimes it will be necessary also to take ac-
count of peculiarly Christian transformations of the material. I.:\
13. At this point it may be useful to list the general studies of Boethius' life
and thought during the last century. H. F. Stewart: Boethius. An Essay (Edin-
burgh. 1891 ); T. Venuti de Domenicis: Boezio I. Studio storico-filosofico, II.
De Consolatirme Philosophille (Grouaferrata, 1911-1912); M. Cappuyns:
'Bohe'. Dictiomwire ct'histoire et de geogmphie ecclesiastiques 9 ( 1937).
pp. 3-iH-.'180; M. Galdi: Saggi Boeziani (Pisa, 1938); H. M. Barrell: Boethius.
Some Asp(cts of bis Times ami Work (Cambridge. 1940); E. Rapisarda: La
aisi spiritua/e di Boezio (Firenze, 1947); G. Vann: The Wisdom of Boethius
(Oxford, 19'i2); H. Liebeschiitz: 'Boethius and the Legacy of Antiquity', The
Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medier,al Pbi/osophy, edited by
A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge. 1967). pp. 538-'i'i'i: C. Leonardi, L. Minio-
Paluello, lJ. Pizzani, e. P. Cournlle: 'Boezio', Dizionario biografico degli
italiani II (Roma, 1969). pp. 142-16'i; L. Oberrello: Severino Boezio 1-11
(Genov;t, 1974); F. <lastaldelli: Boezio (Roma, 1974); A. Crocco: Jntrodu-
zione a Boezio, secunda edizione (Napoli, 1975); and H. Chadwick:
Boetbius. Tbe Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy (Ox-
ford. 198 I). For general studies of the theological tractates see K. Bruder:
'Die philosophischen Elememe in den Opuscula sacra des Boethius. Ein
Beitrag zur Quellengcschichte der Philosophic der Scholastik'. Forschungen
zur Geschichte der Philosophie und der Piidagogik 312 (Leipzig, 1928): H.).
Brosch: Der Seinsbegriff bel Boetbius. mil besonderer Beriicksicbligung tier
Beziebtmg ron Sosein und Dasein (lnnsbruck, 1931); V. Schurr: Die
Triniliitslehre des Boethius im Lichte tier skythischen Kontroversen (Pader-
horn. 193'i): Schrimpf: op. cit .. pp. 1-36: I. Cramer-Riigenberg: Die
Substcmzmetaphysik des Boethius in den Opuscula sacra, Diss. (Koln, 1967);
M. Elsasser: Das Person-l'erstiincl1zis des Boethius, Diss (Wiirzburg, 197 3);
and B. Maioli: Teo ria de/l'essere e clell'esisten lee classificazione delle scienze
in .H. S. Boezio. lfna cle/ucidazicme (Siena, I 9 7 8). I' or general studies of De
Crmsolulione Pbilosophiae see F. Klingner: De Boetbii Consolatione
BOETH!l'S
9.11 THE INFLUENCE OF PLATONISM
Platonic notions are scattered throughout the wnungs of

Boethius, although naturally the extent of their use varies from
one context to another in accordance with the kind of
philosophical question being discussed. H Among the most
significant examples might be mentioned the following: in De
..tritbmetica, the doctrine that number is a transcendent princi-
ple contained in God's mind and serving as the archetype of the
visible creation; I; in the first commentary on the /sagoge, the
tripartite division of theoretical philosophy into theology, an
intermediate study. and physics each of which is defined both
objectively and subjectively; 16 the close association between
the transcendent state of the human soul and God;~~ and the
realist solution to Porphyry's three famous questions about the
ontological status of universals; Ill in Contra Eutycben et
.Vestorium, the notion that God and matter cannot be
understood directly through a process of intellection but only
philusophiae (Berlin. 192 I); K. Reichenberger: Untersuchungen zur

litemriscben Sfelltmg tier Consolatio philosophiae (K61n. 1954 ): V. Schmidt-
Kohl: Die neuplafonische Seelenlebre in tier Consolatio philosophiae des
Uoetbius (Meisenheim am Glan, 1965 ); Courcelle: La Consolation de
philosophie dans Ia tradition litteraire. Antecedents et posterlte de Boece;
H. Scheible: Die Gedicbte in der Consolatio philosophiac des Boetbius
n ll'idl'lhcrg. ll)i 2 ): p Huher: Die Vereinharkelt /I(Jtl g6tt/icher Vorselmng
0
lllulmenscblicber Freiheit in der Consolatio philosophiae des Boethius. Diss.

(Zlirich. ll)i6); and <iruhcr: op. cit.
I.J. That the notions to he described arc Platonic, at least as that term is
IIIHkrstood in late antiquity. is perhaps hy now ob,ious tu the reader.
However, any further justification which might be deemed necessary should
emerge from the detailed discussion later in this chapter.
I 5. Bocthius: De .-lrit/Jm. I, I. 10. 10-2 I.
16. Roethius: In /sag. ed. I, I. 3. 8.:\-9. 12.
1-./fJid. 1.3.'"'~.16-20: 1.3.H.I6-IH:and 1..-\.9.2.
IH.IIJid. I. 10, 23. 1""'-30.21.
NEOI'J.AT< >N IS.\1
indirectly through the removal of predication; IIJ and that the

transcendent state of the human soul can be rendered im-
mutable by God;lo in De Hebdomadibus, the interpretation of
God as existencc;ll the development of the theory that all
things produced by God have a composite nature associated
with their participation in their higher causc;2.2 and the
understanding of causation as a cycle of procession and rever-
sion;23 and in De Trinitate, the threefold division of theoretical
philosophy into theology, mathematics, and physics each of
which is ddined both objectively and subjectively;! the doc-
trine that God is equivalent to form;ls the realist interpretation
of the ontological status of universals;26 the doctrine that the
categories change their meaning when they are applied to
God;l"' and that the divine attributes are co-extensive with one
another.zs Furthermore, besides these notions which are
characteristic of many Platonic schools in late antiquity,
Boethius' writings contain other doctrines harmonized with
Platonism by the more ingenious exegetes of his day. liJ Into this
class would come such teachings as: in the second commentary
on the lsagoge, the non-realist solution to Porphyry's three
19. Boethius: Contra l:'utych. et Nest. I. 1.'\-1 S.

20. Ibid. 2. 24-28.
21. Boethius: De Hebd. 28-.'\7; 124; 1.'\3-134; and 16';.
22./bid. 31-37and41-48.
23. Ibid. 49-"i2; 66-67; 83-84: 98; 119-121; 124-126; 132-1.'\4; 144-146;
I S2-l S.'\; and I S9.
2i. Roethius: De Trin. 2, "i-21.
2"i. Ibid. 2. IH-21; 2, 29-31; 2, IO-i2; amiL 24-26.
26. Ibid. 2, 4-l-%.
2"'. /IJid. 4. -:'-1 H: .j. 20-2.'\: I, :; 1-"i9:-!. 6-f-83: and i, 92-9""'.
28. /bltl . .f. 18-20; 4, H-24 and 4, 26--44.
29. The relationship hetween the doctrines to he described and the
Platonism of late antiquity must :twa it its explanation in the main hody of this
chapter. There we shall discover that the non-realist explanation of predica-
tion. for example. becomes a vital constituent in the final system:llization of
Plato's theory of Forms.
BOETHilJS
basic questions about the ontological Sfatus of universals;.~n and

the analysis of physical processes in terms of the efficient,
material, formal, and final causes involved:31 and in the com-
mentary on the Categories, the notion that this work's subject
marrer is not things but words signifying things ..:\2
In De Consolatione Pbilosopbiae we have a work which is so
thoroughly pervaded by Platonism that it is difficult to single
out specific passages as most illustrating Boethius' philosophical
inclinations.:B However, the debt to the Platonic schools of late
antiquity is readily demonstrable in the following cases: in the
first book, the doctrine that the human soul can become forget-
ful of its own nature in the embodied state;.H in the second, the
belief that one can prove the soul's immortality;3'i that the soul
is divine through its possession of reason;.~<> and that God as
Love is the immanent moving cause of the whole cosmos;3""' in
the third book, the descriptions of God as the embodier of
souls;38 as the creator of the cosmos who is without envy;W as
the artificer of both the world soul wJlich is divided into two
parts and encircles the divine mind and of individual souls
which are placed in vehicles and distributed through the
heavens;4o as the cause of those souls' return to himself;41 and
30. Boethius: hl /sag. ed. II. I, to. 158. 21-164.2.

3l.lbid. 2. 3. 174, 14-18.
32. Boethius: In Categ. I (PL64, 159C and 1628).
3.~. Once again, the doctrines to be described are Plawnk according to the
understanding of that term in late antiquity. Their more exact provenance
within the Platonic tradition will be discussed later in the: prcsc:nt l"haptc:r .
.H. Bocthius: De Con sol. Pbilos. I. pr. 6, 40-44.
35. Ibid. II, pr. 4, 91-97
36. Ibid. II. pr. 5. 72-""'5 .
.~ 1 .1bid. II, m. 8, 1-30.
38. Ibid. Ill, m. 6, 4-S .

.W. Ibid. Ill, m. 9. 6.
-tO. Ibid. Ill. m. 9. 13-.20.
-t 1.1bid. Ill, m. 9. 21.
:'IIEOPLATONISM
a~ that principle than which there is no greater;42 in the fourth,

the notions that the human soul's evil corresponds to its
weakness;-t:\ that God's mind governs the production and ar-
rangement of all things;H and that God's providence embraces
together the infinite diversity of the cosmos;4'i and in the fifth
book. the doctrine that the soul is divided into various faculties
of which the higher always comprehend the lower.46
9.2 BOETHIUS' PHILOSOPHY
One of the most remarkable features of Boethius' work is the

attention which he devotes to the correct definition of the
various branches of philosophy. Thus, in the first commentary
on the lsagoge we have the following account:-17 'And there will
-12./IJid. Ill. pr. 10. SVH~.

H./bid. IV. pr. I. 2HI.
+ot.lbid. IV. pr. 6, 21-~0.
-15./bid. IV. pr. 6. 36-:\7.
46./bid. V, pr. 4. 77-120.
4 7. Bot:thius: In /sag. ed. I. l, .3. 8, .3-9. 12 ertmt ttutem et tot specu/atitae
pbilosopbiae species. quot sunt res in quibus iustae speculatio considera-
tionis IJabetur, quotque (IC/tmm dit,ersitates, tot species t'arie/(1/esque tir-
tutum. est igitur tbeoretices. id est crmtemplatitlle tel speculatitJae, triplex
ditersitas (!/que ips" pllrs pbilosopbiae in Ires species ditiditur. est enim
ww tbeoretices pars de inte/lectibilibus, alia de intel/egibilibus. alia de
natural/bus. Tunc interpellatit Fabius miratusque est, quid hoc nmi ser-
monis esse/, quod unam speculalitae partem intellectibilem 'wminassem.
vorrra, inquam. qumziam Latino senmme numqzwm dictum repperi, in-
te/lectibilitl egomet metl terbi compositicme tocmi. est enim intel/ectibile
quod wmm (!/que idem P'r se in pmprill semper ditinitate consistens nul/is
umqzwm sensihus, sed solll tantum mente inte/lectuque c(lp/tur. que~e res
ad specu/ationem dei atque ad cmimi incorpora/itatem considerationem-
que tertte pbilosofJ/Jiae indagaticme compcmitur: qzwm partem (iraeci
6wA.oyiav 11ominwzt. sec:mula tero est pars inte/legibilis. quae prinumz in-
tel/ectibilem cogitatione cztque inle/legentia comprebendlt. quae est om-
nium caelestium supermze ditinitatis operum et quicquid sub lzmari glubo
BOETHILIS
he as many parts of speculative philosophy as there arc objects

towards which a correct investigation in the speculative manner
can be directed, and there are as many kinds and varieties of
powers as there are differences in activities. 4H Thus, there is
within the theoretical branch of philosophy - that is to say the
contemplative or speculative branch - a threefold diversity,
and this branch of philosophy itself is divided into three parts:l9
For one part of theoretical philosophy is concerned with in-
tdlcctible objects, another with intelligible ones, and another
\Yith natural ones. (Here Fabius has interrupted, wondering
what the novel terminology signifies when I call one part of
speculative philosophy "intellectible". My reply is that it is the
von'tci which l have translated as "intellectibles" using a term of
my own invention, since I have not found this idea previously
expressed in the Latin language). 'iO An intellectible object is that
beatiore animo atque puriore substantiCI talet et postremo bumauarum

animamm. quae omnia cum prioris illius intellectibi/is substantiae fuis-
sent. corporum tttctu ub intel/ectibi/ibus t~d intel/egibilia degenerartmt, ut
non magis ipsa intel/egantur quam intellegant et intel/egentiae puritate
tunc /Jeatiora sint, quotiens sese intellectibi/ibus tlfJfJiicurint. tertitt
tbeoretices species est qtme circa corport~ atque eorum scientit~m cogni-
tirmemque tersatur: qut~e est pbysiologit~, quae natmas corporum pas-
sirmesque dec:/art~t. secunda vero, intel/egibi/ium substt~ntia, merito medio
col/oc((ttl est, quod babeat et corporum animationem et quod((mmodo
l'itij'icatirmem et intel/ectibilium consiclerationem cognitirmemque.
!H. We shall only examine the section of Boethius' analysis dealing with
theoretical philosophy and its parts. It should therefore he horne in mind that
theoretical philosophy itself represents only one branch of philosophy as a
whole. and that practical philosophy comprises the other main branch of the
latter. However. since Boethius has left no treatises or commentaries dealing
with practical philosophy we need not nmsidcr this aspect here.
19 It is a fundamental feature of this argument that the three p:trts of
theoretical philosophy are defined both according to their ohjccts of in-
vesti).\:llion and according 10 the suhjcct of investigation. On this point sec
tht detailed discussion below.
"ill. That Bocthius should render the Greek term vorrr6v hy intelle,tibi/e
which he admits is a coinage rather than by intellegibile which was already
660 NEOPL.ATONISM
which always remaining self-identical in its own proper divinity

is never perceived by the senses hut only by the mind alone and
the intellect. Such an object is pursued in the investigation of
God and the soul's incorporeality, and in the consideration of
true philosophy - that part of it which the Greeks call
8EOA.oyia. The second part of theoretical philosophy is the in-
telligible one which comprehends the first intellectiblc part in
thought and intelligencc.'iJ This is the study of all the heavenly
works of the higher divinity. of whatever has the benefit of a
more blessed soul and a purer substance below the lunar sphere,
and finally of human souls. Although all these things consisted
of that prior intellectihle substance, they have declined owing
to bodily contact from the realm of intellectihles to that of in-
telligibles. 'i.l They are therefore as much subjects of intelligence
as they are its objects. and they are more blessed in the purity of
intelligence the more they join themselves to the intellectihles.
The third part of theoretical philosophy is that which is con-
cerned with bodies and with our knowledge and perception of
them. It is equivalent to physiology'i3 which expounds the
established as a Latin equivalent is l'Urious. The reason seems to be that he

wishes to reserve intellegibile to describe the objects and mode of investiga-
tion proper to the second part of theoretical philosophy - that which he
views as mainly concerned with human souls - perhaps under the influence
of texts like Augustine: De Mor. t:ccl. Cath. I. 12. 20-21 (PL ~2. I ~20) which
contains many points of similarily to the present argument. Marius VkJOrinus
took the more obvious course of rendering the Greek term vont6v by in-
tellegibi/e as demonstrated hy P. f-ladot: Porpbyn! et Victorinus II (Paris.
1968). Index grt:co-latin, s.l'.
t; I. Hoethius means that the intclligihlc subject 1 = 'part") c;m bl applied to
the imelknihlc: object ( = 'part'). See the detailed discussion below.
<;2. Here the term 'intelligible' is employed for the ohjens rather than for
the subject of investigation. See the detailed dislussion below.
<;~. That Hoethius should employ the Greek term cpumoA.oyia in Latin
transliteration is prob;tbly a rcsull of his recollection of its usc in texts like
Aristotle: De Sens. -4. -i-l2b2 ';;Cicero: De Di1i11. I. 90: etc.
BOf:THHIS 661
natures and passions of bodies. The second substance - that of

the intelligibles - is rightly located in the middle. because it is
responsible both for the animating and to some extent the
vivification of bodies and for the investigation and knowledge
of intellectibles'. 'H
This description of the three branches of theoretical
philosophy raises at least two fundamental" questions of which
the first concerns the ambivalent nature of the classification
itself. Thus, the terms (i) intcllectible, (ii) intelligible, and (iii)
natural are defined as signifying a) objects of investigation - in
which cases we are concerned primarily with God, the human
soul, and natural bodies respectively; while the term (ii) in-
telligible is also defined as signifying b) the subject of investiga-
tion - in which instance we are concerned strictly with the
human soui.~S The result is that the words 'the second part of
theoretical philosophy is the intelligible one which com-
prehends the first intellectible part in thought and intelligence'
mean that the object a) of division (ii) also represents the subject
b) capable of investigation the objects a) of division (i). Further-
more, when Boethius adds that 'although all these things con-
sisted of that prior intellectible substance, they have declined
owing to bodily contact from the realm of intellectibles to that
of intelligibles' - by which he means that the object a) of divi-
sion (ii) was originally an object a) of division (i) but declined
from that status - he is repeating the classic Neoplatonic doc-
trine that the human soul is ultimately part of the noetic sphere,
but has declined owing to material contact from the realm of
St. Again the term 'intelligible' is employed for the objects rather than for
the subject of investigation. See the detailed discussion below.
S'i. To complete the symmetry of the scheme we would have 10 say that
the terms (i) intellectible and (iii) natural are also defined as signifying a) ob-
jects of investigation and b) subjects of investigation. However. it is obvious
that neither God nor n:uural bodies cngage in discursive reasoning since the
former is above it and the latter below.
662 NEOPLATONISM
the noetic to that intermediate between the noetic and the sensi-
bleY> Moreover, when he continues that 'they are therefore as
much subjects of intelligence as they are its objects, and they are
more blessed in the purity of intelligence the more they join
themselves to the intellectihles' - by which he means that the
object a) of division (ii) has now become a subject h) of division
(ii) in addition but can return to its original status - he is
repeating the further Neoplatonic doctrine that the human soul
acquires a duality of consciousness as it descends from the
noetic sphere hut can lose this once again as it reascends
thither5 .. Finally, the words 'the second substance- that ofthe
intelligibles - is rightly located in the middle, because it is
responsible both for the animating and to some extent the
vivification of bodies and for the investigation and knowledge
of intellectibles' repeat the idea that the object a) of division (ii)
also represents the subject b) capable of investigating the objects
a) of division (i).
The second fundamental question which this description of
the three branches of theoretical philosophy raises is that con-
cerning its relation to the similar tripartite analysis in the second
chapter of De Trinitate. ss Since the latter has been much more
<;6. On this doctrine seep. <;79 ff.

S7. On this doctrine seep. S79 ff.
SR. Boethius: De Trin. 2. S-16 'There are three parts of speculative
philosophy. There is the natural part which is "in motion and unabstract
(avunE~aipEtoc;)" - for it considers the forms of bodies together with mat-
ter. and these forms are not actually separable from bodies. The bodies are in
motion. as when earth is borne downwards and fire upwards, and the form
has motion by being joined to matter. There is the mathematical part which is
"without motion and unabstract" - for this considers the forms of bodies
aside from matter and therefore aside from motion. These forms are however
in matter and <:an not be separated from it. There is the theological part which
is "without motion and abstract" or separate - for the substance of God
lacks both matter and motion' (Nam cum tres sint speculati1ae partes,
natura/is. in motu inabstracttt civunE~aipEtoc; (considerat enim corporum
BOETHil'S 66.~
extensively discussed in modern scholarship, it will undoubted-

ly be sufficient here to summarize the points on which the two
descriptions agree and differ.';'> Thus, there is agreement bet-
ween them (i) in dividing theoretical philosophy into three parts
in accordance with the kind of object to be investigated and (ii)
in considering God as the object of the theological and natural
bodies as the objects of the physical part. There is disagreement
between the two descriptions in that the version in the first
commentary on the lsagoge (i) lists the three parts of theoretical
philosophy in descending order of importance, (ii) does not
restrict itself to a correlation between one part and one kind of
ohject,60 (iii) considers the human soul as the primary object of
the second part, and (iv) does not analyze the three kinds of ob-
jects into their ontological constituents; while the version in De
Trinitate (i) lists the three parts of theoretical philosophy in
formas cum materia, quae a corporibus actu separari non possunt, quae
corpora in motu stmt ut cum terra deorsum ignis sursum fertur, habetque
motum fonna materiae conitmcta). mathemcltlca, sine motu lnabstracta
(IJaec enim fonnas corpon1m speculatur sine materia ac per hoc sit1e motu,
quae formae cum In materia sint, ab his separari non possunt), theologlcll,
sine motu abstracta atque separabUis (nam dei substantia et materia et
motu caret)). For the interpretation of the many ambiguous formulae see
bdow.
<;lJ. Among the most important discussions in modern scholarship see).
~larictan: Problimze de Ia clllssificlltitm des sciences d'A,Istote il sctlnt-
11mmas (Valais. 190 I), pp. 63-76; Bruder: op. cit .. pp. 3-10; K. Kremer: Der
Metaphysikbegriff In det1 Aristoteles-Kommentllrell der Ammonius-Scbule
(Reitriige zur Geschichte der Pbi/osopbie und Tbeologie des Mittelalters
:Wil) (Munster, 1961), pp. 17-26;). A. Weishcipl: 'Classification of the
Scknces in Medieval Thought'. Medlet'al Studies 27 ( 1965 ). pp. 54-90; P.
Mc:rlan: From Platonism to Neoplatrmlsm, Third Edition (The Hague, 1968),
pp. !7-84; R. Mcinerny: 'Boethius and St. Thomas Aquinas'. Ritista dl
filo.mfiu neoscolastica 66 (1974). pp. 219-245; and Obertdlo: Se!'erino
Boezio 1, pp. 573-588.
60. Thus, the first part is concerned with both God and the human soul
(onc: part rel:ues to several objects), the human soul is studied in both the first
and second parts (one object relates to several parts). and so on.
66i ~EOPI.ATONISM
ascending order of importance. (ii) confines itself strictly to a

correlation between one part and one kind of object, (iii)
postulates mathematical entities61 as the primary objects of the
second part, and (iv) analyzes the three kinds of objects into
their ontological constituents by considering them a) as forms
and b) as ( J) ontologically and logically inseparable from a
substratum of motion, (2) ontologically inseparable but logically
separate from a substratum of motion. and (3) ontologically and
logically separate from a substratum of motion.62 This survey of
the agreements and disagreements between the two descrip-
tions is enough to show how dangerous it is for the interpreter
to transpose one simply into the other, for example by arguing
that the soul's incorporeality which is included among the in-
tellectibles refers to the divine intellect,6.~ or that the in-
telligibles actually include mathematical entities as well as the
heavenly bodies and human souls.M Together these descrip-
tions reveal a metaphysical system with a high degree of
coherence, although they represent complementary and not
equivalent interpretations of it.
9.21 THEOLOGY
Boethius' theological doctrine is expounded mainly in two
61. By mathcmatkal cnttucs is meant gcometrkal figures rather than

astronomical configurations. since their definition implies that they arc
separable from a substratum of motion.
62. Thtrl' ha\'c hccn many contronrsks over the pncisc meaning of ttr-
minology in the \'ersion of De Trinitate 2. especially since the ttxt does not
explicitly distinguish between (i) separable and separate and between (ii) on-
tological and logkal separateness. I have attempted to resolve some of these
ambiguities in my summary. At all events it seems dear that the writer is inex-
plicit rather than confused. as Mcinerny: op. cit .. pp. l.W-lll has sutcessful-
ly demonstrated against Merlan: op. cit.. pp. "7-r 'H.
6:\. This was arguld br Bruder: op. cit .. p. ~.
(H. This was argued b)' Merlan: op. cit .. pp. Hl-H;\.
BOF.THiliS
sets of writings: on the one hand the tractates Contra Eutycben

et Nestorium, De Hebdomadibus, and De Trinitate, and on the
other De Consolatione Pbilosopbiae. Since there is again a high
degree of doctrinal consistency between these works. we are
undoubtedly justified in drawing upon them simultaneously to
construct a synthesis of his philosophical position.M Our pre-
sent plan will therefore be to analyze the Boethian doctrine
under a number of headings depending upon whether God is:
(i) Approached subjectively6<>
a) unintelligible
b) intelligible
c) semi-intelligible
(ii) Approached objectively<>"
a) transcendent6H
( 1) defined as transcendent69
a) supreme
!}) supreme thought
(2) having attributes of transcendence"'o
a) unity
I}) goodness
y) existence
5) beauty
E) immutability
~)non-spatiality
6<;. In the past. scholars have tended to paraphrase given Bocthian works
rather than synthesize the teachings which they contain. perhaps on the
a~sumption that there is no underlying philosophical consistency. Howc,er.
as a good example of the synthetic approach one might mention M. Baltes ar-
tkk: '(lott, Welt. Mensch in der Conso/atio pbllosopbiae des Boethius',
l'igilie~e Chrlstianae :H ( 1980), pp. 313-340.
66. i.e. in describing God from the viewpoint of our perception.
6'7. i.e. in describing Gud from thl" viewpoint of his l"Xistence.
6R. i.e. in describing God without specific reference to what he creates.
69. i.e. in desuibing God's transcendence in a general way.
-:>o. i.e. in describing God's transcendence in its specific modes.
NEOPI.ATONISM
11) atemporality
9) incorporeality
1) unified plurality
h) causal't
(I) defined as causar'2
a) form
~)mind
y) providence
2) having attributes of causality""3
a) omnipotence
~)activity
y)beneficence
B) volition
E) bestowal of being
~) bestowal of motion
11) bestowal of similarity
The presentation of Boethius' theological position in the form
of a synthesis has the advantage of demonstrating its overall
coherence, although we would be ill-advised to ignore totally
the different contexts in which the various constituent elements
originally appear. Our discussion will therefore begin by ex-
amining the separate contributions of the school writings, the
relevant theological tractates, and De Conso/atione
Philosopbiae to the evolution of the system as a whole.
9.211 J THE DOCTRINE OF THE SCHOOL WRITINGS
In the school writings Boethius describes God in various

ways. Thus. De Arithmetica speaks of him as goodness: 'the
goodness which is defined, subject to knowledge, and always
71. i.e. in describing God with specific reference to what he creates.

'""2. i.t.. in describing God's c.:ausality in a general way.
"":\.i.e. in describing God's causality in its specific modes.
BOETHlliS
imitable and perceptible to the mind' (bonitas definita et sub

scientiam cadens cmimoque semper imitabilis et percep-
tibilis);"" as immutable: 'the nature which is always of its own
proper condition and in no way changes' (quae propriae suae-
que semper habitudinis est nee ullo modo permutatur);"~S and
as form: 'Number was the primal exemplar in the mind of the
creator' (fuit principale in animo conditoris exemplar). 7 6 The
first commentary on the lsagoge speaks of God as intelligible:
'the intellectible which always remaining self-identical in its
own proper divinity is never perceived by the senses but only
by the mind alone and the intellect. Such an object is pursued in
the investigation of God and the soul's incorporeality' (intellec-
tibile quod unum atque idem per se in propria semper
dit initate consistens nul/is umquam sensibus, sed sola tantum
1
mente intel/ectuque capitur. quae res ad speculationem dei at-

que ad animi incorporalitatem ... indagatione componitur);77
as incorporeal: 'There are certain incorporeal things which
altogether avoid bodily contact such as mind or God' (quaedam
incorporales sunt res, quae omnino corpora non patiuntur, ut
animus t'el deus);""H and as mind: 'that wisdom which, lacking
nothing, is the living mind and sole original reason of things'
.., -1. = ii a 2 p. Bot:thius: De Arithm. I, 52. 66, Hl I.

""'i. = ii a 2 E. Ibid. II, ;H. 122, 2'il2:\. :\. Cf. ibid. I. I."", 26-H. I.
-:'6. = ii b I a. Ibid. I. 2, 12, 14-17. Cf. ibid. I. I. 10, 11-13 wht:re of
arithmt:tk he writes: 'Tht: cre;uor of this world's suhstanct:, God, had this as
the first ext:mplar of his rt:asoning' (bane ille buius mumlanae molis ccm-
clitor deus primam .mae babuil l'llliocinatltmis e;r:emplar). Two points
should he madt: rt:garding tht:se passagt:s. First. Boethius is following the
:'1/eopythagorean tradition in equ;uing number and form; secondly. he
follow~ the same tradition's identifkation of number and form with the
dhinity itself.
....... = i h. Boethius: In/sag. ed. I. I.;\. H. I;\ I H. lnte/lectibi/e is the term
which the author employs uniquely in this passagt: to translate the Grt:t:k
vonT6v ( = 'intclligihk'). See pp. 6'i9-660 and n. 'iO.
-H. = ii a 2 6. Ibid. 1. I 0, 29. 22-;\0, I.
NEOPI.AT< >NISM
(ilia supientia, quae nullius indigens, l'il'tlX mens et sola

rerum primae11a ratio est).79 Finally. the second commentary
on the lsagoge speaks of God as incorporeal: 'There arc two
varieties of incorporeals of which one can exist independently
of bodies and remain separate from bodies in its incorporeality:
thus God, mind, and soul' (duae quippe incorporeorum formae
sunt, ut alia praeter corpora esse possint et separata a cor-
paribus in sua incorpora/itate perdurent, ut deus, mens,
anima).BO
9.2112 THE DOCTRINE OF THE THEOLOGICAL TRACTATES
In the theological traClates Boethius describes God in the

following terms. In Contra Eu~)'Chen et Nestorium he is refer-
red to as semi-intelligible: 'God and matter cannot be known
fully and perfectly by the intellect. although they can be ap-
prehended to a degree through the privation of other things'
(deus et materia integro perfectoque intellectu intel/egi non
possunt, sed aliquo tamen modo ceterarum rerum privatione
capiuntur);Hl as supreme: 'just as he excels all things so is he
also like a foundation of things' (idem omnibus uti praeesset ita
etiam quasi principium subesset rebus);Hl as immutable: 'Of ra-
tional things one class is immutable and impassible by nature
like God' (ratimwlium tero alia est inmutabilis atque in-
passibi/is per naturam ut deus);H.~ as bestowing being: 'He sup-
79. = ii hI !3./bid. 1, 3. ' I'H6. Cf. ibid. 1, 3. 7. 19-20 where the study
of wisdom is defined as 'the study of divinity and the kinship with that pure
mind' (Situlium dil'initatis et purae mentis illi11s amicitia). By interpreting
wisdom a~ the illuminator of tht human intdktt in tht dau~e intervening
between these two quotations. Boethius shows that the mind with which that
wisdom is identified is the divine one and not the human.
HO. = ii;t29. Boethius:/n/sag. ed./1.1,10. 160.23-161.2.
HI. = i c. Bocthius: Conlm Eutycb. et ,Vest. I. 13-1 c;,
H.!. = ii :1 I a. /IJitl. ;\. 99-100.
H.~- = ii a.! E. Ibid. .!. 2-t-l'i. Cf. ibid. 6. 13-IL
BOETHIUS
plies all things with oum&a9at or subsistence' (eis omnibus

oum&a9at vel subsistere subministrat);B4 and as bestowing mo-
tion: 'that from which the being of all things proceeds' (a quo
omnium esse proficiscitur).W'> In De Hebdomadibus God is
described as goodness: 'Let us consider how things could be
good if they had not flowed down from the primal good' (con-
sideremus quemadmodum bona esse possent, si a primo bono
minime deflu.:'Cissent);R6 as existence: 'Things cannot have their
existence unless that has flowed down from the primal ex-
istence' (non potest esse ipsum esse rerum, nisi a primo esse
dejluxerit);B..., as unified plurality: 'The primal good. since it ex-
ists, is good insofar as it exists' (Primum enim bonum,
quoniam est, in eo quod est bonum est);BH as activity: 'In him
R-i.= ii b 2 &. Ibid. 3. 100-101. On the meaning of 'being' seen. H7.

RS. = ii b 2 ~-Ibid. 3. H7-H9.
86. = ii a 2 ~- Boethius: De Hebd. 95-98. Cf. ibid. 77-78; 92-93; 119-121;
124-126; 132-133; 140-141;etc.
87. = ii a 2 y. Ibid. 131-133. Cf. ibid. 149-150 and 166-167. The term esse
in Boethius has a number of meanings: it signifies (A) being generally (I. in
the case of God, 2. in the case of creatures); (B) indeterminate being or ex-
istence (1. in the case of God, 2. in the case of creatures); and (C) determinate
being or essence (I. in the case of God, 2. in the case of creatures). The most
complex situation is presented in De Hebdomad/bus where senses B I and C
2 arc contrasted in Axiom II: 'Existence and the existent thing arc distinct, for
existence itself is not yet anything. Yet the existent thing certainly is and con-
sists of something. having accepted the form of its being' (Dil'ersum e.~t esse
et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at tero quod est accepta essemli
forma est atque consistit). Cf. Axioms Ill and IV. On the other hand senses B
2 and C 2 are contrasted in Axiom VII: 'Every simple thing possesses its ex-
istence and its essence in identity with one another' (Omne simplex esse
suum et id quod est rmum habet). Cf. Axiom VIII. In Crmtra Eutychen et
Nestorium the discussion seems to center on senses A l and A 2 and in De
Trlnitate it seems to center on senses C I and C 2. although a correct alloca-
tion of the six meanings of esse among these three texts will remain a matter
of uncertainty. Seen. 91.
HH. = ii a 2 l. Bocthius: De Hebtl. 121-122. Cf. ibid. l 54-1 :\S; 149-1 SO; and
16'!-16';.
6"70 :'IIEOPLATONISM
existence and activity are identical' (idem autem est in eo esse

quod agere);H9 as volition: 'Created things are said to be good
because their existence flowed down from the volition of the
Good' (ldcirco quoniam esse eorum a boni voluntate deflzl."dt,
bona esse dicuntur);90 as bestowing being: 'The existence of all
things flowed from that which is the primal good' (ipsum esse
omnium rerum ex eo fluxit quod est primum bonum);91 and as
bestowing motion: 'The second good is also good since it flow-
ed from that whose existence is good (secundum vero bonum,
quoniam ex eo fluxit cuius ipsum esse bonum est, ipsum quo-
que bonum est). 92 Finally, in De Trinitate God is referred to as
semi-intelligible: 'If one employs the categories to affirm
something regarding God, everything affirmed is transformed in
meaning' (At haec cum quis in divinam verterit praedica-
H9. = ii h 113. Ibid. 166-167.

90. = ii h 2 6. Ibid. 119-121. Cf. i/Jid. I 50-I 53 and I ii-I 59.
91. = ii b 2 &. Ibid. 124-125. Cf. Ibid. 119-121; 131-133; etc. Esse in these
texts clearly signifies the existence of created things or sense B 2 according to
the classification proposed inn. 87. The literature on the interpretation of
esse in Boethius' theological tractates is enormous. largely owing to its
rcle\'ance to interpretations of Thomas Aquinas' ontology. Among the more
important treatments seeP. Duhem: Le systeme du monde. Histoire des doc-
trines cosmologlques de Pluton ti Copernic V (Paris, 1917), pp. 285-316;
Brosch: op. cit.; P. Hadot: 'La distinction de l'etre et de l'etant dans le De
Hebdomad/bus de Boece', Miscelkmea Medlaet,alia 2 (Berlin, 1963). pp.
147-153; Schrimpf: op. cit .. pp. 1-36: P. Hadot: Porpbyre et Victorinus, pp.
'ci88-49.~. 'Forma essemli. Interpretation philologique et interpretation
philosophique d'une formule de BoC<.e', Les etutles c/assiques .~8 ( 1970), pp.
14:HS6; Obertello: Set,erino Boezio I, pp. 619-656; Maioli: op. cit., pp.
13-56; and L. M. de Rijk: 'Bocce logicien ct philosophe. Ses positions seman-
tiqucs et sa mctaphysique de l'etre', Atti del Congresso lnternazionale dl
Studi Boezia11i (Pat,ia. 5-8 ottobre 1980), a cura di L. Obertello, pp.
14 1-156. It is the interpretation proposed in Hadot's three works which will
form the basis of the present author's development of the same theme.
92. = ii h 2 ~- Bocthius: De Hebd. 122-124. Cf. ibid. 98; 119-120;
124-126; 131-1.33: 144-146; and 159.
BOETHIIIS
tionem, cuncta mutantur quae praedicari possunt);lJ.~ as unity:

'That is truly one in which there is no number and in which
nothing is present except its essence' (hoc vere unum in quo
nul/us numerus, mtllum in eo aliltd praeterquam id quod
est);'>t as non-spatial: 'For this reason he is said to be nowhere in
a place because he is everywhere hut in no place' (atqu.e ideo
nusquam in loco esse dicitu.r. quoniam ubique est sed non in
loco);'>"' as atemporal: 'The phrase "God is eternal" denotes a
single thing, as though he was in every past, in every present so
w speak, and in every future' (Quod vero de deo dicitur semper
est, unum quidem significat, quc1si omni praeterito fuerit, om-
ni qzwquo modo sit praesenti est, omni futuro erit);% as
unified plurality: 'Fur he is not one thing because he is God and
another because he is just, but it is the same for him to be God
and to be just' (Neque enim a/iud est quod est, a/iud est quod
iustus est. sed idem est esse deo quod iusto);'>1 and as form: 'He
is the form which is truly form and not an image. and which is
~ssence itself and that from which essence derives, since all
~ssence is derived from form' (forma quae vere forma neque
imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex qua esse est. Omne nam-
que esse e.Yforma est)YH
9.211.3 THE DOCTRINE OF DE CONSOLATIONE

Pfi/LOSOPHIAE
In De Consolatione Philosophiae Boethius describes God

from a number of viewpoints. Thus, various passages speak of
9~. = i c. Bocthius: De Trill. 1, 1.9. cr. ibitl. L 26-.2<).

9-i. = ii ;J 2 a./bid. .2, f!H2. cr. ibid. 2, 56-<;H: .~. 14; ;~nd 1, .2+.26.
9'i. = ii a 2 ~.Ibid.~. SH-'i9. Cf. ibid. l. i':".
96. = ii a .2 11. /1)/t/. _.. (H 66. Cf. Ibid. L 60-61; 1. 6!.J- "77; and 1. ')t9'i.
'r. = ii a .2 1. Ibid. 4, ll~-20. cr. ibid. 4. 2~-.24: 4 . .26-29; and 4, 3i-36.
'>H.= ii hI a. JIJicl. 2, 1"7.21. Cf.IIJid. 2. 29-~1; 2. 37--iO; .~. H-.~i: and 4.
2+26.
NEOPLA TONISM
him as unintelligible: 'The motion of human reasoning cannot

approach the simplicity of the divine prescience' (humanae
ratiocinationis motus ad divinae praescientiae simplicitatem
non potest admot,eri);<J<J as intelligible: o Father, let me fix on
you my mind's perceptive sight' (da pater ... in te conspicuos
animi defigere l'isus); 1oo as semi-intelligible: 'Therefore let us
be elevated to the height of that supreme Intellect, if we are
able. For there reason will see what it cannot contemplate in
itself (Quare in illius summae intellegentiae cacurnen, si
possumus, erigamul"; i/lic enim ratio t1idebit quod in se non
potest intueri); 1o1 as supreme: 'But we most rightly confess that
he is the most excellent of all things' (Sed hum: esse l"emnz om-
nium praecellentissimum dignissime confitemul"}; 102 as
supreme thought: 'For since nothing can be conceived better
than God, who will doubt that that than which nothing is better
is good?' (Nam cum nihil deo me/ius excogitari queat, id quo
me/ius nihil est bonum esse quis dubitet?); w~ as unity: 'This
world could never have come together from such differing and
contrary parts if there had not been a unity which joined such
disparate things' (Mundus bic ex tam dhel"sis cnntral"iisque
pa,-tibus in unam fonnam mi11ime comenisset, nisi tmus esse/
99. = i a. Boethius: /J(' Ctm.wl. PIJi/(}S. \', pr. ~. 6-H. Cf. i/Jid. IV, pr. 6.
126-12"".
I 00. = i h. fiJi d. Ill, m. 9 . .23-H. This is the first of a number of passages in
this section taken from the important poem 0 qui perpetua. The poem
represents a summary of Plato's Timaeus and as such has attracted the atten-
tion of numerous commentators from mediaeval times onwards. The impor-
tance attached to 0 qui perpetua by its author is underlined by its central
position in the work as a whole.
101. = i c./bid. V. pr. 5. 'i0-53.
102. = ii a I a. Ibid. Ill, pr. 10, -i9-'i 1. At Ibid. V, pr. 6, 38-40 God is
declared to be prior to created things not in quantity of time but in simplicity
of nature.
103. = ii a JJ}.Ibid. Ill, pr. 10. 2'i-2"'. Cf. ibid. Ill. pr. 10. 'i7-58.
UOETHILIS
qui tam diversa coniungeret); IIH as goodness: 'What do you

think we should do now so that we might deserve to find the
seat of that supreme good?' (quid mmcfaciendu.m censes, ut it-
/ius summi boni sedem reperire mereamur?);W" as beauty: 'As
yourself most beautiful you carry the beautiful world in your
mind' (pulchrum pulcberrimus ipse I mzmdum mellle gerens); 106
as immutable: 'You command time to run from eternity and, re-
maining static, you make all things move' (tempus ab aevo I ire
iubes stabilisque manens das cuncta mm,eri); w: as atemporal:
'It is therefore the common judgment of all who live by reason
that God is eternal. Eternity then is the simultaneous and perfect
possession of an interminable life' (Deum igitur aeternum esse
cunctorum ratione degentium commune iudicium est ... Aeter-
nitas igitur est interminabi/is l'itae Iota simul et perfecta
possessio); toH as unified plurality: 'We may also securely con-
clude that the substance of God consists of nothing else but
104. = ii a 2 a./bid. Ill, pr. 12, l'i-24. The argumem is repeated several
times in different language.
IO'i. = ii a 2 p.Jbid. Ill, pr. 9. 101-102. Cf. Ibid. Ill, m. 8, l'i; Ill, pr. 10,
23-25; and Ill, pr. 11,22-23 ('good' (bonus)); ibid. Ill. pr. 9. 91-93 ('the true
good' (t,erum bonum)); and ibid. Ill, m. 9, 23 ('the source of goodness' lfcms
boni)).
106. = ii a 2li.Jbid. Ill, m. 9, 7-8.
107. = ii a 2 &. Ibid. Ill, m. 9, 2-3. Cf. ibid. III, pr. 12, 102-108 'For such is
the form of the divine substance that it neilher extends to the external nor
receives anything external into itself. But as Parmenides says of it "On all
sides it is like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere", it rotates the moving
sphere of things while it preserves itself immobile' (E'a est enim ditintle for-
ma substantiae ut neque In exte1'1Ul dilabatur nee in se e:~:tenlUm aliquid
ipm suscipiat. sed, sicut de ea Pt1rme11ides ait: 7tciv-ro9&v &UKUKA.ou OqJaipTJc;
tvaA.iyKIOV {)yKqJ, rerum orbem mo/Jilem rot~lt, dum se immobilem ipsa nm-
sertat).
108. = ii a 2 fl./bid. V, pr. 6, 'i-11. Cf. Ibid. V, pr. 6, 25-31. At ibid. V, pr.
6, 35-38 a contrast is established: 'For it is one thing to enjoy an endless life.
which Plato attributes to the world. and another to embrace the entire
presence of an interminable life simultaneously, which is dearly the
NE< >PLATONISM
goodness itself' (Securu igitur concludere licet dei quoque in

ipso bono nee usquam a/io sitam esse substantiam); to9 as
form: 'The intellect. having crossed the limits of the universe.
beholds that simple form itself with the pure gaze of the mind'
(supergressa namque unil'ersitatis ambitum ipsam i/lam
simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur);IIO as mind:
'For things are best governed if the simplicity remaining in
God's mind brings forth an inflexible series of causes' (Ita enim
res optime reguntur. si manens in divina mente simplicitas in-
declinabilem causarum ordinem promat); ttt as providence:
'For providence is that divine reason itself, established in the
supreme ruler of all things, which arranges all things' (Nam pro-
videntia est ipsa ilia divina ratio in summa omnium principe
constituta quae cuncta disponit); ttl as omnipotent: 'Nobody
doubts that God is omnipotent. And there is nothing that the
omnipotent cannot accomplish (Deum . . . esse omnium
potentem nemo dubitaverit ... Qui vero est ... omnium patens,
nihil est quod ille non possit); t u as beneficent: 'As form of the
supreme good which lacks envy. you lead all immanent forms
from their higher paradigm' (verum insita summi I forma bani
characu:ristic of the divine mind' (Aiiud est enim per intermi1labilem duci
titam, quod mtmdo Pifllo tribuit, a/iud intermbrabi/ls titcte totam pariter
cmnplexum esse praese111iam, quod dlti11ae mentis proprium esse
manifestum est). Cf. Ibid. V. pr. 6, 57-'59.
109. = ii a 2 1. JIJid. Ill. pr. 10, 142-144. Cf. Ibid. Ill, pr. 9, 41-49; Ill, pr.
10, 106-1 15: III. pr. I 0, 119-125; and Ill. pr. 10, 134-14 2.
I HI. = ii b I a. Ibid. V, pr. 4, 89-91. Cf. ibid. Ill, m, 9, 5-6 and Ill, pr. 10,
2('formofthegood'(bonifomra)):ibid. lll,pr.l2. 102-104('formofthe
divine suhstance' (ditoinqe forma substa11tiae)); and ibid. IV, pr. 6, '56-'58
('form of things to he accomplished' (gerendarumforma rerum)).
Ill.= ii hIp. Ibid. IV, pr. 6, 90-92. Cf. ibid. Ill, m. 9, 7-9: IV, pr. 6,
22-25; IV, pr. 6, 73-78: etc.
112. = ii b I y. Ibid. IV, pr. 6, 32-33. The theme of God's providence and
its relation to human free will is developed at length from this point onwards.
113. = ii b 2 a. Ibid. Ill, pr. 12.74-78. cr. ibid. IV. pr. 2, 121-123.
BOETHiliS
lit,ore carens, tu cuncta superno I ducis ab exemplo);ll4 as

bestowing motion: 'Do you know whence all things have: pro-
cc:c:ded? And knowing the beginning, how can you be unaware
what is the end of things?' (Atqui sc:is unde cuncta processerint?
... Et qui fieri potest, ut principio cognito quis sit remm ji'nis
ignores?); JJ<; and as bestowing similarity: 'Forming things in the:
likeness of yourself, you order the perfect world to complete its
perfect parts' (similique in imagine formans I perfectasque
iubens perfectum abso/vere partes). 116
9.212 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
In his descriptions of the first principle, Boethius follows

much of the teaching shared by the Greek Neoplatonists
Plotinus and Porphyry.! 1'7 For example, these writers had main-
tained with equal conviction the views that God is unintelligi-
Il-l. = ii b 2 y. Ibid. III, m. 9, 5-7.

I 15. = ii b 2 ~. Ibid. I, pr. 6, 27-30. Cf. ibid. Ill, pr. 12, 20-2-l; IV, pr. 6,
~ 3--4-1; and V, pr. 1, 55-58. The term procedere is technical for the motion of
effects from their cause.
116. = ii b 2 T(.lbid. III. m. 9. 7-9.
117. This teaching had already been reproduced in Latin by Macrobius.
The evidence for Boethius' knowledge of the latter is constituted (i) by the
explicit citation of Macrobius: In Somn. Sclp. I, 5. 5 on the incorporeality of
temzini at Boethius: In /sag. ed. /, I. II, 3 I, 19 - 32, 2; and (ii) by the pro-
bable recollection of Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. II. 9. 8ff. on the nature of
human glory at Bocthius: De Consul. Pbllos. II, pr. 7. -t-65. On these parallels
sec the discussions in Courcellc: Latin Writers and their Greek Sources, pp.
298-.~00 and La Consolation de Philosophic (/ans ltl traditiml /itteraire.
Antt!n!dents et posterite de Boece, pp. 1 17-124. Of course, Boethius would
also have derived Plotinian and Porphyrian teachings through Marius Vic-
torious.
NEOPI.ATONISM
ble, IIH semi-intelligible, 119 supreme, 120 unity, Ill goodness, Ill
omnipotent, 123 beneficent, 124 bestowing being, 12'; motion, 126
118. See pp. 530-';31 and ch. 7, n. 165.

119. See pp. 531-532 and ch. 7. n. 169.
120. Thus, the One is described as 'the first' (To npTov) at Plotinus: Hnn.
I. 6 /1/6, 25-26; II, 4 /12/ 5. 31-32: 111, 9 /13/7, I; V, 3 1491 II. 27-28; Por-
phyry: In Parm. XI. 23-26; XII, 11-12; etc.; as 'the supreme' (To untpTaTov,
un&p TO nciv) at Plotinus: E1111. IV 2/4/ 2, 5455; VI, 8 1391 16, 8-9; Porphyry:
In Parm. IV, 7-9: VI. 32-35; and as 'the best' (To dplaTov) at Plotinus: Etm. I,
7 /54/1, 5-7; II, 3/52/9, 34-39; V, I /10/6, 51-53: and VI. 7 /38/8, 21.
121. Seep. 532 and ch. 7, n. 176.
122. Seep. 532 and ch. 7, n. 173.
123. Seep. 533andch. 7, n. 181.
124. The One Is described as an ungrudging c:mse at Plotinus: Enn. V, 4 /4/
I, :H-36 'How then could the most complete and primal Good remain set in
itself as if grudging of itself?' (7tc; ouv TO n:A.erotaTOV Kai TO npTOV aya9ov
f:v auTci> ataill roan&p q>Sovijaav f:auToii). Cf. ibid. IV. 8/6/6. 12-16 and V. 5
/32/ I 2. 44-45. At ibid. 11. 9 /33/ I 7. 15-21 the source of the doctrine is in-
dkated: the statement that the gods are ungrudging at Plato: Tim. 29e. Cf.
also Plotinus: 1111. 111. 2/41/11. 6-9.
125. The One is described as the source of being at Plotinus: Enn. V. 2 Ill/
I, 5-6 'It is because there is nothing in it that all things arise from it. And in
order that Being might arise, its source must he not Being hut the produler of
!king' (ii on ouo&v tiv &v a\JTci>, liui TOUTO &I; aUTOU 1tQVta, Kai iva TO ov 1], l>ui
TOiiTo aUTO<; ouK ov, yEVVllTilc; 6& auToii). Cf. ibid. 111, 6/26/6, 28-29: V. 5 /32/
5, 16-27; VI, 7/38/16,22-31; VI. 8/39/12, 20-22; and VI, 8/39/ 19. 12-19:
Porphyry: In Pann. XI. 15-23;Sent. 31. 21. 16-22.3: etc.
126. The One is deslribed as the source of its consequents' pnKcsslon ;u
Plorinus: Enn. V. 2 /II/ 2. 1-2 'There is a procession from the first principle
to the furthest point, each consequent rem:1ining always at its own rank'
(7tp0E\OIV ouv cin'cipxilc; Eic; axaTOV KQtaAE\7t01lEVOU a&i EKQOTOU f:v T~ oiKEi~
fop~). Cf. ibid. V. I II 0/ 6, 22-27 :md V, 2 /I 1/ 2. 21-2i. However. the terms
npotpxeo8at, npoi:tva1, np6o6oc; are assigned hy Plotinus more frequently to
the cause than to the effel't of a causal process. Sec J. H. Sleeman and G.
Pollet. Lexicon Plotinimmm (lciden/Leuvcn, 1980), s. 1'1'. Boethius' modcl
may therefore have heen passages like Porphyry: Sent. 24. li. 5-8 'Among
the incorporeal lin:s. the processions arise whih: their priors remain st:thlc
and firm' (Tv ~wv Tv ciawllliTwv ai np6oo01 llEVOVTWV Tv npoTtpwv
BOETHIUS
and similarity.l27 However, there are various points at which

Boethius departs from this earlier teaching, as indicated by the
following instances.l28
9.2121 GOD AS INTELLIGIBLE
When the first commentary on the Isagoge includes God

among the 'intellectibles' (vmrra- intel/ectibilia), the latter be-
ing the objects of the highest part of speculative philosophy, it
seems to deviate from the Plotinian position that God
transcends the intelligiblt: sphere.l29 However, Porphyry seems
more inclined to make the first principle accessiblt: to intellec-
tion, for example in the passage where he says that 'the man
who knows God has him present while the man who does not
know him is absent from the one who is omnipresent' (6 yvouc;
Tov 9eov ~X.Et Tov 9eov 1tap6vm Kai 6 ciyvoci>v tcp 1tavmx.ou
1tap6vt1 ci1tEOtt),130 and in that where he argues that 'it is per-
EOpaiCJJV Kai J}&jlaiCJJV yiVOVtal). Cf. ibid. 29, 19, 7-8; 31, 22, 10-13; 33. 37.
14-15; and 35. 39, 19-21.
127. The One is described as the source of similarity at Plotinus: Emz. I. :
/S-4/ I. 11-19 'The Good must not look or aspire 10 another, hut stay quiet be-
ing the source or cause of natural activities and making other things like the
<iood' (O&i to ciya6ov 1.1~ npoc; ciA.Ao I}A.tnov l.lllO'tqntll&Vov ciHou tv ~alix.C!l
ouaav 1tl1Y~V Kai cipx_~v tv&py&IWV Kata cpl.imv ouaav Kai tO. ciA.A.a tiya6o&tOii
nmoiiaav ). Cf. ibid. IV, S /29/7. 17-20and V, 6/24/ S. 12-IS: Porphyry: In
Pann. III, 32-IV, 4; etc.
128. It should be stressed that the departures 10 be illuslr:ued below arc
from the sbaret/teaching of Plotinus and Porphyry. Thus. some will he con-
sistent with Porphyry bul not with Plotinus, while olhers will be consislenl
with ndthcr Porphyry nor Plotinus.
129. Bocthius' intellectibile is of course equivalent 10 the intelligible
(VOfltov) of the Ncoplatonk tradition. Sec Plotinus: Enn. V. S /32/ 6. 19-20
where <iod is 'beyond the imclligiblc' (tntK&tva toii VOfltOii) and /hit/. I. I
/'i3/ H. 9-11 where he is 'horne upon the intelligible' (tnox.olill&vov tfj VOfltU
IPUCJ&l).
UO. Porphyry: Ad Gaur. 12, SO. 21-22.
NEOPLATONISM
mitted to few to attain God through the power of intellect' (ad

Deum per t'irtutem intellegentiae pervenire paucis esse con-
and so it is possible that Boethius is being influenced
cessum),.~
by this writer's modes of expression. We should perhaps em-
phasize that Porphyry's theory does not make the first principle
accessible to the regular kind of intellection, as shown by the
argument where he urges us to perceive God by 'remaining in a
non-comprehending comprehension and an intellection which
understands nothing' (IJ.EVElV o'f:v QKQtQATJ1tt~ KataA.iJ\JfEl Kai
IJ.TJOEV f:vvoouau vot;aet),I.U and that where God is identified
with the non-being 'of which we have a pre-intellection when
united with being' (to OE npOEVVOOUIJ.EV EX61J.EVOl TOU ovtoc;), 1:\3
and it is undoubtedly prudent to interpret Boethius' statement
along similar lines. Moreover, Plotinus himself admits that man
can approach God through intellect if not with intellect, 134 and
so the real differences between these writers may not be as great
as the terminology suggests.I3S
I:\ I. Porphyry: De Regr. Anim. fr. 10. ji 12-1 .'\. Of courst', that God is
intelligible implies that he is accessible to intellect for Plotinus, Porphyry,
;and Roethius.
132. Porphyry: In Parm. II, li- P.
13.~. Porphyry: se,t. 26, 1'5. 1-H. At ibid. 2'5. 1'5. 1-.f God is accessible 'to
non-intellection abo\'e intellection' (avol]aic;r KpEittovt voJ1aeroc;). On the in-
tl'llecti\'e approach to God in Porphyry and later Neoplatonism see]. M. Rist:
'Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism', Hermes 92 ( 1964),
pp. 213-22'5.
13-f. See Plotinus: Enn. VI, 7 /.:.HI 3'5. 1-'5 where the soul dismisst's intellec-
tion in order to see God e,en though it is by means of intellect that it has the
vision' (KaitOl vouc; YEV6J.lEVoc; atitl] 9eropei). Cf. Ibid. VI. 9/9/:\. 11-27.
135. On God as intelligible in Augustine see De Ord. II. 3. 8 (CCSL 29,
III-112);11,8,25(CCSL29,121);11,11,30(CCSL29,124);.'io///.I,I,2(Pl.
32. 869-870); I, 6, 13-8. 15 (PL .U, 876-877); De Mus. VI, 12, .'\6 (PL 32,
1183); De Mor. Ecc/. Cath. I, 12,20 (PL 32. 1320); and De Vera Relig. 55,
I U (CCSL 32. 259-260). For the significance of Augustinian parallels seep.
70'i.
BOETHil'S
9.2122 GOD AS EXISTENCE
Plotinus frequently describes God as 'heyond being'

(ErtEKEtVa ouoiac;) using the phrase made famous hy Plato's
Republic. :\6 Fortunately, he is more explicit about the meaning
of this statement than were earlier Platonists, 1:\-:' for in one
passage he states that 'what has being has determination and is
therefore limited' (t66E yap t'l 6Ei t'TJV OUOiav dvat' t'OUt'O 6
wplOJ.l.EVOV).l:\H Thus, when Plotinus states that God is beyond
being he means that he transcends determinate heing or
essence.
From the logical viewpoint, this means that one can make no
predication regarding the first principle. 'And indeed it is none
of those things of which it is the cause. Its nature is that nothing
can be predicated of it: not being, not essence, not life' (TJ &ott
J.l.EV tO J.l.TJ6Ev toutwv rov tanv t:ipx_iJ, t'OlOUt'O J.l.EVt'Ol, oiov,
J.1 T\6Evoc; aUt'OU Ka t'T\YOPEio9at 6uvaJ.l.EVOU, J.l~ ovtoc;, J.l.TJ ouoiac;,
J.l.TJ ~wijc;). :\9 'In addition. every questioning must be considered
as dealing with a thing's nature or its quality or its cause or its
heing. But the first principle's being, if we may use this term. is
only knowable from its consequents' (npoc; 6f: tol>tmc; ~iJtTJOlV
iinaoav X.PTJ VOJ.li~Etv i1 toO ti tottv eivat i1 toO o{ov i\ toO 6ul. ti i1
t'OU dvat. t'O J.l.EV ouv ElVat, roc; AEYOJ.l.EV EKEiVO ElVat, EK t'WV
J.l.Et'au-c6).4o
However. despite the fact that one can make no predication
regarding the first principle, it is possible to speak of it in the
following ways. In the first place, we can allow for the fact that
none of our conceptions apply directly to the highest hy ex-
1~6. Plotinus: Enn. I, 7/'i:f/1, 19.20; II, '11121 16, 2'i; III. 9/1;\/9, I; V. 4
!"'fl. 910: VI.: /.~R/'10, 262'7; and VI. K/39/19, 12-19.
I ~7. Compare the treatment by Calcidius discussed on pp. 440-442.
I :H~. Plotinus: Etm. V.; /~2/6, 'i-6.
lW.IIJitf. III, K/~0/10. 2K-;H.
140. IIJid. VI. 8/_>,9/ 11. 'H~.
680 NEOPI.ATONISM
pressing them together with the qualifying word quasi-

(ofov). Thus. it is permitted to refer to its activities as 'its
quasi-essence' (ft oiov ouoia auw0),1-t2 to the will which 'is con-
joined with its quasi-essence' (OUVEOttV autoO tij OlOV ouoi~;t). H.~
and so on. Secondly. we can avoid all predicative language
regarding the highest and still use that expression which 'docs
not affirm one thing or another but simply reveals identity' (oux
w~ Kat'cUA.ou iiA.A.o, tUA. w~ OTU.taivov 0 EOtt).l.f.f Thus, it
becomes possible to declare 'that it exists' (OtliJ.EV eon) without
seeking to specify 'what kind of thing it is' (oiov cS'eoti). Hi
The dear distinction which Plotinus makes between the ex-
istence of the first hypostasis or One and the existent essence of
the second hypostasis or Intellect seems to be reflected in the
distinction made by Boethius between God viewed as 'existence
itself (ipsum esse) and God viewed as 'the form which is
essence itself (fonna ... quae esse ipsum est).l-16 Of course
Plotinus applies these notions to two successive hypostases
I i I. liJid. VI. R 1391 I 3. 49-';o.

liZ. Ibid. VI, H 1391 1.:\, 7-H.
I-!;\. Ibid. VI. 8 1.:\91 I 3. 26-28.
l!l. Ibid. \'1. 7 /38/ .:\8. 1-..f.
l-1 'i. Ibid. V. 5 /32/ 6. 17 -l I. Cf. ibid. V. ; 1321 I.:\. I I -17. On the notions
of hcin~. existence:, and csscnlc in Plotinus scc G. Ncbd: 'Tcrminologischc
l'ntcrsuchungcn zu ousia und on bt:i Plot in', Hermes 65 (I 930). pp. -!22--f..f'i;
(1. Hubtr: /Jas Seln und das Absolute. Stmlien zur Geschichte der on-
tologiscben Problematik in der spiitantiken Pbilosophle (Basel. 19'i'i). pp.
19-60; and P. Aubenque: 'Piotin et le depassement de l'ontologie grecque
dassiquc. Le Neoplatrmlsme (Col/oque lnternutinnal du Centre NatimUII
de Ia Recherche Scienlifique. Roymmumt <J-13 juin 1969) (Paris. 197 I 1. pp.
101-109.
146. See Boethius: De Hebd. I.:\ I- I 33; I 49- I 50; and 166-167 together with
IJe Trill. 2. 1~-21; 2, 2lJ-~l: 2. 3'--W; .'\ . .H-.:\4; :md i. 21-26. It is important
to rcmemhcr th;n in the lontext of Plotinus'. Purphyr(s. :md Bucthius'
theology. the contrast envisaged is between (i) existence and (ii) the Platonic
(really existent) essence or form, and not between (i) existence and (ii) the
Aristotelian (logically separabk) csscncc or form.
BOETHil!S 6HI
whereas Boethius combines them into the characterization of a

single principle, and this naturally gives rise to the question why
the latter should have departed from his predecessor's teaching
in such a radical way. The explanation probably lies in the in-
tervention of Porphyry who had combined the features of the
first hypostasis or One and the second hypostasis or Intellect in
order to explain the derivation of the highest principles accor-
ding to Plato's doctrine. 147
In his commentary on the first hypothesis of Plato's
Parmenides, Porphyry also develops the argument that one can
make no predication regarding the supreme principle. Thus, 'it
is necessary to remove all predicates and apply none, realizing
that although it is the cause of the multitude and being of things
it is itself neither one nor many' (navta ouv aipstv ost Kai llTJOEV
npoa8Eivat ... llYEta8at OE 6n ainoc; j..LEV au-roc; Kai WU nA.fl8ouc;
Kai -rou Eivm au-rcov, au-roc; of: OU'rE EV OU'rE nA.fi8oc;). I.JH This is
because anything to which predication is applied must have a
determinate character while it is cle'ar that 'God is not
something of a certain kind' (OUK eanv o 'r010VOE 6 8s6c;). H<J
However, despite the fact that one can make no predication
regarding the supreme principle, it is possible to speak of it in
certain ways. Thus, it can be described as 'alone the true being'
(tO j.16VOV ov-rroc; OV) in comparison with which all lower things
are 'nothing' (tO OUOtv)l'iO provided that the term 'being' is
transformed from its usual predicative sense. Alternatively, it
can he called 'the being which is prior to being' (-ro j..LEV
npounapxst wu ovwc;) in contrast with 'the being which is
derived from the prior principle and added to it: as if one thinks
"being white" '(tO an'at>"rOU E7tl<j)Ep6j..LEVOV stvat' roc; El VOTtCJEtac;
147. On this question see further the discussion of Intellect on pp.

