48 ALSTON, PHILIP Labour Rights As Human Rights

Protecting Labour Rights
as Human Rights: Present and Future

of International Supervision
Protecting Labour Rights
as Human Rights: Present and Future
of International Supervision
Proceedings of the International Colloquium

on the 80th Anniversary of the ILO Committee of Experts
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,
Geneva, 24-25 November 2006
Edited by
George P. Politakis
Copyright International Labour Organization 2007
First published 2007
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ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data

Politakis, George P.
Protecting labour rights as human rights : present and future of international supervision: pro-
ceedings of the international colloquium on the 80th anniversary of the ILO Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Geneva, 24-25 November
2006 / edited by George P. Politakis ; International Labour Office. Geneva: ILO, 2007.
1v.
ISBN: 978-92-2-019944-2 (print); 97-892-2-019945-9 (web pdf)
International Labour Office
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Cest lOrganisation internationale du Travail
qui ds sa cration et sans cesse depuis a perfectionn
un contrle de lexcution des conventions,
et plus gnralement des normes internationales du travail,
qui est encore aujourdhui le modle le plus accompli
en la matire
Jean Charpentier, Le contrle par les organisations

internationales de lexcution des obligations des Etats,
Recueil des cours de lAcadmie de droit international,
vol.182, 1983, p. 163
Foreword
In early 2006, the International Labour Standards Department of the Inter-

national Labour Office took the initiative to organize an international event in
order to celebrate the 80th anniversary from the establishment of the ILO Com-
mittee of Experts (1926-2006), the Organizations main supervisory organ for
monitoring the application of ratified international labour Conventions. In con-
sultation with the Committee members, it was decided that the event should not
be ILO-centric but outward looking addressing topical issues such as human
rights protection and institutional reform in a global context. It was further
decided to associate the UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights as much
as possible with this event as the two bodies not only share similarities in their
mandates and functioning but also hold their respective annual sessions practi-
cally at the same time.
As finally scheduled, the two-day conference focused on current issues
concerning the effectiveness of supervision in the international legal system. The
aim was to put the Committee of Experts work into broader perspective by
bringing together practitioners from different international human rights bodies
and scholars specialized in the problems of state compliance with binding norms
in international law. Guest speakers presentations were articulated around four
thematic sessions: (i) the existing institutional framework for monitoring state
compliance with social and economic rights, (ii) rethinking methods of supervi-
sion and evaluating their impact, (iii) international supervision at the time of
institutional reform, and (iv) future approaches to international regulation and
supervision. Two roundtable discussions on the effectiveness of international
supervision and on the quest for new compliance tools completed the pro-
gramme.
The Proceedings of the international colloquium Protecting Labour
Rights as Human Rights: Present and Future of International Supervision do
not merely reproduce what was actually said at the colloquium, but are based on
papers submitted by numerous panelists and the verbatim transcriptions of the
vii
Protecting Labour Rights as Human Rights
various sessions. Oral interventions, remarks and discussions were edited to

make a coherent record while space limitations required others to be shortened.
Several colleagues offered a helping hand in preparing this volume, in particu-
lar Christine Bader, Elisabeth Fombuena, Martine Humblet, Kroum Markov,
Shingo Miyake, Martin Oelz and Maria Travieso, without whose valuable assis-
tance it would not have been possible to complete the task of publishing the pro-
ceedings on time.
The photos included in this volume as well as the cumulative list of all
CEACR members are part of the photo and document exhibition A peerless
heritage 1926-2006 which was organized by the Communications and Files
Section (DOSCOM) to mark the 80th anniversary of the ILO Committee of
Experts. Special thanks go to Ms. Rene Berthon for her meticulous work in set-
ting up this exhibition.
The International Labour Standards Department is particularly thankful to
the Geneva office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) which kindly accepted
to cover the full cost of the publication of the colloquium proceedings. The FES
also hosted the official dinner on the first day of the colloquium in continuation
of its initiative to organize a joint luncheon for the members of the ILO
Committee of Experts and the UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights.
A special word of thanks goes to the former director of the FES Geneva office,
Mr. Erfried Adam, whose personal commitment and generous support is grate-
fully acknowledged.
Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry
Director
International Labour Standards Department
Geneva, March 2007
viii
Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Welcome address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Mr. Juan Somavia, ILO Director-General
Opening remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Ms. Robyn A. Layton, QC, Chairperson of the ILO Committee
of Experts
Friday, 24 November 2006 Morning session
I. MONITORING STATE COMPLIANCE WITH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

RIGHTS THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
(Chair: Ms. Angelika Nussberger) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Monitoring the 1966 International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Mr. Eibe Riedel, Professor of Law, University of Mannheim;
Vice-Chairperson of the UN Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights
Les procdures spciales des Nations Unies en matire
de droits de lhomme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Mr. Doudou Dine, UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
ix
The Inter-American human rights system . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Judge Thomas Buergenthal, International Court of Justice
The ILO system of regular supervision of the application
of Conventions and Recommendations: A lasting paradigm . . . 29
Mr. Kari Tapiola, Executive Director, Standards and Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work Sector, International Labour Office
The European Committee of Social Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Mr. Andrzej Marian Swiatkowski, Vice-President,
European Committee of Social Rights
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Friday, 24 November 2006 Afternoon session
II. RETHINKING METHODS, EVALUATING IMPACT ISSUES AND DILEMMAS

(Chair: Mr. Michael Halton Cheadle) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Promoting compliance now and then: Mobilizing shame
or building partnerships? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Ms. Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law,
London School of Economics and Political Science
Duplication des travaux, superposition des normes, engagements
diffus: o sont les limites? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Mr. Emmanuel Decaux, Professor of International Law, University
Panthon-Assas (Paris II); Member of the UN Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
Le contrle du respect des droits conomiques et sociaux:
privilgier la soumission de rapports ou lexamen de plaintes? . 93
Mr. Giorgio Malinverni, Professor of Law, University of Geneva;
Judge at the European Court of Human Rights; former Member
of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
PANEL DISCUSSION EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION

IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
(Moderator: Ms. Janice R. Bellace) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
On social participation, public awareness and social capacity . . 105
Ms. Tonia Novitz, Reader in Law, University of Bristol
x
Contents
Facing the realities of supervision of social rights:

The experience of the UN Rapporteur on indigenous peoples . . 109
Mr. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People
Rflexions sur le paralllisme dans la mise en uvre des droits
conomiques et des droits sociaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Ms. Brigitte Stern, Professor of International Law, University
Panthon-Sorbonne (Paris I)
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Friday, 24 November 2006 Evening
DINNER ADDRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Prsent et avenir des mcanismes de contrle de lOIT . . . . . 133
Ms. Ruth Dreifuss, former President of the Swiss Confederation
Saturday, 25 November 2006 Morning session
III. INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION AT THE TIME OF INSTITUTIONAL

REFORM (Chair: Ms. Laura Cox) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A fresh start in human rights protection: The United Nations

Human Rights Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Ms. Wan-Hea Lee, Human Rights Officer, Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights
La rforme des organes des Nations Unies chargs du contrle
de lapplication des traits relatifs aux droits de lhomme . . . . 151
Mr. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Associate Professor of International
Law, University of Athens; Member of the UN Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Reforming the Council of Europes system of human rights

protection: Current developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Ms. Jutta Limbach, President of the Goethe-Institut; Member of the
Group of Wise persons for the strengthening of the system of human
rights protection under the European Convention on Human Rights
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
xi
La fusion de la Cour de Justice de lUnion africaine

et de la Cour africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples . . 187
Judge Fatsah Ouguergouz, African Court on Human and Peoples
Rights
Saturday, 25 November 2006 Afternoon session
IV. FUTURE APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

AND SUPERVISION (Chair: Ms. Blanca Ruth Esponda Espinosa) . . . 201
Cdigos de conducta y regimenes voluntarios de cumplimiento:

es la autoregulacin una respuesta? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Mr. Adrin Goldin, Professor of Law, Universidad de San Andrs,
Argentina
Does law matter? The future of binding norms . . . . . . . . . 221
Mr. Bob Hepple, Professor of Law, Clare College, University
of Cambridge
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
PANEL DISCUSSION THE QUEST FOR NEW COMPLIANCE TOOLS:

MARRYING THE BEST OF THE OLD WITH THE NEW
(Moderator: Mr. Miguel Rodrguez Piero y Bravo Ferrer) . . . . . 237
Learning or diversity? Reflections on the future
of international labour standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Mr. Simon Deakin, Director of the Centre for Business Research
and Professor of Law, University of Cambridge
The ILO is not a State, its members are not firms . . . . . . . . 247
Mr. Brian Langille, Professor of Law, University of Toronto
Rolling Rule labor standards: Why their time has come,
and why we should be glad of it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Mr. Charles Sabel, Professor of Law and Social Science,
Columbia Law School
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Closing remarks The future of standards supervision:

Reconciling development and adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Ms. Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry, Director, International Labour
Standards Department
xii
Contents
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Members of the ILO Committee of Experts (1927-2006) . . . . . . . . . 285
Statistics concerning the work of the ILO Committee of Experts

(1960-2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
Selected bibliography on the ILO Committee of Experts . . . . . . . . . 291
xiii
Welcome address
Juan Somavia *
Distinguished guests, distinguished members of the Committee of Experts,

dear colleagues, dear friends,
The two-day symposium that you all honour with your presence offers the
opportunity for a triple exercise: to pay tribute to a venerable institution, to look
critically into its past record and give some constructive thought to its future
evolution.
Let me first pay homage: the Committee of Experts is monitoring the appli-
cation of nearly 200 binding international instruments that have given rise to
more than 7,400 ratifications to date. To my knowledge, this is an unparalleled
record, a truly Herculean (though perhaps sometimes Sisyphean) task, for any
international supervisory body. Then there is the stature of its members; the
Committee has been served by world-renowned academics and eminent legal
practitioners. William Rappard, Arnold McNair, Georges Scelle, Earl Warren,
Max Sorensen, Boutros Boutros Ghali, Roberto Ago, Jos Maria Ruda have all
put their great intellect at some point in the service of this Committee. And then
there is the output. The Committees annual report runs for hundreds of pages
and contains on the average some 2,200 comments addressing the strengths and
weaknesses of the labour legislation of all 179 member States true benchmark
for the protection of social rights around the world and the implementation of
the ILOs decent work agenda. By all means an outstanding achievement.
Secondly, a word of caution. There is no doubt that the Committee of
Experts gained prominence due to the highest standards of objectivity and
impartiality in discharging its task. The Committee of Experts dispelled all
doubts that might have been raised at the outset by strictly clinging to its man-
date. You appoint innocuous experts warned the Belgian government dele-
gate, Professor Mahaim, in 1926 and they become inspectors. I would
* ILO Director-General.
xv
consider it extremely dangerous to organize an improvised tribunal, a council of

war. The Mussolini government long considered the Committee of Experts
unconstitutional suffice to take a look at some documents displayed in the
exhibition outside this room. The Committees consistency and unfailing faith
in the value of its activities defeated bad prophecies and brought it the recogni-
tion and respect that it still enjoys today. However, the Committee has been at
the crossroads for the past few years. Its workload is reaching an alarming
weight; this could be prejudicial to its ability to make its comments easily under-
standable despite their frequent technicality and its aim of achieving tangi-
ble progress through dialogue with Governments rather than through the con-
demnation of shortcomings. In prefacing a book published two years ago by the
Standards Department in honour of Nicolas Valticos, I referred to standards as a
source of responsibility responsibility to manage this impressive normative
wealth effectively, work energetically for their promotion, strengthen
their impact and add muscle to the organs responsible for the supervision of their
application. In fact, the ongoing effort to mainstream international labour stan-
dards needs to go in parallel with an effort to improve the working methods of
the supervisory machinery. Reforms must of course be well-thought of and
mature and must carry a certain unanimity. They also need, however, to be
timely, far-sighted and audacious to have their chance of success.
Thirdly, what does the future hold in store? Writing in 1969 on the occa-
sion of yet another anniversary, my predecessor Wilfred Jenks referred to the
continued vitality of the ILO tradition of bold but cautious innovation as
attested by the new arrangements for direct contacts with governments first
introduced by the Committee of Experts in 1968. Well, the recipe, I think, still
holds good, perhaps we just need a more generous dose of boldness in the cau-
tion. After all, let us not forget how pioneering this Committee looked and was
at the time of its inception. Let us not forget other pioneering steps, such as the
Committee on Freedom of Association, which have made not only the reputa-
tion of this House but also landmark contributions to the evolution of the law of
international organizations. May our action be driven not only by past experi-
ence but also by future exploration. How can our Organization make the best use
of this institution this precious asset which is not possessed by any other organ-
ization? Strengthening the synergy with the Conference Committee, using the
Committee of Experts comments in a more focused way and integrating them
into a country-specific decent work action plan, bringing the Committees work
closer to peoples realities and linking it with technical cooperation as part of the
assistance package offered to our constituents: these are all ideas to be explored.
More then ever before, strengthening our system of supervision is a genuine con-
cern and the Committee of Experts can count on Office support to put in place
all necessary changes to accompany its work for the years to come.
I am confident that this two-day event will give enough food for thought,
I warmly welcome you all, and I wholeheartedly wish you every success in your
discussions.
xvi
Opening remarks
Robyn A. Layton *
Distinguished guests, contributors, participants, colleagues and also ILO

officials,
On this splendid occasion of the colloquium to mark 80 years of the work
of the Committee of Experts, it is indeed an honour that as the current chairper-
son of the Committee, I have the privilege of giving an opening address. I do so
with considerable humility, on behalf of highly esteemed colleagues, present and
past and I especially mention four past colleagues who are able to be present
with us over these next two days. In order of retirement from the Committee,
they are Professor Verdier from France, Professor von Maydell from Germany,
Vice-President Alburquerque from Dominican Republic and Professor Mesquita
Barros from Brazil. Each of those colleagues has made an impressive contribu-
tion to our work. This colloquium is an ideal way in which to acknowledge the
inspirational decision made by the Governing Body 80 years ago to create this
Committee. The colloquium provides an invaluable opportunity to reflect on the
unique supervisory aspects of the ILO of which this Committee is a vital part. It
enables us to reflect on past, present and future, a luxury which we, as current
working members of the Committee do not usually have. It will enable us to con-
sider new ways in which we, as current members may contribute to the contri-
bution of the work of the Committee, both during our terms and for the col-
leagues that follow. And as part of this reflection, its worth remembering that at
the time of its creation in 1926, it was specifically stated that the persons
appointed to sit at the Committee in what was otherwise a tripartite organization,
were to be appointed not as representatives of states or particular interests but
because of their expert knowledge. It was stated that the persons should be of
independent standing and it was also stated that it should be an impartial body
* Chairperson of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and

Recommendations.
xvii
with as wide a representation of experience in different countries as possible. It

was also indicated that its creation would be authorized as an experiment and
that is the wording that was used. This experiment has lasted quite a long time
and these features remain the hallmark of the Committee, the independence,
impartiality, expertise and geographic spread. The initial members of the Com-
mittee were eight, they met for three days to examine 180 reports from 26 States,
the number of member States at the time were 55. There were 23 Conventions
and 28 Recommendations. Now we have 18 members who meet for three weeks
to examine some 2,500 reports from 179 member States with nearly 200 bind-
ing instruments. The sheer number matters that we need to consider and the
volume of work is of itself one of the greatest challenges of the future. Again,
returning to the past, in 1947 after the war, which of course significantly
impaired the work of ILO generally, the Committee of Experts requested the
Governing Body to enlarge the Committee to its pre-war size, 13 members. And
also said, it would be of particular assistance to have and this is a quotation, a
woman member, with specialized knowledge in the field of protective legisla-
tion for women and children. At the time this request was probably viewed as
radical indeed. And of course, stereotyping was not a notion which had currency
at the time. One can see from the representation of photographs outside as to the
gender representation. And even when I joined the Committee 13 years ago,
there were only three female members. Today, 6 of the 18 members on our Com-
mittee are women which is an unprecedented proportion and we now have a
woman as a Chairperson. I wonder whether in the future, the numbers will be
reversed and what might be the consequence. The Committee is indeed at a
crossroads as indicated in the Director-Generals speech. For the last few years,
we have developed a subcommittee on working methods to give preliminary
consideration to issues of improvement to our work as well as major issues about
our direction for the future. We have made important decisions concerning the
length of time we are prepared to offer ourselves for appointment as members
so that there is a balance between the need to retain continuity but still keep
refreshed by new input. This means that sadly, we must say farewell to some
members at the same time as welcoming others. We have also discussed
improved ways of dealing with our work. All members share a common com-
mitment and passion for the tasks required of the Committee, which given our
now exhausting levels of work is just as well. In the same breath, I also pay trib-
ute to the dedicated work of the Office which unstintingly support us. Another
of the major challenges is continuing to foster relationships with other bodies in
the house. Notably, the Committee on the Application of Standards at the Inter-
national Labour Conference. Whilst we each have our respective mandates, there
is a clear linkage and complimentarity between our Committees and we are
continuing to increase our dialogue with positive results. Notwithstanding our
intense workload, we still have very spirited discussions, particularly on impor-
tant matters of principle and of course including one of our major outputs which
is the General Survey this year, on forced labour, which I thought was actually
quite apt.
xviii
Opening remarks
In conclusion, on behalf on my colleagues, I thank the Office and the ILO

as a whole for the wonderful opportunity to listen to erudite papers from emi-
nent people, to hear discussions and exchanges both during and after the sessions,
and to be refreshed in my thinking, at least, as a consequence.
xix
I.
Monitoring state compliance
with social and economic rights
The institutional framework
Friday, 24 November 2006 Morning session
Monitoring the 1966 International Covenant

on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Eibe Riedel*
I. Introduction
It is a very happy occasion, indeed, for holding an international collo-

quium. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
wholeheartedly congratulates the Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) for its impressive achievements
in 80 years of practice, and our praise goes, of course, also to the parent organ-
isation, the International Labour Organization (ILO), that has made this success
story possible. 1 The fact that the ILO has by now adopted 186 Conventions and
192 Recommendations all geared to harmonising and improving national
labour rights situations and the fact that the CEACR at its last session mus-
tered a total of about 1,900 country reports, already speaks for itself. The
painstaking work undertaken has had an enormous effect on labour law in all
Member States, and is a cause for lasting pride and satisfaction. It must be
remembered that the ILO began its standard-setting work on formulating and
later monitoring labour rights well before any other human rights bodies under
conditions of participation of non-governmental actors, in the context of the
unique tripartite structure of the Organisation, and this deserves special mention.
The human rights treaty bodies established after the Second World War, partic-
ularly under the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
* Professor of Law, University of Mannheim; Vice-Chairperson, UN Committee on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
1
On the impressive work of the CEACR, see Isabelle Boivin and Alberto Odero, The Com-
mittee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations: Progress achieved in
national labour legislation, International Labour Review, vol. 145, 2006, pp. 1-14.
3
and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and under regional social
rights charters, all draw heavily on the experience and practice of the ILO mech-
anisms. The fact that our two Committees, the CEACR and the CESCR, now
regularly meet once a year to exchange experiences and to learn about the most
recent developments in our respective bodies, bears witness to this.
II. Monitoring of Covenant Provisions
At the outset, I wish to briefly summarize the monitoring experience of the

CESCR, placing particular emphasis on those rights of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter the Covenant)
where the ILO has regularly provided us with extensive and useful information,
i.e. particularly articles 6 (right to work), 7 (just and favourable conditions of
work), 8 (trade union rights, including the right to strike) and 9 (right to social
security, including social insurance), but also on articles 10 (rights of the family),
11 (provision of an adequate standard of living), 12 (health) and 15 (culture).
Other relevant articles which are interrelated and co-variant are not addressed
here. Needless to say, when the Covenant was adopted in 1966, almost exactly
50 years ago, the labour rights were drafted, based almost entirely on the expe-
rience of the ILO. Ever since, the International Labour Organisation has faith-
fully contributed to the effective work of the eighteen members of the CESCR
by providing us for each of our two annual sessions of three weeks each, plus
two pre-sessional working groups of an extra two weeks, with extensive back-
ground material without which we could not do our monitoring work adequately.
The ILO faithfully fulfils the philosophy laid down in article 22 of the Covenant
which provides, inter alia, that organs of the UN, their subsidiary organs and
specialized agencies concerned with furnishing technical assistance may bring
to the attention of other organs any matters arising out of the reports referred to
in Part IV of the Covenant, which may assist such bodies, in deciding, each
within its field of competence, on the advisability of international measures
likely to contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the []
Covenant. In so doing, the various departments of the ILO have regularly pro-
vided the CESCR with valuable information on the realization of the core labour
rights, as contained in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. 2 That Declaration sets baseline entitlements or a floor set of
rights that all States must comply with, regardless of their level of develop-
ment or location in the international economy. 3 The seven fundamental Con-
ventions embraced in that Declaration which itself re-iterates the thrust of the
2
Adopted at the 86th Session of the International Labour Conference in June 1998.
3
See generally Patrick Macklem, The Right to Bargain Collectively in International Law:
Workers Right, Human Right, International Right? in Philip Alston (ed.), Labour Rights as
Human Rights, Oxford, 2005, pp. 61-84.
4
Monitoring the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
1944 Philadelphia Declaration and the ILO Constitution, 4 refer to freedom of

association and collective bargaining (Nos. 87 and 98), forced labour (Nos. 29
and 105), non-discrimination (Nos. 100 and 111) and minimum age (No. 138),
all of which affect specific Covenant rights as well. And in the monitoring
process, CESCR members regularly ask State parties why they have not ratified
some of the relevant ILO Conventions, and if not, the CESCR will regularly rec-
ommend ratification in its concluding observations addressed to the State Party.
Not all ILO Conventions are covered by the Covenant, many of them relat-
ing to domestic labour law issues, not specifically to human rights situations.
The distinction is important, because in non-human rights areas, States are free
to change positions in the light of later societal developments, which cannot be
the case with human rights standards because once a human right, always a
human right! Thus it has to be carefully assessed whether a labour law conven-
tion affects core labour standards as human rights standards or not. The core
labour rights have proven to form the minimum baseline to which the CESCR
now regularly refers.
III. General Comments
The CESCR has recently adopted a General Comment on the right to work,
drawing heavily on the material provided by the ILO. In fact, General Comment
No. 18 on the right to work 5 emphasizes that the Covenant deals more compre-
hensively with that right than any other international instrument.6 It stresses that
that work specified in article 6 of the Covenant must be decent work, and that
articles 6 to 8 are interdependent. 7 As outlined in its General Comment No.3
(1990) the CESCR stresses core obligations of article 6, encompassing non-dis-
crimination and equal protection of employment; access to employment, espe-
cially for marginalized and disadvantaged individuals and groups must be
ensured, in order for them to live a life of dignity; and measures must be
avoided that lead to discrimination and unequal treatment in the private and
public sectors of such individuals and groups; and the State party further is
required to adopt and implement a national employment strategy and plan of
4
Originally Part XIII (articles 387-427) of the Treaty of Versailles setting up a permanent
organization of the League of Nations. The ILO was set up as a specialized agency under article 57
of the UN Charter on 14 December 1946. On the Philadelphia Declaration, adopted 10 May 1944
and annexed to the ILO Constitution, see P. A. Khler, ILO in R. Wolfrum (ed.), United Nations:
Law, Policies and Practice, vol. 1, Mnchen/Dordrecht, 1995, pp.714-723. See also K. Samson and
K. Schindler, The Standard-Setting and Supervisory System of the International Labour Organi-
zation in R. Hanski and M. Suksi (eds.), An Introduction to the International Protection of Human
Rights, Turku, 1999, pp.185-218.
5
General Comment No. 18 (The Right to Work, art. 6 ICESCR), adopted on 24 November
2005, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006.
6
Ibid., para.1.
7
Ibid., paras. 7, 8.
5
action based on and addressing the concerns of all workers on the basis of a
participatory and transparent process that includes employers and workers
organizations. 8 From this can be seen that the approach taken by the CESCR
reflects similar efforts undertaken in the context of the ILO, even though the
human rights approach is broader, transcending tripartite relationships.
Beyond the scope of core labour standards within the meaning of the 1998
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the CESCR has also
embarked on a Draft General Comment on the right to social security, as laid
down in article 9 of the Covenant. Here the CESCR heavily relies on ILO Con-
vention No.102 on the right to social security,9 and takes up the ILO structure of
the nine social security areas 10 elaborated there.
Moreover, the CESCR held a day of general discussion in 2006, where ILO
representatives, representatives of trade unions and employers associations, and
other experts of social security explained their respective positions in relation to
several key questions that the Draft General Comment No. 20 seeks to clarify,
namely: (i) whether the CESCR should ensure that contributory insurance-style
schemes should not be favoured vis--vis non-contributory schemes; (ii) whether
in relation to non-contributory schemes, the CESCR should not favour targeted
schemes over universal schemes; (iii) the need to emphasize that lack of social
security is not just increasing risk but has clear human rights dimensions, and is
responsible for poverty; (iv) the need to follow more closely the ILO approach
in indicating the types of benefits that should be made available, i.e. follow the
nine categories of Convention No. 102 that are reflected in the CESCR report-
ing guidelines; (v) stressing State parties obligations in relation to the informal
sector, or informal economy, as well as the effects on migrant workers, refugees,
asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons; (vi) provide greater detail on
rights of women to social security; (vii) define the right to social security as
embracing social insurance and also social assistance; (viii) look at accessibil-
8
Ibid., para. 31.
9
See generally E. Riedel, The Human Right to Social Security: Some Challenges in
E. Riedel (ed.), Social Security as a Human Right, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2007, pp.17-28; E. Renaud,
The Right to Social Security Current Challenges in International Perspective, ibid., p. 1-16;
M. Langford, The Right to Social Security and Implications for Law, Policy and Practice, ibid.,
pp. 29-53; A. Nussberger, Evaluating the ILOs Approach to Standard-Setting and Monitoring in
the Field of Social Security, ibid., pp. 103-116. See also the doctoral dissertation by C. Steiner,
Das Recht auf soziale Gesundheitsversorgung, Frankfurt a. M., 2004, English summary at pp. 215-218;
J. van Langendonck, The Right to Social Security and Allied Rights in F. Ruland (ed.), Festschrift
H .F. Zacher, Heidelberg, 1998, pp. 477-488; M. Scheinin, The Right to Social Security in
A. Eide, C. Krause, A. Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights A Textbook, 2nd ed.,
Dordrecht, 2001, pp. 211-222; L. Lamarche, The Right to Social Security in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in A. Chapman and S. Russell (eds.), Core
Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Antwerp, 2002,
pp. 87-114.
10
See Draft General Comment No. 20 (The right to social security, art. 9 ICESCR), UN Doc.
E/C.12/GC/ 20/ CRP 1. The Draft is presently under discussion in the CESCR and may conceiv-
ably be adopted in 2007.
6
ity and eligibility for benefits and justiciability of rights; (ix) define more closely
the minimum core obligations of States and domestic implementation; (x) look
more closely at the roles of international financial institutions in relation to the
current crisis in developing countries, and at the role of the private sector; (xi)
address the issue of emergencies (natural disasters and armed conflict) and
system responses of social security.
These and other questions are now examined by the CESCR, and will prob-
ably lead to the adoption of a General Comment sometime in 2007. As can be
seen from the issue list, the ILO input has been crucial throughout, and thanks
must go to all ILO experts and members of the CEACR who have contributed to
this venture.
The ILO has also been most helpful in the preparation of General Com-
ments No.14 (right to health) and No. 16 (equal rights of men and women), and
undoubtedly will offer similar assistance with General Comments on articles 7
and 8 of the Covenant, on which work has just begun. At the same time, draft-
ing projects are under way on the principle of non-discrimination (article 2 (2)
of the Covenant) as cross-cutting Covenant obligations, and on the right to par-
ticipate in culture (article 15), but it will take some time before specific General
Comments on labour rights, particularly on articles 7 and 8 of the Covenant will
materialize. The CESCR, as in the past, will rely heavily on the excellent
cooperation offered by the ILO secretariat, and by members of the CEACR in
particular.
IV. Institutional Framework and Compliance
At present, the Covenant has been ratified by 155 States out of 192 UN
Member States, the most notable exception being the USA. As the text of the
Covenant did not set up a monitoring body, as happened with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the United Nations Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) decided in 1985 by resolution to set up a work-
ing group, which was transformed into the CESCR in 1987. 11 The Committee
was to receive State reports and to make suggestions and recommendations to
State parties, after a so-called constructive dialogue. The process since devel-
oped and now follows that adopted by the other seven, soon nine 12 human rights
treaty bodies. It starts with the submission of an initial report and subsequent
regular periodic reports at five-year intervals, followed by the elaboration of a
list of additional questions arising from the report, to which the State party
11
See ECOSOC Decision 1978/10 setting up a Sessional Working Group, transformed into
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by ECOSOC resolution 1985/17. The
Committee took up its work in 1987.
12
Two more treaty bodies are expected to monitor the application of the International Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006, (not yet in force) and the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 2006 (not yet in force).
7
responds by submitting extensive answers to the list of issues. 13 In preparing

