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PT&T vs. NLRC

272 SCRA 596 [1997]

FACTS:

Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever for a fixed period from
November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under
the Reliever Agreement which she signed with Petitioner Company, her employment was to be
immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July
1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondents services as reliever were
again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave
during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services
were terminated.

It now appears that private respondent had made the a representation that she was single
even though she contracted marriage months before, in the two successive reliever agreements
which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the
same later, its branch supervisor sent to private respondent a memorandum requiring her to explain
the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy of not
accepting married women for employment.

Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992, which she
readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter handed down a
decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee,
was illegally dismissed by petitioner. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and it ruled that private respondent had indeed been
the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T.

ISSUE:

Whether or not discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee is

expressly prohibited by Article 136.

RULING:

SC ruled that the stipulation is violative of Art. 136 of the Labor Code.

An employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all
aspects of employment, from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those
which may be provided by law. Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified
from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.

Respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be
properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly
because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was
practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for
fear of being disqualified from work.

The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by
petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:

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ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require
as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or

conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a sex-plus discrimination
where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and
must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job
discrimination laws.

Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code
on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with
her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive
a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual
as an intangible and inalienable right.

Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that
petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations
and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

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DUNCAN ASSO. OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO vs. GLAXO WELLCOME PHILS.

G.R. No. 162994, Sept. 17, 2004
FACTS:

Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philppines(glaxo) as

medical representative on Oct.24,1994 thereafter signed a contract of employment which stipulates
among others that he agrees to study and abide existing company rules; to disclose to management
any existing of future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co- employees or employees of
competing drug companies and if ever that such management find such conflict of interest,he must
resign. The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to
inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of
interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employees employment with the
company, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a transfer to another
department in a non- counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside the company
after six months.

Reminders from Tecsons district manager did not stop him from marrying.Tecson married
Bettsy, an Astras Branch Coordinatior in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area.

Tecson was reassigned to another place and was not given products that the Astra company
has and he was not included in products seminars and training.

Tecson requested for time in complying said policy by asking for a transfer in the Glaxos
milk division in which the other company had no counterpart. Thereafter, he bought the matter to
Grievance Committee but the parties failed to resolve such issue, Glaxo offered Tecson a separation
pay of one-half (12) month pay for every year of service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined the
offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its
Decision declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and persons
employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another sales
territory.

Tecson filed for a petition for review on the CA and the CA promulgated that the NCMB did
not err in rendering its decision. A recon was filed in appellate court but it was denied, hence this
petition for certiorari. Petitioners contention it was violative of constitutional law which is the equal
protection clause and he was constructively dismissed while the respondents contention that it is a
valid exercise of it s management prerogatives.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from
marrying employees of another pharmaceutical company is valid.

RULING:

This petition was denied Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially
so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor

companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of

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that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company
policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will
gain access to its secrets and procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect
its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.

The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the
equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority.

From the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is
clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees
and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry
persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest
between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.

There was no merit in Tecsons contention that he was constructively dismissed when he
was transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City- Surigao City-
Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the companys seminar on new
products which were directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive
dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or
diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee. The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly
discriminated upon by reason of such transfer.

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STAR PAPER CORP., vs. SIMBOL

G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006

FACTS:

Simbol was employed by the company on Oct 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of
the company, whom he married. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they
decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy to which Simbol
complied.

1) New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the]
3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
2) In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed
a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get
married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.

ISSUE:

Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company
violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of
management prerogative

RULING:

Petitioners sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two or more of its
employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is without merit.

Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:

It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment
or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

The requirement is that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to
qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative. It is significant to note that in the case at bar,
respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they
married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting
Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental
to its business operations.The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each
other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer
can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an
employees right to security of tenure.

The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a
disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial
scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect.
The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy
cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon
stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.

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DEL MONTE PHILS vs. VELASCO

G.R. No. 153477, March 6, 2007

FACTS:

Lolita Velasco was hired by Del Monte as seasonal employee and was subsequently
regularized by Del Monte. On June 1987, petitioner warned Velasco of its absences and was
repeatedly reminded that her absence without permission may result to forfeiture of her vacation
leave.

Another warning was sent due to her absences without permission which eventually led to
the forfeiture of her vacation entitlement. On September 1994, a notice of hearing was sent to
Velasco informing her of the charges filed against her for violating the Absence without leave rule. On
January 1995, after the hearing, Del Monte terminated the services of Velasco due to excessive
absence without leave. Feeling aggrieved, Velasco filed a case for illegal dismissal. She asserted that
she was absent since she was suffering urinary tract infection and she was pregnant.

She sent an application for leave to the supervisor. Upon check up of the company doctor,
Velasco was advised to rest. On the following check-ups, she was again advised to rest where this
time, she was not able to get secure a leave.

The Labor Arbiter rendered decision that she was an incorrigible absentee. Respondent
appealed to the NLRC. NLRC vacated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It decided that respondent
was illegally dismissed and was entitled to reinstatement. Petitioner appealed to CA where it
dismissed its claim and affirmed NLRC, thus, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal was illegal.

RULING:

Yes. In this case, by the measure of substantial evidence, what is controlling is the finding of
the NLRC and the CA that respondent was pregnant and suffered from related ailments. It would be
unreasonable to isolate such condition strictly to the dates stated in the Medical Certificate or the
Discharge Summary. It can be safely assumed that the absences that are not covered by, but which
nonetheless approximate, the dates stated in the Discharge Summary and Medical Certificate, are due
to the continuing condition of pregnancy and related illnesses, and, hence, are justified absences.

The termination was illegal since it comes within the purview of the prohibited acts
provided in Article 137 of the Labor Code. Based on Article 137, it shall be unlawful for any employer
(1) to deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to discharge any
woman employed by him for the purpose of preventing her from enjoying any of the benefits
provided under this Code; (2) to discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, or while on
leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy; and (3) to discharge or refuse the admission of such
woman upon returning to her work for fear that she may again be pregnant.

The respondent was illegally dismissed by the petitioner on account of her pregnancy. The
act of the employer is unlawful, it being contrary to law.

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YRASUEGUI vs. PHIL AIR LINES

G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008

FACTS:

This case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

Petitioner was a former international flight steward of PAL. He had problems meeting the
required weight standards for cabin and crew. He was advised to go on leave without pay several
times to address his weight concerns, to no avail. PAL had him grounded until such time he
satisfactorily complies with the weight standards and he was directed to report every two weeks for
weight checks.

On November 5, 1992, petitioner weighed 205 lbs, way beyond his ideal weight of 166 lbs.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a
total of almost five (5) years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately

The Labor Arbiter ruled that he was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter held that the
weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner.[15] However,
the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not
hamper the performance of his duties.[16] Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred to
other positions where his weight would not be a negative factor. NLRC affirmed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter, with modifications.

The CA, however, reversed the ruling. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of
PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employees position. The failure to adhere to
the weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of
the Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to
suggest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

The weight standard of PAL for its cabin crew is reasonable under the bona fide occupational
qualification and constitutes a continuing qualification for them to keep their job. Petitioners dismissal was
held to be of just cause and valid falling under Article 282(e) now Article 297(e) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and as an exception he is entitled to a separation pay in this case.

The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
The standards violated in this case were not mere orders of the employer; they were the prescribed
weights that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the
company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an
employees position.

By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and after an employee
is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must
initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to

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meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is
not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed.

The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Being overweight
impedes mobility in times of emergencies where seconds are precious.

Petitioner was not, therefore, illegally dismissed. He is entitled to a separation pay, including
his regular allowances.

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