690-694.
1-!H. Porphyry: In Pann. ll, +II. Cf. ibid. XII. 24-2'5.
1-19. /fJid. X, 2324.
I 50. Ibid. IV, 26-2H. Cf. ibid. IV. IH-19; IV. 3S-V. '5; and VI. .:\2-3'5.
61-!2 :'IIEOPI.ATONISM
AEUKOV EtVat) I'; I provided that the term 'being' is understood in

a way transcending its usual meaning.
So far Porphyry's commentary follows the lines of the Ploti-
nian ontology, hut at this point the necessity of interpreting
Plato's statement that the One of the second hypothesis 'par-
ticipates in being' (ouaiac; JlETEX.Etv) forces him to go beyond
it.IS2 Of the two ways of interpreting this phrase, the first
relates it to the 'co-alteration' (auval..l..moua9at) of unity and be-
ing in the second One or hypostasis which results from its imita-
tion of the first One's or hypostasis' unity.I'B The second inter-
pretation relates it to the second One's or hypostasis' 'having a
being derived from' (e~ auTou EX.El EKKAtV6JJ.Evov TO dvat) the
first One's or hypostasis' nature which is manifested in the iden-
tity of unity and being.t S4 According to either interpretation,
the logical consequence is the postulation of an especially close
relation between the first two hypostases: 'Thus, the second is
simultaneously identical and not identical with the first since
what comes after something and from something is in a manner
equivalent to that from which it comes' (cSto OJlOU EKEivo Kai
OUK EKEivo, 5n TO JlETa T1 Kai TO (m6 TOU EKEiv6 TE Tp6nov nva
eanv).l';'; This interpretation of Plato's statement by Porphyry is
a significant departure from the Plotinian ontology, and will be
l'il. Ibid. XII. 29-35. Cf. ibid. XII, 23-24 and XII, 26-27. Cf. also Por-
phyry: Sent. 26, I 5. 7-1 ;\.
I 'i2. Ibid. XI, 1-XIl. 35.
I 5.'\. /hid. XI. 'i-10.
154./bid. XII, 22-29.
155. Ibid. XI, 33-XII, 3. On Porphyry's transformations of being, ex-
istcnn:. and essence seeP. liadot: Porpbyre et Victorim1s, passim; 'L'ctrc et
l'etant dans le ncoplatonisme'. Etudes neoplatonicietmes, (Neuch:itel. 1973).
pp. 27-41 and 'Dieu commc acte d'ctrc dans lc: neoplatonismc. Apropos des
theories d'E. Gilson sur Ia metaphysique de I'Exode', Dier1 et /'etre. EYegeses
d Ex ode J, li et de Coran 20, 11-24, presentees par P. Vignaux (Paris. 1978).
pp. 57-63.
BOETHil~S
reinforced elsewhere by certain doctrines drawn from the

Cbaldaean Oracles.
The distinction which Porphyry makes between the
originative being of the first hypostasis or One and the derived
being of the second hypostasis or One, as well as the identifica-
tion which he proposes between the two levels of being in the
process whereby the first principle gives rise to the second,
represent the probable background to Boethius' developments.
On this question some final observations may be ventured:
(i) Boethius is closer to Porphyry than to Plotinus in ter-
minology. Boethius uses esse to signify both existence and exis-
tent essence just as Porphyry employs Eivat, ov in the two cases.
Plotinus is more explicit in using Eatt to signify existence and
ouaia to signify existent essence. I 'HI
(ii) The difficult axiom II of Boethius' De Hebdomadibus:
'Existence and the existent thing are distinct, for existence itself
is not yet anything. Yet the existent thing certainly is and con-
sists of something, having accepted the form of its being'
(Diversum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est.
attero quod est accepta essendi forma est atque consislit) can
he given an obvious sense in the Plotino-Porphyrian context. I o; 7
When a metaphysical principle performs a function which is the
higher analogue of and cause of a function more usually
un<.krstood at a lower level, it is possible to say that the given
metaphysical principle does 'not yet' perform the function
more usually attributed to the lower level. Thus, Plotinus can
argue that motion, rest, sameness, and otherness relate to the
being of the second hypostasis as the analogues of various
156. Boethius: De Hebd. 131-133: De Trin. 2, 17-21; etc. Porphyry's use

of dvm I ov to signify both l'Xistc:nc:c: and c:xistc:nt c:ssc:nc:c: in the: Commtu-
taritls in Parmenidem is, of <:ourse, part of his strategy of demonstrating that
thl one: is the: cause: of the: othc:r.
I o;-:o. Boc:thius: De Hebd. 28-30.
NEOPLATONJSM
qualities' relations to sensible substance: 'How then do the four

kinds complete its being without yet making the latter
qualified?' (1tGJ<; ouv 't'U 't'Enapa YEV11 OUI.I.1tAT)pot tiJv ouaiav
oumo 1tOlUV ouaiav 1tOlOUV't'a;).I<;H
(iii) Boethius uses the peculiarly Porphyrian word oumroa9at
to indicate the result of God's causality. The word is rare and in
the passive voice unknown before Porphyry. However. in his
works it becomes so common that it almost amounts to a
trademark of his philosophy. I 'i<J
Of course, in such an area of uncertainty these observations
are offered in a tentative manner.IC>O
9.2123 THE ATTRIBUTE OF BEAUTY
When Boethius refers to the first priAc;pJe .as 'most beautiful'

(pulcherrimus) in De Consolatione Philosophiae, he is
deviating from the regular teaching of Plotinus although in
agreement with certain of his statements. Among passages in
which Plotinus refers to the One as beauty is included that
ISH. Plotinus: Emz. VI. 2/43/IS. 1-2.

159. Porphyry: De Anim. ad Boetb. fr. I (Eusehius: Praep. ENmg. XI. 28.
I); In Ce~teg. l)l), 7; In Htmn. Ptol. I I, .U-12, I; Sent. W. -i"', 2-.-\ and 4 I, 'i2,
9.
160. On God as existence in Augustine sec the following illustr:Hions: (i)
God has 'being' (esse) supremely at De Mor. Eccl. Cmb. II, I, I (Pl 32. 134S );
II. 6. R (Pl. 32. I 348); De Vera Relig. JR . .~S (CCSl. :\2. 208-209); De Trin. V,
2, 3 (CCSL 'HI. 207-208); VII, S, 10 (CCSl. SO, 260-261); and Cit. Dei Xll, 7
(CCSl. -f8. 362); (ii) God as 'being' (essentia ) at De lmm. An. II. 18-12. 19
(Pl. .U. 10.'\0-1031): IS. 24 (Pl. 32. IO:B): Dt' Vem Re/ig. II, 22 (CCSI. 32.
201-203): De Trin. V, 2. 3 (CCSI. 'iO, 20"'~-lOH); and V, 9. 10 (CCSL SO.
216-21"'); (iii) God as 'existence' (essentitl) hut not 'essence' (sufJSitmtitl) at
IJe Trin. VII. 'i, I 0 (CCSI. SO. 260-261 ). A numht:r of passa~o~cs employ E\'otl.
:\: H as the Scriptural basis for such lheorks: Conf Vll. 10 (CSEL 3.-\11.
I S...,-1 SH): De Trin. I. I. 2 (CCSL SO. 2H-l9); V, .2, .'\ (CCSL SO . .20""-201-l): VII.
S. 10 (CCSI. 'iO. 261 ); and Ci1. Dei VIII. II (CCSL-!7. 227-221-l).
BOETHIUS 6HS
where the first three hypostases are described as 'Bt.;!uty which

~equivalent to the Good' (f) KaA.A.ovft, om:p Kai Taya96v). 'the
immediately beautiful' (eu9uc; TO KaA.6v), and 'that which is
beautiful through IAteJ!e..ct' (vQ> KaA.6v) respectively .161
However, since Plotinus usually associates beauty with form,
-
and since form is the characteristic of the second hypostasis
rather than the first, we usually find beauty in conjunction with
Being or Intellect.16Z At least one passage takes a mediating posi-
tion by saying of the One: 'Its beauty is of another kind and a
beauty above beauty, for its beauty is no existent thing. It is
lovely and would be the begetter of beauty' (roan: Kai TO
K<iA.A.oc; aUTOU aA.A.ov Tp01tOV Kai K<iA.A.oc; U1tEP K<iA.A.oc;. OUOEV
yap ov Tl K<iA.A.oc;; ep<iOf.UOV o ov TO yevvrov liv Ell'l TO
K<iA.A.oc;).I63 The reason for Boethius' alignment with the less
dominant tendency in Plotinian thought may be once more the
intervention of Porphyry's teaching, although at this point
there is no direct textual evidence for such a conclusion.16-J
9.2124 GOD AS UNIFIED PLURALITY
Plotinus speaks of God as a unity with a plurality of attributes

in several passages. Thus, when arguing against the Gnostics
16l. Plotinus: t:nn. I, 6/1/6, 251, 6/1/7, 30. Cf. ibid. V, S /32/8, H-13
and V, 9/5/2, 1-9.
162. See ibid. I, 6/1/9,32-43: V, 5/32/12, 9-40; V, 8/31/8, 1-12; V, R
/31113, 11-12; etc.
16.'\. Ibid. VI, 71.'\H/ .U . .26-30. On heauty in Plotinus s~~ A. H. Armstrong:
Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus'.
1\epbtt/aion. Studies in Greek Phi/mopby ami its Continuation offered to C.
.f. de Vogel, edited hy J. Mansfeld and 1.. M. de Rijk (Assen. 1975). pp.
155-163.
164. On God as heauty in Augustine sec Soli/. I. 15.27 (PL 32. 883-8H4):
De Mus. VI, J'7, 56 (PL 32 I 191 ); De Quant. Anim. 35. 79 (PL 32, I 0"'9); De
Vera Rllig. I 1. .2 I (CCSL 3.2, .200-.20 1): Conf IV, 16 (CSEL 3 3/1. HS-H8): and
Cit. Dei X, 16 (CCSI. 47, 21i9291 ). The last passage quotes Plotinus.
686 :'>IEOPLATONISM
that there are no more than three principles, he stresses that the
terms 'One' and 'Good' indicate different aspects of the first
hypostasis rather than a first and second hypostasis.l65
Elsewhere, he approaches the same question from another
viewpoint by arguing that the unity and the goodness derived
from the first principle by other things are identical, since all
things come into existence endowed with simultaneous tenden-
cies to both unity and goodness. 166 In all such passages, Plotinus
is careful to stress that God's plurality is strictly one of at-
tributes.
In the case of the second hypostasis or Intellect, we find a
plurality in a more genuine sense. although even here the unity
of the hypostasis makes the nature of its inherent plurality dif-
ficult to grasp. In some texts Plotinus speaks of Intellect as (i) a
plurality of constitutents whose nature is not further
specified. H' In most of these the writer stresses that 'each part
is the whole and in every respect all. Yet they are not confused
but still distinct' (oA.ov tE yap ottv ~Kaotov Kai nav-raxu ndv'
Kai OU OlJ"(KEXUtat, aA.A.a au xropic;). 168 Other passages refer to
Intellect as (ii a) a plurality of partial intellects.l69 The whole
and partial intellects interrelate in that 'the whole is all the par-
tials together in actuality but each of them separately in poten-
tiality, while the partials are what they are in actuality but the
whole in potentiality' (EvEpyEiQ ovtt ta nO.vta iiJ.la, ouv<iJ.lEl of:
EKaotov xropic;, toile; o'aO EVEpyEiQ J.lEV 0 ElOl, OUV<iJ.lEl OE tO
oA.ov).l7o In further texts Plotinus speaks of Intellect as (ii b) a
IM. Plotinus: Em1. 11,9 l!dll. 1-8.

166. Ibid. VI. 2 IHI I I, I i -29.
167. Ibid. I, 8/51/2, 15-21; Ill. 2 /47/1, 26-36; Ill, 8/30/8, 40-48; V, 8
131/4, 1-11; etc. The same doctrine: occurs in Porphyry: Sent. 10, 4, 7-8; 22,
13.13-16:andH.56,12-Ii.
168. Plotinus: Em1. I. 8/5112. 18-19. Cf. ibid. Ill, 8/30/8. 42--L~.
169.1bid. V,9/i/IO,I0-14;V1.2/43/20,10-16;etc.
liO./I,id. VI. 2/i.'l/20, 21-2.'\.
BOETHiliS
plurality of Kinds: Being. Motion. Rest, Sameness, and

Otherness.t-ct The Kinds interrelate in that 'Motion will appear
in Being and Being in Motion, for in the One Being each
separately contains the other. But it is thought which makes
them two' (Kai &v tcp ovtt KiVTJat~ q>avi)oetat Kai f.v tij Ktvi)oEt
ro ov, oiov f.ni tou tvoc; ovto~ eKcitepov xropi~ eixe 9citepov,
Ct.A.A.'oiJ.W~ 1i otcivma Mo q>lloi ); 172 in that 'we separate Rest and
do not separate Rest from Being in the same way. namely
separating with intellect' (tOV aUtOV tp07tOV Kai tTJV OtclOlV
xroplOUIJ.EV autou Kai au ou XWPlOUIJ.EV tOOOUtOV xwpi~OVtEC, tcp
vcp); P3 and in that 'it is necessary to posit these three if intellect
discerns them as distinct. If it thinks them, it both thinks them
and establishes them, while they exist, if they are thought'
(aA.A.a xPit tpia tauta ti9eo9m, Einep 6 vou~ xropi~ EKaotov vo-
ei . Uj..la of. VOEl Kai ti91101V, El1tEP VOEi, Kai EOtlV, El1tEP
vev611tat).J74 Other passages refer to Intellect as (ii c) a plurality
of Forms like 'man', 'fire', and so on.175 Intellect and the Forms
interrelate in that 'Intellect embraces the other Forms in poten-
tiality like a great living creature. while each of the Fonns is in
actuality what Intellect embraces in potentiality' (vou~ 7tEptxrov
OUVcliJ.El taA.A.a oiov ~cpov jJ.Eya, ta of. f.vepyeic;t ~Kaotov, li
OUVcliJ.El 7tEplEtXE 9citepov).l76 Finally, in some texts Plotinus
speaks of Intellect as (iii) a plurality of subject and object or ob-
jects.J77 In most of these the writer emphasizes that 'it is in our
Pl./bid. III, 7/45/3,4-1 I; VI, 2/43/3,20-32: VI. 2/4.>.,/7, I-VI, 2/43/8,

'\:etc The same doctrine is found in Porphyry: /11 I'Clrm. XIV. 26-34.
1~2_ Piminus: 1:"1111. VI, 2/4V7. 20-23.
1~.~_/bid. VI, 2/431""'. 31HO.
l~--1./bid. V1.2/J3/M, I-3.
I-:5./bid. IV.B/6/3. I4-2I:V.9/5/8, I-8;V.9/5/9,1-8;elc.
1~6. Ibid. IV, H 1613. 14-16.
I'' Ibid. II, 9/33/ I. 46-54: III, 9/13/ 1, 12-2I; V, 6/24/ I, 20-23; etc.
The same doctrine occurs in Porphyry: /11 PClrm. XIII, 4-9; XIV. 16-26; and
Sent. -H. 57. I-I6.
688 :'IJEOPI.AT<>NISM
thought that we have made unity from duality. On the other

hand duality arises from unity, making itself dual because it
thinks. Better: it is dual because it thinks and unity because it
thinks itself' (ru.u:ic; IJ.EV ouv tcp A.6y4> EK ouo ev 7tE7tmftKaiJ.EV, to
o'av<i7taA.tV E~ ev6c; EO"tl Mo, Ott VOEi, 7tOlOUV auto Mo, IJ.aA.A.ov
ot ov, Ott voEi, Mo, Kai Ott auto, EV).I78
When Boethius speaks of God as a unity with a plurality of at-
tributes, he is therefore reproducing a theory which Plotinus
had applied partially to the first hypostasis but more fully to the
second. The change of focus which this represents is consistent
with our impression of Boethius' relationship to Greek
Neoplatonism formed elsewhere, 17 9 for it is in the Porphyrian
version of that philosophy where the characteristics of the first
and second hypostases overlap that the Latin writer finds his
model. Unfortunately, the material in Porphyry's extant works
is insufficient to prove the Boethian debt to him regarding the
unified plurality of God's attributes conclusively. 1so
178. Plotinus: 1:'1111. V, 6 /}AI I. 21-2-i. Cf. ibid. Ill, 9 /1.~/ I. 12- H. On the:
One and Intellect as unified pluralities in Plotinus sec: R. Arnou: 'La separa-
tion par simple alteritt' dans Ia Tri11ite plotinienne'. Gregorimwm 2 ( 1930),
pp. IHI-193; A. H. Armstrong: "Eternity, life: and Movement in Plotinus' Ac-
counts of Nouc;'. Le Neoplatrmisme. pp. 67-76; J. M. Rist: "The: Prohlc:m of
Otherness in the: Enneads', ibid. pp. "'7-88; and A. Smith: 'Potentiality and
the: Problem of Plurality in the: lntc:lligibk World'. Neoplatonism and Early
Cb1isticm 7'/mugbt. Essays in lltmour of A. II. Armstmng, l'tlitc:d hy II. J.
Blumenthal and R. A. Markus (London, 1981 ). pp. 99-107.
179. Seep. 682 ff.
I HO. Sec: however nn. 167. 171. and 177. On God as unified plurality in
Augustine: sc:e the: following examples: (i) God as a unity of his attributes at De
Trin. V, H, 9-\'. 10. II (CCSL 50, 215-218}; VI, 3. 5-VI, -4, 6 (CCSI. 50,
233-235): VI. 6. 8-VI, 9. 10 (CCSL 50, 236-240); VI. 10, 12 (CCSL 50,
24 2-24 3 ); and VIII, I, 2-VIII. 3. 5 (CCSL 50, 269-27 4 ); (li) God as a unity con-
mining Forms or numbers at Soli/. I, 8, 15 (Pl. 32, 877); De Mus. VI. 4. 7 (PL
32 1166-1167); De Lib. Arb. II. II, .'\0-.~2 (CCSL 29, 258-259); De Dit.
Quaest. 46, 2 (CCSI. -l4A. 7 1-73); and De Trin. IV, I. 3 (CCSL 50. 162-163.)
BOETHil!S
9.2125 GOD AS FORM
De Arithmetica, De Trinitate, De Consolatione

Philosopbiae, and other works describe God as form, thereby
departing from the fundamental tenet of Plotinus' writings that
God transcends the level of form.IRI However, Porphyry is
prepared to speak of the first principle as form in one passage of
the Commentarius in Parmenidem. where it is argued that the
first One or hypostasis is an Idea in which the second One or
hypostasis participates.1s2 He writes: 'Thus, there are two kinds
of being. The first is pre-existent to being, the second is that
produced from the One which is pre-existent to being and is the
transcendent mode of being and like an Idea of being. It is by
participating in the latter that another One has come to be
(roan: otttov to dvat, to J.1EV npoumipx,&t toO ovto<;, to Of: 6
tmiy&tat EK toO ovto<; toO E7tEK&tva EV<'><; toO dvat ovto<; to
cin6A.utov Kai &an&p ioea toO ovto<;, ou J.l&taax.<'>v ciA.A;o n ev
yeyov&v).IR3 Of course, when Porphyry re(ers to the first One or
hypostasis as 'like' an Idea rather than as an Idea, he reveals that
he is continuing to maintain the usual dissociation between the
first hypostasis and form. 184 To that extent his position is not
I R 1. See pp. 53S-53R.

182. See pp. 681-683.
183. Porphyry: In Parm. XII, 29-34. Cf. ibid. XIV. 10-12 where of these-
~ond One or Intellect he writes: 'It is one and simple according to ils first
Idea' (&v J.lEV ouv tanv Kai ad.oiiv Kata t1)v 7tpWtTJV ... i&&av). Here, these-
cond One or hypostasis is described as an Idea because it is emerging from the
prior principle in the process of emanation. On the latter doctrine see pp.
6R2-683 and 693-694.
184. Sec Ibid. Xlll, I6-23 where the first One or hypostasis 'is the activity
of no specific thing and therefore has neither form nor name nor essence'
(aUtTJ li& ol>liev6~ tan, 010 oUSt dlio~ OUOE 6VOJ.1 fX,EI OUOE ouaiav). Here, the
first One is described as an activity prior to determination in order to con-
trast it with its consequent which is an activity co-extensive with determina-
tion. On the Iauer doctrine see pp. 69S-697.
690 NEOPl.ATONISM
far removed from certain statements in Plotinus' Enneads

which suggest a similarly metaphorical application of the notion
of form to God.IHS
Boethius' descriptions of God as form perhaps give rise to a
question: When he refers to 'god' (deus) as form, does he really
have the Neoplatonic One or first hypostasis in mind?l86 Could
the writer be incautious! y adopting the terminology of a treatise
like Hicrocles' Commentarius in Aureum Carmen where 'god'
signifies the Demiurge UP - equivalent to Intellect or the se-
cond hypostasis or to the intellect of the world sou!IHR -
without implying that there is no further metaphysical principle
prior to it?IH9 Fortunately, the question loses its urgency when
one reflects on the content of Boethius' theological doctrine as
a whole. This, as we have seen, is drawn simultaneously from
the Neoplatonic theories of the first and second hypostases.I90
9.2126 THE ATTRIBUTE OF MIND
Plotinus frequently describes God as lying beyond and as the

cause of 'Intellect' (vouc;) for several reasons. 'If Intellect
because it is plural and intellection itself- which supervenes,
so to speak, even though self-derived - are multiplied, it is
necessary that the completely simple and primal of all things
185. See Plotinus: Enn. VI. 7 /38/17, 17-18; VI, 7 /38/ 28, 28-29; and VI, 7
/38132.9-10.
186. As we have argued above.
187. See Hierodes: In Aur. (.(lrm. I, 10, 2-21 and 20, 87. 19-89. 14.
188. See pp. 548-551.
I H9. This is the interpretation of I. Hadot: Le pmbli!me du mfoplatonisme
a/e.wuulrh1. 1/illmc/es et Simplicius (Paris, 1978), pp. 93-94 and 113-116
which supersedes all earlier views.
190. Sec p. 5.~0 ff. On God as form in Augustine see De Lib. Arb. II, 16,
44-17. 46 (CCSL 29, 267-268); De Vera Relig. 3. 3 (CCSL 32. 188-190); II. 21
(CCSJ. 32. 200-201); 18,35-36 (CCSL 32. 208-9); 31,58 (CCSL 32, 225-226);
-~6. 66 (CCSL 32. 230-231 ); and H. H 1-44, 82 (CCSL 32. 241 ).
BOETIHIIS 691
should be beyond Intellect' (Ei ouv vouc;, O't'l 1tOAUc; EO't'l, Kai TO
voeiv auto oiov 7tapEJ.17tEa6v, Kiiv t~ auwu 1), 7tA:n9uEt, cSEi to
7tUVHI a1tA.ouv Kai 7tpw-rov a1tavnov tmiKEwa vou Eivat).l9t 'If
there is a multiplicity, there must be a unity prior to the
multiplicity. And if there is a plurality in the intellective, there
must be no intellection in the non-plural. The latter is the first
principle' (Ei cipa 1toA.A.a -ri an, cSei 7tpo twv 1toA.A.rov fv Eivat. Ei
ouv -reT> voouvn 7tA.t;eoc;, 5Ei E.v -reT> lllt 7tA.iJ9Et to voEiv J.Lil Etvat. ,;v
8f: 'tOU'tO TO 7tpW'tOV).192
However, despite the fact that God lies beyond and is the
cause of Intellect proper, the former can be regarded as intellec-
tual in a special sense. In the first place, since it is the cause of
Intelkct, 'whatever is present in Intellect is present in a far
higher mode in that One' (oiov yap to tv veT>, 1toA.A.axu J.LEi(,ov ii
totoutov to f.v ~vi EKEivq>)193; and secondly, since ignorance re-
quires a relation to something external, 'that which is alone
neither knows nor has anything of which to be ignorant' (to <Sf:
J.LOVOV OU'tE ytyvcboKEl, OU'tE 't'l EXEl 0 ayvoEi).191 Furthermore,
this special variety of intellection- which he now calls 'quasi-
intellect' (oiov vouc;) t9S or 'super-intellection (\mEpv6nmc;) t96
- can be characterized more precisely as an activity without a
determinate subject. Thus, the highest can be considered 'not as
something having intellection hut rather as intellection' (ou yap
Kat a TOV VOOUVTU ... a:\A.a J.LciAAOV KU'ta 'tltV VOT\01V),19' or alter-
natively as 'like an awakening which is not of something being
191. Plo!inu~: 1:"1111. V. 3 1191 II, 1';-lH.

ll)l.lhit/. \', 6 /2~13. 20-2i. Cf. ibid. Ill. H /30/ II. 1';-19: V. 'i 1::,213, 1-6;
\',(>11.~/2.1-20;\',H/::,I/1, I-6;V1.7/3H/3'i.19-2!;andV1.1)11)13.3-W.
193./bid. VI. H /39/IH. 32-.H.
191. Ibid. VI, 91916, -47--49.
19'i. Ibid. VI. 8/39/16, I ';-16.
19(>. IIJicl. VI, 8/39116. 32.
19-. Ibid. VI. lJ /9/ 6. 52-"d.
692 NEOPI.ATONISM
awakened' (OlOV &ypftyopatc; OUK liA.A.ou ovtoc; tOU ey-

PTIYOP6toc;). t9R
Plotinus' postulation of both a special intellection enjoyed by
the first hypostasis or One and the intellection proper
associated with the second hypostasis or Intellect may well have
suggested Boethius' combination of the two levels of intellec-
tion to form the 'mind' (mens) characteristic of his own first
principle.tiJ9 However, the Porphyrian tendency to combine
the features of the first hypostasis or One and the second
hypostasis or Intellect in order to explain their causal connec-
tion would have provided an even clearer model for Boethius'
transformation of the Neoplatonic doctrine of intellection to fit
Christian teachings.2oo
In his commentary on the first hypothesis of Plato's
Parmenides, Porphyry also explains that the supreme principle
lies beyond and is the cause of Intellect. Thus, it is 'neither in-
tellection, nor intelligible, nor being, hut is beyond all things
and the uncoordinate cause of all things' (ou v6tlatc; ouoa, ou
VOllt6v, OUK ouoia, aA.A.'btEK&tva navtrov Kai navtrov aitia
aou~uyoc;).20t This is because such a principle must be a unity
198. Ibid. VI, 8 /39/ 16, 3 1-32. On the notion of intellect in Plot in us sec R.
Arnou: 'L'acte de !'intelligence en tam qu'elle n'est pas intelligence. Quelque
considerations sur Ia nature de !'intelligence selon Plot in', Mekmges ].
Marechalll (Paris, 1950), pp. 249-262;). Pepin: 'Elements pour unc histoire
de Ia relation entre l'intelligcncc ct l'intclligiblc chez Platon ct dans lc
neoplatonisme', Ret'lle pbilosopbique R 1 ( 1956). pp. 39-64; and A. H. Arm-
strong: 'Thc B;u:kground of thc Donrinc "That thl lntclligihlcs art: not Out-
sidl' the lntdkct'' , l.es sources de Plotin (Frmdation Hardt. Enlretiens sur
/'Ani/quite c/assique <;) (Vandocuvres-Gcnevc, 1960), pp. 393-42<;.
199. Sec Boethius: In /sag. ed. I. I. 3. 7. 15-16; De Cm1sol. Pbi/os. Ill, m,
9. 7-9: IV. pr. 6. 22-25: IV. pr. 6, 73-78; etc. Bocthius follows the Latin
Ncoplatonil' tradition in rendering vouc; as mens.
200. On this question sec also the discussion ofheing on pp. 679-684.
201. Porphrry: In p,,,.,,, XIII, 20-2:-\. Cf. Sent. 25. IS, l-2; In Tim. fr. 51
(Proclus: In Tim. l, 394, R-9). On Porphyry's transformation of the notion of
IJOETHillS
and 'if it had knowledge of things how could it fail to be a

multiplicity' (Kai nroc; yvroatv exrov OUK E<Jtl noA.Uc;)?202
However, despite the fact that the supreme principle lies
beyond and is the cause of Intellect, the former can be regarded
as intellectual in a special sense because of an important
philosophical principle enunciated elsewhere: 'All things are in
all things but appropriately to the status of each' ( navta !lEV t.v
namv, clAACL oiKsiroc; tij eKciatoU ouaic;t).203 Thus, its special
variety of intellection can be characterized as that which is ac-
tually 'neither knowledge nor ignorance and from which
knowledge is derived' (E~(I) yvroasroc; Kai ayvoiac;, aq>'ftc; tl
yvroatc;).204 This is because both of these require the distinction
of subject and object while such a principle's activity 'is not that
involving something knowing and something known' (ou
ytyVOO<JKOV't'O<; ouaa Kai ytyVOO<JK01!EVOU).2Clt;
So far Porphyry's commentary follows the lines of the Ploti-
nian ontology, yet at this point his desire to incorporate certain
teachings of the Chaldaean Oracles into his system forces him
to go beyond it. These teachings are that the first two principles
are 'an intellect' (vouc;) and 'yet another intellect' (iiA.A.oc; naA.tv
vouc;) respectively,2o6 and that the first principle is equivalent to
a triad consisting of father, 'power' (ouval!t<;), and intellect.2Cl7
intellect see P. Hadot: 'Etre, vie, pensee chez Plotin et a\ant Plotin'. l.es
sources de Ploti11 (Fondation Hardt, Entretiens sur I'Antiquite c/assique 5)
(Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1960) pp. 105-141; 'La metaphysique de Porphyre'.
Porpb_)'re (Fonda lion Hardt, Elllretiens sur f"A11tiquite c/assique 121
(Vandoeuvres-Geneve. 1966). pp. 125-163; and Porpbyre et Victorinus,
passim.
202. Porphyry: In Pann. V. 8-9.
205. Porphyry: Sent. 10, 4. 7.
20-l. Porphyry: In Pann. V. 10-11. Cf. ibid. V. 15-15; V. 25-2-l; and V.
2/i-29.
205./hid. Vl,8-lO.Cf.ibid. VJ.I0-12andXIV.I-4.
206. Ibid. IX. 3-5.
207./hid. IX, 3. Cf. DeRegr. Anim. fr. 7, 35" 27-29; fr. R. 36" 15-37" S;
and fr. 9. 37" 7-9.
NEOPLATONISM
Since such teachings obviously conflict with the usual

Neoplatonic doctrine, where the first two hypostases are the
One and Intellect and where the first hypostasis or One is strict-
ly unitary, the writer must find some formulae which will per-
mit the opposing positions to be reconciled. Thus, he argues
that the first two principles are Intellect when 'it is unitary and
simple' (fv tcrnv a1tA.ouv) and when 'it differs from itself' (auto
au toO Otaq>EpEt) respectively, 2os and that the relation of the
first to the second principle is equivalent to a triad consisting of
'existence' (Cmap~t~). 'life' (~roit), and intellect.209 It is easy to
see that the logical consequence of this exegesis of the
Chaldaean Oracles will be the postulation of a closer connec-
tion between the One and Intellect.2to
9.2127 GOD AS PROVIDENCE
When De Consolatione Philosophiae describes God as

'providence' (providentia), it is clearly deviating from the Ploti-
nian position that God transcends the sphere in which pro-
vidence operates.2tt In fact, the only parallel to this doctrine in
the writings of Greek Neoplatonists seems to be in Proclus who
20H. Porphyry: In Parm. XIV. 7-R. Cf. ibid. XIII, 1-9 and XIII, 34-XIV, 4.
209. Ibid. XIV. 10-26.
210. On God as mind in Augustine see Contra Acad. Ill. 19, 42 (CCSL 29,
60): De Ord. II, 5. 16 (CCSL 29. 115-116); II, 9. 26 (CCSL 29, 12 1-122); De
Dit. Quaest. 46, 2 (CCSL 44, 71-7 3 ). It seems that from a relatively early date
in his career Augustine replaced the Neoplatonic intellectuslintellegentia
with the more Scriptural sapietllia. See Soli/. I, 1, 2-3 (PL 32, 869-871); De
Quant. Anim. 3L 77 (PL 32. 1077-1078): De Mor. Eccl. Catb. I, 7, II (Pl. 32.
1.-\15 ): De Doctr. Christ. I. R. 8 (CCSL 32. II) and innumerable later passages.
2 I I. See Plot in us: Enn. V, 3 /-t9/ 12, 2H-31. Plotinus seems to have
transferred such a function from the first principle to the Logos, a hypostasis
which takes over many of Soul's functions in certain late treatises. See ibid.
Ill, 3 /48/ I, 1-2, 15: Ill, 3 /4H/ 4. 6-13; Ill, 3 /-18/ 5, li -20; and VI, 8 /39/ 17.
1-9.
HOETHIUS 695
attributes providence primarily to the henads or gods:

'Providence then is primarily among the gods. For where would
"the activity prior to intellect" be except among superessential
things?' (tv 9Eot~ ouv i] np6vma npcinro~. Kai noli yap i] npo vou
vpyEta ij tv rot~ U7tEpouaim~;);l1.2 and also in a sense to the
One itself: 'For "pronoia" that is to say "providence" indicates
that activity which is totally prior to intellect. This should be at-
tributed only to the Good' (Nam pronoia (id est providentia)
quidem eam que ante intellectum palificat omnino opera-
tionem, quam soli bono attribuere necessarium),2l!o these two
representing the main subdivisions into which the first
hypostasis has been divided according to the later Neoplatonic
system. It is possible that an assimilation of providence to God
himself had already taken place in the teaching of Porphyry,
although there is not sufficient evidence to draw this conclusion
with certainty . .214
9.2128 GOD AS ACTIVITY
Plotinus speaks of God as prior to 'activity' (tvtpyEta) in cer-

tain passages. Thus, when discussing the nature of the intellec-
tion proper to the second hypostasis or Intellect, he observes
that 'this is the first activity and first intellection having neither
212. Proclus: /em. Then/. 106, 5-7. Cf. ibid. 104, 31. 31 ff.; 108, 1-24:
IIH, 20-.U: 124. 19-26; and 176, Iff.
213. Prod us: De Prmid. et Fa to 7, 10-12. Cf. Prod us: Theol. Plat. I, 69
ff.: De Decem Dubit. I, 2 ff.; etc. On Proclus' doctrine here see W. Beier-
waites: Pnmoia und Freiheit in der Philosoph it: des Proklos'. Freiburger
/.eitscbrift fiir Pbllosnphie tmd Tbeologie 24 ( 1977) pp. HHII I.
2 1-l. On God as providence in Augustine see De Ord. I, I. I, (CCSl29, 89):
II. I, II (CCSl 29, 113): II, 5. 15 (CCSI. 29. 115 ); De Mus. VI, II, 30-33 (Pl.
.U. 11"'9-IIHI); VI, 17,56 (Pl. 32. 1191): De Lib. Arb. I. 6, 14 (CCSI. 29.
219); II. 17.45 (CCSl29, 267-268): II, 19, 5,'\ (CCSI. 29. 272): DeMor. Eccl.
Catb. I. 7, 12 (Pl 32. 1315-1316): De Vera Rellg. 25, 46 (CCSl 32. 216): De
Doctr. Christ. I, 35. 39 (CCSL 32, 28-29); etc.
696 :'IIEOPI.ATONISM
intellection nor activity prior to itself' (np<irrT) OTJ ouoa autT)

tvepyeta Kai np<irrTJ v6T)m~ ouK iiv exm oiitE tvepyetav npo
autii~ oiitE v6T)mv).21 c; The reason for this position emerges
from another text in which two kinds of activity are distinguish-
ed. Here, 'one activity is of each thing's essence, the other from
each thing's essence' (evepyeta ~ IJ.EV ton tii~ ouoia~. ~ o'tK tii~
ouoia~ EKciotou). the former being further defined as equivalent
to each thing itself and the latter to an emanation from the thing
different to it. 216 These two kinds of activity relate to
something determinate and therefore cannot apply to God.
Yet Plotinus does apply the notion of activity to the first prin-
ciple in certain senses. Although it does not possess activity in
the normal meaning of that term, it can be described as having a
'quasi-activity' (oiov tvepyeta) appropriate to its nature.217 Fur-
thermore, the latter can be characterized more precisely either
as activity which is not the activity of a determinate thing: 'The
Good is without activity, for what activity could activity itself
possess? No activity could have a further activity' (avevepYT)tov
ouv. Kai ti OEi EVEpyeiv tTJV E.vepyetav; oA.ro~ IJ.EV yap 0\JOEJ.Lia
tvepyeta EXEl au nciA.tv tvpyetav);21H or else as activity which is
not the activity of essence: 'We should not shrink from positing
the first activity as independent of essence but as itself the quasi-
hypostasis' (OUOE yap q>OPTJtEOV E.vepyEtaV tTJV nprotT)V ti9Eo9at
clVEU ouoia~, aA.A.'aUtO tOUtO tTJV OlOV U7tOOtamv 9EtEOV ).219
.ZI 5. Plminus: Enn. VI. 7 I !I'd! .fO. 22-2-i. Cf. ibicl. VI. 7 /38/ 17. 9-1 I. The
same doctrine Ol"Curs at Porphyry: In Parm. I. .U-11. 2 and XII. 23-25.
216. Plotinus: Enn. V. -f 17 I 2, 28-;\ I. Cf. iiJicl. IV, c; /29/ 7, I !t-23 and V, I
I 10/ 3. 6-12. On the two kinds of activity in Plotinus sec C. Rutten: 'La doc-
trine des deux actcs dans Ia philosophic de Plot in', Rerzw pbllosophique Rl
(1956)pp. 100-106.
217. Plotinus: Emr. V. c; /32/ !1. 21-2i: VI, H !WI"" . .f6-i.f: VI, H /39/ 13.
5-7: and VI. H /39/ 16, 2-l-26.
218./bid. \',6/2-l/6, 1-8.
219. lbicl. VI. H /39/ 20, 9-1 I. The same doctrinl' occurs at Porphyry: In
Parm. XIII. 9-13 and XIV, 21-2!1.
BOETHiliS
The reason is that if the first principle had no activity it would

he incomplete and if it had a determinate activity it would be
multiple ..z.zo
When Boethius refers to God as activity. he is once again
reproducing a theory which Plotinus had applied partially to
the first hypostasis and more fully to the second. But since the
Latin writer's comments on the divine activity are not suffi-
ciently extensive to indicate whether it is determinate or not, it
is impossible to describe the precise relation between his doc-
trine and the corresponding Plotinian one. Thus, Boethius
could equally have been reiterating the part of Plotinus' theory
relative to the first hypostasis or combining the parts relative to
hoth hypostases along Porphyrian lines ..Z.ZI
9.2129 THE ATTRIBUTE OF VOLITION
When Boethius speaks of the first principle as 'volition'

(1'0/untas) in De Hebdomadibus, he is deviating from the
regular teaching of Plotinus although superficially in agreement
with it. Among passages in which Plotinus speaks of the One as
volition are included that where it becomes the multiplicity of
Imellcct because 'it wished to contain all things' (n<iv-ra EXElV
SEA.oov).Z.Z.Z and that where it is wholly in control of itself since
'its volition and its essence are identical' (ti ~ouA.11cn~ autou Kai
ti ouoia tautov f:otat) .223 It is easy to see that these represent
two distinct senses in which the first principle can be described
2.20. Plotinus: Etm. VI, 8 /39/20, 11-13.

221_ St:c nn. 215 and 219. On God as activity in Augustine see De lHus. VI,
1.., 56-'i""' (Pl. ~2. 1191-1192); De Trb1. V. 8, 9 (CCSL 50, 21 5-216); De Cien.
CUI /.itt. I. 18 (CSEL 2811, 26-27); IV. 11-12 (CSEI. 2811. 107-110); IV. 22
(CSE1.2HII.121-122);V.20(CSEl.2811.16~-165);ctc.
22.2. Plotinus: Etm. Ill. 8 /~0/ 8, :H-35. Cf. ibid. II. I /40/1. 1-~-
22.~ Ibid. VI. H /.~9/ I~. 5-H. Cf. Ibid. VI. 8 /."'l9/ 1.~. 2'4-H; \'I. 8 IWI I~
'ill-59; and VI, 8/39/21. 12-19.
698 NEOPLATONISM
as volition: as willing its consequents and as willing itself,224

and that if other texts deny volition of such a principle they are
not necessarily in conflict with all the teaching above. Thus,
when Plotinus argues that the One has 'no volition towards
anything' (ouoe ~oUA.fl<nc; roivuv ouoev6c;)225 and that it is 'itself
superior to all volition and produces volition after itself' (aurn
oe J.l.&i~rov navroc; toO 9&A.Ew ouoa ro 9tA.Etv J.l.&t'aurflv
9&J.l.EVfl),226 he is qualifying the affirmation of volition in the first
sense only. However, since Boethius speaks of the first principle
as volition in precisely the sense about which Plotinus is hesi-
tant, there is probably a disagreement between them concealed
behind their common terminology. The extent to which Por-
phyry may have contributed to this state of affairs is a matter for
speculation.227
9.213 GOD AS IMMUTABLE, NON-SPATIAL, ETC.
Besides these descriptions of the first principle, there are cer-

tain others in which Boethius departs from the teaching shared
by the Greek Neoplatonists Plotinus and Porphyry.22s Into this
category come his references to God as immutable,229 non-
224. It is nor clear in what sense Porphyry speaks of God's 'volition'

(roluntas) at De Regr. Anim. fr. 7, 35 28-29.
225. Plotinus: Em1. VI, 9/9/6, 39-42. Cf. ibid. VI, 8/39/21, 10 I 2.
226. Ibid. VI. 8 /39/ 9. 42-48. On volition in Plotinus see E. Benz: Mar/us
Victor/nus und die Entwicklmzg der abendliindiscben Wi/lensmetapbysik
(Stuttgart. 1932). pp. 210-225 and 300 ff.
227. Seen. 224. On God as volition in Augustine see De Beat. Vii. 2. 12
(CCSL 29. 1 2): 3. 18 (CCSL 29, 75): Conf XII. 14 (CSEL 33/1. 320-321); De
Trin. III, 2. 7 (CCSL 50, 132-133): Ill. 4, 9-10 (CCSL 50. 135- I 37): De Gen. ad
Uti. VI, 18 (CSEL 28/1, 192); etc.
228. This departure from the teaching of Plotinus and Porphyry is to be
understood in the sense explained in n. I 28.
229. Sec Sleeman et Pollet: ojJ. cit .. s. v. rooatitwc;, etc.
ROF.THJliS 699
spatial,lW and atemporal,H I such characteristics being discuss-

ed by these writers but only in association with the second
hypostasis.Z.:U Into the same category come his references to
God as supreme thought,H3 this characteristic being atypical of
the Greek Neoplatonists' works and clearly compatible with the
slcond hypostasis alone. z.~.J
9.2131 THE INFLUENCE OF PLOTINUS AND PORPHYRY
The parallels between Boethius' methods of describing God

and those of Plotinus and Porphyry are undoubtedly numerous,
and there is considerable evidence to suggest that such
agreements result from a direct literary dependence. The
~rounds for believing that Boethius made use of actual Plotinian
writings are few indeed, since his only quotation of Plotinus is
in connection with the latter's approval of Andronicus of
Rhodes' dialectical doctrine, and the form of this reference in-
dicates a report of the Plotinian teaching by Porphyry rather
than a passage from the Enneads.n; However, the likelihood
that Boethius had recourse to various works of Porphyry, in
which the doctrines of Plotinus were sometimes paraphrased
2W. See Sleeman et Pollet: op. cit .. s.v. t6noc;. etc.

2:\ I. Sec Sleeman ct Pollet: up. cit., s.vv. ax.povoc;, x.povoc;. etc.
2:\2. The characteristic of non-spatiality is also associated with the third
h ypoMa!tis.
233. The notion that God is the supreme object of thought is more
rharactcristic of Stoic texts than Platonic ones. Sec Seneca: Nat. Quaest. I. pr.
13. It can he said to enter into the Platonic tradition with Augustine who uses
it repeatedly. See De Mor. Ecc/. Ctllh. 11. II. l'l (Pl. .U. 1355): De Doctr.
C'brist. I."""~, 7 (CCSL 32. I 0): De Div. Quaest. 18 (CCSL 44A, 23 ); etc .
.BI. The characteristic of supremacy in thought is only consistent with a
hypostasis which is intt:lligible.
235. Roethius: De DitJ/s. (PL 64, 87S D-876 D). That Boethius' reference to
Plotinus is indirect is a justifiahle conclusion hy Courccllc: Late Latin Writers
and tbeir Greek Sources, pp. 281-282.
700 :'IIEOPLATONISM
and summarized and sometimes transformed to differing

degrees, has been demonstrated to be considerably greater by
modern scholarship.lj6 Thus, in connection with the logical
doctrines of Porphyry it is established that Boethius commen-
tary on the Categories closely follows Porphyry's extant com-
mentary Kata m;umv Kal. cm6Kptotv,l:l7 it has been noted that
Boethius acknowledges his debt to Porphyry's corresponding
treatise in his double commentary on De Interpretatione,l.~B
and it is virtually certain that Boethius' Introductio ad
Categoricos S_yllogismos is heavily dependent upon Porphyry's
non-extant work on the same subject;l:\9 in connection with the
metaphysical doctrines of Porphyry it has been noted that
Boethius' De Divisione explicitly cites Porphyry's commentary
on the Sophisf,l40 and it is extremely likely that Boethius ex-
236. Of course. it is obvious that Boethius had acn:ss to Porphyry's

lsagoge since he commented upon it twice and translated it himself once. For
the relation between Boethius and Porphyry in general sec J. Bidez: 'Bocce et
Porphyre', Comptes rendus des seances de I'Academie des Inscriptions et
Belles Lettres ( 1922). pp. :H6-350: 'Bocce ct Porphyrc'. Retue beige de
philo/ogle et d'bistoire 2 ( 1923) pp. 189-20 I: Courcelle: Late Latin Writers
and their Greek Sources, pp. 281-283: P. Hadot: 'Un fragment du commen-
tain: perdu de Bocce sur lcs Categories d'Aristotc dans It: codex Bernensis
363 . Arcbites d 'bistoire doctrinale etlitteraire du moyen dge 34 ( 1959). pp.
I 1-28: Obcrtello: Seterino Boezio I. pp. 476-493: and Chadwick: op. ell .. pp.
120-127. 141 ff. and 152 ff. On the specific question of their relation on
thcologkal questions seeP. Hadot: 'La distinction de l'etre et de l'ctant dans
le De bebdommlibus de Bocce', pp. 147-153: Porpbyre et Victorinus. pp.
488-493: and 'Fonna essendi. Interpretation philologique et interpretation
philosophiqut: d'une formule de Bocce', pp. 14 3-156.
23". Thcrt: is a list of parallel passages in Obertello: op. cit., p. 4"'7,n. 8. It
is undcar to what extent Boethius may also ha,c used Porphyry's lost longer
commentary npoc; rE5ai..Eiov. St:e the comments of Chadwick: op. cit.. p.
126.
238. Bot:thius: In De lnterpr. ed. II. pr. 7, 5-"'. Set: Bidt:z: 'Bohl et Por-
phyrt:'. Retue beige de pbilologie et d'bistoire. pp. 195-19"'.
239. This question is discussed in detail by Obertello: op. cit .. pp. -486-488.
240. See Courcelle: op. cit.. pp. 281-282.
BOF.THHIS 701
pounds doctrines derived from Porphyry's treatises in his De

Hebdomadibus. 241 The examination of Greek philosophical
doctrine undertaken in the last few pages has yielded a quantity
of circumstantial evidence regarding the dependence of
Boethius upon Porphyry or on Plotinus through Porphyry
which complements the more concrete testimony of their
literary relationship.
9.2132 THE INFLUENCE OF IAMBLICHUS, SYRIANUS, AND

PROCLUS
Despite the fact that post-Porphyrian Neoplatonists are men-

tioned in Boethius' logical writings - Iamblichus is quoted in
the commentary on the Categoriesl42 and Syrianus in the se-
cond commentary on De Interpretatione243- there is little to
suggest that the last pagan writers of antiquity had much in-
fluence on his theology. For this reason, we must consider the
emphasis which many modern scholars have placed upon the
influence of the later Neoplatonist Proclus over the writer to be
somewhat excessive.244 Such scholars have appealed to (i) the
2-i I. See Hadot: 'Forma essendi. Interpretation philologique et interpreta-

tion philosophique d'une formule de Bocce', pp. 148-1 <;2, etc.
2-i2. Boethius: bz Categ. I (PL 64, J62A) ami II (Pl 64, 2240-22';8). These
quotations are possibly derived through a later intermediary like Themistius.
Sec: Obc:rtello: op. eft .. pp. 194-';06.
2B. Boethius: In De Interpr. ed. II, I, I, 18, 26: 2. 4. 88. 28: 2. "' 172, 13:
1. 10, 321, 20; and 4, 10, 324, 15. These quotations are probably taken
directly from Syrian us. See Obertello: op. cit., pp. 507-';08.
2-i-i. There is no mention of Proclus' name anywhere in the Boethian cor-
pus: a fact which is usually explained either in terms of the ancient practice of
not citing one's immediate sources, or through the author's failure to com-
plete the: theological portion of his program of writing. On the possibk rela-
tions between Proclus and Boethius see Klingner: op. cit .. pp. 32-.'\7. 41 ff ..
HH-89, 107 ff.; H. R. Patch: 'fate in Boethius and the Neoplatonists',
Speculum 4 (1929). pp. 62-72: 'Catzso/atio philosopbiae IV, m, 6. 23-2-i'.
NF.OPI.ATONISM
presence of several parallel texts,lH (ii) the use of shared ter-

minology,l46 (iii) the fondness for similar quotations,247 and (iv)
ibid. 8 ( 1933), pp. 41-51; 'Necessity in Bocthius and the Neoplatonists', ibid.
I 0 ( 1935 ), pp. 39.-\-404; Galdi: op. cit., pp. 131-148; Courcelle: late Latin
Writers cmd their Greek Sources, pp ..-\01-307; C. J. de Vogel: 'Amor quo
caelum regitt~r', Vimrittm I ( 1963). pp. 2-Yt; W. Theiler: 'Antike und
christlkher Riickkehr zu Gott'. Mttlltts, Festschrift Tbeodor Klauser
(Munster. 1964 ). pp. 352-361; Courcclle: La Consolation de Philosophic
dans fa tradition littemire. Antecedents et posterite de Boece, pp. 163-168,
20.-\ ff.; Scheible: op. cit., pp. 101-112; Obertcllo: op. dt .. pp. 508-521;
Gruber: op. cit., pp. 277-290. 355 ff.; Chadwick: op. cit., pp. 20 and 129;
and C. J. de Vogel: 'Am or quo coelum regitur. Qud amour et que I dicu?', A ttl
del Congresso btterne~zionale di Studi Boeziani (Pavie~, 5-8 ottobre 1980), a
cura di L. Obcrtello (Roma. 1981). pp. 193-200. We cannot enter here into
the question whether Boethius acquired his knowledge of Proclus through an
intermediary like Ammonius Hermciou or some other Alexandrian commen-
tator. The extremely inconclusive results of the scholarship on this question
are reviewed by Obertello: op. cit .. pp. 540-544.
2-15. The most striking parallel is between Produs: Itt Tim. l, 378, 18 roc;
yap it aya90&l5i)c; aip&cnc; tauti;c; yiyv&TQl Kapn6c;, OUTroc; it J.lOX9TJpci tauti;c;
7tOlVll and Boethius: De Consol. Philos. IV, pr. 3, 36 Siwt igitur probis pro-
bitas ipsa fit praemium, ita improbis nequitia ipsa suppllc:ium est. This
was discovered by W. Theiler: Porpbyrios tmd Augustitt (Halle, 1933). p. 31.
There is a slightly looser parallel between Produs: In Pc1nn. 1056. 11-13 d
J.LEV EOTI 7tp6vota, 7tQVTQ 6p9ci>c; f~El Tel 5vta' Ei eSt llll EOT17tp6vota, OU5V f~El
Kal..cl>c; and Bocthius: De Cottsol. Pbi/os. I, pr. 4, I 05-106 Si quidem deus, in-
quit, est, unde malt1? Bona tero unde. si 11011 est? On this passage see Chad-
wick: op. c:it., p. 129.
2-f6. For example. the termporisma at Bocthius: De Consol. Phi/os. III, pr.
10. 92 and the phrase in Timaei cosmopoeia at De Aritbm. ll. 46, 149. 22.
both of which seem Prodinc. Sec Courcelle: La Consolation de Philosophic
dans le1 traditionlitteraire. A11tecedeuts et posterite de Boece. p. 167.
2'1"'. For example. the quotations of Parmenidcs: fr. 8. 43 navto9&v
EUKUKA.ou mpaipn.; tval..iyKlOV 5yKq> at Boethius: De Consol. Pbilos. Ill, pr.
12. 106 ;md of Orac. Clmld. fr. 9H avcSpoc; St'J l&pou 5tj.la~ ai9tpec;
oiKo56J.LTJOav at Boethius: De Consol. Philos. IV, pr. 6. 145 are dose to
similar ones in Proclus. See Courcclk: late Ltllin Writers m1d their Greek
Sources, pp. 30.-\-3<H.
BOETHil 'S
the appearance of certain identical literary forms;24H as well as

to agreements of doctrine such as those concerning a) God as
cosmic love,2-l'.> b) the Demiurge of the Timaeus,Ho c) the rela-
tion of providence and fate,2SI and d) soul and epistemology.Hl
However. against these parallels one must balance the extensive
and blatant disagreements between the two philosophers: the
fact that Boethius does not postulate Proclus' radical distinction
between 'the One' (to f:v) and 'Intellect' (vouc;), his identifica-
tion of 'limit' (7tepac;) and 'infinity' (am:tpia) as the first prin-
ciples subsequent to the One, his identification of a series of
'henads' (EVQOE<;) or 'gods' dependent upon the One, and his
further subdivision of Intellect into the hypostases of 'being'
(ouaia). 'life' (~ron), and 'intellect' (vouc;);25:\ and that Proclus'
2iH. The most important of these liter:1ry forms is the hymn 10 the divinity
which is represented by \'arious examples in Produs works and by Boethius:
/Je Omso/. Phifos. Ill. m. 9. A feature of both writers' hymns is a penchtmt
for triadil' structure in whil'h :mdent literary procedures are adapted to thc-
rt:quirements of Neoplatonic metaphysics. On this question see Klingner: op.
cit .. p. ;\H ff. and Theilt:r: 'Ant ike und christliche Riickkehr zu Gott', pp.
_'\;2-.~61.
219. Boethius: De Consol. Pbifos. II. m. H. The respe-ctive doctrines are
discu~sed by dl Vogel: 'Am or quo caefum regitur'. pp. 2-.H.
2;0. !fJid. Ill. m. l). See the discussions of Klingner: op. cit .. p. 3H ff. and
Courcclk: /.a Consolation de Philosophic clans Itt traditiml litteraire .
.lnten!clellts et posterite de Boece. pp. 163-164 and I 17.
25 I Ibid. IV, pr. 6. The respective doctrines are discussed by Patch: 'Fate
in Boethius and the Neoplatonists'. pp. 62-72 and Courcellc: Late Latin
\l"rilers mul their Greek Sources, pp. 302 30L
252. !fJid. V. pr. -i. See the discussion of Obertello: Seterino Boezio I. p.
; 1.~ ff.
.!55. On the first question sec H. D. Saffrcy ct L. G. Wt:stcrink: Proc/us.
Thc.'ologie platonicicnne. Li1re /, texte etah/i et traduit par fl. D. S. et L. G.
II". (Paris. 196H), pp. l\'lxxxix: on the second, W. Beicrwaltcs: Pmklos,
Grwulziige seiner Metaphysik, 2. Autlage (Frankfurt, a. M. 1979). pp. 50-60;
onrhc third. E. R. Dodds: Procfus, The Elements of Theology. A Re1ised Te:~:t
uitb Translation, lntroductitm ami Commentm)'. Second Edition (Oxford,
iO-t NEOI'I.ATONISM
doctrine is quite inconsistent with the Boethian reners that God

is intellectible' (intel/ectibile - VOT)tOV), that he is 'form' (esse,
Jonna), that he is 'mind' (mens, intellegentia), and that he is
'omnipotent' (omnium potens). Furthermore, the arguments
about (ii) the use of shared terminology ,2'H (iii) the fondness for
similar quotations,w; and (iv) the appearance of certain iden-
tical literary forms are completely insubstantiaJ;2';6 the
arguments regarding agreements of doctrine like those concern-
ing a) God as cosmic Jove,l';"' b) the Demiurge of the
Timaeus,l';H and d) soul and epistemology are ambiguous in
1963 ), p. 2"57 ff.: and on the fourth, S. Gersh: From lamb/ichus to Eriugena.
An lnl'estigation of the Prehistory and Et,olution of tbe Pseudo-Dionysian
Tradition (Studien zur Problemgescbicbte det an liken und mittela/terlichen
Phi/osopbie 8) (leiden. 19i 8 ), pp. IH-1 "5 I.
25-i. Seen. 246. The term n6ptOIJ.a could equally have been derived from
Hierodes: In Aur. Cann. 23. 96. 14 or from various mathematical writers;
the terms KOOIJ.Oltmia I KOOIJ.OltOt6<; from Aristotle: Metaph. A. 4. 98"5al9;
Actius: Plm:. I. 25, 3. 321a9 and h9; and ps.-lamblichus: Tbeol. Arithm. 43,
5 ..... 2 I.
2"55. Sec n. 247. Boethius could also ha\'t." found the quot:ltion from
Parmenidcs in Plato: Sopb. 2-t'!e - sec 1-1. Diels und W. Kranz: Die
Fragmente tier Vorsokratiker. Griechisch unci Deutsch ton H. D.,
herausgegeben von W. K., 12. Aufage, I (l>uhlin/Ziirich. 1966), pp. 2.H-23i
-and the Cb,llclae'm Oracle presumably in Porphyry's commentary.
2"i6. Seen. 248. The similarity of literary form betwen Bocthius: De Con-
sol. Pbi/os. Ill. m. 9 and \'arious hymns of Prod us can easily be explained on
the assumption that both arc following the ancient classical as opposed 10 the
more modern Christian forms.
2"57. Sec n. 249. The doctrine of cosmic love could e4ually have been
derin:d from Plato's reminiscences of Empedoclt:s at Gorg "508a :md Tim.
32c or from a Stoic or eclectic reworking of his theory. Similar ideas also oc-
cur in Philo and the Hermetic Asclepius.
2';8. See n. 2SO. Although Boethius' God and Produs' Demiurge have
many similarities in their respective modes of causality. the latter can all he
explained in terms of their <:ommon dependem:e upon Plato's Ti,weus and
the accepted traditions of its exegesis. Thus. nothing definite can he conclud-
ed from the references 10 God's la,k of envy. the presence of the paradigm in
his mind. and so on.
BOETHHIS 70S
their results;ZS9 and even the arguments about (i) the presence of
several parallel textsZ6o and the agreement of doctrine concern-
ing c) the relation of providence and fate are not totally con-
clusive,26t In short, we may admit that the references to post-
Porphyrian Neoplatonists in Boethius' logical writings indicate
some use of these late ancient sources on this topic, and that the
textual and doctrinal agreements with Proclus in De Conso/a-
tione Philosophiae suggest that its author had some knowledge
of the later Neoplatonists' theology. However, it is clearly a
mistake to emphasize these doctrinal affiliations in preference
to the more obvious one with the Plotinian and Porphyrian
traditions.
9.2133 THE INFLUENCE OF AUGUSTINE
Since the parallels between Boethius' methods of describing