those lists of issues, the five members of a pre-sessional working group draw on
information received from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR), and also from the ILO and other specialised agencies on the
specific countries under review, and also on information provided by non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs). Before the actual dialogue with the State Party
takes place, the CESCR devotes a half-day at the beginning of each session for
consultations with specialized agencies, NGOs and the country desk officers of
the OHCHR, so that CESCR members can obtain additional information about
the States examined, all of which helps to structure the questions put to the State
delegation during the ensuing dialogue. During the last week of the session, con-
cluding observations are drafted, mentioning positive and negative factors, and
sometimes also factors impeding the full implementation of the Covenant, such
as natural catastrophes or armed conflict. The Concluding Observations then
outline major concerns, and end with suggestions and recommendations, fre-
quently indicating that the CESCR will come back to the particular issue during
the next dialogue with the State party.
V. Indicators and Benchmarks
In recent years the CESCR has begun to ask for indicators and benchmarks
to be set by the States parties themselves, so that disaggregated data relating to
such issues as urban/rural distribution, how marginalized and disadvantaged
groups of society are affected, particularly women, children, older persons, the
disabled, minority groups and indigenous peoples can be assessed more effec-
tively. 14 The CESCR now regularly asks for these data on an annual basis, so that
changes can be assessed, enabling CESCR members to inquire, for instance,
why the situation has improved so little despite a period of financial stability, or
what are the reasons for failing to achieve targets and plans set. There may be
good reasons for that, such as armed conflict or natural catastrophes, but the
burden of proof is on the State party to show that it has done everything in its
power to improve the situation, including asking for international co-operation
and assistance under article 2(1) of the Covenant. 15
13
Cf. B. Simma, The Examination of State Reports in E. Klein (ed.), The Monitoring
System of Human Rights Treaty Obligations, Berlin, 1998, pp. 31-48; E. Riedel, The Examination
of State Reports, ibid., pp. 95-105.
14
See, for example, General Comments No.14 (right to health), paras. 57-58; No.15 (right
to water), paras. 53-54; No. 16 (equal rights of men and women), para. 39; No.17 (right to benefit
from the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he or she is the author), paras. 49-50; No.18 (right to work), paras. 46-47.
15
Cf. E. Riedel, Measuring Human Rights Compliance The IBSA Procedure as a Tool of
Monitoring in Mlanges en lhonneur du Professeur Giorgio Malinverni, 2007 (in print). See also
A. Eide, The Use of Indicators in the Practice of the CESCR in Eide, Krause, Rosas, op.cit., supra
n.9, pp. 545-552.
8
VI. Resource Allocation and Covenant Obligations

One of the difficulties in the reporting framework of the Covenant is the
vague and sometimes ambiguous wording of the Covenant provisions. 16 Arti-
cle 2(1) may serve as an example. It reads in part: Each State Party to the pres-
ent Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full real-
ization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
Words like maximum, available, progressively, appropriate means
sound wonderful to the ears of lawyers, because they are so ambiguous that
almost any position can be taken in that respect. The CESCR, ever since Gen-
eral Comment No. 3, adopted in 1990, 17 has carefully defined this provision as
a principle that serves as a chapeau to the specific provisions of Part III of the
Covenant, and therefore may not be viewed as a stand-alone provision, but like
articles 2(2) and 3 on non-discrimination and equal rights of men and women, has
always to be read in conjunction with the specific rights set out in articles 6 to 15.
In the extensive reporting practice of the CESCR, several general interpre-
tations have emerged which now structure the dialogue with the States parties,
and which the States parties have regularly accepted. The interpretations con-
cern the level of obligations placed on States parties and detail obligations to
respect, protect and fulfil.
The obligation to respect refers to immediate negative obligations of the
State party with which it must comply at all costs, such as not to discriminate in
its legislation on the prohibited grounds mentioned in article 2(2). These are
largely resource-independent obligations which even less developed countries
are required to respect.
The obligation to protect shifts the focus of obligation to the State party
having to oversee the activities of private actors, if these violate basic human
rights protected by the Covenant. Although the State party in that case has done
nothing directly to violate human rights provisions, it remains responsible for
not regulating and overseeing the activities of third parties, such as trans-national
corporations, operating in its territory. NGOs are attempting to broaden this
responsibility of States parties to cover activities of nationals even in other coun-
tries, but at present there seems to be little support for that amongst States, in
particular developed States. 18
16
See generally E. Riedel, International Law Shaping Constitutional Law Realization of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in E. Riedel (ed.), Constitutionalism Old Concepts, New
Worlds, Berlin, 2005, pp. 109-126.
17
General Comment No.3 (The nature of States parties obligations, article 2(1) ICESCR),
HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 7, pp. 15-18.
18
On this issue see C. Scott, Multinational Enterprises and Emergent Jurisprudence on Vio-
lations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Eide, Krause, Rosas, op.cit., supra n.9, pp. 563-
595, at 580. See also A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford, 2006,
p.195 et seq.
9
Obligations to fulfil embrace duties to inform, promote, educate about cer-

tain Covenant rights, and also cover direct provision of resources for meeting the
survival kit, or minimum essential levels of rights protection, such as for pri-
mary education, or social assistance, if no other resources are available to the
individuals concerned.
In fact, the CESCR in its monitoring practice has staunchly resisted any
attempt to differentiate the level of protection in each Covenant right, which
would amount to lower levels of individual rights protection, for instance by
regarding certain Covenant obligations merely as promotional obligations, pro-
grammes for legislation, or target norms for States parties creating objective
duties for them, but not subjective rights for individuals or groups. 19 The
CESCR, instead, is of the opinion that quite apart from such promotional and
programmatic levels of protection, each Covenant right read together with the
principles enunciated in articles 2(1), 2(2) and 3 Covenant contains a core area
of protection for individuals concerned, namely the core minimum essential
levels of protection, or the survival kit, the existential minimum, without
which a life in dignity cannot be ensured. The core rights guarantees should be
respected, protected and fulfilled by the States parties, and this applies across
the board to all States, rich or poor. If the States parties are unable to meet even
these minimum levels of protection, for instance, in relation to basic health care
or equal access to available job opportunities, then under article 2(1) Covenant
the Member States that are in a position to do so, should render technical coop-
eration and assistance to those States. 20 It is incumbent to all States to do their
best to realize the rights guaranteed by the Covenant, to the best of their capa-
bilities. Taking steps, therefore, is not just a programmatic promise in arti-
cle 2(1), but a binding legal obligation to take active steps to realize the Covenant
rights, in line with the available resources for that particular State. Doing noth-
ing, therefore, would be a clear breach of Covenant obligations.
VII. Constructive Dialogue or Violations Approach?
In the literature, an elaborate discussion has taken place, drawing a dis-

tinction between the constructive dialogue 21 and the violations approaches
19
For a critical analysis see C. Tomuschat, Human Rights between Idealism and Realism,
Oxford, 2003, p. 38 et seq. Contra, see A. Eide, Economic and Social Rights in J. Symonides
(ed.), Human Rights. Concept and Standards, Aldershot, 2000, reprinted 2005, pp.109-174;
M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights A Perspective
on its Development, Oxford, 1995, p. 106 et seq.; E. Riedel, op.cit., supra n.16, p. 109 et seq. See
also H. J. Steiner and P. Alston, International Human Rights in Context, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2000,
pp. 237-320.
20
Cf. General Comment No. 3, paras. 13, 14.
21
See E. Riedel, op.cit., supra n.13 at p.100; M. Craven, op.cit., supra n.19, pp. 66, 104,
arguing strongly in favour of having a quasi-judicial complaints procedure to render the CESCR
procedure more effective.
10
of the CESCR 22 in dealing with States reports. Suffice it to say here that the three
categories of obligations (to respect, protect and fulfil) have been firmly estab-
lished in the practice of the CESCR, and while it generally tries to uphold the
spirit of a constructive dialogue with the State party, hoping that this will
entice the country concerned to do everything in its power to improve the human
rights situation for its population, there are limits to that approach. If the State
party does nothing to remedy the situation, if there is no follow-up at all, or if
the alleged breaches of Covenant provisions display a pattern of gross and mas-
sive, reliably attested breaches of human rights, as under the UN Charter-based
1503 procedure of the ECOSOC, then the CESCR will call a spade a spade, and
attest clear violations. But generally, it is felt to be better to suggest and recom-
mend remedial action rather than insist on stating that violations have occurred.
VIII. An Optional Protocol for the Covenant
Since the establishment of an Open-ended working group on the elabora-

tion of an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, 23 this debate has taken on a new
dimension. The new Human Rights Council in its Resolution 2006/3 has given
the Working Group a drafting mandate, which in all probability will consider-
ably speed up the process of elaborating such an Optional Protocol, setting up a
communications procedure for individual and possibly also group communica-
tions, embracing mechanisms that the Optional Protocol to the International
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW OP)
and the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR have developed, such as interim
measures and inquiry procedures. Needless to say, very strict and detailed admis-
sibility criteria will have to be elaborated, but it looks as though the Optional
Protocol will be forthcoming and ready for adoption soon.
The advantages of such a quasi-judicial procedure are obvious: Very little
is known about the Covenant practice, and the mass media rarely report about it
at the national level, because the concluding observations are very technical,
often abstract, and relate to complicated issues, which journalists hardly under-
stand or do not find newsworthy, even if the issues touched upon really matter,
such as widespread poverty, existence of grave discriminatory measures, and the
plight of disadvantaged and marginalised groups of society, finding themselves
in situations of great vulnerability. To take but one example, even in highly
developed countries, hundreds of thousands of homeless people exist, and
amongst the unemployed millions, vast numbers are permanently out of work.
22
For more on the violations approach, see C. Fenwick, Minimum Obligations with
Respect to Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
Chapman and Russell, op.cit., supra n.9, pp. 53-86.
23
Cf. Reports of the open-ended working group to consider options regarding the elabora-
tion of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
on its first session, 23 February 5 March 2004, E/CN.4/2004/44; second session 10 20 January
2005, E/CN.4/2005/52; third session 6 17 February 2006, E/CN.4/2006/47.
11
If an individual communications procedure were to exist, media attention

would be greatly enhanced. CESCR views, suggestions and recommendations
would frequently be reported in the press, as if a court of justice had handed
down a decision, even though technically the decision under an Optional Proto-
col would represent no more than a recommendation, very similar to those under
the State reporting procedures, but individualised.
The greatest advantage in having an Optional Protocol would be that the
CESCR would henceforth develop a case law, thus helping to interpret the Covenant
and supplementing the work under the State reporting procedure. The Optional
Protocol would underline the position outlined above that the CESCR has taken
from the very beginning, namely that every single right in the Covenant contains
some justiciable elements that are capable of being directly applied.
While some States parties still maintain that the Covenant merely contains
non self-executing obligations of States, the CESCR has consistently insisted
that by ratifying the Covenant States parties have accepted the obligations to
respect, protect and fulfil the Covenant obligations, and that these obligations
exist immediately, without further implementation steps, at least as far as core
obligations are concerned. All the General Comments so far produced by the
CESCR have reaffirmed this view. If an Optional Protocol were to be accepted
like with the ICCPR, the issue of justiciability would clearly be answered in the
positive. The CESCR will soon deal with a Draft Statement on how it would treat
the question of resource allocation under article 2 (1) of the Covenant, leav-
ing a margin of discretion to States in questions of concrete resource allocation,
but pointing out that there are limits to national policy choices, when funda-
mental human rights positions are at peril. Some common law jurisdictions have
developed the notion of reasonableness as a limiting factor, while civil law tra-
ditions stress the principle of proportionality, whereby the State party has to opt
for the policy choice that least restricts a Covenant right, if several policy choices
are available. Such a test strikes a careful balance between sovereign policy
choices at the national level and international accountability for the policy
choices taken, measured against the provisions of the Covenant and other human
rights norms.
In this connection, the Working Group had to deal with the allegation that
there would be a great deal of overlap with other monitoring bodies, such as the
ILO Committee of Experts, the Committee on Conventions and Recommenda-
tions of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) and regional bodies, but it was shown that the mandates and func-
tions of these bodies addressed different issues than those arising under the
Covenant. For instance, while the CEACR could deal with collective complaints
under the tripartite model, the position of individuals not covered under the trade
union or employers association umbrella would only be coped with under the
Covenant. The mandate of the UNESCO Committee is geared far more towards
producing recommendations, although it also deals with communications in a
non-public procedure, and is an inter-governmental body of 30 ambassadors, not
a Committee of independent experts. Important as such an institutional frame-
12
work may be, it cannot be compared with the CESCR under the Covenant, apart
from the fact that it covers only three of the Covenant rights.
IX. Conclusion
The institutional framework in which the CESCR operates thus provides a
legal basis on which key questions of common concern to all UN bodies can be
discussed. The real challenge facing the UN system, and in particular the spe-
cialised agencies like the ILO, and all human rights treaty bodies, is the chal-
lenge of globalisation. Trade liberalisation, capital and financial flows, concen-
tration tendencies of multinational enterprises, the development of transport
facilities, coupled with the general urbanisation trend, all have positive and neg-
ative aspects. The human rights focus taken since the Millennium Declaration,
and the Millennium Development Goals has put particular emphasis on the
human rights requirements that have to be insisted on. The erosion and destruc-
tion of traditional social and religious systems, and the concurrent loss of cul-
tural identity, particularly for indigenous peoples, has led to the realization that
a human rights approach to development is indispensable. The CESCR has tried,
within its limited means, to highlight these challenges, focussing particularly on
how marginalized and disadvantaged groups suffer from globalisation tenden-
cies 24 where the poor stay poor, or become poorer while the rich become richer. 25
In the field of labour rights this is exacerbated by a race to the bottom, whereby
developing countries vie with each other to attract investments, lowering mini-
mum human rights standards, particularly in the area of environmental law and
labour law. We are all aware of this, and the close cooperation existing between
the CESCR and the CEACR, undoubtedly will help to face more squarely the
challenges posed by globalisation. We need to find viable solutions soon, and
the human rights approach undoubtedly is a good complementary strategy, based
as it is on legal obligations resting on all Member States of the United Nations.
The ILO and its Committee of Experts, like the CESCR, will continue to play a
significant role in those endeavours. While that process primarily affects the
political responsibility of the community of States, and of the United Nations
family of organizations, and all its subsidiary bodies, the concurrent and increas-
ingly important role of non-governmental and civil society actors should not be
forgotten. Both Committees should be and remain receptive to new ideas and
input provided by these sources as well. 26
24
On this, see the statements made by the CESCR on globalization and its impact on the
enjoyment of economic and social rights (UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/9) and on poverty and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/10).
25
See generally E. Benvenisti and G. Nolte (eds.), The Welfare State, Globalization, and
International Law, Heidelberg, 2004, in particular pp. 175 et seq., 321 et seq., 371 et seq.
26
For a fuller analysis, see Clapham, op.cit., supra n.18, p. 82 et seq.; E. Riedel, The Devel-
opment of International Law: Alternatives to Treaty-Making? International Organizations and Non-
State Actors in R. Wolfrum and V. Rben (eds.), Developments of International Law in Treaty
Making, Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 301-318.
13
Les procdures spciales des Nations Unies
en matire de droits de lhomme
Doudou Dine *
Je voudrais tout dabord souligner limportance du contexte dans lequel se

tient cette runion du BIT et qui est caractris par une rflexion en profondeur
sur la pertinence, lefficacit et la porte de tout le systme de protection des
droits de lhomme, mene linitiative du Secrtaire Gnral des Nations Unies
et linstigation de lAssemble gnrale. Des dcisions importantes ont dores
et dj t adoptes par lAssemble gnrale des Nations Unies, entre autres,
le remplacement de la Commission des droits de lhomme par le Conseil des
droits de lhomme, la nouvelle procdure dlection de ses membres et la rduc-
tion de leur nombre ou le principe de revue priodique universelle des pays en
matire de droits de lhomme.
Dans ce contexte de rflexion et de rforme de lensemble du systme des
droits de lhomme, une des questions cls pour la russite de la rforme porte
sur le systme des procdures spciales, car elles reprsentent la dernire avan-
ce dans la mise en place progressive de mcanismes pour la protection des
droits de lhomme. En effet, au cur de ces procdures spciales se trouvent
deux avances qui seront peut-tre des points-tests pour lefficacit et le futur de
tout le systme de protection des droits de lhomme.
La premire, fondatrice de toute larchitecture des procdures spciales, est
relative lindpendance des titulaires de mandats. En effet, les procdures sp-
ciales ont t cres comme troisime mcanisme, indpendant des gouverne-
ments et mme du Secrtariat des Nations Unies, pour complter les mcanis-
mes intergouvernementaux que reprsentaient la Commission et actuellement
le Conseil et les organes de traits. Les gouvernements et les organisations de
dfense des droits de lhomme ont donc estim opportun de crer un mcanisme
* Rapporteur spcial des Nations Unies sur les formes contemporaines de racisme, de
discrimination raciale, de xnophobie et de lintolrance qui y est associe.
15
dont le fonctionnement repose sur lindpendance de ses titulaires de mandat

comme garantie de leur libre contribution la protection des droits de lhomme.
Cest dabord autour de ce concept dindpendance des titulaires de mandat, sa
nature, sa porte et ses limites ventuelles que sarticule actuellement le dbat, de
nature juridique mais surtout politique, au sein du Conseil des droits de lhomme.
La deuxime avance, peut tre la plus innovatrice pour rendre tangible la
protection des droits de lhomme, est lautorit accorde aux Rapporteurs sp-
ciaux de procder librement des visites de pays de leur choix, pour enquter in
situ sur le thme de leur mandat comme le racisme, la discrimination raciale
et la xnophobie, en ce qui me concerne. Le progrs immense que cette capacit
de visite ouvre nest rien moins que laccs aux victimes, la captation de leur
tmoignage et de leur vcu, la connaissance directe de leur situation relle.
Briser la solitude ou lisolement des victimes est ltape fondatrice, la condition
sine qua non de la dfense et de la promotion des droits de lhomme. Trs
concrtement, lenjeu central de la visite de pays porte sur laccs, entre autres,
aux minorits victimes de racisme, aux familles de victimes dexcutions extra-
judiciaires, aux prisonniers et personnes tortures, isoles au fin fond de leurs
geles ou dans des zones recules et isoles de leurs pays.
Le dbat sarticule, dans ce contexte, autour dun certain nombre de points
critiques en cours dexamen. Le dbat sur lindpendance des procdures sp-
ciales se concentre ce stade sur la procdure de slection: nomination par le
Prsident du Conseil des droits de lhomme aprs consultation avec les groupes
gographiques (procdure actuelle) ou lection par le Conseil des droits de
lhomme. Si bien des divergences existent parmi les pays sur la meilleure garan-
tie dindpendance (nomination ou lection), une solution hybride combinant les
deux procdures est en train dmerger en trois tapes: liste courte labore par
la Haut Commissaire aux droits de lhomme sur la base dun roster (constitu
sur la base de critres de comptence, dintgrit et dquilibre goculturel), sou-
mission de cette liste au Prsident du Conseil, et lection par le Conseil.
La question centrale, en filigrane de ce dbat, qui sous-tend en profondeur
ce que je voudrais appeler la tension ontologique des droits de lhomme est
celle du rle, du poids des gouvernements dans larchitecture des droits de
lhomme en gnral et, en loccurrence, dans les procdures spciales. En der-
nire analyse, cette tension permanente est inhrente la nature intergouverne-
mentale du cadre institutionnel du systme des droits de lhomme, lOrganisa-
tion des Nations Unies. Elle se traduit par la qute permanente dun quilibre
indispensable entre la ralit politique des droits de lhomme incarne par les
appareils politiques des Etats, acteurs incontournables de llaboration et de la
mise en uvre des droits de lhomme et la dimension universelle et thique
des droits de lhomme assume par la socit civile et les organisations non
gouvernementales. La recherche de cet quilibre constitue un dfi permanent
pour les procdures spciales, tant dans lorganisation et le droulement des visi-
tes que pour le contenu des rapports de visites.
Lindpendance des procdures spciales inclut la libert du choix des pays
visiter. En ce qui concerne mon mandat, les critres de slection de ces pays
16
me permettent la fois de mettre en lumire diffrentes dimensions du racisme

et de la xnophobie et de promouvoir un change dinformations entre les gou-
vernements et les organisations de la socit civile sur les politiques et pro-
grammes pour combattre le racisme. Quatre critres dterminent mon choix: la
gravit des manifestations de racisme et de xnophobie, dtermine sur la base
des informations et des allgations reues; le rle des constructions identitaires
et historiques dans la gense et la recrudescence du racisme et de la xnopho-
bie; linstrumentalisation politique du racisme et de la xnophobie; et le lien
entre multiculturalisme, immigration et racisme. Jai ainsi, entre autres, visit la
Colombie et la Fdration de Russie sur la base du critre de la gravit des all-
gations de manifestations de violence raciste et xnophobe; le Japon, sur la base
du critre du rle des constructions identitaires et historiques dans la gense et
la monte du racisme et de la xnophobie; la Guyane, Trinit et Tobago, la Suisse
et lItalie sur la base de linstrumentalisation politique et lectorale du racisme
et de la xnophobie; le Canada, mais aussi la Suisse et lItalie, sur la base du lien
entre multiculturalisme et racisme.
Ds le dbut de mon mandat, jai pris conscience du fait que le principe des
visites comportait, en filigrane, trois potentialits essentielles pour le combat
contre le racisme: le renforcement des dimensions nationale et internationale; la
mise en lumire des typologies des manifestations et expressions de racisme; et
lchange dinformations entre pays sur les politiques et programmes de lutte
contre le racisme. Le programme de mes visites et la structure de mes rapports
de visite sont dtermins cet effet.
Pour minimiser le conflit entre la dure limite des visites et la complexit
des questions tudier et garantir une perception objective de la ralit dun
pays, jai estim ncessaire de poser trois questions identiques aux principaux
acteurs concerns chronologiquement, le gouvernement et les institutions
concernes de lappareil dEtat, les communauts et groupes ethniques, raciaux,
culturels et religieux concerns, et les organisations de la socit civile engages
dans la dfense des droits de lhomme et le combat contre le racisme. Ces trois
questions portent sur la ralit du racisme et de la xnophobie dans le pays, la
nature de ses manifestations et expressions, et les politiques et programmes, tant
sur les plans politique, social et conomique que culturel.
Le rapport de visite est en consquence structur en quatre parties: la posi-
tion du gouvernement sur la ralit du racisme ainsi que la description de ses
politiques et programmes; les tmoignages, informations et allgations des grou-
pes et communauts victimes ainsi que leur valuation des politiques du gou-
vernement et les solutions appropries leur situation; la position des organisa-
tions de la socit civile; et, en dernire partie, les analyses et recommandations
du Rapporteur spcial. La capacit du rapport reflter la ralit du racisme dans
le pays visit et la nature des solutions adoptes ou ncessaires est conditionne
par la prcision et lobjectivit des informations refltes dans les trois premi-
res parties, lesquelles sont garanties notamment par la soumission du projet de
rapport au gouvernement du pays visit et, pour des raisons dquilibre, aux
reprsentants des communauts et de la socit civile. Dans son rapport final, le
17
Rapporteur spcial est libre dans le choix et la formulation des corrections,

ajouts ou prcisions proposes par ces acteurs de la socit.
Le rapport de visite est de nature entraner trois dveloppements impr-
vus dans la dfinition des mandats, mais favorables la promotion des droits de
lhomme en gnral et, en loccurrence, au combat contre le racisme. Dabord,
sur le plan interne, par les faits et politiques rapports ainsi que par la rfrence
systmatique aux instruments internationaux pertinents et aux engagements des
gouvernements, le rapport est de nature promouvoir et nourrir un dbat contra-
dictoire sur une question comme le racisme, souvent occulte par les pouvoirs
politiques. Ensuite, sur le plan international, par la prsentation prcise des poli-
tiques, programmes, lgislations et mcanismes de combat contre le racisme, le
rapport favorise linformation rciproque et la comparaison non seulement entre
gouvernements mais galement entre communauts victimes et organisations de
la socit civile. Enfin, la capacit de suivi des visites par le Rapporteur spcial,
tant dans ses rapports annuels que par des visites de suivi, est de nature main-
tenir la vigilance et lobservation de la situation du racisme dans un pays par la
communaut internationale. Dans ce sens, un facteur fondamental de la promo-
tion et du respect des droits de lhomme consiste convaincre tous les gouver-
nements que les questions des droits de lhomme ne relvent pas de leur seule
autorit, prrogative ou discrtion, mais que leurs pays peuvent tout moment
faire lobjet dun examen sur le respect de tel ou tel aspect des droits de
lhomme. Cest sur ce terrain fondamental que les procdures spciales appor-
tent une contribution dcisive en mettant, par leurs visites, le curseur internatio-
nal sur les pays visits.
Le suivi des visites constitue, dans ce contexte, un enjeu essentiel. En effet,
les visites effectues dans le cadre des procdures spciales ne peuvent consti-
tuer la manifestation de la vigilance internationale pour le respect des droits de
lhomme que si elles sont pratiques, non comme un acte ponctuel, isol et final,
mais comme une tape initiale de cette vigilance. Cest prcisment cette dyna-
mique des visites qui met en lumire la rsistance des gouvernements accep-
ter ou faciliter le suivi des visites et leur volont de faire de la visite un acte
final, une page tourne et close. Lenjeu est, par consquent, la fois la mise en
uvre des recommandations formules dans le cadre des procdures spciales
et la continuation, par un examen du Conseil des droits de lhomme, du suivi du
respect des droits de lhomme par les gouvernements. En ce qui me concerne,
jai estim ncessaire de promouvoir le suivi des visites comme manifestation
de vigilance internationale pour le respect des droits de lhomme par deux pra-
tiques de suivi: dune part, linclusion dans mon rapport gnral annuel sur le
racisme dune partie portant sur le suivi des visites du Rapporteur spcial rela-
tive tout dveloppement et fait significatif sur le racisme en gnral et les
recommandations du Rapporteur spcial en particulier, de la part du gouverne-
ment ou de la socit civile et des communauts victimes; dautre part, la
demande systmatique dune visite de suivi, deux ou trois ans aprs la premire
visite. Cest galement pour donner substance cette vigilance internationale
que jai plaid devant le Conseil la ncessit dun vrai dbat international sur les
18
rapports de visite, loppos de la pratique actuelle qui, en gnral, se limite