God and those of Plotinus and Porphyry are numerous, and the
parallels between his methods of describing God and those of
post-Porphyrian Neoplatonism are less frequent, the question
naturally arises why the Latin writer should reveal this set of
relative preferences among his philosophical authorities. To
259. See n. 252. The doctrine of the levels of human cognition could
equally have been derived from Aristotle: De Anim. Ill, .3. 427b7-26,
although the more systematic presentation may reflect the traditions of later
<:ommentary. Such Aristotelian hierarchies are frequent enough in l'lotinus
and Porphyry.
260. Seen. 215. The two Procline texts ;tre extremely short and have tht
character of maxims. They could presumably have reappeared in any stt of
glosses stemming from the Athenian or Alexandrian :'lleoplatonic schools
which Boethius might have found attached w one of the ':lassie philosophical
texts.
261. Seen. 251. This is the only point at which a connection between Pro
clus and Boethius is virtually established. The present author has therefore
accepted the Procline character of Boethius' doctrine of providence. See pp.
69-i-695.
706 NEOPI.ATONISM
some extent this question can be answered by drawing attention

to the enormous influence of the Plotinian and Porphyrian
traditions in Italy during the century and a half before Boethius'
time. an influence documented adequately by the literary ef-
forts of Marius Victorious and Macrobius to name only those
writers who openly confessed their allegiance to those tradi-
tions.26:Z However, a more fundamental answer lies in Boethius'
relation to Augustine whom he most strikingly acknowledges as
the master of his theological doctrine in the famous statement of
the preface to De Ttinitate that 'you should however examine
whether the seeds of argument from Saint Augustine's works
have borne any fruit in my writing' .263 This suggests the
following working hypotheses regarding Boethius' approach to
the use of Greek philosophical sources: first, that the source
followed is the one whose teaching is most consistent with
Augustine's; and secondly, that this source is usually Plotinus
and/or Porphyry but occasionally a later Neoplatonist like Pro-
clus.26.f Thus, although the question raised can be answered par-
262. This influence h:1s been ably documented b}' P. Henry: Plotln et /'Oc-
cident. Firmicus Matenzus, Marius Victorinus, saint Augustin et ,uacrobe
(Lou\"ain, 19.:\4) and Courcc:llt': Lllte Latin Wrif(rs ami their Greek Sources,
pp. 26--i7, 71-78. 165-196, 208-223, 238-251, and 295-318. Interestingly,
Hc:nry did not notice the reference to Plotinus at Boethius: De Dhis. (PL 64,
~F5D-8768).
263. The Latin text has already been given inn. 7. For various viewpoints
on the influence of Augustine over Boethius see G. Boissic:r: 'Le christianisme
de Boece'. journal des Savants ( 1889), pp. 449-462; R. Carton: 'Le chris-
tianisme et l'augustinisme de Boece'. Melanges augusllniens (Paris, 19 31 ),
pp. 243-329; E. T. Silk: 'Boethius' Consolatio Phi/osophiae as a Sequel to
Augustine's Dialogues and So/lloquia', Harvard Theological Rer,iew 32
( 1939). pp. 19-W: Courcelle: La Consolation de Philosophic: dans Ia tradi-
tion littemire. Antecedents et posterite de Boece, pp. 168-176: Obertello:
Seterbw Boezio I. pp. 270-275: and Chadwick: op. cit .. pp. 249-250. The
debate has often been focused mistakenly on the search for parallel texts
rather than underlying structures of thought.
26-i. E\"idc:ncc indicating the \"alidity of these hypotheses can be found by
HOETHil 'S 707
tially by stressing the influence of the Plotinian and Porphyrian

traditions over Boethius' intellectural milieu in general, it is the
specific influence of those traditions over the latter's most im-
portant Christian predecessor which is probably the deciding
factor.
9.12 PSYCHOLOGY
Of the three parts of theoretical philosophy described in the

first commentary on the lsagoge the second consists primarily
of psychology, and in this area Boethius provides a considerably
less complete and also less original doctrine ..2M We shall
therefore summarize it by examining two aspects briefly: first,
the ontological characterization of the human soul in terms of
its transcendence and immanence in relation to the human
hody: and secondly, its epistemological characterization as the
subject of intellective, imaginative, and sensitive activity.
However, before considering the details of Boethian
psychological doctrine it will be necessary to explore some
questions of terminology.
Boethius uses two Latin terms when speaking of the psychic
suhstance from a purely ontological viewpoint: anima and
animus. The former seems to signify the human soul as a
whole, where it is contrasted simply with God on the one hand
and the body on the other,.266 and is described as turning either
to the higher realm or to the world of corporeality.Ulc The ap-
plication of the latter term is somewhat more complex, since in
l'X;unining the:: Augustinian parallels already assc::mhlc::d in nn. 13;, 160, 16L
I HO. 1l)O, 210, 2 H. 221. 227. and 23.3.
26S. For the classification sec pp. 658-664.
2(l6. Boethius: Contra Eut)'Ch. et Nest. 2, 24-28; 6, 70-74; and De Como/.
Philos. Ill, m. 9. 18-21 (soul and God): Boethius: In/sag. ed. If. I. 10, 160.
23-161. 2 and De Cmzso/. Philos. Ill, pr. 11. 31-34 (soul and body).
26~. Bucthius: De Consul. Pbilos. \'. pr. 2. 16-lO.
NH>PI.ATONIS~I
some contexts it clearly signifies the human soul as a whole- it

is capable of turning either to the higher world or to the realm
of corporeality,26H and is consequently a principle which both
enjoys immortality and is susceptible to vice.Z69 - whereas in
other passages it seems rather to signify the higher phase of the
human soul alone.27n Elsewhere Boethius refers to the psychic
substance by using the Latin term mens which seems to cover
both the ontological and the epistemological aspects: the
substance is interpreted ontologically when it is contrasted with
the body.Z.,t and said both to enjoy immortality and he suscepti-
ble to vice;2~.z it is viewed epistemologically when it is describ-
ed as the force which comprehends intelligible truths and links
sensory impressions with the latter.2 7:\ Finally, Boethius
employs two Latin terms when speaking of the psychic
substance from a purely epistemological viewpoint: ratio and
intellegentia. The application of both terms is quite complex,
since the former signifies in some contexts the higher human
soul as a whole - it is contrasted simply with the non-rational
element.Zi-1 - and in others the lower part of the higher human
268. Boethius De Al'ifhm. I. I. 9, 2fl- 10. I and In /sag. ed. I. 1. I 0, 24,

15-IH.
269. Boethius: De Conso/. Pbi/os. IV. pr. 4. 20-2S (immortality); ibid. IV.
pr. 4, 149-1 S4 (susceptibility to vice).
270. Boethius: lnlstlg. ed. I. I, 10. 25, .f-6; I, 10. 29, 22-.~o. I: In Dl!lnter-
fJr. ed. fl. I. I, 20. 1"'-18: andDeConsol. Pbi/os. V. pr. 'i, 1-10.
2"' I. Rocthius: In /sag eel. II, I. I 0, 160, .U-16 I. 2 and De Con sol. Pbi/os.
II. pr. 6. 21-26.
2"' 2. Boethius: De Conso/. Pbi/os. II, pr. 1. 91-lr:' and II. pr . ., . "'9-H'i (im-
mortality); ihid. V. m. 3. H-JO(susceptihility to vice).
r.~. 1\octhius: In /sag ed. /,I,.~. H. 13-16; De Conso/. Pbilos. II, pr. S,
""S-78: III. pr. 2. 1-2: Ill. m. 9. 22-2-4; and V. pr. L 100-104 (intdligihles):
Bocthius: In /sag ed. /, I. I 0, 2S. B-1 I and De Ccmso/. Pbilos. V, m. 4, 3S-40
(sensihlcs and intelligihlcs).
2"'-i. Bocthius: De C(mso/. Pbilos. II. pr. 'i, "72.78 and II. pr. 6. 2-f-26. At De
.Hus. I. 2. 188, 2""-189, I mtio is cmployld in an ontologic:tl sense to signify
the human soul as a whole in contrast with the hody.
BOETflll 'S
soul- that is to say its faculty of discursive rather than intuitive

thought.2 7 S This usage is complemented by that of the other
term, for the latter indicates in certain passages the higher
human soul as a whole - it is used in conjunction with various
forms of cognition2 7 6 - and in others the higher part of the
higher human soul - that is to say the faculty of intuition
itself.277
9.221 THE ONTOLOGICAL ASPECT
In Boethius, the ontological characterization of the human

soul is twofold: as transcendent and as immanent. This is accor-
ding to the traditional teaching of the Neoplatonists that the
soul exists on the one hand disengaged from the body and on
the other in conjunction with it, the first state being interpreted
chronologically sometimes as prior to the second, sometimes as
posterior to it, and sometimes as simultaneous with it.
When the soul is viewed from the aspect of its transcendence,
a number of specific attributes are emphasized of which the first
is divinity. Thus, the figure of Philosophy reminds the imprison-
ed Boethius that man is a divine being because of his possession
of 'reason' (ratio) or 'mind' (mens),2'"'8 and elsewhere that
'everyone who is blessed is a god. By nature there is only one
God although nothing prevents there being many by participa-
tion' (Omnis igitur beatus deus, sed natura quidem unus; par-
ticipatione l'ero nihil prohibet esse quam plurimos).l"'<J Since
the human soul is said to be divine in this way, it is not surpris-
Do;. Bocthius: De Omso/. Pbi/os. V, pr. -1. "'1-1.20 and V, pr. 1, 12-lfl.
n6. Boethius: lnlsttg. ed. I, I. 10, .2-l, 18-.2'5, I; I, 10 . .21. 6-8; .2, 12. IOH .
.~fl; and In /sag. ed. 1/, I, I. 13 7. 8-16. At In lsttg. ed. I. I, 3, 8, 1.~-16 and In
l.~ttg. etl. II. l, 10. 160, :\-10 i11tel/ectus is employed in tht same sense.
r-. Boethius: De Consol. Pbilos. V. pr. 4. 7'5-1.20.
2-H. /hid. II, pr. 'i. "'2-7H.
2-'J. Ibid. Ill, pr. 10. HH-90.
710 NEOPLATONISM
ing that it is endowed with further attributes mirroring God's.lt

is unitary because the state to which it aspires is 'by nature sim-
ple and undivided although human failing divides it' (Quod
enim simplex est indit,isumque natura, id error humanus
separat);2Bo it is good, a characteristic which is 'innate' (in-
situm) in it;2RI it is immutable since, although there are as two
kinds of rational beings: that which is immutable and impassible
by nature and that which is mutable and passible through
createdness, the latter 'can be transformed into that stead-
fastness of impassibility belonging to angels and the soul by the
grace of the impassible substance' (inpassibilis gratia substan-
tiae ad inpassibi/itatis firmitudinem permutetur ut
angelorum atque animae);2B2 it is immortal, as has been prov-
ed 'by many demonstrations' (permultis demonstra-
tionibus);2R~ and it is incorporeal by being one of those things
'which are in bodies and permit themselves to be separate from
bodies' (quae in corporibus sunt et praeter corpora sese esse
patiuntur).2R4 Furthermore, since the human soul is said to be
divine, it is also endowed with the additional characteristics of
blessedness by which alone it can become sufficient, powerful,
revered, famous, and joyful in the true sense,2sc; and of freedom
280. Ibid. Ill, pr. 9. 10-13. Cf. ibid. Ill, pr. 9, 45-49. For the analogous at-
tribute of God see pp. 666-675.
281. Ibid. ll, pr. 5. 70-72. Cf. ibid. IV, pr. 3. 25-28. For the analogous at-
tribute of God see pp. 666-675.
282. Boethius: Crmtra E'utycb. et Nest. 2, 23-28. Cf. ibid. 6, 6682. For the
analogous attribute of God see pp. 666-675.
283. Boethius: De Crmsol. Philos. If. pr. 4, 91-97. Cf. ibid. If. pr. 7. 79-85
and IV. pr, 4. 20-.2'5. The analogous attribute of God is atemporality- see
pp. 666-67'5- yet clearly the human soul has a temporal activity.
284. Boethius: /n /sag. ed. I. I, 10, 29, 22-30, 4. Cf. In De Interpr. ed. /1,
6, 13, 459, 2-3. Forrhe analogous anribute of God see pp. 666-675.
285. Boethius: De Crmso/. Phi/os. Ill. pr. 9, 80-86. Cf. ibid. If. pr. 4,
.,. 2- I 0 I. etc.
BOETHilrs 711
whereby it can be liberated from the compelling causality

associated with fate and fortune.ZH6.
In these descriptions, Boethius obviously has in mind the
transcendent aspect of the human soul, and here an important
question arises. Does this transcendence correspond to a state
chronologically prior to, posterior to, or simultaneous with im-
manence in the individual body?ZW' To this question there is
nothing to suggest that Boethius' answer is different to that of
his Neoplatonic predecessors Plotinus. Porphyry. and
Macrobius for whom the transcendence is an atemporal state to
which all three of these chronological determinations would ap-
ply or not apply equally. It is important to stress that this
transcendence of the human soul does not correspond to the
state: in which the latter is placed into one of the heavenly
bodies according to one important text. Here, the argument is
concc:rned with an immanence of the soul chronologically prior
to its immanence in the human body.zss
When the soul is viewed from the aspect of its immanence
some more complex ontological distinctions become explicit.
Thus, the hymn 0 qui perpetua distinguishes God's creation of
the: world soul and of individual souls as two operations in suc-
cc:ssion to one another, although it presumably follows the
1\eoplatonic view that Plato's narrative is concerned with on-
tological rather than chronological priority .zs<J Regarding the
creation of the world soul. it states: 'You dispose through the
2H(l, /hid. IV. pr. 6. 6~- .. H. Cf. iiJid. \'. pr. 2, 11-2"'.
2H". See pp. 579-582 and 587-589 for a discussion of the same question in
:\lacrohius.
1HH. Sec hclow.
2HlJ. l'seful commentaries on this hymn are pro\'ided hy Sthl'ihlc: op. cit ..
pp. I 01-112 :tnd Gruhcr: op. cit .. pp . .2-:'7-290 who summarize a quantity of
carlic:r scholarship. My remarks hclow arc indehted to this scholarship.
although they will lay less emphasis upon the doctrinal paralll'ls with Pro-
clu~.
N EOPLATON ISM
harmonious parts of the cosmos a soul of threefold nature

which moves all things. It is placed in the middk and, when
divided, produces two circuits of motion. It moves in returning
to itself and encircles the depth of mind, and it turns the heaven
with a motion imitating its own' (Tu triplicis mediam naturae
cunctc1 moventem I conectens animam pe1 consona membra
resolzis. I Quae cum secta duos motum glomeravit in orbes, I
in semet reditura meat mentemque profundam I circuit et
simi/i convertit imagine caelum).29o This interesting text con-
tains a number of aspects derived from Plato's Timaeus: the
references to the threefold nature,291 the middle position,292
the moving force,29.~ the disposition through harmonious
parts.29i and the twofold division of the world souJ;29'5 as well
as certain elements reflecting more peculiarly Neoplatonic
views: the notions that the world soul returns to itself,296 en-
circles the divine mind.29-r and is imitated by the cosmic mo-
tion.29H Since the: mens pmfunda of the passage seems to recall
the 'paternal depth' (7taTptKO<; pueoc;) which plays an analogous
.290. Roethius: De Con so/. Phi/os. Ill. m. 9. 13-1"7.

291. See Plato: Tim . .35a. The threefold nature is constiluted by its com-
position from 'indi\'isiblt: substance' (ll lillEPtcnoc; ... ouaia), 'substance divid-
ed around bodies' (ll 7tEpi Tel awj.lata YlYVOilEVllllEPlOT~). and 'thl' third kind
of substance' (TpiTOV ... OUaiac; Ei5oc;).
191. See i/Jid. j6e .
.29.3. See ibid.
29-J. See ibid. .35b-c .
.295. See ibid. j6b-c. Here. the Demiur~e di\'ides the suhslance of soul into
two strips which are then pl:tl'ed across one another in the form of the letter
Xand finally bent :around a~ two illll'rlockin~ circles.
296. For the doctrine in Plotinus, Porphyry, and Macrobius see pp.
538-542.
297. For the doctrine in Plotinus, Porphyry, and Macrohius see pp.
5.38-5-ll.
298. See Plotinus: l:'tm. II . .2/l.f/ 1. l-1:'.
ROETHil'S
role in the system of the Chaldtlean Oracles,l<J'J there are strong

grounds for thinking that the whole theory is derived from a
Porphyrian commentary on Plato in which such oracles were
citcd ..\oo Regarding the creation of individual souls. it con-
tinues: 'In similar fashion you produce the souls and lesser lives.
Placing them aloft in light chariots, you sow them into the
heavens and the earth and, by a kindly law, make them return to
you with fire streaming back' (Tu causis animas paribus vilas-
que minores I provehis et levibus sublimes curribus aptans I in
caelum terramque seris quas lege benigna I ad te conversas
reduci facis igne revertt). 30 t Here, we also find various aspects
derived from the Timaeus: the references to the similar mode of
creation,302 the placing into chariots,303 and the sowing into the
heavenly bodies of individual souls;304 together with other
elements reminiscent of more characteristically Neoplatonic
views: the notions that individual souls are coordinated with
lesser lives,305 are fiery in nature,306. and return to their
creator.307 In fact, the redux ignis of the passage bears such a
striking similarity to the 'elevative splendor' (avayroyci q>aTt)
mentioned in a text of Synesius d~pendent upon both the
Chaldaean Oracles and Porphyry ,308 that it seems to provide
299. Omc. Cba/d. fr. 18. This paternal depth corresponds to the 'twice
ht:yund' (Ol~ EnEKEtva) or Demiurgic intellect of ibid. fr. 169 .
.~00. For the Porphyrian interpretation of the Cbe~ldaean Oracles see p.
608 :md ch. 8, n. 18.
50 I. Boethius: De Como/. Pbilos. Ill. m. 9. 18-ll .
.~02. Sc:e Pl:uo: Tim. 41 d .
.~0:~. Sc:c ibid. -i te 'having mounted them as if in a chariot' (EI-If3tf3aaa~ ~
Et; OXTII.lU) .
.~!H. Sc:e ibid. -l2d.
50'i. Sec: Porphyry: Sent. 2.~. 14, 1--i, etc .
.\06. For the: doctrine in the Che~/d(leml Oracles, Porphyry. and Martianus
Capella seep. 629 ff .
.~o-. Sc:e Porphyry: De ReRr. Anim. fr. 2. z,. 2:~-2f, c:tc .
.~08. Syncsius: Hymn. l, 377; 595. The dependence of Synesius'
71..f NEOPLATONISM
further evidence for the thesis regarding the sources of the

whole poem advanced earlier.30<J
Of course, the hymn 0 qui perpetua is not the only text in
which the human soul is viewed from the aspect of its im-
manence, and indeed throughout the pages of Boethius' final
work and elsewhere there are numerous references to the ac-
quisition, possession and abandonment of this status. For exam-
ple, Boethius depicts the descent into body ,.Ho the resulting
contamination:\11 and debilitation,312 and the reascent to the
higher realm5t3 in his most vivid and rhetorical language. It is
interesting to observe that all of this accords with the normal
psychological doctrine of late pagan Neoplatonists,3t4 although
Boethius as a Christian presumably excludes other aspects of
their doctrine such as the transmigration of the human soul
from one body to another.
9.222 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECT
Boethius' epistemological characterization of the human soul

corresponds to some extent with its ontological characteriza-
tion examined earlier, for here we find the soul divided into a
hierarchy of faculties associated with the degree of
transcendence or immanence of their respective primary ob-
jects. Thus, when Philosophy explains to Boethius the nature of
the divine foreknowledge she has occasion to distinguish four
psychology upon Porphyry has been noted on p. 635 and ch. 8, n. 178.
309. Seep. 71 I ff.
310. Bocthius: ln/s(lg ed. I, I. 3. 9. 2-6.
311: Bocthius: De Cmtso/. Philos. IV. pr. 4, 149-154: V. pr. 2. 20-27: and
V. m. 3. H-10.
312./bitl. IV. pr. I, 24-31: IV. pr. 2. 38-42; and IV, pr. 2, 113-119.
31."1. Bocthius: DeArithm. I, I. 9, 28-10. I; De Crmso/. Ph/los. Ill, pr. 2.
2-5;11l,m.II.I-16:1V,m.l, l-30;etc.
314. See Macrobius' doctrine examined on pp. 571-595.
HOETHiliS 71';
epistemological faculties: 'sense (sensus), 'imagination

(imaginatio), 'reason' (ratio), and 'intelligence' (intellegen-
tia).:'>l'; The first faculty considers 'the form in the matter which
is its substratum (/igura in subiecta materia constituta); the
second 'the form alone without its matter' (sola sine materia ...
figura); the third transcends this level to consider 'the form
itself which is in individual things in a universal manner'
(sjJeciesque ipsa quae singularibus inest unit,ersali comidera-
tione); and the fourth transcends this to consider 'that simple
form with the pure gaze of the mind' (ilia simplex forma pura
mentis acie).3t<> Since the specific illustration of perceiving a
man is given, it is possible to delineate the operation of these
faculties further. In the case of the first faculty the soul grasps an
individual man through the senses; in that of the second it pro-
duces a mental picture of an individual man in the absence of
any individual presented externally to the senses; in the third
case the soul disengages the universal notion of manhood from
the individual man perceived through the senses; and in the
fourth it perceives this universal manhood as coinciding with
the divine form ..H7 The theory outlined in this passage agrees
with that invoked elsewhere to answer Porphyry's first ques-
:\IS. Boethius: De Om.ml. PIJilns. V. pr. 4. R291. The same hierarchy of

faculties is envisaged at Ibid. V. pr. S. IS6 .
.-\ 16. In translating this passage. I have renderedfigum, species, and forma
equally as 'form. However. since Boethius is concerntd with the ways in
which form is perceived at different ontological levels. it would no douht
al~o he justifiahlc to translate the three Latin terms using separate English
equivalents. in this tase. we might opt for 'shape'. 'form'. and 'Idea' respec-
tivdy as most suitahle .
.-\I". My explanation of the fourth faculty perhaps goes beyond the infor
marion explicitly provided by Boethius' text. That the form of manhood
perccin:d hy this faculty coincides with the divine form follows from the
facts that (i) this manhood is superior to the purely epistemological universal
- ~et ibid. V. pr. t, 8991; (ii) ontologically transcendent forms coincide
with the divine substance elsewhere in Boethius- see pp. 685-690; and (iii)
716 NEOI'I.ATONISM
tion about the nature of universals. although there only the

three faculties of sense. imagination, and intelligence are en-
visaged ..~ IH
Besides distinguishing a hierarchy of faculties within the soul
according to the degree of transcendence or immanence of thdr
respective primary objects, Boethius also draws certain conclu-
sions regarding the relations of these various faculties to one
another. In the first place, a higher faculty also comprehends
the objects of a lower although the reverse is not the case. Thus,
intelligence perceives all things which are below the supreme
form in the same manner in which it comprehends that form
itself: 'It grasps the universal of reason, the form of imagination.
and the materiality of sense employing neither reason nor im-
agination nor senses but as it were perceiving all things formally
with that single intuition of the mind' (Nam et rationis univer-
sum et imagination is figuram et materia/e sensibile eognoscit
nee ratione utens nee imaginatione nee sensibus, sed i/lo uno
ictu mentis forma/iter, ut ita dieam, euneta prospiciens).
while reason and imagination perceive the objects of the
faculties below them in analogous way .519 In the second place.
the two higher faculties are not passive recipients of the data
furnished by the two lower but active generators of notions. For
example, the force which arranges notions in hierarchies of
more generic and more specific and employs their interrt:lations
as the standard for the judgment of truth and falsity must be an
active cause: 'Then the awakened force of the mind summons
this manhood is described using language normally applied to God - see nn.
98 and II 0: this equation being possible because the divine form is a unity in
plurality of the kind described earlier in this chapter .
.HH. Boethius: In lst~g. ed. I. I. 10, 24. 1~-2<;, II.
.~19. Boethius: De Consol. Pbilos. V, pr. 1. 92-120. This passa~-:e also ap-
plies a further important epistemological principle: that it is the subject
rather than the object which determines the n;lture of a perception. Cf. Ibid.
V, pr. -i, "12-7!.
BOETHiliS ""17
those forms which it holds within to similar motions. It relates

them to external stimuli, blending the images with forms con-
cealed within' (Tum mentis vigor excitus I quas intz1s species
tenet I ad motus similes vacans I notis applicat exteris I intror-
sumque reconditis I form is miscet imagines).320
Boethius' epistemological characterization of the human soul
hy dividing it into a hierarchy of faculties and by examining the
relations of these various faculties to one another is naturally
connected with his approach to the theory of universals. Since
this is a topic which has generated an enormous quantity of
discussion from the early Middle Ages onwards, it should
perhaps be considered not briefly within a summary of
Boethius' doctrine of the soul in general but at greater length as
a self-contained question elsewhere,.UI although a few remarks
may be ventured here on the kinds of problem which arise in
this connection. The principal difficulty is that in certain texts
the Platonic realist theory of universals is expressed: apart from
those in which physical processes take place through the rela-
tion between transcendent and immanent cause,322 there are
various texts which underline the ontological priority of univer-
sals over particulars.323 On the other hand in certain passages
the Aristotelian realist theory of universals occurs: not only are
.UO. Ibid. V, m . .f. 35-40. The mentis !!igor strictly corresponds to the
third faculty described in the passages wnsidered earlier - it is responsible
for the collection and division of concepts associated with discursive reason
- although it is probably intended as loosely equivalent to the third and
fourth faculties combined. Cf. ibid. V, pr. 'i, 1-10.
3 21. See the discussion in my article 'Realism, Dictiot~a rJ' of tbe Middle
Ages 6 (New York, forthcoming) .
.U.2. This system operates in terms of an immanent Form. a paradigmatic
Form. and the Demiurge and is described in p:tssages such as Bocthius: De
Aritbm. I. I. 10. 10-28 and De Como/. Philos. lll, m. 9. 5-9.
3.23. See Bocthius: In /sag. ed. I. I. 10 . .26. 15-25; De Triu. I, .25-30 and 2.
-lltR.
"71H NEO PLAT< >:-.I ISM
there some passages in which physical processes take place

through the interrelation of immanent causes,32.f but also others
which stress the ontological priority of particulars over univer-
sals ..uc; Fortunately, this difficulty is easily resolved by assuming
that the usual doctrine of later Greek Neoplatonists according to
which.U6 there is a distinction between (i) universals, (ii)
transcendent absolutes, and (iii) transcendent Forms underlies
such apparently contradictory positions. Thus, if not all univer-
sals arc transcendent absolutcs:\27 and not all transcendent ab-
solutes are transcendent Forms,:\2!1 it emerges that the Platonic
and Aristotelian doctrines can both be correct since they apply
to different sets of universals. Of course, this brings us back to
the questions with which we began this chapter - whether
Bocthius was a Platonist and, if so, what kind of a Platonist he
was - and provides further evidence for the precise interpreta-
tion of his position advocated earlier. 32<J
32-i. This system operates in terms of the material, formal, tlnal and effi-
cient causes and is described in texts such as Boethius: In /sag. ed. II, 2, 3.
17L 14- Hi; In Cic. Top. V, ll.fiD-1146A; and De Top. Diff ll. 1188A-H.
32i. See Boethius: hllsag. ed. II. I. 10. 161. 14-162, 3: Contra Eutych. et
Nest. 2 ..P-i2; 3. 29-i7; and t. 106-109.
326. Sec my discussion of Syrianus and Produs in From lmnblichus to
Eriugena. An flwestigation of the Prehistory am/ ENJiutirm of tbe Pseudo-
Dionysian Tradition. p. 86 ff.
327. llniversals of manufactured objects, ethically negative things. and
composite objects do not correspond to transcendent absolutes .
.UH. Transcendent absolutes of cthicallr positive things do not correspond
to transcendent Forms.
329. Sc:c: p. 647 ff.
Excursus D
Marius Victorious'
Commentarius in Ciceronis Rhetoricam
The fourth-century rhetorician and philosopher Marius Vic-

torinus is famous for both his secular and his Christian writings.
In the former category, two works survived into the Middle
Ages and became influential: the Ars Grammatica and the Com-
mentarius in Ciceronis Rbetmicam; and in the latter group,
one set of writings exercised a significant if spasmodic in-
lluc:nce: the Trinitarian treatises. Since our concern is with the
transmission of Platonism through non-Christian works, we
may confine the discussion to a single text.
The specifically philosophical arguments in Victorinus' Com-
mentarius in Ciceronis Rbetoricam are few in number and
I. On the influence of the Commentarius in Ciceronis Rbetoricam see J.

1.k Ghcllinck: 'Reminiscences de Ia dialectique de Marius Vicwrinus dans les
contlits theologiques du XI meet du XII me siecle'. Retue neoscolastique de
{JIJiltJ.WijJbie 19 ( 191 I) pp. H2-4 :\5.: H. Silvestre: 'Gunzo et Marius Vic-
torinus'. Re11ue bem!dic:tine 7-l ( 196:j ). pp. 321-:\23: M. Dickey: 'Some Com-
mlntaric:s on the De 11wentione and All Herennium of the Eleventh and
Twelfth Centuries'. Mediaeta/ and Renaissance Studies 6 ( 196H). pp. 1-4 I:
and ,1.0. Ward: 'The Date of the Commentary on Cicero's De 11wentirme by
Thil'rry of Chartres (ca. 1095- I 160?) and the Cornifician Attack on the
Liheral Arts. Viator:\ ( 1972 ). pp. 219-279: on that of the Trinitarian writings
1'. lladot: 'Marius Vicwrinus et Alcuin', Arcbites d'bistoire doctrlna/e et
littt!raire du mo.ren dge 21 ( 195-l), pp. 5-19: 'Les hymnes de Victorinus ctles
hyrnnl's Adesto et /Hiserere d'Aicuin' ihill. 27 ( 1960), pp. -::r-17: and .J. A.
.lun~-tmann: 'Marius Vik!Orinus in dcr karolingischen Gchetslileratur und im
riimischen Drc:ifaltigkcitsoffizium'. Kyriakon: Festschrift }. Quasten.
lwrausKl'gehen \"On P. von G r;tnfield und J. A. .Jungmann II (Mi.inster. 19'70 ),
pp. 691-69-::".
..,.,9
720 NEOPLATONISM
have already been examined in a recent study by P. Hadot.2

Among these the most important deal with the following topics:
I. The relation between God and nature; 2. The character of Be-
ing; 3. The descent, embodiment, and ascent of the human soul;
and 4. The nature of time and space.:\
I. 'This is the reason why it is difficult to define "nature":
because there is a disagreement among the wise regarding the
respective priorities of God and nature. If nature is prior, then
God was generated. However, God could not have been
generated. On the other hand if God is prior, then nature was
generated. But if nature was able to be generated, it follows that
it is no longer nature. Therefore it is difficult to define nature.
Cicero says that it is "difficult" although in certain respects he
shows that it can be defined. Some wise men indeed have defin-
ed nature as follows: "nature is a craftsmanlike fire which
moves in a certain way to produce sensible things" since it is
manifest that all things are generated by the agency of fire. Plato
however has defined it in this way: "nature is the will of God".
Of all the definitions it is this which should be preferred: for if
God and nature are such that neither can be prior to the other -
it is necessary that what is second should be generated from
what is first, while that which is generated can be neither God
nor nature - then he has correctly stated that nature is the will
of God. It is necessary that God has always willed and is always
willing. Therefore, if nature could not have been generated, this
is because it is the will of a God who could not have been
generated either. We should however observe that nature is
identical with the world, and that beyond the world is not
nature but God alone. It is the will of God through which the
2. P. H:u.lot: ,Uarius Victol'inus. Rechel'cbes sur Stl 1ie et S'S oeu,.,es (Paris.
)l)i(),pp. -.~101 .
.~. Tht:rt' art: also discussions of thl' tln c:llt:gorit:s and of tht: syllogism
which :tre ofsornt: intt:rt:sl. St:t: Hadot: o{J. cit .. pp. 92-99.
MAR ILlS VICTORINliS
world exists that is identical with nature' ....

Victorious' discussion is at this point quite carefully struc-
tured. It consists in the first place of a conceptual argument
where he explains why Cicero found 'nature' such a difficult
thing to define5 This is because its relation to God is somewhat
ambiguous. On the one hand, neither can be demonstrated as
prior to the other, since neither can be viewed as the second
and therefore generated principle. On the other hand, God is
prior to nature, since he is prior to the world which is
equivalent to nature. In all this we can see Victorious'
adherence to the characteristically Middle Platonic and
Neoplatonic position that God is from different viewpoints im-
manent and transcendent in relation to his creation.6 The se-
4. Marius Victorinus: In Cic. Rhet. l, 21 '), 23-39 Haec ratio est, ut diffici/is
sit naturae definilio; etenim aput sapientes cnntenlio est, quid prius sit,
deus an natura. Si natura prior est, ergo deus natus est: atqui deus twsci
non potuit. Rursus, si deus prior est. nata est natura: quod si nasci potu it
natura, incipit non esse natura. ltaque naturae difficilis de/initio est. 'Dif-
fici/is' inquit; alioquin ostendit posse definiri. Denique sapientes quidam
sic definlere naturam: natura est ignis artifex quadam zia vadens in res
sensiblles procreandas; etenim manifestum est mmria principe igne
generarl. Plato autem sic defitzivit: natura est del volrmtas. Et inter ceteras
IJaec magis probanda definitio; nam si deus et natura ita sutzt, ut ex IJis
alterum prius non sit (necesse est autem ex primo nasci, quod secundum
est, deinde si quod nascitur nee deus est nee natura), recte naturam del dix-
it esse voluntatem: deus enim semper roluerit et relit necesse est. Ita
quoniam nasci natura tzon potuit, si dei voluntas est. ut deus nasci non
fmtuit, nee natura. 11/ud autem scire debemus, naturam illud esse quod
mundum, ultra mundum naturf:ltll mm esse. sed deum: toluntatem cmtem
dei. qua mundus est. eandem esse twturam. The text is in C. Halm: Rbetores
Latini minores, ex codicibus ma..Yimam partem primum adiJibitis, emetr-
dclbat C. H. (Leipzig. 186.'\l.
5. This comprises the first and last sections of the prcscm passage.
6. Victorinus will later repeat this doctrine with much further elaboration
in his Trinitarian writings. Cf. Adt. Ar. I. 49, 39-40 where the Om: 'is
through an ineffable power and in a pure manner all things which truly are'
722 NF.OPLA TONISM
cond element in the discussion is a doxographical argument in

which the writer reports two definitions of 'nature': the Stoic
and the Platonic. 7 The former interprets nature as the immanent
fiery pneuma and the latter as the will of God. Of these two
definitions it is the latter which is recommended on the grounds
that it accords with the view that neither God nor nature can be
demonstrated as prior to the other. On these questions Vic-
torious is clearly following the eclectic philosophical teachings
of late antiquity, since the notion that nature is the will of God
is a typical piece of Platonic and Stoic syncretism.H
2 a. 'The Greeks maintain that Being is the genus of both
substance and accident although they are mistaken in this. For
every part should be similar to its genus. Yet a substance is
something which is a substratum of other things, capable of
receiving the qualities which are present to it as accidents; an
accident is something which supervenes on a substance. For this
reason. since that higher Being cannot be both of these things, it
is not correctly held to be the genus of both substance and acci-
dent' .9
(inenarrabili potentia pure exsistens omnia quae vere sunt) and ibid. l, 49,
13-14 where it is 'before all existence, before all existentiality, and absolutely
before all inferiors' (ante omnem exsistentiam, ante omnem exslsten-
tialitatem et maxime ante omnia infer/ora).
i. This comprises the middle section of the present passage.
H. Hadot: op. cit .. pp. HH-91 demonstrates this syncretism by comparing
two passages: Seneca: Nat. Quaest. II. 15. 23 where 'nature' (natura) is
equated with 'providence' (pror,identia) and ps.-Piutarch: De Fato 9, 572 f
where 'providence' (np6vma) is equated with 'God's will' (9EOU ... ~oUA.llal<;).
To the Latin parallel to this syncretism which Hadot adduces from Calcidius:
In Tim. IH. 1!:13. 6-10 should be added those at Asclep. B. 305, 12-15 and
Firmicus Matern us: Math. V, pr. 3. See my discussions on pp. 345-348 and
7:\0.
9. Marius Vktorinus: In Cic. Rhet. I. 211. 25-30 VOv Graeci substantiae et
uccldenti genus ponrmt, sed mm bene; pars enim omnis generi suo simi/is
esse debet. Substantia porro res est, quae a/ils rebus subest capax acciden-
MARILIS VI\.TORINUS
b. 'Aristotle has postulated as the genus "opposites", and

under the opposites "the contrary", "the dissimilar", and "the
relative". Aristotle has defined the contrary as "those species
which are most different from one another under the same
genus" on the basis that all things are referred to that single
genus which the Greeks postulate as primary above all things.
This is the ov, called "Being" by the Latins: in other words that
which is able to be' .10
One might well ask why Victorious contradicts himself by
stating in passage 2 a that Being is not the supreme genus but in
passage 2 b that it is. Hadot has answered this question by
demonstrating that the same contradiction is apparently stated
in Adversus Arium and goes back to Porphyry, who held that
Being (the second hypostasis) is not the genus of individual ex-
istents in a logical sense but is their genus ontologically speak-
ing. The reader is referred to this excellent analysis for more
detailed discussion.lt
.3 ~l. 'Virtue is a state of the soul in harmony with reason ac-
cording to the mode of its nature. It is 'according to the mode
of its nature" because we consist of two things: a soul and a
body. The soul is immortal. If it is immortal, it has descended
from the divine; and if it has descended from the divine, it is
perfect. Yet the vision even of a soul which is perfect is enmesh-
ed and enveloped by the weight of its bodily covering so that it
acquires a kind of forgetfulness of itself. But when it has begun
timn qua/ita tum: deinde accidens est id, quod in substantiam cadit. Quare,
qucmiam illud superius ov utrumque esse non potest, non recte substantiae
et accidenti genus factum est.
Ill. Ibid. I. 22H. 29-34 Aristoteles 'opposita' genus posuit, 'ccmtrarium.
dispamtum. ad aliquld' sub oppositis. Cotllrarium porro Aristote/es sic
definitit: 'suiJ eodem genere species multum inter se dit,ersae ', hac ratione,
ut cmmia ad unum il/ud genus referantur. quod supra omnes res principtlle
Gmeci pcmrmt. id est ov. quod Latini 'ens t'ocant, id est, quod esse possit.
I I. See Hadot: op. cit. pp. 9'i-98 and Porph_vre et Victoritrus I (Paris.
1968). pp. 249-2'i3.
724 NE<>Pl.ATONISM
to be uncovered and laid bare, so to speak. by study and educa-

tion, the state of the soul is returned and recalled to the mode of
its own nature. Plato sometimes says that this virtue is produced
by art, sometimes that it is inborn in mankind, sometimes that it
is perfected by practice. and sometimes that it is bestowed by
God'.t.2
b. 'As we have stated earlier, the philosophers declare that
man consists of two things: a soul and a body. They maintain
that the soul is perfect but is impeded by the weight of the body
in the task of uncovering itself as it really is according to its
nature. Thus. when the world was created, there were men
who were excessively impeded by the body and in whom the
vigor of the soul was overwhelmed and oppressed. Of necessity
they lived by pillage and wicked conduct, misusing the powers
of the body in all their affairs, since the good of the soul was op-
pressed. But nature had not bestowed itself equally on all men,
and so at length one appeared who understood himself well. He
perceived that there was in mankind that divine soul which
would have great abilities if it could be brought out from a cer-
tain place of concealment and revealed by someone'. t :\
12. Marius Victorious: In Cic. Rhet. I. 155. 28 - 156 . .j Virtus est animi
habitus, in naturae modum rationi cmzsentaneus, et ideo in naturae
modum; duobus enim constamus, anima et corpore. Animll inmortalis est.
Si imnortalis est, a ditinis descendit: si a divinis descendit. perfecta est. Sed
acies quamtis perfectae an/mae qurulam corporis crasso tegmine inretitur
et drcumftmditur. et ita fit, ut quandam oblivionem sui capiat. Cum vero
studio m: disCJjJlina teluti detegi coeperit atque nudari. tunc in naturae
suae modum animi baiJitus rerertitur atque ret,ocatur. Hanc virtutem
Plato dicit nunc arte fieri, nunc cum hominihus nasci. maze exenitatione
cmifici, nunc a deo dari.
13. Ibid. I. 160. 15-li lft supra diximus. Clitmt philosopbi e dtwbus
hominem ccmstare, anima et corpore. An imam tero esse petfectam, sed in-
pediri crassituditze corporis, quo minus se talem exserat, qua/is est per
twturam. Ergo mundo conslituto emnt homines nimis inpedlti corpore, et
in quilms tis animae obruta atque oppressa esset. Tunc necessaria rapto
MARJliS VICTORINliS
c. 'The soul is like wine. Just as wine either retains or loses its
strength depending upon the vessel in which it is kept. so does
the soul preserve its nature if it meets with a good and chaste
hody but loses it if the opposite is the case. Thus, when the mor-
tal race wandered in stupidity and ignorance of all things. a cer-
tain great man appeared. His soul preserved its nature and he
perceived that all men had something divine within themselves,
that this was oppressed and ruined by the vices of the body. but
that it could produce the greatest benefits for mankind if it
could be brought out' .14
Three remarks are required in connection with passage 3 a.
First. the wording of Cicero's definition which has been inter-
polated here from a later passage of De lnventione is slightly
changed. I'; Secondly and more importantly, the argument as a
whole shows that the original notion that virtue is conformity
to nature in the sense of an immanent logos is transformed by
Victorinus into the notion that virtue is conformity to nature in-
terpreted as the transcendent status of the soul.t6 Third, the
reference to Plato can be identified as a loose paraphrase of cer-
titelumt et malls moribus, uppresso an/mae bono, circa res omnes tlrilms
corporis abutebantur. Sed quia natura nun aequaliter se per omnes ju11dil.
alicJucmdo tmus extitit, qui se bene inte/legeret et qui t1ideret esse in
lmmi11ibus animam il/am divbzam, qut~e /)(lberel in se mu/tt1s utililt~les, si
tamen posset ab aliquo e /atebris quibusdam elici atque proferri.
I -i. Ibid. I. I 61. I 2-20 Anima ita est ut vin um. Nmn, quemadmudum
tinum pro vase, in quo est habitmn, aut retinet aut amittit vio/enliam,
{Jmimle a11ima, si optimum et c:astmn corpus offemleril. serrat 11atumm.
sin alias, telut amittlt. Ita ergo c:um mortale genus bruttlm atque insc:ium
rerum omnium tagaretur. extitit quitltU11 tir 111t1gnus. in quo anima suam
retineret1taturam et qui i1zte/legeret omnes homines habere in se quiddam
clitinum. sed id titio corporis opprimi clique deperire: quod si fuisset
elicitum. maximas incle c:ommoditates hrmzinibus posse contingere.
I'\. Cf. Cicero: De lnv. H. I S9.
I 6. This is noted by Hadot: Marius Vic:torinus. Rec:herc:bes sur sa tie et sm1
oetwres, p. 82 who comments on the fusion of Stoicism with Platonism.
726 NEOPLATONISM
tain ideas formulated in the latter's dialogue Meno. 17 Passages 3

b and 3 c can be taken together since they are variations on the
same theme. This is one in which Cicero's account of the
historical process whereby barbarous men became civilized is
interpreted as the metaphysical transformation in which human
souls acquire wisdom.tR The two authors agree in their belief
that it is eloquence which produces the crucial change and that
eloquence and wisdom therefore have the closest relation to
one another.t9 However, it is obvious that Victorious' inter-
pretation of the origin of civilization in terms of the Platonic
doctrine of the descent and ascent of human souls is a signifi-
cant modification of the original.20
4 a. 'It is difficult to make a general definition of time. Of
necessity time must always have existed either before the world
or together with the world - since many contend that the
world was generated, but many that it was not generated- and
so this universal time which has neither beginning nor end is
eternity or "aion" as the Greeks call it' .21
b. 'First, according to the doctrine of Lucretius and others
space is the whole void, this void being receptive of all things
and occupied by the elements: fire, air, water, and earth. Thus,
17. Cf. Plato: Meno 87b ff. and 99b-100c.

18. Again, this observation was made by Hadot: up. cit., pp. 84-86. He
rightly compares Marius Victorinus: In Cic. Rbet. I, 161, 4143 where it is
stated that the man who introduced civilization should not be interpreted as
any specific historical figure.
19.0nthisquestionseeibid.l,l63.14-34;1.16"i.32166,:H;etc.
20. Again, this observation was made by Hadot: op. cit .. pp. 84-86.
However. the further conclusion that Victorinus must himself have been
following an earlier Platonic commentator on Cicero seems unnecessary.
21. Marius Victorinus: In Cic. Rbet. l, 223. 14-18 Tempus generaliler
definire diffici/e est. quod tempus semper fuerit necesse est sive ante mun-
dum sitJe cum mundo: multi enim natum mundum, multi natum non esse
contmdunt. Ergo lmc tempus genera/e. quia nee initium nee finem babel.
aeternitas est, quam Graeci aeona appellant.
MARilJS VICTORINliS 727
these elements are in space, that is to say the void. Yet the
elements themselves are also spaces, as fire is the place of the
stars, air that of birds, water that of swimming creatures, and
earth that of walking creatures or all which are generated in
it' .22
These last two passages of Victorinus' Commentarius are
largely self-explanatory.
22. Ibid. I, 222, 35-40 Ac primo secundum Lucreti ceterorumque sen ten-
limn inane totum locus est, quod lnmle patet rebus oc:cupaturque ab
ehmentis. igni, aere, aqua, terra. Ergo baec e/ementa in loco sunt, id est, in
immi. Sed rursus ipsa elementtl loci sutlt, ut Ignis sideribus locus est, tier
mibus. aqua natantibus, terra gradient/bus tel lis omnibus, quae in
eadem nascuntur.
Excursus E
Firmicus Maternus'
Matbesis
The manuscript tradition associates the name of Iulius Fir-

minas Maternus with two works entitled Matbesis and De Er-
rore Profana rum Religionum respectively . Since the first is an
apparently pagan treatise on astrology and the second an ex-
plictly anti-pagan religious tract, it was formerly suggested that
these were the works of two different writers of the same
name ..z However, the lexicographical analyses which accom-
panied the critical editions of these texts eventually removed
any doubt that there was only one author responsible for their
composition. 3 Fortunately, since the Mathes is can be dated by
I. !'or ~eneral studies of Firmicus Matern us see C. H. Moure: julius Fir

micus Jlaternus, der Heide tmd der Christ (Mlinchen, 1897); F. Boll: 'Fir-
mil:us -'laternus'. Ptm~vs Rea/emJiclopadle der k/assiscben .4/lertums
\f"issenscbaft 6 (Stuttgart, 1909). col. 2365-2379; P. Hadut: 'Firmicus Mater-
nus. It' sii:cle'. Dicliomutire de spi,itualite 'i (Paris. 196-f). col. 384-388; :md
K. Zit-glt:r: 'Firmicus Matcrnus', Rea/le:-.:ikon fur Antike tmd Cbristentum 7
!Rerlin. 1969). col. 946-959. Other important documents for the study of Fir
micus M:uernus arc G. Blask6: Grmzd/lnien der astrologiscben
We/tcmsdumwzg nacb der Mathcsis des Finnicus Maternus. Diss. (lnn-
shrulk. 19'i6); G. Heuten: julius Firmicus Maternus. De Errore Profanarum
Reli~ionum. Traduction nmwelle mec texte et commentai,.e (Bruxelles,
193M): A. Pastorino: luli Finnic/ Mctterni De Errore Profan:trum Religionum.
lnt,.oduzione. testo crilico e commento con trculuzlone e indici (Firenzc,
19'i6); C. A. Forhes: Firmicus Maternus. The Error of the Pagan Religions.
Transle~tecl ami Amwtated (New York. 1970); and A.-J. festugicre: Trois
ch;I'II/S fmiens l. Firmin1s J'tftllenzus, Prieres et consei/s de tie (Paris. 19i4 ).
2. Sl'l' Zkgkr: op. cit. col. 949-950 .
.'>. Set: Zic:gler: op. dt. col. 949-9';0.
730 NF.OPLATON!SM
internal references to between A.D. 334 and 337 and De Errore

Profanarum Religionum by similar means to between A.D. 347
and 350, it is only necessary to postulate a conversion on the
writer's part during the intervening period. 4 Our concern will
naturally be with what Firmicus has to say on philosophical
questions in the first of the two works. o;
Firmicus Matern us' theological doctrine begins from the no-
tion of a supreme God.6 He is a principle whose real identity
cannot be known;7 who is eternal,B characterized as substance,9
power, 10 and activity, II and providential; 12 who is the creator
and sustainer of all other things- of the world itself, I:\ of the
godsl4 and heavenly bodies,l5 and of mankindl6 - and a
creator and sustainer in special ways -by his thought alone, 17
by a will which is equivalent to its completion, 18 and by identity
with his product.19 Firmicus also refers to a principle which is
4. See Hadot: op. cit., col. 38'; and Ziegler: op. ciT., col. 94 7.
5. For the critical text of the Mathesis see lu/ii Finnic/ Matern/ Matheseos
Libri VIII ediderunt G. Kroll et F. Skutscb,Jasciculusprior(Stuttgart, 1897) .
. . ediderunt G. Kroll et F. Skutscb in operis societatem assumpto K. Ziegler,
fasciculus alter (Stuttgart, 1913 ).
6. Firmicus Maternus: Math. l, ';, 7 summusdeus.
7 .Ibid. V, pr. 3 'God, whoever thou art' (quiwmque es deus).
8.1bid. l, 5, 78; VII, 1, 2.
9. Ibid. Vll, l, 2 substantia.
I 0. Ibid. I, 7, II maiestas.
II. Ibid. Ill, pr. 2; IV,!, 3: VII, 1, 2 'creator' (fabricator); V, pr. 3 'ruler'
(gubernator); I. 5, 12; VIII, I, I 'author' (auctor); etc.
12. Ibid. I, 5, 6; I, 7, II; Ill, !, ? 'the provident divinity' (prot,idum
numen). Cf. ibid. I, 5. 7-8.
13.1bid. Ill, 1. 9; VII, I. 2.
14.1bid. I. 6. 2;V, pr. 3.
15.1bid. I. 5, 7; V, pr. 3; VI!, I, 2.
16. Ibid. Ill, pr. 2; IV, I, 2-3.
17. Ibid. I, 5, 7. The translation is perhaps uncertain here.
18.1bid. V, pr. 3. See pp. 731-7.'\5.
19.1bid. V. pr. 3. See pp. 73i-'.'\5.
FIRMJCUS MATERNlJS 731
called the divine mind20 and is not explicitly distinguished from

the supreme God.21 This is also eternal,22 characterized by
power23 and activity,24 and fiery;25 it is the creator and sus-
tainer of other things- producing life,26 introducing necessity
into the cosmos,27 sustaining heavenly2B and earthly bodies,29
enveloping the cosmos from the inside and the outside,30 and
producing knowledge31 - and the creator and sustainer in a
special way - by identity with its product.32 Finally, the
theological system of Firmicus Maternus includes the notion of
a divine spirit33 which is explicitly distinguished from the
supreme God;.H and is the creator and sustainer of other things
- of the heavenly bodies,35 of mankind,36 and of terrestrial
creatures.3'
It is quite consistent with the eclectic Stoic and Platonic
character of this system that there should be considerable em-
20. Ibid. l, 5, 10-11 mens dirina. Cf. ibid. V, pr. 3. The same principle is
apparent I)' described as caeleslis mens at ibid. Ill, pr. 2; as dirJ/nus animus at
ibid. I, 5. 9 cf. ibid. l, 5, II; and as animus caelestis at ibid. I. 5. I 0.
2 I. In contrast to the divine spirit which is so distinguished. Cf. n. 34.
22. Ibid. I, 5. 10; I, 5. 12.
25. /hid. l, ;, 11 maiestas; ibid. I, 6, 4 vis.
2~. Ibid. I, 5. 10 'motion ... mobilit)'' (agitatio ... mobilltas).
25. /hid. I. 5. 10.
26. Ibid. I. 5. 12.
2"'./bid. I. 5. 9; IV, I. 5.
2H. Ibid. I, 'i, II.
29. Ibid. I, 5. 9; IV. I. 3 .
.~0. Ibid. I. 5. 10.
51./bid. I, 5. 12; I, 6, 4 .
.\2./hid. I. 'i. 10. See pp. 734-7.~'5.
5.'\. /hid. IV. I 1 spiritus dirinae mentis; ibid. IV. I. 6: V, pr. 3 inspiralio.
51. /hie/. I, 'i, II; Ill, pr. 2 .

.~'i./hie/. V. pr. 3.
56. Ibid. IV, I. I.
:\"'.Ibid. IV. I. 6.
7_U NEOPLATO!';ISM
phasis upon the relation between the macrocosm: God and the
microcosm: manY! This is no doubt justifiable on the traditional
grounds that there is an analogy between the further relations of
God to the world's body and the soul to the human one.W
However, the specifically astrological orientation of the writer
makes it inevitable that the relation between the macrocosm
and the microcosm should be mediated by a third term: the
heavenly bodies.-w Thus, the heavenly bodies are described as
being sustained by the divine mind, 41 having a fiery constitu-
tion,-tz endowed with their own sense and the divine wisdom;H
and as performing the transfer of mind or soul to and the recep-
tion of spirit from terrestrial bodies-i-t and the production of in-
dividual characteristics in the lower realm. -1<; Similarly, the sun
is invoked as subject to the divine mind,-16 the source of all
celestial fire, -17 the mind of the universe;-18 and as agent of
distributing mind or soul among living creatures and of permit-
ting their reascent to the higher sphere.4<J
Firmicus Maternus' anthropological doctrine is founded on
3H. Sec Ibid. I. i. 12 the human soul 'corresponds 10 its crc:uor and its
origin' (mu-tori suo originique ... respondeat).
39. On the importance of this doctrine in Cicero and the Hermetic
Asclepius sec pp. 99 ff.. 119 ff., 380-384.
40. Sec: Firmicus M:ucrnus: Matb. Ill. pr. -~'the five planets and the sun and
moon sustain man like some smaller univc:rsc' (bominem quasi minorem
qu(tulam mundum stel/ae quinque. Sol etiam et Luna ... sustentant).
t I./bid. I, i. II; V, pr. 3.
42. /lJid. I. 'i. I I.
4 3. Ibid. I, .:; , 7 pmpl'ius sensus ditinaque pmdentitt.
44. Ibid. I. 'i. II. Here the term employed is animus. Traditionally. this
could indicate hoth mind and soul. Cf. n. 49.
45. Ibid. I, 'i, 6.
-!6. fiJi d. \'. pr . .:; .
-i~.lbid. I. 10, 1-t.
-iH.Ibid. l, 10. 1-f mensmmuli.
-t9. JfJid. V, pr. 5. Here the term employed is anima. It is unclear whether
a distinction is intended with animus. Cf. n ..W.
FIRMIU:s MATERNl'S 7.H
the assumption that humanity is a blend of divine and terrestrial

or psychic and bodily elements.so In the first place, man's soul
has a transcendent state: it is immortal, 'II in eternal motion, '12
and fiery.'\~ However, it descends from its celestial origin
through the sun's circle to the realm of its earthly habitation. s-1
Here. the soul becomes subject to the vices which stem from im-
manence in the body but,'~'~ since it retains some consciousness
of its derivation from the higher realm, '16 it also has the means
to extricate itself from the evils inherent in corporeality:P these
means being essentially the practice of astrology. sH Thus, it can
ascend from its terrestrial abode through the circuit of the moon
w its celestial source once againYJ Naturally. Firmicus' notion
that humanity is a blend of divine and terrestrial elements
represents both an account of its temporal life and an analysis of
its present constitution. 60
This highly compressed survey is perhaps sufficient to in-
dicate that Firmicus' philosophical position is one of Stoic and
Platonic syncretism. The fact that the writer makes extensive
use of Cicero's works - there are identifiable verbal parallels
with De Nlltura Deorum, the Tusculanae Disputationes, the
;o.Jbid. I. 4, 12; IV. l. 3-4; VIII. l. 4 'mimuslcorpus.