un dbat avec la dlgation du pays visit, avec occasionnellement lintervention
des ONG, sans prise de position, valuation ou jugement de la part des autres
dlgations.
Si les titulaires de mandat dans les procdures spciales ont la libert de
choisir les pays visiter, il appartient aux gouvernements daccepter ces visites.
Cest l que nous rencontrons un des premiers problmes de relation avec les
gouvernements, dans la mesure o tous les gouvernements nont pas, lgard
de ces demandes dinvitation, la mme attitude. Certains gouvernements ont
donn une standing invitation, cest--dire, une invitation permanente qui
indique quils sont prts recevoir les rapporteurs. Beaucoup de gouvernements
nont pas encore adopt cette formule. Le problme se pose lorsque certains gou-
vernements prennent du temps pour rpondre, tant donn quils nont aucune
espce de contrainte de temps pour donner une rponse la demande. De ce fait,
les gouvernements peuvent tout autant contribuer au travail des rapporteurs sp-
ciaux que le retarder, le freiner ou le rendre beaucoup plus difficile.
Jai le cas de plusieurs gouvernements pour lesquels jattends une rponse
depuis deux ou trois ans. Je lai signal au Conseil des droits de lhomme en lui
demandant dans le cadre des dbats sur les reformes envisages des procdures
spciales, de fixer un dlai de rponse aux gouvernements pour les demandes
de visite.
Un autre aspect important des visites des pays concerne la libert daction.
Cest l o se trouve une des avances des procdures spciales. Les titulaires
de mandat ont lautorit de visiter les pays et daller voir in situ comment les
problmes se prsentent, par exemple, la question du racisme en ce qui me
concerne, la question des populations autochtones ou celle de la torture ou des
excutions extrajudiciaires pour dautres collgues. Cest l que se manifeste
galement toute la complexit des relations avec les gouvernements. Un certain
nombre de gouvernements jouent le jeu: ils laissent les enqutes seffectuer de
manire libre et sans entraves; dautres gouvernements tablissent un certain
type de rapports qui les amnent vouloir privilgier la relation du Rapporteur
spcial avec le gouvernement, par exemple, pour les informations que le gou-
vernement peut fournir, les lieux que le Rapporteur spcial peut visiter et les
groupes et institutions que le Rapporteur spcial peut rencontrer. Certains gou-
vernements jouent l-dessus et ne collaborent pas dune manire extrmement
ouverte. Un point galement important concerne la libert des rapporteurs sp-
ciaux de sadresser la population dun pays quils visitent travers, par exem-
ple, la presse.
Enfin, le problme le plus dlicat et qui est actuellement au cur du dbat
sur la rforme du systme des droits de lhomme concerne la place et le rle de
la socit civile et des organisations non gouvernementales. Beaucoup de gou-
vernements tentent, de manire presque instinctive, soit de restreindre le rle de
ces organisations de la socit civile, soit de limiter linformation, les contacts
et les visites. Par exemple, quand je visite un pays, je veux absolument rencon-
trer les organisations de dfense des droits de lhomme concernes; je visite les
19
communauts, je ne les coute pas seulement dans les capitales ou dans des
bureaux des Nations Unies, mais je vais voir leur contexte de vie pour voir si
cela donne une indication sur les discriminations dont elles sont lobjet; je
demande galement visiter les prisons pour voir quelle est la rpartition eth-
nique dans la population carcrale. Cest un terrain complexe et sensible sur
lequel les rapports avec les Etats ne sont pas faciles et font souvent lobjet de
ngociations extrmement dures.
Une dernire question qui me parat essentielle pour faire progresser le rle
des procdures spciales dans la nouvelle problmatique des droits de lhomme,
cest tout le rapport, la coordination et la complmentarit avec les autres mca-
nismes du systme des Nations Unies. Ceci est un point extrmement sensible.
Dabord, cette coordination se fait gnralement de manire libre pour chaque
procdure spciale, cela signifie quil va falloir, dans les rformes en cours, pro-
cder une rvision de ces relations et formaliser la complmentarit et la coor-
dination avec les autres mcanismes du systme. Deuximement, il apparat trs
clairement que la plupart des institutions du systme ce nest pas le cas du BIT
ignorent la nature, le rle, les actions et les mandats des procdures spciales.
Il y a donc un problme dinformation. Un autre enjeu important concerne le rap-
port des procdures spciales avec les reprsentants de lONU. Si mon exp-
rience montre que, dans la plupart des cas, les reprsentants du systme coop-
rent avec les rapporteurs spciaux, jai t confront des situations o ma visite
a t considre comme une nuisance par quelques reprsentants locaux cause
des rapports trs intimes et particuliers quils ont tablis avec les gouvernements.
Larrive du Rapporteur spcial bouscule ce type de relations. De manire plus
ou moins subtile, ces reprsentants vous suggrent, par des conseils amicaux, de
ne pas toucher certains problmes, de ne pas visiter certains lieux, etc. Jai
senti, comme dautres de mes collgues, quil y a un travail de fond faire pour
que les reprsentants des institutions du systme des Nations Unies sur le terrain
cooprent dans lesprit et le mandat des procdures spciales.
En conclusion, je voudrais rappeler que lenjeu actuel de la crdibilit de
toute la rforme du systme des droits de lhomme va dpendre de ce que les
gouvernements vont dcider dans les mois venir sur les procdures spciales.
Jaimerais souligner que ces procdures constituent une avance majeure dans
la protection, la dfense et la promotion des droits de lhomme. Pourtant, des
questions sensibles essentielles doivent tre rgles pour conforter lindpen-
dance des titulaires de mandat dans le cadre de ces procdures. Il sagit de lin-
dpendance par rapport aux Etats et aux gouvernements, de lquilibre entre les
gouvernements et la socit civile et, enfin, de lefficacit de leur travail, cest-
-dire, de tout le suivi des rapports et des recommandations quils soumettent au
Conseil ou lAssemble gnrale.
20
Discussion
Budislav Vukas * Jaimerais que M. Dine revienne sur un point quil a

soulev la fin de son expos et quil prcise sil y a eu une raction ngative
face la nouvelle tendance de nommer des rapporteurs spciaux pour des
rgions dtermines. Personnellement, je suis originaire dun petit pays des Bal-
kans qui compte quatre millions dhabitants et 22 minorits ethniques entre les-
quelles il existe de nombreuses diffrences. Il me semble trs difficile pour une
personne mandate par les Nations Unies de comprendre toutes ces diffrences
et de constater les faits de discrimination dans lensemble des 192 Etats memb-
res de lONU. Je suis donc favorable la nomination de personnes qui connais-
sent bien la rgion concerne, son histoire et son contexte politique.
Doudou Dine Le systme des rapporteurs par pays fait certainement

partie des grands progrs de ces procdures spciales, ainsi, lorsquun pays fait
face une situation critique de violations des droits de lhomme, le Conseil
auparavant ctait la Commission nomme quelquun pour suivre la situation
de ce pays et faire un rapport extrmement utile. Je donne un exemple: un Rap-
porteur spcial avait t nomm pour le Rwanda avant le gnocide et, dans son
rapport, il avait alert la communaut internationale sur la dynamique gnoci-
daire qui tait en train de se mettre en place et avait demand des mesures
urgentes. Ses recommandations nont pas eu un effet fondamental et le gnocide
a eu lieu. Mais ce que nous voyons, et cest la ralit du dbat actuellement au
Conseil des droits de lhomme, cest que le point sur lequel les gouvernements
sont les plus critiques, cest le maintien de ces rapporteurs par pays. Cest sur ce
maintien des rapporteurs par pays que va galement se jouer toute la crdibilit
de la rforme en cours.
Jlargirais votre question pour dire que cest le rapport avec les gouver-
nements qui est le point sensible. En voici deux illustrations: un exemple per-
sonnel et un autre plus politique. Voici lanecdote personnelle. Jai rcemment
visit la Suisse parce quaucun rapporteur ntait jamais venu dans ce pays qui
accueille le systme des Nations Unies. Tout le monde pensait quil ny avait rien
voir. Jai pourtant lu dans la presse des choses qui me paraissaient srieuses
loccasion des votations, de discours, la presse parlait de xnophobie. Je suis all
voir ce qui se passait. Jai t accueilli avec extrmement de courtoisie. Jai vu
tout ce que je voulais voir. Jai visit les prisons, rencontr les communauts.
Mais la fin de ma visite, le porte-parole dun des grands partis de la coalition
au pouvoir a fait une dclaration en disant que: M. Dine vient de finir sa visite
en Suisse, nous sommes obligs en tant que pays membre de lONU de
laccueillir, mais franchement comment se fait-il que ce soit un Sngalais qui
vienne visiter notre pays? Le rapporteur aurait en effet pu tre un Danois aux
yeux bleus Cette question est trs intressante parce que le grand problme
* Professeur de droit international public, Universit de Zagreb; membre de la Commission

dexperts de lOIT.
21
que je rencontre en tant que rapporteur, cest damener les institutions, les repr-
sentants de lEtat ou de lappareil politique rvler leurs sentiments profonds.
Ils sont souvent masqus derrire des formules diplomatiques ou des program-
mes extrmement gnraux dans lesquels il est difficile de voir la ralit. Je me
suis dit: pour une fois, ce Monsieur a parl ouvertement, je vais lindiquer dans
mon rapport, cela va illustrer lenjeu. Ce qui tait intressant, ctait que la
dclaration de ce Monsieur a suscit immdiatement une condamnation du Pr-
sident de la Confdration, du ministre des Affaires trangres et du ministre de
lIntrieur, et donc un dbat interne la socit suisse. Jaime bien ce rapport de
tension parce quil est rvlateur.
Le deuxime exemple que je voulais citer porte sur les rapports avec les
gouvernements. Nous avons dcid denvoyer une quipe de rapporteurs sp-
ciaux pour visiter Guantanamo parce que les informations que nous recevions
nous semblaient graves. Un groupe de rapporteurs a t nomm pour aller visi-
ter Guantanamo, mais le gouvernement amricain ne les a pas autoriss aller
sur place et a pos des conditions quils ne pouvaient pas accepter. On revient
donc cette problmatique du rapport avec les gouvernements qui fait actuelle-
ment lobjet dun dbat au Palais des Nations.
22
The Inter-American Human Rights System
Thomas Buergenthal*
The ILO Committee of Experts is a true pioneer in the supervision of labor

rights and human rights. The UN human rights treaty bodies, among other
modern human rights reporting mechanisms, are in many ways modeled on the
structure and function of the Committee of Experts. The Committees many
important achievements in its 80-year history justly merit a special place of
honor among international protective mechanisms.
The topic assigned to me is the Inter-American Human Rights System, a
system to which I devoted many years of my past professional life, although my
work on the International Court of Justice no longer permits me to follow the
inter-American human rights developments as closely as I once did. My heart is
still in San Jos, but my head is in The Hague.
Unlike the European human rights system, which was brought into being
by the European Convention of Human Rights, the Inter-American system has
two normative sources. One of these sources is the Charter of the Organization
of American States, the other is the American Convention on Human Rights. The
evolution of the Inter-American system thus bears greater resemblance to the
United Nations human rights system, which evolved in a parallel way from the
UN Charter, on the one hand, and the human rights conventions adopted under
UN auspices, on the other. 1
* Judge, International Court of Justice; Judge, Inter-American Court of Human Rights

(1979-91).
1
For some selected writings on the Inter-American human rights system, see H. Faundez-
Ledesma, El sistema internamericano de proteccin de derechos humanos: aspectos institutionales
y procesales, 2nd ed., 1999; T. Buergenthal & D. Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the
Americas: Cases and Materials, 4th ed., 1995; D. Shelton, New Rules of Procedure of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 22, 2001, pp. 169-
171; J.M, Pascualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
Continued on page 24
23
When the Charter of the Organization of American States, which estab-

lished the OAS, was adopted in Bogot, Colombia in 1948, it made only some
vague and innocuous references to human rights. However, the Bogot confer-
ence also adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
whose catalog of rights resembles the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Prior to the entry into force of the American Convention of Human Rights, the
human rights provisions of the OAS Charter, read together with the American
Declaration, which had been adopted in the form of a non-binding conference
resolution, provided the sole and rather weak legal basis for the protection of
human rights by the OAS.
Until 1960, moreover, the OAS had made no serious efforts to create a
mechanism for the enforcement of these rights. That year the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights came into being, an action that had much to do
with Fidel Castros successful revolution in Cuba a year earlier. Composed of
seven independent experts, elected by the General Assembly of the OAS, the
Commission was charged with the promotion of the rights proclaimed in the
American Declaration. It was to perform this task by preparing country studies
and by adopting resolutions of a general character only. A few years later, the
Commission was authorized to establish a limited petition system that allowed
it to receive individual communications charging large-scale violations of a
selected number of basic rights set out in the American Declaration, including
the right to life, equality before the law, freedom of religion, freedom from arbi-
trary arrest, and the right to due process of law. During this period, however, the
Commission was hampered in the performance of its functions because of its
ambiguous legal status. Since the OAS Charter contained no provision for such
a body, the Commission was established as an autonomous entity of the OAS.
Its lack of a sound constitutional status weakened its authority from the start and
made it easy for OAS Member States not to take the Commission very seriously.
This unsatisfactory state of affairs was partially remedied in 1970 with the entry
into force of the Protocol of Buenos Aires. It amended the OAS Charter and
transformed the Commission into a Charter organ which was charged with the
promotion of the observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a
consultative organ of the Organization in these matters.
In the early years of its existence, both as autonomous entity and later as
Charter organ, the Commission was kept busy preparing reports on human rights
situations in various countries. These reports were based on on-site visits and/or
information found in communications by individuals and groups addressed to
the Commission. The Commission adopted its first country reports in the early
1960s. These dealt with the human rights situations in Cuba, Haiti and the
Continued from page 23
2003; F. Salvili, La proteccin de los derechos econmicos, sociales y culturales en el sistema

interamericano de derechos humanos, Revista IIDH, vol. 39, 2004, pp. 101-167; M. Pinto, Los
derechos econmicos, sociales y culturales y su proteccin en el sistema universal y en el sistema
interamericano, Revista IIDH, vol. 40, 2004.
24
Dominican Republic. Only the Dominican Republic had granted permission for
the visit to the country. It thus became the first OAS Member State to host a so-
called in loco or on-site investigation by the Commission. (The reports on Cuba
and Haiti had to be prepared on the basis of communications received by the
Commission from individuals and groups.) During its in loco visit to the
Dominican Republic, the Commission criss-crossed the country, held hearings
and met with different groups of claimants. This modus operandi came to serve
as a model for the Commissions subsequent on-site visits generally. The Com-
missions most dramatic on-site investigation took place in Argentina, which
permitted the Commission to visit the country in 1979 after rejecting many ear-
lier requests. Once in Argentina, the Commission was able to verify allegations
of the massive forced disappearances that had been taking place in that country
during its so-called dirty war. The publication of the Commissions report on
the Argentine situation in 1980 had a dramatic effect in that country and abroad
and contributed to ending this terrible practice.
For many years, even after the entry into force of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, the Commissions in loco investigations and country
reports occupied much of its time, primarily because until the early to mid-80s
various Latin American countries continued to be ruled by dictatorships of one
form or another that engaged in widespread violations of human rights. Most of
these States did not, of course, ratify the Convention until democratically elected
regimes came to power. Until then the investigations and the reports of the Com-
mission in these countries provided the only means for putting pressure on their
governments to improve their human rights conditions. It is important to note,
in this connection, that the Commission continues to this day to prepare country
reports for problem countries, even if they have ratified the Convention. Such
action is necessary because the Commissions powers under the Convention are
for all practical purposes limited to dealing with individual violations, whereas
its powers as an OAS Charter organ authorize it to address countrywide viola-
tions of human rights. As an OAS Charter organ, the Commission also prepares
studies on various human rights topics.
The American Convention on Human Rights was concluded in San Jos,
Costa Rica in 1969. It came into force in 1978. Like the European Convention,
the American Convention guarantees only civil and political rights. Economic,
social and cultural rights are dealt with in a parallel treaty of the Organization of
American States, the so-called Additional Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Pro-
tocol of San Salvador. This treaty entered into force on November 16, 1999.
While the catalogue of rights that the European Convention guarantees has
grown with the adoption of further protocols, the drafters of the American Con-
vention opted for a comprehensive instrument that drew heavily on the much
more extensive catalogue of rights set out in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. But not all the rights guaranteed in the American Conven-
tion derive from the Civil and Political Covenant. Some of them reflect the his-
torical and cultural traditions of the Americas. This is true, for example, of the
25
provision that guarantees the right to life. It provides, inter alia, that this right
shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. Del-
egates from Latin Americas overwhelmingly Catholic countries insisted on this
provision during the drafting of the Convention. This provision has proved to be
a major obstacle to United States ratification of the American Convention.
The institutional structure of the American Convention is modelled on the
European Convention as originally drafted, that is, before Protocol No. 11
entered into force and abolished the European Commission on Human Rights.
The American Convention provides for a Commission and a Court. Each of these
bodies consists of seven members. Because the Inter-American Commission
retains the powers its predecessor exercised as an OAS Charter organ in addi-
tion to being a Convention organ, all OAS Member States have the right to elect
the members of the Commission. Only the States Parties to the Convention have
the right to elect the judges of the Court since it is solely a Convention organ.
However, because not all OAS Member States have to date ratified the Conven-
tion, the Commission continues to apply the human rights provisions of the
Charter and the American Declaration to these States, whereas it applies the
Convention to the States Parties to that instrument. Various amendments of the
OAS Charter have over the years strengthened its human rights provisions, rein-
forcing the normative status of the American Declaration in the process. The dual
role of the Commission as a Charter organ and Convention organ permits it to
deal with massive violations of human rights which, although not within its juris-
diction as a Convention organ, it has the power to address as a Charter organ and
that regardless whether or not the State in question is a party to the Convention.
It is worth noting that by ratifying the American Convention, the States Par-
ties are automatically deemed to have accepted the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion to hear cases brought against them by individuals. Inter-State complaints,
on the other hand, can be heard by the Commission only if the Applicant and
Respondent States have each filed a separate declaration accepting the Com-
missions jurisdiction to receive such complaints. This is a reversal of the rule
traditionally found in human rights treaties. Until Protocol No. 11 to the Euro-
pean Convention entered into force, no other human rights instrument conferred
on individuals the favourable status they enjoy under the American Convention.
It is also important to note that under the American Convention not only victims
of human rights violations or their representatives may file individual complaints
with the Commission; NGOs and groups also have standing to do so, whether or
not they are victims. The existence of this remedy has proved over the years par-
ticularly useful for dealing with forced disappearances because it is as a rule
impossible for victims of this violation to file such complaints. Frequently, too,
their next of kin are afraid to do so on their behalf. Here it is most helpful that
NGOs can step in and institute proceedings before the Commission on behalf
of victims.
As a Convention organ, the Commission passes on the admissibility of
individual and inter-State communications. If the case is not referred to the Inter-
American Court, the Commission examines the merits of the case, assists in
26
efforts to work out a friendly settlement, and failing that, makes final findings
on the merits. If the State Party in question has recognized the jurisdiction of the
Court a separate declaration to that effect is necessary the Commission or
an interested State may refer the case to the Court. Individuals have no standing
to do so, but once a case has been referred to the Court, individuals may now,
that is since 2001, appear before the Court to plead their case. While the Com-
mission tended in the early years of the Courts existence rarely to refer cases to
it, this situation also changed in 2001 when it adopted new Rules of Procedure.
These rules provide, with some minor exceptions, for the referral to the Court
of all cases of non-compliance by States with the recommendations of the
Commission.
Today the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has both con-
tentious and advisory jurisdiction, plays an ever more important role in the inter-
American human rights system. Most of the States that have to date ratified the
Convention have now also accepted the Courts contentious jurisdiction. The
American Convention, moreover, allows OAS Member States, whether or not
they have ratified the Convention, and all OAS organs, to request advisory opin-
ions from the Court seeking the interpretation of the Convention or of other
human rights treaties of the inter-American system. Such advisory opinions may
also be sought regarding the compatibility with the Convention of national
legislation.
Since 2001, when the Inter-American Commission decided to routinely
refer cases to the Court, the Court has come to play an ever more important role
in the implementation of the Inter-American human rights system. Not only has
the Court been able to decide many more cases, it has also made very effective
use of the provisional measures provision of the Convention by ordering an
increasing number of such measures and by closely supervising their imple-
mentation, a practice that is not expressly provided for in the Convention. In this
connection, it is interesting to note that in 2004, for example, the Court ordered
13 provisional measures and in 2005 seven. The fact that such measures are
deemed by the Court to be necessary is very telling since the Convention pro-
vides in Article 63(2) that they shall be issued only in cases of extreme gravity
and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons.
In short, some democratically elected governments are still deemed by the Court
to be guilty of inadequately protecting their citizens against serious human
rights violations.
In general, the Inter-American human rights system still lags behind its
European counterpart in protecting human rights, although with the expansion
to the East of the States Parties to the European Convention, its Court is now
confronting problems similar to the ones the Inter-American Court faced in the
past. The American continent continues to suffer from widespread poverty, cor-
ruption, discrimination and illiteracy as well as archaic judicial systems that are
badly in need of reform. Also, some of the Commonwealth Caribbean nations
as well as the United States and Canada have to date not ratified the Convention.
Their absence has had a detrimental effect on the system, which is thereby
27
deprived of the presence of States with strong legal traditions. Although it has
also been taking some national courts in the Americas a long time to familiarize
themselves with the practice of the Convention institutions and to give domes-
tic legal effect to the rulings of the Court, that situation has gradually improved
in recent years. It must be recognized, all in all, that notwithstanding the prob-
lems the region faces, substantial progress has been made over the years as far
as the protection of human rights in the Americas is concerned.
28
The ILO system of regular supervision
of the application of Conventions
and Recommendations: A lasting paradigm
Kari Tapiola *
In my own language, there is a saying which goes something like if you

have reached happiness, make sure to hide it from others. I am not certain that
this is always the wisest thing to do. Yet, we seem to be rather good at this with
our precious standards supervisory mechanism. I have senior colleagues who
some time after joining the Organization and trying to understand how it works
have called our standards system the best held secret of the ILO. We are actu-
ally quite good at not making public what the Committee of Experts and the rest
of the supervisory mechanism do. Sometimes it seems that we are like the owner
of a Rolls Royce Silver Ghost who guards the car so jealously that no-one else
dares to even manifest a desire to use it.
We believe that this is the most sophisticated standards supervisory system
in the world, and we quite probably are right. But then we must continue to make
sure that it is known, recognized, understood including the language in which its
conclusions are couched and that it is used in a transparent, fair and efficient
way. Otherwise it, and all those who work with it, including its Secretariat, will
be seen as a semi-secret society, a group of the initiated and the enlightened
the keepers of the faith but also the only ones authorized to use it and its findings.
I am not calling for a public relations effort. I am simply saying that if we
want to reaffirm our relevance for the next eighty years, we need to be several
things at the same time. The system needs to be in practice more user-friendly,
and it also must express itself with sufficient clarity. It needs to demonstrate its
* Executive Director, Standards and Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Sector,
International Labour Office.
29
worth in a competitive world including the fundamental role of international

labour standards as public goods. The system also needs to show how its workings
get translated into better laws, better practice, trade union members reinstated in
their jobs and renewed social justice in a market economy. At the same time, the
system must be simple enough and accessible for those who use it and those
whom it addresses. It has to continue to navigate between the Scylla of detail
and the Kharybdis of generality.
Too much detail will not reach even indirectly the political decision-
maker who notoriously will not read anything which does not fit on one page.
Some situations that the supervisory bodies examine contain such a multitude of
detail that it is too easy for its addressees to either say that no-one can cope with
all these recommendations or, maybe, find fault with one detail and thus question
the validity of the rest. I can think of a number of countries which at present
actually can use the sheer amount of detail as an alibi to do nothing, particularly
if they are not clearly guided towards action on the most urgent issues. If again
the system is too general, it does not help in finding concrete solutions to
concrete problems. It is important to derive practical recommendations from
general principles, and they have to address specific issues, be they laws or
administrative practices or the fate of persons who are unjustly treated and
abused.
But I probably have rushed too quickly into the debate on the future of the
supervisory mechanism. I need to go back to the beginning. In order to deter-
mine where we want to go, we need to know where we are coming from.
In the second year of the ILOs existence, in 1921, the Governing Body
adopted draft questionnaires for the first two Conventions which by then had
been sufficiently ratified to enter into force. This was the point where the super-
visory functions of the ILO became operative. They are based on obligations
contained in the Constitution: (i) a Member State has to report annually to the
International Labour Office on measures it has taken to give effect to the provi-
sions of a Convention to which it is a party; (ii) these reports have to be made in
such form and must contain such particulars as the Governing Body may
request; (iii) the Director-General must lay before the annual Conference a sum-
mary of the governments reports.
The original method, or lack thereof, was too raw to be dealt with by the
Conference directly, without the help of specific bodies and additional proce-
dures. Even today, a summary of a report from a government is not likely to gen-
erate an objective discussion. Yet some governments have still, over eighty years
later, not quite accepted this point. If the drafters of the ILO Constitution
expected that information from governments alone would have been a sufficient
and reliable basis for supervision, they may have got carried away by the post-
war euphoria of 1919.
In fact, when reporting to the Conference in 1926, the Chairperson of the
Committee which then dealt with the annual reports noted that the very large
amount of space that these summarized reports took, ranging from 200 to
300 pages, made it impossible for delegates to discuss the reports with profit
30
The ILO system of regular supervision of the application of standards
and in detail. Consequently, a preparatory examination of the reports would be