~1./hid.I,I,~;IV,I.3.
~ 2. /IJi1. l.I. 2 semp item a a~itatio.
'i~./1Jid. l. t. I; I. 4. i: I. 'i. 11-12.
'il. 1/u'd. I. 'i, 9.
~'i. Ibid. I. L I 'the soul trapped in earthly pollution' (animus terrenis sor-
cfium laqueis impeditus). Cf. ibid. Vlll, I, 12.
'iC>. Ibid. l. -1, 5: VIII. I, 'i.
~~. lfJid. I. -1, 5 'if it shall be liberated from the: \'il'es and plc:asurc:s of the:
tanhly hody' (si atitiis ac libidinibus terreni corporis.fuerit separatus). <.:f.
ihid. \'Ill. I. I .
'iH. /hid. I. i. 'i; VIII. I. 6.
'i9. lbicl. I. 5. 9.
60. IIJid. I. 1, 2 speaks of tht soul's descent as an event already accomplish
t<.l. ibid. \'Ill, I. 2 of its descent as a continuing process.
734 NEOPlA TON ISM
Somnium Scipionis, and De Divinatione- is naturally not un-

connected with this state of affairs.61 However, the character of
Firmicus' philosophical syncretism is not adequately delineated
by appealing to the prevailing tendencies of late ancient thought
in a general way. It should rather be determined through com-
parison with the doctrines of two groups of later sources who
are explicitly cited by the author of the Matbesis: the Hermetic
writings and the Neoplatonists Plotinus and Porphyry.
When Firmicus Maternus states on two occasions that he is
reporting a doctrine transmitted by the god Mercury through
Aesculapius and Hanubius to Petosiris and Nechepso, it is easy
to perceive that he is under the influence of the Hermetic
philosophical and astrological literature of late antiquity. 62 That
the author has drawn material from such sources is further con-
firmed by the general tone of his writing: at one point he prays
for a divine inspiration to enable him to explain the motions of
the heavenly bodies,63 at another he speaks of the whole nature
of the divinity as 'revealing itself' (se ... ostendere),64 and at
another he stresses the importance of keeping the profoundest
teachings as a secret from all except the initiated.M This in-
fluence is also confirmed by the presence of certain doctrines:
that God is 'equally father and mother of all things' (omnium
pater pariter ac mater),66 that 'his will is the substance of the
61. See Boll: op. cit .. col. 2367-2369 and 237 3. This scholar compares Fir-
micus Maternus: Math. I, I. 3-4 and Cicero: De Nat. Deor. l, 1-4; Firmicus
Maternus: Math. l, 4, I, ff. with Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I. 57 ff.; Firmicus Mater-
nus: Math. l, 5. II and Cicero: De Nat. Deor. ll. 39-40.
62. Firmicus Maternus: Math. Ill, I, I; IV. pr. 5.
63./bid. V, pr. 4. Cf. Asclep. l, 296.4-8, etc.
64. FirmicusMaternus:Math. l,4,4.Cf.Asclep. 19.318. 12-17;41,353.1
-355, 4 and my discussion on pp. 338-340.
65. Firmicus Maternus: Math. VII. I. 2-3. Cf. Asclep. 1. 297.6-9. etc.
66. Firmicus Matcrnus: Math. V, pr. 3. Cf. Asclep. 20.321. 9-11; 21,321,
I H-19 and my discussion inch. 5. n. 161.
FIRMIClJS MATERNliS 735
completed work' (cuius voluntas perfecti operis substantia

est)F that a spirit descending from God plays a formative role
in the cosmos,6!:1 that man's individual physical and moral
characteristics 'are assigned by none other than the planets
perpetual motion' (de nulla re alia nisi stellarum perenni cur-
sus agitatione distribu1),69 and that 'an upright stance' (recti
cmporis Janna) has been given him in order that he might con-
template the heavens. 70 It is impossible to say whether Firmicus
was familiar with one or more of the Hermetic treatises which
arc still extant or simply with various writings of a similar
character, although his reference to the transmission of Mer-
cury's doctrine to Aesculapius suggests the possibility that he
knew the A6yoc; TeA.ewc; or its Latin version.
When Firmicus Maternus refers in one passage to Plotinus
and in another to Porphyry, he shows some awareness of the
kinds of Platonic literature current in his own day. Plotinus is
cited as 'attributing nothing to the power of the heavenly bodies
and reserving nothing for the necessity of fate, but saying that
everything is subject to our power' (nibil potestati stellarum
tribuens, nibil jaton1m necessitatibus reservans, sed tatum
dicens in nostra esse positum potestate):" a teaching which the
writer considers to have been adequately refuted by Plotinus'
eventual succumbing to fate in the form of the wasting disease
which brought about his death.72 On the evidence of the
c,-. Firm it: us M;tternus: .'rltllb. V. pr. :\. C. f. Asclep. H. 50S. 12-1 <; and my
dist.:ussion on pp. :\~ S-.:HH.
hH. Firmicus Maternus: Matb. IV, I, I; IV, I, 6; V, pr. :\; etc. For the
paralld texts in the Asclepius see pp. 361-363.
(,9. Firmicus Maternus: Math. I, 5, 6-7. Cf. Asclep. 19, 319. 1-5 and my
dbl:Ussion on pp ..'\S5-:\'H.
-o. Firmit.:us !\laternus: Jfatb. VIII, I, 3. Cf. Asclep. 6 ..~02, S-19 and my
dbcussion on pp. :\HO-:\H2.
-I. Firmicus Maternus: Matb. I, 7. 18. l'irmicus seems to have in mind the
dourine expounded in Plminus: Enn. II, 3 /52/.
-2. Firmicus ~faternus: MatiJ. I. 7. 19-2 I. The account of Plotinus final il-
NEOPLATONISM
material presented in this passage P. Henry has concluded that

the Latin astrologer was familiar with parts of Plotinus' En-
neades and Porphyry's Vita Plotini.73 Porphyry is cited in af-
fectionate terms as 'our author' (noster) for the notion that the
most important religious doctrines should be veiled in
secrecy,7~ but later attacked as 'the enemy of God, foe of the
truth, and teacher of wicked arts' (hostis dei, veritatis inimicus,
sceleratarum artium magister) because of his conjuration of
the demon Serapis.7'i On the latter occasion the actual source is
named as Porphyry's nepi ti;c; EK A.oyirov qnA.ooo<piac; although
scholars such as G. Heuten have also detected traces of the same
author's Epistula ad Anebonem. 7 6 That Firmicus should men-
tion the doctrines of Platonists who are almost contemporary is
an indication of his progressive intellectual mentality, even if
the peculiarities of their teaching seem to have had little impact
on his thought in general.
Iness should be compared with Porphyry: VII. Plot. 2.

'3. P. Henry: Plolin eti'Occident: Finnicus Maternus, M(lrius Victorinus,
saint Augustin et Macrobe (Louvain. 19.H). pp. 2S-i.~. There is some
likelihood that Firmi<:us knew Plorinus: 1m. I, 2 1191 and I. 6 Ill in par-
ticular.
~~. Firmicus Marernus: Math. VII, I. I.
7S. Firmicus Matern us: De Err. Prof Relig. 1.~. 4. The change of viewpoint
naturally reflects Firmicus' religious conversion between the writing of these
two works. Sec above p. 729.
""~6. Heuten: op. cit .. p. 169. Cf. Pastorino: op. cit .. pp. IS 1-1 S2 and
Forbes: op. cit .. p. I H.~. nn. 270-272.
Excursus F
Favonius Eulogius'
Disputatio de Somnio Scipionis
The Disputatio de Somnio Scipionis by Favonius Eulogius, a

grammarian from Carthage and sometime pupil of Augustine of
Hippo. is a typical example of late fourth-century philoso-
phical learning. It abounds in citations of Greek doctrines such
as Pythagoras that the the nature of all things depends upon
numherl and that the distances between the heavenly bodies
represent harmonic ratios,.~ Plato's that soul is compounded
from the substance which is indivisible and from that which is
divided around body,4 Xenocrates' that number corresponds to
soul and god, 'l and the Stoics' that soul is subject to seven mo-
tions: four perturbations and three constancies.6 Combined
with these are frequent references to Latin writers: mention is
made ofVarro's teaching that there is a relation between the cir-
cuits of the moon and the six surfaces of a cube,-:" of the descrip-
I. For the attribution of this lommentary to Fa von ius Eulogius. and for the
identification of the latter as Augustine's pupil see R. E. \'an Weddingen:
/:amnii Eulogii Oisputatio de Somnio Sdpionis. Edltirm et traductf(m de R.
E. l'an \V. (Collection Latomus 27) (Bruxdles. 19S7), pp. 510; M. Sicherl:
'Fanmius Eulogius'. Reallexlkmz fiir Ant/k( und Christentum 7 ( 1969). col.
65(>-6-!0; and L. Starpa: Fmonii Eulogii Disputatio de Somnio Sdpionis.
l:'dizimze critica, traduzimze e note a cura di L.S. ( Padova, 197 4 ). pp. xi-xii.
2. Fanmius Eulogius: Disp. de S(mm. Scip. 2, 1-2. I shall quote the text of
Sctrpa's edition in all passages except that cited on pp. 743-74-i.
:~.Ibid. .25. 1-3.
-1. Ibid. S. 2-:\.
'i. Ibid. S. 6.
6.1hid.I2,S.
- /hid . ..... 12.
738 NEOPLATONISM
tion of the river Styx's ninefold encirclement in Virgil's epic

poem,s and of its interpretation as an account of the human
soul's descent through the planetary spheres by certain Platonic
exegetes,9 naturally in addition to the continuous citation of
Cicero's own text. Since the quotations of Greek authors are
allusive and doxographical in character, it seems likely that
Favonius has derived all his philosophical material from the
Latin milieu. to
Favonius' treatise is a commentary not on the Somnium Sci-
pionis as a whole but on two specific passages: namely, the
references to Scipio's ageii and to the harmony of the
spheres.I2 Both these topics provide the author with an excuse
to embark on investigations of Pythagorean numerical theory,
in the course of which various doctrines of a more
philosophical nature concerning God, mind, and soul are
discussed. It is perhaps worth summarizing the teaching
reported by Favonius in connection with. his explanations of
these two texts even though, as we shall see, 13 it is questionable
whether there is a single and coherent philosophical position
which underlies them.
B./bid. 19.4-7.
9. Ibid. 19, 4.
to. This is correctly surmised by Sicherl: op. cit .. col. 638-639 who
postulates Varro and a lost Neoplatonic commentary on Virgil's Aeneid as the
sources for all Favonius' philosophical material. On the controversial ques-
tion regarding the identity of the lost Neoplatonic Virgilian commentary see
my discussion in connection wilh Macrobius on pp. S I 5-'i 16. As Sicherl: op.
cit., col. 637 also remarks, there is unfortunately no e\idence to show either
the priority or posteriority of Favonius' work to the Commelllarius in Som-
nium Scipimzis of Macrobius.
I I. Cicero: De Rep. VI. I .2. Cf. Favonius Eulogius: Disp. de Somn. Scip. I .
.2.
I 2. Cicero: De Rep. VI, 18-19. Cf. Favonius F.ulogius: Disp. de Somn. Scip.
21. 1-.~.
13. On p. 745.
FA VONilJS EUl.OGiliS 7:\9
The discussion of Pythagorean arithmetic naturally begins by

considering the nature of the monad. The writer defines this as
a unity which is indivisible in contrast to a unified plurality, H
proceeds forth into a dyad with which it then combines, t r; and
thereby generates the numberst6 which are eternal,17 intelligi-
hle.IH incorruptible, t9 and the sources of all things perceptible
to the mind and the senses.2o Most of this teaching can be
paralleled in various Greek and Latin writers belonging to the
1\:eopythagorean tradition,2t yet Favonius also adds certain
points which seemingly recall the combination of
Neopythagorean and Neoplatonic ideas in Macrobius.22 Thus,
the monad is now further defined as that which is prior to, pre-
sent in, and posterior to all other things in a causal sense,23 and
that which is manifested in different contexts as God,24 mind,25
and soul.26 Since these teachings represent the closest approx-
imations to philosophical doctrine found in this commentary, it
may be worth while to look at them separately in greater detail.
In the first place, 'God' (deus) is a manifestation of the
monad.2 7 Whereas the world and physical bodies are examples
1-t. Favonius Eulogius: Disp. deSomn. Scip. S, 1-2.

I '5. Ibid. 6, 1-2.
16./bid. 4, 1-2.
I~. Ibid. :\, I.
IH. Ibid. :\. I.
llJ. IIJid. :\. I.
20. Ibid. :\, I. Cf. Ibid. 2. 1-2 and '5, '5.
21. St:t: pp. '51 :\-'514.
22. Sn p. '5:\0 t'f.
2:\. Favonius F.ulogius: Disp. deSonm. Scip. S, 7.
2-1. Ibid. S, 4.
2'5. Ibid. 6. :\and 7. :\.
26. 1/Jid. '5, 2.
2~. Favonius' discussion of the monad in chapter '5 of !he Disputatio has
~limulatcd !he interest of various modern scholars, largely on account of the
lloxo~raphkal reference 10 Xenocrates embedded in il. Sec M. Sic.:herl:
Bcitra~t' zur Kritik und Erklarung des Fa von ius Eulogius', Abhandltmgen der
7--lO NEOPl.ATONISM
of 'unity' (unum): that is to say a single thing but one which is

divisible into parts,21l God is an instance of 'unity alone' (unum
so/um) in the sense of a single thing but one which is not suscep-
tible to division.2<J Favonius' rather casual use of the term 'uni-
ty' from the third sentence of this argument onwards, and his
reference to the various powers of God immediately following
that to the unity of God, have driven modern scholars to emend
the single text transmitted to us in several passages.30 However,
the doctrine is reasonably clear that the world and physical
bodies are unities of a spatio-temporal character which are
divisible into 'parts' (partes),31 while God is a unity in a
metaphysical sense which is divisible into 'powers' (virtutes)
only .32 This last aspect of God is parallel to the procession of
unity into the dyad.33
The second manifestation of the monad is as 'mind' (mens),
although on this point the interpretation of Favonius' text is
more delicate. At the beginning of the discussion of the dyad he
writes: 'The dyad indeed, according to the theologians, is the
Akatlemie tier lflissenscbajten uml der Literatur in Mainz. Cieistes. -tmd

snzialwiss. Kl. 10 (Wiesbaden, 1960), pp. 679-683 and 702-707: H. ).
Kramer: Der l!rsprtmg der Geistmetapbysik. Untersuchungen zur
(iescbicbte des Platonism us ztl'ischen Pia tun untl Plutin (Amsterdam. 1964 ).
p. --l2 ff. and 60 ff.: and P. Krafft: 'Zum Monaden-Kapitt:l des favonius
Eulogius. Vigilhle Cbristianae 22 ( 196H). pp. 96-127. Unfortunately. since
the two separate questions regarding the correctness of the doxographical
report and the nature of Favonius own doctrine have become confused. a
fresh start from the obvious meaning of the text itself is probably needed.
2H. fa von ius Eulogius: Disp. de Somn. Sclp. S, 2 and S . .f.
29. Ibid. S. -L
.~0. It is because of these l"mcnd:uions. which arc naturally :111 conjectural,
that the modern editions of the Disputtttio by both van Wcddingen and Scar-
pa have been criticized. Sec Sicherl: 'Bc:itrage zur Kritik und Erklarung des
favonius Eulogius, pp. 67<J-6H3 on the former.
31. Favonius Eulogius: Disp. de Somn. Scip. :;, 2.
32./bid. :;, .f .
.~3. Seep. 739.
FA VON IllS EULOGJliS 7--!l
second motion. For the first motion remaining stable in the

monad proceeds as if to the exterior into the dyad}4 And the
poets have called this the first marriage of the sister-wife. in
thl'ir mythical language. since it comprises the union of a single
kind of number ..~'; They also call it Juno because it adheres to
the unity of Jupiter in his acquisition of the other principle ..~<>
From this number the world has arisen constructed from the
mind and the matter which is termed "hyle" in Greek' (Dyas
tero. ut theologi asserunt, secundus est motus: primus enim
motus. in numade stabilis et consistens, in dyadem, velut
foras. egreditur. Primumque conubium poetae fabulosae dix-
erunt. sororis et coniugis, quod videlicet unius generis numero
coeunte copuletur: et lunonem vacant, uni, scilicet lovi, acces-
simze a/terius inhaerentem. Ah hoc numero mundus apparuit
mente ac materia, quae Graece dicitur OA.Tt, constructus).37
Favonius' statement that the combination of monad and dyad
produces the world as composite of mind and matter naturally
gives rise to the question: is the first pair of terms distinct from
the: second in an ontological sense or should the former be
viewed as the underlying substance of the latter? This seems to
be answered by the description of the triad which soon follows:
'But the triad is the first complete number because it also has an
intermediate. It is said to be male since, when joined to another
odd number, it cannot produce something of its own
character.3H The world has taken its name from this number:
having been made from two principles it has grown strong as a
third nature.:\9 For it is neither mind alone nor matter alone but
.~!. For the: doctrine: of the: monad's stable motion see pp. :\59-360.
Vi. For the: doctrine of the monad as male and female: sc:e ch. 'i. n. 161.
5CJ. The:: argument is c:tymological: lmw = tmi + lol'i.
:\-. Fa von ius Eulogius: /Jisp. de Srmm. ScifJ. 6. 1-.~. Cf. Ibid. 'i. --1 .
.~H. The meaning of the phrase creare mm taleat id quod ipse sit is am
higuous. The probable meaning is that thrc:e, when added to another odd
number. cannot produce a further odd number .
.~9. The meaning of the phrase mtmdus ah bo numero nomen accepit is
742 NEOPLATONISM
both of these, being a kind of third entity produced by their

combination (Sed trias primus est tofus quod habet et
medium. Estque, ut dicitur, masculinus, quod, adiunctus
a/teri impari, creare non valeat id quod ipse sit. Mundus ab
hoc numero nomen accepit: namque ex duobus factus, in ter-
tium quod genus eva/uit. Non enim aut mens tantum aut sola
materia sed utrumque est, tertium quid il/orum commixtione
compositum).40 Since the triad is generated by the combination
of monad and dyad, Favonius' interpretation of the world both
as representing the triad and as the product of mind and matter
has an obvious further implication: that monad and dyad con-
stitute the underlying substance of mind and matter respective-
ly.
In the third place, 'soul' (animus) is a manifestation of the
monad. Soul is 'not just a unity but unity alone' (non unum sed
so/um quoque) because it contrasts with the world and physical
bodies which are merely unities by 'subsisting in a natural
simplicity' (natura/i simplicitate subsistens).4l Favonius goes
on to show that the kind of unity attributed to soul here is one
which excludes a division into physical parts but not a division
into metaphysical powers42 since on the one hand, Plato's doc-
trine teaches that soul is compounded from the substance which
is indivisible and that which is divided around bodies43 and on
the other, the Platonic interpreters of Virgil hold that soul is
multiplied as it descends through the nine planetary spheres. 44
unclear. Van Weddingen: op. cit.. p. 19 suggests that mut~dus is a mistake for
terra which is 'etymologically' connected with trias. Scarpa: op. cit., p. 52
suggests that mundus is to be understood as the adjective meaning 'ordered'
or 'beautiful' which is also applicable to the triad.
40. Favonius Eulogius: Disp. deSomn. Scip. 7, 1-4. Cf. ibid. 'i. 4.
4 I . Ibid. 5. 2.
42. This interpretation of soul's unity parallels that regarding God's. On
this question see pp. 7 39-7 40.
43. Favonius Eulogius: Disp. deSomn. Scip. 5, 2.
44./bid. 19,4-7.
FA VON IllS ElllOGJl 'S '743
Of these two theories the former is said to concern a principle

simply described as 'soul' (animus). whereas the latter is said to
<.:oncern one entitled 'the source soul' (fontana anima -
mlYaia)Yi But at this point some further explanation is provid-
ed.
Favonius' discussion of the source soul is contained in a
passage which deals with the enneadic structure of the
planetary system: 'This is the reason that Virgil the most learned
of the Romans, it seems to me, wrote his verse ''the windings of
the Styx enfold them nine times". For the earth is the ninth
region to which that Styx extends itself.46 You should be aware
that this was said with a mystical and Platonic significance,
since Virgil with his poetic license introduces the notion of a
<.It-scent from heaven to earth by the source soul: hence the term
rtTJyaia. -47 Having been placed at the feet of the supreme father,
who disperses it, the Styx flows through all the circles and gives
to each thing the driver of a chariot so to speak - that is the
suhstance of life- from which all living things take their origin
and to which they return on dissolution.4s It flows through all
the circles which tend to intermingle because of their discon-
tinuous nature, and through the interposing of its force it
separates them- or as Virgil finely expresses it "enfolds" them
- so that they preserve their proper motions'49 (Ex quo mihi
tidetur Maro, doctissimus Romanorum, dixisse illud: 'novies
Styx inte1fusa coercet'. Terra enim nona est, ad quam Styx ilia
t;;. It i~ likdy that these arc understood as equi\'alcnts for one another.
t6. Thl Virgilian passage cited here is Aeneid VI. -i.-~9.
t ~. For the notion that the tlowin~ of the Styx corresponds to the descent
of ~oul. See pp. SH9-S9S.
tH. For the notion that souls scattered through the cosmos are mounted in
vthides see pp. SH9-S9S.
t9. The meanin~ of the sentence mana/que ... consert.enl is unclear. Ap-
parently the su~gestion is that the planetary spheres have ill-defined orbits
until they are infused with the appropriate portion of soul.
NEOPI.ATONISM
protenditur: mystice ac Platonica dictum esse sapientia non

ignores. Nam poetica libertate inserit fontanae animae a
caelo usque in terras esse decursum: hinc dicitur 7tT)yaia. Nam
sub pedibus summi patris, qui dissipat, S~yx posita per omnes
circulosfluit, imponens singulis velut in curru aurigam, id est
vitae substantiam, ex qua cuncta uil'entia originem sortiun-
tur et eidem so/uta redduntur. Manatque ilia per cunctos
volentes commisceri. quod ex natura sunt hiulci: interiectu sui
vigoris separat et, quod ipse mire Virgilius loquitur, 'coerce!',
ut sui generis momenta conservent). ';O The relation between
the source soul and the planetary system as envisaged by
Favonius might be summarized as follows: (i) The cosmos con-
sists of nine concentric spheres including the fixed stars, the
seven planets and the earth; (ii) Soul is immanent in all the mat-
ter which extends from the boundary of the transcendent realm
through the nine spheres to the earth itself; 51 (iii) It provides a
source of animation to the individual souls inhabiting these
spheres which administers their bodies in a way that a driver
steers a chariot;52 and (iv) The nine concentric spheres retain
iO. Favonius Eulogius: Disp. de Sumn. Scip. 19. -4-6. The passage has given
rise to numerous emendations by modern scholar~. and my version does not
agree precisely with either van Weddingen or Scarpa. With the former, I
transpose the phrase hinc dicitur TCTiyaia to the only place where it makes
sense, and leave Styx to stand before posita a<.-cording to the manusnipt -
Scarpa's objections against both on contextual grounds have no validity.
However. with the latter, I read dissipat as being a simpler conjecture in the
fan of the obvious corruption than the: Dis est proposed hy certain earlier
editors - although Scarpa~ ohjntion to the latter on contextual grounds
ag:tin has little weight.
i I. The boundary of the: transcendent realm is indicated by the words sub
pedilms summi pcllris. since: the: God n:fern:d 10 would have a transcendent
or metaphysical status.
il. The individual souls inhabiting these sphc:rc:s are indicated by the
words singu/is .. . nmcta titentia. They will he those of the: sphc:rc:s
themselves and of earthly hc:ings bet\vc:c:n incarnations.
FAVONIUS Elii.O<ill'S
their separate identities through the delimiting function of soul.

We have seen that the monad constituting the hasis of
Pythagorean arithmetic manifests itself in different contexts as
God, mind, and soul, ~3 and here the question might be raised
whether this monad actually represents three principles or only
a single principle described by three names. If Favonius'
philosophical doctrine is derived specifically from the Plotinian
or Porphyrian teaching regarding the three hypostases, then the
former will be the case; but if his doctrine merely reflects eclec-
tic Platonism of the period between Varro and Plotinus, then
the latter will more clearly reflect the situation. Unfortunately,
there are perhaps only two significant pieces of evidence: the
reference to the concealment of Platonic philosophical truths
beneath the surface of epic poetry~" in the text just quoted
together with the description there of soul in language recalling
the Chaldaean Oracles. s~ For what these are worth, they point
in the direction of Porphyry.
'i5. It should be emphasized that neither this triad of terms nor anything
ds<: in the Dlsputatlo de Somnio Scipionis indicates a Christian affiliation on
the author's part. On this question see Sicherl: 'Favonius Eulogius', col. 659.
'it. See pp. 51 0 and 515-516.
'i'i. The reference to soul as 7rl1Yaia. On the connection between the no-
tions of soul and source which is very characteristic of the Cbaldaean
Oracles see H. lewy: Cbaldaean Oracles and Tbeurgy. Mysticism. ,\.lagic
and Platonism in tbe Later Roman Empire (Recbercbes d'arcbeologie, de
fJbilo/ogie el d 'bistoire 15) (Cairo, 1956). Nouvelle edition par M. T:1rdieu
I Paris. 19"H). pp. H-t-HS :md 1:-18-89. For Porphyry's use of the Cbaldaean
( Jrac/es sec: ch. H. n. I H.
Excursus G
Servius'
Commentarii in Virgilii Carmina
Any remarks on the philosophical content of Servius' Com-

mentarii in Virgi/ii Carmina must be prefixed by a short note
on the so-called 'Servius problem' .1 The latter stems from the
circumstance that Servius' text descends to us in two separate
traditions of which one contains rather more material than the
other.2 According toP. Daniel, the discoverer of this version, it
is the longer text which represents the authentic Servius while
the shorter is an abbreviation of it.3 However, later scholars
have held different views: G. Thilo maintaining that the Servius
Danielis constitutes a fusion of the true Servian commentary
with notes drawn from various sources by a mediaeval com-
piler;-1 and K. Barwick that the Servius Danielis is a combination
of the vulgate Servian commentary with a second continuous
I. The most re.cent useful biographical material on Servius can be found in

,1. Flamant: Macrobe etle m!oplatonisme latin a Ia fin d11 /Ve steele (lciden,
19"'"). pp. 75-87.
2. For description of these manuscript traditions see J.J.H. Savage: 'The
Manuscripts of the Commentary of Servius Danielis on Virgil'. Hartard
Studies in Classical Philology 4 3 ( 1932). pp. 77-1 21 and 'The Manuscripts of
Sen,ius's Commentary on Virgil', ibid. 45 (1934). pp. 157-204; C.E. Murgia:
'Critical Notes on the Text of Servius' Commentary on Aeneid Ill- V', ibid. 72
(1967), pp. 311-350 and Prolegomena to Servius 5: The Man11scripts
(Berkeley/los Angeles. 1975 ), p. I ff .
.'\.Since his time, the longer version has been termed the 'Senius Daniclis'
and lhe shorter the 'vulgate Servius'.
1. Sec G. Thilo: Servii Grammatici q11i ferzmtur in Vergilii Carmina
Commentarii, recensuerunt G. Tbilo et H. Hagen I (Leipzig, 1881). p. iii ff.
747
NEOPI.ATONISM
ancient commentary.'; this latter view having gained majority

support. Interestingly, A. F. Stocker's argument that Servius
himself probably draws from the same ancient commentary
mediates the conflict between the two rival viewpoints to some
degree.6 Since both versions of the Servian text were influential
in the mediaeval period. they naturally have equal significance for
the historian of the Platonic tradition."' However, their differing
values as indicators of Servius' authentic doctrine must be
evaluated according to the above criteria.
The Servian commentaries are full of notes on philosophical
doctrine although it is doubtful that their author had any
coherent system of his own to expound.B These notes fall large-
ly into two categories: the theological and psychological respec-
tively. Among remarks which the commentator makes on
'5. Sec K. Barwick: 'Zur Scrviusfrage', Philologus 70 ( 191 I), pp. 106-145.
That this second ancient commentary was that of Aelius Donatus was argued
by E. K. Rand: 'Is Donatus' Commentary on Virgil Lost?'. Classical Quarterly
10 (1916). pp. 15H-16i. His view was supported by N. Marinone: E/io
Donato. Macrobio e Serl'io commentatori di Vergilio (Vercelli. 1946), pp.
-45--jH and 77 but rejected by A.H. Travis: 'Donatus and the Scholia Daniells:
A Stylistic Comparison', Hartard Studies in Classical Philology 53 ( 1942),
pp. I '57-169.
6. See A. F. Swcker: A Possible New Source for Sertius Dmzielis on Aeneid
Ill v. Studies in Bibliography 4 ( 195 1-1952), pp. 129131.
7. Some examples of the influence of the Sen ian commentaries on
mediaeval thought have been noted by P. Courcelle: 'lntcrpn!tations neo-
pl:uonisantes du livre VI de I' Em!ide ', Recherches sur Ia tradition platoni-
cienne (Fondation Hardt, Entretiens sur I'Antiquite classique 3)
(V:mdoeuvn:s-Genhc, 19'55). pp. 9'5136 and 'Les Peres de I'Eglise devant les
enfers virgiliens'. Arcbites d'bistoire doctrinale et littemire du moyen dge
22 ( 19'5'5). pp. '5'-l.
H. For some obsenations on this philosophical material see E.G. Sihler:
'Serviana', American .founwl of Philology 31 (1910), pp. J,2.f; E. 0.
Wallace: Tbe Notes on Philosopby in the Commentary of Sertius on tbe
Eclogues. the Georgics. and tbe Aeneid of Vergil (New York, 193R) - a
valuable inventory of material although weaker as criticism -; 1.. F.
1-lackemann: Servius and bis Sources in the Commentary on the Georgics
SERVJUS 749
rheological questions are those to the effect that God is a 'spirit'

(spiritus),9 'mind' (mens, animus), to or 'intellectual fire' (7tl>p
voep6v = ignis sensualis)ll controlling all things; that he ac-
complishes this by being their origin,l2 by being diffused
through them and sustaining them,l3 and by being their end; 1-4
and that God controls 'the world' (mundus),l'; 'body' (cor-
pus),l6 and the 'elements' (elementa).~"" Furthermore, the first
principle is simples and describable in mythological terms as
Pan,l9 although he is also multiple20 and describable
mythologically as the sun,21 as the Penates: Minerva. Jupiter,
and Juno,22 and so on. Finally, God has a certain relation to
( :'l:ew York. 1940), p. I'; ff.; and P. Courcelle: Late Latiu Writers tmd their
Greek Sources. translated by H.E. Wedcck (Cambridgc.MA. 1969). pp. 16.
2l)-) 1. ~0-41 and 46.
lJ. Servius: In Aeneid. l, .'\88; VI. 724; VI, 726; b1 Georg. IV, 219; IV, 221.
I shall quote the commentary on Aeneid l-V from E. K. Rand, etc.: Ser-
l'immrum in Vergilli Carmbza Commentariorum edilio Harrardiana 11-IJI
(l.ancaster,PA and Oxford, 1946 and 196';); the commentaries on Aeneid VI-
XII, on the t'c:/ogues. and on the Genrgics from Thilo: op. cit. Passages cited
:1~ 'Scnius' will be those occurring in both the Servius Daniclis and the
\'ulgate Senius, while those cited as 'Servius Danielis' will be those occurring
in that version alone.
I 0. Sen ius: In Aeneid. VI, 726; VI, 727.
II. Ibid. VI. 727; VI, 747.
1.2. Ibid. VI. '24.
I;\. 1/Jid. l, 388; VI. 724; VI. 726; VI. 72""'; In Bucol. 3, 60: In Georg. IV,
221.
I-t. Sen ius: In Georg. IV, 226.
I 'i. Servius: lt1 Aeneid. VI. 72,..: VI, 726; VI. 727.
16.1bid. VI, 727.
P. lfJid. VI, 7 2 .. ; VI, 726: VI, 7 28; 111 Georg. IV. 219.
I H. Senius: In Aeneid. VI. 7-!7.
19. Sen ius: 111 Bucol. 2, 31. Cf. 111 Aeneid. VI. 7 24.
20. St:r\'ius: lt1 Georg. I. 'i .
.21. Senius: 111 Bucol. 'i, 66; In Georg. I. ';.
22. Senius: In Aeneid. I. 17: Senius Danielis: In Ae11eid. 11. 296: Scnius:
In Aeneid. IV, 20 I; In Georg. 11, 3.25.
750 NEOPI.A TON ISM
numbers,23 to the Ideas after which all visible things are pattern-
ed,24 and to matter.zs Among observations which the commen-
tator makes on psychological questions are some which require
a more detailed analysis.
Servius observes that, although the whole of Virgil contains
scientific material, Aeneid VI is especially rich in this respect.26
In fact, this text contains so much of the profoundest teachings
of the philosophers, theologians, and Egyptians that many of
these have written commentaries devoted to it alone. Precisely
what kind of philosophy is contained there is explained by the
note on the poet's words: 'meanwhile Aeneas sees .... ' Here,
Servius comments that throughout this passage the doctrine
m:pi wux.ii~ which Plato had expounded in his Phaedo and
Varro in his Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum functions as an
underlying theme.r The Platonic theory of the soul identified
23. Servius Danielis: In Buco/. 8. 75.

24. Servius: In Aeneid. VI, 289.
25. Ibid. I. 31-i; VIII, 60 I. It is clear th:tt tht doctrine stated in all these
passages is Stoic in character. Apart from the fact that this school is cited by
name in passages like ltl Georg. I. 5. three other features are especially
l'haracteristic of their teaching: (i) The technical terminology nup vo&p6v at
In Aeneid. VI, 727; VI. 747; (ii) The notion that the spirit is 'alternating'
(reciprocus) at ibid. l, .388; and (iii) The statement that God = niip vo&p6v is
'corporeal' (corpora/is) at ibid. VI, 727. However, it also seems likely that
the commentator held Porphyrian doctrine to be consistent with this- as is
shown by the explicit reference to the latter's solar and metaphysical monism
at In Bucol. S, 66 - in which case his position is identical with that
developed by Macrobius in the Satumalia. Seep. 555 ff.
26. Senius: In Aetleid. VI, pr. On this section sec J. Riquelmc Ot:ilora:
'Interpretacion de Scrvio a los infiernos virgilianos', Aetas del V Congreso
Expariol de Estudios C/dsicos (Madrid 20 a/ 25 de abril de 1976) (Madrid,
1978). pp. 613-620.
27. Servius: In Aeneid. VI. 703. References to the Platonic doctrines of
Virgil also occur at ibid. 111, 68; IV, 653; V, HI; VI. 289; VI. H.f; VI. 44H;
VIII, 56.f; Servius Daniclis: In Aeneid. V, 81; In Georg. II, 3.36.
SERVILJS 751
at this poim may perhaps be summarized under the following

headings:
(i) In the first place, the human soul has a transcendem status.
It is derived from God,28 as indicated by the fact that it is 'invisi-
ble' (invisibilis),29 'endowed with reason' (habet consilium),30
and 'imperishable' (nee perit) ..H It is also 'impassible' (nihil
patitur)32 and 'unchangeable' (idem est):33 this is why, although
its activity is impeded by emering imo conjunction with the
body, it can easily regain its status.34 On all these points we find
the typical imerpretation of Middle Platonism and Neo-
platonism. 35
(ii) The soul loses its transcendem status temporarily on emry
into the body. This descent is elaborately symbolized by Virgil's
description of the topography of the infernal regions. Here, the
underworld itself corresponds to the cosmos: it cannot repre-
sent a place below our earth since the latter's cemer is solid and
below that are only the antipodes.36 The river Styx with its nine
convolutions corresponds to the celestial system - the Milky
Way, the Zodiac, and the circles of Saturn, jupiter, Mars, the
sun, Venus, Mercury, and the moon - which surrounds the
centrally placed earth.37 Human souls descend from their
heavenly place of origin through this celestial system acquiring
in the process certain qualities which will disturb them on em-
18. Senius: In Aeneid. VI. 724. Cf. ibid. VI, 71-t; VI. 7W.
29. Ibid. VI, 724. Servius contrasts this and the next two attributes with
the corresponding ones in the case of body.
W. Ibid. VI. 724.
31.1bid. VI, 724. Cf. ibid. VI, 714 .
.H./bid. VI, 724. Cf. ibid. VI, 733.
H. Ibid. VI. 7 32.
3i. Ibid. VI. 7 24. The commentator quotes an analogy with a light source
which is undiminished yet obscured by an object placed beside it.
35. See the discussion of Macrobius on pp. 579-582 .
.~6. Sc:r\'ius: In Aeneid. VI, I 27.
-~~.Ibid. VI,l27;Vl,439.
7'JEOPL.ATONISM
bodiment: lethargy from Saturn, ambition from Jupiter,

irascibility from Mars, and so on.311 Finally, the river Lethe cor-
responds to the souls' forgetfulness on entering body: it
therefore cannot be counted as one of the nine convolutions of
the Styx . .W This elaborate theory is the one which we have
already seen Calcidius. iO Macrobius, .J I and Favonius Eulogius42
derive from Numenius and Porphyry.
(iii) As a third manifestation of the human soul there is its im-
manent status. The descent of the soul is accompanied by a
lapse from unity into multiplicity, so that it is embodied on four
distinct levels: the 'physical' (q>UcnKi}), 'viral' (vita/is), 'sensitive'
(sensua/is), and 'intellectual' (intellectualis). -13 The lapse from
unity into multiplicity is also indicated by rhe fact that the soul
is accompanied by a 'genius or familiar spirit' (genius et numen
quoddam familiare) which is a reduplication of the soul at the
higher levcl,-1-i and by an 'image' (simulacrum) which is a
38. Ibid. VI, 4 39; VI. 7 14: XI. 51. The last two passages differ slightly
regarding the qualities which the descending soul is said to acquire from the
seven planetary circles:
Saturn torpor humor
Jupiter regni desiderium bonorum desiderium
Mars iracundia sanguis
the sun spiritus
Venus libido cup/dilates
Mercury lucri cupiditas ingenium
the moon corpus
ibid. VI. 714 ibid. XI. 5 I.
It is ob\'ious that there \\<ere a number of variants upon this theme in the com-
mentator's source or sources. Seep. 589 ff.
39.1bid. VI. 705. Cf. ibid. VI, .264; VI. 703.
40. Sec pp. 488-490 .
.j I. See pp. 582-587.
-il. See pp. 7'!.2-745.
i:\. Servius: In Aeneid. V, 81; Senius Danielis: In Aeneid. V. 81. Cf. Ser-
vius: In Aeneid. VIII. 564.
44. Senius: In Aeneid. IX. 182. Here, Senius cites Plotinus' view that
SERVIllS 75.~
reduplication of the soul at the lower level. 45 On all these points

the commentator is probably indebted to Plotinian and Por-
phyrian teachings.46.
(iv) The soul is continually losing and regaining its immanent
status in the course of transmigration from one body to another.
This process - which underlies Virgil's reference to Caeneus'
change of sex47 - is described in some detail. After quitting
their present mortal bodies human souls are subject to the
purifications of earth, water, air, and fire either in the sense that
they will enter terrestrial. aquatic, or aerial bodies in their next
incarnation, 48 or in the sense that they must traverse zones of
souls entering human bodies are accompanied by genii which will be respon-
~ibh: for their better moral conduct. For Plotinus, the genius is a reduplica-
tion of the soul, as shown in n. 46.
15. Ibid. VI, 134. Cf. ibid. IV, 654; VI, 650. Here, the commentator states
that souls which have returned to the gods retain certain images which in-
habit the underworld. This is revealed by the mythological accounts of Her-
cules. Liher, and Castor and Pollux. At Ibid. VI, 7.W he adds that the souls
which have departed from the body are not themselves punished but only
"the remains of that union which existed between soul and body' (illius con-
itmctirmis re/iquiae, quae fuit inter animam et corpus). These remnants
prtsumably correspond lO the image described above. For Plotinus and Por
phyry, this image is a reduplication of the soul. as shown inn. 46.
>~6. Plot in us' teaching is that the genius corresponds to the phase of the in-
dividual soul immediately above the one which is active. See Emz. Ill, 4 /I 5/
.1o. 1-r. Servius' employment of this doctrine is discussed by P. Henry: Plotin
et I'Occitlent. Firmicus Matenms, Marius Victor/nus. saint Augustin et
.lfacmbe (Louvain. 1934). pp. 19'1-196. Plotinus also holds that the image
l"llrresponds to a phase of the individual soul which it projects towards body
and which undergoes punishment for sins. See Enn. I. I /53/ 12, 1-39; VI, 4
122! 16. 1-iR (the first passage using the illustration of Hercules' shade). Cf.
Porphyry: Sent. 29, 17. II ff. Servius' relation to this tradition is discussed by
J PC:pin: 'Heracles et son reOet dans le neoplatonisme', Le Neoplatonisme
fCul/nque lnternellional du Centre National de Ia Rechetcbe Scienlifique,
Royaumont CJ-13juitz /969)(Paris, 1971). pp. 167-192 .
~. Servius: In Aeneid. VI. 44R. Cf. ibid. Ill, 6R; Ill, 140; VI. 603.
-IH. J1Jid. VI, 741.
NEOPLATONISM
water, air. and fire to reach the point v.here new bodies are
assigned to them. -t9 Elsewhere the souls return to bodies is said
to result perhaps from their need to revert to the place of pro-
creation, perhaps from the capacity to do so consequent upon
their immortality, and perhaps from their desire for bodies
whose pains have been forgotten. <;O Finally, after leaving their
present mortal bodies human souls may become free of
transmigration either because they need not return to bodies for
a considerable length of time'i I, or because they need not return
to bodies at all. 'il Although some of its details cannot be parallel-
ed exactly in other late ancient writers, this theory is generally
in line with Calcidius', 'i~ Macrobius', 'i4 and their Greek sources'
views on the subject.
The doctrine of the soul which Servius finds especially in
Aeneid VI is obviously put together from commonplaces in
Platonic philosophical literature. These are perhaps drawn in
the first instance from much earlier Latin writers among whom
Varro is explicitly cited on this topic, 'i'i Cicero in conjunction
with closely related issues, 56 and Apuleius in the context of one
49. Scrvius: In Georg. I, 2B.

SO. Servius: In Aeneid. VI, 703. Cf. ibid. VI, 713.
S I. Ibid. VI. 745.
5.2. Ibid. VI, 713. This text cont1icts with the previous one which stated
that there could he no permanent escape from the process of transmigration.
The conflict no douht reflects a hcsit:tnce in Senius sources since we know
(i) that Porphyry disagreed with Plotinus on this question. and (ii) that Por-
phyry himself was not consistent in his solution. Scl' nn. 53-5-J.
5:\. Sec pp. 488-490.
'H. Seep. '\79 ff.
55. Servius: In Aeneid. VI, 70;~. Varro is also <:itl'd on philosophical points
at ibid.\', .295; In Buco/. 8. 29; Scnius Daniclis: In Georg 11 ..~56; etc.
56. Sec especially tht citations of Hortensius at Sen ius: In Aeneid. l ..H 1;
of the Tusculanae Disputationes at Servius: In Aeneid. VI. 7.27; In Georg. II.
l99; of De iVatura IJeorum :u Scrvius: In Aeneid. IV, :\79; and of Cicero in
dialogis at Scr\'ius: In Georg. I. 7 2.
SERVILJS
similar question. 57 Yet there were undoubtedly Greek sources:

Plotinus is named in this connectionSH and Porphyry's influence
also seems certain. 59 The question naturally arises whether our
writer has obtained some of his knowledge of the Greek
Neoplatonists through an intermediate later Latin source such as
the: lost Virgilian commentator whose existence is assumed by
\'arious modern scholars. 60 There is no clear answer to this
question, although Servius' own approach as a grammarian
rather than a philosopher suggests that the doctrinal synthesis
which he presents is not of his own making.
S"". See especially the apparent citations of De Platcme et eius Dogmate at

Servius: In Aeneid. VIII, 27S and of a lost work at Senius: In Georg. II. 126.
SH. Seen. 44.
S9. The works of Porphyry are explicitly cited by Servius: the Quaestiones
/lomerlcae at Senius: In Aeneid. V, 73S and the Sol at Servius: In Buco/. S.
(l6. Besides these citations, the doctrine that the human soul can totally
escape transmigration stated at Senius: In Aeneia. VI. 71 3 is probably a
legacy of Porphyry's De Regressu Animae. See ch. 7. n. 393.
60. See pp. c; 1s-s 16.
Excursus H
Fulgentius' Mitologiae and

Expositio Virgilianae Continentiae
The inclusion of the writer known as Fabius Planciades

Fulgentius I - who was the author of the works Mito/ogiae, Ex-
positio Virgi/ianae Continentiae, Expositio Sermonum Anti-
quorum. and De Aetatibus Mundi et Hominis;2 who is assumed
from various pieces of evidence to have been North African in
origin) a practising Christian, 4 and active within the period
A.D. 439 to A.D. 533;5 and who may or may not be identifiable
I. Brief accounts of Fulgentius' life and works can be found in P. Langlois:

Ful~cntius', Real/exikonfiir Antike und Christen tum 8 (Stuttgart, 1972), pp.
(l_i2-661; L. G. Whitbrcad: Fulgentius the Mytbograpber. Translated from
/be /.a lin with Introductions by L. G. W. (Columbus,OH, 197 1). T. Agozzino c
F. Zanlucchi: Fabio Planciade Fulgenzio: Expositio Virgilianae Continen-
tia~:. a cum eli T.A. e F.Z. (Padova, 1972), pp. 7-38 provide a survey of his in-
tcrprctati\'e methods.
2. The first three titles are associated with this author in the earliest
manu~nipts. For a survey of the arguments for the ascription of the fourth
~ee G. Pennisi: Fulgenzio e Ia Expositio Sermonum Antiquorum (Firenze,
19(,~~- pp. li-19.
5. At Fulgentius: De Aet. Mundi et Hom. pr. 13 1, 10-14 he refers to Libyan
a~ hb native lan~uage.
-!. There arc. for example, references to the Antichrist at Mitol. Ill, I. 59.
-20; to Adam at ibid. Ill. 6, 69. 15-17; and to Christ at E;'l:pos. Virg. Cont.
H-. --Ill.
i. The lenuinus post quem is provided by the citation of Martian us Capella
at Fulgentius: Expos. Serm. Antiqu. 45, 123, .3-6. The terminus ante quem is
dtpcndent upon whether the writer is to be identified with Fulgentius of
Hu~pc who died in A.D. ';32 or i33.
NEOPLATONISM
with the theologian Fulgentius of Ruspe6 in a history of

Platonism perhaps requires justification. This is undoubtedly
provided by the facts that the first two of the works named en-
joyed a remarkably sustained popularity throughout mediaeval
times.""' and that they contain a certain amount of popular
Platonism in the philosophical rationalization of mythology and
the allegorical interpretation of Virgil's Aeneid respectively .R
6. Scholarship is still very much divided on this question. For a survey of

bibliography and argumenrs for the identification of these two Fulgemii see
P. Langlois: 'Lcs oeuvres de Fulgence It: Mythographe et lc problt:me des deux
Fulgence .}ahrbuch fiir Ant ike und Christentum 7 ( 1964). pp. 94-IOS; for a
survey of bibliography and arguments against that identification see Pennisi:
op. cit.. pp. I 1-1 S.
7. The bibliography on this question is quite extensive. SeeM. Manitius:
Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters 1-111 (Miinchen,
191 I -19~ I). indices s. 11.: H. Lieheschiitz: Fulgentius Metafora/is. Ein
Beitmg zur Geschichte der anti ken Mythologie im Miltelalter (Studien der
Hihliothek Warburg 4) (Leipzig/Berlin. 1926); M. L. W. Laistner: 'Fulgentius in
the Ninth Century', Melanges M. Hrouchevsky (Kiev. 1928). pp. 445-456
(reprinted as 'Fulgentius in the Carolingian Age'. The Intellectual Heritage of
the Early Mitldle Age.~ by M.L.W.L.. edited by C.G. Starr (lthaca.NY. 1957),
pp. 202-21 S); B. Bischoff: 'Theodulf und der Ire Cadac-Andreas'.
Historischesjahrbuch 74 (I 9SS ). pp. 92-98 (reprinted in Mittelalterlicbe Stu-
dien: Ausgewiihlte Aufsiitze zur Schriftkwuie und Literaturgescbichte von
H. H. II (Stuttgart. 1967). pp. 19-2S): F. C.hatillon: 'Sur quelques citations de
Fulgence It: Mythographe. de Boece. et de Maximien dans le Florilege d'Ox-
ford. Bod/. 633 ', Rel'Ue du moyerz age latin I 2 (I 956). pp. 5-26: B. Smalley:
English Friars and Antiquity in the Ear(v Fourteetltb Century (Oxford,
1960): and M.-T. d'Aiverny: 'Les Muses et les spheres celestes', Classical.
Mediaetal and Renaissance Studies in Honor of H./.. Ullman II (Roma.
1964), pp. "-19.
8. See Ci. Rauner-Hafner: 'Die Vcrgilimerpretation des Fulgentius.
Bemerkungen zu Gliederung und Ahsicht der E.\posilio tergilianae con-
tinentiae. Mitte/lateinisches jabrbuch I~ (1978) pp. 7-.f9. This author
reveals many illuminating parallels between Fulgcntius and contemporary
philosophical literature. although it is clear that we arc dealing with parallels
to rather than demonstrable sources of his ideas. See also Agozzino e Zanluc-
chi: op. cit .. pp. ~-38.
Flii.G EN Til JS 759
In the course of his discussions Fulgentius cites a number of

philosophical sources. Hermes Trismegistus is quoted for a
Greek maxim<> and for teachings about the division of musiciO
and the stars; I I Orpheus for statements regarding the seat of
Just I.! and the division of music; 13 Pythagoras for his discovery
of the numerical basis of musical sound; 14 Heraclitus for his
teaching about fire; Is Plato for his esoteric arguments,l6 for the
maxim: 'wise men have a greater conflict with the vices than
with their enemies' ,17 for his doctrine regarding the Ideas, 18 for
the saying 'a man's intellect is a god. If he is good, then it is a
god rendered propitious', 19 and for the notion that there is a
threefold order of life;zo and Aristotle for his teaching about the
entelechy .21 Since these citations have the brevity associated
with doxographical writers and the fourth reference to Plato is
traceable to Corpus Hermeticum XII only,22 it seems likely that
9. Fulgentius: Mitol. I. 15, 26, 18-20 'Hermes in his book "Opimandra" .. .'
(llermes in Opimandrae libro ... ).
10./bid. III. 9. 74. 11-14.
II. Fulgentius: Expos. Virg. Cont. 85. 21-86, I.
12. Fulgentius: Mitol. III. 7. 71. 19-22.
15. /hid. III, 9. 7-i, 9-10 'Orpheus in his "Theogony" .. .' (Orfeus in
teogonia ... ).
14. /hid. III, 9. 75, 4-7: III, 10, 79. 7-11: and Expos. Virg. Cont. 85. 20-21.
I 5. /hid. 85, 21.
16. Fulgentius: Mitol. I, pr. I 5. I.
1-. /hid. II. -4, 43. 14-1 'i 'Plato in his ethical writings (Plato in
11/0I'U/i/J/IS ... ).
I H. Fulgentius: E:~:pos. Virg. Cont. 8'i. 21.
I<J. Ibid. 88,2-5.
20. IIJid. 90, H-1 'i.
2 I . fiJi d. 86, I.
22. Compare ibid. 88, 3-'i voiic; civ6promvoc; 6e6c;' OUtoc; t.av ciya66c;, eeoc;
Eu E:pya~6~Evoc;. id est: sensus bominis deus est; is si bonus est, deus est pro-
{Jitius with Corp. Herm. XII, 1-2. 174, 7-16 outoc; M 6 vouc; t.v ~f;v civ6pronOtc;
0E6c; tan ... Kai yap 6 ciya6oc; l)ai~wv ... 6 yap vouc; '1/UXWV t.anv EUEPYEtllc;
<i vOpronwv.
760 NEOPLATONISM
the Mythographer has derived his material indirectly through

various Greek or Latin writers nearer to his own time. Among
such writers he cites Cicero for his description of Scipio's
dream23 and for the reference to memory as the storehouse of
wisdom;24 Varro for information about Roman demonology25
and religious rituals;26 Apuleius for his narrative of the love af-
fair between Cupid and Psyche;27 Tertullian for his definition of
the term 'problem ;28 Cornelius Labeo for his explanation of the
Etruscan techniques of divination;29 and Martianus Capella for
an allusion to the virginity of Minerva. 30 Several of these writers
are known for their transmission of doxographical material and
are cited in a manner indicating direct access to their works,3t
so that it seems reasonable to view them as the direct sources of
most of the Mythographer's information about Greek
philosophical doctrine. Furthermore it can be demonstrated
that Tertullian in particular set out doxographies which jux-
23. Fulgentius: Milo/. l, pr. 4 . .f-7 'But let his "Republic" indicate what
Cicero achieved' ( Verum res publica tldeat quid Cicero egerit).
24. Fulgentius: Expos. Virg. Cont. 102,2-4.
25. Fulgentius: Expos. Serm. Antiqu. 11, 115, 8-10 'Varro in his book on
mystery rites .. .' (Varro in mlstagogorum /ibro ... ).
26. Ibid. 14, 116, 3-4.
27. Fulgentius: Milo/. Ill, 6, 66, 19 ff. Apuleius in his book "Metamor-
phoses" .. .' (Apuleius in libris metamorfoseotl). Cf. ibid. III, 6. 68, 21-22;
Ill, 6, 69,28-70,2: Expos. Serm. Antiqu. 17, 116,21-117, 4; etc.
28. Ibid. 16, I 16, 18-20 Tertullian in the book which he wrote about fate
... ( Tertul/ianus in /ibro quem de Jato scripsil ... )
29. Ibid. 4, 112, 11-13 'Labeo who explained this in fifteen books .. .'
(Labeoqui ... quindecim toluminibusexplallat'il ... )
30. Ibid. 4<;, 12.~. 4-'> 'felix Capdla in his book "On the Marriage of Mer-
cury and Philolo~y" ... (Feli.Y Capella in /ibro de nuptiis .Hercurii et
Pbilologiae ... ).
.31. Thus, Fulgentius usually memions the name of the work in which each
writer expressed the view described. See above nn. 23. 25, 27 etc. This con-
trasts clearly with the mostly quite imprecise references to Greek writers.
FliLGENTilTS 761
tapose many of the same authorities mentioned by Fulgentius.:\l

What follows will represent a brief summary of the doctrine
regarding the philosophical interpretation of myth in the
Jlitologiae and Expositio Virgilianae Continentiae. Here, we
shall consider first the writer's remarks about his own inter-
pretative method, and secondly some examples of his pro-
cedure.
Regarding method, Fulgentius states that his intention is not
to imitate the labors of a poet like Ovid in depicting the
shameless conduct of the pagan deities for its own sake.:B His
aim is rather to investigate the true nature of things 'so that we
may recognize, having disposed of the fictional inventions of
the lying Greeks, whatever allegorical significance ought to be
understood here' (quo sepulto mendacis Greciaefabu/oso com-
menlo quid misticum in his sapere debeat cerebrum
agnoscamus).34 The application of this method has a moral
dimension for, by turning aside from the external significance
of these narratives, the human soul is directed away from its em-
broilment in the realm of sensation.35 Of course, in pursuing the
philosophical meanings lying beneath the surface of the classical
myths, Fulgentius is aligning himself with well-established tradi-
tions from the Hellenistic period onwards. Thus, in the period
of Stoic and Platonic syncretism writers like Cicero and Varro,36
.U. In the doxography of Adt. Valent. 1~. I (CCSL 2, 76~-766) Tenullian

a~~ociatt:s lkrmcs Trismegistus. the Pythagoreans, and Plato; and in those of
/Je Anim. 2. 3. 3. 17-23 and 28, I, 39. 25-29 he connects Hermes
Tri~mq~istus. thl Pythagoreans, Plato and Albinus. On Tenullian as the
~ourct: of Fulgentius see L.G. Whitbrcad: 'Fulgentius and Dangerous Doc-
trinc.l.atomus 30(19"1). pp. I 1~7-1 161.
5.~. Fulgentius: Mito/. I. pr. -~ 20-.f, I .
.H. Ibid. I, pr. I I, I ~-18. Cf. ibid. I, pr. 12, 3 'concealed and allegorical
maulrs (secretae misticaeque res) and Expos. Virg. Cont. 83, 10-11
'allegorical interpretations' (misticae rationes) .
.Vi .. \lito/.l,pr.4,4-6;1.pr. l.f.21l~.l;etc .
.~(,_ For Cicero and the Stoics sec pp. 90-100; for Varro and the Stoics seep.
762 NEOPI.ATONJSM
and in that of the Neoplatonic transformation of Stoicism

writers like Porphyry.~ 7 had actively pursued the quest for such
hidden meanings. However, the mythographer is more con-
cerned with stressing his moral repugnance to the classical
legends' surface meanings after the manner of Christian
polemicists from the first century A.D. onwards.
The treatises of Fulgentius, and especially the Mitologiae,
contain many illustrations of his method. These may perhaps be
classified under four headings: (i) metaphysical, (ii) physical. (iii)
astronomical, and (iv) moral.
(i) Metaphysical Interpretations.
Into this category comes the explanation of Saturn as 'holy
intellect, for "nus" is the Greek for intellect' (sacrum nun -
nus enim Grece sensus dicitur).3R The authority for this pseudo-
etymological interpretation is cited as the Stoic Apollophanes,
although Fulgentius undoubtedly has in mind the similar
arguments found in Macrobius,39 Martianus Capella, -io and
others. Into the same category comes the explanation of Pro-
metheus as ' "pronantieu" which we call divine providence in
Latin' (pronantieu quod nos Latine praevidentiam dei
dicimus). 4 1
(ii) Physical Interpretations.
Under this heading we should include the explanation of
Jupiter, Juno, Neptune, and Pluto as the elements of fire, air,
HI H ff. Since the S!Oics were the main practitioners of the philosophical ra-
tionalization of myth. it is among the Platonists who were actively interested
in SlOicism that this method recurs .
.-\7. For Porphyry and the Swics sec pp. 558-560.
;\H. Fulgcntius: Mftol. I. 2, I H, 7-9. The translation of the Greek vouc; hy the
Latin se11sus is characteristic of the Hermetic Asclepius in its extant form. See
ch.5,n.U .
.'\9. Sec p. 561 (interpretation of Dionysius).
HI. Sec pp. 620-621 (interpretation of Mlrcury).
-ll. Fulgentius: Milo/. II, 6, 46. 8-9.
FULGENTJllS 76;\
water. and earth respectively. The interpretation of Jupiter as

fire is based on the etymological connection between the Greek
Zf;u~ and ~tiv, since the life-force had traditionally been
understood as fiery in nature; that of Juno as air upon the
ctvmological connection between the Greek "Hpa and aiJp.-tl
These explanations are at least as old as Varro-t:\ and make a
reappearance in Macrobius' Saturnalia. 44 The interpretation of
Neptune as water is founded on the presumed etymological
connection between noaEtOrov and notEtv iotav, since the mak-
ing of shapes is uniquely characteristic of this element; that of
Pluto as earth upon the etymological connection between
nA.ounov and nA.outo~. 4-; Also under the heading of physical in-
terpretations we should note the sustained allegorical exegesis
of Jupiter's marriage of Thetis to Peleus.46 Here, Jupiter cor-
responds to fire, Thetis to water, and Peleus to earth; the mar-
riage to the combination of fluid and flesh to constitute human
nature; and Jupiter's officiation to the unifying function of the
fiery soul. The allegorical interpretation of this narrative was
widespread in later antiquity and is the subject of a short
modern study by J. Danielou:l7
(iii) Astronomical Interpretations.
Under this heading must be included the explanation of
Apollo as the sun. This interpretation is based on the
l'tymological connection between the Greek 'An6A.A.rov and
cm6A.A.ua9at, since the sun can generate sufficient heat to wither
vegetation. -ill Macrobius' Saturnalia mentions this among many
12. Ibid. I. 2, IH. 101. :\, llJ, 7.

t .">. Sec pp. 828-R3 I.
I I. Sn pp. 'i60-'i62.
1~. Fulgentius: Milo/. l, -i. 19. lJ-1. 'i. 20. "' The Greek l'tymology of
lloor.!Ou)v i~ garhkd in the m;muscripts.
16./hid. Ill...,, 70,4-72. 9.
1- . .f. Daniclou: 'Die Hochzcit \'on Thetis und Pcleus in hcllenistischcn
Allq~orismus'. A tlfaios :\ ( 1962), pp. lf.i-2'i..,.
IH. Fulgentius: ,\-lito/. l. 12,2:\,4-6.
NEOPLA T<>NISM
explanations of the name Apollo;i9 and no doubt Varro was

already familiar with it. ';O Also under the heading of
astronomical interpretations must be mentioned the correlation
established between the depiction of Mercury and the planet
named after him.; I Here, the fact that Mercury was traditionally
visualized as a swift-footed youth is held to stem from the
phenomenon that the planet Mercury completes its circuit in
the shortest time or vice versa. Martianus Capella puts the same
argument to elaborate use in constructing the allegory of De
Nuptiis Phi/ologiae et Mercurii. ';2
(iv) Moral Interpretations.
Into this category comes the explanation of the three god-
desses Minerva, juno, and Venus between whom Paris judged as
the three varieties of life called 'contemplative' (contem-
plativa), 'active' (activa), and 'pleasure-seeking' (voluptaria)
which can be pursued by man. 53 Into the same category comes
the explanation of the battle between Aercules and Antaeus as
the psychological conflict of 'virtue' (virtus) and 'lust'
(libido)-';4 The partially etymological argument in favor of this
interpretation has been studied in a short paper by N. Tadic. ';';
These have been merely selected illustrations, albeit par-
ticularly characteristic ones, of Fulgentius' interpretation of
myths. They are perhaps sufficient to indicate that the rationale
of his procedure stems from a belief in the structural parallelism
between fable and reality, this parallelism being manifested to
49. Macrohius: Saturn. I, 17,9-10.