needed by some body which would bring into light the particular points to
which attention of the Conference should be directed.
An Irish government delegate had already at the 1925 session of the Con-
ference suggested that special supervisory committees should be set up at future
sessions, to examine reports and to make sure that the system of control set out
in the Versailles Peace Treaty functioned. In 1926 the Conference adopted a res-
olution which called for the setting up each year of a Committee to examine the
summaries of the reports as well as the establishment by the Governing Body of
a committee of experts who would in advance study the reports.
This draft resolution was adopted after an animated discussion by 66 votes
to 36. The point of divergence was on the nature of both the new bodies and
supervision itself. This certainly was not the last time that the spectre of super-
visory bodies becoming a tribunal was raised, or the fear that the mechanism was
utilized to force ratifications. The adopted resolution finally stipulated that a
technical expert committee would be appointed for a trial period of one, two
or three years. Later on in the Governing Body, the debate centered on whether
the Committee would consist of representatives of member countries or be one
whose membership was to be determined by the competence of the persons con-
cerned alone. The criterion of competence certainly was the approach chosen
when the first six-member Committee was appointed. At the same time, the
underlying assumption from the beginning was that there would be diversity in
competence and nationality.
The process leading to the Committee of Experts shows a number of
things. In its wisdom, the Organization had given the Governing Body the
powers to deal in an innovative and efficient way with the needs that quickly
arose and have continued to evolve since. If the functioning of the supervisory
mechanism had been prescribed by the Constitution itself in more detail than the
short article 408 of the Peace Treaty, the Organization would have had quite seri-
ous difficulties in coping with the steady rise of ratifications and subsequent
reporting. The current Constitutions articles 22 and 23 also retain this frame-
work in a suitably succinct way.
The ILO has, from the beginning, been remarkably pragmatic when it
comes to dealing with processes which, however, we tend to at each given time
hold sacrosanct and look upwards with reverence. Let us hope that this pragma-
tism will continue to serve the purpose of an efficient and fair standards super-
visory mechanism.
Another heritage from those early days is one of frank debate, rich with
criticism a questioning of the constitutionality and authority of new methods,
with concerns expressed that the Organization was granting itself powers of a
court of inquiry or even becoming a social Interpol. Yet innovation has contin-
ued to take place even reaching to the otherwise rather untouchable Constitu-
tion, which in 1946 was amended to include the obligation of Member States to
supply again at the request of the Governing Body reports on Conventions
they have not ratified, leading into the regular General Surveys. And, of course,
31
the special machinery for the protection of freedom of association was estab-
lished in 1950 by the Governing Body.
I think it is fair to say that today, the Committee of Experts is one of the
least criticized, and probably also the best respected, part of the supervisory
system. Member States and the Office labour in trying to feed it in time with the
material needed, and its conclusions have served many passionate debates in the
Conference Committee. Its recognized independence serves as a tranquil center-
point in the sometimes quite rough ocean of supervision. No doubt it has lived
up to the words of Wilfred Jenks who in 1967 referred to
a general spirit imbuing the ILO supervisory bodies, to some unwritten wisdom
guiding their action based on certain fundamental principles: firm adherence to
accepted international obligations and standards; a scrupulous thoroughness; the
strictest objectivity; recognition of the need for a sympathetic understanding of
what lies beyond the letter of the law, of problems of timing, and of practical dif-
ficulties; and acceptance of the duty to observe the highest standards of tact and
courtesy in the valuation of complex and delicate problems. 1
I trust that the Members of the Committee recognize themselves in this
characterization. It might be more difficult to use exactly the same words for all
other parts of the supervisory process, which after all is a combination of both
legal and political elements. This only underlines the obvious fact that laws
emerge out of the political process, and labour law is determined to a great extent
by the interplay of the forces in the labour market itself.
With the Committee of Experts, we have for the purpose of supervision
found a good balance between independent and objective expert advice and the
tripartite policy process. The same is true, although not in such a structured way,
for the setting of standards, where expert meetings can take place prior to the
tripartite drafting of a Convention. Whether, and how, more expert analysis could
or should be systematically injected into the process of standard setting goes
beyond the scope of this mornings talk but might be worth revisiting in another
context.
Nicolas Valticos gave in the 1990s an unequivocal answer to whether the
ILO system of standards supervision still was a model. By that time it had sur-
vived, and had been developed, through political and structural change, the end
of the Cold War, and the arrival of a virtually universal market economy a con-
dition which had not earlier existed in the lifetime of the ILO. The answer of
Valticos was, yes, the ILO system still remained a model. To quote his words:
The reasons remain numerous. The fact that it combines two basic methods of
supervision, periodic reports and complaints, the fact that on some basic matters
freedom of association it provides for supervision even on the absence of ratifica-
1
See Wilfred Jenks, Human rights, social justice and peace The broader significance
of the ILO experience, Norwegian Nobel Institute, Symposium on the international protection of
human rights, 25-27 Sept. 1967, p. 37.
32
tion. The fact that reports are requested and examined, even on unratified conven-
tions and on recommendations. The fact that it has established the principle of
quasi-judicial assessment by independent persons and the due process of law. The
fact that it has worked out methods for on-the-spot inquiries and that it has also
developed methods of quiet diplomacy. All these aspects constitute solid achieve-
ments and significant progress in the field of international supervision and, more
generally, international law. 2
This is the way in which Nicolas Valticos defines the happiness we have
reached an achievement which, I would argue, we should not, like the proverb-
loving Finns, hide but rather make full use of.
What is interesting is the reminder, in both citations; one part of the system
has to do with methods of quiet diplomacy, argues Valticos. An acceptance
of the highest standards of tact and courtesy in the valuation of complex and del-
icate problems, adds Jenks. All ardent partisans of naming and shaming are
thus reminded that the system is there for analyzing the issues raised, identify-
ing the problems, drawing governments attention to them, rendering the find-
ings public, but also working with the governments and the employers and
workers organizations to find solutions.
Sometimes it seems that over the years and decades, we have been better
at identifying the problems than moving forward towards solving them. When I
called for more information and publicity for what the supervisory mechanism
is doing, I did not necessarily mean directing a stronger searchlight on our usual
suspects or those who have willingly, or by mistake, erred in the application of
standards. Rather, I believe that we should make better known how the ILO
method of supervision works. A key part of this is the dialogue between the
supervisory bodies and the countries concerned, assisted by the International
Labour Office.
I keep on hearing that the problem of our supervisory mechanism is that it
does not have teeth. We are told that although we can bark, we cannot bite.
Recently, I have taken to answering this ever-recurring issue, which could be
called the dental work question, by reminding that the track record of mecha-
nisms that are based on economic or other sanctions actually is not much to write
home about. I am sure that for any success that sanctions-based mechanisms can
claim, we can come up with several achievements which have combined a fac-
tual and principled analysis and recommendations with the diplomacy and cour-
tesy that Jenks and Valticos referred to.
We can measure this in the number of legislative amendments, or changes
in practice, or, for that matter, the number of detained trade unionists that regain
their freedom because of interventions by either the supervisory bodies or the
Office. If I am correct, recently this number has been around at least 500 per-
sons a year.
2
See Nicolas Valticos, Once more about the ILO system of supervision: In what respect is
it still a model? in Mlanges H.G Schermers, 1994, vol. I, p. 112.
33
But if we speak about our strengths, we have to address our weaknesses

before going to the obvious item of future challenges. The alleged weakness of
no teeth I have already dealt with, and I believe that we can safely put it aside
as a non-question. It is no wonder that the ILO cannot solve human and labour
right problems in certain countries which resist fairly unanimous condemnation
and pressure by the whole international system. What is important there is that
once the conditions are there for us to work, we can contribute with our accu-
mulated knowledge, as we have done over the years in such countries as South
Africa, Poland, Indonesia, Turkey and many others. What we cannot do today in
Myanmar/Burma or Belarus, we may be able to do tomorrow. What some see as
a weakness is, in fact, a source of future strength.
A potential weakness, however, is if the supervisory mechanism does not
recognize the root causes of problems it is asked to deal with. A failure to respect
international labour standards can be caused by a deliberate decision of a gov-
ernment to ignore its obligations. It can be the result of a governments failure
to set out, in law and policy, the expectation that private actors respect standards.
It can arise out of systematic non-compliance, aided and abetted by weak or non-
existing labour inspection. It can also arise out of institutional weakness and
ignorance on all sides of the tripartite constituents.
It should be obvious that conclusions drawn in a case of willful non-
compliance by responsible authorities would be different from those drawn in a
situation where the main problem is a lack of capacity. This seems to be increas-
ingly recognized by the supervisory bodies, when they call for technical coop-
eration as a primary means to address the failures that have been identified.
I would dare to submit that most of the problems that the Committee of Experts
deals with are problems of capacity, including a lack of awareness and also a
deficiency of social consciousness. The number of countries that do not want to
comply with standards although they have the capacity to do so may be rather
small. In fact, arguably some of those we tend to see as the worst offenders also
suffer from a lack of capacity. If, for instance, Myanmar/Burma would genuinely
decide tomorrow to stop using forced labour, it would still be facing a huge prob-
lem of deficiency in capacity (which is why as part of our attempts for dialogue,
we worked out a plan on how infrastructure projects could be carried out while
respecting minimum labour standards this plan is, of course, shelved for the
time being).
Inevitably, there is also the question of resources. Legislative advice is rea-
sonably cheap to deliver. Direct contact procedures which were introduced in
1968 have still been manageable within the human and material resources avail-
able to the Office. But when we look at implementing labour standards through
proper technical cooperation, we need to go well beyond what we traditionally
have seen as standards-related activities. One example is the biggest technical
cooperation programme of the ILO, the almost exclusively donor-financed IPEC
programme to eliminate child labour. The programme has been a success. The
two relevant Conventions, Nos. 182 and 138 have attained very high levels of
ratification, and figures published last spring show that child labour is declining.
34
But one cannot ignore the fact that recently the annual expenditure of the pro-
gramme has been around at least 35 million US dollars.
And yet, behind this development lies a success story on the way we can
deal with problems with the application of standards. When the IPEC pro-
gramme started, a number of governments hesitated to get involved because they
feared that admitting the existence of such a human rights and labour standards
problem might make them vulnerable to criticism, boycotts and sanctions. In fact
what has happened is that engaging in cooperation with the ILO has become a
way for them to demonstrate that they are tackling the problem. What could have
been negative has turned into a positive message. At the same time, we have a
practical example of how technical cooperation and normative action can sup-
port one another. This is demonstrated by both the success of the Worst Forms
of Child Labour Convention No. 182 and the revival and surge in ratifications of
the Minimum Age Convention No. 138.
All this presupposes, of course, that the engagement in technical coopera-
tion is genuine and results can be reported over a reasonable period of time. This
is where the supervisory mechanism again comes in, as the regular reporting
should expose any attempts at using technical cooperation as a cover for not
doing anything.
I have tried to speak of weaknesses but seem to be sliding back to our
strengths again. This concerns in particular the potential strength of combining
supervisory action with technical cooperation. Some new avenues are becoming
open to us, for instance through the introduction of Decent Work Country Pro-
grammes. If we can integrate the comments of the supervisory bodies into the
comprehensive programmes which our constituents carry out at the national
level, we have another tool to support the solutions to identified problems.
Let me then pass on to challenges. The system of supervision has devel-
oped continuously and it will have to develop further. As the beginnings of the
Committee of Experts show, very early on it became clear that reports had to be
treated as the assumption that the Conference would directly deal with sum-
maries of them became impractical. Observations by employers and workers
organizations are now a crucial element of the process. Annual reports have
become either biannual, in the case of priority Conventions, or every five years
for others. The last reform, which we have to evaluate soon, rearranged Con-
ventions by groups or families in order to facilitate reporting. The previous
readjustment in 1993 also gave the employers and workers organizations a
better possibility to break into the cycle when serious concerns arise.
Currently, the system runs the risk of being choked up at several levels: at
the national level, where reports are prepared; at the Office level where the files
are processed; at the level of the Committee of Experts that examines the files;
and also at the level of the Conference Committee on the application of stan-
dards, which does not have an unlimited absorptive capacity either. At each of
these levels answers can be found, but all of them will be partial. Nationally tri-
partite cooperation could be used more. Both the Office and the Experts could
strive at distilling the essential questions into the observations, and the Confer-
35
ence Committee could think of more strategic approaches to discussing the

report. But within each approach there are dangers. Genuine tripartism is still a
scarce commodity, and the guise of tripartism can be used against the legitimate
interests of minority groups. What may not be essential for someone is a matter
of freedom and subsistence for others, and the system will still have to be able
to help individuals who have been discriminated because they have exercised
their rights to freedom of association and non-discrimination. And if we only
single out the worst offenders, we end up with a rather one-sided rogues
gallery, which would furthermore crowd out the supervision of important tech-
nical Conventions.
I still have a preference of saying, lets keep on course, as I do not believe
that it will lead us into a wall. The fundamental logic of the system is sound. The
amount of detail can be reviewed, as can the frequency of reporting as the 1993
decision showed, there is a trade-off between the frequency of reporting and the
possibility of employers and workers organizations to break into the cycle. But,
as was generally agreed in the last review in 2001, reporting cycles that go much
beyond five years are liable to lead into serious lapses of institutional follow-up
and memory.
The feasibility of a country-based approach and different alternatives for
it should of course be studied. In my view, it would have to be accompanied
by a boost to the engagement and capacity of the tripartite constituents in the
countries concerned. Maybe this could take place with the help of Decent Work
Country Programmes, which by definition should set the national priorities for
all ILO action in a given country. Another area to look at is how our field staff
is integrated into the dialogue with the supervisory bodies.
I do not believe in one magic solution, a Big-Bang which would solve
all the problems in the functioning of the supervisory system. I do not think that
the system has failed to address the major issues involved in the application of
standards, either in terms of understanding the provisions of the standards or
examining their application in specific countries where issues are urgent.
If the workload is the main problem we have, maybe we should rather con-
sider it a good problem, much better than reluctance or refusal to use the mech-
anism. In 1926, the Conference interrupted its discussion on the supervisory
mechanism and went to the Governing Body to get the 6,000 Swiss francs that
were annually needed for the new technical expert committee. But today our
budgetary masters are unlikely to tell us that there is a big pot of gold at the end
of this particular rainbow. Consequently, we have to keep working on the right
trade-off between detail and relevance. The Committee of Experts should be par-
ticularly well placed to concentrate, and give guidance, on the most essential
issues that arise out of reports. That after all is exactly why it was set up eighty
years ago.
36
The European Committee of Social Rights
and the collective complaints procedure
under the European Social Charter
Andrzej Marian Swiatkowski*
I. Introduction
The Additional Protocol of 1995 to the European Social Charter introduc-

ing the collective complaint procedure gave the Committee of Social Rights the
status of a quasi-judicial body. 1 The Committee was vested with the power to
examine collective complaints lodged by selected international and national
organisations against the authorities of Member States wich violate the provisions
of the European Social Charter or the Revised European Social Charter, or do
not adapt their domestic labour and social insurance legislation to the European
standards. The Additional Protocol of 1995 was opened for signature on
9 November 1995. It came into force on 1 July 1998, upon ratification by eight
European States. 2 The signatories of the Protocol could only be States which had
previously ratified the European Social Charter of 1961. In adition, five States
signatories of the European Social Charter of 1961, signed the Additional Pro-
tocol of 1995 undertaking to comply with its provisions. 3 Two other States sig-
natories of the Revised European Social Charter of 1996, declared that they
would abide by the provisions of the Protocol. 4 Therefore, the procedure of the
Committee of Social Rights for the examination of collective complaints applies
to 15 out of 46 Member States of the Council of Europe.
* Vice-President, European Committee of Social Rights.
1
See A. Swiatkowski, Funciones causi-jurisdiccionales del Comit de Derechos Sociales
del Consejo Europeo, Revista de Derecho Laboral y Seguridad Social, Abril 2005, p. 533.
2
Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Italy.
3
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Slovakia.
4
Bulgaria and Slovenia.
37
The Additional Protocol of 1995 is based on the procedures applicable in

proceedings before the ILOs Committee on Freedom of Association. The ILO
Committee has less power than the Committee of Social Rights of the Council
of Europe. The Committee on Freedom of Association deals only with com-
plaints concerning the violation by the authorities of Member States of the rights
related to freedom of association. The Committee of Social Rights examines col-
lective complaints lodged against the authorities of the Member States of the
Council of Europe concerning the violation of economic and social rights,
including the freedom to organise in trade unions and in employers organisa-
tions (art. 5) guaranteed under the Social Charters.
II. Entities empowered to initiate collective complaints proceedings
Under the Additional Protocol of 1995, the following types of organisa-

tions are entitled to lodge collective complaints:
(i) International employers organisations and trade unions invited by the Sub-
committee of the Governmental Committee 5 (art. 27(2) the European
Social Charter). This provision provides for the invitation of no more than
two international organisations of employers and no more than two inter-
national trade union organisations to be represented as observers in a con-
sultative capacity at the meetings of the Governmental Committee.
Although the European Social Charter protects mainly the rights of
employees 6, one international trade union organisation (The European
Trade Union Confederation ETUC) and two international employers
associations (the Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of
Europe UNICE and the International Organization of Employers IOE)
have been invited to participate in the work of the Governmental Commit-
tee. These organisations are entitled to file collective complaints (art. 1(a)
of the Additional Protocol of 1995).
(ii) Other international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) having a
consultative status with the Council of Europe and appearing in a list estab-
lished for this purpose by the Governmental Committee (art.1(b) of the
Protocol). To be included in the list, an organisation has to fulfil certain
conditions set out in the Decision of the Committee of Ministers of the
5
The Committee was formerly known as the Governmental Social Committee.
6
Article 6(4) of the European Social Charter guarantees the employers right to undertake
collective actions, hence, it gives them the right to organise defensive lock-outs; see Committee of
Independent Experts, Conclusions I, 1969-70, Council of Europe Press, Strasbourg 1995, pp. 38,40;
Conclusions III, p. 38; Conclusions V, p. 48; Conclusions VI, pp.39-40; Conclusions VIII, p. 95;
Conclusions IX-2, pp. 47-49; Conclusions XV-1, vol. 1, pp. 81, 123; Addendum to Conclusions
XV-1, p. 27. See also The right to organize and to bargain collectively Study drawn up on the
basis of the case law of the European Social Charter, 2nd edition, Council of Europe Publishing,
Strasbourg 2001, pp. 79-81; L. Samuel, Fundamental social rights Case law of the European
Social Charter, 2nd edition, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 2002, p. 167.
38
Council of Europe of 22 June 1995. 7 All the INGOs having consultative

status with the Council of Europe, competent in matters governed by the
European Social Charter, which have access to sources of information and
are able to draw up and professionally present from a legal point of view
their stand in matters examined by the Committee of Social Rights of the
Council of Europe are entitled to apply for the right to lodge collective
complaints. 8 The applications for inclusion in the list of INGOs entitled to
lodge collective complaints are examined by the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe. An application is considered accepted by the Govern-
mental Committee unless it is rejected in a ballot by a simple majority of
votes cast. 9 An INGO can be included in the list for a period of four years
and has the right to apply for renewal.
(iii) Representative national employers organisations and trade unions, having
the right to undertake their activities within the jurisdiction of a Member
State of the Council of Europe, against which they will be entitled to lodge
a collective complaint (art. 1(c) of the Protocol). Only employers and
employees organisations are entitled to apply to be included in the list.
Therefore, those employers who are not members of any employers organ-
isation or association are not entitled to lodge any collective complaints.
Trade unions enjoy the status of organisations and, hence, trade unions and
associations of trade unions are entitled to apply for entry. Pursuant to arti-
cle1(c) of the Additional Protocol of 1995 national organisations are also
entitled to apply for entry in the list. The decision admitting an organisa-
tion to apply for entry is not conditional upon a membership of a national
employers organisation or a trade union in an international organisation of
similar character. Only representative employers organisations and trade
unions are eligible for inclusion in the list. None of the cited international
documents specify any criteria for establishing whether an organisation is
or is not representative. Nor do they specify a body which would be enti-
tled to make such judgments. The Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe would rather leave this issue to the authorities of its Member
States. Thus, an employers organisation or a trade union, which, under the
domestic legislation, enjoys the status of a representative organisation,
retains this status for the purposes of the Social Charter of the Council
of Europe. Yet, in the absence of any criteria for the assessment of the
representativeness or non-representativeness of an organisation on
a national level, the power to make judgments concerning the status of a
7
See Explanatory report to the 1995 Protocol in European Social Charter Collected texts,
4th edition, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 2003, p. 149.
8
See R.Brillat, La Charte sociale europenne du Conseil de lEurope dveloppements
rcents, Droit en Quart Monde, 1996, No.12, p.3. Several hundreds of international non-govern-
mental organisations have the right to express their opinions in the Council of Europe.
9
Three organisations which applied for the right to lodge collective complaints have not
been included in the list by the Governmental Committee.
39
national organisation applying for entry in the list of organisations entitled

to lodge collective complaints is vested in the Committee of Social Rights.
Factors such as the number of members and the organisations actual role
in national negotiations should be taken into account. 10
(iv) Representative national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) entitled
to carry out their statutory activities within the jurisdiction of the Member
State of the Council of Europe, against which their complaint is made
(art. 2(1) of the Protocol), if the State in question has previously issued a
declaration in this respect. The Committee of Social Rights has been autho-
rised to verify whether NGOs other than organisations of employers and
trade unions, referred to in article1(c) of the Additional Protocol of 1995,
entitled by the authorities of Member States to lodge collective complaints,
have the status of a representative organisation, as construed under arti-
cle 2(1) of the Protocol. The authorities of the Member States have the right
to authorise representative NGOs to initiate proceedings in accordance
with the procedures laid down in the Additional Protocol of 1995. The
authorisation is valid for the period stated in the relevant authorising doc-
ument or for an unlimited period. An authorisation to lodge collective com-
plaints can be revoked by way of denunciation of the Protocol.11 Finland is
the only State among those which have ratified or signed the Additional
Protocol, to have authorised its representative NGOs to lodge collective
complaints. No Finnish NGOs have so far made use of this possibility.
The Additional Protocol of 1995 makes a clear distinction between the
organisations entitled to lodge collective complaints against their own state.
Organisations of employers and trade unions falling within one of the four cat-
egories of organisations entitled to lodge collective complaints may do so in
respect of every matter governed by the provisions of the European Social Char-
ter. Other organisations, falling within any of the categories mentioned in the
Additional Protocol, are entitled to lodge collective complaints only on those
matters specifically recognised by the Committee of Social Rights (art.3 of the
Additional Protocol).
10
It is pointed out that the Additional Protocol has the status of an international treaty which
should apply identical criteria while assessing employers organisations and trade unions; see
Explanatory report, op.cit., supra n.7, p. 153. The report also considers that the Committee of Social
Rights should be vested with the power to assess all employers organisations and trade unions
also those which, pursuant to their domestic legislation, already enjoy the status of representative
organisations. See also R.Birk, The Collective Complaint: A New Procedure in the European
Social Charter in C. Engels and M. Weiss (eds.), Labour Law and Industrial Relations at the Turn
of the Century Liber Amicoum in Honour of Roger Blanpain, Kluwer Law International, 1998,
pp. 265-266; D. Harris and J. Darcy, The European Social Charter, 2nd edition, Transnational Pub-
lishers, Ardsley 2001, p. 358.
11
The notice period for denunciation is 12 months.
40
III. Examining the admissibility of the complaint
The Committee of Social Rights plays a quasi-judicial role during the

examination the status of an organisation lodging a collective complaint (i.e. rep-
resentative or non-representative, active or not in the areas regulated by the Euro-
pean Social Charter). Another important element of the quasi-judicial proceed-
ings carried out in respect of collective complaints is the initial examination of
a complaint and deciding upon its admissibility. Out of 31 collective complaints
submitted to the Committee of Social Rights in the years 1998-2005, only one
was lodged by an employers organisation, 12 11 by NGOs 13 and 13 by trade
unions and trade union organisations. 14 During the pre-court proceedings, the
Committee of Social Rights examined the right of an international lawyers asso-
ciation to lodge a collective complaint against the authorities of Portugal, for
allowing the employment of children under 15 years of age, which constitutes a
violation of article 7(1) of the European Social Charter. 15 The Committee also
had to decide whether a Quakers organisation has the right to lodge a collective
complaint against Greece for violation of the provision prohibiting forced labour
(art. 1(2) of the European Social Charter) by introducing some alternative forms
of compulsory military service. As regards the complaints examined so far, the
Committee of Social Rights has pronounced that INGOs making collective com-
plaints meet the requirements laid down in the additional Protocol of 1995. They
have been established either to represent and defend economic and social rights
expressed in the European Social Charter, or to protect the rights of a particular
social group, such as for instance children or immigrants. Decisions on the
admissibility of collective complaints are made by the Committee in a plenary
12
Confederation of Swedish Enterprises v. Sweden, Complaint No.12/2002. See European
Social Charter Collected texts, op.cit., p. 500.
13
International Commission of Jurists v. Portugal, Complaint No/1998; International Fed-
eration of Human Rights Leagues v. Greece, Complaint No/2000; Quaker Council for European
Affairs v. Greece, Complaint No/2000; Autisme-Europe v. France, Complaint No.13/2002; Inter-
national Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) v. France, Complaint No.14/2003; European Roma
Rights Centre v. Greece, Complaint No.15/2003; World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) v.
Greece, Complaint No.17/2003; OMCT v. Ireland, Complaint No. 18/2003; OMCT v. Italy, Com-
plaint No. 19/2003; OMCT v. Portugal, Complaint No. 20/2003; OMCT v. Belgium, Complaint
No.21/2003.
14
European Federation of Employees in Public Services (EFEPS) v. France, Complaint
No.2/1999; EFEPS v. Greece, Complaint No.3/1999; EFEPS v. Italy, Complaint No.4/1999; EFEPS
v. Portugal, Complaint No. 5/1999; Syndicat national des professions du tourisme v. France, Com-
plaint No. 6/1999; Confdration franaise de lEncadrement (CFE) CGC v. France, Complaint
No.9/2000; Tehy ry and STTK ry v. Finland, Complaint No.10/2000; European Council of Police
Trade Unions v. Portugal, Complaint No.11/2001; CFE-CGS v. France, Complaint No. 16/2003;
Confdration gnrale du Travail v. France, Complaint No. 22/2003; Syndicat Occitan de ledu-
cation v. France, Complaint No.23/2003; Syndicat Sud Travail Affaires Sociales v. France, Com-
plaint No.24/2004; Centrale gnrale des services publics (CGSP) v. Belgium, Complaint
No. 25/2004.
15
See International Commission of Jurists v. Portugal, Complaint No.1/1998, Council of
Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 2000, p. 13.
41
session. A report prepared by a member of the Committee selected by the Pres-

ident to be a spokesperson in a particular case serves as the basis for discussion.
IV. Grounds of Collective Complaints
A collective complaint can only be made in the event of an alleged unsat-

isfactory application of the European Social Charter by the authorities of a
Member State (art.1 of the Additional Protocol). Since Member States do not
apply the Charter and are only obliged to abide by the Charters provisions on
the basis of which the Committee of Social Rights formulates European stan-
dards for social and economic rights, the wording used in article1 of the Addi-
tional Protocol should be construed as meaning that a collective complaint may
be lodged, whenever the authorities of Member States fail to fulfil their obliga-
tions arising from the European Social Charter, which they have voluntarily
accepted for implementation. 16 When lodging a collective complaint, the com-
plainant should identify particular provisions of the Charter and indicate in what
respect State authorities have not ensured a satisfactory application thereof (art.4
of the Additional Protocol). Presenting its conclusions, the Committee of Social
Rights has to assess whether or not the Member State concerned has ensured the
satisfactory application of the provision of the Charter, referred to in the com-
plaint art.8 Section 1 of the Additional Protocol. As regards the supervision
over the reports presented by Member States, the Committee of Social Rights
assesses whether labour law and practice in the countries concerned comply with
the European standards set out in the Social Charters of the Council of Europe.
Hence, a collective complaint can be made in the event of the alleged unsatis-
factory application of the provisions of the European Social Charter and of the
standards laid down by the Committee of Social Rights by a Member State.
The allegations made in a collective complaint cannot be of a general
nature. They have to refer to a specific case of unsatisfactory application by a
Member State of a particular provision of the European Social Charter or non-
compliance with a particular European standard laid down by the Committee on
the basis of the Charter. The analysis of the collective complaints examined so
far by the Committee of Social Rights shows that they concern the unsatisfac-
tory application of the following provisions of the European Social Charter: arti-
cle 7(1) (the right of children and young persons to protection) 17, art.5 (the right
to organise) 18, article 6 (the right to bargain collectively) 19, article 1(2) (non-
discrimination as regards the right to work and prohibition of forced labour) 20,
article 10 (the right to vocational training) 21, article 2 (the right to just conditions
16
Cf. Harris and Darcy, op. cit., supra n. 10, p. 360.
17
Complaint No.1/1998.
18
Complaints No.2/1999, No.3/1999, No.4/1999, No.5/1999, No.11/2001, No.12/2002.
19
Complaints No.2/1999, No.4/1999, No. 5/1999, No. 9/2000, No.11/2001, No.16/2003.
20
Complaints No.6/1999, No.7/2000, No.8/2000.
42
of work) 22, article 2(4) (the right to work in safe conditions) 23, article 4 (the right
to a fair remuneration) 24, article 27 (the right of workers with family responsi-
bilities to equal opportunities and equal treatment) 25, article 15 (the right of per-
sons with disabilities to independence, social integration and participation in the
life of the community) 26, article 17 (the right of children and young persons to
social, legal and economic protection) 27. Collective complaints include some
allegations of violation of certain economic and social rights guaranteed in the
above-mentioned provisions of the European Social Charter against public
authorities of certain Member States of the Council of Europe. Collective com-
plaints can be made for the benefit of all citizens (not only employees and per-
sons having social insurance) of a particular Member State which, while intro-
ducing regulations with regard to a particular social group, does not abide by the
provisions of the Social Charters or does not comply with the standards set on
the basis of the Charters. A review of the complaints examined by the Commit-
tee of Social Rights shows that collective complaints can be made for the bene-
fit of children, young persons, families, disabled persons, persons deprived by
the State of their right to organise and organisations deprived by the State of their
right to bargain collectively. The terms used in the Additional Protocol of 1995
suggest that a collective complaint can be made to protect the interests and rights
of a particular community. As construed in the Additional Protocol of 1995, the
admission of a complaint as a collective complaint does not exclude the possi-
bility to identify persons for whom the complaint has been made. The Commit-
tee of Social Rights admits the possibility of making a complaint on behalf of
employees of a particular establishment, as in the case of employees of the
British Governmental Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) an organiza-
tion responsible for intelligence, security and military communication systems
deprived of the right to organise guaranteed in article 5 of the European Social
Charter. 28 Another specific social group, in respect of which the Committee of
Social Rights considered a collective complaint admissible, was a group of Nor-
wegian workers employed in the oil drilling industry and nurses working on the
drilling platforms, who had been obliged to submit a collective dispute for set-
tlement by a social arbitration body before they could decide to go on strike,
which constitutes a violation of article 6(4) of the European Social Charter. 29
22
Complaints No. 9/2000, No.16/2003.
23
24
Complaints No. 9/2000, No. 16/2003, No.17/2003, No.18/2003, No.19/2003, No.20/2003.
25
26
27
Complaints No.13/2002, No.14/2003.
28
Conclusions XI-1, p.80.
29
Conclusions XII-1, p.130; Conclusions XIII-1, p.158.
43
V. Formal requirements of collective complaint proceedings
A collective complaint is addressed to the Secretary General of the Coun-

cil of Europe. The Additional Protocol requires the Secretary General to
acknowledge receipt of the complaint, to notify the Member State concerned and
to immediately forward the complaint to the Committee of Social Rights (art.5).
Formal requirements for making collective complaints have been laid down in
the Rules of Procedure of the Committee of Social Rights. 30 A collective com-
plaint has to be made in writing, in one of the two official languages of the Coun-
cil of Europe (English or French) and signed by a person authorised to represent
the entity that is entitled to lodge collective complaints.
The fact that the case is pending before other authorities or that a judgment
has already been passed (res judicata) does not constitute any formal impedi-
ment to the examination of a complaint. There is no time limit, the lapse of
which, in the case of individual complaints, results in the loss of right to demand
certain benefits. A collective complaint can be lodged even when not all legal
remedies have been exhausted before domestic state authorities. The ne bis in
idem principle (prohibition against double jeopardy) does not apply in the case
of collective complaints, either. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe has clearly stated that a collective complaint may be declared admissi-
ble by the Committee of Social rights, even if a similar case has already been
submitted to another national or international body. The cases on the violation
of the right to organise are dealt with by the ILOs Committee on Freedom of
Association and by the Committee of Social Rights of the Council of Europe.
Making a complaint in one of these institutions does not exclude the possibility
to refer for legal opinion on domestic legislation concerning collective labour
law and common practice in this respect to another institution authorised to
assess the compliance of national collective labour law with the international
standards laid down in ILO Convention No. 87 (art.2) and the Social Charters of
the Council of Europe (art.5). The examination of a collective complaint, sub-
ject to the provisions of the Additional Protocol of 1995, is also possible when
the Committee of Social Rights had already presented its opinion on the subject
in the course of its regular supervision based on reports submitted by the
authorities of Member States concerning compliance with the provisions of the
Social Charters and with the European standards on labour law and social insur-
ance laid down on the basis of these Charters. Other, less rigorous standards are
set by the ILO a global organisation, the members of which often vary con-
siderably as regards the level of economic, technological, social and cultural
development. The standards established by the Council of Europe, whose
Member States all come from the same continent, are definitely more stringent.
30
The legal basis for the Rules of Procedure is to be found in the provisions of articles 24
and 25 of the European Social Charter as amended by the Amending Protocol of 1991; see Euro-
pean Social Charter Collected texts, op.cit., supra n.7, p. 189.
44
The Committee of Social Rights has two roles: first, it acts as a body setting
the standards and supervising the compliance with these standards. Secondly, it
is empowered to examine collective complaints lodged against authorities of
Member States which do not comply with the standards concerning the protec-
tion of social and economic rights. As a supervisory body, the Committee mon-
itors the situation in Member States and its evaluation is mainly based on the
reports submitted by the authorities of the States concerned. In the case of col-
lective complaint proceedings, a different approach is followed. Legal environ-
ment and common practice as regards the compliance with the provisions of the
Social Charters of the Council of Europe and with the relevant European stan-
dards are assessed on the basis of a collective complaint. Proceedings initiated
by an entity entitled to lodge collective complaints is of contradictory nature.
Every party has to present statements and evidence in support of the allegations
made in a collective complaint (presented by the complaining party) and in the
response to the allegations (presented by the authorities of the State against
which the complaint is made). If a collective complaint is made by national
employers organisations, national trade unions and national or international
NGOs, the Committee of Social Rights has to notify through the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe the international employers organisations
and trade unions referred to in art. 27(2) of the European Social Charter of the
proceedings and invite them to submit their observations on the subject and to
consider the stand expressed by the organisation acting in the collective com-
plaint proceedings as amici curiae.
The specific quasi-judicial role of the Committee of Social Rights results
from a lack of any formal impediments to the examination of the case already
examined or currently being examined by another organisation or by the Com-
mittee itself. This role is further attested by the limited formalization of the pro-
ceedings and the non-binding character of the Committees conclusions.
VI. Collective Complaint Proceedings
Unlike in the case of proceedings before the ILOs Committee on Freedom

of Association, the Committee of Social Rights may examine a collective com-
plaint during a hearing with the participation of the parties. The decision on the
form of examination is made by the Committee in a plenary session. The Com-
mittee decides to proceed with the participation of the parties whenever it
believes that such procedure is necessary. The hearing enables the Committee
to establish the facts which cannot be established on the basis of the procedural
writs and documents. Hearings are open to the public. They are held in the court-
room of the European Court of Human Rights. The Parties and their representa-
tives put forwards their arguments and offer additional explanations. The right
to present arguments during the hearing is also given to organisations acting as
amici curiae.
45
The proceedings of the Committee of Social Rights are concluded with the
adoption of the Committees a report. The findings of the Committee of Social
Rights are presented to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and
to the parties. On the basis of the report and findings of the Committee of Social
Rights, the Committee of Ministers passes a resolution or a recommendation. A
resolution on the compliance of domestic labour and social insurance legislation
with the Social Charters of the Council of Europe is passed by a simple major-
ity vote of the Committee of Ministers. A recommendation concerning the unsat-
isfactory application of one of the two Social Charters of the Council of Europe
requires a qualified majority of two-thirds of those voting. The report of the
Committee of Social Rights accompanied by the resolution or recommendation
of the Committee of Ministers is forwarded to the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe and to the parties engaged in the collective complaint.
The Committee of Ministers is not bound by the conclusions of the report
prepared by the Committee of Social Rights. In the case International Commis-
sion of Jurists v. Portugal, 31 the Committee of Ministers adopted a resolution
approving the report of the Committee of Social Rights, which concluded that
the authorities of Portugal unsatisfactorily applied article 7 of the European
Social Charter although, pursuant to article 9(1) of the Additional Protocol of
1995, it should have adopted a recommendation stating the unsatisfactory appli-
cation of the European Social Charter. 32
The authorities of the Member State against which a collective complaint
is lodged have the right to request the Committee of Ministers to consult the
Governmental Committee of the Council of Europe before adopting a recom-
mendation. An opinion of the Governmental Committee is required when the
report of the Committee of Social Rights raises some new issues, or when the
qualified majority of the Committee of Ministers so decides (art.9(2) of the
Additional Protocol). The new issues, which require the Committee of Minis-
ters to consult the Governmental Committee, may be legal issues which have not
been dealt with by the Committee of Social Rights within the framework of reg-
ular supervision. The Governmental Committee, composed of representatives of
Member States is a political body. The Committee of Ministers is also political
in nature. An additional political body in the proceedings contributes to a bal-
anced assessment of the findings of the Committee of Social Rights. Although
the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers are not biding upon the
Member States of the Council of Europe, the authorities of the States against
which proceedings have been initiated consider that the Governmental Com-
mittee should participate in the proceedings to counterbalance the legal evalua-
tion of the Committee of Social Rights with a political opinion.
31
Complaint No.1/1998, op.cit., supra n.15.
32
See Harris and Darcy, op.cit., supra n.10, pp. 366-367.
46
VII. Conclusions
The Committee of Social Rights is not a judicial body. It does not deal with
any individual complaints concerning instances of violation of the provisions of
the European Social Charters by the Member States of the Council of Europe.
As regards collective complaints, the Committee does not adjudicate. It gathers
information and adopts a reasoned position, whenever an authorized entity
lodges a complaint against a Member State which has ratified the Additional Pro-
tocol of 1995 and has thus submitted its national labour and social insurance leg-
islation and practice to the supervision and assessment of an independent inter-
national body. The procedure for the examination of collective complaints
follows the pattern of similar international judicial bodies competent to hear
complaints in matters of labour and social security law. Hence, the view that the
Committee of Social Rights plays a quasi-judicial role seems justified. This role
is supplementary to the main function of the Committee, which is to serve as an
international body established to set European standards with regard to labour
and social insurance legislation and to supervise the compliance of the Member
States of the Council of Europe with the provisions of the European Social Char-
ter of 1961, the Revised Social Charter of 1996 and of the standards set on the
basis of those Charters. The Committee of Social Rights and its predecessor, the
Committee of Independent Experts, is sometimes regarded as a body less influ-
ential than the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court
of Human Rights the bodies supervising the compliance of the Member States
of the Council of Europe with the provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights 33. The criticism is voiced mostly on grounds of effectiveness. 34
The Committee of Social Rights as an independent, professional body does not
pronounce any binding judgments. It presents its view on technical aspects, and
is subject to the political control of the Governmental Committee and of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The quasi-judicial role of the
Committee of Social Rights does not influence the number of collective com-
plaints examined by this body of the Council of Europe. As of 30 June 2005, the
Committee had received 31 collective complaints for examination. 35 As the
number of Member States which decide to ratify the Additional Protocol of 1995
33
See Ph. Alston and J. Crawford, The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, New York 2000; M.C.R. Craven, The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights A Perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press,
Oxford 2002; R.R.Churchill and U. Khaliq, The Collective Complaints System of the European
Social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social
Rights?, European Journal of International Law, vol.15, 2004, p. 417.
34
SeeL. Betten, International Labour Law Selected Issues, Kluwer, Boston 1993, pp. 416-
417; T. Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike A Comparative Study
of Standards Set by the International Labour Organization, the Council of Europe and the Euro-
pean Union, Oxford Monographs on Labour Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 212.
35
The Committee examined one collective complaint in 1998, five in 1999, four in 2000,
one in 2001, two in 2002, ten in 2003 and five in 2004.
47
increases, the working methods of the Committee of Social Rights will also
change. The reports of Member States will be progressively replaced by collec-
tive complaints lodged by social partners active in the national or international
arena and by the INGOs included in the list drawn up by the Council of Europe.
The role and nature of the Committee will necessarily evolve as well. The Com-
mittee will ultimately be transformed from a supervisory body monitoring the
compliance with the provisions of the Charters to a judicial body.
Discussion
Jean-Maurice Verdier * Jaimerais faire un peu le rapport avec linter-

vention de M. Dine sur les procdures spciales. Jai eu loccasion de faire ce
que lon appelle des visites sur place dans le cadre du contrle rgulier de la
commission dexperts. Je crois quun des gros problmes du contrle, tant
donn que la sanction nest quune sanction dappel lopinion publique, il faut
bien le dire, cest le problme de lapplication pratique. M. Dine a eu raison
dinsister sur le suivi des rapports spciaux et, par consquent, dans le cadre du
rapport rgulier, de limportance du suivi qui est prvu par le rapport rgulier
puisquil y a des rapports priodiques. Ce qui ma intress, cest que M. Dine
a mis laccent sur les visites sur place et mme les visites de suivi. Je pense que
ce serait peut-tre un exemple suivre dans le cadre du contrle rgulier sur les
rapports priodiques.
Jai eu lexprience suivante quand je suis all dans un de ces pays, accom-
pagn dun fonctionnaire du bureau. Je suis rentr trs satisfait, ainsi que le fonc-
tionnaire, parce quon avait fait des engagements par crit avec les autorits qui
avaient commis des violations aux droits de lhomme graves (tous les syndical-
istes taient mis en prison, tous leurs emplois taient perdus, dans le priv aussi
bien que dans le public, etc.). On prend des engagements prcis avec un calen-
drier dans lequel on note ce que lon vient de dire et cela est constat par la com-
mission dexperts. Pendant quinze jours, trois semaines, on fait quelques petites
actions paravent et puis plus rien. Autrement dit, on a fait un cinma formi-
dable, comme on dit en franais. Un beau film. Un cinma formidable, avec des
runions, rassemblant des ministres, des syndicalistes, etc., les engagements sont
pris et puis plus rien ne se passe. Je ne sais pas o cela en est actuellement, mais
je sais que pendant les deux ou trois annes qui ont suivi, la commission sest
borne constater que cela nvoluait pas. Cest l o je pense quil serait
intressant de faire des visites de suivi. Pas seulement des visites sur place
comme la commission a lhabitude de le faire mais des visites de suivi parce que
je pense que lon ne peut pas, la seconde visite, refaire le mme cinma
quavant. Faire du cinma cela est possible une fois, cest beaucoup plus diffi-
cile de le refaire aprs.
* Ancien membre de la Commission dexperts (1974 -2001).
48
Kari Tapiola To react to what Professor Verdier has just said, we all know
that there are places where we are liable to be shown what he called the cinma
formidable. I can think of one country, in particular, where we have seen the
same film over and over again, and then the Conference Committee was not con-
vinced and asked us to actually specify to the Governing Body what Article 33
of the Constitution would mean. So we had a reversal of the situation. We were
no longer invited to come to the country but the country decided to send a high-
level delegation here to make their presentation which we might say was a
prsentation formidable, but at least the process had led to reaction.
If we look at some of the most difficult cases that we have, we need to be
sufficiently sceptical but on the other hand we also need to see where we can try
to keep on the engagement and if it is not for any other purpose, after all the
commission of enquiry at the time was not allowed to go to Poland it might
well be just for the sake of maintaining a presence and an opening. After all, sit-
uations change, and then you need a model, something that can be followed up
in that country. If we cannot produce anything else, I would say we should still
try to articulate a response so that, if and when the country is politically ready,
if and when it decides to fulfil its obligations properly, some groundwork be
readily available. The experience of South Africa is a case in point.
The Conference Committee decided last year that with respect to 19 indi-
vidual cases of non-compliance its recommendations should be followed up by
missions, and it seems that in most of those missions the discussion was gen-
uine. This is an approach that we have to develop further even though the danger
of a cinma formidable always exists.
Tom Etty * My question relates to something which has been said by

Mr. Tapiola about the strength and the quality of what he called the quasi-judicial
output of the Committee of Experts. The point is that the legitimacy of the
Committee of Experts and the reason why very few people would be prepared
to criticise it is the undisputed quality of its members, their impartiality, their
independence, their objectivity that is a mantra which we repeat year after year,
and quite rightly, in the Conference Committee. We should not forget, however,
that there is another body in the ILO that also produces case-law, that is the Com-
mittee on Freedom of Association, which is not composed of legal experts. It is
composed of government representatives, trade union representatives and
employers representatives and therefore it is more of a political body. Interest-
ingly enough, despite the fact that this latter body is not truly legal, my impres-
sion is that the case law it produces remains also unchallenged. How is this to
be explained?
Kari Tapiola The Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has the

habit of referring the legislative aspects of a case to the Committee of Experts
* Adviser, International Affairs, Netherlands Trade Union Confederation (FNV).
49
but the Committee on Freedom of Association, as you said, does have a broader
view of the situation. If I would have gone into discussing case-law in general,
I would have integrated more comments on the Committee on Freedom of Asso-
ciation but I think that we have in-built mechanisms to ensure that we do not end
in a situation where the conclusions of these two Committees are contradictory
which would, of course, be unfortunate.
In line with the logic of the system, the legitimacy of the Committee of
Experts comes from independence and expert knowledge, whereas the legiti-
macy of the Committee on Freedom of Association comes from its tripartite
nature, in other words the fact that you have employers and workers represen-
tatives who are there in an expert capacity. It is worth noting that the CFA does
not reach a conclusion unless it is a unanimous one. This, of course, gives
remarkable legitimacy to these issues which are in the core mandate of the Orga-
nization. This interaction between expertise and representativeness has always
been instrumental, including during the debate that led to the establishment of
the Committee of Experts. There is this constant need to find the balance
between the tripartite functioning of the Organization, the preparatory work that
is being done by the Office and the independent expertise that gives the touch of
excellence to this work.
Angelika Nussberger * With reference to the latest developments in the

Strasbourg system of protection of social rights, it is particularly interesting the
emphasis given to the role of NGOs. It is indeed striking that the European Com-
mittee of Social Rights can even use the court room of the European Court of
Human Rights for its deliberations. The ILO has of course its own long-estab-
lished tradition of tripartism but there is also a different form of bringing in the
civil society. So, the collective complaint procedure introduced within the Coun-
cil of Europe might be seen as a forerunner of similar arrangements to be
adopted elsewhere.
Abdul Koroma ** Is the European Social Charter not enforceable domes-

tically because, if I understood well what Professor Swiatkowski said, there are
some 40,000 pending complaints or cases only 36 of which have come before
the Committee.
Andrzej Marian Swiatikowski Concerning the figure of 40,000 cases, this

is the average number of individual cases pending on an annual basis before the
European Court of Human Rights. As regards the application of the European
Social Charter in domestic jurisdiction, the Charter is considered to be a legal
source in Member States but there is ongoing debate as to whether national
constitutional courts are bound by the findings of the European Committee of
* Professor of Law, University of Cologne, Germany; Member, ILO Committee of Experts.

** Judge, International Court of Justice; Member, ILO Committee of Experts.
50
Social Rights. As far as the relationship between the European Committee of

Social Rights and the European Court of Human Rights is concerned, the only
area of overlap is the right to organize, or freedom of association, under Article
5 of the European Social Charter and Article 11 of the European Convention on
Human Rights respectively.
Yozo Yokota * My specific question is addressed to Mr. Tapiola who

started by saying that one should be secretive about happiness and success. In
my experience of four years in the ILO Committee of Experts, I think I found
one good thing about the Committee and we have been keeping it secret and that
is the Secretariat. I am sure all Committee members agree that our function
cannot be fully carried out without the good services of the Secretariat and it is
true that we have benefited from an excellent support from the International
Labour Standards Department. Reverting to my question, many of the comments
we put in our report relate to the provision of further information or copies of
legislative texts and court decisions. At the same time, I understand that there are
regional or country-specific ILO offices throughout the world but I have not
encountered in reading all the documents any direct contacts between those
offices and the governments concerned so that instead of repeating every year
requests for the dispatch of documents we could use more effectively our local
resources to remind governments and eventually collect and transmit the neces-
sary information. The work of the Committee would be tremendously facilitated
but this involves the secretarial support of not only the Standards Department but
of other departments as well and I am not sure whether this is feasible or advisable.
Kari Tapiola Thanks for your nice words to the Secretariat. We some-
times tend to like to keep it a secret also because we seem to be confronted with
governments who think that basically the Secretariat writes all the texts and the
different supervisory bodies simply put their stamp on them. As you all know,
this is not the case. On the other hand, if one carefully looks at the Constitution,
the fact that the Director-General has to present the summary of the reports actu-
ally legitimizes a role for the Secretariat which is an argument that we some-
times need to recall.
The direction we are going to is to try to engage our field structure much
more in the supervisory process and engage it in an integrated way. What we are
doing, of course, through our standard specialists in the field is that they are
involved in the follow-up and in many cases they assist governments with their
reporting obligations. But this brings us back to what I said earlier that if we go
really into technical cooperation then we cannot do it with that part of the Sec-
retariat that deals with the standards issues alone. We need full involvement and
this is where the approach of comprehensive decent work country programmes
is important.
* Professor , Chuo Law School, Japan; Member, ILO Committee of Experts.
51
The ILO Committee of Experts
in pictures (1926-1959)
ILO Governing Body, 33rd session, Geneva, 14-16 October 1926
Mr. Paul Tschoffen (Belgium) Mr. William Rappard (Switzerland)

Member of the ILO Committee Member of the ILO Committee
of Experts (1927-1961) of Experts (1927-1958)
55
CEACR, 29th session, Geneva, CEACR, 29th session, Geneva,

6-18 April 1959 6-18 April 1959
(left to right): Mr. Gnther Beitzke (left to right):
(Federal Republic of Germany) and Mr. Paul Tschoffen (Belgium) and
Mr. Isaac Forster (Senegal) Mr. Paul M. Herzog (United States)
Mr. Paal Berg (Norway) Ms. G. J. Stemberg (Netherlands)

56
The ILO Committee of Experts in pictures (1926-1959)
CEACR, 29th session, Geneva, 6-18 April 1959

(foreground): Mr. C. Wilfred Jenks, Principal Deputy Director-General and
Mr. Nicolas Valticos, Chief of the International Labour Standards Division,
in the gardens of the old ILO building (Center William Rappard).
CEACR, 29th session, Geneva,

6-18 April 1959
(left to right):
Professor Henri Batiffol (France),
Baron Frederik van Asbeck (Nethelands),
Mr. Paul Ruegger (Switzerland)
57
The Committee of Experts in session, April 1959

Chairperson: Mr. Paul Tschoffen (Belgium)
Reporter: Mr. Harold Stewart Kirkaldy (United Kingdom)
Sir Grantley Adams (Barbados) Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar (India)

58
CEACR, 29th session, 6-18 April 1959

in front of the old ILO building (Center William Rappard)
1. Mr. Paul TSCHOFFEN (Belgium), Chairman of the Committee

2. Mr. Afonso Rodrigues QUEIRO (Portugal)
3. Mr. Enrique GARCA SAYN (Peru)
4. Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar (India)
5. Mr. C. Wilfred JENKS, Principal Deputy Director-General
6. Mr. Isaac FORSTER (Senegal)
7. Mr. Choucri CARDAHI (Lebanon)
8. Mr. Harold Stewart KIRKALDY (United Kingdom), Reporter of the Committee
9. Mr. Nicolas VALTICOS, Chief, International Labour Standards Division
10. Mr. Isidoro RUIZ MORENO (Argentina)
11. Mr. Paul M. HERZOG (United States)
12. Mr. Gnther BEITZKE (Federal Republic of Germany)
13. Baron Frederik VAN ASBECK (Netherlands)
14. Mr. Paul RUEGGER (Switzerland)
15. Mr. Henri BATTIFOL (France)
16. Sir Grantley ADAMS (Barbados)
17. Mr. Max SRENSEN (Denmark)
59
II.
Rethinking methods,
evaluating impact
Issues and dilemmas
Friday, 24 November 2006 Afternoon session
Promoting compliance now and then:

Mobilizing shame or building partnerships?
Christine Chinkin *
The invitation from the organisers invites me to address the various modes
of supervising or ensuring compliance with human rights obligations and to
consider the merits or otherwise of mechanisms that are used primarily to induce
compliance through shame and partnerships that may be formed to foster com-
pliance. In this brief presentation, I first survey some of the existing methods
of UN human rights monitoring processes and then consider some issues of
compliance.
Before the evolution of what we now think of as the international human
rights system, the League of Nations pioneered methods for the supervision of
human rights obligations through the mandate, for example through such meth-
ods as the annual reporting system, 1 and individual petitions. 2 In the same era
the ILOs wide range of innovative supervisory mechanisms laid the foundations
for the UN human rights processes for promoting compliance: 3 periodic state
reporting, complaints procedures, fact-finding commissions of inquiry, direct
contacts between ILO and government representatives, and the possibility of
recourse to the Permanent Court of International Justice, subsequently the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ). Some of these same methods and their underly-
ing rationales have been incorporated into the UN human rights procedures.
* Professor of International Law, London School of Economics and Political Science.