50. Varro interprets Apollo as the sun at Anliqu. Rer. Ditin. fr . .25 I
(Augustine: Cit. Dei VII, 16 (CCSL 47. 199)).
51. Fulgentius: Mito/. I, 18, W. 11-16.
U. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. I. 26-30.
'53. Fulgentius: Mito/. II, I, 36 . .2 ff.
54. Ibid. II. 4, 43. 2-20.
SS. N. Tadic: 'line ctymologie fulgentienne. celle d'Antce'. La tom us 28
( 1969). pp. 685-690.
FlJLGENTIUS 765
the exegete through his use of either etymological or

iconographic modes of argument. <;6 Furthermore, these illustra-
tions show that Fulgentius' method can be applied both to in-
di\'idual symbols and concatenations of symbols in narrative. 57
<;6. For etymology. see the interpretations of Saturn, Prometheus, Jupiter,

Juno. ;\leptune, Pluto, and Apollo: for iconography, sec the interpretation of
!\kn.:ury.
:;-. For sustained narrative, sec the intt:rprctations of the marriage of
Pl'leus ami Thetis, the judgment of Paris. and the combat of Hercules and An-
weu~. However, the most elaborate cxamplt: of the sustained narrative is, of
wurse. tht: story of Aeneas which is the subject-matter of the Expositio
1;,~'(ilianae Crmtimmtiae. Here, the Trojan hero's journey to Italy is inter-
preted as an allegory of the gradual moral education of mankind: tht: earliest
comph:te example of this approach 10 Virgil's text in extant litt:rature. For
usc:ful discussions of this Expositio see H.C. Coffin: 'Allegorical lnterpreta-
1ion of Vcrgil with Special Reference 10 Fulgt:ntius , Classical Weekly I 5
( 1921 ). pp. 33-35: M.F.A. Brok: 'De Aeneis als Spiegel van het Menselijk
l.c:\Tn. Hermeneus 24 ( 1953), pp. 210-214; :md L.C. Stokes: 'Fulgentius, E:1:-
fiositio Virgilicmae Continentiae', Classical Folia 26 ( 197 2), pp. 27-63 in
addition to the works of Whitbread and Rauner-Hafncr mentioned above. On
more ~pecific questions st:e J.W. Jones: 'Vergil as Magister of Fulgt:ntius',
Classical. lt.lediaet,al, ar~d Renaissance Studies in Honor of B.L. Ullman I
(Roma, 196-i), pp. 273-275 and T. Agozzino: 'Secretum quaerere teritatis.
Virgilio. tates ignarus nt:lla Continentia Vergiliana ', Studi classici in onore
clUj. Cataudella Ill (Catania, 197 2), pp. 615-630.
Excursus I
Prise ianus Lydus' So/utiones Borum

de Quibus Dubitavit Chosroes
Persarum Rex
When Justinian issued his famous edict to close the pagan

philosophical school of Athens in A.D. 529, seven Neoplatonic
tc:achers including Damascius, Simplicius, and Priscianus sought
refuge with King Chosroes I of Persia. The king was apparently
an enlightened student of philosophy and, on conclusion of a
peace treaty with justinian, was able to arrange the intellectual
c:xilcs' return to Athens in a climate of religious tolerance.' The
three Neoplatonists Damascius, Simplicius, and Priscianus have
all lc:ft writings indicating their importance in the history of
latc:r Greek philosophy - Damascius is the author of commen-
taries on Plato and a treatise on first principles and Simplicius
the author of commentaries on Aristotle - yet Priscianus has
the added distinction of playing a small but interesting role in
the philosophical tradition of the early Latin West.l
Priscianus is known as the author of two or perhaps three ex-
tant works. In the first place, there is a Metaphrasis in
11Jeopbrastum which draws material from the writings of
Theophrastus on sensation, imagination, and intellection and
combines this with considerable Ncoplatonic elaboration on the
I. Thlsc fac.:ts arc reported in Agathias: His/. II, 30.

2. For a gcncral survey of Priscianus works ami their transmission sec C.
B. !'>chmitt: "J>riscianus Lyc.Jus. Catalogus Tmnslt~ticmum et Commen-
tariorum: .Weditler,al and Renaisstmce Latin Trtlnslations and Commen-
taries ..-lwwtated Lists mul Guieles Ill, cc.Jitcc.J hy P. 0. Kristdlcr and F. E.
Cranz (\X'ashington. DC . .19-:'6), pp. ~';-82.
768 NEOPlATONISM
same topics;:\ secondly. there is the work entitled So/utiones

Borum de Quibus Dubitarlit Chosroes Persarum Rex whose
sources -t are cited as including Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus,
Posidonius. Arius Didymus,s Gaius, Albinus. Plotinus, Por-
.:\. The doctrine of this work has been studied (with emphasis upon the
Thcophrastean material) hy E. Barbotin: La theorie aristotelicienne de
/'Intellect d 'apres Tbeophmste (louvain, 1954) and (with emphasis upon the
Neoplatonic clements) by C. Steel: The Changing Self A Study on the Soul in
Later Neuplatonism: lamblichus. Damascius and Priscianus (Brussel,
1978).
4. I quote the full latin text of the Solutiones' preface at the point where
the sources arc listed: E:r Platunico enim Timaeo Faedoneque et Faedro et
Politia. et aliis comenietllibus disputallonibus assumptct atque confecta
sunt, et m:tionibus Aristotelis de Physica et de Caeli generalione et corrup-
lione et MET0EQPQN, similiter quoque et ex his quae sunt de Somno et
somniis, et ex bis quae quasi in dialogis scripta sunt de Pbilosophia et de
Mundis. Tbeofrastus item plurimas occasiones sennone dignas praestetit
his quae quesita sunt ex Naturali bistoria et Natumli au,litu, et ex his quae
dicit de Somno et somniis, Morsibusque slmu/ tzocivis. et de Ventis. et de
Modis et moribus et babitationibus: Hippocrates quoque ad hoc perveniens
de Aere /ocis aquis. l!si quoque stmms ulillbus quae sunt ex Strabonis
Geograpbia. Latini quoque. e:r Ge~ii sco/is, e.wmp/aribus P/atonicorum
dogmatum. e~dbuc etiam ex commento Gemini Posidonii de MET0QPQN,
et Pto/omaei Geograpbie~ de k/imalibus, et se quid utile nobis ex
Astranominis apparuil. Marcianique Periegesi. et MET0EQPQN Arriani,
Didymoque de Aristotele, et ipsius scriptore dogmatum, et Dorothei
Ne~turalirmr Aristotelis commento. Aesli11wtus est autem et Tbeodotus nobis
oportunas occasiones /argiri ex co/lectione Ammonii sco/arum, et Por-
pbyrius ex Commi:rtis quaestionibus. /amblicbusque de Anima scribens, et
Ale:wmder. et Tbemislius, qui ea quae sum Aristote/is narmrrt. Plot/nus
quoque magmts, et Proclus in omnibus defererrtes singulos libros com-
ponens. et maxi me de Tribus sermonibus per quos apud P/atonem mrime~e
immortale ostenditur. This text is reproduced in the form edited by A.
Wilmart: 'lcs rcponscs de Priscicn lc philosophe sous le nom de saint
Augustin'. Rerme bemfdicline 49 ( 1937), pp. 4-5 after the two Carolingian
manuscripts.
'i. That Didymoque de Aristotele. et ipsius scripture dogmatmn is a
reference to the famous doxographcr Arius Didymus is argued by H. Diels:
PRISCIANLJS l YDl'S 769
phyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, and Ammonius.6 Finally, two

modern scholars have argued on the basis of certain stylistic
similarities to the work first mentioned above that the Com-
mentarlus in De Anima previously attributed to Simplicius
should now have its authorship assigned to Priscianus instead.7
Among these three works the Solutiones has the unique
distinction of surviving in a Latin translation only. This transla-
tion is clearly the work of a scholar whose method was to
render the Greek into Latin with word by word equivalence and
who frequently misunderstood the technical arguments of his
originaLs It has been dated by modern scholarship either to the
pre-Carolingian period or to the ninth century and more
specifically the time of the philosopher Johannes Scottus
Eriugena.9 The translation aroused sufficient interest to have
/Joxngrapbi Graeci. Co/legit recensuil prolegomenis indicibusque instruxit

H. D. (Berolini, 1879), pp. 77-78.
6. That Lavin/ should read Albini is assumed by most modern scholars.
Sec especially J. Whittaker: 'Paris/nus Graecus 1962 and the Writings of
Albinus', Pbomix 28 ( 1974), pp. 326-328.
"'. F. Boissier and C. Steel: 'Priscianus lydus en de In de Anima van Pseudo
U)-Simplicius', Tijdscbrift tmor Fi/osofle 34 ( 1972), pp. 761-822. For a good
:~~sessment of their demonstration see I. Hadot: Le probleme du
nt'oplatonisme ale:mndrin. Hierocles et Simplicius (Paris. 1971-J). pp. 29-30
and 193-202.
R. The only complete edition is that of I. Bywater: Supplementum
.lristotelicum I. 2 (Berolini, 1866). pp. 40-130.
9. That the translation is pre-Carolingian has been argued by M. Esposito:
'l'ri~l'ianus l.ydus and Johannes Scott us'. Classical Retieu 32 ( 1918), pp.
21-23: M. Cappuyns: jean Scot Erigene. Sa tl/e, smz oemre. sa pensee (lou-
,.ain/Paris, 1933) (repr. Bruxclles. 1969). pp. 148-149; and Wilmart: op. cit ..
pp ..~-12. That the translation was done by Eriugena or a member of his circle
Was the position of nineteenth century scholars and has recently been reviv-
ed by M.-T. d'Alverny: 'les Solutiones ad Cbosroem de Priscianus lydus ct
.le<tn Scot', jean Scot Erigene et l'bistoire de Ia philosophie (Colloque Inter-
11'1fimwl du Centre National de Ia Recherche Scientifique, l.mm "'-12juil/et
1 'r'5) (Paris. 1977), pp. 145-160. LJnfortunately. neither the arguments of
770 NEOPLATONISM
been copied at least twice during the ninth century and five
times during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. JO However,
its influence on actual philosophical writing cannot be clearly
demonstrated prior to the Salernitan Quaestiones Physica/es of
ca. 1200 and the encyclopaedic activity of Vincent of
Beauvais.ll
Priscianus' So/utiones as preserved contain treatments of the
following topics disposed in separate chapters: (i) the soul, (ii)
sleep, (iii) dreams, (iv) the seasons, (v) medicine, (vi) the tides,
(vii) rain. snow, etc., (viii) the adaptability of animals, (ix)
poisonous reptiles, (x) the winds. Since the first chapter is the
only one which includes any developed philosophical argu-
ment, the remainder of this discussion will be devoted to ex-
amining its content. As a matter of convenience, the analysis
will be divided under the following headings: (1 a) the
arguments regarding the nature of the soul, (1 b) the assump-
tions regarding the nature of the soul, (2) miscellaneous doc-
trines about causality and the intelligibles.
(1 a) Priscianus' arguments regarding the nature of the soul.
In a series of arguments which seem to reflect the doctrines
of Proclus in particular, Priscianus demonstrates that the human
soul is a self-subsistent substance and that it is incorporeal, sim-
ple, and indestructible. It is a 'self-subsistent substance' (essen-
ria ll se ipsa subsistens) because it is receptive of contraries like
Esposito that the translation is too barbarous for Eriugena and that it is
nowhere cited in the latter's Periphysenn; nor those of d' Alverny that the
translation contains peculiarly Eriugenian expressions and that one passage is
retlccted in the latter's E."<positiones in lerarchiam Caelestem arc really com-
pelling. Thus, the precise question of authorship and dating should be left
open.
10. The \'arious manuscripts arc listed by Schmitt: op. cit .. pp. H t-82.
II. On the intlucncc of the Solutiones see also B. Lawn: The Salenritan
Questions. An Introduction to the History ofMedieral and Renaissance Pro-
blem Literature(Oxford, l963).passim.
PRISCIANl 'S 1. Yl>l'S 7"7(
prudence and imprudence and does not require a substratum for

its cxistence.ll The human soul is incorporeal I:\ for a number of
reasons: first, it 'pervades the body totally' (per corpus totwn
pertransire) and is neither juxtaposed, mixed, or fused \vith it.
The latter all represent varieties of physical union between one
hody and another and are clearly inapplicable here .1-4 Secondly,
it is 'separable' (separata), as shown by the fact that it possesses
an activity independent of body.J'i Third, it 'both knows itself
and the incorporeal principles prior to it' (et se ipsam cognoscit
et quae sun/ ante se sepamta corporibus) and knowledge is on-
ly possible when there is a similarity between subject and ob-
jcct.16 The human soul is 'incomposite, simple. and uniform'
(incompositum et simplex et uniforme) since its nature is not
dcpcndent upon the coming together of matter and form or of
the four elements.~ Finally, it is incorruptiblelH for various
reasons: first, it 'invariably provides life to any body to which it
is present' (cuicumque adest corpori, vitam semper ei infer/)
and a principle which acts in this way cannot receive the con-
trary of life.l9 Secondly, it 'is not corrupted by its own evils'
12. Priscianus: Solut. I. B. 23-44, J.l. Cf. ibid. I. 48 ..u-.:H. For the no-
tion of the "self-constituted substance' (au8un6atatoc; ouaia) sec Proclus:
Flem. 7/Jeo/. 40, -42. H ff. The Proclinc: doctrine is examined in S. Gersh:
A'intsis Akinetos. A Stud) of Spiritual Motion in t!Je P/Jilosopb.J' of Proclus
tl.ciden. ltJ~:\). pp. 7-9and 12H-13S.
1:\.J>risdanus:So/ut. 1.44. 1.'\-14: I.-46.1-2: 1.46.6-7: I.-48.29.
I i. I!Jitl. l. 44. I 5-28. This is clearly one of the :trguments which Pris-
lianu~ has dr:twn (sec n. -4) from the Quaestiones Commixtae of Porphyry.
The latter's teaching on this question has already been examined in the light
ol it~ influence on Calcidius in (.'hapter 6.n. 26-i.
I<;, l'riscianus: Solut. I. ojl. j 1-15. 12.
16./bicl. I. .f.!. 12-.f6, 19.
1-. Ibid. l, 46, 19-29.
lH.IIJid. I. -17, 2; I. -48. 9.
19. !hid. 1. -i7. 2-2-f. Plot in us is explicitly cited as an authority at this point
l 'ce n. -1 ). Possibly Priscianus is recollening the argument atl:'nn. IV. 7 /2/ II.
NEOPLATONIS.M
(non corrumpitur ab eis) of which the greatest are in-

temperance, injustice, fear, and so forth. Whatever, is not cor-
rupted by its own evils must be completely incorruptible.20
Third, it 'is moved by itself' (a se mot,etur) since it is the
ultimate cause of motion to other things.21
(1 b) Priscianus' assumptions regarding the nature of the soul.
In the course of his arguments about the nature of the soul,
the writer employs certain notions which are not demonstrated
as such. The most important of these are that the soul reverts to
itself,22 that this activity is equivalent to its substance ,2.~ and that
the soul reverts to itself as a whole;24 that the same principle is
self-existent2'i and, since there is an interrelation between ex-
14-17 that a principle: which confers life must be immortal since it cannot ad-
mit life's contrary.
20. Priscianus: Solut. I. 4 7. 2i-4R. 9.
21. Ibid. I, 48, 10-49, 36. These three argumems for the immortality of
the soul clearly correspond to Produs' Tres sennmzes, per quos apud
P/atonem animae immortale ostendilur mentioned in Priscianus' preface
(see n. 4 ). On this monograph which is partially preserved in the Arabic tradi-
tion see L. G. Westerink: 'Proclus on Plato's Three Proofs of Immortality',
Zetesis, Album Amicorum aangebode11 aan /:.'. de Slr.Jcker (Antwerpen,
1973). pp. 296-306.
22. Priscianus: Solut. I. 46. 12 ad se ipsmn cmwersa. Cf. Proclus: E/em.
Tbeo/. 42. 44. II everything self-constituted reverts to itsc:lf (nCiv to
au9u1t6cnatov 1tp0<; eaut6 EOtiV e1tlOtpE1ttiK6V).
23. Priscianus: So/ut. I. 48, 21 eandem enim essen/lam babens et opera-
lio1lem. Cf. Proclus: In Tim. II. 293. 18 where primary hc:ing 'does not have
ils activity distinct from its substance' (ou5t yap ID.A.T)v EX.Et tiJv tvtpyEtav
~tapa tl')v ouoiav).
24. Priscianus: Solut. I. lB . .Z.Z tota in totam se ijJsam i1lfrtms. Cf. Pro
clus: Elem. TIJeo/. 47, i6. 31 where the self-lonstituted 'will revert to itself as
a whole' (oA.ov auto atpaq>tlOEtal1tPO<; eauto ).
2i. Priscianus: Solut. I, 4 3. l:~; I. B. 2i; etc. a se ipsa subsistens. Cf. Pro-
d us: 1:"/em. Tbeol. 189, 164. 22-2." 'the: soul is self-constituted and the cause
of its own existence' (tlljiUX,l') apa UU9U1t60tat0<; KUi EUUtl')V U(j)lOtT)OlV).
PRISCIANlJS LYDllS
istcnce and life,26 self-living27 and, since there is an interrelation

between existence and knowledge,.zs self-knowing ..z9 In addi-
tion to these notions which are thoroughly Procline in
character, the writer also employs others which reflect
Neoplatonic ideas generally. The most significant of these are
that soul is a unity in all individual men according to its
substance but a multiplicity in all those individuals according to
its qualities;.:\O that the same principle can be divided into a
higher rational phase and a lower irrational one,.:\1 the higher
being associated with the faculty of knowledge.:\2 and the latter
with those of imagination.:\.:\ and the vegetaJ.3-t
(2) Miscellaneous doctrines about causality and the in-
telligibles.
16. Indicated by Priscianus' argument at Solut. l, 48, 27. It is a fundamen-

tal tenl"t of Proclus' and Damascius' metaphysics that there is a thrt"dold im-
plkation between 'existence' (ouaia), 'life' (~wrj), and 'knowledge' (voiic;).
for discussion seeS. Gersh: From lamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation
uf tbe Prehistory 'md Er,olution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition ( Leiden.
19-,8), pp. 143-150.
2"". Priscianus: Solut. I. 48. 16 per se ipsum vlvlt. Cf. Proclus: Elem.
7'beo/. 189, 164, 31-32 'the soul must be a self-living principle' (auT6~wc; liv
EiTJ ~ wuxrl).
18. Indicated by Priscianus' argument at Solut. I. 48, 32-33. On thl
metaphysical doctrine implied seen. 26.
2<J. Priscianus: Solut. 1, 46, 'i: I, 48, 33: etc. per se cognoscens. Cf. Pro-
l'lus: l:'lem. Tbenl. 190, 166. 11-12 'But if the soul is not only these things: a
~df-nmstitutcd substance, a self-living life. and a sdf-knowing knowledge'
(Ei B& llll TatiTa ~-t6vov aTiV i( IVllXti. ouaia aueun6aTaToc; Kai ~wn aUTO~wc; Kai
YVWCilc; autftc; yvwanKt')).
30. Prisl'ianus: So/ut. l, 50. 5-9. This monopsychist position goes back to
Plato and the Middle and Neoplatunists. For Calcidius see pp. -t7'i-478; for
Macrobius pp. 5.~8-<;4 2 and 'i51 ff.; for Boethius pp. 71 1-7 13.
31. Priscianus: Solut. 1, 49. 'i-8 rationalis ... irrati,malis ...
.U. At ibid. 1. 45. 35 Priscianus speaks of a 'cognitive phase' (mgnosdbllis
species). and at ibid. l. 49. 29 of the 'eye of the soul' (an/mae oculus) .
.H./bid. 1, 46, 17; I. 49.7 phatllasia, etc.
~t. lhid. l, 45, 5-8; I, 46, 1-2titale, elc.
:'IIEOPLATO:-.IISJ\1
In the course of his arguments about the nature of the soul,

the writer also alludes to certain other metaphysical doctrines.
Some of these are concerned with general principles of causali-
ty: for example, that 'nothing which causes is ever dependent
upon that which it causes, for the former always possesses
powers greater than those transmitted to the latter' (omnino
nibil causalium indigens est causativi, meliores babens
semjJe1 lirtutes his quas causativo largiturpr, or that
'everything which produces a certain form itself primarily
possesses that character which it bestows upon its participants'
(omne autem quod quandam formam efficit ipsum prima est
quod particijJantibus infertp6 Other doctrines are concerned
with the hypostases which are higher than the soul. Thus, above
this level there is a 'creator of the universe' (unil'ersitatis fac-
tor) who is responsible for the production of both the higher
substances and human souls.:\"' These higher principles can be
described from different viewpoints as, or3R can be divided into
'that which exists' (id quod est),39 the 'intelligibles'
(intelligibilia), 4o 'the intellectual substances' (intellectuales
essentiae).'~ I and 'the divine' (divina).-~2 Finally. these higher
principles unite with one another in the same way that they
.'\'i. Ibid. I. 4". 18-2-t. This argument occurs in almost identical terms in
Proclus: Elem. Tbeol. 7. 8, I -28. Priscianus' causate corresponds to Prod us'
napciyov /napaKnK6v. and his causatitw1l to the Greek napay6~Evov.
;\6. Priscianus: Solut. I. 49. 4-S. This thesis is stated in almost identical
language at Proclus: E/em. Then/. 18. 20. 3-20. Priscianus' ipsum primo esse
quod parlicipantibus infert equals Proclus' auto npTW~ tcni TOUTO, OU
~Etaoiowm toi~ XOPTJYOU~tvot~ .
.'\.,. Priscianus: So/ut. I. 'i2. I 0- I I .
.'\H. Depending upon the extent 10 which Produs' elahorately hierarchical
interpretation of the higher realm is assumed.
59. Priscianus: Solut. l. 49. 24: I. i9. 26.
-W.Ibid. 1. -l9. 2'i.
-t I. Ibid. I . 'i2. I 0- I I.
-il.. Ibid. 1. 4 S. 14.
PRISCIANllS l.YDUS
unite with corporeal things: in a variety of blending which is at

the same time a separation. 43
. 1 .~. !11id. I. ';2. 16-18. At this point the Porphyrian doctrine. whi<:h is also
repelled at ibid. I. ';0, 2'; ff.. comes hack into the picture. Seen. 14.
Note on Priscianus Grammaticus
In Book XVII of Priscian 's lnstitutiones Grammaticae, there

is a discussion of definition containing a brief reference to the
Platonic theory of Forms. According to the writer, there are
generic and specific Forms of things which exist in an intelligi-
ble manner in the divine mind before they proceed into bodies'
(._l!,enerales et specialesformae rerum, quae in mente divina in-
tellegibi/iter constiterunt antequam in corpora prodirent)
(Priscian: lnst. 17, 44, 135. 7-9.). This text is unusual among the
late ancient testimonia concerning this theory, in that it stresses
the universal character of the Forms in addition to their
paradigmatic function: cf. Seneca: Epist. 65, 7; Apuleius: De
Plat. I. 6, 192-193; Augustine: De Div. Quaest. LXXXIII, 46;
and other passages discussed earlier. It was no doubt this feature
which interested Abailard who utilized the testimony for exam-
ple at Theol. 'Schol. I. 9 (PL 178, 991A); Theol. Christ. IV. 139
(CCCM 12, 335).
...,..,..,
Conclusion
In the introduction to this work, we attempted to describe a

methodology for the study of mediaeval Platonism based on the
examination of its sources: the various Latin philosophical
writers of late antiquity who can be viewed as a kind of indirect
tradition of Platonism. In order to reduce this material to
reasonable proportions, it was decided to concentrate first on
those writers who do not elaborate an overtly Christian doc-
trine and secondly on the internal consistency of their
philosophical teachings in themselves. I These tasks have been
discharged in the main section of this book where each of the
relevant Latin authors has been studied in some depth, the only
sources left out of consideration being perhaps some dox-
ographical notes in writers like Tertullian and Lactantius,2
various scholia on the poets, 3 and some anecdotal material in
Valerius Maximus, Ammianus Marcellinus, and others. 4 Now in
the conclusion of the study, we shall attempt to illustrate the ap-
plication of the methodology described earlier by looking at the
contributions of various representatives of the mediaeval
Platonic tradition proper. Once again in order to reduce our
material to manageable proportions, it will be necessary to con-
fine ourselves first to those writers who derive significant doc-
trines from the sources selected and secondly to those of their
I. Sec pp. HI-50.

1. This material was omitted from the discussion because it is difficult to
draw precis<.' limits to its extent and because it is illustrated adequately hy
Ambrose: Hexaem. I. l. 1-4 (CSF.L ;\2/1, 3-4).
5. For I.'Xample, the Luccmi Scholia Benzensia.
t. This material was omitted from the survey because it deals only with
biographical detail and because it contributes nothing to the understanding
of Plato's or the Platonists' doctrine.
779
CONCLUSION
doctrines which are of primary philosophical interest.

A survey of Platonism from the end of antiquity until roughly
the middle of the twelfth century would need to focus on the
following major phases in its development5 In the first place,
the appropriation of elements from pagan Platonism in the
works of various Latin Fathers and of two important Christian
writers of late antiquity: Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville
should be examined. This must be followed by a brief discussion
of the occasional appearance of material stemming from this
tradition during the seventh and eighth centuries. Next, con-
siderable attention should be paid to the first great efflorescence
of doctrine derived from pagan Platonism in the writings of late
Carolingian thinkers. Here, the important contributions are
those of Johannes Scottus Eriugena, Ratramnus of Corbie, and
the commentators on Martianus Capella and on Boethius. This
must be followed by another brief discussion of the occasional
references to this tradition in writers of the tenth and eleventh
centuries. Finally, more detailed analysis should be undertaken
of the second great efflorescence of doctrine derived from
pagan Platonism in the schools of the early twelfth century.
Here, the important landmarks are represented by the work of
Anselm of Canterbury, the School of Chartres, Abailard, the
School of St. Victor, and john of Salisbury. Of course, this
survey of medieval Platonism can only be a brief sketch which
leaves the details to be filled in by a later more extensive treat-
ment.
Among the Latin Fathers who make use of Platonic
philosophical material Ambrose occupies an important position.
Despite the polemical stance in respect of Greek philosophy in
general which this writer frequently adopts, modern scholar-
ship has been able to demonstrate his extensive indebtedness to
'i. The middle of the twelfth century is a useful terminus in that beyond
this point the intellc~o:IUal milieu is totally transformed by the influx of Greek
and Arabic m:uerial.
the doxographers, Philo Iudaeus, and the Neoplatonists. Fur-

thermore. there is ample evidence that Ambrose is familiar with
Latin transmitters of the Platonic tradition.6 Thus, as examples
of his use of Cicero might be mentioned the borrowings of
phraseology throughout his works; 7 the references to Plato's
doctrine of the ideal state in De Abraham, B De Officiis
Jlinistrorum,9 and Exp/anationes in PsalmosiO which are
derived from Cicero's De Republica, and to Plato's doctrine of
the human soul in De Excessu Fratris, J I Expositio Evange/ii
secundum Lucam,t2 and De Noet3 which are taken from
Cicero's Tusculanae Disputationes; and the structural plan of
the treatise De Officiis Ministrorum as a whole. I-I Finally, there
is some evidence indicating Ambrose's knowledge of the works
of Seneca. ~ Gellius, t6 and Apuleius.t7 It is not possible to speak
6. On Ambrose's use of Latin sources seeS. N. D. Charles: 'The Classical

Latin Quotations in the Letters of St. Ambrose'. Greece and Rome, Series 2,
l'i (196H). pp. 186-197 and A.M. 1.. Ricci: 'Fortuna di una formula cicero
niana presso sant' Ambrogio. A proposito di iustitia'. Studi italicmi di
.fi/IJ!ogiaclciSSica 43 (1971), pp. 222-24<;.
-. These are quite extensive hut- since Cicero is mentioned by name only
in De Officiis Ministrnrum- mostly unacknowledged. See G. Madec: Saint
:lmhmisl! efltl pbilosopbie (Paris, 1974 ), pp. 146-161.
H. Ambrose: De Abrah. I, I, 2 (CSEL 32/1, ';0 1-502).
'J. Ambrose: De Offic. Ministr. l, 12,43-44 (PL 16, 36A-C).
10. Ambrose: E:'Cplan. in Psalm. 3';, I (CSEL 64, 48-49). For detailed
disn1ssion of these and similar passages see Madec: op. cit .. pp. I 09132.
II. Ambrose: De f:'xc. Fmtr. II, 3';-36 (CSEL 73, 268-269).
12. Ambrose: Expos. in Luc. VIII, 48 (CCSL 14. 314-31 <; ).
1.~. Ambrose: De Noe 25. 92 (CSEL 3211, 4'78-479). For detailed discussion
of1hese and similar passages see Madec: op. cit.. pp. 141-166.
l-1 Hlre !he tillc. the di\'ision into three hooks. and the arguments recall
the Ciceronian De Officiis.
I<;_ Precise parallels wilh Seneca are difficult 10 come by, although Am-
brose\ frequent anti-dialectical tone is possibly Sem:can in origin. See pp.
I ';';-1 '58.
I(). One possible borrowing from Gellius is noted hy Madec: op. cit .. p.
l'J').
1- J\ dtfinite borrowing from Apulcius is noted by P. Courcellc: 'De
-:'82 CONCLliSI0:-.1
of extensive philosophical arguments as being derived by the

Latin Father from such sources as these. since it is scarcely part
of his program to explore that kind of issue. However, Ambrose
is still one of the earliest Christian Latin writers to have utilized
pagan Platonic material in a constructive way.
The same tendencies recur in the writings of his sometime
disciple Augustine. However, in accordance with the latter's
more extensive commitment to systematic philosophical
speculation, it is necessary to distinguish the use of Latin
Platonic writers as sources of his philosophical information and
as influences on his philosophical doctrine respectively.ts
Cicero alone functions in these two ways for Augustine. Among
sources of his philosophical information, Cicero's Academica
and Orator supply important details regarding Plato's theory of
Forms,t9 while the same author's version of the Timaeus pro-
vides a summary of Plato's doctrine of the sensible world.20
Platona saint Ambroise par Apult't:. Parallelcs textuels entre le De t.".Ycessu

Fmtris et lc De Plt~lrme , Rerue de pbilologie y; ( 1961 ). pp. 25-28.
18. On Augustine's knowledge of Latin writers see H. Hagendahl:
Augustine and tbe Lt~tin Clc1ssics 1-11. U'ith " Contribution on Varro by B.
Cardauns (Gotcborg. 1967) and L. Alfonsi: s. Agostino c gli autori Iatini'.
Studi Romani 2-i (1976), pp. 453-470.
19. Augustine: Contm Acad. Ill, 17. 37 (CCSl. 29. 57) d. Cicero: Amd. I,
19; Augustine: De Vera Relig. 3. 3 (CCSL 32. 188-190) cf. Cicero: Oral. 10.
The Augustinian passages hascd on Cicero arc listed and discussed by Hagen-
dahl: op. cit. I. pp. 35-169; II, pp. 479-588. See also A. Solignac: 'Dox-
ogr:tphics ct manut:ls dans Ia formation philosophique de saint Augustin'.
Recberchescmgustiniemzes I ( 1958). pp. 113-148; l\1. Testard: Saint Augustin
et Ciceron 1-11 (Paris, 1958); A. R. Sodano: 'l.'intcrprt'tazionc ciccroniana di
Timeo 4 I a 7 - b 6 nellc citazioni tcstuali di Sant' Agostino'. Retue des etudes
cmgustiniennes II ( 1965 ). pp. I 5-24; Q. Cataudella: 'I Soliloqui di Agostino
e illibro I dcllt: Tusmlcme, Aevum 40 (1966), pp. SS0-'5'52; and G. Madet.::
'I.' Hortensiu.~ de Ciccron dans les I ivrcs XIII-XIV duDe Trinitate . Revue des
etudesaugustiuiemw.~ IS (1969). pp. 161-173.
20. Augustine quotes twenty-eight times from Plato's Timaeus. Since all
MEDIAEVAl PI.ATONISM 7H3
Among influences on Augustine's own philosophical theories,

not only are the earlier phases of his intellectual development-
che turning towards philosophy itself,2t the preoccupation with
an immanentist and materialist notion of divinity ,22 and the
evaluation of dogmatism and skepticism respectively23 - in-
dications of Ciceronian influence, but also certain features of his
mature philosophical position - the notion of a transcendent
reason or law governing the universe ,24 the continual refusal to
quotations except one (which is derived through the Academical come from
the part translated by Cicero, and Augustine expressly cites this latin transla-
tion at Cil'. Dei XIII, 16 (CCSL 48, 396-398), it seems that all his information
;lhout Plato's cosmology is drawn from Cicero. These passages are listed and
discussed by Hagen dahl: op. cit. I, pp. 131-138; II, pp. 53 5-540.
21. Augustine: Conf Ill, 4 (CSEL 33/1, 48-50). The writer here cites
Cicero's Hortensius as the crucial influence.
22. Ibid. Ill, 7 (CSEL 33/1, 53-56); IV, 15 (CSEL 33/1, 83-85); \', 10 (CSEl
.~.~11. I 0')-108); etc. Augustine himself associates lhis interpretation of God's
nawre with Manichaeism rather than Cicero. However. Testard: op. cit .. pp.
I<J-6H and 116-118 argues convincingly that he must also have seen its con-
nection with Cicero's eclectic Stoic and Platonic theology.
2.~. Augustine: Conf V. 10 (CSEl 33/1, 105-1 08). The writer here men-
tions the Academic/ about whom he would have read in Cicero.
2"1. This theme is developed especially in Augustine: De Lib. Arb. I and
rt:prcs<.ms the Stoic teaching of Cicero's De Republica and De Legibus. On
Au~ustine's Stoicism which is derived through Cicero, the doxographies, and
l'lotinus !>cc G. Verbeke: L 'evolution de Ia doctrine du pneuma du stoicisme
ti s. ..tugusti11. t.'tude philosopbique (Paris/lou vain, 194') ): R. M. Bushman:
~t. Augustine's Metaphysics and Stoic Doctrine', Neu Scholasticism 26
( 1952), pp. 2H3-305; G. Verbeke: 'Augustin et le stoicisme. Recherches
augustiniennes I ( 19')8). pp. 67-89; M. Sicherl: 'Piatonismus und Stoizismus
in lien Friihschriften August ins', Acta Pbi/ologictl Aenipontana 2 ( 1967), pp.
6 :\-65; C. Baguette: 'line periode stoicienne dans revolution de Ia pensee de
~aint Augustin .. Ret' lie des etudes augustiniennes 16 ( 1970). pp. i 7-77; R. J.
O'Connell: 'De Libero Arbitrio 1: Stoicism Revisited', Augustitzitm Studies I
1~ 9 "'0); pp. 49-69; and M. Spanneut: 'le stokisme de saint Augustin', Forma
htturi: Stud/ in on ore diM. Pellegrino (Torino, 197';), pp. 896-914.
78-J CONCLUSION
deny that the world itself is endowed with a soul,25 and the
belief in immanent seminal reasons.26 Other Latin writers are
generally used only as sources of philosophical information. For
example, Seneca's De Superstitione provides some material
critical of the Roman civil theology ,27 Gellius' Noctes Atticae an
anecdote about a Stoic philosopher,zs Apuleius' De Deo
Socratis an account of the pagan demons' mediating role bet-
ween God and man,29 the same author's De Mundo some notes
on the causes of physical catastrophes,3o and the Latin Asclepius
a discussion of the theurgic animation of statues. 31 All this in-
dicates that the reading of Augustine in the Latin Platonic
writers of late antiquity is extensive, their role as sources of in-
formation climaxing in De Civitate Dei and their role as in-
25. The notion recurs in at least eight of Augustine's works. For a complete
list of references sec V.). Bourke: 'St. Augustine and the Cosmic Soul', Gior-
nale di metafisica 9 ( 1954), pp. 4 31-440. It is, of course, both Ciceronian
and Plotinian.
26. This theme is developed especially in Augustine: De Trin. III (CCSL 50,
127 ff.) and De Gen. ad Lilt. (CSEL 28/1 ), and reflects the Stoic teaching of
Cicero's De Natura Deorum, etc. Seen. 25.
27. The list of Senecan and Augustinian references can be found in Hagen-
dahl: op. cit. I. pp. 245-249. In addition, one Epistula of Seneca is quoted by
Augustine. See also J. Oroz Reta: 'Seneca y San Agustin. (lntluencia o coin-
cidenzia?', Augustin us 10 ( 1965), pp. 295-325.
28. Augustine: Cit. Dei IX, 4 (CCSI. 47, 25 l-25.:H cf. Gellius: Noel. Attic.
XIX I, 1-21.
29. The list of Apuleian and Augustinian references can be found in Hagen-
dahl: op. cit. l, pp. 17-28. In addition, the Apologitl and Metamorphoses of
Apuleius are quoted by Augustine. See also C. Moreschini: 'La polemica di
Agostino l"ontro Ia demonologia di Apuleio', Ann ali della Scuole Normale de
Pisa, Classe di lett ere e filosofitl 2 ( 197 2), pp. 583-596.
30. Augustine: Cit. Dei IV. 2 (CCSI. 47. 99-1 00) cf. Apuleius: De Mundo
3-f.
31. The list of Hermetic and Augustinian references can be found in Hagen-
dahl: op. cit. l, pp. 29-33. Textual parallels indicate that Augustine consulted
the latin \"ersion of this \Vork.
MEDIAE\' AL PLATONISM 7fl5
tlucnccs on philosophical doctrine being more prominent in the

early works. This constructive relationship to the pagan tradi-
tion is one which will influence Christian authors of the next
two centuries.
Cassiodorus and Isidore of Seville can be considered together
hridly. since they represent culminations of ancient learning in
similar ways. Cassiodorus is significant not only because of the
enormous range of late ancient Platonic writers with whom he
is familiar - the list includes Cicero,.3.Z Seneca,.~:\ Apuleius,.H
Ccnsorinus,.~s Marius Victorinus,.36 Macrobius,37 and Boethius38
- but also because he popularizes the Augustinian theory which
justified their study by Christian readers . .39 In addition,
Cassiodorus' lnstitutiones expound at least two philosophical
doctrines of some interest: the division of philosophy into
theoretical and practical, of theoretical philosophy into
theology, mathematics, and physics, and of mathematical
philosophy into astronomy, music, geometry, and arithmetic;4o
and the method of defining a God whose nature transcends our
comprehension 'by removal of what is opposite' (Kat'
aq>aipecnv tau vavtiou),41 in both of which it is the Boethian in-
52. St>t" LJssiodorus: Ins/. II. 2. 10 (citin~ De lmenlione) .

.~.'>.Ibid. II. 6. 4.
'1. St"t' i!Jid. II.;\, 12 (citing Peri Hermeneia.~). Cf. ibid. II,;, I fl.
_,<;,Ibid. II. 5. I: II. 6, I.
_,6. Stt i"id. II, 2, 10 (citing In Cicerrmis Rhetoricam); II. 3. I; (citing De
.\)flo.~ismis Hypotbeticis); II. 3. IH (citing translations of Porphrrr's lsagoge
anJ Aristotle's Categoriae).
5- Cassiodorus: Expos. Psalm. I 0 (CCSI. 97. I 16).
!tH. St>t" Cassiodorus: hzst. II. 3. II (citing In De lnterpretalione ed. II); II,
~. I H (citing In lsagogen ed. II); II, 6.; (citing transl;uion of Euclid's Elemen-
'").
W. The tht>ory of Augustine: D<' Doctr. Chr. 11-111 (CCSL 32. 32 ff.) that tht.
pagan arts art" \'aluablc as aids towards the exegesis of Scripture.
10. Cassiodorus: Ins/. II. 3. -t-7. The doctrine is based on Boethius: De
Trin. 2. 'i-.21 and De Arilhm. l, I, H, .29-9, H. etc.
I I. Cassiodorus: lnst. II ..1. 14. The d<H:t rint> is based on Boethius: Contra
786 CONCLl!SION
fluence which is most apparent:H Isidore of Se,ille is likewise

important both because of the wide range of late ancient
Platonic writers with whom he is familiar - in most cases not
explicitly cited yet identifiable by modern scholarship-B -and
because he advocates the Augustinian doctrine which justified
their study by Christian readers:H Furthermore, Isidore's
Etymologiae and other writings report numerous philosophical
theories of great interest: the division of philosophy into
logicaL physical, and ethical;4S the cosmological viewpoint ac-
cording to which God is diffused through the cosmic body,4C>
the macrocosm of world corresponds to the microcosm of
man,47 and the soul is diffused through the human body;4K and
Eu~J'L"b. et Nest. I, 12-1 5.

42. See nn. 40-.fl. Cassiodorus' De Anima also contains much of
philosophical interest derived partly from Augustine and partly from certain
/ibri saeculares. The most recent analysis of this work can be found in j. j.
O'Donnell: Cassiodorus (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1979), pp. IO'H ;HI.
4~. Cicero and Apulcius are explicitly cited in the Etymologiae although
on relatively insignificant points. The great work of identifying Isidore's
sources has been carried out by j. Fontaine: Isidore de Seville et Ia culture
c/assique dans /'Espagne uisigotbique 1-11 (Paris, 1959). He concludes that
Isidore takes his material from the classical period through the intermediary
of late ancient sources like Servius. Martianus Capella. and Boethius. Of
course. such writers supplement the recourse to his fa\'orite Patristic sources:
Ambrose and Augustine.
44. See .J. Fontaine: 'Isidore de SC\ille et Ia mutation de l'encyclopcdisme
antique'. La pensee enqclopedique au moyenllge (Ncuch;itcl, 1966), pp. 43,
47-48. and 54.
-15. Isidore: Etym. II. 24, .38. On the Augustinian background of Isidore's
knowlege of this scheme see Fontaine: Isidore de Seville et Ia culture classi-
que dans I 'Espagne wisigotbique II. pp. 609-611. At Etym. II, 2-t. 9 ff. Isidore
also repeats the <..:assiodoran scheme described above.
46. Ibid. VIII, 6, 18-19. The source is Cicero via Tertullian and Lactantius.
Sec Font:tinc: op. cit. II, p. 711 ff.
i''. Isidore: De Nat. Rer. 9, 2. Cf. Isidore: Sent. I. 8, I ff. (PL 8.3. 'H9A).
-J8. Isidore: Differ. II, 30. I Ol (PL 8.3, 8'iB-C). The source is Cicero through
Lactantius. See Fontaine: op. cit. II. pp. 684-686.
MEDIAEVAL PLATONISM "787
the belief in the symbolic correspondence between the realms

of the divine and the physical,49 these teachings going back to
Ciceronian syncretism via Augustine, Tertullian and Lactantius,
and Gregory the Great respectively. so
This is hardly the place to attempt a summary of the intellec-
tual and educational advances attributed to the Carolingian
period. s t It will be sufficient for our purposes to note that most
of the Latin Platonic writers of late antiquity are available to Al-
cuin and the other scholars associated with Charlemagne's
court. Thus, Cicero's De Inventione, Topica, and De Oratore
are among the sources used by Alcuin;52 the Anonymous of MS.
Miincben 18961 - B makes use of Seneca's Naturales Quaes-
tiones;s~ Apuleius' Peri Hermeneias provides material for the
Ubri Carolini;S4 the Anonymous of MS. Muncben 18961- B is
dependent upon Calcidius;55 Marius Victorious' works are
among the sources of Alcuin's Adversus Elipandum and De
-i9. Isidore: De Nat. Rer. 26. 2, etc. For the Gregorian influence over this
aspect of Isidore's thinking see Fontaine: op. cit. II, p. S41 ff.
SO. Sc=c= nn. 4S, 48, and 49.
S I. For a useful introduction, see the works cited by G. Schrimpf:
'Gdc=hrsamkeit und Philosophic im Bildungswesen des 9. und 10.
Jahrhunderts. Ein Literaturbericht fiir die Jahre 1960 bis 197S '. Zeitschrift fiir
pbilnsnphische Forschtmg 31 ( 1977) pp. 123137.
i.!. See W. S. Howell: The Rhetoric of Alcuin attd Cht~rlemagne. A
Translation with a11 /1llroductio11, the Latin Text and Notes (Princeton,NJ,
191 I). p. 22 ff.
S3. The philosophical material in this manuscript, which can be associated
with Akuin's pupil Candidus, has been discussed by C. lneichen-Eder:
'Thtologisches und philosophisches Lehrmaterial aus dem Alcuin-Kreise'.
D('lltsches Archit fiir Erforschung des Mittelalters 34 (1978). pp. 192-201
and .f. Marenbon: From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre. Logic,
Thenlo!{J' and Philosophy in tbe Early Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1981 ), pp.
;;.;~ .
. ';-f. Sc=e 1.. Wallach: Diplomatic Studies in Latin and Greek Documents
}rom !be Camli11gian Age (lthaca.NY. 1977), p. 71 ff.
SS See lneichc:n-Eder: op. cit., pp. 196-199 and Marenbon: op. cit .. p. S7.
CONCLlTSJON
Fide Trinitatis;'S6 the Libri Carolini make use of Macrobius;57

Servius provides information to Alcuin;58 Theodulf of Orleans is
familiar with Martianus Capella;59 and Boethius' school
writings, opuscula Sacra, and De Consolatione Philosopbiae
are among the sources used by Alcuin, the Anonymous of MS.
Miinchen /896/ - B, and the Libri Carolini. 6o Since this list in-
cludes the names of all the major Latin Platonic writers of late
antiquity, we should not expect Carolingian scholars after the
time of Alcuin to add significantly to the repertoire. Rather, the
contribution of Hadoard's extensive compilation of extracts
from Cicero's philosophical works,61 the editorial activity of
Lupus of Ferrieres on writers like Macrobius,6l and the
elaborate commentaries on Martianus Capella by Eriugena and
others6:\ is to the dissemination and systematization of such
authors' study. It will also be sufficient for our present purposes
to note that the manner in which the Latin Platonic writers of
late antiquity are studied by Alcuin and the other scholars of
Charlemagne's court is fully in accordance with the principles
56. Marius Victorious is one of the aurhors mentioned as being available at

York in Alcuin's poem De Patribus Regibus et Stmctis Euboricensis Ec-
clesiae. I. 15.36 ff. On the usc of this author in Aleu in's theological works see
P. Hadot: 'Marius Victorious ct Alcuin', Arcbi1es d'bistoire doctriiUI/e et
littemire du moyen tlge 21 ( 1954 ), pp. 5-19 and Lcs hymnes de Vit:torinus et
lcs hymnes Adesto et Miserere d'Aicuin , ibid. 2i ( 1960), pp. 7-1 '7.
5'7. See Wallach: op. cit .. p. 6:\.
5R. Senius is another of the authors mentioned as being available at York
in Akuin's poem.
59. Sec C. Cuissard: Tbeodu/phe, et,eque d'Uriffans (Orleans, IH92), pp.
218-2'51.
60. See Wallach: op. cit .. p. 70 ff., lneit:hen-Eder: op. cit .. pp. 194-197;
and Marenbon: op. cit.. pp. 55-57.
61. Sec intr .. n .. j I.
62. See A. Ia Penna: 'Le Parisinus /atinus 63 ..0 et It: texte des Commen-
rarii de Mac robe', Re/llle de phllologie et d 'histoire 21 ( 1950 ), pp. 177-1 H7.
6.3. This question will be discussed in detail on p. '7l)8 ff.
MEDIAEVAl. PLATONIS:\1 7H9
of Augustine, Cassiodorus, and Isidore. Thus, the notion that

literature of the pagan arts has a value in preparing us for the
understanding of Scripture is elegantly expressed by Alcuin in
his JJisputatio de Vem Philosophia where the biblical reference
w the seven columns on which Wisdom has built her house is
interprtted as signifying the seven liberal arts' relation to divine
truth.6t It is also illustrated in the same author's De Rhetorica et
de Firtutibus where the four cardinal virtues as defined by the
philosophers are examined as a preliminary for studying the
corresponding four virtues on which Christian ethics are bas-
edJ>'i In handling this question some changes of emphasis can be
<.ktected in the writings of the second and third generations of
Carolingian scholars: the literature of the pagan arts begins to be
studied more as an object in its own right, while the role of
dialectic within the scheme of those arts becomes a dominant
one for Eriugena and his circle.66 However, the basic assump-
(H. Alcuin: Disp. de Vera Philos. (PL to I, 853A-854A (where the work ap-
Pl':lrs as :1 prolo~ue to his De Grammatica)). Since the smdies of this text hy
F. Brunhiilzl: 'Ocr Rildungsauftrag der Hofschule', Kml der Grosse.
l.d>ensuerk wul Ne~cb/ehen II: Das geistige Leben. herausgegeben von W.
llraunfl'ls (Dusseldorf. 1965). pp. 2H---ll and P. Courcelle: La Consolation dc
Philosophic dtms Ia tradition litteraire, Antecedents et postirite de Boece
fl'arb. 1967) pp. :\3-ii we know that it is p:1cked with allusions to Boethius'
Oe Consolatimte Pbilosophitte.
<>5 Akuin: De Rhet. et de Virt. 44--47. The m;uerial on the pagan virtues is
drawn largdy from Ciccro 's De bll'l.!lltione (which is one of the major
sources for the whole hook). See Bowell: op. cit .. pp. 29 ff.. 69 ff. and S.
,\liihl: <JuaJriga \'irtutum. Die Ktudilwllugelldn in der Cielstesgescbicbteder
1\aru/ingazeit (Beibefte zum Arcbit .fiir Kulltu:~escbicbte 9) (Kiiln/Wien.
I>C.<)), p. H.~ IT.
(,(, Thnc transformations of perspec.:ti\'e ha\'c been s!Udied by G. Mathon:
l.es formes ct Ia signification de Ia pedagogic des arts libcraux au milieu du
IXl sil:ck. L'enscignemcnt palatin dc Jean Scot Erigene', Arts libemu.\ et
/JI>ilusopbit au mo)en tlge ( Actes t/u /Ve Congres International de
1'hilosofJbie Mtlditltc;le. 2- mnlt-.! septemiJre 196 ..) (MontrC::ti/Paris. 1969).
Pp. ,-.c,..and G. Schrimpf: Das Werk des .Joburmes Scottus Eriuge1w im
790 CONCLUSION
tion that these studies are ultimately directed towards the better
comprehension of Scripture remains intact.
It is within the area of the actual elaboration of philosophical
doctrine that we see the clearest evolution during the Carol-
ingian period. Although Alcuin and his contemporaries had ac-
cess to most of the Latin Platonic writers of late antiquity, it re-
mains true that their interpretation of those writers is entirely
within the perspectives established by the Latin Fathers,
Cassiodorus. and Isidore. However, in the cases of Eriugena and
other later Carolingian scholars there is a greater readiness to
approach the Latin Platonists on their own terms. A few ex-
amples will perhaps illustrate this.
(i) Johannes Scottus Eriugena
Among the various Latin Platonic writers Eriugena67 reveals a
marked preference for the later ones. A passage from Cicero's
Tusculanae Disputationes dealing with the Stoic theory of the
emotions is utilized three times in his Expositiones in lerar-
chiam Coelestem;6R a passage from Macrobius describing the
Greek exegetical principle of the 'purpose' (oK07t6c;) is the basis
of another section in the same work.69 From Martianus
Rahmen des Wissenscbaftsverstiindnisses seiner Zeit. Eine Hinfubrung zu