1
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations required mandatory powers to submit
an annual report to the League Council.
2
In its advisory opinion concerning the International Status of South-West Africa, the ICJ
noted that the right of petition was not mentioned in the League Covenant or the Mandate for South-
West Africa, but was organized by a decision of the Council of the League; see ICJ Reports (1950).
3
See V. Leary, The International Labour Organization, in P. Alston (ed.), The United
Nations and Human Rights (Oxford), 1992.
63
Through a mixture of treaty obligation and opt-in requirements within the

human rights treaty body system there are provisions for state reporting, inter-
state complaint, individual complaint, inquiry and visitation. The objectives of
such supervisory processes are mixed and include offering authoritative guid-
ance on the meaning of international obligations, the prevention of violations,
and ensuring prompt and effective responses when violations occur. 4
International supervisory mechanisms also look forward to prevention of viola-
tions by seeking to identify obstacles to compliance and offering practical or
technical assistance. They allow for the mediation of international standards at
the national level so as to facilitate compliance for the benefit of the individuals
subjects of the system.
These objectives emphasise mediatory and cooperative rather than con-
frontational and shaming techniques. They appear to be based upon a belief that
the best way to ensure initial and continued participation in the human rights
treaty regime and compliance with its obligations is to assume political will and
that what is needed is expert assistance in giving it effect, for example through
capacity building. There are a number of instances of this non-confrontational
approach. Underlying the single procedure applicable to all UN treaty bodies
the state reporting system are the concepts of self-evaluation and constructive
dialogue. The human rights treaty bodies do not have the coercive weight of the
Security Council behind them, as do other committees to which States must
report such as sanctions committees and the Counter Terrorism Committee. 5 The
more confrontational process of inter-state complaint has never been used at the
global level 6 and rarely do States make formal objections to another States
reservations, despite the inroads made by reservations into the integrity of a
treaty text. Where individual complaint is allowed it leads only to recommenda-
tions and only recently has there been any requirement that States indicate their
response to any such recommendations.
The same is true of the UN Charter-based mechanisms. It was not until the
late 1960s that ECOSOC provided for any form of investigatory procedure
before the State-based Commission on Human Rights. Even after the introduc-
tion of the 1503 and 1235 procedures the potential for naming and shaming
through outcomes such as condemnatory resolutions and the mandating of coun-
try-specific rapporteurs has been limited by political realities. There have been
contradictory signals as to the effectiveness of condemnation, with States on the
one hand purporting not to be shamed by adverse statements but on the other
4
See Concept Paper on the High Commissioners Proposal for a Unified Treaty Body, UN
Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2, 22 March 2006, para. 3.
5
The Counter Terrorism Committee was established by SC Res. 1373, 28 September 2001.
6
The Democratic Republic of the Congo unsuccessfully argued the Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, article 29 (1), as a basis for jurisdic-
tion in its case against Rwanda; see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Applica-
tion: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ
Reports (2006).
64
Promoting compliance now and then: Mobilizing shame or building partnerships?
going to considerable lengths to see off any attempt at a condemnatory resolu-

tion, or at least to ensure diluted language. The need for thematic rapporteurs to
seek consent for access to state territory also places some premium on diplomacy
and negotiation. Joint reports by special rapporteurs, members of working
groups and Secretary-General special representatives, such as those into the con-
dition of detainees in Guantanamo Bay (2006) 7 and conditions in Lebanon and
Israel (2006), 8 are an innovative move away from the model of single-authored
reports. In the former the experts rejected the US conditions for visiting the
detention facilities and produced a hard-hitting and non-compromising report
that was predictably rejected by the US as largely without merit. 9 Conclusions
and recommendations agreed in joint reports may have greater authority and thus
more potential for inducing shame, although it must be admitted that this has not
transpired in either of these instances. They also provide a practical example of
combining different mandates so as to address together violations of both eco-
nomic and social rights and civil and political rights, an integrative approach that
has been at the core of ILO activity from the outset.
The politicization of the Commission on Human Rights contributed to its
demise in 2006. 10 However, the language of the General Assembly Resolution
adopting the Human Rights Council 11 is also that of conciliation and negotiation,
preserving the position that persuasion and assistance are the most effective keys
to human rights compliance. Thus the Council will promote human rights
through education, learning and advisory services, technical assistance and
capacity building, all to be provided in consultation with and with the consent
of the Member State concerned. This implies cooperation, working together to
achieve a common object. The projected universal periodic review intended to
ensure that no State will be able to avoid being called to account is designed
as a cooperative mechanism based on interactive dialogue and consideration
7
See UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120, 15 February 2006. The report on Guantanamo Bay was
made by the special rapporteurs on independence of judges and lawyers, torture, cruel inhuman and
degrading treatment, freedom of religion or belief, and health. They were joined by the chairper-
son of the working group on arbitrary detention.
8
The Lebanon and Israel mission was carried out by the special rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions; the special rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the representative of the Secretary-
General on the human rights of internally displaced persons; and the special rapporteur on adequate
housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living; see UN Doc. A/HRC/2/7,
2 October 2006.
9
BBC News, 16 February 2006.
10
In the words of Kofi Annan: the Commissions capacity to perform its tasks has been
increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism. In particular, States have
sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves
against criticism or to criticize others. As a result, a credibility deficit has developed, which casts
a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole; see In Larger Freedom:
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the UN Secretary-General,
UN Doc A/59/2005 (2005), para. 182.
11
See GA Res. 60/251, 3 April 2006.
65
given to the states capacity building needs. The Council is answerable to the
General Assembly, not the Security Council.
Two interlocking themes run through these enforcement and monitoring
processes: the first is the concept of working together (partnership) as a means
to promote delivery of human rights obligations and the second is that non-coer-
cive methods (no stronger than mobilizing shame) are the best ways of ensuring
compliance.
Human rights supervisory mechanisms create partnerships between States
and the international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) or expert bodies
that are based on the assumption that they will work together to achieve the
agreed goals. But more broadly partnerships have emerged as the key institu-
tional innovations in the expanding global governance toolbox. 12 We see a range
of different partnerships across international arenas, inter alia partnerships
between the UN and regional organizations in the security field; between the UN
and multinational corporations in the Global Compact; between different spe-
cialized agencies and the human rights treaty bodies; 13 between the different
treaty bodies; and public/private partnerships between INGOs, States and a
range of NGOs and independent contractors across numerous programmes, for
example in delivery of humanitarian assistance and state-building. Such part-
nerships are extolled within the UN system. In the words of former UN Secre-
tary-General, Kofi Annan:
I think it is clear that there is a new diplomacy, where NGOs, peoples from across
nations, international organizations, the Red Cross and governments come together
to pursue an objective. When we do [] this partnership [] is a powerful part-
nership for the future. 14
One of the advantages of partnership is flexibility allowing for a functional,
contextual and pragmatic approach. Accordingly there are many different
models. At one extreme they may be formal, endorsed by UN Security Council
resolution and contractually determined. At the other they may be informal, the
parameters worked out on the ground and variable.
In the specific context of human rights monitoring systems there are a
range of informal partnerships that effectively operate as the glue of the system.
One evident partnership in human rights compliance exists between NGOs and
the treaty bodies. The State reporting system provides the framework for
12
See T. Benner and J. Witte, Everybodys Business: Accountability, Partnerships, and the
Future of Global Governance in S. Stern and E. Seligmann (eds.), The Partnership Principle
New Forms of Governance in the 21st Century (London, Archetype Publishers), 2004 at p. 36.
13
At times this is formalized as is the case with UNICEF and the Committee on the Rights
of the Child, at others it may be informal, functional and have evolved through practice; see Con-
cept Paper, op. cit., supra n. 4, para. 55.
14
NGO Forum on Global Issues, 30 April 1999, cited by W. Pace and J. Schense, The Role
of Non-Governmental Organisations, in A. Cassesse, P. Gaeta and J. Jones, The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press), vol. I, 2002 at p. 105.
66
dialogue between national stakeholders, including government and civil

society, 15 as well as between the State and the treaty body. The many roles of
NGOs in the reporting system are well known, for example through the tech-
niques of shadow or parallel reporting, offering data and comments to assist the
treaty bodies in their questioning of State representatives, meeting informally
with treaty body members and attending the public session. NGO involvement
has to some extent been formalized in some committees through time set aside
for NGOs to make formal statements to the relevant committee or to meet with
members of the Committee. NGOs may seek to ensure that a particular issue is
taken up in the reporting session of a number of different States and thus make
its way into the concluding comments and enhance the normative effect. In such
processes NGOs often form partnerships inter se, that is working together and
networking so as to present a coordinated position, or dividing the work to avoid
duplication of effort and to maximize expertise. 16 NGOs also work with the
Committees in the preparation of general comments or recommendations.
INGOs may also form partnerships with local NGOs, for example to offer train-
ing in the reporting process so as to assist local NGOs in making the greatest use
of the process. A long active example of this has been the work of the Interna-
tional Womens Rights Action Watch (IWRAW) and IWRAW-Pacific in assist-
ing local womens groups to work with the UN Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women. After the issuing of concluding comments,
NGOs can continue communications with the Committee by providing updates
on whether the government has adopted follow-up measures and engage the
local media with reports of the process.
This informal relationship between NGOs and the treaty bodies may how-
ever set up an apparent opposition between the State on the one side and the
committee and NGO community on the other. This appears somewhat at odds
with the aim of the Committee to engage in constructive dialogue with the State
and to assist it in treaty compliance. But NGOs especially national NGOs
have an ongoing relationship with the State and have the greatest stake in human
rights compliance. To be effective international standards and the comments of
international monitoring bodies must be domesticated, translated into local real-
ities and adapted accordingly. 17 One NGO observer has noted that to be effec-
tive an NGO should seek to make strategic demands of governments and then
to follow them up with defined indicators of progress. 18
NGOs thus perform at least two functions in monitoring human rights obli-
gations: they assist the committees in strengthening the effect of the reporting
15
See Concept Paper, op. cit, supra no. 4, para. 8.
16
Human rights treaties typically cover many areas of social and political life and different
NGOs have different areas of expertise.
17
See P. Antrobus, The Global Womens Movement Origins, Issues and Strategies (Zed
Books), 2004 at p. 124.
18
See Faustina Pereira, Monitoring Implementation of CEDAW: A Snapshot of the Ban-
gldesh Experience, paper at Conference on CEDAW, Galway, 2006.
67
process and they seek to further state compliance with the committees recom-
mendations, for example through lobbying and making recommendations for
practical measures for change within national laws and to ensure the interface
between the national and international. There is thus a tripartite relationship
between the State, the treaty body, and the NGO sector. The latter function
ensuring compliance with recommendations has been recognized and institu-
tionalized in other contexts, for example in the strategies addressed jointly to
governments, NGOs and other actors in the international instruments, such as
the Beijing Platform for Action.19 States too recognize that to be effective, effi-
cient and legitimate they must work with other, multisectoral bodies, constitut-
ing what has been termed the global public policy network 20 an integrated and
collaborative approach to governance in accordance with human rights stan-
dards. A further complexity is added at the national level where the State out-
sources services to the private sector, including NGOs. For example, the State
may have been recommended to improve its provision of welfare services within
prisons. One solution may be to encourage NGO assistance in this regard where-
upon the NGO and the State become partners in compliance. Such partnership
may undermine government commitment through a privatization of responsibil-
ity, removing pressure on governments to provide adequate resources to carry
out their own obligations. It also puts the onus on the NGO to ensure that
partnership does not become co-option and collusion, or that by becoming too
closely entwined with government the NGO loses its independence and capac-
ity for critique. Working or functional partnerships must not be allowed to prej-
udice a rules-based system. The dilution of legal principle is a trend that can be
detected in many areas of the international legal system and must not be allowed
to undermine commitment to human rights standards. Similar concerns occur at
the international level and NGOs need to be somewhat cautious of the UNs ini-
tiatives for partnerships. The Development Alternatives with Women for a New
Era (DAWN) expresses a healthy skepticism about the assumed benefits of
partnership:
The Partnerships Initiatives lock NGOs into a very difficult position. On the one
hand they provide opportunity to engage in dialogue [] On the other, they rep-
resent a strategy of control and deliberately gloss over the inequalities in power and
capacity of different actors (NGOs and TNCs); and use NGO participation to legit-
imise the claims to democracy in the neo-liberal models of governance. 21
19
See Fourth World Conference on Women, Platform for Action, 15 September 1995, UN
Doc. A/CONF. 177/20.
20
See J. Witte, C. Streck, T. Benner, The Road from Johannesburg: What Future for Part-
nerships in Global Environmental Governance, available at http://www.globalpublicpolicy.net/
fileadmin/gppi/Road_from_JohSnesburg_Artic.pdf.
21
See Antrobus, op, cit., supra n. 17 at p. 105.
68
Compliance with international legal obligations depends upon many

factors and has been the subject of many studies. 22 Benedict Kingsbury has
suggested that compliance cannot be regarded as a monolithic or freestanding
concept but rather one that derives meaning and utility from different theories of
law. 23 Different approaches to inducing compliance have been explained, for
example punitive, managerial or rewards-based. As stated, the human rights
system tends to work on the assumption that persuasion and technical assistance
are the most effective keys to human rights compliance. NGOs however may not
see it this way and might favour more confrontational means of promoting com-
pliance than so-called constructive dialogue, including mobilization of shame
within the national context (for example through use of the media, parliamen-
tary questions) and recourse to the courts (for example advocacy through inter-
vention in existing litigation or commencing test cases). 24 NGO tactics at dif-
ferent times, or simultaneously, are thus both aimed at pressuring the state
through a shaming process and seeking to assist in the practicalities of compli-
ance. What they must seek is a workable balance between confrontation with
government and a demonstration of a cooperation that seeks to assist in achiev-
ing the required change in national laws and policies and, crucially, in their
implementation.
It is striking, however, that the non-coercive approach to law enforcement
favoured by the UN human rights system contrasts with developments elsewhere
in international law, for example the compulsory jurisdiction under the WTO
Dispute Settlement provisions and the possibility of sanctions for non-compli-
ance, the promotion of accountability through the individual criminal jurisdic-
tion of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ad hoc criminal tribunals,
and the compulsory jurisdiction of regional human rights courts. NGOs have
been instrumental in the establishment of adjudicative processes in international
criminal law and have used them both to combat impunity and for the deterrent
effect that may be gained in mobilizing shame. However, instead of perceiving
criminal trial processes as shameful, defendants may seek to manipulate them to
suggest bias or a witch hunt, as was the case with the proceedings against
Milosevic at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
NGOs have also looked beyond the more obviously human rights-oriented
processes to other procedures. This may be especially useful where there is a gap
in human rights law, for example with respect to the legal responsibility under
22
See, for instance, A. Chayes and A. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with Inter-
national Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press), 1998; D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment
and Compliance The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford Uni-
versity Press), 2000.
23
See B. Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions
of International Law, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 19, 1998, pp. 345-372.
24
There is regular recourse to adjudicative processes within the European and Inter-Amer-
ican human rights systems. Nevertheless friendly settlement is available to the parties; European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, article 38; American
Convention on Human Rights, articles 48 (f) and 49.
69
international law of transnational corporations. An innovative example is the sig-

nificant NGO activism after the hiking of water rates by Bechtel (an American
company) by an average of 50% in a Bolivian town. Bechtel sought compensa-
tion after it had failed to generate its anticipated profits because of public demon-
strations against its policies and commenced arbitration proceedings at the World
Banks International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
against Bolivia. Trade unions, environmental groups, consumer organisations,
research groups and religious bodies joined together in petitioning to participate
in the ICSID hearings (which are held in private). Over a four-year period there
were protests, adverse media reports and demands that the Bechtel bring an end
to the proceedings. Since ICSID proceedings are held in private the potential for
mobilizing shame through reporting about their progress would have been lim-
ited, but the adverse publicity generated by the many protests caused Bechtel to
drop the case. One commentator heralded the outcome as the first time that a
major corporation has ever dropped a major international trade case as a direct
result of global public pressure. 25 The episode suggests ways in which different
arenas can be targeted for human rights direct action.
State failure to comply with human rights obligations occurs not only
through lack of technical expertise. There are many other reasons, for example
reporting fatigue and the complexity of the regulatory framework, or more fun-
damentally because a State favours other cultural, religious or social norms,
regards human rights as unnecessary constraints upon sovereignty, or simply
because it lacks the political will. Non-compliance may not be a technical or bad
faith problem but a political one: substantive disagreement about obligations
incurred by the party accused of non-compliance, 26 or internal political opposi-
tion. In this light naming and shaming by international intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organisations may itself be seen as selective in that it is invari-
ably the South that is named and blamed by the North. Such constructions are
rooted in assumptions of civilised states and the other and may inhibit the
effectiveness of partnerships of equals across States in seeking human rights
compliance.
There are also some intractable States or regimes that simply reject their
human rights obligations, for example apartheid South Africa, the Taliban,
Myanmar. This reality raises the dilemma of whether international bodies (pri-
vate and public) should work with the regime fearing that exclusion and isola-
tion will simply aggravate the abuses suffered by the population, or whether
coercive measures such as sanctions should be introduced in an attempt to
change behaviour. This is the position of the ILO with respect to Myanmar. The
Committee of Experts has been commenting on this situation for over 30 years,
Myanmar has been the subject of condemnation by the Conference Committee
25
See H. Elver, International Environmental Law: Water and the Future, Third World
Quarterly, vol. 27, 2006 at p. 896.
26
See M. Koskenniemi, The Lady Doth Protest Too Much: Kosovo and the Turn to Ethics
in International Law, Modern Law Review, vol. 65, 2002 at p. 165, n. 23.
70
on the Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference, and by

the Governing Body. A Commission of Inquiry has reported on its flagrant con-
tinuing breaches of standards relating to forced labour. 27 The Governing Body
has previously indicated that effective dialogue and cooperation should be
undertaken with the Government, although it must be asked whether this can
ever be appropriate when there has been a blatant disregard of condemnatory
findings, a refusal to be shamed and indeed an expressed determination to pros-
ecute as terrorists those who complain of being subjected to forced labour. Arti-
cle 29 of the ILO Constitution envisages the possibility of the referral of a com-
plaint to the ICJ, whose decision shall be final (Article 31). In November 2006,
delegates to the Governing Body expressed their great frustration at the lack of
any progress in dealing with complaints of forced labour in Myanmar. They
decided upon an agenda item at the March 2007 session of the Governing Body
to enable it to move on legal options, including involving the International Court
of Justice. 28 However, with the exception of individual criminal responsibility,
the effectiveness of even such greater coercive action as international adjudica-
tion rests upon the hope that the State will respond to being named and shamed
in this way. The example of the Israeli Security Wall case 29 where the ICJ
strongly affirmed Israel to be in violation of its human rights obligations in the
occupied territories shows the weaknesses of this procedure when the affected
State rejects the judicial opinion.
This discussion has focused on partnerships within the UN human rights
institutional frameworks. Perhaps we should also be thinking more widely about
partnerships across the human rights field as occurs, in the security field where
for example NATO and the African Union work with the UN or with each other.
There is cross-fertilisation between the global and regional human rights insti-
tutions with respect to substance, for example through drawing upon the
jurisprudence of each other and through joint participation by personnel from
the various bodies in seminars and workshops. But could these informal rela-
tionships be extended to more formal working partnerships or are there reasons
why such arrangements might be undesirable?
There is no simple binary distinction between compliance and non-com-
pliance as international practice is fluid, variable and contextual. 30 Concepts of
compliance depend upon understandings of the relations between law, behav-
iour, objectives and justice. Further, violations of human rights are rarely
straight-forward but bring together complex issues of political and cultural
27
See Forced labour in Myanmar (Burma), Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed
under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the obser-
vance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Geneva, 2 July 1998.
28
See ILO Press release, 17 November 2006; ILO/06/53.
29
See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (2004).
30
See Kingsbury, op. cit., supra n. 23 at p. 346.
71
self-determination, economic restructuring and long histories of various forms

of intervention which all compromise commitment to universal standards. Meth-
ods such as the world travelling notion advanced by Isabelle Gunning, 31 or the
cross-cultural dialogue advocated by Abdullah An-Naim, 32 that rest on mutual
communication in an attempt to achieve understandings of the root problems
may in the long term be more effective than coercive responses such as sanc-
tions. Nor can there be a dichotomy between mobilizing shame or building part-
nerships but rather different strategies should continue to be engaged in differ-
ent contexts so as to benefit as much as possible from the diversity and flexibility
offered by coordinated action between UN agencies and the private sector.
31
See I. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The
Case of Female Genital Surgeries, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, vol. 23, 1991-1992 at
p. 189.
32
See A. An-Naim, State Responsibility to Change Religious and Customary Laws in
R. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women National and International Perspectives, 1995, pp. 178-181.
72
Duplication des travaux,
superposition des normes, engagements
diffus: o sont les limites?
Emmanuel Decaux *
En tant que membre de la Sous-Commission, un organe subsidiaire qui

vient de tenir sa 58e session en aot dernier et sans doute son ultime session du
moins dans sa forme actuelle, puisque son organe suprieur a disparu je suis
particulirement sensible cette invitation de participer un colloque interna-
tional clbrant le 80e anniversaire de la Commission dexperts de lOIT. Au-
del de ladmiration naturelle pour la continuit des efforts de gnrations de
juristes je pense notamment au nom de Georges Scelle qui a si profondment
marqu la doctrine franaise, mais aussi dautres grands internationalistes
comme Roberto Ago nous avons des leons tirer sagissant du dveloppe-
ment et de la coordination des mcanismes internationaux de contrle. Rien de
durable ne se fait sans une volution cratrice, marque par la fidlit aux origi-
nes et aux principes, mais aussi une vitalit permanente, propice aux innovations
et aux adaptations ncessaires. L o la SdN avait sombr, corps et me, lOIT
a su renatre, forte des valeurs partages de la Dclaration de Philadelphie.
Mais le systme international de protection des droits de lhomme mis en
place en 1945 na lui-mme cess de se dvelopper de manire de plus en plus
complexe. Le nouvel ordre international fond sur la Charte des Nations Unies
a eu limmense mrite de consacrer luniversalit et lindivisibilit des droits de
lhomme pour tous. Pour autant le tableau actuel est caractris par la diver-
sification, la fragmentation, voire lmiettement
Lindivisibilit est remise en cause par la diversification des gnrations
des droits de lhomme selon une doctrine qui me semble elle-mme date, mais
* Professeur lUniversit Panthon Assas (Paris II); membre de la Sous-Commission de

la promotion et de la protection des droits de lhomme des Nations Unies.
73
surtout errone et dangereuse. La distinction vulgarise par Karel Vasak a certes

les vertus de la simplicit pdagogique et de la correction politique, en opposant
la premire gnration avec les droits civils et politiques des dmocraties
occidentales, la deuxime gnration avec les droits sociaux des dmocraties
populaires et la troisime gnration, avec des droits de solidarit inhrents
au Tiers monde 1. Mais elle nglige lhistoire interne propre chaque Etat et plus
encore lhistoire du droit international, puisque le droit humanitaire est apparu
au milieu du XIXe sicle, le droit international du travail en 1919, et le droit inter-
national des droits de lhomme partir de 1945. Enfin, elle introduit une slec-
tivit perverse, comme si les Etats pouvait exceller dans une catgorie de droits,
tout en ngligeant ou en bafouant les droits dune autre gnration. Fort heu-
reusement, les grands textes onusiens, depuis la Charte de 1945 et la Dclara-
tion universelle des droits de lhomme de 1948, notamment loccasion de la
confrence de Thran de 1968 et de la confrence de Vienne de 1993, nont de
cesse de rappeler le caractre indivisible et interdpendant de tous les droits de
lhomme.
Luniversalit se trouve elle-mme confronte la multiplication des sys-
tmes rgionaux. Certes ces systmes sinscrivent le plus souvent dans le droit
fil des principes universels, mais par l force des choses des variantes ne man-
quent pas de stablir entre les diffrents modles qui se dveloppent. L
encore la Dclaration de Vienne a prsent une synthse particulirement nces-
saire: Sil convient de ne pas perdre de vue limportance des particularismes
nationaux et rgionaux et la diversit historique, culturelle et religieuse, il est
du devoir des Etats, quel quen soit le systme politique, conomique et cultu-
rel, de promouvoir et de protger tous les droits de lhomme et toutes les liber-
ts fondamentales (I, 5) 2. Reste que la multiplication des systmes rgionaux
cre une diffrenciation objective, travers une superposition de normes. Lors-
quil existe un seul systme rgional, les choses restent relativement simples,
comme en Amrique latine ou en Afrique. Les choses sont plus compliques
lorsque telles des poupes russes, les sous-systmes rgionaux sembotent,
comme dans le cas de lUnion europenne, du Conseil de lEurope et de lOSCE,
crant ainsi cinq niveaux diffrents de normes relatives aux droits de lhomme.
Il faudrait aussi tenir compte des systmes trans-rgionaux de plus en plus actifs
sur le terrain de droits de lhomme, comme le Commonwealth et la Francopho-
nie, mais aussi la Ligue arabe et lOrganisation de la confrence islamique
(OCI), sans parler de la Communaut des Etats indpendants (CEI).
Mais on constate aussi, sur un plan plus technique, une diversification
interne des systmes. Chaque organisation internationale connat ses spcialisa-
tions et ses cloisonnements. Il y a ainsi une sorte de diversification juridique
1
Pour une rfutation, cf. notre rapport gnral sur les droits culturels, 8e colloque inter-
national sur la convention europenne des droits de lhomme, Budapest, in Annuaire de la
Convention europenne des droits de lhomme, vol. 38A, 1995.
2
Texte in Les Nations Unies et les droits de lhomme (1945-1995), srie livres bleus, Nations
Unies, 1995.
74
Duplication des travaux, superposition des normes, engagements diffus
qui passe par la diffrenciation des organes et des fonctions, des approches th-
matiques, des techniques de contrle. Une rflexion thorique a t lance
rcemment, comme on le sait, au sujet de la fragmentation du droit international,
avec notamment les rapports prsents par Martti Koskenniemi la Commission
du droit international 3. Cette interrogation plus large sur les rgimes juridiques
auto-centrs, touche aussi le droit international des droits de lhomme, dans
ses relations avec le droit international public, proprement dit, mais aussi avec
des domaines connexes, comme le droit international humanitaire et le droit
international pnal. A travers linterrogation fondamentale sur la notion dordre
juridique cest la hirarchie entre les diffrents ordres juridiques qui se trouve
en jeu et la possibilit mme dun ordre public international, travers la
conscration dun jus cogens des droits de lhomme tel que la Cour internatio-
nale de justice vient de lesquisser 4.
Reste, plus modestement, que sur le plan concret, la juxtaposition de sys-
tmes conventionnels et de mcanismes institutionnels pose des problmes
pratiques darticulation, avec les risques de concurrence et de contradiction,
mais aussi les chances de complmentarit et deffectivit plus grande. Lenjeu
juridique est vident, comme lavait bien montr il y a dj une vingtaine
dannes le professeur Emmanuel Roucounas dans son cours sur les engage-
ments parallles et contradictoires 5. La question technique qui est toujours
actuelle, senrichit dsormais dune dimension politique. Au moment o lon
dbat de la rforme densemble du systme des droits de lhomme, travers la
mise en place du Conseil des droits de lhomme, il ne faudrait pas que le souci
vident de rationalisation et de simplification fasse oublier latout que constitue
la multiplication des filets de scurit ou des outils de rechange et que le dsir
lgitime damlioration se traduise par un affaiblissement des mcanismes et des
procdures existants et aboutisse en fin de compte une rgression dans la pro-
tection des droits de lhomme. A dfaut dun impossible inventaire, on se bor-
nera examiner la question pose, sous deux angles, celui du dveloppement des
normes et celui de leffectivit des contrles.
3
Commission du droit international, Fragmentation du droit international: difficults
dcoulant de la diversification et de lexpansion du droit international, rapport A/59/10. Et le rap-
port du groupe de travail, A/.CN.4/L.663/Rev.1 de 2004.
4
Arrt du 3 fvrier 2006, affaire des activits armes sur le territoire du Congo, RDC c.
Rwanda. Cf. aussi Emmanuel Decaux, La Cour internationale de Justice et les droits de lhomme
in Studi in onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Editoriale scientifica, 2004, t. II, pp. 921-970.
5
RCADI 1987, vol. 206. Cf. aussi la mme anne, le cours dA.A. Canado Trindade,
Coexistence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of International Protection of Human Rights (at
Global and Regional Levels) , RCADI 1987, vol. 202, et plus rcemment, Emmanuel Decaux,
Concurrence et complmentarit des systmes juridictionnels de protection des droits de
lhomme, cours Euro-Mditerranens Bancaja de droit international, vol. V, 2001, pp. 719-769.
75
I. Le dveloppement des normes

Dun simple point de vue quantitatif, le recueil des instruments inter-
nationaux relatifs aux droits de lhomme publi par le Haut-Commissariat des
Nations Unies, qui est loin dtre exhaustif, comporte deux tomes consacrs aux
instruments universels qui font plus de mille pages, laissant de ct les
instruments rgionaux auxquels un volume de cinq cents pages environ est
consacr 6. A sen tenir aux traits, la liste des principales conventions inter-
nationales et rgionales qui est recense chaque anne par Jean-Bernard Marie
couvre dsormais 115 traits et protocoles 7. On est loin de la pause normative,
de lhiver climatique, que certains prconisaient aprs la Confrence mondiale
de Vienne de 1993. Faut-il craindre pour autant que trop de droit tue le droit?
La question doit tre pose en distinguant le droit primaire, avec les traits, la
hard law, et le droit secondaire, travers le droit driv, le dveloppement des
standards, la soft law.
1. La consolidation du droit primaire
La notion de traits de base est une formule largement utilise pour
parler des core instruments en matire de droits de lhomme. En fait ce voca-
bulaire est fallacieux, car il vise en pratique les seuls instruments dots dun
organe de suivi, les treaty-bodies, longtemps au nombre de six, avant de passer
sept avec lentre en vigueur de la convention internationale sur les droits des
travailleurs migrants et de leur famille en 2003. Plus rcemment encore deux
nouvelles conventions ont t adoptes, la convention internationale pour la pro-
tection de toutes les personnes contre les disparitions forces, ouverte la signa-
ture le 6 fvrier 2007 Paris, et la convention relative aux droits des personnes
handicapes, ouverte la signature le 30 mars 2007, New York. A terme, cest
un ensemble de neuf comits sans parler du sous-comit contre la torture cr
la suite de lentre en vigueur le 22 juin 2006 du protocole de 2002 la conven-
tion des Nations Unies contre la torture.
Mais au-del ce cet aspect structurel, rien ne permet de dterminer srieu-
sement en droit une hirarchie des instruments internationaux en matire de
droits de lhomme 8. Tous les traits sont gaux, et seule une qualification extra-
conventionnelle permettrait de faire un sort particulier un instrument donn. A
cet gard, il est notable que les instruments correspondant des obligations
intangibles, comme les conventions sur le gnocide ou lesclavage, nont pas de
mcanisme propre de surveillance. Certaines conventions relatives la traite et
lesclavage taient confies un suivi du groupe de travail sur les formes
contemporaines de lesclavage qui a t cr il y a 30 ans au sein de la Sous-
Commission des droits de lhomme, mais faute de mthodologie efficace pour
6
Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de lhomme, Recueil dinstruments inter-
nationaux, vol. I (2 parties), Instruments universels, ST/HR/1/Rev.6, 2002.
7
Au 1er janvier 2007. A paratre dans la Revue universelle des droits de lhomme, 2007, no 1.
8
Pour une rflexion densemble, voir le colloque de Bruxelles, sous la dir. dEmmanuelle
Bribosia et Ludovic Hennebel, Classer les droits de lhomme, Bruylant, 2004.
76
organiser un dialogue structur avec les Etats transmettant les informations

requises, ce rle tait devenu purement formel. Cest en ce sens que nous avons
pu parler de conventions orphelines, en labsence dun mcanisme centralis
de suivi. Si lon tient compte de lensemble des traits dont lobjet est la pro-
tection des civils, la liste est longue.
Il faut esprer que les dclarations dintention des Etats candidats pour
siger au Conseil des droits de lhomme comme les indicateurs tablis dans le
cadre de lexamen priodique universel prendront pleinement en compte len-
semble de ces instruments internationaux. La consolidation du systme norma-
tif international passe en effet par la ratification prioritaire de ces instruments
universels par lensemble des Etats, conformment la Dclaration et au pro-
gramme daction de la Confrence mondiale de Vienne. Ce faisant les Etats eux-
mmes tourneraient le dos la neutralit classique du droit des traits o un
Etat est souverainement libre de ratifier ou de ne pas ratifier, de formuler des
rserves ds lors quelles sont compatibles avec le but et lobjet du trait pour
crer une dynamique vertueuse en fixant lobjectif dune ratification universelle
et en recommandant le rexamen des rserves.
Mais si la priorit est la consolidation de lacquis, pour mieux garantir le
respect universel et effectif des droits de lhomme selon les termes de larti-
cle 55 de la Charte, au lieu dune accumulation compulsive, quitte oublier les
engagements prcdents, par une sorte deffet de mode, plusieurs problmes
techniques doivent tre poss.
La question sest pose ds les lendemains de la Dclaration universelle
des droits de lhomme, lorsque pour des raisons essentiellement politiques,
lide dadopter une convention internationale couvrant lensemble des droits de
lhomme a t abandonne au profit de deux instruments distincts. Accepter une
telle diffrenciation entre les deux Pactes, ctait non seulement revenir au
volontarisme conventionnel en permettant le pick and choose des Etats par-
ties, l o la Dclaration universelle dfinissait un socle objectif ayant vocation
simposer tous les Etats membres des Nations Unies, mais galement ouvrir
la voie une dqualification des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels. Les
deux Pactes, malgr le renvoi crois de leur prambule, sont en effet de faux
jumeaux: alors que le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques
institue un comit dexperts indpendants charg dexaminer les rapports prio-
diques des Etats parties, ainsi que les communications individuelles prsentes
par les particuliers, le Pacte international relatif aux droits conomiques, sociaux
et culturels prvoit seulement la remise de rapports priodiques lECOSOC.
Cest seulement par le biais dune rsolution de lECOSOC sous-traitant cette
comptence que le comit des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels a vu le
jour. Les efforts se sont multiplis pour laborer un Protocole facultatif au Pacte
international relatif aux droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels permettant les
communications individuelles. A la suite de lavant-projet adopt par le Comit 9,
9
Cf. notre tude La rforme du Pacte international relatif aux droits conomiques, sociaux
et culturels in Droit et Justice, Mlanges en lhonneur de Nicolas Valticos, Pedone, 1999, p. 405.
77
un groupe de travail a fini par tre mis en place dans le cadre de la Commission,
puis du Conseil des droits de lhomme.
La ngociation a longtemps but sur la question de la justiciabilit des
droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels, qui seraient dune nature diffrente de
celle des droits civils et politiques. Sur le plan thorique, la distinction faite par
Asbjorn Eide entre les obligations de respecter, de protger et de mettre en
uvre, montre que le sujet est plus complexe que lopposition binaire entre
liberts-abstentions et droits-crances, entre obligations ngatives et obli-
gations positives. En fait, cest labsence de jurisprudence qui donne un carac-
tre flou aux droits proclams et non leur dfaut de justiciabilit. Les notions de
vie prive ou de procs quitable taient beaucoup plus vagues que la
libert syndicale ou le droit lducation consacrs dans le Pacte relatif aux
droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels. Et la mise en place dun systme pni-
tentiaire digne de ce nom est plus coteuse que le respect du principe de non-
discrimination. Il est temps de mettre niveau les deux Pactes, avec la mme
gamme de mcanismes complmentaires, rapports priodiques, communications
individuelles, voire enqutes sur le terrain, pour revenir sur le divorce idolo-
gique hrit des annes cinquante. Le dbat en France sur lopposabilit du
droit au logement montre que les esprits progressent, tout comme le fait que la
nouvelle convention sur les droits des personnes handicapes, dont bien des
dispositions sont particulirement vagues, est accompagne dun protocole
facultatif instaurant un systme de communications individuelles.
Reste une question tout aussi fondamentale, face la multiplication dins-
truments spcialiss: faut-il multiplier les systmes indpendants ou favoriser
des blocs de comptence? Avec 14 protocoles additionnels, la Convention euro-
penne des droits de lhomme est un bon exemple dun instrument vivant, qui
sest transform au fil de plus de cinquante annes. Pour autant, des instruments
parallles ont t mis en place quil sagisse de la Charte sociale europenne ou
dautres textes concernant les minorits nationales, linformatique ou la bio-
thique, alors que des passerelles auraient pu tre maintenues. Cette structura-
tion se retrouve ensuite tous les niveaux. Ainsi, alors mme que la Charte
sociale europenne a t rattache la direction gnrale des droits de lhomme du
Conseil de lEurope, les programmes daction et les documents des Sommets
du Conseil de lEurope font figurer les questions relatives aux droits sociaux sous
le thme de la cohsion sociale et non sous celui des droits de lhomme! On
retrouverait le mme clivage entre les instruments relevant de la direction gn-
rale des affaires juridiques et de la direction gnrale des droits de lhomme, au
risque du brouillage des messages sagissant de la lutte contre le terrorisme dans
le plein respect des droits de lhomme, en utilisant un vocabulaire visant un
quilibre entre lutte contre le terrorisme et protection des droits de lhomme.
La mauvaise rdaction de la Convention europenne pour la prvention du ter-
rorisme adopte en 2005, malgr les mises en garde du Commissaire aux droits
de lhomme du Conseil de lEurope, trahit cette absence de vision densemble.
On pourrait en dire autant dans le cadre des Nations Unies, entre les diff-
rents siges de New York, de Vienne et de Genve. Ds les premires sessions
78
de la Commission des droits de lhomme, la Sous-Commission de la condition

de la femme a obtenu son mancipation, en rendant compte directement
lECOSOC. Devenue un organe subsidiaire de lECOSOC, au mme titre que la
Commission des droits de lhomme, elle a trouv son prolongement avec la mise
en place du Comit pour llimination de la discrimination lgard des femmes
(CEDAW) constituant un ple part New York, au dtriment du mainstreaming
des droits de la femme au sein de tout le systme des droits de lhomme bas
Genve. Le mme problme a failli se poser avec la nouvelle convention sur les
droits des personnes handicapes, que certains Etats souhaitaient voir mise en
uvre dans le cadre du dpartement du dveloppement social, au lieu de mettre
en relief la problmatique des droits de lhomme. Le dynamisme du Haut Com-
missaire aux droits de lhomme, Louise Arbour, a permis de crer une nouvelle
synergie entre ces instruments afin de renforcer leur cohrence et leur efficacit,
en obtenant terme le rapatriement de ces instruments Genve. La question a
t encore plus grave sagissant de la coopration pnale et de la lutte contre le
terrorisme, les priorits en matire de droits de lhomme nayant pas t spon-
tanment prises en compte par les organes spcialiss mis en place Vienne
ou New York, avec des risques vidents de contradictions entre des logiques
diffrentes.
La multiplication des systmes cloisonns prsente en effet une srie de
risques juridiques trop souvent ngligs. Des logiques diffrentes peuvent se
cristalliser dans des instruments distincts. Ainsi, la convention no 182 de lOIT
sur les pires formes de travail des enfants a t mise en cause par les milieux
associatifs, et notamment en France le Dfenseur des enfants, qui y voyaient une
reconnaissance de la prostitution infantile comme une forme de travail, alors
mme que le but de lOIT tait de mobiliser tous les efforts pour mettre un terme
ces pires formes de travail. Pour ces mmes ONG, la priorit doit tre
donne aux dfinitions abolitionnistes des instruments dj anciens comme la
Convention pour la rpression de la traite des tres humains et de lexploitation
de la prostitution dautrui de 1949 alors mme quun mouvement de dnon-
ciation se fait jour ou aux nouveaux textes rpressifs, notamment le Protocole
additionnel la Convention des Nations Unies contre la criminalit transnatio-
nale organise, visant prvenir, rprimer et punir la traite des personnes en
particulier des femmes et des enfants, adopt par lAssemble gnrale en 2000.
La monte en puissance du droit communautaire a multipli les contradic-
tions potentielles. Cest le cas du travail de nuit des femmes, la logique de pro-
tection spciale de lOIT ayant t battue en brche par la logique de non-dis-
crimination de lUnion europenne. Cest encore plus vrai pour les instruments
du Conseil de lEurope, comme la convention pour la protection des personnes
lgard du traitement automatis des donnes caractre personnel, qui a t
doublement remise en cause. Dabord par la directive europenne sur le mme
sujet, faisant prvaloir la logique concurrentielle des lobbies commerciaux sur
la protection des citoyens, mais plus encore par laccord bilatral conclu par la
Commission avec les Etats-Unis, sacrifiant les liberts individuelles aux imp-
ratifs de la guerre contre le terrorisme dcrte par ladministration amri-
79
caine. Il nest pas sr non plus que la directive europenne sur la brevetabilit
du gnome humaine offre les mmes garanties que la Convention sur les droits
de lhomme et la biomdecine dOviedo et ses protocoles. Plus gnralement en
imposant une clause de dconnection dans les nouveaux instruments ngocis
dans le cadre du Conseil de lEurope, comme dans la ngociation de la rcente
convention europenne contre la traite des tres humains adopte en 2005,
lUnion europenne impose son particularisme, sans ncessairement offrir de
meilleurs garanties ses ressortissants.
En dehors mme du danger de contradiction, il existe galement un danger
de rgression. A force de rpter ou de dcliner les mmes principes, on risque
de les affadir, de les banaliser. On risque aussi de donner la possibilit aux Etats
de remettre en cause indirectement leurs engagements. La situation de conven-
tions internationales qui ne sont pas signes par un nombre significatif dEtats,
comme cest le cas actuellement de la convention sur les droits de tous les tra-
vailleurs migrants et de leur famille de 1990, a un effet dsastreux, alors mme
que la plupart des engagements recenss correspondent aux obligations liant dj
les Etats en vertu des deux Pactes. De mme lorsque la Sous-Commission des
droits de lhomme avait envisag, la suite du rapport Treat-Tchernichenko,
dlaborer un troisime protocole facultatif au Pacte sur les garanties judiciaires,
cest le Comit des droits de lhomme lui-mme qui avait mis en garde contre
les effets dune non-ratification, par un raisonnement a contrario offrant une
sorte dopting-out, alors que les Etats se trouvaient dj lis en pratique par
linterprtation du Comit. Plutt que de multiplier les obstacles juridiques, le
dveloppement progressif des normes existantes, travers le droit driv cons-
titue la voix de la sagesse.
2. Lapprofondissement du droit secondaire

Pendant longtemps la doctrine franaise a eu une vision linaire du dve-
loppement du droit international des droits de lhomme, passant dune phase
dclaratoire, une phase conventionnelle appele se prolonger par une phase
juridictionnelle, avec la mise en place de garanties effectives. Ce faisant elle
limitait la porte de la Dclaration universelle, simple pierre de touche, en
attente dune conscration conventionnelle en bonne et due forme, mais elle
ngligeait aussi le foisonnement du droit dclaratoire 10. Theodor Meron a bien
montr que la Dclaration universelle pouvait tre considre comme une inter-
prtation autorise des principes affirms par la Charte de 1945, tandis que le
Comit des droits de lhomme a mis laccent sur le bloc constitu par la
Charte internationale des droits de lhomme autour de la Dclaration, des
Pactes et de leurs protocoles, travers une sorte de cristallisation juridique 11.
10
Cf. De la promotion la protection des droits de lhomme: droit dclaratoire et droit
programmatoire in colloque de Strasbourg de la SFDI, La protection des droits de lhomme et
lvolution du droit international, Pedone, 1998, p. 81.
11
Observation gnrale n 27. Pour une discussion thorique, cf. la thse dOlivier de Frou-
ville, Lintangibilit des droits de lhomme en droit international, Pedone, 2004.
80
Lexemple de lOIT montre bien quune Dclaration de droits fondamentaux

peut traduire la quintessence des obligations conventionnelles des Etats membres.
Alors que les conventions ne lient par dfinition que les Etats parties et
dans la stricte mesure de leur engagement, le droit dclaratoire possde une
porte plus vaste, ne de la recherche du consensus dans un systme institution-
nel donn. Ce nest pas pour rien que la Dclaration universelle sert de rfrence
indiscute aux travaux des organes de contrle qui ont t mis en place dans le
cadre de la Commission des droits de lhomme, que ce soit la procdure confi-
dentielle, sur la base de la rsolution 1503 adopte en 1970 par lECOSOC, ou
encore la procdure de plainte mise en uvre depuis 1990 par le groupe de tra-
vail sur la dtention arbitraire. A dfaut de tout engagement conventionnel, les
Etats membres des Nations Unies sont lis par ce socle commun, et de fait, aucun
Etat na remis en cause cette base de rfrence dclaratoire de la procdure, alors
mme quil pouvait contester comme Cuba linvocation du Pacte, considr non
sans abus comme inter alios pacta.
Mais le droit driv a une fonction tout aussi importante de codification et
de dveloppement des normes. En ce sens, il est particulirement utile de faire
travailler ensemble les organes comptents. La Sous-Commission a pu jouer ce
rle travers ses tudes, et encore rcemment, avec ses travaux en matire de
non-discrimination ou de droits des non-ressortissants, qui ont t repris par plu-
sieurs comits dans leurs observations gnrales. Quel que soit le rsultat de la
rforme en cours, cette fonction dexgse est indispensable. Elle doit tre
confie un organe collgial, de caractre indpendant et vocation gnraliste,
pour maintenir une stratgie densemble afin de dfinir des priorits et pour
viter la pression des lobbies nayant quun seul agenda ou lexcs de spciali-
sation sans vision densemble de larchitecture du systme. A cet gard largu-
mentation du porte parole de lUnion europenne prconisant une liste dexperts
est assez nave pour ne pas dire plus: A roster of experts would be an instru-
ment to support the work of the Human Rights Council in a flexible and respon-
sive manner. Qualified experts would be appointed on a case-by-case basis to
study a specific issue upon the request of the HRC. In a nutshell if you need to
fix a specific problem go straight to the specialist! 12. Non seulement lexis-
tence dun organe permanent est une garantie collective dindpendance, mme
si lindpendance individuelle de certains membres peut prter caution, mais
surtout la dlibration collgiale est une phase importante dans llaboration
conceptuelle des projets de textes et un test dcisif de leur acceptabilit par les
diverses composantes de la communaut internationale.
On pourrait sinterroger sur la ncessit de dvelopper en commun de nou-
velles problmatiques, de nouvelles priorits, alors que le corpus des droits de
lhomme correspond des principes immuables. La multiplication des standards
ouvre la porte aux doubles standards, avec un risque de brouillage et de dva-
luation, la mauvaise monnaie chassant la bonne, comme pour les conomistes.
Pour les juristes, le risque est celui de voir le droit mou remplacer le droit dur.
12
WG RMM, Expert Advice, Draft 30.01.2007.
81
Le droit driv ne doit pas tre une occasion de remettre en cause les obligations
des Etats, il doit les prciser et les approfondir, travers des rfrences prcises
et cohrentes visant en faciliter linterprtation et lapplication par toutes les
parties concernes.
A cet gard les principes directeurs adopts, la suite des travaux de la
Sous-Commission en matire de lutte contre limpunit, avec Louis Joinet, ou
sur les formes de rparation des violations massives des droits de lhomme, avec
Tho van Boven, sont exemplaires. Il ne sagit pas dimposer de nouvelles obli-
gations aux Etats en matire de justice ou de rparation mais de leur offrir une
grille danalyse systmatique de leur propre situation. On pourrait en dire autant
des rcents principes en matire dadministration de la justice par les tribunaux
militaires, transmis en janvier 2006 par la Sous-Commission la Commission,
qui clairent les angles oublis de la justice militaire, sans remettre en cause la
diversit des expriences nationales. Le succs de tels principes est moins leur
adoption formelle par lorgane suprieur, que leur mise en uvre pratique par
les intresss eux-mmes, dans des ngociations de paix ou lors de processus de
rforme. Les rfrences et les renvois leur confrent ainsi une ralit objective,
une vidence pratique, avant mme leur conscration officielle: les principes sur
la justice militaire ont dj t cits par la Cour europenne des droits de
lhomme et ont servi de moteur la rforme trop longtemps diffre de la jus-
tice militaire en Argentine.
Lapparition de nouvelles problmatiques dpend galement de la conjonc-
ture internationale. La priorit donne la lutte contre le terrorisme depuis 2001
a impliqu une rflexion urgente sur les impratifs en matire de droits de
lhomme. Cette valuation, loin de se faire dans labstrait, de manire idolo-
gique, a pu trs rapidement se fonder sur la base de la jurisprudence europenne
dveloppe notamment lorsque diverses formes de terrorisme avait frapp plu-
sieurs Etats, commencer par le Royaume-Uni et lIrlande, mais aussi lAlle-
magne, lItalie et la France ou la Turquie. Cest le sens des lignes directrices sur
les droits de lhomme et la lutte contre le terrorisme adoptes le 11 juillet 2002
par le Comit des ministres du Conseil de lEurope, partir dune codification
droit constant de la jurisprudence de Strasbourg. Ces principes ont t com-
plts par des lignes directrices sur la protection des victimes dactes terroris-
tes adoptes par le Comit des ministres le 2 mars 2005. De son ct, le Haut
Commissaire aux droits de lhomme, Bertrand Ramcharan, avait ds 2003 tabli
une compilation des textes pertinents, faisant une large part ces expriences
rgionales, publie sous le titre Digest of jurisprudence of the United Nations
and regional organizations on the protection of human rights while countering
terrorism 13. Le rappel de ces rfrences jurisprudentielles a permis de recadrer
le dbat, en montrant que la lutte indispensable contre le terrorisme devait tre
mene dans le strict respect des principes de lEtat de droit et du droit interna-
tional, notamment en matire de protection des droits de lhomme. Paralllement
13
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, 2003.
82
aux rfrences gnrales introduites peu peu dans ce sens dans les rsolutions
du Conseil de scurit, le dveloppement dun corpus dtaill de principes
directeurs sest avr particulirement utile.
On pourrait multiplier les exemples, avec les travaux de la Sous-commis-
sion ayant abouti en 2003 ladoption par consensus dun projet de principes
directeurs sur la responsabilit des entreprises en matire de droits de lhomme,
contribuant ainsi mettre la question lordre du jour de la Commission, malgr
sa raction immdiate de rejet. Le danger vident est de vouloir imposer un
ensemble cohrent de principes, dpassant la diversit des codes volontaires et
des normes sectorielles, mais dajouter la confusion, en apportant une rf-
rence de plus, parmi tant dautres, et non une rfrence unique, faute daccepta-
tion par les destinataires. Sur ce terrain, lexemple du tripartisme de lOIT
montre bien la ncessit dassocier troitement toutes les parties prenantes
llaboration des normes.
Reste que le cheminement des ides dans le systme international pour
arriver une conscration consensuelle par lAssemble gnrale demande une
longue patience, comme lillustre ladoption de la dclaration des droits des per-
sonnes appartenant des minorits nationales ou ethniques, religieuses et lin-
guistiques en 1992, la dclaration sur les dfenseurs des droits de lhomme de
1998 ou la dclaration sur les droits des peuples autochtones adopte en 2006
par le Conseil des droits de lhomme pour se voir remise en cause devant
lAssemble gnrale.
Tous ces efforts sont loin dtre inutiles, ils font vivre le droit. Mais il ne
sagit pas de rinventer sans cesse les droits de lhomme, comme un amnsique
pour qui chaque instant serait un premier matin. Lessentiel est de tenir les deux
bouts de la chane, en affermissant la cohrence thorique dun systme fond
sur des droits universels, inhrents la dignit de la personne humaine, mais
galement en sachant dcliner son contenu pratique en fonction des situations
concrtes et des nouveaux dfis qui se prsentent. Cest assez dire que sur ce
terrain, luniversalit est indissociable de leffectivit.
II. Leffectivit des contrles
Le problme de la duplication ne se pose pas de la mme manire si lon

envisage les garanties contentieuses ou les garanties non-contentieuses. On
entendra ici les garanties contentieuses au sens large, en visant des systmes de
plaintes faisant lobjet dun traitement juridique par un organe indpendant, au
terme dune procdure contradictoire, mme si lon est parfois dans des syst-
mes quasi-juridictionnels, faute dun lment essentiel, comme lautorit de la
chose juge, sagissant du Comit des droits de lhomme. Lambigut est par-
fois au sein dune mme procdure o lon passe du rglement juridictionnel au
rglement amiable, comme lon peut glisser dun diffrend politique un
diffrend juridique. A lvidence la gamme des modes de rglement pacifique
83
des diffrends numrs larticle 33 de la Charte peut se dcliner dans le

domaine des droits de lhomme, comme dans les autres matires 14.
1. Les garanties contentieuses