Periphyseon (Beitriige zur Gescbicbte der Pbilosopbie und Theologie des
Mittelalters. N.F. 23)(Mlinster. 1982), pp ..-\571 and 1.33 ff.
67. In my remarks about Eriugena, I shall not draw upon his glosses on
Martianus Capella. It is methodologically easier to discuss these in conjunc-
tion with the corresponding work by Remigius of Auxerre. See pp. 798-801.
68. Cicero: Tusc. Disp. IV, II ff. at Eriugena: Expos. itl /erarcb. Coel. 8,
275-292; 15. 612-616; 15, 1044-1049. In his second passage Eriugena sug-
gests that he is quoting Cicero through the intermediary of Augustine: Cit'.
Dei XIV. 8 (CCSL 48, -t23-42 5). Cicero is also cited incorrectly in place of the
Ciceronian excerptor Julius Victor at Eriugena: Periph. I, 161 B.
69. Macrobius: /11 Sumn. Scip. I, 4. 1-2 at Eriugena: E:xpos. in lerarch.
Coel. 3. 94-98. On Eriugena's use of Macrobius see H. Silvestre: 'Note sur Ia
survie de Macrobe au moyen :lge', Classica et Medim.'tltl/ia 24 ( 1963). pp.
170-180.
MEDIAEVAl. PLATONISM 791
capella's De Nuptiis Pbilologiae et Mercurii are derived a

p;tssage in the Peripbyseon concerned with the measurement of
the earth's circumference7 0 and another dealing with the
dimensions of the lunar body;7t from Boethius come three
passages in the same work describing the transcendent status of
numbers, their derivation from the monad, their production of
sensible bodies, and so on72 together with a further passage
dtaling with the impossibility of converting the soul into God
or the body into soul. 73 That these are virtually the only
pass<tges in which philosophical material is drawn directly from
the Latin Platonists is an indication of Eriugena's theological
rather than cosmological emphasis in the works cited.
There are, however, various other arguments in Peripbyseon
where Eriugena quotes not the Latin Platonists of late antiquity
but Plato himself through such intermediaries. In the first place
we have a discussion of the world's soul and body. 'For Plato,
the greatest of those who have philosophized about the world,
asserrs by many arguments in his Timaeus that this visible world
is constituted of body and soul like some vast animal, and that
the body of this animal is composed of the four well-known and
general elements and of the different bodies arising from them
\vhile the animal's soul is a universal life which animates and
moves all things which are in motion and at rest .... But because
the soul itself, as he declares, is eternally in motion in order to
vivify and administer its body, that is the whole world, and to
move it by the uniting and separating of various individual
"'II. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. VI, 609 at Eriugena: Peripb. III. 719A. On
the Carolingian glosses on Martianus Capella sec pp. 798-80 I .
.., I. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. VIII, 859 at Eriugena: Peripb. Ill, 720 B.
.., 2. Boethius: De Aritbm. I, I, 7, 21 ff. at Eriugena: Peripb. I. 498B-C (ex-
plidtly dting De Aritbmetit:u); ibid. l, 5038-C; and ibid. Ill, 655 A (citing his
IJe Matbesis lihri). On the Carolingian glosses on Bocthius sec pp. 802-80-i .
..., .'\ Boethius: Contra Eu~)cb. el Nest. 6, 7 3-82 at Eriugena: Peripb. V, 877
B (explidtl)' citing this work as secundus /iber de Trinitate).
CONCLLISJON
bodies in different ways. and yet remains in its natural and un-
changing state; for these reasons it is always in motion and
always at rest. Similarly the body, that is the universe of visible
things, is partly at rest in eternal stability as earth, partly in mo-
tion with eternal velocity as the aetherial region, partly neither
at rest nor in motion with velocity as water, and partly in mo-
tion with velocity but not the maximum velocity as air. And this
argument of the greatest of philosophers is not wholly to be
despised, I believe, because it seems perceptive and in accor-
dance with the nature of things'. 74 Eriugena has derived this
discussion without doubt from Calcidius' Commentarius in
Timaeum, since its final section does not correspond to
anything in the Ciceronian translation of the dialogue.7S It is
also clear that Eriugena is using Calcidius' commentary rather
74. Eriugena: Periph. I, 476C-477A Plato siquidem phllosophantium de

mundo ma.\'imus in Timeo suo multi.~ ralim1ibus asseril htmc mundum
tislbilem quasi magnum quoddam animal corpore animaque componi,
cuius anima/is cmpus quidem est qualluor elementis notissimis
generalibusque ditersisque corporibus ex eisdem compos/tis compactum,
m1ima t 1ero ipsius est generalis vita quae omnia qtwe in motu atque in
statu stml tegetal atque nuJI!et ... Sed quia ipsa m1ima, ut ail ipse, aeter-
naliter movetur ad corpus suum, id est totum mundum, tivificandum
regendum dft,erslsque ration/bus variorum corporum si11gulorum coniunc-
timlibus resolulionibusque mot,endum, manet etitml in suo naturali im-
mobllique statu, motetur er-go semper et stat, ac per hoc et corpus eius, id
est tmitersitas rerum tisibilium, partim quidem stat aeterna stabilitate, ut
est terra: parlim tero aeten1a t.elocitate motJetur, ut est aetherium
spatium: partim nee stat nee telociter mcJIIetur, ut aqua: partim teloclter
sed non telodssime, ut est aer. Et haec ratio summi philosoph/ non est om-
1lino spernemla, ut aestlmo. Acuta enim atque rwturalis esse t'ldetur. The
same theory is mentioned at ibid. Ill, 735C and (without specific citation of
the Timaeus) at ibid. Ill, 72RA.
"'5. Ckero's translation goes only as far as Plaro: Tim. <t7b- a condition in
which it had apparently been since antiquity- whereas the classification of
dements according to their mobility occurs at ibid. 55 e - 56 a. Eriugena
would also have found the doctrine of the world as soul and body in
MEDIAEVAl PlATONISM
than his translation alone, since the latter breaks off before the
discussion corresponding to the last part of the Pe1iphyseon's
account.- 6
Plato is also explicirly cited in support of Augustine's account
of rhc nature of matter. 'With this Plato agrees in his Timaeus,
lkdaring in similar terms that formless matter is a receptivity to
forms.-- The source of this quotation is in all likelihood
catcidius' translation of the Timaeus, since the most relevant
section of Plato's text was not translated in the Ciceronian ver-
sion.-H
A third discussion quoting Plato through the intermediary of
the Latin Platonists of late antiquity concerns the motion of the
~l:tcrohius' Commentarirts in Somnium Scipionis and in Boethius' De Con-

so/atiom.> Pbi/osopbiae, but in these works the classification of elements
docrihe;-d dot:s not occur.
-(~ Calddius' translation goes as far as Plato: Tim. 53 c - a statt: in which
it was :tpparcntly left by the author- although the classification of elt:mcnts
at iiJid. 55 t.'- 56 a is anticipated at Calcidius: In Tim. 21, 71, 24-22,73.4.
The following scholars have argued for the use of Calcidius by Eriugena: P.
Duhcm: Le systi!me du mrmde. Histoire des tloctrines cosmologiques de
Plat on d (.'opemic 111 (Paris. 1915). p. 61; M. Cappuyns: jean Scot Erigene.
Sa t'il', .wn oewre, sa pensee(louvain-Paris. 1933). p. 392. n. 4; G. Mathon:
'jean ~cot l:rig~nt:, Chalcidius et le probleme de !'arne universclle (A propos
dt.~ .Innotationes in /Uartianum 7. 10)', L 'bomme et sm1 destin d'apres les
/JI!IIseurs c/u moyen dge (Actes du premier Congres /ntertwtiona/ de
Philosopbie mr!dietale, Lmwain-Bru."<elles. 28 amit - 4 septembre 1958)
(lou\':tin-Paris, 1960), pp. J61-75; and E. Jcauneau:}ean Smt: flome/ie surle
Prologue de Jean. lntmductirm, texte critique. traduction et notes par E../.
(Pari~ ll)(,9t. pp. -10--1 I. The use has been questioned by). Drascke: 'Johannes
Sc01u~ l'rigcna um.J dessen Gewahrsmanncr in seinem Werkc De ditisione
naturae lilni 1", Studien zur (iescbicbte der Tbeo/ogie und cler Kircbe 912
(lcipl.iJ(. 190.! l. p. 2H ami 1. P. Sheldon-Williams: Eriugena's Gn:ek Sources.
The Minct 1~( Eriugetw. Pe~pers of a Colloquium. Dublin 14-18 }II~)' 19"0.
Ec.lncll hY.f.J 0':\kara and 1.. Bider (Duhlin. 1973). p. I.
fi .,., Eriugcna: Peripb. I. SOOC cui assent it Plato 111 Timeo, similiter in-
ortllem 111 1 .
., a eruun esse dicens fontwrum capacitatem.
H. Plato discusst:s this question at Tim. -!He- 51 b. Sec n. "'S.
CONCI.LISION
heavenly bodies. 'Indeed, those planets which circle around it

change their colors in accordance with the qualities of the
regions which they traverse. I am referring to Jupiter, Mars,
Venus, and Mercury which always accomplish their orbits
around the sun, as Plato teaches in the Timaeus. Thus. when
they are above the sun, they reveal a bright countenance and
when below it a reddish one'. 79 Since this unusual attribution of
heliocentric orbits to four planets deviates radically from the
teaching of the Timaeus itself, there has been considerable
debate among modern scholars about a possible intermediate
source or sources upon which Eriugena depends.so Calcidius'
Commentarius in Timaeum quotes a doctrine of Heraclides
Ponticus assigning such an orbit to Venus,Ht and so it may be
that Eriugena is extrapolating from this text which he has used
elsewhere. However, since Martianus Capella reports a doctrine
attributing heliocentric orbits not only to Venus but also to Mer-
cury ,sz it seems more likely that the Carolingian writer is also
dependent upon the latter.
79. Eriugena: Periph. Ill. 698A Plmzetae tero quae circa eum l'(J/vtmtur
mutant co/ores secundum qualitates spatiorum in quibus discurrunt,
lorem dico et Martem. Venerem et Mercurium, quae semper circulos suos
circa so/em pe,.agunt sicut Plato in Timeo edocet, atque ideo dum supra
so/em sunt claros ostendunt tJultus, dum tJero infra rubeos.
80. That Eriugena is advocating a heliocentric theory of planetary motion
is the opinion of the majority of modern scholars. However. for a dissenting
view see E. von Erhardt-Siebold and R. von Erhardt: The Astronomy of
.fobmmes Scott1s Erigena (Baltimore. MD. 19-40) and Cosmology in tbe An-
notationes in Mardanum. More Ligbt ott Erigena 's Ast1"mwmy (Baltimore,
MD. 1940.) These authors' translation of the passage quoted is totally dif-
ferent.
81. Calcidius: In Tim. 110, 157.6-21.
82. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. VIII. 857. The same theory is expressed in
a less distinct form by Macrobius: In Srmm. Scip. I. 19. 5-6. For excellent
discussion of these passages see W. H. Stahl: Roman Science. Origins,
Derelopment. and Influence to tbe Later Middle Ages (Madison, WI. 1962),
pp. 148-149, 158-160, 183-184.
MEDIAEVAL PLATONISM 79'i
Plato is again explicitly cited in connection with a discussion

of the nature of angels. 'I say nothing of Plato who defines
angels as "rational immortal animals" lest 1 be thought a
follower of his sect' ,83 The source of this quotation is in all pro-
bability Calcidius' commentary on the Timaeus, where exactly
1hcse words are applied to demons if not to angels. 84
In certain other arguments of Periphyseon it is not Plato who
is quoted through the intermediary of the Latin Platonists of late
antiquity but Virgil. Thus, three lines from the poet are inserted
into the lengthy report of Plato's doctrine of the world's soul
and body discussed above. 'In the first place, a spirit sustains the
heaven and earth, the watery wastes, the shining globe of the
moon and the star of Titan from within' .ss It is possible that
Eriugena himself perceived the connection between the state-
ment in Virgil's poem and Plato's cosmological theory but, since
this association has already occurred in two earlier writers:
Macrobius who was certainly known to himB6 and Servius who
probably was,s7 it is more reasonable to assume that the Carol-
ingian author has derived the whole sequence of ideas from
these intermediaries. The account in Servius' Commentarius in
Aeneidem is the more extensive of the two and is therefore
perhaps more likely to have been recalled by Eriugena.
Virgil is also explicitly cited as an authority on the doctrine of
the four elements. 'For when heat mingles with wetness and
H.~. Eriugt:na: Peripb. Ill, 7320 De Platone sileo, ne l'idear sectam i/lius
sequi. qui diffinil ange/os esse animalia rationabilia immortalia. The
S:lmt: dt:finition is utilized at ibid. IV, 762C-763A.
H-~. Calcidius: In Tim. 13'i. 17'i, 16-18.
H'\. Eriugena: Peripb. I, 476C-D Principia cae/um ac terram camposque
licfuemes I lucentemque glob urn /unae titaniaque astra I spiritus intus alit.
1{(,. M:tcrohius: In Srmm. Scip. I, 14, 14.
H~ Sl'rvius: In Aeneid. VI, 721-726. The same passage of Servius also
reters to the Greeks' description of the totality of God and the world as 'the
All' (to nciv): a notion which Eriugena translates into the Christian context at
Peripb. I, 4698. Cf. however Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. 17, 'i.
":'l)(l CONCl.L'SlON
coldness with dryness in a certain natural coming together, all

things which arise on land or in the sea receive their generation.
This is what the poet meant when he said: "Then Aether, the
almighty father, descended into his consort's lap with
widespread fertilizing showers". He called the fiery quality
which is heat "father" and the watery quality which is coldness
fertilizing showers'; by calling the fertility of wetness which is
the quality proper to air and of dryness which is the qualitative
property of earth "his consort's lap", he signified the earth
together with the denser air adjacent to it with the single name
of a wife so to speak' .RH The source of this interpretation is in all
likelihood Servius' Virgilian commentaries once again, for there
the same physical allegory is elaborated in explanation of these
lines.H<J Eriugena's own contribution is to make the theory a lit-
tle more complex and confused by incorporating reminiscences
of the Aristotelian pairing of qualities transmitted through
Isidore of Seville.
(ii) Other Writers
a) The treatise De Anima ad Odonem Bellovacensem of
Ratramnus of Corbie is an interesting testimony to the evolution
of Platonic doctrine during the mid-ninth century .90 Here,
H8. Eriugena: Peripb. Ill. 712 8-C Dum enim caliditas umiditati et
frigid/las ariditali natura/i quodcmt coitu miscentur, omnia quae in terra
et marl nasnmtur procreationem accipitmt. quod etiam poeta intelligebat
clicens: 'Tunc fuller omnlpotens foecwulis lmbrihus aetber I coniugis in
gremium late clescendit'. Patrem siquiclem ignemn qua/itatem, qtwe est
caliditas. foecwulos te1o imbres aquaticam, qtwe est frigid lias, appellat!/1.
crmiugis tero gremium fertilitatem umiditatis, quae est qualitas aeris pro-
pria, et arlditalis, quae est terrm qtwlitatit.la proprietas, tocando unius
L'eluti uxoris nominafiune terram cum sibi proximiuri et corpolentiori aere
significal'it.
H9. Servius: In Georg. II. 325. The same verse is interpreted in less detail at
Augustine: Cit. Dei IV. 10 (CCSl. 4"'. 106-108).
90. For the tl'Xt Sl'C C. l.ambot: LiiJer de Anima ad Oclonem
Be/lcJI'acensem. te.Yte inedit pub/ie par C. L (Analecta Mediaetalia
MEDIAEVAl. PLATONISM
R;llramnus replies to a theory regarding the nature of soul- ex-

pounded by a monk of Saint-Germer de Fly in accordance with
till' u:aching of a certain Macari us Scottus - based on the inter-
pretation of Augustine's De Quantitate Animae.9t On this
,icw. of the three possibilities considered in this text that soul is
one. that it is one and many. and that it is many Augustine
himself gives support to the second:92 a fact which necessitates
a metaphysical doctrine that there is a single soul which is the
source of the multiplicity of souls. This corresponds to the
uni\'ersal 'soul' to which the particular souls arc related.93
Ahhough the argument is here nominally derived from
Augustine. it is easy to see the parallels with Eriugena and his
secular Platonic sources: the notions that the primal soul is a
'fount' (jons) and that it is both one and many recalling
l\lacrohius and Eriugena;94 the statements that the primal soul is
1\'ammceusia 2) (Namur/Lille. 19S2) and for commentary P. Delhaye: Une

colltml'erse sur /'dme tmirersel/e tltl IX siecle (Analeclct Medfae1a/ia
Namurcensial) (Namur/Lille, 19SO). The dating of the work to the early 860s
is ~Uf.:f.:l'Sttd hy .J.-P. Bouhot: Ratramne tie Corbie. Histoire /itlf!rctire et con-
ll'lll'erses doctrilw/es (Paris, 1976), p. S9.
'>I Au~ustine: De Quant. Anim. 32. 69 (Pl. 32. 107."). On the Stoic and
Platonic theory of the cosmic soul which ultimately inspired Augustine's
di~nts~ion here stt n. 25.
lJ2. R:uramnus: DeAnfm. ttdOdon. 3. 36. S-37 . .f: 10, 137. 23-131-l. 9.
93. IIJid. 9. 130. 20-23 'He says therefore that the human soul is a universal
and that from it the particular souls descend. They arc also contained hy i! in
order that they might subsist, since those among which the division occurs
arl' uuabk to subsist in the ahstnce of that universal' (Dicit itaque quotl
humm1a tlltima species sit, et de bac specie particulares animae descen-
(/ant. (//Uie ('limn continetmtur Clb ilia ut suhsistere possint. qtwniam mm
e.,istente sfJecie, nee illtt in qutte pttrtitio fit subsistere pnsszmt). It is in-
terlstin~ 10 note that Macarius' disciple identifies the primal soul with the
Uni\Lrsal 'soul' - something which ancien! Ncoplatonism a\oided (see
Plotinus: Enn. V. 9 lSI 13. 1-7) - although there may be some distortion in
R:ttr:unnus' rtport of his dourine.
91 Hatramnus: De Anim. ad Odon. ""~. 109. 1-4: 9, 133 ..B-13'*. 3 cf.
798 CONCLL'SION
'matter' (materia) and that it corresponds to Adam recalling

Eriugena.lJ'; At all events, Ratramnus replies that of the three
possibilities considered earlier Augustine himself gives assent to
none, since he is concerned with the concept 'soul' which can
be universal or particular depending upon its application.96
Moreover, in the former case the concept of soul does not cor-
respond to a single entity which is the source of the coordinate
multiplicity.97 Apart from the intrinsic philosophical impor-
tance of the matters discussed, Ratramnus' De Anima ad
Odonem Bellovacensem has two features which claim our at-
tention as historians. First, its writer lays emphasis upon the fact
that he will reply not by appealing to Scripture but to the doc-
trines of the arts and the philosophers;9B secondly, in carrying
out this program he makes considerable use of Boethius' Contra
Eutycben et Nestorium and In /sagogen Editio Secunda.99
b) Of the various sets of glosses on Martianus Capella dating
from the Carolingian period, those attributed to Eriugena (ex-
tant in two versions) and those by Remigius of Auxerre un-
Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 6, 20 on the notion of the primal soul as fount;

Ratramnus: De Anim. ad Odon. 2. 29. 2.:j-29 cf. Macrohius: In Somn. Scip. I,
14. 7 on the notion of the primal soul as one and many. Eriugena describes
his primordial causes in similar terms throughout Peripbyseon, and these
causes include that of mankind as a whole.
95. Ratramnus: DeAnim. adOdon. 9. 133. 33134, 3 cf. Eriugena: Peripb.
I. SOOC-S02A; Ill. 636C-637 A; Ill, 664 B-66SA; etc. where maner is included
among the inlorporeal causes of things; Ratramnus: De Anim ad Odun. 9.
13-f. 12-19 cf. Eriugena: Peripb. IV, 7688-7728: IV, "'99C-803A: etc. where
Adam corresponds to the incorporeal cause of all men.
96. Ratramnus: De Anim. ad Odon. -4. -40. 26-4 I, 28; H. I 14. 1-116, 20; 8,
119,8-120,23;9.136,9-137.6: 10,140,27-1-ll,.:j.
97. Ibid. 2, 28,4-29, 23: 5. 52, 1-6,83, 31:8. 121, 21-12.:i, I; 9, 130,
34-131.37.
98. Ibid. S. 53. :PS-i. -1; 7, 106,31-107, 2:9. 13S. 12-IH. Appeals to the
Christian faith do, however. appear later in the treatise. See ibid. H. 118.
19-25;8,IH,l ff.:etc.
99. Ibid. 5. 51. 29-6. 83. 31.
MEDIAEVAL PLATONISM '799
doubtedly hold the greatest interest for the historian of

philosophy.oo It is naturally impossible to present an adequate
account of these glosses here, but a few remarks are necessary
regarding their exegetical framework and philosophical content
respectively. Regarding the exegetical framework, it can be said
that both the Eriugenian M and C glosses and Remigius' glosses
interpret the marriage of Philology and Mercury and the ensuing
apotheosis as signifying the requirement to combine the
tOO. There is a number of manuscripts containing all or part of Remigius of

Auxerre's commentary on the De Nuptiis of Martianus Capella (see C. E. Lutz:
R1migii Autissiodorensis Commentum in Martianum Cape/lam /, edited
ll'itb an Intruduction bJ' C. E. L. (Lei den, 1962), pp. S0-54 ). Among these, the
:\IS. Paris R.N. lat. 12960 also contains anmher commentary on the same
text ;mrihutable to Eriugena (see C. E. Lutz: Johann is Scotti Amwtationes in
.llarcimzum. edited by C.E.L. (Cambridge,MA, 1939)). Furthermore, the MS.
U.\ford Roell. Auc. T. 2. 19 contains yet another commentary on Martianus
Capella attributable to Eriugena (see E. jeauneau: Quatre themes erigeniens
rcm~(tfrence A/bert-Ie-Grand /CJ74) (Montreal/Paris, 1978), pp. 91-166). The
~rudy of these texts is beset with many difficulties: (i) The e\'idencc docs not
pnmit the whole of the 'Eriugenian' commentaries to be attributed reliably
to Eriugen;l; (ii) The precise relation of the three commentaries to one
another and to certain other Carolingian commentaries is a mauer of debate;
and (iii) The two 'Eriugenian' commentaries differ to some extent although
they h;lve equal claims to stem from Eriugena. Among the numerous scholar-
lv contributions W. H. Stahl: 'To a Better Understanding of Martianus
<:apdla . .\jJecu/u m 40 ( 1965 ), pp. I 02-1 1; describing the nature of the pro-
blem~ and G. Schrimpf: 'Zur Frage der Authentizitat unserer Texte vonJohan-
nt, Snlltus' Atmotationes in Mc1rtianum The Mind of Eriugena. edited by
.f . .f. O'Meara and l. Bieler (Dublin. 1973). pp. 125-139 outlining a
lllethmlology for their solution will serve as convenient introductions. In
wh;tt follows. I shall adopt the approach favored by the majority of recent
~chol;trs in holding the Paris manuscript (henceforth described as C = Cor-
htiensis) and the Oxford manuscript (henceforth describeu as M = Mettensis)
to contain much authentic Eriugenian commentary on the earlier books of De
.YujJtiis and to represent separate ahbrcviations of the same authentic com-
11ll'ntary on De Nuptiis 1.
800 CONClliSI<>N
quadrivium and the tnvtum in the pursuit of wisdom. JOJ

However. the somewhat rationalistic tendency of this inter-
pretation is mitigated in the Remigian commentary by stressing
the role of Pallas - interpreted as signifying scriptural wisdom
- who is consulted about the advisability of the marriage yet
distances herself from it.I02 Furthermore, both the Eriugenian
glosses and Remigius' glosses indicate a full understanding of
the different senses in which the mythological symbols can be
understood: metaphysical, physical, astronomical, and so
forth.l<H However, the relatively limited scope of the remarks
on such topics in Eriugena's glosses is vastly expanded in the
Remigian commentary where each symbol is systematically
evaluated for its Christian as well as for its secular
significance.IO-t Regarding the philosophical content of the
glosses on Martianus Capella, we should note that both the
Eriugenian M and C glosses and Remigius' glosses reveal a clear
appreciation of the Platonic character of the doctrines express-
ed in De Nuptiis and of the manner in which they can be inter-
preted in conjunction with similar ideas in Calcidius,
Macrobius, and other writers of late antiquity. JOS Thus, all three
glosses interpret the embossed sphere placed before the gather-
ing of the Olympians as signifying the transcendent Forms or
Ideas. Remigius providing the fullest explanation that the
sphere corresponds to an eternal paradigm in the mind of God
101. Set: Eriugena: In Mart ..~. -i (M), 6, 20 (C); Remigius: In Mart. 6. 20; 7,
2.
102. Remigius: I" Mart. 2i. 1-i; 2i, 14. There art: valuable t'omments in C.
E. Lutz: 'Remigius Ideas on the Classification of the Seven Liberal Arts',
Traditio ll. ( 19'i6), pp. 6'i-86 and 'Remigius' Ideas on the Origin of the Seven
Liberal Arts'. Mediaetalia et Humanlstica I 0 ( 19i6), pp. 3219.
103.SeeEriugena:b1Mar/. i.14;6.20;7.li;9,12(C).
10-i.Remigius:lnMar/.7,16; 19.11.
IO'i.SeeEriugena:ln,'t-far/. 7,10;7,13: 13.2:\(C).
MEDIAEVAl. PLATONISM HOI
according to which all created things are fashioned.I06 All three

glosses likewise understand Endelechia the mother of Psyche as
equivalent to the universal soul which is the source of particular
souls, the Eriugenian C glosses bringing in Plato's Timaeus and
Calcidius' commentary. Remigius' glosses Plato, Aristotle,
Virgil, Calcidius, and Acts as evidence.lo.. All three glosses
elaborate at various points on the Platonic doctrines of the des-
cent, transmigration, and ascent of individual souls, the Eriuge-
nian M glosses noting Plato and Cicero's Somnium Scipionis,
the C glosses Macrobius, and Remigius' glosses Plato and the
philosophers as supporting testimony .1os Finally, all three
glosses interpret the variegated raiment of Juno at the gathering
of the Olympians as signifying the different manifestations of
divinity in the physical cosmos, the Eriugenian M glosses and
Remigius remarking elsewhere that this theory of divine im-
manence in the cosmos is attributable to the Roman writer
Varro.1o9
106. Eriugena: hz Mart. 32.6 (M); 32.7 (C); Remigius: In Mart. 32.7 ff. See
<i. Schrimpf: 'Idee II A 2', Historiscbes Wiirterbucb der Pbilosopbie 4.
herausgegeben von). Ritter und K. Grunder (Basel, 1976), p. 68.
w-. Eriugena: /11 Mart. 7, 10 (M): " 10 (C); Remigius: In Mart. r, 10. G.
Mathon: 'jean Scot Erigi:ne. Chalddius et le probli:me de l':ime universelle',
pp. 561-57'; demonstrates Eriugena's extensive knowledge of Cakidius on
the basis of these glosses.
I OH. Eriugena: /11 Mart. 15. 2-4; 15. i-IH (;l-1); U. I (C); Remigius: hi Mart .
.. . II; 13. I: 13. 6. On the exposition of Platonism in M and the apparent
niticism of it by Prudent ius of Troyes see H. liebeschiitz: western Christian
Thought from Boethius to Anselm'. Tbc Cambridge History of /.a fer Grcek
and Ear~l' /Hedietal Philosophy. Edited by A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge.
ll)(,-). pp. 'P6-i78 and 'The Place of the Marti;mus G'lossae in the Develop-
llll'nt of Eriugena's Thought'. The Mind of Eriugena. edited by J. J. O'Meara
and 1.. Bieler pp. 49-'iH. On the Macrobian reference in C see Silvestre: op.
cit, pp. 172-17-f.
109. Eriugen;t: /11 Mart. 27, 'i-8: 32. i (.1-1): 31. 12; 34. 5 (C}, Remigius: In
.1/art. 21. II; 26. -t. On the report of Varro's cosmology in M and the :tp-
parlnt criticism of Prudentius of Troyes sec lieheschiitz: 'Western Christian
802 CONCLUSION
c) Of equal interest to the historian of philosophy are various

sets of glosses on the writings of Boethius which first appear
during the Carolingian period and continue to be produced into
the eleventh and twelfth centuries. ItO Once again it is impossi-
ble to present an adequate account of these glosses here,
although their character may be indicated by tracing the evolu-
tion of commentary upon one passage of Boethius De Consola-
tione Philosophiae. In the famous poem Ill, 9. where Plato's
cosmological theory is brilliantly summarized, the writer ad-
dresses God in the following terms: 'You dispose through the
harmonious parts of the cosmos a soul of threefold nature
which moves all things. It is placed in the middle and, when
divided, produces two circuits of motion'"' This passage at-
Thought from Boethius to Anselm', pp. 576-578 and "The Place of the Mar-
tianus Glossae in the Development of Erlugena's Thought', pp. 49-58.
II 0. There are two main traditions of glossing Boethius" works in the Mid-
dle Ages: one associated with the Opuscula Sacra and one with De Crmsokl-
tione Phi/osophiae. The first tradition is represented by an early commentary
probably from the hand of Remigius of Auxerre (see E. K. Rand: johannes
Scottus (Quel/erz und Ullfersuchungen zur lateinischen Phi/olugie des ,.,fit-
telalters 1/2) (Miinchen, 1906) together with M. Cappuyns: 'Le plus ancien
commentaire des Opuscula Sacra et son origine', Recherches de theologie
ancienne et medietale 3 (19.:H). pp. 237-332 and E. K. Rand: 'The Supposed
Commentary of John the Scot on the Opuscula St1cra of Boethius'. Retue
mfoscolastique de philosophie 36 (1934) (Hommage a M. de Wulj). pp.
67-77). and by an important group of twt:lfth-century works. The second
tradition includes a number of commentaries from the "Anonymous of St.
Gall" in the ninth century onwards: see the titles listed in nn. 112, 114, and
116 for extra<.ts from these texts.
I II. Boethius: De Consol. Phi/os. Ill, m. 9. 1."1-1 5 Tu triplicis mediam
naturtle c:zmcta moventem I conec:tens animllm per consoru1 membrtl
resoltis. I Quae cum secltl duos motum glomeratil in orbes ... for discus-
sion of the mediaeval commentaries on this work see P. Courct:lle: La Con-
solation de Philosophic dans Ia tradition /itteraire. Antecedents et puster/te
de Boece (Paris. 1967). pp. 239-299: F. Troncarelli: 'Per una ricerc:a sui com-
menti altomedicvali at De Consolatione di Boezio , ,.,fiscel/ttnea in memoria
di G. Cencetti (Torino, 19"7."1), pp. 363-380: and). Beaumoll!: 'The Latin
MEDIAEVAL PLATONISM
tracted the attention of many of the mediaeval glossators not

least because of its resistance to an obvious Christian interpreta-
tion. and in response to it they ask three questions: (i) what is
this soul?, (ii) why is it threefold?, and (iii) how is it in the mid-
dle? Thus, the commentary of Remigius of Auxerre begins by
considering the opinion of the philosophers according to which
the soul is another name for the sun, its threefold nature is
manifested in its being, its warming, and its shining, and its mid-
dle position in its relation to Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars on one
side and to Venus, Mercury, and the moon on the other.lll In
this interpretation, Remigius takes a detail from Macrobius'
Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis, another from
Augustine's Soliloquia, and another from the astronomical
handbook tradition. II~ The Anonymous of Bruxelles 10066- ":'7
is more systematic in sketching out two distinct interpretations
of the soul. In the first place, it may be another name for the
sun, in which case its threefold nature and its middle position
can be understood in the ways already indicated; secondly, it
may correspond to the human soul whose relation to the body
is analogous to God's to the world. Thus, its threefold nature is
n:presented by its division into rational. irascible. and concupis-
cent, and its middle position by the localization of its activity in
the heart.II4 Various verbal borrowings in this commentary in-
Tradition of the De Conso/atione Phi/osophicle . Boetbius: His Life, Tlmugbt

and ll~f1uence, edited by M. Gibson (Oxford. 1981 ), pp. 278- :\OS.
112. For the text see H. F. Stewart: 'A Commentary by Remigius
:\utissiodorc:nsis on the De Consolaticme Phi/osophiae of Boethius',jnurna/
uf Tbeulngica/ Studies 17 (1915-1916), p. 32 and E. T. Silk: Saeculi Noni
.4ucturis in Boetii Crmsolationem Pbi/osophiae Commenttlrius (Roma.
19 V; ). p. ;\:\5 ff. For discussion see Courcelk: op. cit., pp. 278-290 and Beau-
mont: op. cit., p. 285 ff.
II:\. Sc:c: Macrobius: In Sonm. Scip. I. 20, 6- the sun is the 'mind of the:
world' (mens mundi)- and Augustine: So/if. I, 8, IS (PL .U. 877).
_ 11"1. for the: text sec: H. Silvestre: 'I.e commentaire incdit de Jean Scot
Erigcne au metre IX du livre III duDe Ccmsolatirme Pbilosophiae de Bocce'.
H<H CO:"t~CLUSION
dicate that the Anonymous is familiar with Calcidius, II 'I and so

it is likely that the ideas about the division of the soul and about
its localization are derived from this source, even though
Calcidius' espousal of the thesis that the world has a soul of its
own is completely ignored. The commentary of Bovo of Corvey
concentrates on reporting the doctrine of the philosophers ac-
cording to which the soul corresponds to the world soul, its
threefold nature being manifested in its distribution of reason,
sense, and life to different creatures, and its middle position in
its diffusion through the world.ll6 In this interpretation, Bovo
explicitly cites his sources: Macrobius' Commentarius in Som-
nium Scipionis and Servius' Commentarius in Aeneidem, the
first and last points apparently coming from both writers and
the second from Macrobius alone.ll7
To attempt a survey of the intellectual and educational ad-
vances associated with the late eleventh and early twelfth cen-
turies is even more beyond the scope of these concluding
remarks. However, it should at least be noted that the study of
the Latin Platonic writers of late antiquity reaches its greatest
climax during this period. Thus, in their different ways Anselm
of Canterbury, the School of Chartres, Abailard, the School of
St. Victor, john of Salisbury, and others provide testimony to an
Retue d 'bistoire ecclesiaslique 4 7 ( 19S2), p. SH ff. Both these interpretations

m:cur in Remi~iu1i' commentarr although the distinction between them is less
clearly formulated. The philosophical ideas in this and the mher commen-
taries on De Cfmsolatione Phi/osopbiae have been recently examined by G.
d'Onofrio: 'Giovanni Scoto c Remigio di Auxcrrc. A proposito di :dcuni com-
memi altomedievali a Boezio'. Sttuli Medietali, Serie 3. 22 ( 1981), pp.
SH7-693.
II S. The parallels arc nmcd by Silvestre: op. cit., p. S9.n. I and p. 61, n. 4.
I 16. For the text sec R. B. C. Huygens: 'M inclaltlrlichc Kommcmare zum
0 qui pettJelml', Sucris Erudiri 6 ( 19S.f ). p. 390 ff. For discussion see
Courcelle: op. cit .. pp. 292-29<;.
117. Sec Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I. I.J, 6-H and mhcr passages; Servius:
In Aeneid. VI, 724-727.
MEDIAEVAL PLATONISM HO"i
unprecedented assimilation of material derived from such

sources. From the viewpoint of the repertoire of authors there
are perhaps two ways in which the tendencies initiated by
Carolingian scholars are reinforced. First, the volume of com-
mentary on the Latin Platonic writers in general is increased:
Calcidius becomes the starting point for a number of newer ex-
positions of Plato's cosmology; ttll Macrobius' Commentarius
in Somnium Scipionis is subjected to formal glossing for the
first time; tt<J Martianus Capella provides the basis for various
fresh discussions of the liberal arts; 12o and Boethius Opuscu/a
Sacra and De Consolatione Philosophiae are studied in
systematic glosses of a more elaborate kind, Ill although the
IIH. Th~se ar~ surveyed in T. Gregory: Platonismo Mediet(l/e. Studi e

ricercbe (Roma. 19';8), p. S3 ff. and M. Gibson: 'The Study of the Timaeus in
tiH' Eknnth and Twelfth Centuries', Pensmniento 2S (1969). pp. 183-194.
William of Conches' glosses ha,c been edited by E. .Jeauneau: Guillaume de
Cuuchs: (;Jos:tt.' super Platonem. 1i.xte critique mec introduction, notes et
taiJ/esparE.}. (J>aris, 196"i).
119. Set. E.,Jeauncau: 'Gloses de Guillaume de Conches sur Macrohe. Note
~ur In manuscrits'. Arcbites d'histoire doctritwle et litteraire du moyen dge
r (1960). pp. 1..,23 and P. Dronke: Fabula. Explomtions into the Uses of
.\lyth in Me,lieNII Platonism (Leiden/Kiiln, 1974 ). pp. 1-78.
120. See E. ,Jeauncau: 'Note sur l'cn>le de Chartres'. Studi medietali .:;
! I <J(HI. pp. H"i"i-H(H and W. W~thcrhee: Platonism and Poetry in the Ttte/ftb
C'11/w:r(Prinleton.:'l). 19"'2). pp. 111-12.:; and 267-272.
121. l'seful discussion is presented hy G. Schrimpf: Die Axiomenscbtip
des /Juetbius (De hdldomadihus) als pbilosopbisches Lebrbucb des liJit-
telallers (l.cidcn. 1966), pp. "i/-118. The glosses on the theological tractates
hy Thil'fry of Chartr~s havt= been edited hy N. M. Haring: Commentaries on
Boetbius by ThienT of Chartres and his Schon/ (Toronto. 1971 ); those hy
<ilhl'rt of Poiticrs hy N. M. H;iring: Tbe Commentaries rm Boetbius by
C,"/IIJrt of PrJi/iers (Toronto, ll)66); and those of Clarcmhald of Arras by N.
\1 ll;iring: /,U( and \f'orks of Claremlulltl r~( Arms. 11 Tuelfth-Cnfllry
.\faster ~{!be Sclmol of (.'bur/res (Toronto. 196"i ). Extracts from William of
Comhe~ glosses on De Crmsolatione Pbilosopbiae arc contained in ,1.
l';trcnt: l.u doctrine tie Ia creation duns /'ecole de Cbartres (Publi:atirms de
I'Jnstitut d '!!tudes Mediemles d 'Ottmm 8) (Paris. 19 38). pp. 122- 136.
806 CO:'>JCLllSIO:'>J
relative emphases placed upon these writers are different to

those which occurred in the Carolingian period.l.2.2 Secondly,
the repertoire of Latin Platonic writers who are systematically
exploited is expanded: Cicero's philosophical works begin to
play a more constructive role; 123 Seneca's Epistulae Morales
and Naturales Quaestiones are used in both theology and
natural science;l24 Apuleius' interpretation of Plato's thought
becomes increasingly well-known; 1.2'i and the Latin Asclepius is
treated as a philosophical textbook of fundamental impor-
tance, 1.26 even though none of these acquires a significance
equivalent to that possessed by the more established group of
texts.l.27 From the viewpoint of the method of employing these
authors the tendencies initiated by Carolingian scholars are also
reinforced. Thus, the notions that the pagan arts are useful as
aids to the comprehension of Scripture and that they form a
122. For example. Calcidius has more importance than in the Carolingian
period, while Martianus Capella is somewhat less significant.
123. See T. Gregory: Anima Mundi. La filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches
e Ia smola di Chartres (Firenze, 1955). p. 123 ff. and 184-185; Platonismo
mediezale. Studi e ricerche, p. 136 for some useful illustrations.
12-i. On the influence of these works on Anselm of Canterbury and
William of Conches see K.-D. Nothdurft: Studien zum Einfluss Senecas auf
die Philosophie zmd Theologie des zu6/ften jahrhunderts (Leiden/~oln,
1963). p. 161 ff. and 182 ff.
125. On the influence of Apuleius over john of Salisbury set D. D.
McGarry, The Metalogicon ofjohn of Salisbury. A Twe/fth-Cellfury Defense
of the Verbal cmd Logical Arts of the Trivium, trmzslated with an Introduc-
tion and Notes by D. D. MeG. (Berkeley/Los Angeles. 1955), p. xxiii and
passim.
126. See R. B. Woolsey: 'Bernard Silvester and the Hermetic Asclepius',
Traditio 6 ( 19-iH), pp. 340-34-i and B. Stock: ll1ytb and Science in the Tue/ftb
Century. A Study of Bernard Siltester (Princeton.NJ, 1972). pp. 101-103.
150 ff.. etc.
127. This was clearly because their less metaphysical tendency was ob-
vious to twelfth-century thinkers.
unified and coherent program of study are reiterated, us

although the emphasis placed upon the positive contribution of
the arts to such knowledge and the extension in both the
number and the content of those arts is greater than in earlier
times.t29 When we look at the manner in which the Latin
Platonic writers are used by Anselm of Canterbury, the School
of Chartres, Abailard, the School of St. Victor, and john of
Salisbury, it seems reasonable to conclude that the philosophical
learning of late antiquity has now been reappropriated as a
whole in the Christian context. Since the modern scholarly in-
vestigation of this period is undeniably still in its infancy, it is
obvious that the true extent of this reappropriation will become
even more evident in the future .t30
128. Classic texts illustrating this are Thierry of Chartres' Heptateucbon.

Hugh of St. Victor's Didascalicon, and John of Salisbury's Metalogicon.
129. See G. Pare, A. Brunet, P. Tremblay: La renaissance du Xlle siec/e.
l.es emles et l'enseigtzement (Publications de l'lnsHtut d'Etudes Medierllles
d'Ottmva .3)(Paris, 1933). p. 94 ff.
1.30. For suggestions regarding future research see G. Verbeke: 'Les
sources de Ia pensee medlevalc:. Antiqultc et moyen age', Arts libemu., et
pbilosopbie au moyen dge (Actes du /Ve Congres International de
Pbi/osopbie Medieva/e, 21 aotU-2 septembre 196~ (Montreal/Paris, 1969),
pp . .38.3102.
Appendix
Varro
X.ll INTRODUCTION
Cicero had perhaps only one Roman contemporary whose

knowledge of Greek philosophy equalled or surpassed his own:
M. Terentius Varro.l We have already seen how Varro was one
of the main speakers in the Academica, and the introduction to
that work supplies useful information about the relationship
between the two men or at least about Cicero's view of that
relationship. The dramatic setting of the dialogue is a conversa-
I. For a general introduction to Varro it is still useful to refer to the old

work of G. Boissier: Etude sur Ia vie et les ouvrages de M. T. Varron (Paris,
1861). Among more recent treatments, the most useful are perhaps H.
Dahlmann: 'Terentius Varro', Paulys Realencyclopiidie der klassiscben
Altertumswissenschaft, Suppl.-Band 6 (Stuttgart, 1935), col. 1172-1277; F.
della Corte: Varrone. II terzo gran lume romano (Genova, 1954), the value
of the former being restricted by brevity and that of the latter by excessive
generality. Varro's writings are listed in A. Klotz: 'Der Katalog der var-
ronischen Schriften', Hermes 46 (1911), pp. 1-17. Bibliographies of editions
and secondary works can be found in B. Cardauns: 'Bibliographie varro-
nienne', Varron. Six exposes et discussions (Fondation Hardt, Entretiens sur
l'Antiquite classique 9) (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1963), pp. 209-212; H.
Dahlmann: 'Varroniana', Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt:
Festschrift]. Vogt I, 3, herausgegeben von H. Temporini (Berlin, 1973), pp.
3-25; and B. Riposati e A. Marastoni: Bibliografia varroniana (Milano,
1974). For the influence of Varro on the Christian tradition see E. Schwarz:
'De M. Terentii Varronis apud sanctos Patres vestigiis', jahrbiicher fur
klassische Philologie, Suppl.-Band 16 (1888), pp. 405-499 andJ. H. Waszink:
'Varrone nella letteratura cristiana dei primi secoli', Atti del Congresso Inter-
nazionale di Studi Varroniani, Rieti settembre 1974 I (Rieti, 1976), pp.
209-223.
809
810 APPENDIX
tion between Cicero, Atticus, and Varro in the country villa of

the last-named at Cumae, and Cicero begins the discussion by
asking Varro a question which has arisen, he says, from his own
recent labors in expounding the Academic philosophy in Latin.
Why does Varro, who is such a prolific author and so expert in
the history of philosophy, decline to expound the most impor-
tant philosophical topics in his own writings?2 Varro's reply is
that there are no readers for such works since on the one hand,
experts in the field turn immediately to the Greek originals and
on the other, those who are repelled by their technicalities will
be no more sympathetic to a Latin version. He then goes on to
show that one cannot expound any of the three main topics of
philosophical discussion: logic, physics, and ethics without
resorting to technical language, at the same time not letting slip
an opportunity to denounce the popular philosophical writings
of the Epicurean school. However, in conclusion Varro adds
that he has not totally passed over philosophical questions in his
works, since there is considerable discussion of ethics in his
satires written in imitation of Menippus, while the prefaces to
the work entitled Antiquitates are composed specifically with
philosophers in mind.3
In the course of this reply to Cicero, Varro has already reveal-
ed what his own philosophical allegiance is - to the Academy
-by quoting Plato's dictum that philosophy is the greatest gift
bestowed upon mankind by the gods.4 The remainder of this
opening discussion, in which Cicero defends his project of
translating Greek technical philosophy into Latin and invites
Varro to essay a similar task, now describes the nature of this
allegiance more precisely.5 Although both Cicero and Varro
consider themselves to be Academics, they seem to have taken
2. Cicero: Acad. 3.
3. Ibid. 4-8.
4. Ibid. 7. Cf. Plato: Tim. 47b.
5. Cicero: Acad. 9-14.
VARRO 811
different views of the Platonic tradition, for Varro accuses

Cicero of deserting the Old Academy for the New. Cicero
replies that according to Philo of Larissa there is only one
Academy, to which Varro in his turn""l"ejoins that Antiochus of
Ascalon has effectively combated Philo's view. Varro is in fact
defending the interpretation of Platonism by Antiochus with
whom he once studied in Athens, and it is this philosophical
doctrine which Cicero now calls upon him to expound.
X.12 THEANTIQUITATES RERUM DIVINARUM
Varro's ensuing account of the Antiochean philosophical

system has already been studied in detail, on the assumption
that it is really a work of Cicero and only of a fictitious or
'literary' Varro.6 Although this account contains nothing which
conflicts with the philosophical views expressed elsewhere in
the authentic Varronian corpus, it is obviously more important
to assess Varro's (as opposed to Antiochus') doctrines in the
light of his own writings. However, the extant works of this
great polymath contain little in the way of philosophical discus-
sion,7 and so we are compelled to resort to the fragmentary
material preserved in unsympathetic later authors.
Among these fragmentary works, it is perhaps the one whose
full title is Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum which primarily
demands our attention for two reasons. First, it appears to have
contained Varro's most concentrated philosophical exposition.
This is indicated not only by Cicero's remarks in the mouth of
the character Varro which were noted earlier,s but by a state-
ment of Servius that Varro had treated of the soul's nature very
extensively 'in his first book on divine matters' (in prima
6. See pp. 101-118.

7. Although there is one important theological passage in De Lingua
Latina. See pp. 830-831 and n. 64.
8. See above.
812 APPENDIX
divinarum).9 Secondly, it is the Varronian work which is most

influential in later times, especially upon Christian writers who
viewed it as a definitive statement of paganism useful as a target
for their own polemic.10 For this reason, the fragments preserv-
ed by Tertullian and Augustine who, unlike some of the other
writers of late antiquity, seem to have had access to Varro's
original text, 11 are sufficiently extensive for a reconstruction of
the work's main outlines to be attempted. (A third more prac-
tical reason for concentrating on the Antiquitates is that among
the fragmentary writings ofVarro it has attracted much scholar-
ly attention in modern times, the most recent attempt at
reconstruction being that undertaken by B. Cardauns.12 This
naturally makes it a most readily accessible source of Varronian
material for the present project).
The basic structure of the Antiquitates13 is explained by
Augustine, who states that Varro composed forty-one books of
'antiquities': twenty-five on human matters followed by sixteen
on divine matters. The treatment of divine matters was clearly a
survey of religious practice divided up according to a fourfold
9. Servius: In Aeneid. VI, 703.

10. See B. Cardauns: M. Terentius Varro, Antiquitates rerum divinarum I-II
(Wiesbaden, 1976). Cardauns traces the influence of this work especially in
Seneca, Aulus Gellius, Macrobius, Servius, and the grammarians in ibid. II,
pp. 127-128.
11. Arnobius and Lactantius, however, seem to have taken material from
the Antiquitates via an intermediate Christian compilation. See Cardauns:
op. cit. II,pp. 127-128.
12. Seen. 10. For bibliographical information on earlier collections see H.
Dahlmann: 'Varroniana', pp. 13-16.
13. Another fragmentary work of Varro which is relevant to our study is
his compendium of the liberal arts entitled Disciplinae. See F. Ritschl: 'De M.
Terentii Varronis Disciplinarum libris commentarius', Kleine philologische
Schriften (Opuscula philologica) 3 (Leipzig, 1877), pp. 352-402 and M.
Simon: 'Zur Abhangigkeit spatromischer Enzyklopadien der artes liberates
von VarrosDisciplinarum libri', Philologus 110 (1966), pp. 88-101.
VARRO 813
classification with three books each on 'men' (homines),

'places' (loci), 'times' (tempora), and 'things' (res)- these were
concerned with priests, temples, festivals, and rites respectively
- followed by three books on the objects of these observances
- the gods themselves - the whole project being prefaced by a
general discussion of theological questions.I4 For purposes of
reconstructing Varro' s philosophical position, our attention
must be directed to the first introductory book whose fragments
deal with a topic of considerable interest: the famous threefold
classification of theology itself into 'mythical' (mythice),
'natural' (physice), and 'civil' (politice), whose sources have
been energetically debated.l5 Into the first category come ac-
counts of the gods' miraculous births and of their immoral con-
duct, 16 into the second the doctrines of the philosophers that
14. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 4 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VI, 3 (CCSL 47, 168-169)).
The numbering of the fragments will follow the edition of B. Cardauns.
15. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 6 (Augustine: Civ. Dei. VI, 12 (CCSL 47, 184)) and fr.
7 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VI, 5 (CCSL 47, 170-172)). The scholarship on this
question has been discussed and evaluated by G. Lieberg: 'Die theologia
tripertita in Forschung und Bezeugung', Aufstieg und Niedergang der
romischen Welt: Festschrift]. Vogt I, 4, herausgegeben von H. Temporini
(Berlin, 1973), pp. 63-115. Among more important treatments are]. Oroz de
Ia Consolaci6n: 'lntroducci6n a una theologia agustino-varroniana, vista
desde Ia Ciudad de Dios', La Cuidad de Dios, Numero Extraordinario 1
(studios sobre la Ciudad de Dios) (El Escorial, 1954), pp. 459-473; P.
Boyance: 'Sur Ia theologie de Varron', Revue des etudes anciennes 57 (1955),
pp. 57-85; B. Cardauns: Varros Logistoricus uber die Gotterverehrung (Curio
de cultu deorum). Ausgabe und Erkliirung der Fragmente (Wiirzburg, 1960),
pp. 53-67; ]. Pepin: Mythe et Allegorie. Les origines grecques et les contesta-
tions judeo-chretiennes (Paris, 1958), Nouvelle edition (Paris 1976), pp.
276-392; H. Hagendahl: Augustine and the Latin Classics, with a Contribu-
tion on Varro by B. Cardauns (Goteborg, 1967), pp. 589-666; T. Orlandi:
'Sallustio e Varrone in Agostino, De Civitate Dei I-VII', La parola del passato
23 (1968), pp. 19-44; and G. Barra: Lafigura e l'opera di Terenzio Varrone
Reatino net De Civitate Dei di Agostino (Napoli, 1969).
814 APPENDIX
the gods are generated or eternal or that they are composed of

fire, numbers, or atoms (all of which is more appropriate for
scholars than for the general public),I7 and into the third the
beliefs of the priests regarding the objects and methods or
religious observance .Is The placing of the classification near the
beginning of the book underlines its importance for Varro as a
methodological principle yet, because of the fragmentary
nature of the text, it is not easy to determine precisely how this
tripartite scheme is handled in analyzing the diverse theological
material in the remainder of the work. This question has not
been successfully resolved by the modern scholarship, and I
would therefore suggest the following tentative reconstruction.
At the outset, it seems clear that Varro gives pride of place to
the physical theology. He argues that for more than one hun-
dred and seventy years the Romans worshipped their gods
without any anthropomorphic images, a practice which would
lead to a purer form of religion were it continued to the present
time.I9 Elsewhere he remarks that if he were founding the
Roman state afresh, he would bestow names upon the gods
derived 'rather from the principles of nature' (ex naturae
potius formula).20 However, the continuation of this latter
passage shows that Varro will not devote the present work only
to the exposition of natural theology, despite his personal
18. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 9 (Augustine: Civ. Dei. VI, 5 (CCSL 47, 170-172)).
19. Varro:Antiqu. fr. 18 (Augustine: Civ. Dei. IV, 31 (CCSL47, 125-126)).
Varro's attitude here has been compared with that of Q. Mucius Scaevola, a
pontijex maximus of the early first century B.C. Augustine: Civ. Dei IV, 27
(CCSL 47, 120-122) reports that Scaevola made a slightly different use of the
tripartite scheme by rejecting the theologies of both the poets and the
philosophers in favor of that of the state. We shall see that Varro's interpreta-
tion is much more complex than this. On the whole question see Boyance:
op. cit., pp. 63-66; Pepin: op. cit., pp. 280-283; and Cardauns: Varros
Logistoricus ii.berdie Gotterverehrung, p. 53 ff.
20. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 12 (Augustine: Civ. Dei IV, 31 (CCSL 47, 125-126)).
VARRO 815
preferences, since he lives in a society which is endowed with

many ancient traditions whose content cannot be ignored. The
result is therefore that civil theology will be the actual starting
point for the Antiquitates. From here onwards is the most
delicate part of our interpretation, for Varro m'akes it clear that
this civil theology does not exist in isolation but depends for its
source material either upon myth or upon natural science. Thus,
Augustine remarks that Varro did not distinguish the civil from
the mythical and natural theologies as a separate kind, but
understood it 'rather as a combination of the two' (magis eam
ex utraque temperatam).21 Although the writings of the poets
21. Varro:Antiqu. fr.11 (Augustine: Civ. DeiVI, 6(CCSL47, 172-174)).

The double relation of civil to mythical and to natural theology explains, I
believe, the meaning of Varro: Antiqu. fr. 23 (Tertullian: Adv. Nat. II, 2,
14-20 (CCSL 1, 43-44)) and fr. 30 (Tertullian: Adv. Nat. II, 14, 1 (CCSL 1,
68)). The former cites the tripartite theological scheme of 'Dionysius the
Stoic' who classifies the gods into (i) visible, for example the sun and the
moon; (ii) invisible, for example Neptune; and (iii) men who have been
deified, for example Hercules and Amphiaraus. In the latter fragment, the
same Dionysius simply distinguishes (a) native gods, and (b) manufactured
gods. There seems little doubt that (i) and (ii) in the former fragment corres-
pond to (a) in the latter fragment, while (iii) in the former fragment cor-
responds to (b) in the latter fragment. See the note in Cardauns: M. Terentius
Varro, Antiquitates rerum divinarum II, p. 154. However, this is only the
beginning of the problems surrounding this tripartite scheme, since textual
corruptions in the former fragment have given rise to two radically different
interpretations of the same passage. According to Pepin: op. cit., p. 279
Dionysius' three groups correspond to the natural, mythical, and civil
theologies respectively, whereas according to Cardauns: M. Terentius Varro,
Antiquitates rerum divinarum II, p. 150 the three are merely subdivisions
within natural theology. The logic of the argument goes against Cardauns, for
it is difficult to see why Varro would include the deified heroes in natural
theology. However, the phraseology of the text itself speaks against Pepin's
view, at least if we accept the very reasonable emendations proposed by
Borleffs. A way out of this impasse can perhaps be found by applying
Dionysius' three categories neither to the three theologies nor simply to
natural theology but to natural theology in relation to the other theologies.
816 APPENDIX
were too base to guide the people and those of the philosophers
too obscure - these two theologies moreover disagreeing with
one another - there are nevertheless many elements which
civil theology can adopt from both sources.
A study of the remaining fragments of Antiquitates I indicates
that Varro 's aim is to investigate the civil theology in terms of its
origin in either myth or natural science, although these two ap-
proaches are clearly not viewed by him as having equal value.
The relation of civil to mythical theology is described in several
fragments, one of which laments the fact that the people were
often more inclined to follow the poets than the philosophers,
with the result that the gods were endowed with sex and paren-
tage.zz The mythical basis of much civil theology is also shown
by the belief that certain heroes of history were transformed in-
to gods, to be eventually worshipped in specific countries -
like Amphiaraus at Thebes - or throughout the world - like
Castor and Pollux.23 Varro contends that such doctrines are
false, although even a mistaken belief in divine parentage could
have a positive social value in encouraging aspiration towards
noble conduct,24 and so it is to natural theology that we should
turn in preference. A number of fragments therefore describe
the relation of civil to natural theology, the most important il-
lustration of this being the location of Jupiter's temple in the
Capitol as an indication of his status as the supreme cosmic prin-
Thus, Dionysius' first group corresponds simply to natural theology, his se-
cond group to natural in relation to mythical theology, and his third group to
natural in relation to civil theology. On this basis a real distinction between
the three groups can be maintained, while the reference to natural theology
alone at the beginning of the text retains its obvious meaning.
22. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 19 (Augustine: Civ. Dei IV, 32 (CCSL 47, 126)).
23. Varro:Antiqu. fr. 31 (Tertullian:Adv. Nat. II, 7, 1 (CCSL 1, 51))andfr.
32 (Servius Danielis: In Aeneid. VIII, 275).
24. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 20 (Augustine: Civ. Dei III, 4 (CCSL 47, 67-68)) and
fr. 21 (Augustine: Civ. DeilY, 31 (CCSL 47, 125-126)).
VARRO 817
ciple.2S Jupiter is furthermore the object of worship among

those peoples such as the Jews who revere a single deity
without recourse to anthropomorphic depictions.26
By this point Varro has made his position reasonably clear: he
will study the civil theology in the Antiquitates primarily in
terms of its basis in natural theology, and so the remaining
fragments of the first book are concerned either with the
natural27 or with the civil theology.28 This approach is main-
tained during the last three books when the su9~ect of the gods
themselves is resumed. In this latter section of the work we find
a new threefold classification of theology into the studies of
those gods whose nature and function are 'certain' (di certi), of
those whose nature and function are 'uncertain' (di incerti), and
of 'the primary and select gods' (di selecti atque praecipui).29
These three categories do not correspond to the earlier three
but rather represent different aspects of the relation between
civil and natural theology. Thus, when Varro discusses the cer-
tain gods, he is concerned primarily with the civil side of the
relation, where every aspect of human life is associated with a
cult deity of precise function. However, when he examines the
uncertain gods and the primary or select gods, his interest lies
primarily with the natural side, where the role of these deities as
expressions of natural forces becomes the principal topic. It is
inevitable that the less precise the gods' cult roles are the more
they lend themselves to abstract interpretation, and so it is hard-
ly surprising that Varro's last book has the aim of finally bring-
26. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 15 (Augustine: Civ. Dei IV, 9 (CCSL 47, 105-106))
and fr. 16 (Augustine: De Cons. Evang. I, 22, 30 (CSEL 43, 28)).
27. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 24 (Tertullian: Adv. Nat. II, 3, 1, (CCSL 1, 44)).
28. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 33a (Tertullian: Adv. Nat. II, 8, 6 (CCSL 1, 53)).
29. Tertullian: Adv. Nat. II, 9, 3 (CCSL 1, 55) and other testimonia cited by
Cardauns: M. Terentius Varro, Antiquitates rerum divinarum I, p. 63 ff.
818 APPENDIX
ing the civil and natural theologies into agreement.30
X.21 VARRO'S MONOTHEISM
The most striking feature of Varro's theology - that is civil

theology interpreted by means of natural theology - is its
definite monotheistic tendency: an aspect duly noted by
30. Augustine: Civ. Dei. VII, 5 (CCSL 47, 190-191)). Varro's tripartite
scheme and its applications invite comparison with certain texts of Cicero
discussing the nature of the gods. See Pepin: op. cit., pp. 300-305. Perhaps
most interesting in this connection is De Nat. Deor. II, 56-69 where the at-
tribute of divinity is applied successively to (i) the world and the heavenly
bodies (ibid. II, 59-60); (ii) things of great utility conferred upon humanity.
For example, corn is Ceres (ibid. 60); (iii) extremely powerful forces. For ex-
ample, Faith and Mind have temples devoted to them on the Capitol (ibid.
61-62); (iv) great human benefactors who have been deemed gods because of
the immortality which their souls earned. For example, Castor and Pollux
(ibid. 62); and (v) figures of poetic fiction which symbolize natural forces.
For example, the belief that Caelus was castrated by his son Saturn, then
Saturn thrown into bondage by his son Jupiter, indicates that the highest ele-
ment of aether or fire which by itself generates all things lacks that bodily
member which requires union with another to achieve procreation (ibid. 63
ff.) Category (i) clearly coincides with Varro's natural theology, whereas
categories (ii), (iii), and (iv) seem to be versions of Varro's civil theology.
However, the extensive developments in category (v) (of which only one il-
lustration has been quoted) seem to go beyond Varro, since the latter tends to
downplay the mythical theology in the Antiquitates. What seems to have oc-
curred is that Varro's theory that civil theology should be purified by increas-
ing its dependence upon natural science and decreasing its dependence upon
myth (Antiqu. fr. 11 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VI, 6 (CCSL 47, 172-174)) has led
him to apply to civil theology the physical allegory which Cicero applied to
mythical theology. The comparison between Varro and Cicero reveals two
important facts: (a) that the various methods of theology interrelate in a very
flexible manner, different authors combining different elements in accor-
dance with their respective philosophical aims; and (b) the most famous prac-
titioners of these methods in the period before Cicero were the Stoics whose
spokesman Balbus is at Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II,. 59 ff.
VARRO 819
Augustine.31 It is a fundamental tenet of the Antiquitates that

the world is governed by a supreme deity whom it w()uld have
been better to worship without an 'image' (simulacrum) than to
depict anthropomorphically as Jupiter.32 But since we are con-
cerned with the existence of civil theology as a fact, it is
necessary to discuss the nature of Jupiter, a god held to be
supreme because he holds the causes of all things in himself,33
or because he is a 'spirit vivifying all things, by which the world
is filled' (spiritus vivificans omnia, quo mundus impletur) in
Augustine's words.34 Elsewhere Varro speaks of the supreme
cosmic principle in different language by saying that the whole
of nature is governed by 'soul' (anima),35 and this leads him to
the further conclusion that Jupiter is equivalent to the world
soul.36 Here, we see a clear reference to the characteristic doc-
trine of both Platonism and Stoicism, no doubt transmitted to
Varro through the teachings of his master Antiochus,37 and the
writer shows that he understands its varying application in
several other fragments. On one occasion the supreme God is
31. Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 7 (CCSL 47, 191-192).

32. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 15 (Augustine: Civ. Dei IV, 9 (CCSL 47, 105-106))
together with Augustine's own comment.
33. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 235 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 9 (CCSL 47, 193-194))
'The god ... who has control of the causes by which anything in the world
happens' (deus ... habens potestatem causarum, quibus ali quid fit in mun-
do) and fr. 238 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 12 (CCSL 47, 196)) 'And he is called
Pecunia, because all things are his' (et Pecunia ... vacatur, quod eius sunt
omnia).
34. Augustine: De Cons. Evang. I, 23, 34 (CSEL 43, 32). Cf. Civ. Dei IV, 12
(CCSL 47, 110).
35. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 227 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 23 (CCSL 47,
203-205)).
37. As W. Theiler: Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus, 2. Auflage
(Berlin/Zurich, 1964), p. 54, n. 3 and Boyance: op. cit., pp. 79-82 have noted.
On Antioch us' doctrine of the world soul see pp. 110-116.
820 APPENDIX
said to be equivalent not simply to the soul of the world - for

this soul manifests itself on a number of different levels: in some
things as life, in others also as sense, and in yet others also as
'mind' (animus) - but to its highest manifestation in which in-
telligence resides.38 On another occasion Varro identifies the
supreme God not simply with the soul of the world but with
'the world itself' (ipse mundus) although, just as a wise man is
wise not because he consists of body and soul but because of his
soul, the world is God not on account of its corporeal mass but
on account of its soul. 39
These texts describing Varro's theological doctrine exemplify
a pattern which should be familiar to us by now: a God is
depicted who is both transcendent and immanent, although the
transcendence is the predominant aspect of the picture.4o This
combination of tendencies has its historical origin in the syn-
thesis of Platonic and Stoic doctrines which characterized An-
tiochus' philosophy, and can be further illustrated by a passage
in Seneca's De Consolatione ad Helviam41 where there are
203-205)). It should be noted that Varro uses the term animus for 'mind'
with anima reserved for 'soul' in the wider sense. However, in the previous
fragment animus seems to indicate 'soul' in contrast to body. The flexibility
of terminological usage parallels the Ciceronian practice. See ch. 1, n. 255.
39. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 226 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 6 (CCSL 47, 191)).
40. See pp. 94-99 for the Stoics and 101-118 for Antioch us.
41. Seneca: Consol. ad Helv. 8, 3 'Believe me, this was done by him,
whoever he was, who created the universe, whether he is an omnipotent
god, or an incorporeal reason creating great works, or a divine spirit per-
vading all things both great and small with a uniform tension, or fate and the
unalterable sequence of causes dependent upon one another' (Id actum est,
mibi crede, ab illo, quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille deus est patens
omnium, sive incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artijex, sive divinus
spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima aequali intentione diffusus, sive
fatum et immutabilis causarum inter se cobaerentium series). Two points
in this passage are worthy of note: (i) The reference to God's incorporeality.
That Platonists of this period attributed incorporeality to God is stated
VARRO 821
clearly Varronian influences at work. Varro's view of the stabili-

ty of the natural order is quoted in the preamble to a theologic~l
meditation in which God is said to be (i) an omnipotent cause,
(ii) an incorporeal reason producing great works, (iii) a divine
spirit pervading all things, and (iv) the ineluctable succession of
fate. I. Marten42 first drew attention to this text by observing
repeatedly in the doxographical tradition. See Cicero: De Nat. Deor. I, 30

'Again, Plato holds that God is without any body (as the Greeks say, "incor-
poreal")' (Quod vero sine corpore ullo deum vult esse (ut Graeci dicunt
aa<i:>J.Latov)); Seneca: De Superst. in Augustine: Civ. Dei VI, 10 (CCSL 47,
181-183) 'Am I to tolerate either Plato or Strato the Peripatetic, of whom one
says that God has no body, the other that he has no soul?' (Ego feram aut
Platonem aut Peripateticum Stratonem, quorum alter fecit deum sine cor-
pore, alter sine animo?); and Tertullian: Apol 47, 6 (CCSL I, 163) 'Some
assert that God is incorporeal, some that he is corporeal. Thus the Platonists
and the Stoics' (Alii incorporalem asseverant, alii corpora/em, qua
Platonici et Stoici). The question in relation to all these passages is: is this in-
corporeality a rarefied corporeality (of the aether) or a genuine spatia-
temporal transcendence (as in the classical theory of Forms)? See pp. 96-98.
(ii) The uniform tension of the divine spirit. This is apparently a reference to
the Stoic theory that different levels of being are associated with varying
degrees of tension in the pneuma. See Philo: Quod Deus sit Immut. 35 (SVF
II, 458). But if this is the case, what does the suggestion that the tension is
uniform mean? The answer is indicated by the words 'pervading all things
both great and small' which show that Seneca's source has the Stoic doctrine
of infinite divisibility in mind. According to this theory, however much one
divides the pneuma one will never reach an indivisible unit, since every part
mirrors the whole. See Plutarch: De Comm. Not. 38, 1079a (SVF II, 484) 'The
Stoics contend that a man does not consist of more parts than a finger, nor
the world of more parts than a man. For the division of bodies is to infinity,
and there is no greater or lesser among infinites' (YEVOJ.lEVOl Oi; l:twi:Koi &o-
~O.~ouatv, w~ OOK EOttv EK 1tAElOV(J)V J.!Opiwv 6 avepw1to~ i\ 6 &O.KtUA.o~. o0&'6
KOOJ.LO~ i\ 6 av8pw1to~ (E7t't'i7tetpov yap i] toJ.Ln 7tpouyet til a<bJ.Lata t&v
&'a1tEipwv oO&ev EOtt 1tf...eov oo&'eA.attov )). Interestingly, it is precisely this
theory which Varro links with the account of motion in his exposition of An-
tiochus' theory at Cicero: Acad. 27-28, a further piece of evidence for the
Varronian character of Seneca's argument at this point.
42. I. Marten: 'Ein unbeachtetes Zeugnis von Varros Gotteslehre', Archiv
822 APPENDIX
that it contains an un-Senecan theology in which divine

transcendence (in (ii) and (iv)) is juxtaposed with divine im-
manence (in (i) and (iii)), and Platonic philosophy (in (i) and (ii))
with Stoic speculation in (in (iii) and (iv)). Although Varro's
name is not explicitly linked with the four categories presented
here, the combination of notions is very similar to tendencies
manifested in the extant fragments of his work.
X.22 VARRO'S POLYTHEISM
In the texts examined so far, Varro's theology has emerged as

a kind of monotheism in which God is interpreted as the world
soul. However, despite his personal inclinations in this regard,
Varro was not simply concerned with the exposition of natural
theology, but with the interpretation of civil theology by means
of natural theology. In other words, some account had to be
given of the traditional polytheistic religion of the Roman state
according to which Jupiter was the king of the gods. The solu-
tion to this problem is described by Augustine in words which
no doubt recall the original text of the Antiquitates: 'Let the one
god Jupiter be all the gods and goddesses or, as some would
have it, let all these be his parts or powers. This is the view of
those who maintain that he is the world soul'. 43 It is not clear
whether either Varro or Augustine intends to suggest that there
are two theories here - one simply maintaining that there is an
identity between the one and the many gods, the other that the
fur Gescbichte der Philosophie 43 (1961), pp. 41-5I. Cardauns: M. Terentius

Varro, Antiquitates rerum divinarum II, pp. 226-227 argues that the connec-
tion of this text with Varro cannot be proven.
43. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 27 (Augustine: Civ. Dei IV, II (CCSL 47, 108-IIO))
omnes dii deaeque sit unus Iuppiter, sive sint, ut quidam volunt, omnia
ista partes eius sive virtutes eius, sicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet esse
mundi animum. Cf. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 225 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 5 (CCSL
47, 190-I91)).
VARRO 823
one is divisible into parts or powers - or only that the first

statement is an imprecise version of the second. But it is signifi-
cant that in other texts the nature of the relation between
Jupiter and the other gods is described more fully. Thus,
Augustine continues his exposition of the same theory by speak-
ing of Jupiter 'to whom perhaps all the other gods are to be
referred ... since all are really Jupiter himself, whether they
should be considered his parts or powers, or whether the force
of the soul, which they believe pervades all things, has assumed
the names of many gods from the parts of this mass into which
our visible world expands or from the manifold operations of
nature'.44 Here, Varro or Augustine seems to refer to two ways
of formulating the relation between the one and the many, for
the gods are either to be viewed as 'parts' (partes) or 'powers'
(potestates) of Jupiter = the world soul, or else as 'names'
(nomina) of a single force derived from the place or manner of
its operation.
This philosophical interpretation of polytheism was not
originated by Varro or by his teacher Antiochus, but goes back
at least to Stoic sources and ultimately to Xenocrates and the
Old Academy.45 There is a certain amount of fragmentary tex-
tual evidence for the Stoics' attempts to harmonize the tradi-
tional Greek theology and philosophical notions, and these in-
44. Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 13 (CCSL 47, 196-197) ad quemfortasse ceteri
referendi sunt . . . cum hie ipse sint omnes, sive quando partes eius vel
potestates existimantur, sive cum vis animae, quam putant per cuncta dif-
fusam, ex partibus molis buius, in quas visibilis mundus iste consurgit, et
multiplici administratione naturae quasi plurium deorum nomina ac-
cepit. Cf. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 237 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 11 (CCSL 47,
195-196)).
45. For Xcnocrates see Aetius: Plac. I, 7, 30 (DG 304b 17 -22) 'He calls the
watery aspect Poseidon, the generative aspect of earth Demeter. He
paraphrased earlier doctrines of Plato and passed them on to the Stoics' (-ci]v
OE OtU 'tOU uypoi3 TioaEtf>Glvu, -ci]v OE OtU 'tfi~ yfi~ <pU'tOCJ7t6pov dft~TJ'tpU. 'tUU'tU
f>e XOPTJYitau~ -cot~ 1:-cffitKot~ -cu 7tp6-cepu 1tapu -coG Tii..a-cffivo~
~E'tU7tE<ppU KEV).
824 APPENDIX
deed seem to have achieved the synthesis in ways which parallel

Varro's procedure. According to one report46 the Stoics main-
tained 'that there is only one God and a single self-same power,
which is called by various names in recognition of its different
functions' (non esse nisi unum deum, et unam eandemque
potestatem quae pro ratione officiorum variis nominibus ap-
pellatur). It is actually possible that this passage depends upon
Varro, in which case we would not have clear evidence for the
earlier doctrinal position but simply for later Platonic con-
tamination. However, Philodemus' fragmentary De Pietate47
provides earlier testimony of Chrysippus' interpretation of
traditional theology according to which (i) the various names of
Zeus are explained as signifying his different functions as cause
of life, as fate and necessity, and so on; and (ii) the various gods
signify 'not that there are male and female divinities' (J.LTJ dvat
8couc; lippEvac; J.LllOE 811A.ciac;) but that Zeus 'is simply named as
male and female' (OVOJ.LU~E08at OE J.LOVOV appEVtKffic; Kal.
811A.UKffic;).48 Since the evidence is so fragmentary, it is perhaps
unwise to speculate too much on the Stoics' philosophical
46. Servius: In Georg. I, 5 (SVF II, 1070). Cf. Servius: In Aeneid. IV, 638
(SVF II, 1070).
47. Philodemus: De Piet. 11 (SVF II, 1076 = DG 545b12-547b16). This
whole passage should be compared with Cicero's account of Chrysippus'
theology at De Nat. Dear. I, 39-41.
48. It is obvious that this passage suggests two ways in which the relation
between unity and plurality is formulated: (i) as the relation between Jupiter
and his various names, and (ii) as the relation between Jupiter and the other
gods. Both occur with equal frequency in Stoic texts. For (i) see Stobaeus:
Eclog. I, 31 (SVF II, 1062); Lydus: De Mens. IV,71,122,15-19 (SVF II, 1063);
for (ii) Plutarch: De Isid. et Osir. 40, 367c (SVF II, 1093); Servius: In Georg. I,
5 (SVF II, 1070); for (i) and (ii) Philodemus: De Piet. 11 (SVF II, 1076 = DG
545b12-547b16); Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Philos. VII, 147 (SVF II, 1021). Both
occur in Varro also. For (i) see Varro: Antiqu. fr. 237 (Augustine: Civ. Dei
VII, 11 (CCSL 47, 195-196)); for (ii) Varro: Antiqu. fr. 229 (Augustine: Civ.
Dei VII, 2 (CCSL 47, 185-186))
VARRO 825
motives for developing such a theory, although their interpreta-

tion of polytheism is undoubtedly a logical consequence of their
physics. In the Stoic universe there is really no relation of cause
and effect between two things, because any two things are
ultimately just moments in the life of one thing: the primal God.
Since the world consists only of body, when one thing is said to
be the cause of another, it is not strictly the cause of that other
but of something 'incorporeal' (aaroJ..la-rov).49 For the Stoics
there are in fact two levels of being: the one corresponding to
the underlying reality of the single force, the other to a plurality
of incorporeal 'expressions' (A.EK-ru) arising on the surface of
reality. It is this epistemological nominalism which is reflected
in the theological discussions through the application of the
terms nomina-OVOJlU~Ea8at to the various manifestations of the
primal God. 50
X.23 VARRO'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Our first group of Varronian texts placed the emphasis on

monotheism, suggesting that the relation of God to the world
was manifested on a number of different levels from
transcendence - the God worshipped without an image - to
immanence - God is equivalent to the world. The second
group of texts dealt with the relation of monotheism to
49. See Sextus Empiricus' discussion of the Stoic theory of causation at

Adv. Math. IX, 211 (SVF II, 341) 'The Stoics declare that "every cause is a
body which is the cause to a body of something incorporeal" ' (LtWi:Koi. !-LEV
niiv ui:twv aG:l!lci Q>Uat affi~-LUtt aaw!lcitou ttVo<; uittov yivEa6ut). The example
he gives is of a scalpel (body), the flesh (body), and the 'the predication "be-
ing cut" ' (to tE!-LVEa6ut KUtTJYOPlWU) (incorporeal). For a clear analysis of
the doctrine see E. Brehier: La theorie des incorporels dans /'ancien
stoicisme, 5" edition (Paris, 1980), pp. 5-13.
50. This epistemology is the result, from the viewpoint of subjective
reflection, of the Stoic theory of mixtures. See pp. 101-105.
826 APPENDIX
polytheism, indicating God's relation to the world in different

ways - the plurality of subordinate gods are either parts or
powers of Jupiter - all of which imply modes of immanence.
When we come to examine the operation of natural processes
which Varro considers to represent the deeper meaning of his
civil theology in detail, we find there a correspondingly com-
plex interrelation of transcendent and immanent modes of
causation. 51
Varro describes the structure of the natural world in the
following way. The cosmos is primarily divided into two parts:
'heaven' (caelum) and 'earth' (terra) of which the former is sub-
divided into 'aether' (aether) and 'air' (aer) and the latter into
'water' (aqua) and 'earth' (terra). Thus, there is a hierarchy of
four elements: aether, air, water, earth, in descending order. All
four elements are moreover full of souls: immortal ones in the
aether and air, and mortal ones in the water and earth. From the
outermost circle of heaven to the circle of the moon is the
region of aetherial souls, stars, and planets - these are both
'understood to exist' (intellegi esse) and 'visible' (vidert)- and
from the circle of the moon to the summits of the clouds is the
region of aerial souls - these are perceived 'by the mind and
not by the eyes' (animo, non oculis videri).52 What Varro pro-
vides here is an account of the physical cosmos in which he
describes analytically the contents of the existing world: in
other words the order of description in this text does not reflect
an actual cosmogonical sequence of production. Furthermore,
he describes the contents of the universe as a group of physical
elements which are shown to be arranged in concentric circles
by the discussion of the various domains of souls in the latter
part of the text.53 This account has been essentially couched in
51. See Varro's account of Antiochus' theory (which the following discus-
sion reflects in a mythological mode) at Cicero: Acad. 24-29. See pp.
101-118.
53. Two other fragments preserved by Tertullian give information about
VARRO 827
the abstract terminology of natural science, but in another

passage the same cosmic system is described in a more
theological manner as the various parts of the supreme divinity.
The earth 'is like' (ut) the bones of God since 'sensation does
not permeate thither' (quo non permanat sensus), while the
sun, moon, and planets which we perceive 'and by means of
which God perceives are his senses. The aether on the other
hand is his mind whose force reaching the stars makes them also
gods and flowing through them to the earth produces the god-
dess Tellus. What flows thence into the sea and ocean makes the
god Neptune' (quibusque ipse sentit, sensus esse eius; aethera
porro animum eius; cui us vim, quae pervenit in astra, ea quo-
que facere deos, et per ea quod in terram permanat, deam
Tellurem; quod autem inde permanat in mare atque
oceanum, deum esse Neptunum).54 All this should be seen as an
elaboration of the notion that the world is an ensouled being to
which two new ideas have been added: first, that the various
the Varronian cosmology. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 24 (Tertullian: Adv. Nat. II, 3,
7-11 (CCSL 1, 44-45)) states that heaven, earth, and the heavenly bodies are
gods. Furthermore, they are living creatures 'because they are moved by
themselves' (quod per semeiipsa moverentur). This argument should be
compared with Cicero: De Nat. Deor. II, 31-32 where Plato's authority is in-
voked for the equation between self-motion and divinity. Varro: Antiqu. fr.
26 (Tertullian: Adv. Nat. II, 5, 2-7 (CCSL 1, 48)) states that divinity is to be at-
tributed first to the 'elements' (elementa) because nothing could be produced
or sustained without them, and secondly to the sun and moon, to the stars,
and to heaven itself because of their similar role. Cardauns: M. Terentius
Varro, Antiquitates rerum divinarum II, p. 150 enters into unnecessary com-
plications regarding Tertullian's use of the term elementa. Modern scholars
like Boyance: op. cit., pp. 76-77 and Pepin: op. cit., pp. 318-320 trace the
theological doctrine of these passages back to Xenocrates. Thus, Aetius: Plac.
I, 7, 30 (DG 304b10-14) reports this writer's view that the heaven, the 'fiery
stars' (toile; aatepac; 7tUpc00Etc; ) equivalent to the Olympians, and the
sublunary demons are gods.
54. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 227 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 23 (CCSL 203-205)).
828 APPENDIX
parts of this being (mind, senses, body) correspond to physical

elements and secondly, that the different parts (when ensouled)
are equivalent to various subordinate gods. One further point of
significance in the context of physical theory is the statement
that the cosmic process is controlled by the divine mind
equivalent to aether, the latter being treated not simply as an
element which surrounds the other three but as a force which
actually pervades them. In other words, it performs the
cohesive function attributable to pneuma in the Stoic system. 55
X.24 JUPITER AND JUNO
It is against the background of this general physical theory

that Varro develops his natural scientific rationalization of civil
theology, and the central element in the latter is perhaps the in-
55. For a real understanding of the role of aether in Varro's physical

system we must compare: (i) the Stoic theory of aether, and (ii) Varro's
allegorization of Minerva to be studied below. For (i) see Cicero: Luc. 126 and
De Nat. Deor. I, 36; Tertullian: Adv. Marc. I, 13 (SVF I, 154); Minucius Felix:
Octav. 19, 10 (SVF I, 154) who describe aether as the supreme God. Cf.
Plutarch: De Stoic. Repugn. 41, 1053a (SVF II, 579) where aether is the ele-
ment surrounding the cosmos. R. B. Todd: 'Monism and Immanence, The
Foundations of Stoic Physics', The Stoics, edited by J. M. Rist (Berkeley/Los
Angeles, 1978), pp. 148-155 has examined the Stoic notion of aether and its
relation to pneuma, concluding that the two overlap in function and that
both play a role distinct from that of the four elements. Aether is a self-
moving body which enjoys circular motion and is the substance of the
heavenly bodies, while pneuma has the function of distributing this superior
element throughout the cosmos. Thus, from the circular motion of the
aether, the pneuma is emitted in the double rectilinear motion of 'tension'
(-c6voc;). Such a doctrine - which Todd is prepared to trace back to Chrysip-
pus -makes good sense of certain testimonia where the pneuma is described
as a fifth element independent of the four regular bodies somewhat along the
lines of the Aristotelian aether. However, there is an important distinction
between the two interpretations, since the Stoic pneuma is both transcendent
and immanent whereas the Aristotelian aether is transcendent only.
VARRO 829
terpretation of Jupiter and Juno as the active and passive prin-

ciples in the world. Since active and passive principles can
manifest themselves in a number of different ways according to
this Stoic and Platonic doctrine,56 we find various accounts of
the relation between Jupiter and Juno which should not be con-
sidered as inconsistent with one another.
(i)Jupiter is an active force operating upon the four elements.
Augustine describes this view, according to which the supreme
God is the world soul which 'fills and moves' (implet et movet)
the composite mass. 57
(ii)Jupiter is the aether which acts upon Juno as the air. Varro
explains how Jupiter 'from above embraces Juno spread below'
(Iunonem subterfusam desuper amplectatur). The same
allegory of the gods' sexual union is recounted by the Virgilian
commentator Servius. 58
(iii) Jupiter is the combination of aether and air while Juno is
the combination of water and earth. This interpretation is also
paralleled in Servius. 59
(iv) Jupiter's relation to Juno is that of both brother and hus-
band. He is brother because 'air is generated from the same
seeds as heaven' (isdem seminibus quibus caelum etiam aer
procreatus est) according to Macrobius, 6o or because aether and
air are 'elements of a similar degree of rarefaction' (tenuitate
56. See pp. 107-108.

57. Augustine: Civ. Dei IV, 11 (CCSL 47, 108-110). The material in sections
(i) to (iv) below is based on this testimony rather than on authentic Varronian
fragments. However, the relationship between the testimony and definite
fragments, as well as the parallels with doctrine stated in sections (v) to (viii),
is sufficient evidence for its authenticity. With the immediate passage cf.
Varro: Antiqu. fr. 27 (Augustine: Civ. Dei. IV, 11 (CCSL 47, 108-110)).
Cf. Servius: In Aeneid. I, 47.
59. Servius: In Georg. II, 325.
60. Macrobius: In Somn. Scip. I, 17, 15.
830 APPENDIX
haec elementa paria sunt) according to Servius.6I He is hus-

band according to both writers because of the relation implied
in (ii).
(v) Jupiter's relation to Juno is equivalent to his relation to
himself. A fragment of Varro' s Logistoricus Curio de Cultu
Deorum preserved in Augustine is an interpretation of Valerius
Soranus' lines: 'Jupiter, all-powerful father of kings, gods, and
all things, also mother of the gods, one God and all the gods'
(Iuppiter omnipotens regum rerumque deumque I progenitor
genetrixque deum, deus unus et omnes) according to which
Jupiter is both the emitter and the recipient of seed. 62 This is
clearly an extension of the sexual metaphor for the relation of
active and passive cosmological principles in (ii), for here the
Stoic and Platonic theory that the active and passive are not two
separable principles but always exist in relation to one another
is implied. 63
(vi) Jupiter is the soul informing Juno as the body. This notion
is stated in Varro's De Lingua Latina and repeats the idea in (i)
with the additional point that Juno corresponds to the cor-
poreal mass.64
(vii) Jupiter is the heaven which acts upon Juno as the earth.
Varro quotes Ennius, Zeno of Citium, and Epicharmus to the ef-
fect that the union of heaven and earth signifies the descent of
'fire, soul, and mind' (ignis ... anima ac mens) from above in
the generative process.
61. Servius: In Aeneid. I, 47.

62. Varro: Logist. Curio fr. 2 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 9 (CCSL 47,
193-194)). See Cardauns: Varros Logistoricus iiber die Gotterverehrung
(Curio de cultu deorum), pp. 16-18 and 58-67 who, however, seems to
overestimate the un-Stoic character of the theory expressed. For the sexual
allegory of Jupiter and Juno in Stoicism see Origen: Contra Cels. IV, 48 (SVF
II, 1074).
63. Seepp. 101-105.
64. Varro: De Ling. Lat. V, 59-60 contains the material in this and the next
two sections.
VARRO 831
(viii) Jupiter is the combination of hot and dry while Juno is

the combination of wet and cold. The transition from (vii) to
(viii) is roughly equivalent to that from (ii) to (iii).
X.25 THE DEITIES OF SAMOTHRACE
The interpretation of the relation between active and passive

principles in the cosmos as the marriage of Jupiter and Juno is
primarily inspired by Stoicism. Yet Varro has another natural
scientific rationalization of civil theology which is not so much
Stoic as Platonic - reflecting the philosophical synthesis of the
two systems by Antiochus -and this involves three of the tradi-
tional deities: Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva. In a fragment of Anti-
quitates XVI preserved in Macrobius, he identifies the gods call-
ed 'Penates' whose cult ultimately derived from Samothrace
with these three Olympians, and then interprets the latter as
having the following meanings in natural science: 'They say that
the Penates are the gods through whom our innermost life
originates, through whom we have body, and through whom
we possess the reason of the mind. And these are Jupiter signify-
ing the middle aether, Juno the lower air together with the
earth, and Minerva the highest point of the aether. They prove
this interpretation by observing that Tarquin, the son of
Demaratus of Corinth and an adept in the mystical rites of
Samothrace, unified the aforementioned divinities' cult in a
single temple and under the same roof'. 65 In another fragment
65. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 205 (Macrobius: Saturn. III, 4, 8) Penates esse dix-
erunt per quos penitus spiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos ra-
tionem animi possidemus: esse autem medium aethera Jovem, Junonem
vero imum aera cum terra et Minervam summum aetheris cacumen: et
argumento utuntur quod Tarquinius, Demarati Corinthii filius,
Samothracicis religionibus mystice imbutus, uno templo ac sub eodem tecto
numina memorata coniunxit. The same doctrine is stated in slightly dif-
ferent wording at Servius Danielis: In Aeneid. II, 296.
832 APPENDIX
from the same book preserved in Augustine, he promises to ex-

pound aspects of the Samothracian mysteries of which even the
priests there are unaware, for he has collected evidence to show
that 'among their statues one signifies heaven, another the
earth, and another the patterns of things which Plato calls the
"Ideas". By Jupiter one must understand heaven, by Juno the
earth, and by Minerva the Ideas, for heaven is that "by which"
something comes to be, the earth that "from which" it comes to
be, and the pattern that "according to which" it comes to be' .66
Both these passages on the Samothracian mysteries are expan-
sions of the physical allegory contained in the previous set of
texts, a point made clear by Augustine's remarks in introducing
the second passage where he says that heaven signifies the ac-
tive and earth the passive principle in the cosmos. But the
precise nature of this expansion requires some further
remarks.67
Varro's interpretation of the Penates assumes an identity bet-
ween the following five sets of terms (now placed in descending
order of being):
1 mind soul body

2 Minerva Jupiter Juno
3 higher aether middle aether lower air
4 Ideas heaven earth
5 after which by which from which
It is obvious that, since the first three triads represent different

ways of analyzing the constituent principles in the world as a
in simulacris aliud signijicare caelum, aliud terram, aliud exempla rerum,
quas Plato appellat ideas; caelum Iovem, terram Iunonem, ideas Miner-
vam (vult intellegi); caelum a quo fiat aliquid, terram de qua fiat, ex-
emplum secundum quod fiat.
67. This interpretation of the Samothracian mysteries has been much
VARRO 833
whole, while the first triad signifies three moments in the con-
stitution of the human individual, these two passages are con-
cerned not only with the threefold analysis of being itself but
with a structural parallelism between macrocosm and
microcosm. 68 Many of the terms occurring in this scheme can
be adequately explained with reference to their use in the other
Varronian texts examined earlier, although certain points are
perhaps sufficiently obscure to require further clarification.
First, the term 'soul' is not explicitly mentioned in the initial
triad but only the notion of life. However, it seems reasonable
to supply it not only because it is required by the context - it is
juxtaposed with the two terms reason and body - but because
other texts identify Jupiter and soul. Varro clearly inserted the
phrase 'innermost life' in place of the term 'soul' simply because
he wished to exploit the etymology: Penates - penitus.69
Secondly, the interpretation of Minerva as the higher aether is
very characteristic of Stoic exegesis, as indicated by Diogenes
Laertius' report that this school called the cosmic God 'Athene'
'because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether'
(Kat a ti)v de; atetpa ouita<Jtv 'tOO TtYEJlOVtKOD UU'tOD). 70 This in-
terpretation is also common in late antiquity, since Macrobius,71
discussed in the modern literature. See especially Theiler: op. cit., pp. 18-19
and 40; Pepin: op. cit., pp. 347-351; Boyance: op. cit., pp. 77 -78; Cardauns:
Varros Logistoricus iiber die Gotterverehrung (Curio de cultu deorum), pp.
12-16 and M. Terentius Varro, Antiquitates rerum divinarum II, pp. 220-222
and 234-235.
68. See pp. 99-100 and 119.
69. Varro's use of etymology in such contexts is discussed by P. Boyance:
'Etymologie et theologie chez Varron', Revue des etudes Ia tines 53 (1975),
pp. 99-115.
70. Diogenes Laertius: Vit. Philos. VII, 147 (SVF II, 1021). Cf. Philodemus:
De Piet. 15 (SVF III, Diogenes of Babylon 33 = DG 548b 14-550b8).
71. Macrobius: Saturn. I, 17, 70 'For this goddess is said to have been
generated from the head of Jupiter, that is to say produced from the highest
part of the aether, whence the sun takes its origin' (nam ideo haec dea Iovis
834 APPENDIX
Servius,n and Martianus Capella73 all explain Minerva's birth

from the head of Jupiter as signifying (i) her identification with
the highest part of the aether or something above the aether and
(ii) her identification with mind or reason, this whole tradition
undoubtedly going back to Varro. Thirdly, the interpretation of
Minerva as the Ideas reveals the fact that Varro or Antiochus has
combined Stoicism with Platonism, for the aether is no longer
simply the most active element which imparts cohesion to the
world through its identification with pneuma74 but also the
vehicle by which the Platonic Forms are instantiated into in-
dividual things in the world.75 Varro's doctrine at this point
seems virtually identical with that expounded by Cicero in the
Orator where the writer trod the narrow border line between
physical and metaphysical theory.76 Finally, the foundation of
the fifth triad upon a group of prepositional phrases is of con-
siderable interest. Schemata composed of such prepositional
phrases become extremely common in the later school tradition
and, when they occur in writers like Philo Iudaeus77 and
capite prognata memoratur, id est de summa aetberis parte edita, unde

origo solis est). For Macrobius, the Varronian doctrine is mediated through
Porphyry.
72. Servius: In Aeneid. IV, 201 'She is above the aether, for which reason
she is said to have been generated from her father's head' (quae supra
aetherem est: unde de patris capite procreata esse dicitur).
73. Martianus Capella: De Nupt. VI, 567 'Beautiful armed maiden, wisdom
of things, Pallas, aetherial spark, mind and intelligence of fate' (Virgo armata
decens, rerum sapientia, Pallas, I aetherius james, mens et sollertia jati).
74. Seen. 54.
75. The identification of Athene with Jupiter's thoughts (although not
specifically with Platonic Forms) occurs in Stoicism. See the report in Justin
Martyr: Apol. I, 64 (SVF II, 1096) where Athene is the 'first concept' (7tpcOt1]
i:vvota) of Jupiter according to which he fashions the world.
76. Seep. 150 ff. Theiler: op. cit., pp. 17-19 and 40 has argued persuasive-
ly for the parallel between Cicero and Varro at this point.
77. Philo Iudaeus: De Cherub. 125-127 andQuaest. in Gen. I, 58.
VARRO 835
Seneca,78, they are usually applied to lists of causes drawn from

Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. Varro's example lacks
the Aristotelian component, although it is otherwise a typical
representative of that tradition.
X.26JANUS, SATURN, APOLLO AND OTHERS
The natural scientific rationalization of civil theology does

not stop with the allegories of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva, and
even in the meager fragments which remain it is possible to see
how far Varro takes his explanation of traditional religion.79 In
the present context it is hardly appropriate to pursue all these
allegories in detail - a project which has already been ad-
mirably accomplished by J. Pepin - although a few notes on
some of the more important ones may be found useful.
(i)]anus.so A fragment preserved in Augustine indicates the
relation between Janus and Jupiter: Janus has control over the
beginnings of things whereas Jupiter has control over their
ends. The interpretation of these two gods as the beginning and
end of the circle of causation does not diminish the status of
Jupiter as the supreme God since, although beginnings precede
ends in time, ends have primacy of dignity.st Other Augustinian
texts reveal further aspects of the allegory of Janus. For exam-
ple, his identification with the world itself is the basis of his
depiction with two faces - since the space within our mouths
when opened seems similar to the world where heaven and

79. In the next few paragraphs, I shall be concerned with what Varro call-
ed the 'primary and select gods' (the subject matter of Antiquitates XVI).
These include - according to the arrangement of fragments by Cardauns -
Janus, Jupiter, Saturn, Mercury, Apollo, Mars, Vulcan, Neptune, Sol, Orcus,
Liber, Tellus, Ceres, Juno, Luna, Diana, Minerva, Venus, and Vesta.
80. On the allegory ofJanus see Pepin: op. cit., p. 326 ff.
81. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 236 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 9 (CCSL 47, 193-194)).
836 APPENDIX
earth are separated by open spaceB2 - and also of his depiction

with four faces - these latter correspond to the four quarters
into which the world is divided: north, south, east, and west.B3
Augustine ridicules the inconsistency between the two ac-
counts, but the whole doctrine was no doubt coherent from
Varro's own viewpoint, since all the apparent differences are
manifestations of a single underlying divine force.
(ii) Saturn.B4 Fragments preserved by later writers reveal two
interrelated allegories of Saturn. The first connects his name
etymologically with sowing and seed, so that Saturn emerges as
the generative force in the cosmos.B5 His castration of his father
Caelus indicates that the generative force is specifically the pro-
perty of Saturn rather than of his father,s6 while his subjection
to his son Jupiter signifies that the causation proper to Jupiter
takes precedence over that proper to himself.B7 The second
allegory of Saturn is based upon his identification with the
Greek Kpovoc; or Xpovoc; meaning 'time'. His possession of a
scythe indicates that time destroys all things, while his devour-
83. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 234 (Augustine: Civ, Dei VII, 8 (CCSL 47, 192-193)).
84. On the allegory of Saturn see Pepin: op. cit., p. 328 ff.
and fr. 240 (Tertullian: Adv. Nat. II, 12, 18 (CCSL 1, 62)).
201-202)).
200-201)). The interpretation of the relations between Caelus, Saturn, and
Jupiter in Varro is singled out by Augustine as a clear example of the former's
inconsistency. As Augustine remarks (Civ. Dei VII, 19 (CCSL 47, 20 1-202)), if
Saturn is the son of Caelus, then he is the son of Jupiter, since Jupiter is stated
elsewhere to be equivalent to the heaven. Augustine is quite correct about
Varro's identification of Jupiter with the heaven, yet the charge of incon-
sistency misses the real point of Varro's natural theology. That is that there
are no fixed physical interpretations of any of the traditional gods, since the
latter simply represent ways of looking at the same set of natural processes.
The essence of the symbolic mentality is that it deals with approximations
VARRO 837
ing of his children signifies that he absorbs within himself once

again all things which have issued from him.ss The connection
between these two allegories is achieved by emphasizing the cir-
cularity of causation, for seeds return to the ground from which
they have sprung and time passes by cyclic measure.s9
(iii) Apollo and other gods. According to Augustine the
allegorical procedure applied to Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Janus,
and Saturn is extended to a multitude of different gods, among
whom perhaps the case of Apollo - interpreted as the sun with
his arrows signifying the sun's rays reaching the earth- is the
most interesting for its ramifications in natural science.90 In-
deed, there are minor points in the allegories of many other
divinities, occurring repeatedly in the rich mythographic
literature of late antiquity and the Middle Ages, which are deriv-
ed directly or indirectly from Varro.9t Thus, we find authors
like Martianus Capella, Fulgentius, and the so-called Vatican
Mythograpbers reflecting this tradition and, whenever a natural
scientific rationalization of a pagan divinity is presented, we
should be aware of its probable historical origin in the great
Roman encyclopaedist's work.
X.27 THE RELATION OF MACROCOSM TO MICROCOSM
The religious philosophy of the Antiquitates is a combination

or reconciliation of monotheism and polytheism in which the
rather than with precise equations. Further, Varro believed that the civil
theology was a historical fact and not a methodological ideal, and he would
no doubt have admitted readily that there were inconsistencies of this kind.
When considered in its proper historical context, therefore, Varro's theology
can be defended against the polemic of Christian writers.
88. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 247 (Tertullian: Adv. Nat. II, 12, 17 (CCSL 1, 62)).
andfr. 246(Augustine: Civ. DeiVII, 19(CCSL47, 201-202)).
91. Seep. 757 ff.
838 APPENDIX
traditional pantheon of Roman civil theology is interpreted

allegorically in terms of the physical processes of natural
theology. Yet as one would expect in the case of a writer in-
fluenced by Stoicism and Platonism, the analysis is extended not
only to the relation between God and the world - the
macrocosm - but also to those between the human soul and
body- the microcosm- and between God (or the world) and
the human soul (or human being) - the macrocosm and the
microcosm.92 One passage dealing with the second and third of
these relations has already been discussed: Varro's argument
that just as God is the ensouled world but more strictly the soul
of the world itself, so is a wise man an ensouled human being
but more strictly the soul of the human being itself, 93 but there
are three more texts dealing with these questions which should
perhaps be noted briefly.
In the first passage, which is preserved by Tertullian, a dox-
ographical survey of the various notions of divinity leads up to a
statement of Varro's own position:94 that soul's physical
92. The structure of Varro's thought at this point, as at many others, mir-
rors that of Cicero. See pp. 99-1 00 and 119.
93. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 226 (Augustine: Civ. Dei VII, 6 (CCSL 47, 191)). See
pp. 819-820.
94. Varro probably employed the doxographical tradition after the manner
of Antioch us rather than according to the practice of Philo of Larissa which
Cicero followed. On the relationship of such doxographical compilation to
(i) Old Academic dogmatism and (ii) New Academic skepticism see p. 63 ff.
The clearest illustration ofVarro's handling of doxography is provided by his
discussion of the various theories of the supreme good in his De Philosophia.
Fragments of this work are preserved by Augustine: Civ. Dei XIX, 1-4 (CCSL
48, 657-669)) from whom we discover that Varro employed different
variables in order to construct a classification of two hundred and eighty-
eight possible philosophical doctrines regarding the end of man. They are
'possible' in the sense that some have actually existed while some are merely
postulated theoretically. Having established this classification, Varro then
proceeds to eliminate each variable in turn until only one philosophy re-
mains, this coinciding with the Old Academy's doctrine as interpreted by An-
VARRO 839
character is fiery and that, just as fire governs all things in the
world, so does soul control all things in the human being.95
Since the fire mentioned in this passage seems equivalent to the
aether mentioned in other texts,96 soul must therefore corres-
pond to divinity in relation both to the world and to man. Thus,
in a second passage, this time preserved by Augustine, the
various levels of soul are considered, and its highest aspect is
called 'God' (deus) in the case of the world and 'personal deity'
(genius) in that of man:97 an argument which then passes into a
typically Varronian mythological interpretation of the nature of
soul.98 It is the combined doctrine presented by these texts
which explains the argument of a final passage. Here, the
fashioning of gods' anthropomorphic images is justified on the
grounds that, 99 since the relation of the divine soul to the world
is analogous to that of the human soul to its body, it is possible
to signify the thing contained in the former case by the con-
tainer in the latter. too The argument is perhaps the most striking
tiochus. Of great interest is the fact that one of the variables in this scheme is
'certain' (certum) versus 'probable' (veri simile) according to which one
might distinguish a Stoic from a New Academic position. It is easy to see that
the distinction between Varro's and Cicero's respective uses of dox-
ographical material is along precisely the same lines. The fragments of De
Philosophia can now be conveniently studied in the collection of G.
Langenberg: M. Terenti Varronis Liber de philosophia, Ausgabe und
Erkli:irungderFragmente, Diss. (Koln, 1959).
95. Varro: Antiqu. fr. 23 (Tertullian: Adv. Nat. II, 2, 14-20 (CCSL 1,
43-44)).
96. See pp. 827 and 831-835.
98. In this and all the other passages cited during this section of the discus-
sion, the Latin term animus will be translated as 'soul' (rather than as
'mind'), since the contrast is between soul and body (rather than between
mind and lower soul). Varro uses animus in both these senses as does Cicero.
Seen. 38.
100. Varro's argument clearly contains several suppressed premises: (i)
840 APPENDIX
example of Varro's technique of explaining civil by means of

natural theology.
It is unfortunate that the work of this great Roman scholar on
the subject of theology survives only in such an incomplete state
for, if we had something like a full text of Varro or even just of
the Antiquitates, we would be able to explain much of the later
pagan tradition of scientific learning which at the moment re-
mains obscure to us. There can be no doubt that Varro is the
fountain-head of this tradition.lOl Throughout this study we
have found ourselves coming across doctrines of a Stoic or
Platonic character which almost certainly stem from Varro,
although we have rarely been able to identify which of his
works was the actual source for the later elaboration. It is the
profound but shadowy role of this thinker near the beginnings
of the Latin tradition which has justified our brief digression in-
to the archaeology of philosophical literature.
that one can signify the contained by the container, and (ii) that what
signifies in relation to the microcosm can carry a similar significance in rela-
tion to the macrocosm. Of course, it is possible that it is Augustine who has
suppressed the premises in a careless paraphrase.
101. On Varro's influence over the scientific tradition see W. H. Stahl:
Roman Science. Origins, Development, and Influence to the Later Middle
Ages (Madison, WI, 1962), pp. 74-76.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE (1985)
The text of Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism was essen-

tially completed in 1982-3. The bibliographies which follow
therefore reflect the state of scholarship (or at least the scholar-
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text were made in 1984. These modifications were accom-
panied by certain additions to the bibliographies which are ap-
pended as 'supplementary' items. Works marked with an
asterisk(*) are those which are explicitly cited in the main text
or footnotes.
841
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(Paris, 1980).
*Cardauns, B. Varros Logistoricus uber die G6tterverehrung (Curio de
cultu deorum). Ausgabe und Erkliirung der Fragmente (Wiirzburg, 1960).
'Bibliographie varronienne', Varron (Fondation Hardt, Entretiens
sur l'Antiquite classique 9) (Vandoeuvres-Geneve, 1963), pp. 209-212.
'Varro und die romische Religion. Zur Theologie, Wirkungs-
geschichte und Leistung der Antiquitates rerum divinarum ', Aufstieg
und Niedergang der r6mischen Welt: Festschrift ]. Vogt II. 16/1,
herausgegeben von H. Temporini (Berlin, 1978), pp. 80-103.
* M. Terentius Varro, Antiquitates rerum divinarum I-II (Wiesbaden,
1976).
*della Corte, F. Varrone. II terzo gran lume romano (Genova, 1954).
'L'idea della preistoria in Varrone', Atti del Congresso Interna-
zionale di Studi Varroniani, Rieti settembre 1974 I (Rieti, 1976), pp.
111-136.
Dahlmann, H. Varro und die hellenistische Sprachtheorie (Leipzig, 1932).
'Terentius Varro' Paulys Realencyclopiidie der klassischen Alter-
'Varroniana', Aufstieg und Niedergang der r6mischen Welt:
Festschrift]. Vogt I. 3, herausgegeben von H. Temporini (Berlin, 1973),
pp. 3-25.
Dahlmann, H. und Heisterhagen, R. Varronische Studien I
(Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in
Mainz, geistes. -und sozialwiss. -Klasse 195 7/4) (Wiesbaden, 195 7).
Dahlmann, H. und Speyer, W. Varronische Studien II (ibid. 1959/11)
(Wiesbaden, 1960).
898 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Deschamps, L. 'L'harmonie des spheres dans les Satires Menippees de Var-

ron', Latomus 38 (1979), pp. 9-27.
Dible, A. 'Zwei Vermutungen zu Varro', Rheinisches Museum 108 (1965),
pp. 170-183.
*Hagendahl, H. Augustine and the Latin Classics, with a Contribution on
Varro by B. Cardauns (Goteborg, 1967).
Jocelyn, H.D. 'On editing the Remains of Varro's Antiquitates Rerum
Divinarum', Rivista difilologia e di istruzione classica 108 (1980), pp.
100-122.
*Klotz, A. 'Der Katalog der varronischen Schriften', Hermes 46 (1911), pp.
1-17.
*Langenberg, G. M. Terenti Varronis Liber de philosophia. Ausgabe und
Erkliirung der Fragmente, Diss. (Koln, 1959).
*Lieberg, G. 'Die theologia tripertita in Forschung und Bezeugung',
Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt: Festschrift]. Vogt I. 4,
herausgegeben von H. Temporini (Berlin, 1973), pp. 63-115.
Marten, I. 'Ein unbeachtetes Zeugnis von Varros Gotteslehre', Archiv fur
Geschichte der Philosophie 43 (1961), pp. 41-51.
*Orlandi, T. 'Sallustio e Varrone in Agostino, De Civitate Dei I-VII', La
parola delpassato 23 (1968), pp. 19-44.
*Oroz de Ia Consolaci6n, J. 'Introducci6n a una theologia agustino-
varroniana, vista desde la Ciudad de Dios', La Ciudad de Dios, Numero
Extraordinario I (Estudios sabre Ia Ciudad de Dios), (El Escorial, 1954),
pp. 459-473.
Pepin, J. 'La theologie tripartite de Varron. Essai de reconstitution et
recherches des sources', Revue des etudes augustiniennes 2 (1956), pp.
265-294.
* Mythe et Allegorie. Les origines grecques et les contestations judeo-
chretiennes. Nouvelle edition (Paris, 1976).
'Remarques sur les sources de la theologia tripertita de Varron',
Varron: grammaire antique et stylistique latine par]. Collart (Paris,
1978), pp. 127-131.
Pizzani, U. 'La sezione musicale dei Disciplinarum libri di Varrone
Reatino', Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Varroniani, Rieti
settembre 1974 II (Rieti, 1976), pp. 457-476.
Praechter, K. 'Eine Stelle Varros zur Zahlentheorie', Hermes 46 (1911),
pp. 407-413.
*Riposati, B. e Marastoni, A. Bibliografia varroniana (Milano, 1974).
*Ritschl, F. 'De M. Terentii Varronis Disciplinarum libris commentarius',
Kleine philologische Schriften (Opuscula philologica) 3 (Leipzig, 1877),
pp. 352-402.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 899
*Schwarz, E. 'De M. Terentii Varronis apud sanctos Patres vestigiis',

]ahrbucher fur klassische Philologie, Suppl-Band 16 (1888), pp. 405-499.
*Simon, M. 'Zur Abhangigkeit spatromischer Enzyklopadien der artes
liberates von Varros Disciplinarum libri', Philologus 110 (1966), pp.
88-101.
*Stahl, W.H. Roman Science. Origins, Development, and Influence to the
Later Middle Ages (Madison, WI, 1962).
Taylor, D.J. Declinatio. A Study of the Linguistic Theory of Marcus Teren-
tius Varro (Amsterdam, 1974).
*Todd, R.B. 'Monism and Immanence, The Foundations of the Stoic
Physics', The Stoics, edited by J.M. Rist (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1978), pp.
137-160.
Tozzi, I. 'L'eredita varroniana in sant' Agostino in ordine aile disciplinae
liberales', Rendiconti dell' Istituto Lombardo, Classe di lettere, scienze
morali e storiche 110 (1976), pp. 281-291.
* Waszink, J.H. 'Varrone nella letteratura cristiana dei primi secoli', Atti del
Congresso Internazionale di Studi Varroniani, Rieti settembre 1974 I
(Rieti, 1976), pp. 209-223.
BIBLIOGRAPHY X: SUPPLEMENT
Cardauns, B. Stand und Aufgaben der Varroforschung mit einer

Bibliographie der jahre 1935-1980 (Wiesbaden, 1982).
Zucchelli, B. Varro logistoricus. Studio letterario e prosopografico (Par-
ma, 1981).
Citation Of Texts
The following principles have been used to govern the citation of texts:
Latin Platonic works are cited according to the editions described in the
Index. These editions are mostly contained in the Bibliotheca Teubneriana,
and Collection Bude, the Oxford Classical Texts, and the Loeb Classical
Library.
Christian Latin authors are cited according to the Corpus Christianorum
Series Latina, the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, and the
Patrologia Latina, in that order of priority.
Greek Platonic works are normally cited according to the texts listed in the
bibliography of my book From Iamblichus to Eriugena (Leiden, 1978), p.
347 ff. In addition to the versions tabulated there I have used: Albinus,
Didascalicus (P. Louis (CB)); Numenius, Fragments (E. des Places (CB));
Porphyry: De Abstinentia Q. Bouffartigue and M. Patillon (CB)); De Antro
Nympharum (Arethusa Monographs); De Regressu Animae 0. Bidez: Vie de
Porphyre (Ghent, 1913)); Historia Philosophica (A. Nauck (BT)); In
Parmenidem (P. Hadot: Porphyre et Victorinus (Paris 1968)); In Timaeum
(A. R. Sodano (Napoli, 1964)); Sententiae (E. Lamberz (BT)); De Simulacris
(Bidez: op. cit.)
On certain occasions I have resorted to editions other than those described
in the Index. These occasions are noted at the appropriate points in my text.
901
INDEX OF LATIN TEXTS
Ambrose nn.250, 252;
Hexameron 613, n.40
(CSEL 32/1, Schenkl) 65 221, n.22; 267;
273
I, 1, 1-4 397
De Deo Socratis
(CB, Beaujeu)
Apuleius
Apologia I, 115 228
(CB, Vallette) 1, 116 303, n.313
1,116-3,
4 216 124 231
10 217 1, 117 272, n.180
11 220, n.21 1, 118 305, n.322
12 221, n.22; 292; 2, 120 304; 306
315,n.364 2, 121 303; 307
13 217, n.9 2, 121-122 315, n.367
15 216 2, 122 303
25 221, n.22 3, 123 303; 306
26 221, n.22 3, 124 266, n.145;
27 270; 292, 267; 272; 273;
n.263 613, n.40
29-36 216 4, 126 316, n.369
36 216; 216, n.2 4, 127 231, n.61; 301,
38 216, n.2 nn.305, 306
40-42 216 4, 128 233, n.68; 301
41 217, n.9; 221, 6, 132 309; 310,
n.22 n.344
42 236, n.78 6, 133-134 310
43 221, n.22; 309; 6, 134 231, n.61
310, n.345 7, 136 301, n.308
49-50 221, n.22 7, 137 301, n.308
55 216 8, 138 305, n.323
64 220; 221, n.22; 9, 140-141 310, n.344
266; 266, 11, 143-145 314, n.363
n.145; 267, 12, 146 301
n.I48; 270; 12, 146- 13,
272; 273; 289, 148 231, n.61
903
904 INDEX
13, 148 310;314 25, 344 272,0.180

15, 150-151 316, n.367 30, 355 306
15, 150-152 316 30, 357 266, o.143;
15, 150- 16, 273; 316,
155 234, n.70 o.358; 613,
15, 151 316, o.369 n.40
15, 152 314;316, 31, 359 317
n.368 31, 360 267; 270
15, 152-153 314 35, 365 270
15, 153 313; 314; 315, 37, 370 270
o.367 37, 370-371 267, 0.148
16, 154 312 37, 372 365, 0.161
16, 155 312; 312, 38, 372 281, 0.220
o.354; 315,
0.364
17, 157 312; 315 De Platone et eius Dogmate
18, 162 312, o.354 (CB, Beaujeu)
20, 165 312
20, 166 312; 314, I, 3, 187 76, 0.83
0.363; 315, I, 4, 187 227, o.54
o.367 I, 4, 189 227, o.54
I, 5, 190 237; 266; 270;
De Mundo 272; 287; 294;
(CB, Beaujeu) 296; 613, o.40
I, 5, 191 266, 0.144;
1, 288 316, 0.368 295
1, 290 305, 0.322; I, 5, 191-192 320
306 I, 5, 192 318; 319
1, 291 305, n.323 I, 6, 192 286; 294; 296
2, 292 306 I, 6, 192-193 292; 294; 295;
2, 292-293 305; 307, 777
o.335 I, 6, 193 253; 266; 270;
2, 293 307 294; 295; 296;
4, 297 305, 0.322 613, o.40
13, 318- 14, I, 6, 193-194 293, 0.269
321 219 I, 6, 194 294; 296
21, 336 305, n.322; I, 7, 194 290; 322
306 I, 7, 195-196 325
24, 341-342 273 I, 8, 196 325, 0.393;
24, 341- 27, 326
352 277 I, 8, 197 326
INDEX 905
I, 8, I98 326 307; 307,

I, 9, I99 250; 273; 308; nn.332, 335;
3I6 3I5, n.364
I, IO, 202 304, n.320 I5 2I7, n.9
I, IO, 203 305, n.323 I8 22I
I, 11, 203 305; 306; 307, 20 2I6, n.2
nn.332, 335;
I, 11, 204 229; 270; 305,
n.322; 309; Metamorphoses
3IO, n.344; (CB, Robertson and Vallette)
6I3, n.40
I, I2, 205 270; 273 IV, 28ff. 3I5, n.364
I, I2, XI, 2, 267 267, n.I48
205-206 280 XI, 5, 269 267, n.I48
I, 12, 206 231, n.6I; 3IO,
n.345
I, I3, 207 3I6, n.358; The Asclepius
3I7 (CB, Nock and Festugiere)
I, I4,
209-210 222 I, 296, 4-8 734, n.63
I, I7, 2I7 316, n.368 I, 296, IO 343
I, 18, 2I6 316, n.368 I, 296,
I, 18, II-I2 357, n.I24
2I6-218 317, n.371 1, 296,
II, 1, 220 270; 292, 1I-13 345
n.263 1, 297, 6-9 734, n.65
II, 4, 255ff. 317, n.37I 2, 297,
II, 9, 234 3I6, il.358 17-18 385
II,20, 249 316, n.369 2, 297,
II, 21, I8-I9 385
250-25I 3I6, n.369 2, 297,
II, 22, 25I 3I6, n.368 23-24 343
II, 23, 253 28I, n.2I9 2, 297, 23 -
II, 23, 255 3I6, n.369 298,I 346
2, 298, I-2 347
Florida 2, 298, 4 343
(CB, Vallette) 2, 298, 12 373, n.I93
2, 298,
9 2I6, n.2 I2-I3 372, n.I9I
IO 282, n.222; 3, 298, 7-9 354, n.ll6
906 INDEX
3, 298, 7, 304, 2 380

17-19 372, n.191 7, 304, 2-6 380, n.225;
3, 298, 19 373, n.193 381
3, 298, 21- 7, 304,
299,2 341 11-13 382, n.232
3. 299, 1-3 357, n.124 8, 305, lff. 371
3, 299, 3 371 8, 305, 2-8 371
3, 299. 3-4 372, n.187 8, 305, 9-12 383
3, 299, 3- 8, 305, 10 343
4, 300, 18 351,n.94 8, 305,
3, 299, 4-5 372 11-12 383
3, 299, 5 371, n.184 8, 305,
3, 299, 5-6 373, n.193 12-15 347, n.78; 722,
3, 299, 5-7 372 n.8; 735, n.67
3, 299,7-11 354, nn.114, 8, 305, 15-
115 306, 2 380, n.225
3, 299, 8, 306, 2-5 380, n.224
11-13 353, n.109 8, 306,4 380, n.223
3, 299, 8, 306, 4-7 383
13-15 351, n.95 8, 306,
4, 299, 10-17 383
17-19 352, n.97 9, 307, 1-5 383, n.238
4, 299. 10, 308, 8-9 371
18-19 352, n.103 10, 308, 9 371, n.184
4, 299, 19- 10, 308,
300, 2 352, n.102 13-15 386
4, 299, 19- 10, 308, 21 371, n.184
300, 7 351, n.96 10, 308, 23 -
4, 300, 7 371,n.184 309, 1 381
4, 300, 7-10 351, n.93 10, 309, 3 380, nn.222,
4, 300, 8-18 352, nn.102, 223
107 11, 309, 5-6 380, n.221
4, 300, 10 352, n.103 11, 309, 23-
4, 300, 310, 3 381
10-12 352, n.97 11, 310,
5, 301, 2-4 354, n.116 6-10 382, n.234
5, 302, 3 380, n.222 11, 310, 8 382
6, 302, 5-19 735, n.70 11, 310, 25 386
6, 302, 20- 12, 311, 4-5 386, n.250
303, 5 380, n.224 12, 311, 5-6 386
6, 303, 5-6 362 12, 311, 8-9 385
INDEX 907
12, 311, 18, 317,

15-16 382, 0.234 14-15 372
13, 312, 18, 317,
7-16 349, 0.86 18-21 382
14, 313, 4-5 348, 0.83 18, 317, 21-
14, 313, 5-6 362 318, 2 376
14, 313, 5-7 362 19, 318,
14, 313, 7-9 346, 0.74 5-21 374
14, 313, 19, 318,
16-17 344 12-17 341; 734, o.64
14, 313, 17 344 19, 318,
14, 313, 20 348, 0.83 15-17 354, 0.116
14,313,20- 19, 318,
314, 22 355 22-23 376, 0.212
14, 313, 19, 318, 22-
21-22 362 319, 11 368; 375
14, 314, 3-4 357, 0.124 19, 319, 1-5 353, 0.112;
16, 315, 5-9 383 735, o.69
16, 315, 19, 320, 3-4 354, n.116
13-15 361 19, 320, 3-8 355
16, 315, 17 339; 343 19, 320, 5 357, 0.124
17, 315, 20, 320, 15 -
22-23 362 321, 9 342
17, 315, 20, 321, 7 343; 345; 357,
22-24 361 0.124
17, 315, 24 348, 0.83 20, 321,
17, 315, 24- 9-11 347, 0.79; 364;
316, 1 356 734, o.66
17, 316, 3-4 362 20, 321, 12 343
17, 316, 5- 21, 321,
18, 318, 2 351,o.94 18-19 364; 734, o.66
17, 316, 21, 321, 18-
9-13 356 323, 7 363
17, 316, 11 352, o.100 21, 321,
17, 316, 20-21 364
11-13 352, 0.99 21, 322, 5-9 364
17, 316, 12 352, 0.105 21, 322, 7 364
17, 316, 17 352, 0.107 21, 322,
17, 316, 17- 11-13 363; 364
317, 1 352, 0.105 21, 322, 13 364
908 INDEX
21, 322, 15 364 27, 332,

21, 322, 17- 12-13 376
323, 2 364 28, 334, 3-6 385
21, 323, 3-4 364 28, 334, 8-
21, 323, 3-6 364 335, 4 386, n.251
21, 323, S-6 364 28, 335, 2 385
22, 323, 23 - 29, 336, 5 344
324,4 380, n.225 29, 336, 6-7 339
22, 323, 25 380, nn.221, 29, 336,
222 10-11 385, n.247
22, 324, 1 382, n.233 29, 336, 16-
22, 324, 6-7 376 337, 3 372
22, 324, 29, 337, 5 372
13-16 383, n.235 29, 337,
22, 324, 16 385, n.247 12-14 372
22, 324, 18 380, nn.221, 30, 337,
222 19-20 359, n.132
22, 324, 19 380, n.223 30, 337, 20 359, n.131
23, 325, 30, 337, 23 371, n.184
6-10 384 30, 337, 23-
23, 325, 7-8 376 338, 1 372
23, 325, 30, 337, 23-
8-11 384, n.242 338, 2 372
23, 325, 30, 338, 3-4 359
18-19 376 30, 338,
23, 325, 20- 11-12 360
326, 2 384, n.243 30, 338, 16 344
24, 326, 30, 338, 19 343
10-15 384, n.243 30, 338,
25, 328, 20 371, n.184 22-23 359
25, 329, 5-8 385, n.246 30, 339, 1-3 360, n.135
26, 330, 2-3 370 31, 339, 5-7 359
26, 331, 11 344 31,339,7-8 359
26, 331, 31, 339,
12-14 346, n.77 8-18 360, n.136
26, 331, 20 343 31, 339,
27, 332, 4 371, n.184 11-13 360
27, 332, 4-5 372, n.187 31, 339,
27, 332, 10 344 14-20 360
27, 332, 31, 339, 23 344
11-12 344 31, 339,
INDEX 909
25-26 344 35, 345, II -

3I, 339, 26 344 346, 6 352, n.I04
3I, 339, 26- 35, 345,
340, 3 358 I3-I5 352, n.IOO
3I, 340, 3-4 359 35, 345,
32, 340, I7-20 352, n.106
11-12 358 35, 345, 18 352, n.105
32, 340, 35, 345, 18-
16-21 348 346, 6 354, n.l14
32, 340, 35, 345, 19 352, n.100
17-21 358 35, 345,
32, 340, 22-24 376
21-22 373, n.193 35, 345, 24 -
32, 340, 346, 2 352, nn.99,
21-23 372 100
32, 340, 21 - 35, 346, 4-6 352, n.100
341, 20 349, n.86 36, 346, 10-
32, 340, 23- 347, 3 351, n.95
341, 2 382 37, 347,
32, 341, 2-3 382 8-10 384
32, 341, 6-9 382, n.231 37, 347,
32, 341, 15-18 384, n.243
9-13 373 37, 347, 23-
32, 341, 10 373, n.193 348, 1 386, n.250
32, 341, 38, 349,
15-17 350, n.89 9-10 376
32, 341, 38, 349,
20-21 339, n.41 9-15 384, n.243
32, 342, 2 373, n.193 39, 349, 19-
33, 343, 2-8 353, n.110 350, 6 366
34, 344, 13 - 40, 351,
36, 347, 3 351,n.94 14-22 369
34, 344, 14 353, n.llO 40, 351,
34, 344, 19 353, n.110 22-23 356
34, 344, 41, 353, 1 343
19-22 352, n.108 41, 353, 1-
34, 344, 20 352, n.101 355, 4 340; 734, n.64
34, 344, 41, 353, 2 339, n.41
22-23 346 41, 353, 3-
35, 345, 354, 2 343
10-11 352, n.98
910 INDEX
Augustine I, 1, 10,
De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII 11-13 667, n.76
(CCSL 44A, Mutzenbecher) I, 2, 12,
14-17 667
46 406; 777 I, 32, 66,
8-11 667
II, 31, 122,
25-123,3 667
Boethius II, 46, 149,
Contra Eutycben et Nestorium 22 702, n.246
(LCL, Stewart and Rand)
1, 13-15 656; 668 De Consolatione Pbilosopbiae

2, 23-28 710 (LCL, Stewart and Rand)
2, 24-25 668
2, 24-28 656; 707, I, pr.2,
n.266 13-14 652, n.4
2, 37-52 718, n.325 I, pr.4,
3, 29-57 718, n.325 18-21 652, n.4
3, 87-89 669 I, pr.4,
3, 99-100 668 105-106 702, n.245
3, 100-101 669 I, pr.6,
4, 160-109 718, n.325 27-30 675
6, 13-14 668 I, pr.6,
6, 66-82 710, n.282 40-44 657
6, 70-74 707, n.266 II, pr.4,
72-101 710, n.285
II, pr.4,
91-97 657; 708,
De Aritbmetica n.272; 710
(BT, Friedlein) II, pr.5,
70-72 710
I, 1, 7, 26-8, II, pr.5,
1 667 72-75 657
I, 1, 9, II, pr.5,
28-10, 1 708, n.268; 72-78 708, n.274;
714, n.313 709, n.278
I, 1, 10, II, pr.5,
10-21 655 75-78 708, n.273
I, 1, 10, II, pr.6,
10-28 717, n.322 21-26 708, n.271
INDEX 911
II, pr.6, III, m.9,

24-26 708, n.274 13-20 657
II, pr.7, 4-65 675, n.117 III, m.9,
II, pr.7, 18-21 707, n.266;
79-85 708, n.272; 713
710, n.283 III, m.9, 21 657
II, m.8 703 III, m.9,
II, m.8, 1-30 657 22-24 708, n.273
III, pr.2, 1-2 708, n.273 III, m.9, 23 673, n.105
III, pr.2, 2-5 714, n.313 III, m.9,
III, m.6, 4-5 657 23-24 672
III, pr .8, 23 652, n.6 III, pr.10, 2 670, n.llO
III, m.8, 15 673, n.105 III, pr.10,
III, pr.9, 23-25 673, n.105
10-13 710 III, pr.10,
III, pr.9, 25-27 672
41-49 674, n.109 III, pr.10,
III, pr.9, 49-51 672
45-49 710, n.280 III, pr.10,
III, pr.9, 55-58 658
80-86 710 III, pr.10,
III, pr.9, 57-58 672, n.103
91-93 673, n.105 III, pr.10,
III, pr.9, 88-90 709
99-101 652, n.4 III, pr.10, 92 702, n.246
III, pr.9, III, pr.10,
101-102 673 106-115 674, n.109
III, m.9 703, n.248; III, pr.10,
704, 256 119-125 674, n.109
III, m.9, 2-3 673 III, pr.10,
III, m.9, 5-6 670, n.110 134-142 670, n.109
III, m.9, 5-7 675 III, pr.10,
III, m.9, 5-9 717, n.322 142-144 674
III, m.9, 6 657 III, pr.ll,
III, m.9, 7-8 673 22-23 673, n.105
III, m.9, 7-9 674, n.l11; III, pr.ll,
675, n.l16; 31-34 707, n.266
692, n.199 III, m.ll,
III, m.9, 1-16 714, n.313
13-17 712 III, pr.12,
912 INDEX
15-24 673 IV, pr.6,

III, pr.12, 32-33 674
20-24 675, n.115 IV, pr.6,
UI, pr.12, 36-67 658
63-64 653, n.12 IV, pr.6,
III, pr.12, 43-44 675,n.ll5
74-78 674 IV, pr.6,
III, pr.l2, 56-58 670, n.llO
102-104 670, n.110 IV, pr.6,
III, pr.12, 63-78 711
102-108 673, n.107 IV, pr.6, 674, n.ll1;
III, pr.12, 73-78 692, n.199
106 702, n.246 IV, pr.6,
III,pr.12, 90-92 674
110-112 652, n.4 IV, pr.6,
IV, pr.1, 126-127 672, n.99
24-31 658; 714, IV, pr.6, 145 702, n.246
n.312 V, pr.1,
IV, m.1, 35ff. 652, n.6
1-30 714, n.313 V, pr.1,
IV, pr.2, Iff. 652, n.4 55-58 675, n.115
IV, pr.2, V, pr.2,
38-42 714, n.312 11-27 711, n.286
IV, pr.2, V, pr.2,
113-119 714, n.312 16-20 707, n.267
IV, pr.2, V, pr.2,
121-123 674, n.113 20-27 714, n.311
IV, pr.3, V, m.3, 8-10 708, n.272;
25-28 710, n.281 714, n.311
IV, pr.3, 36 702, n.245 V, pr.4 703
IV, pr.4, V, pr.4, 6-8 672
20-25 708, n.269; V, pr.4,
710, n.283 72-77 716, n.319
IV, pr.4, 708, n.269; V, pr.4,
149-154 714, n.311 75-120 709, nn.275,
IV, pr.6 703 277
IV, pr.6, V, pr.4,
21-30 658 77-120 658
IV, pr.6, 674, n.l11; V, pr.4,
22-25 692, n.199 82-91 715
INDEX 913
V, pr.4, 670; 715, 28-37 656

89-91 n.317 31-37 656
V, pr.4, 41-48 656
92-120 716 49-52 656
V, pr.4, 66-67 656
100-104 708, n.273 77-78 669, n.86
V, m.4, 708, n.273; 83-84 656
35-40 717 92-93 669, n.86
V, pr.5, 1-10 708, n.270; 95-98 669
717,n.320 98 656
V, pr.5, 1-56 715, n.315 98 670,n.92
V, pr.5, 119-120 670, n.92
12-18 709, n.275 119-121 656; 669, n.86;
V, pr.5, 670; 670,
50-53 672 nn.91, 92
V, pr.6, 1-3 461, n.177 121-122 669
V, pr.6, 5-11 673 122-124 670
V, pr.6, 124 656
18-22 652, n.6 124-125 670
V, pr.6, 124-126 656; 669, n.86;
25-31 673, n.108 670, n.92
V, pr.6, 131-133 669; 670,
31ff. 652, n.4 nn.91, 92; 680,
V, pr.6, n.146; 683
35-38 673, n.108 132-133 669, n.86
V, pr.6, 132-134 656
38-40 672, n.102 133-134 656
V, pr.6, 134-135 669, n.88
57-59 674, n.108 140-141 669, n.86
144-146 656; 670, n.92
149-150 669, nn.87, 88;
De Divisione 680, n.146
(PL 64) 150-153 670, n.90
152-153 656
875D-876D 699 155-159 670, n.90
159 656; 670, n.92
164-165 669, n.88
De Hebdomadibus 165 656
(LCL, Stewart and Rand) 166-167 669, n.87; 670;
28-30 683 680, n.146
914 INDEX
DeMusica nn.94, 98; 680,

(BT, Friedlein) n.146
4, 26-29 671, nn.93, 97
I, 2, 188, 27 4, 26-44 656
- 189,1 708, n.274 4, 34-36 671, n.97
4, 47 671, n.95
4, 54-59 656
De Topicis Differentiis 4, 58-59 671
(PL 64) 4, 60-61 671, n.96
4, 64-66 671
II, 1188 A-B 718, n.324 4, 64-83 656
4, 69-77 671, n.96
4, 92-97 656
De Trinitate 4, 94-95 671, n.96
(LCL, Stewart and Rand)
Pr.31-32 652, n.7 In Categorias

717, n.323 (PL 64)
1' 25-30
2, 5-16 662, n.58
2, 5-21 656 I (159C) 657
2, 17-21 671; 680, I (162A) 701
n.146; 683 I (162B) 657
2, 18-21 656 II (2240-
656; 671, n.98; 225B) 701
2, 29-31
680, n.146
2, 37-40 671, n.98; 680, In Ciceronis Topica
n.146 (Orelli and Baiter)
2, 40-42 656; 671
2, 44-48 717, n.323 V, 11450-
2, 44-56 656 1146A 718, n.324
2, 56-58 671, n.94
3, 1-4 671, n.94
3, 33-34 671, n.98; 680,
n.146 In De Interpretatione ed. II
4, 7-9 671 (BT, Meiser)
4, 7-18 656
4, 18-20 656; 671 Pr. 7, 5-7 700
4, 20-23 656 1, 1, 18, 26 701
4, 23-24 656; 671, n.97 1, 1, 20,
4, 24-26 656; 671, 17-18 708, n.270
INDEX 915
2, 3, 79, 1 - 24, 74,

80, 17 24, n.82; 651 11-12 466
2, 4, 88, 28 701 25, 75, 14 452, n.I43
2, 7, 172, 13 701 25, 75, 14-
4, 10, 321, 76, 6 451, n.I42
20 701 25, 75, 17 451, nn.l36,
4, 10, 324, 141; 452,
15 701 n.I43
6, 13, 459, 25, 76, 5-6 451, n.I36
2-3 710, n.284 25, 76, 6 472, n.223
26, 76, 7-
77,8 474
In Isagogen ed. I 26, 76, II -
(BT, Brandt) 77, 8 472, n.222
27, 78, 2-11 476
I, 3, 7, 29, 79, 9 451, n.l37
15-16 668; 692, 32, 81, 25-
n.l99 82, 3 477
32, 82, 3-8 477
CALCIDIUS 33, 82, 9-
In Timaeum 83, 19 477
(Waszink) 33, 82,
18-20 477
pr.6, 5ff. 13 39, 88,
1,57,1-4, 11-17 439
59, 2 434; 500, n.31 40, 89,
5, 59, 3 - 6, 15-16 474, n.231
60, 3 434 44, 92, 6-
6, 61, 10 482, n.258 50, 100, 2 430
7, 60, 4- 51, 100, 3-5 477, n.240
61, 9 435 51, 100,
20, 71, IOff. 323, n.385 8-19 237
22, 73, 4 482, n.258 51, 152, 3-5 479
23, 73, 53, 101, 14-
10-12 473 102, 8 477, n.243
23, 73, 12 - 54, 102,
74, 3 473 9-11 474, n.231
23, 74, 54, 102,
14-15 451, n.I41 14-19 487
23, 74, 57, 104, 18-
15-19 472 105, 18 425; 479
916 INDEX
59, 106, 17- - 180, 2 490

91, 144, 12 430 140, 180,
73, 121, 6- 15-21 487
122, 2 430, n.42 140, 181,
92, 144, 1-3 486, n.275
12ff. 481 141, 181,
92, 145, 4 - 9-12 489
146, 8 481 143, 182,
93, 146, 5-7 367, n.164
20-21 474 144, 182,
95, 147, 26- 11-16 474, n.232
148, 9 481 144, 182, 16
95, 148, - 183, 1 368, n.171
9-11 481 144, 182, 16
99, 151, 8 480 - 183, 6 474, n.232
100, 151, 12 144, 183,
- 152, 2 250 6-10 722, n.8
101, 152, 144, 183, 8 284, n.230
11-13 472, n.224 148, 185,
104, 153, 3ff. 474, n.232
23-24 426, n.21 152, 187, 13 474, n.232
105, 154, 162, 195,
10-11 451, n.136 1-18 461, n.177
105, 154, 176, 204,
10-20 451, n.142 5-9 439
105, 154, 11 452, n.143 176, 204, 9-
105, 154, 17 452, n.143 205, 8 462
105, 154, 18 472 177, 206,
119, 164, 11 451, n.136 1-5 474, n.232
128, 171, 4 426, n.21 177, 206, 3 475, n.235
132, 174, 178, 207,
5-7 426, n.21 1-4 474, n.232
135, 175, 180, 208, 22
16-18 311, n.347 - 209, 2 487
137, 177, 182, 209, 16
14ff. 486 - 210, 4 488
137, 177, 18 187, 212,
- 178, 7 489 10-11 490
139, 179, 187, 212,
11-12 489 11-20 487
139, 179, 19 188, 212, 22
INDEX 917
- 213, 2 439, n.74 222, 235, 8-

188, 212, 23 223, 238, 13 427
- 213, 2 475, n.235 222, 235, 10
188, 213, 474; 475, - 237, 9 484
1-2 n.235 223, 237,
188, 213, 10-13 484
1-6 474, n.232 224, 238, 17
188, 213, 5 439, n.74 - 239, 1 427
196, 217, 25 225, 240 -
- 218, 7 489 241, 2 485
198, 219, 225, 241,
4-5 489 2-5 487
198, 219, 226, 241,
4-9 432 8-9 485
198, 219, 228, 243,
5-6 490 13-18 486, n.274
199, 216, 228, 243,
9ff. 488 14-15 425
200, 220, 228, 243, 18
10-17 489 - 244, 10 486, n.274
201, 220, 18 489 230, 244, 21
201, 220, 18 - 245, 2 487
- 221' 9 488 231,245,
202, 221, 20 3-6 482
- 222, 5 483 231, 245,
202, 222, 6 483 13-14 486, n.275
203, 222, 232, 246, 9-
20-21 486, n.275 233, 247, 12 482
207, 225, 232, 247,
3-13 486, n.275 7-12 487; 488
208, 225, 234, 247,
21ff. 427, n.28 17-19 482, n.259
209, 226, 242, 258,
13-15 427, n.28 7-9 426
213, 228, 250, 260,
18-20 486, n.275 10-13 427
214, 229, 3 483 254, 212, 21 426, n.21
221, 234, 5- 255, 263, 20
235, 7 483 - 264, 2 426
222, 235, 255, 264,
8-10 484 11-14 489, n.289
918 INDEX
257, 265, - 277, 8 466, n.203

16-19 427 273, 277, 13
260, 267, 17 466 - 278, 7 467
262, 268, 273, 277, 17 468, n.207
16-17 485, n.269 273,"277,
262, 268, 19 17-18 468
- 269, 4 426 273, 278, 5 451, n.137
267, 272, 273, 278,
23-24 487 5-6 461
268, 273, 7 458, n.162 273, 278, 7 470, n.217
268, 273, 7- 274, 278,
274, 279, 7 445, n.98 13-16 446
268, 273, 8 457, n.161; 275, 279, 8 -
458, n.161 307, 309, 2 445, n.99
268, 273, 11 457, n.161; 276, 280, 1 -
458, n.161 278, 283, 16 429
268, 273, 277, 281, 16
13-14 458, n.161 - 282, 6 429, n.38
268, 273, 16 447 278, 207, 1 475, n.235
269, 274, 278, 282,
3-14 459 8-11 428
269, 274, 4 458, n.161 278, 283,
269,274,8 458, n.161 8-11 453, n.149
269, 274, 10 458, n.161 283, 286, 1 -
269, 274, 12 458, n.161 286, 291, 7 427
269, 274, 286, 289, 12
12-14 458 - 291, 7 427, n.23
270, 274, 15 458, n.161 287, 291,
270, 274, 15 11-12 463, n.185
- 275, 9 459 292, 294, 17
270, 274, 16 458, n.161 - 295, 14 113, n.202
272, 276, 295, 297,
10-15 452 7ff. 459, n.171
272, 276, 295, 297, 7-
12-15 452, n.145 299, 301, 20 428
272, 276, 15 451, n.138; 295, 297,
452, n.143 16-19 449
272, 276, 15 296, 298, 13
- 277, 3 425 - 297, 299,
272, 276, 15 11 384, n.241
INDEX 919
297, 299, 306, 307,

14-17 449 7-10 321, n.382
297, 299, 18 307, 307, 20
- 300, 3 589, n.388 - 308, 2 436
298, 300, 307, 308,
15-17 449, n.I26 2-13 436
300, 302, 307, 308, 14
1-2 448 - 309, 2 263, n.I40;
300, 302, 436
2-11 449 308, 309,
301, 302, 14ff. 447
17-19 432 312, 311,
301, 302, 17 10-11 446
- 303, 4 450 312, 311, 10
301, 302, 17 - 312, 2 321, n.382
- 303, 8 449 313, 312, 3-
302, 303, 314, 312, 11 447
9-15 437 316, 313, 2 468; 468,
302, 303, 9- n.209
320, 316, 13 445, n.IOO 319, 314,
302, 303, 15 17-19 446
- 304, 2 437, n.68 319, 314, 19
302, 303, 15 - 315, I 447
- 304, 17 437 319, 314, 19
302, 304, - 320, 316,
1-2 437, n.68 13 446
303, 304, 18 319, 315,
- 305, 16 438 4-6 447
304, 305, 17 319, 315, 20 439, n.74
- 306, 10 438 320, 316,
304, 305, 8-11 446
17-18 438 320, 316,
304, 306, 11-13 446
5-7 466 321, 316, 14
304, 306, 6 451, n.138 - 354, 345,
304, 306, 7 452, nn.143, 16 445, n.98
146 321, 316,
305, 306, 11 21-23 446, n.l02
- 306, 307, 322, 317,
19 436 19-21 446
920 INDEX
322, 317, 337, 330, 10

20-21 447 - 331' 4 468, n.209
328, 322, 18 337, 330,
- 323, 6 425 14-15 456, n.157
329, 323, 337, 330, 16 451, n.137
8-11 447 337, 330,
329, 323, 17-18 456, n.157
11-13 451, n.141 338, 331, 5-
329, 323, 12 451, n.138; 332, 4 456
452, n.144 338, 331, 6 451, n.137
329, 323, 14 452, n.144; 338, 331, 23
470, n.218 - 332, 1 470, n.220
329, 323, 338, 332, 1 451, n.139
18-20 468 339, 332, 5 451, n.137
329, 323, 24 451, n.137; 339, 332,
470, n.218 5-10 461, n.181
329, 323, 25 451, n.138 339, 332, 7 461
329, 324, 339, 332, 8 451, n.140
1-6 470, n.219 339, 332, 10 451, n.141;
329, 324, 3 451, n.138 452, n.143
330, 324, 15 451, n.138 339, 332, 11 451, n.137;
330, 324, 451, n.138
19-23 467 340, 333, 14 451,n.141
330, 324, 23 468, n.207 340, 333, 16 451, n.138;
330, 324, 23 461, n.176
- 325, 8 469 340, 333, 17 452, n. 143
330, 324, 24 341, 333, 19 451, n.137
- 325, 1 461 342, 334, 20
330, 325, 6 452, n.143 - 335, 4 426
330, 325, 342, 334,
6-8 451, n.141 23-24 461
334, 328, 343, 335,
10-11 446, n.102 11-12 451, n.137
335, 328, 425; 470, 344, 336,
12-13 n.220 5-6 468, n.210
335, 328, 13 451, n.138 344, 336, 6 451, nn.137,
337, 330, 3 470, n.218 138
337, 330, 5 451, n.137 344, 336, 7 451, n.134
337, 330, 344, 336, 8 451, n.140
9-10 456, n.157 344, 336, 9 470, n.218
INDEX 92I
345, 336, I4 5, 4- 6, 2 390, n. I I

- 338, 6 446 7, 1 392
347, 339, I 451, n.138 7, 5 390, n. I I
347, 339, 2 45I, n.137 8, I-3 394
347, 339, 9, I 39I, n.I4
3-6 446 9, 1-3 390, n.11; 393
349, 340, 7 451, n.140 10, I - I 3, 6 391, I6; 389;
349, 340, 392
9-10 461, n.179 10, 7 390, n. I I
349, 340, 10 45I,n.I37 10, 7-8 390, n.II
349, 340, 1 I, I -3 390, n.1 I
I 1-14 426 12, I 393
349, 340, 21 470, n.217 I 2, 3-4 395
349, 340, 23 452, n.144 12, 1 I 390, n.11
349, 34I, I 3, I-6 392
5-6 468 14,I-I5,6 389
351, 342, 14, I2 390, n.11
13-I4 447 14, 13 393
352, 342, 17 I 5, 1 390, n.II
- 343, 20 448 I 6, 1 - I 7, 1 389
352, 343, I 7, 2ff. 391, nn.15, 17
15-20 469,n.215 17,2-24,6 389
354, 344, I8 I 7, I 5 391, n.I 5
- 345, 5 459 20, 2 390,n.I2
354, 344, I9 458, n.161 2 I, 6ff. 389
354, 345,
5-10 460
354, 345, 6 458, n.161 CICERO
354, 345, 15 458, n.161 Academica
(BT, Plasberg)
CENSORINUS 3 810
De Die Natali 4-8 8IO
(BT, Sallmann) 7 68; 810
9-I4 810
I, 6 390, n.IO I3 69, n.49
2, I - 3, 6 389 15-I9 75, n.76
2, 2 39I, n.13 17-I8 66, n.33
4, 1 - I 3, 6 391, n.14 17-I9 164, n.33
4, 3 390, n.11 24 101
5, I - 13, 6 389 24-29 826, n.5I
922 INDEX
26 66, n.33 DeFinibus

26-27 107 (BT, Schiche)
26-29 101
27-28 821, n.4I I, 6-7 73
28 I10 I, 7 68, n.44
29 259 I, 10 73, n.72
30-32 I44 II, 46 I33; I33,
33 66, n.33; I46; n.282; I39,
295, n.280 n.308
33ff. I17 II, 52 I46
35ff. 66, n.33 III, 5 73, n.72
39 95; 1I7 III, I5 10, n.32
43 66, n.33 III, 17 I36, n.293
III, 2I I39, n.308
III, 33 I36
Brutus III, 73 93
(BT, Malcovati) IV, 3 62, n.22
IV, 3-I9 67
24 68, n.47 IV, 5 66
IV, 5ff. 76, n.83
IV, 12 I09
CatoMaior
IV, I4ff. I29
(BT, Simbeck)
IV, 15 66
IV, 16 129
I3 68, n.46
IV, 27 I29
4I 68, n.46
IV, 28 I29
77 384, n.24I
IV, 36 1I8
78 70, n.57
V, I 68, nn.44, 47
V, 7ff. 66, n.33
De Divinatione v, 10-1I 76, n.83
(BT, Giomini) v, I6 6I
V, 50 68, n.46
I, 8 72, n.69 V, 59 133, n.282;
I, 60-6I 71, n.63 139
I, 78 68, n.46 V, 88-89 62, n.22
I, 90 660, n.53
I, I25-126 367, nn.167, De lnventione
I68, I69 (BT, Stroebel)
II, 33-34 98, n.153
II, 87-89 628 I, I 603
INDEX 923
II, 10 58, n.7 II, 16 88; 89, n.120;

II, 159 725, n.15 409, n.8
II, 27 128, n.266
II, 28 124, n.248
Delegibus II, 45 71, n.61
(BT, Ziegler) III, 1 68, n.44
III, 2-3 89,n.117
I, 16 133, n.284 III, 12 89, n.117
I, 18 93, n.l34; 139, III, 14 62
n.308
I, 18-19 85; 89, n.120
I, 18-20 133, n.284
I, 19 85 De Natura Deorum
I, 20 84, n.102 (Van den Bruwaene)
I, 21 85
I, 22-23 86; 89, n.120 I, 1-4 734, n.61
I, 24 71, n.66; 86 I, 3-4 72, n.69
I, 26 133; 133, I, 16-17 66, n.33
n.284 I, 24 98
I, 27 84, n.102; 138 I, 25-41 62
I, 29-30 87, n.l11 I, 30 172, n.57; 821,
I, 33 139, n.308 n.41
I, 33-35 87, n.111 I, 33 66, n.33
I, 37 67 I, 36 84, n.100; 97,
I, 39 68 n.146; 284,
I, 42-43 87, n.111 n.230; 828,
I, 53-55 67 n.55
I, 59 138; 140, I, 39 98, n.150; 112,
n.311 n.200
I, 59-60 130, n.274 I, 39-41 824, n.47
I, 60-62 75, n.76 I, 52 95; 98
II, 7 87 II, 4 123, n.246
II, 8 88; 89, n.120; II, 4-72 93, n.131
409, n.11; 410, II, 5 408, n.7
n.14 II, 16 95,n.139
II, 10 88, n.116; 89, II, 21-22 100; 124,
n.ll5 n.247
II, 11 88 II, 23-24 99
II, 13 88, n.l16 II, 29-30 100, n.163
924 INDEX
II, 31-32 827, n.53 De Officiis

II, 32 71, n.65 (BT, Atzert)
II, 39-40 734, n.61
II, 40 97, n.146; 305, I, 2 66
n.322 I, 6-7 72
11,41 99 I, 11 140
II, 45 99,n.157 I, 15 146, n.327
II, 49-56 304, n.320 II, 5-6 74, n.74
II, 55 97, n.146 11,8 59
II, 56-69 818, n.30 III, 20 67
II, 57-58 94; 95, n.141 III, 76 145
II, 58 98 III, 81 145
II, 59ff. 818, n.30
II, 59-60 818, n.30
II, 60 304, n.319 DeOratore
II, 61-62 818, n.30 (BT, Kumaniecki)
II, 62 818, n.30
II, 63ff. 818, n.30 I, 47 68, n.45; 70,
II, 73-167 93, n.131 n.53
II, 77-78 95 III, 15 68, n.45
II, 81 95, n.141; 98
11,83 305, n.322
II, 83-84 95, n.141 De Republica
II, 84 114 (BT, Ziegler)
II, 87 95,n.141
II, 91-92 95, n.142; 97, 11,8 89, n.119
n.146 III, 3 82
II, 92 305, n.322 III, 33 81; 89, nn.118,
II, 115 97, n.146 120; 93, n.133;
II, 117-118 95, n.142; 96 409, n.11; 410,
II, 118 94; 97, n.147; nn.13, 16
111;305, III, 37 82
n.322 IV, 1 82, n.95
II, 120 98,n.153 VI, 9 114
II, 127 95, n.l39 Vi, 12 738
III, 20-21 99,n.157 VI, 13 128, n.266
III, 27 94,n.136 VI, 14 127, n.264
III, 28 95, n.139 VI, 15 125
III, 35 98 VI, 17 97, n.146; 128;
III, 95 72 272, n.180
INDEX 925
VI, 18-19 738 10 152, n.341;

VI, 26 130, n.274 410, nn.l3, 16,
VI, 27-29 70, n.57 17, 18
101 148; 295,
n.280; 296,
Epistulae ad Atticum n.282; 410,
(Shackleton-Bailey) n.l8
XIII, 19 62
ProMurena
(CB, Boulanger)
Epistulae ad Familiares
(Shackleton-Bailey) 263 67, n.39
I, 9 68, n.46
IX, 22 68, n.45 Timaeus
(BT, Giomini)
Lucullus 1 9
(BT, Plasberg) 5 10
6 295, n.276
17 134
18 134, n.288
19-20 141 Topica
21-22 141 (SCBO, Wilkins)
30-31 142
Ill 60 26-27 132
116 74, n.75 31 132
121 60, n.11
126 828, n.55
129 74, n.75 Tusculanae Disputationes
139 68 (BT, Pohlenz)
142 74, n.75
145 135, n.291 I, 8 59; 62
I, 9-25 120
I, 18 125, n.253
Orator I, 18-22 61
(BT, Westman) I, 20 126
I, 22 109; 645,
7ff. 147 n.242
926 INDEX
I, 23 62 126
I, 26-81 120 I, 97-99 71, n.S9
I, 35-36 121 I, 103 71, n.S8
I, 36 123; 408, n.7 II, 5 79
I, 38 140, n.312 11,9 59, n.9
I, 39 68, nn.44, 46; III, 2 133; 139,
121 n.308
I, 40 125, n.253 III, 10 140, n.311
I, 40-75 121 III, 11 140, n.312
I, 42 122; 125 IV, 6 66; 67
I, 44 133, n.281 IV, 7 58
I, 45 140; 304, IV, 35 515, n.123
n.318 IV, 44 68, n.46
I, 46 140 IV, 53 133
I, 49 121 V, 7 74
I, 51 126 v, 8-11 62, n.22
I, 53-54 123 V, 32-33 60
I, 53-55 70, n.57 v, 35 71, n.60
I, 57 71, n.64 v, 36 71, n.62
I, 57ff. 734, n.61 V, 37 98
I, 57-58 149 V, 39 140, n.310
I, 58 295, n.280 v, 61-62 515, n.123
I, 59 ISO v, 68 74, n.75
I, 60 124 V, 70 130, n.274
I, 62-63 123 v, 83 60, n.11
I, 63 71, n.65
I, 64-65 123 FAVONIUS EULOGIUS
I, 65 124 Disputatio de Somnio Scipionis
I, 65-66 123, n.245 (Scarpa)
I, 66 124
I, 67 126, n.257 1, 1 500, n.31
I, 67-70 124, n.248 1, 2 938, n.11
I, 70 11 2, 1-2 737; 739, n.20
I, 70-71 123, n.243; 3, 1 739
126, n.257 4, 1-2 739
I, 71 126 5, 1-2 739
I, 72-73 128 5, 2 739; 740; 742
I, 73 126 5, 2-3 737
I, 75 127 5, 4 739; 740; 741,
I, 78-79 122 n. 37; 472,
I, 80 125, n.255; n.40
INDEX 927
5, 5 739, n.20 I, 6, 2 730

5, 6 737 I, 6, 4 73I, n.23
5, 7 739 I, 7, 11 730
6, I-2 739 I, 7, I8 735
6, I-3 741 I, 7, I9-2I 735
6, 3 739 I, 10, I4 732
7, I-4 742 III, pr.2 730; 73I
7, 3 739 III, pr.3 732, n.40
12, 5 737 III, 1, I 734
I7, I-2 737 III, I, 9 730
I9, 4 738 IV, pr.5 734
19, 4-6 744 IV, 1, 1 731; 735
19, 4-7 738; 742 IV, 1, 2-3 730; 731; 733
21, 1-3 738, n.12 IV, 1, 3 730; 731; 733
25, 1-3 737 IV, 1, 3-4 733
IV, 1, 6 731; 731, n.33;
735
FIRMICUS MATERNUS V,pr.3 365, n.16I;
Mathesis 722, n.8; 730;
(BT, Kroll, Skutsch and Ziegler) 731; 731, n.33;
732; 734; 735
I, 1, 3-4 734, n.61 V, pr.4 734
I, 4, 1 733 V, pr.5 732
I, 4, Iff. 734, n.61 VII, 1, 1 736
I, 4, 1-2 733 VII, 1, 2 730
I, 4, 2 733 VII, 1, 2-3 734
I, 4, 3 733 VIII, 1, 1 730
I, 4, 4 733; 734 VIII, 1, 1-2 733, n.55
I, 4, 5 733 VIII, 1, 2 733
I, 5, 6 730; 732 VIII, 1, 3 735
I, 5, 6-7 735 VIII, 1, 4 733
I, 5, 7 730; 732 VIII, 1, 6 733
I, 5, 7-8 730
I, 5, 9 731; 731, n.20;
733 FULGENTIUS
I, 5, 10 731; 731, n.20 Expositio Virgilianae Con-
I, 5, 10-11 731 tinentiae
I, 5, 11 731; 731, n.20; (BT, Helm)
732; 734, n.61
I, 5, 11-12 733 83, 10-11 761, n.35
I, 5, 12 730; 731; 732 85, 20-21 759
928 INDEX
85, 21 759 17-20 757, n.4

85, 21-86, 1 759 III, 6, 66,
86, 1 759 19ff. 760
87, 7-10 757, n.4 III, 6, 68,
88, 2-5 759 21-22 760, n.27
88, 3-5 759, n.22 III, 6, 69,
90, 14-15 759 15-17 757, n.4
102, 2-4 760 III, 6, 69, 28
- 70, 2 760, n.27
III, 7, 70, 4-
Mitologiae 72,9 763
(BT, Helm) III, 7, 71,
19-22 759
I, pr.3, 20 - III, 9, 74,
4, 1 761 9-10 759
I, pr.4, 4-6 761 III, 9, 74,
I, pr.4, 4-7 760 11-14 759
I, pr.11, III, 9, 75,
15-18 761 4-7 759
I, pr.12, 3 761, n.34 III, 10, 79,
I,pr.14, 7-11 759
21-15, 1 761
I, pr.15, 1 759
I, 2, 18, 7-9 762 GELLIUS
I, 2, 18, 1 0 Noctes Atticae
-I, 3, 19, 7 763 (SCBO, Marshall)
I, 4, 19, 9 -
I, 5, 20, 7 763 pr.1-5 199
I, 12, 23, pr.8 205,n.17
4-6 763 pr.11-12 199
I, 15, 26, I, 3, 10-29 203
18-20 759 I, 9, 1-7 201
I, 18, 30, I, 9, 9-11 200
11-16 764 I, 20, 1-9 203, n.12
II, 1, 36, 2ff. 764 II, 8, 1-8 204, n.15
II, 4, 43, II, 9, 1-5 204, n.15
2-20 764 II, 18, 2-3 207
II, 4, 43, II, 22, 1-26 205
14-15 759 11,30,1-11 201, n.7
II, 6, 46, 8-9 762 III, 6, 1-3 201, n.7; 204,
III, 1, 59, n.15
INDEX 929
III, 10, 1-17 203 1-2 202, n.9

III, 16, 6-14 203,n.12 XVII, 12, 3 210
IV, 11, 1-4 201, n.6 XVII, 20,
V, 3, 1 209 1-9 209
V, 12, 13 203 XVII, 20,
v, 15, 1-9 206 7-9 212
V, 15, 6 202, n.8 XVIII, 1,
v, 15, 7 210 1-16 205, n.17
V, 16, 2 202, n.8 XVIII, 2, 8 210
V, 16, 4 210 XIX, 1,
VI, 6, 1-3 201 14-21 202, n.8
VII, 1, 6 208 XIX, 2, 5 506
VII, 2, 1-3 367, n.167 XIX, 6, 1 201, n.7
VII, 2, 1-12 202 XIX, 14, 1-8 202, n.lO
VII, 2, 12 201, n.6 XX, 1, 4 210
VII, 10, 1 208, n.25
VII, 13, 8-11 208
VII, 14, 5-9 209 MACROBIUS
X, 4, 1-4 202 In Somnium Scipionis
X, 22, 1-24 209 (BT, Willis)
XI, 5, 1-8 202
XI, 5, 5 205,n.17 I, 1, 6 504, nn.58, 60
XI, 12, 1-3 202, n.8 I, 1, 7 504, n.63
XIII, 5, 1-15 202, n.8 I, 2, 4-18 520
XIII, 19, 1-2 209 I, 2, 5 502, n.52
XIII, 28, 1-4 202, n.8; 203, I, 2, 8 512
n.ll I, 2, 13-15 549
XIV, 1, 1-33 205 I, 2, 13-16 524
XIV, 3, 3-4 209 I, 2, 14 531; 532; 535,
XIV, 4, 1-5 205, n.17 n.189; 536
XV, 2, 3 506, n.72 I, 2, 15 531
XV, 2, 3-8 210 I, 2, 15-16 531
XV, 10, 1-2 204, n.15 I, 2, 16 32
XVI, 2, 1-13 207, n.21 I, 2, 19 507, n.81
XVI, 8, 1-17 207 I, 3, 17 510
XVI, 8, 6 203,n.12 I, 4, 1 580; 581; 589,
XVII, 11, 1 210 n.393
XVII, 11, I, 5, 5 675,n.117
1-6 204 I, 5, 5-7 521, n.146
XVII, 15, I, 5, 5-14 570, n.334
930 INDEX
I, 5-6 513 I, 8, 8 583, o.365

I, 6, 2 503, o.55; 504, I, 8, 10 509, o.91
o.67 I, 9 516, o.123
I, 6, 2-3 569 I, 9, 1 581, o.357;
I, 6, 4 504, o.67; 568, 583
o.330 I, 9, 2 515, o.123
I, 6, 7 514,o.114 I, 9, 3 516, o.123;
I, 6, 8 532; 535; 536; 581; 581,
539; 546; 547 oo.357, 358;
I, 6, 8-9 525; 536; 537 583, o.365;
I, 6, 9 34; 539; 540; 584
541 I, 9, 5-6 581, o.357
I, 6, 18 532; 533 I, 9, 10 583
I, 6, 19-20 526 I, 9-10 515
I, 6, 20 532; 535, I, 10 516,0.123
o.189; 536; I, 10, 9 588
540; 551; 551, I, 10, 10 586, o.377;
o.260 588, o.382
I, 6, 23 504, o.65 I, 10, 10-11 588
I, 6, 24 504, o.65; 548 I, 10, 12 515, o.123
I, 6, 24-25 548, o.248 I, 10, 12ff. 588
I, 6, 25 548 I, 10, 15 515, o.123
I, 6, 25-28 521, o.146 I, 10, 16 515, 0.123
I, 6, 29-31 504, o.65 I, 10, 17 588
I, 6, 30 548, o.247, I, 11, 4 507, o.80
248 I, 11, 9 507, o.80
I, 6, 35-36 570, o.334 1,11,10 517
I, 6, 36-39 514, o.ll4 I, 11, 10-12 572
I, 6, 41 521, o.147 I, 11, 10 - I,
I, 6, 42 565, o.312 12, 18 516
I, 6, 45 504, o.67; 514, I, 11, 11 579; 580; 583,
o.ll4; 551, o.362; 585
o.261 1,11,12 565; 587
I, 6, 45-46 570 I, 12, 1-3 517; 517,
I, 6, 45-47 551, o.262 o.129; 573
I, 6, 46 548 I, 12, 2 583; 584
I, 6, 65-76 514, o.114 I, 12, 4-6 575
I, 8, 3-11 507 I, 12, 4-18 517
I, 8, 5 507, oo.83, 84 I, 12, 5 583; 586
I, 8, 7 509, o.91 I, 12, 6 504, o.66; 580;
INDEX 93I
588 I, I4, I5 528; 532; 534;

I, I2, 7 503, n.57; 585 535, n.I89;
I, I2, 7-I2 52I, n.I47; 539; 54I,
576 n.223
I, I2, 8 583; 585 I, I4, I6-I8 554
I, I2, 9 586; 588 I, I4, 17-I8 563, n.308
I, I2, 10-II 586, n.377 I, I4, I9 506; 507, n.80;
I, 12, I3 585; 585, 542, n.224
n.373 I, I4, 20 540, nn.2I2,
I, I2, I3-I6 578 2I4
I, I2, I4-I5 565 I, I7, 8 55I, n.26I
I, I2, I6 583, n.362 I, I7, 8-II 508
I, I2, I7 589, n.393 I, I7, 9 540, n.2I2
I, I2, 17-I8 579 I, I7, 11 552
I, I3, 5 503, n.56 I, I7, I2 532; 539
I, I3, 6 583 I, I7, I2-I3 535
I, I3, 9-20 508 I, I7, I2-I5 529; 553,
I, I3, I6 505 n.270
I, I4, 2 530; 533 I, I7, I4 55I, n.260
I, I4, 2-8 527 I, I7, I5 52I; 829
I, I4, 3-5 580 I, I9, 27 508
I, I4, 4 536; 580, I, 20, I 555, n.274
n.352; 588 I, 20, 2 504, n.68
I, I4, 5-7 5I8 I, 20, 6 555
I, I4, 6 532; 533; 534; I, 2I, 34 580, n.352;
535 58I; 589
I, I4, 6-7 537; 538, II, I, 5-7 52I, n.I46
n.205; 54I; II, I, 7 57I, n.337
542, n.225; II, 2, I 502, n.52; 503,
544 n.55; 504,
I, I4, 7 5I9; 537; 539; n.67; 55I,
540; 54I, n.260; 55I,
n.223; 548; n.262; 568
549; 563, II, 2, I4 504, n.67; 570
n.308 II, 2, I4-I5 55I, n.260
I, I4, 8 553; 563, II, 2, I4-I6 55I, n.262
n.308 II, 2, I5 504, n.67; 55I,
I, I4, I0-13 565, n.3I2 n.262
I, I4, I4-I6 552 II, 2, I6-I7 569, n.332
932 INDEX
II,2,17 570, n.334 Saturnalia

II,2, 20 504, n.67 (BT, Willis)
II, 2, 22 504, n.67
II, 2, 23 502, n.52 I, 1, 3 505, n.69
II, 3, 1 504, n.62 I, 1, 5-6 505, n.69
II, 3, 1-3 520, n.143; I, 3, 2 511, n.98
571, n.337 I, 3, 4 511, n.98
II, 3, 11 541; 551, I, 4, 1 500
nn.260, 261 I, 7, 12 511, n.98
II, 3, 12 571, n.337 I, 8, 1 511, n.101;
II, 3, 12-13 570 514, n.116
II, 3, 13-14 571 I, 9, 11 521
II, 3, 14 507, n.80 I, 9, 16 511, nn.101,
II, 3, 14-15 571 102
II,3,15 505, n.71; 510; I, 10, 20 521
549, n.253 I, 11,41 505, n.69
II, 4, 1 571, n.337 I, 11, 42 511, n.98
II, 9, 8ff. 675, n.117 I, 12, 20-21 512
II, 10, 5-16 520 I, 16, 21 514, n.116
II, 10, 9 548, n.246; I, 16, 29 512, n.l06
552 I, 17,1-1,
II, 10, 14 504, n.64 23, 22 560
II, 12, 5 540 I, 17, 3 508, n.89
II, 12, 7-8 509, n.92 I, 17, 4 561, n.294
II, 12, 7-10 507 I, 17, 7 505, n.69
II, 12, 10-11 542 I, 17, 8 507, n.80
II, 12, 14-15 508 I, 17, 9-10 764
II, 13, 1-8 540, n.214 I, 17, 53-54 561
II, 13, 7-8 542, n.224 I, 17, 65 507; 620, n.78
II, 14, 4ff. 506 I, 17, 70 510; 556; 561;
II, 15, Iff. 506 618, n.62; 833,
II, 15, 6 504, n.59 n.71
II, 15, 11-12 541, n.219 I, 18, 3-4 511
II, 15, 12 542, n.224 I, 18, 15 556; 561
II, 15, 25 504, n.69 I, 18, 18-21 513
II, 16, 21-22 542, n.224 I, 19, 7-9 561; 562
II, 17, 13 504, n.61 I, 22, 2-6 562
II, 17, 15 523,n.155; I, 23, 1-2 561
548; 571 I, 23, 5 505, n.69
II, 17, 15-17 522,n.153 I, 23, 7 505, n.69
INDEX 933
I, 24, 18 499, n.28 VII, 15,

I, 24, 21 499, n.28 15-16 505, n.69
II, I, 2 505, n.69 VII, 16, 5-8 64I, n.221
II, I, 6 498 VII, 16, 34 506, n.75
II,8, 2 511, n.98
II, 8, 4-8 505, n.69; 506,
n.72 MARTIANUS CAPELLA
II, 8, 10-I4 506 De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii
III, 2, 8 511, n.101 (BT, Willis)
III, 2, I1 51 I, nn.101,
102 I, 7 605; 645
III, 4, 2 511, n.101 I, 22 604, n.9; 640;
III, 4, 6 513, n.107 640, n.2I6
III, 4, 7 511, n.98 I, 23 605; 645
III, 4, 8 511; 618, n.68; I, 26-30 764
831 I, 27-28 621, n.86
III, 6, 5 511,n.98 I, 30 626
III, 6, 10 511, n.IOI I, 32 639
III, I2, 2 5Il,n.98 I, 44 638
III, 13, 1 511, n.98 I, 45-61 627; 637ft.
III, 13, I, 68 623
14-15 511, n.98 I, 73 626
III, 15, 6 511, n.98 I, 75 626
III, 15, 8 511, n.98 I, 76-77 627
III, 16, 12 511, n.98 I, 92 604, n.9; 605;
III, 18, 5 511, n.98 616; 621
V, 2, I 499, n.28 I, 93 640; 640,
v, 18, 19-20 506, n.75 n.215
v, 20, 13 511, n.98 I, 94-95 639
VI, 4, 8 511,n.I01 I, 94-96 639
VII, 1, 13 505, nn.69, 72 I, 95 639
VII, 3, 24 506, n.75; 512 II, I09 640; 640,
VII, 5, 20 548 n.2II
VII, 6, 15 506, nn.75, 79 II, II8 640, n.216
VII, 9, 17 54I, n.223 II, I20 640
VII, 12, II, I23 640
25-26 506, n.75 II, 125 639
VII, 13, II, 125-I26 639
I9-20 506, nn.75, 79 II, I26 620; 639; 640,
VII, IS, 3 505, n.69 n.2I5
934 INDEX
II, 131 639 II, 185-187 627

II, 133 643 II, 188 619
II, 134 643 II, 189 626
II, 136 641 II, 191-192 620
II, 140 641 II, 193 619
II, 142 640, n.212 II, 194-195 625
II, 143 643 II, 196 626
II, 143-144 643 II, 197 626
II, 145 644 II, 198-206 626
II, 149 629, n.124 II, 200 644, n.235
II, 150 629, n.124; II, 202 610; 611
630; 631; 632; II, 203 610; 615
634 II, 203-204 612
II, 150-157 629ff.; 637ff. II, 204 611; 612
II, 151 631 II, 204-205 609
II, 151ff. 630 II, 206 611; 612; 640,
II, 153-154 631 n.213
II, 154 632; 634; 636 II, 212 639
II, 155 630; 631; 634 II, 212-213 639
II, 156 629, n.124; II, 213 645, nn.239,
632; 633; 637 242
II, 157-158 633 VI, 567 617; 618; 834
II, 160 634; 635 VI, 567-574 604
II, 161 631; 632; 633; VI, 571 617
635 VI, 574 621
II, 162-163 634 VII, 731 612; 617; 623,
II, 162-164 635 n.93
II, 165 636 VII, 733 623
II, 165-166 629, n.124; VIII, 812 625
637; 639 IX, 910 611; 611, n.29;
II, 166 636 612
II, 167 631; 632; 634; IX, 922 610, n.27
636
II, 169 644, n.235
II, 169-170 625
II, 171-180 PRISCIANUS GRAMMATICUS
625
II, 181
Institutiones
625
(Keil)
II, 182-193 625
II, 183 626
II, 185 610, n.27; 612; 17, 44, 135,
619; 626 7-9 777
INDEX 935
PRISCIANUS LYDUS I, 49, 7 773

Solutiones ad Chosroem I, 49, 24 774
(Bywater) I, 49, 25 774
I, 49, 26 774
pr. 768 I, 49, 29 773, n.32
1, 43, 13 772 I, 50, 5-9 773
I, 43, 23 - I, 50, 25ff. 775
44, 14 771 I, 52, 10-11 774
I, 43, 25 772 I, 52, 16-18 775
1,44,12-
46, 19 771
I, 44, 13-14 771 SENECA
I, 44, 15-28 771 De Benejiciis
1,44,31- (CB, Prechac)
45, 12 771
I, 45, 5-8 773 I, 3, Iff. 175
I, 45, 14 774 IV, 7, 1 167, n.47
I, 45, 35 773, n.32 IV, 7, 1-2 175; 368,
I, 46, 1-2 771; 773 n.170
I, 46, 5 773 IV, 8, 2 176, n.68
I, 46, 6-7 771 IV, 8, 2-3 166
I, 46, 12 772 IV, 8, 3 180, n.91
I, 46, 17 773
I, 46, 19-29 771
I, 47, 2 771 De Consolatione ad Helviam
I, 47, 2-24 771 (SCBO, Reynolds)
I, 47, 18-24 774
I, 47, 25 - 6, 8 168, n.49
48,9 772 8, 3 166; 174, n.61;
I, 48, 9 771 820, n.41
1,48,10- 8,4 166, n.40
49, 36 772 8, 5 168, n.48
I, 48, 16 773 9, 1-2 180, n.92
I, 48, 21 772
I, 48, 27 773
I, 48, 29 771 DeOtio
I, 48, 32-33 771, n.12; 773 (SCBO, Reynolds)
I, 48, 33 773
I, 49, 4-5 774 4, 1-2 179, n.89
I, 49, 5-8 773 5, 5 167, n.47
936 INDEX
De Superstitione 65, 3-14 189, n.122

(Augustine: Civ. Dei, CCSL 47-48, 65, 4 835
Dombart and Kalb) 65, 4-6 189
65, 7 190; 777
Civ. Dei VI, 65, 7-8 190; 295,
10 174, n.61; 821, n.276
n.41 65, 7-10 189, n.122
Civ. Dei VI, 65, 8 296, n.285
10-11 175, 64 65, 9-10 190
65, 11 105, n.178;
191
De Vita Beata 65, 11-12 160
(SCBO, Reynolds) 65, 12 177, n.76; 189,
n.122
8, 4 178; 179, n.90 65, 12-14 191
65, 15ff. 162
Epistulae ad Lucilium 65, 16 157, n.3
(SCBO, Reynolds) 65, 18-19 180, n.92
65, 23-24 177, n.71
41, 2 169 65, 24 179, n.89
48, 6 157 71, 16 180, n.93
58, 6-8 181 82, 9 160
58, 8-12 182 85, 17-18 157
58, 13 182, n.101 88, 20 158
58, 14 182 88, 21 158, n.8
58, 16 183 88, 24 164, n.32
58, 16-20 182, n.102 88, 25 158
58, 17 183 88, 26-28 158
58, 18-19 183; 295, 88, 42-45 157
n.276 89, 4 164
58, 20-21 183 89, 5 164
58, 22 182, n.102; 89, 5-6 164
184 89, 8 159, n.10; 160
58, 22-3 193, n.133 89, 9 75
58, 26ff. 162 89, 9-13 164
58, 27 187, n.118 89, 14-18 164
65, 2 176, n.70; 189; 89, 16 177, n.73
189, n.122 89, 18 165
65, 3 189 92, 30 112, n.200
65, 3-10 246, n.103 102, 22 180, n.93
INDEX 937
106, 3-10 161 I, 47 521, n.149;

107, 10-12 175 749; 829, n.58;
111, 1-2 157, 11.3 830
113, 18 135, n.291 I, 314 750
113, 23 180, n.94 I, 331 754, n.56
117, 1-3 161 I, 388 749; 750, n.25
117, 2 159,n.10 II, 296 831, n.65
117, 6 137, n.302; II, 689 367, n.166
162 III, 68 750, n.27; 753,
117, 7-10 162, n.22 n.47
117, 13 161 III, 140 753, n.47
III, 376 367, nn.167,
168
Naturales Quaestiones IV, 201 749; 834
(CB, Oltramare) IV, 379 754, n.56
IV, 638 824, n.46
I, pr.3 170, n.52 IV, 653 750, n.27
I, pr.11-12 180; n.92 IV, 654 753, n.45
I,pr.13 166, n.39; 260 V,81 750, n.27; 752
I, pr.16 177, n.77 v, 295 754, n.55
II, 3, 1 166, n.38 v, 735 755, n.59
II, 6, 2 178 VI, pr. 750
II, 6, 5 342, n.47 VI, 127 751
II, 45, 1 175 VI, 134 753
II, 45, 1-3 167 VI, 264 752, n.39
II, 45, 2-3 722, n.8 VI, 289 750; 750, n.27
Ill, 10, 3-5 178, n.87 VI, 439 751;752
IV, 8, 2-3 166 VI, 444 750, n.27
IV B, 6 160 VI, 448 750, n.27; 753
VII, 25 174, n.61 VI, 603 753, n.47
VII, 25, 2 167 VI, 650 753, n.45
VII, 30, 3-4 169 VI, 703 750; 752, n.39;
754; 812
VI, 705 752
SERVIUS VI, 713 754, n.50; 755,
/nAeneidem n.59
(I-V: Rand, Stocker and Travis; VI- VI, 714 751, nn.28, 31;
XII: Thilo and Hagen) 752
VI, 724 749; 751
I, pr.lff. 500, n.31 VI, 726 749
938 INDEX
VI, 727 749; 750, n.25; IV, 221 749

754, n.56 IV, 226 749
VI, 728 749
VI, 730 75l,n.28
VI, 732 751, n.33 SERVIUS DANIELlS
VI, 733 751, n.32 lnAeneidem
VI, 739 753, n.45 (I-V: Rand, Stocker and Travis; VI-
VI, 741 753 XII: Thilo and Hagen)
VI, 745 754
VI, 747 749; 750, n.25 II, 296 512, n.l03;
VIII, 275 755, n.57
749
VIII, 564 750, n.27; 752 III, 134 309, n.343
VIII, 601 750 V,81 752
IX, 182 752 VIII, 275 309, n.343;
XI, 51 752 816
lnBucolica
(Thilo and Hagen) In Georgica
(Thilo and Hagen)
2, 31 749
3,60 749 II, 336 750, n.27; 754,
5,66 510, n.95; 749; n.ss
750, n.25; 755,
n.59
8, 29 754, n.55 VARRO
8, 75 750 Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum
(Cardauns)
In Georgica fr. 4 813

(Thilo and Hagen) fr. 6 813
fr. 7 813
I, 5 749; 750, n.25; fr. 8 814
824; 824, n.48 fr. 9 814
I, 72 754, n.56 fr. 11 815; 818, n.30
I, 243 754 fr. 12 814
II, 126 755, n.57 fr. 13 819
II, 325 749; 829 fr. 14 817
II, 499 754, n.56 fr. 15 817; 819
IV, 219 749 fr. 16 817
INDEX 939
fr. 18 175, n.65; 814 (Halm)

fr. 19 816
fr. 20 816
fr. 21 816 I, 155,
fr. 23 815, n.21; 839 28-156, 4 724
fr. 24 817; 827, n.53 I, 160, 15-24 724
fr. 26 827, n.53 I, 161, 12-20 725
fr. 27 822; 829, n.57 I, 161, 41-43 726, n.18
fr. 28 521, n.149 I, 163, 14-34 726, 0.19
fr. 30 815, n.21 I, 165,
fr. 31 816 32-166, 34 726, n.19
fr. 32 816 I, 211,25-30 722
I, 215, 23-39 721
I, 222, 35-40 727
VICTORINUS, MARIUS I, 223, 14-18 726
In Ciceronis Rhetoricam I, 228, 29-34 723

Gersh, Stephen Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition, 2 Vols

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SELECTED WORKS BY STEPHEN GERSH

Kinesis Akinetos. A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy

From lamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the

'Omnipresence in Eriugena. Some Reflections on Augustino-

'Platonism - Neoplatonism - Aristotelianism. A Twelfth-

.I St'rie., Fmmded by P/Jilip S. Moore, C. S.C. t. .fosepb N. G'artin, C. S.C. t.

MIDDLE PLATONISM AND

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS

Introduction i. Mediaeval Platonism

ii. Greek Platonism 26

PART I. I Middle Platonism: The Platonists

I. I I Philo of Larissa and the New Academy 55

1.13 Antiochus of Ascalon and the Old Academy 63

1. I .:j Cicero's Platonism 67

1.16 Greek and Latin Philosophy 73

1.17 The Division of Philosophy 74

1.18 The Themes of Philosophy 77

1.21 The Argument of De Republica III 80

1.22 The Argument of De Legibus I 84

1.23 The Argument of De Legibus II 87

1.31 Cicero's Theology 90

1.311 The Nature of God 93

1.312 The Transcendence and Immanence of God 94

1.313 The Relation of Macrocosm to Microcosm 99

1.32 Cicero's Philosophy of Nature 101

1.321 Antioch us at Academica 24 101

1.322 Antiochus at Academica 26-27 107

1.323 Antioch us at Academica 28 110

1.324 The Question of Incorporeality 116

1.325 The Relation of Macrocosm to Microcosm 119

1.33 Cicero's Psychology 119

1.331 The Knowledge of the Soul 122

+t.332 The Transcendent Soul 125

-r 1.33.3 The Immanent Soul 129

~. ... Logic 131

1.41 The Innate Standard of Knowledge 132

1.42 Antiochus on Sense and Mind 139

1.43 The Theory of Forms 145

Chapter 2 SENECA 155

.2. 1 Introduction 155

2. 11 Seneca's Stoicism 159

.2.12 The Themes of Philosophy 163

.2.21 Theology 165

.2 . .21 1 The Transcendence and Immanence of God 168

.2.212 Transcendence and Incorporeality 170

.2.213 Immanence and Polytheism 174

.2.22 Philosophy of Nature 176

2.23 The Relation of Macrocosm to Microcosm 179

.2.3 Seneca's Eclecticism 180

2.31 The Argument of Epistu/a ad Luci/ium 58 I HI

2 . .32 The Argument of Epistu/a ad Lucilium 65 188

2.33 Conclusions 194

PART I. 2 Middle Platonism: The Platonists

Chapter 3 GELLIUS 199

3.11 Gellius and Philosophy 200

3.2 Platonism in the Noctes Atticae 207

3.21 The References to Plato 207