Si lon sen tient aux systmes de plaintes, fondes sur des communica-
tions individuelles ou collectives, dfaut de communications tatiques, il existe
des rgles pour viter duplications ou contradictions.
Une rgle procdurale classique est celle de la litispendance, en vertu de
laquelle le Comit des droits de lhomme nexaminera aucune communication
dun particulier sans stre assur que: a) la mme question nest pas dj en
cours dexamen devant une autre instance internationale denqute ou de rgle-
ment () (art.5 2 du Prot. add.). Cette formule que lon retrouve, mutatis
mutandis, dans de nombreux instruments, ne rgle quune partie du problme,
puisquune fois que lorgane sest prononc, laffaire nest plus en cours
dexamen. Cest le sens de la rserve formule par la France, linstar de nom-
breux Etats membres du Conseil de lEurope, en ratifiant le protocole, afin
dviter de faire du Comit des droits de lhomme une sorte de juridiction
dappel des arrts de la Cour europenne des droits de lhomme: La France fait
une rserve lalina a) du paragraphe 2 de larticle 5 en prcisant que le Comit
des droits de lhomme ne sera pas comptent pour examiner une communication
manant dun particulier si la mme question est en cours dexamen ou a dj
t examine par une autre instance internationale denqute ou de rglement.
Mais cette extension ne rgle pas tout, comme lont montr les dbats au sein du
Comit lors dune premire affaire danoise o la requte avait t dclare irre-
cevable par la Commission europenne des droits de lhomme, sans avoir t
examine en tant que telle, ce que Bernhard Graefrath, lexpert est-allemand
stait empress de relever dans une opinion individuelle 15! Mais au-del mme
de ces arguties procdurales, il est trs facile de pratiquer le forum-shopping, en
portant la mme question de droit devant des juridictions diffrentes, ds que des
droits collectifs sont en jeu ou que des violations en srie sont commises,
puisque la rgle non bis in idem ne vaut que pour un mme requrant et une
mme cause.
Une autre rgle de fond mise au point pour viter aux juges davoir se
prononcer en vertu de rgles diffrentes, est de prvoir une clause dindexation,
en prcisant, comme la Convention europenne des droits de lhomme, quau-
cune de ses dispositions ne sera interprte comme limitant ou portant atteinte
14
Cf. notre chapitre sur Le rglement des diffrends in Denis Alland et al., Droit inter-
national public, Coll. droit fondamental, PUF, 2000.
15
A. M. c. Danemark, dcision de rejet du 23 juillet 1982, Slection des dcisions du Comit
des droits de lhomme, vol. 1 (1976-1982). Comparer avec deux affaires norvgiennes, O. F, dci-
sion du 26 octobre 1984 et V. O, dcision du 17 juillet 1985, in Slection des dcisions du Comit
des droits de lhomme, vol. 2 (1982-1988). Cf. le commentaire de Markus Schmidt, in Emmanuel
Decaux (dir.), Le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, Economica, 2007,
paratre.
84
aux droits de lhomme et aux liberts fondamentales qui pourraient tre recon-
nus conformment aux lois de toute Partie contractante ou toute autre Conven-
tion laquelle cette Partie contractante est partie (art. 53). On a fait grand cas
de cette formule qualifie de clause la plus protectrice, linstar de la clause
de nation la plus favorise, notamment lors de llaboration de la Charte des
droits fondamentaux de lUnion europenne et de son incorporation dans la
deuxime partie du trait sur la Constitution europenne 16. Mais cest ngliger
la relativit de la plupart des droits de lhomme qui impliquent un arbitrage du
juge entre des droits de lhomme concurrents ou entre des droits de lhomme et
des buts lgitimes: sagit-il de donner lextension la plus grande la libert dex-
pression ou lutte contre le racisme, la protection du domicile ou au caractre
sacr de la proprit prive? En soi, la clause napporte aucune solution. Tout
au plus indique-t-elle une certaine dynamique, le choix de la cross-fertilization
entre systmes distincts, de linfluence mutuelle des instruments internationaux.
De plus en plus souvent, le juge est appel invoquer des rfrences mul-
tiples, soit titre de source directe, soit titre de simple comparaison. Les juri-
dictions du Commonwealth ont toujours eu cette culture des prcdents, sans
considration de frontires. Certains juges de la Cour internationale de Justice,
le plus souvent issus du Tiers monde, ont galement depuis longtemps cit la
jurisprudence europenne dans leurs opinions individuelles, notamment en
matire de bonne administration de la justice dans des affaires relatives au
TANU, tout comme les juges de la Cour europenne des droits de lhomme issus
des pays dEurope centrale nont pas hsit se rfrer aux principes de la Cour
suprme des Etats-Unis, dans un contexte pourtant tout autre. Mais cest dsor-
mais le cas pour les juridictions nationales les plus jalouses de leur souverainet.
La Cour suprme des Etats-Unis a fini par faire tat dun prcdent de la Cour
europenne des droits de lhomme, sagissant de la dpnalisation de lhomo-
sexualit entre adultes consentants 17. Le Conseil constitutionnel, plus tardive-
ment encore, sest rsolu citer un arrt (non dfinitif!) de la Cour europenne
des droits de lhomme pour renforcer son argumentation sur la conformit au
principe de lacit du Trait sur la Constitution europenne 18.
Mais mme avant de formuler des rfrences expresses de telles jurispru-
dences, les juges nationaux ont multipli les rfrences implicites, sagissant
notamment de combler une lacune, un dficit de garantie, face un systme
mieux disant. Le Conseil constitutionnel a donn un tel exemple en dcou-
vrant dans larticle 16 de la Dclaration des droits de lhomme et du citoyen de
16
Cf. Guy Braibant, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de lUnion europenne, le Seuil,
2001 et Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Anne Levade et Fabrice Picod (dir.), Trait tablissant une
Constitution pour lEurope, tome 2 (Partie II: La Charte des droits fondamentaux de lUnion),
Bruylant, 2005.
17
Commentaire de Marina Eudes, in revue lectronique Droits fondamentaux, www.droits-
fondamentaux.org no 3 (janvier-dcembre 2003).
18
C.C., dcision du 19 novembre 2004 relative au trait tablissant une Constitution pour
lEurope.
85
1789, le principe du droit un recours, par une illumination soudaine deux

sicles aprs, faute de pouvoir fonder sa dcision sur larticle 13 de la Conven-
tion europenne ou larticle 2 3 du Pacte 19.
Ces emprunts peuvent concerner le fond, comme lorsque la Cour euro-
penne dveloppe sa jurisprudence sur la base de larticle 1er du Protocole I et de
larticle 14 pour garantir par le biais du principe de non-discrimination des droits
sociaux qui ne sont pas protgs en tant que tels par la Convention. Plus curieu-
sement encore le Conseil dEtat qui dans un premier temps avait refus de suivre
la jurisprudence Gueye c. France du Comit des droits de lhomme 20, en consi-
drant que larticle 26 du Pacte relatif aux droits civils et politiques ne sten-
dait pas aux droits sociaux, a fini par adopter la mme solution mais sur la base
pourtant plus incertaine, mais sans doute plus familire de la Convention
europenne, avec larrt Diop 21. Paradoxalement une telle jurisprudence rend lar-
gement superftatoire la ratification du protocole no 12 la Convention euro-
penne des droits de lhomme que la France rechigne pourtant ratifier pour ne
pas surcharger la Cour europenne de recours sur la base du principe de non-dis-
crimination. Or le Protocole no 12 avait pour unique objet de mettre larticle 14
de la Convention niveau avec larticle 26 du Pacte. Ce que le processus for-
maliste de rvision conventionnelle na pas encore parachev, la dynamique de
la jurisprudence la dj largement atteint. Pour autant le tableau est confus, la
jurisprudence dressant une frle passerelle entre deux strates de droit conven-
tionnel, avec larticle 14 initial dune part, larticle 14 complt par le protocole
no 12 dautre part. A fortiori, la non-discrimination du droit communautaire
nest pas celle des multiples clauses du Pacte international relatif aux droits
civils et politiques ou des conventions spcialises.
Les emprunts qui ne disent par leur nom peuvent galement toucher la pro-
cdure avec une mulation de plus en plus vidente entre les juridictions. Les
comptences du Tribunal international du droit de la mer en matire de mesures
conservatoires ont entran des ractions en chane de la part de la Cour inter-
nationale de justice et de la Cour europenne des droits de lhomme pour affir-
mer contra legem que les mesures conservatoires taient dsormais obligatoires,
ce qu chaque rvision du statut les Etats staient refuss concder. On
retrouve la mme contagion en matire de rserves, lorsque le Comit des droits
de lhomme a fait sienne, avec lobservation gnrale no 24, la jurisprudence de
la Cour europenne des droits de lhomme, alors que la formulation des deux
traits est trs diffrente, comme ne manque pas de le rappeler le rapporteur de
la CDI sur les rserves, le professeur Alain Pellet.
Mais lassimilation peut galement se faire de faon expresse, lorsque le
juge nhsite pas appliquer lui-mme dautres instruments. Parfois cest son
statut qui lui donne cette comptence, comme lorsque la Cour interamricaine
19
C.C., dcision du 9 avril 1996 concernant la LO relative au statut de la Polynsie franaise.
20
Dcision du 3 avril 1989, in Slection des dcisions du Comit des droits de lhomme,
vol. 3 (1988-1990).
21
C.E., arrt Diop du 30 novembre 2001.
86
est amene interprter des traits relatifs aux droits de lhomme, y compris
la convention sur les relations consulaires de 1963, avant mme la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice, dans laffaire Avena. Il en ira sans doute de mme avec la
nouvelle Cour africaine des droits de lhomme travers notamment les disposi-
tions trs gnrales de larticle 60 de la Charte africaine des droits de lhomme
et des peuples visant les principes applicables. La Cour europenne des droits
de lhomme est alle trs loin dans cette direction, sans une telle base textuelle.
Ainsi elle sest fonde sur la convention des Nations Unies contre la torture de
1984, pour introduire une srie dobligations positives, en matire denqute,
de poursuite et de sanction, ct des obligations ngatives de larticle 3 de
la Convention europenne des droits de lhomme qui se borne consacrer
linterdiction de la torture. Mais plus concrtement encore la Cour se rfre
trs frquemment aux constatations du Comit europen pour la prvention de
la torture, malgr les clauses de la convention de 1987 visant cloisonner de
manire tanche les deux systmes de contrle, ou aux rapports du Commissaire
aux droits de lhomme, et ce dautant plus que depuis la suppression de la Com-
mission europenne, la Cour ne peut gure mettre en uvre ses possibilits pro-
pres denqute sur le terrain 22. Elle multiplie les rfrences au droit secondaire,
comme les normes pnitentiaires europennes ou les rgles minimales des
Nations Unies, voire des principes encore en gestation, comme les principes
relatifs ladministration de la justice par les tribunaux militaires.
Le plus tonnant est que la Cour internationale de Justice a adopt une atti-
tude identique dans des affaires rcentes, en se fondant sur les travaux ou les
constations dorganes des Nations Unies en matire de droits de lhomme. Dans
lavis du 9 juillet 2004 sur les consquences juridiques de ldification dun mur
dans le territoire palestinien occup, la Cour consacre un long dveloppement
lapplication des conventions internationales relatives aux droits de lhomme
qui lient Isral, aprs en avoir tabli lapplicabilit aux territoires occups, en se
rfrant la pratique constante du Comit des droits de lhomme (109), tout
comme la position du Comit des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels
(112). La Cour prend en compte les dispositions pertinentes du Pacte interna-
tional relatif aux droits civils et politiques (127), du Pacte international relatif
aux droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels (130) et de la Convention des
droits de lenfant (131). Elle se rfre galement aux rapports du Secrtaire
gnral, comme ceux du Rapporteur spcial de la Commission des droits de
lhomme sur la situation des droits de lhomme dans les territoires palestiniens
occups par Isral depuis 1967, le professeur John Dugard (133). Pour dter-
miner si des drogations aux obligations conventionnelles pesant sur Isral peu-
vent tre invoques, la Cour nhsite pas reprendre la formulation retenue par
le Comit des droits de lhomme dans son observation gnrale no 27 (136).
La Cour peut conclure au vu du dossier que la construction du mur constitue
une violation par Isral de diverses obligations qui lui incombent en vertu des
22
Pour un cas-limite o la Cour na pas pu enquter sur le terrain, cf. larrt Chamaiev c.
Gorgie et Russie, du 12 avril 2005.
87
instruments applicables de droit international humanitaire et des droits de

lhomme (137).
Larrt rendu le 19 dcembre 2005 dans laffaire des activits armes sur
le territoire du Congo (Rpublique dmocratique du Congo c. Ouganda)
comporte lui aussi une apprciation de la Cour sur les violations du droit
international relatif aux droits de lhomme et du droit international humanitaire,
prenant en considration les lments de preuve contenus dans certains docu-
ments de lOrganisation des Nations Unies dans la mesure o ils ont une valeur
probante et sont corrobors si ncessaire, par dautres sources crdibles (205).
La Cour se fonde ainsi sur les rapports du Rapporteur spcial de la Commission
des droits de lhomme et du Secrtaire gnral, ainsi que sur les rsolutions du
Conseil de scurit (206) pour estimer quil existe une concordance suffisante
entre les informations manant de sources crdibles pour la convaincre que des
violations massives des droits de lhomme et de graves manquements au droit
international humanitaire ont t commis () (207). Sagissant du droit appli-
cable, la Cour recense un certain nombre de traits qui lient les deux parties,
comme les conventions de Genve et le protocole I de 1977, le Pacte internatio-
nal relatif aux droits civils et politiques ou la convention sur les droits de len-
fant et son protocole sur limplication des enfants dans les conflits arms, mais
aussi la Charte africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples, avant de dter-
miner les obligations conventionnelles qui ont t violes par lOuganda (219).
Cette pluralit de normes et cette multiplicit dinterprtes ouvrent grand
la porte des contradictions potentielles. Il faut admettre que cest un fait de la
vie, et que sur le plan interne, les divergences et les revirements de jurisprudence
sont un lot quotidien. Pour sen tenir un exemple franais rcent, pendant une
dizaine dannes, la Cour de cassation a considr que la Convention sur les
droits de lenfant ntait pas directement applicable, avant de se rallier la posi-
tion de sagesse du Conseil dEtat qui avait admis que certaines dispositions
taient directement applicables par le juge interne, en se fondant lune et lautre
sur lintention des Parties contractantes et la lettre de la convention. De mme,
les spcialistes nont pas manqu de pointer les contradictions entre la Cour de
Luxembourg et la Cour de Strasbourg sur la porte de la notion de domicile
au sens de la Convention europenne des droits de lhomme, sagissant de
locaux professionnels ou de vhicules. Pourquoi stonner que dans une socit
internationale, htrogne par nature, on retrouve ces mmes contradictions?
Cest plutt le nombre limit de telles situations qui devrait nous tonner.
Une contradiction virtuelle est celle qui existe, entre un juge gnraliste
et un juge spcialis. Par dfinition, un juge spcialis a un intrt investi dans
une discipline et on comprend la rticence des Etats se prsenter devant une
chambre de lenvironnement constitue au sein de la CIJ. Cela vaut sans doute
pour la comptence du Comit pour llimination de la discrimination raciale ou
du Comit contre llimination des discriminations lgard des femmes, face au
Comit des droits de lhomme ou la Cour europenne. Ainsi le CERD a-t-il
flicit le Danemark pour les poursuites contre un journaliste qui ont donn lieu
un arrt de condamnation de la Cour europenne des droits de lhomme, dans
88
laffaire Jersild 23. Et terme, rien ne dit que le Comit des droits conomiques,
sociaux et culturels aura la mme jurisprudence que le Comit des droits de
lhomme, alors que leurs comptences se chevaucheront inluctablement,
notamment par le biais de larticle 26 du Pacte international relatif aux droits
civil et politiques. Une autre contradiction latente dcoule de la composition des
organes: lvidence le Comit des droits de lhomme sest trouv en complet
dcalage, sagissant de la peine de mort, par rapport la Cour europenne des
droits de lhomme, comme en tmoignent les fortes opinions dissidentes des
membres europens du Comit des droits de lhomme. Plus grave encore est le
conflit latent entre la Cour internationale de justice et les juridictions pnales,
Tribunal pnal international pour lex-Yougoslavie, aujourdhui, et, demain,
Cour pnale internationale.
2. Les garanties non-contentieuses

Les garanties non-contentieuses sont encore plus diffuses, notamment en
matire de rapports ou denqutes, ce quon appelle aujourdhui au sens large le
monitoring. Il faut dabord constater la multiplicit des structures mises en
place. Paralllement au dveloppement des autorits indpendantes qui viennent
complter les garanties judiciaires sur le plan interne institutions nationales de
protection des droits de lhomme, Ombusdman et mdiateurs, commissions sp-
cialises sagissant dun groupe vulnrable on observe le mme mouvement
lchelle internationale, notamment sur le plan europen: Ombusdman europen,
Haut-Commissaire de lOSCE sur les minorits nationales, Commissaire aux
droits de lhomme du Conseil de lEurope, Commission europenne contre la
racisme et lintolrance (ECRI), Observatoire de Vienne contre le racisme et la
xnophobie transform compter du 1er janvier 2007 en Agence europenne des
droits fondamentaux. On retrouve la distinction classique de la science admi-
nistrative, entre administration de gestion et administration de mission:
chaque nouvelle institution indpendante doit trouver sa place auprs des struc-
tures institutionnelles beaucoup plus lourdes qui prexistent, mais surtout
apprendre travailler ensemble avec ses homologues, lgitimement jaloux de
leur indpendance.
Paradoxalement, malgr cette multiplicit dacteurs, il existe encore des
angles morts, des risques de lacunes, faute de vue densemble de la situation des
droits de lhomme dans tous les Etats du monde ou de prise en compte des rali-
ts concrtes, sur le terrain. Ainsi, le Turkmnistan qui ne remettait aucun rap-
port aux organes de contrle a pu passer largement inaperu, avant le dclen-
chement du mcanisme de Moscou de lOSCE en 2002, suivi dune srie de
rsolutions de la Commission des droits de lhomme et de lAssemble gnrale
qui ont contribu attirer lattention des rapporteurs spciaux et des organes
conventionnels, contribuant ainsi placer la situation de ce pays sur lagenda
23
CEDH, arrt du 23 septembre 1994, cf. commentaire de larticle 10 par Grard Cohen-
Jonathan in Louis-Edmond Pettiti, Emmanuel Decaux et Pierre-Henri Imbert (dir.), La Convention
europenne des droits de lhomme, Economica, 2me ed., 1999.
89
international. Il existe aussi des thmes longtemps oublis, comme la question

des formes contemporaines de lesclavage, relance par le groupe de travail de
la Sous-Commission des droits de lhomme, il y a 30 ans, ou encore la question
des pratiques traditionnelles affectant la sant des femmes et des fillettes,
grce aux rapports de Mme Warzazi, l encore dans le cadre de la Sous-Com-
mission, sans parler du travail de fond sur lextrme pauvret et les droits de
lhomme entrepris depuis 1987, sur la base de ltude de Landro Despouy.
Aussi bien pour viter les conflits positifs que les conflits ngatifs, les
doubles emplois que les omissions, une meilleure coordination simpose tous
les chelons. Il faut coordonner les coordinations, cest bien le sens du multi-
multilatralisme. Un retour lesprit des origines serait trs utile, comme
lorsque lOIT tait associe aux premiers travaux de la Charte sociale euro-
penne. Le Comit des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels a su nouer de
tels liens avec lUNESCO, comme avec lOIT. De manire informelle, le Rap-
porteur spcial de la Commission des droits de lhomme sur la libert dexpres-
sion se concerte avec ses partenaires de lUNESCO et de lOEA pour signer un
appel commun chaque anne lors de la journe de la libert de la presse. De son
ct lOSCE a mis en place un groupe de travail sur la torture qui runit des
reprsentants des principaux protagonistes: rapporteur spcial ou ancien rap-
porteur de la Commission des droits de lhomme, membre du Comit europen
pour la prvention de la torture, etc.
Mais ces liaisons institutionnelles devraient tre systmatiques, et dpas-
ser les rencontres protocolaires entre les responsables administratifs des organi-
sations internationales. Les runions inter-comits organises par le Haut-
Commissariat des droits de lhomme pourraient tre organises sous une forme
plus mthodique, avec une vritable continuit des membres et un programme
de travail dbouchant sur de vritables dcisions communes. Il faut que les
experts indpendants et les rapporteurs spciaux apprennent se connatre,
savoir ce que font les autres et travailler en commun. Il faut crer des carre-
fours. Faute de connaissance mutuelle et desprit de corps, ils manquent de la
cohsion ncessaire pour rsister aux atteintes des Etats leur indpendance ou
prendre des initiatives collectives, au-del dappels urgents ou de dclarations
de principe. Ce qui est vrai au sein des Nations Unies, lest plus encore entre
organisations internationales, notamment lchelon rgional.
III. Remarques finales
Quelle articulation concrte envisager, dans le respect de lindpendance

des acteurs? Un souci de cohrence et de continuit devrait prvaloir. Une
rforme radicale serait dtablir un systme de comits fortement hirarchis,
avec un organe unique dot de chambres spcialises, mais il est peu probable
que les Etats acceptent ce saut qualitatif, tant pour des raisons politiques que juri-
diques. A tout le moins il supposerait une rvision des traits existants. Mais
mme dans cette hypothse, lunification resterait partielle. Le rle jou par la
90
Cour europenne des droits de lhomme na pas empch lessor de mcanismes

non-contentieux, notamment sur le terrain prventif. Reste que le problme se
pose de manire plus spcifique: lorsquun nouvel instrument est mis en place,
faut-il crer un nouvel organe spcialis ou confier une mission supplmentaire
un organe prexistant? La question sest pose avec acuit lors de llabora-
tion de la convention sur les disparitions forces, dans le contexte des rformes
en gestation. La solution de compromis a t de crer un nouveau comit, tout
en prvoyant une clause de rvision. Curieusement, les rdacteurs new-yorkais
de la convention sur les droits des personnes handicapes nont pas eu ce scru-
pule, en prvoyant la mise en place dun comit supplmentaire. Pourtant
lexemple du nouveau sous-comit contre la torture montre bien lintrt dta-
blir des liaisons organiques, tout en prvoyant une spcialisation lie au thme
en jeu ou au mode de fonctionnement de lorgane.
Sagissant de llucidation des normes, un systme de questions prjudi-
cielles ou de renvois pour interprtation permettrait dviter les contradictions,
tandis que des observations gnrales communes pourraient tre adoptes
pour adopter des positions de principe. De mme des missions conjointes pour-
raient tre envisages en matire denqute, de manire souple, si les moyens
ncessaires sont dgags. Dj, la Commission et le Conseil nont pas hsit
envoyer sur le terrain des quipes de rapporteurs spciaux. Laccent pourrait ga-
lement tre mis sur le suivi, en tablant sur les acquis des autres organes au lieu
de repartir zro, chaque fois. Pour ce faire un vritable tableau de bord serait
ncessaire, afin dharmoniser le calendrier des activits et damliorer le suivi
des observations.
Cette rforme semble dautant plus ncessaire que la fatigue des Etats,
y compris de la part des mieux disposs, est vidente. Trop de rapports, trop de
visites, trop de questionnaires inutiles, trop de demandes rptitives ou contra-
dictoires surchargeraient les services comptents. De fait, un Etat a pu adresser
au groupe de travail des communications, dans le cadre de la procdure 1503,
une rponse dj transmise au Comit des droits de lhomme et au Comit pour
llimination des discriminations lgard des femmes. Inversement, il faudrait
viter les passages vide, concernant les pays oublis ou intouchables, les
sujets ngligs ou ignors.
On le voit, le programme des droits de lhomme est immense. Cest un tra-
vail quotidien qui demande le concours de tous. Il ny aura jamais trop dou-
vriers pour contribuer au progrs des droits de lhomme comme la Charte nous
y invite. Il ne faut pas craindre les duplications, si les efforts convergent. Dans
un monde idal, on peut souhaiter un saut qualitatif visant rationaliser, coor-
donner et hirarchiser toutes les activits, mais attention par anglisme ne pas
jouer aux apprentis sorciers. Nous vivons dans un monde rel, o il est sage de
multiplier les garanties, les voies de recours, les sauvegardes Ce qui compte
cest leffectivit, lefficacit, lexprience, cest la diffrence sur le terrain. Il
faut dcloisonner, sans dtruire les fondements de ldifice, mme si son archi-
tecture baroque, faite de bric et de broc, ne correspond pas aux canons de
larchitecture classique.
91
Le contrle du respect des droits
conomiques et sociaux:
privilgier la soumission de rapports
ou lexamen de plaintes?
Giorgio Malinverni*
Dans la panoplie des mcanismes qui existent lheure actuelle pour le

contrle de la mise en uvre des traits internationaux de protection des droits
de lhomme, il y a, dune part, les mcanismes non contentieux, au premier rang
desquels figure la soumission de rapports; et, dautre part, le mcanisme conten-
tieux par excellence: la requte individuelle. Mon propos est de comparer et de
mesurer les avantages et les inconvnients de ces deux systmes. Je souhaiterais
cependant formuler auparavant une remarque dordre gnral.
En droit international, la nature du mcanisme de contrle de la mise en
uvre dun trait international qui peut tre mis en place dpend du contexte
gographique et politique. Dune manire gnrale, il me semble que cest au
niveau rgional, que ce soit en Europe, en Amrique ou, plus rcemment, en
Afrique, quont pu tre mises en place les techniques les plus sophistiques,
savoir les requtes individuelles et les contrles judiciaires effectus par une
Cour internationale. Au niveau universel, en revanche, sauf dans quelques cas,
les mcanismes non contentieux, et en particulier la soumission de rapports,
demeurent les moyens de contrle les plus rpandus.
* Juge la Cour europenne des droits de lhomme; ancien membre du Comit des Nations
Unies sur les droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels; professeur honoraire de lUniversit
de Genve.
93
I.
Dans un premier temps, jaimerais rappeler brivement les principales
caractristiques des systmes de rapports, puis je tenterai desquisser les am-
liorations que lintroduction dun systme de communications individuelles
pourrait reprsenter pour les droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels.
Historiquement, le systme fond sur lenvoi de rapports est le plus ancien.
Cette technique a dj t utilise dans les annes vingt, dans la Constitution
de lOIT et dans dautres traits, comme la Convention relative lesclavage.
Si ce type de mcanisme reste dactualit, il est relativement primitif et peu
sophistiqu. Cest en ralit le systme le plus simple parmi les moyens de
contrle du respect des droits de lhomme, et cest pour cette raison quil a sur-
tout t utilis dans un cadre universel. Sur le plan rgional, en revanche, il a t
supplant par des mcanismes contentieux plus labors, tels que la requte ta-
tique ou individuelle. Les informations transmises aux organes de contrle par
le biais des rapports sont essentiellement dordre lgislatif et concernent moins
la jurisprudence et la pratique. Il faut toutefois noter que, dans le cadre des
Nations Unies, ces rapports sont complts par un dialogue oral avec les dl-
gations des Etats concerns et par des contre-rapports des ONG. Lorgane
de contrle peut ainsi disposer dune image plus complte de la situation dans
le pays.
II.
1. Examinons maintenant la valeur ajoute que pourrait prsenter un sys-
tme de plaintes individuelles, plus particulirement dans le cadre du Pacte rela-
tif aux droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels des Nations Unies. Actuelle-
ment, le mandat du Comit est limit lexamen de rapports. Cependant, un
projet de protocole additionnel ouvrirait la voie, sil est adopt, des communi-
cations individuelles. De mon point de vue, la valeur ajoute de cette innovation
serait importante, et ce pour plusieurs raisons. Premirement, lintroduction dun
systme de requtes individuelles permettrait de clarifier grandement les obli-
gations des Etats. On considre souvent que les droits conomiques, sociaux et
culturels sont imprcis, formuls de manire vague, et ne sont donc pas justi-
ciables. La possibilit de soumettre des communications individuelles pourrait
contribuer affiner les contours de ces droits et leur porte, par le biais dune
analyse approfondie des problmes juridiques soulevs loccasion de chaque
affaire qui serait porte devant le Comit des droits conomiques, sociaux et cul-
turels. Il est bien connu que cest loccasion daffaires concrtes que le contenu
prcis dun droit est dfini.
2. Lintroduction dun systme de communications individuelles pour les
droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels permettrait en outre une meilleure
apprhension de sujets qui restent souvent thoriques. Actuellement, le Comit
des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels, linstar des six autres comits des
Nations Unies chargs de contrler le respect des traits relatifs aux droits de
94
Mcanismes de contrle du respect des droits conomiques et sociaux
lhomme, conclut lexamen de chaque rapport par des observations finales dont
la formulation est gnrale et relativement abstraite. Le Comit y recommande
lEtat de prendre des mesures pour mieux sacquitter des obligations qui
dcoulent pour lui de tel ou tel article du Pacte. Je crois que lexamen de cas
concrets permettrait au Comit dapprhender de manire pratique les manque-
ments aux obligations rsultant du Pacte et son apprciation serait plus proche
de la ralit.
3. Un autre point positif serait lefficacit des sanctions. En effet, leffec-
tivit dun droit se mesure la possibilit de voir sa violation sanctionne. Il ny
a aucune commune mesure entre les observations finales adoptes dans le cadre
dun systme de rapports, qui sont de simples recommandations, et les consta-
tations faites par les organes qui disposent de la comptence dexaminer des
plaintes individuelles. Les constatations du Comit des droits de lhomme ou du
Comit contre la torture, sans parler des arrts des Cours internationales, per-
mettent de dterminer si, dans un cas donn, il y a eu violation dun trait inter-
national. Elles ont donc une force juridique nettement plus importante que les
observations finales du Comit des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels.
4. Le systme de communications individuelles permettrait galement aux
individus lss de rclamer des rparations en cas de violation de leurs droits.
Conformment ladage no right without remedy, je pense que les droits co-
nomiques, sociaux et culturels ne seront pas considrs comme de vritables
droits tant quil ne sera pas possible de remdier leur violation au moyen dune
rparation.
5. Enfin, les procdures de communication individuelle joueraient un rle
de catalyseur et permettraient ainsi damliorer la mise en uvre des droits co-
nomiques, sociaux et culturels au niveau national. La premire raison en est le
principe de lpuisement des voies de recours internes, les juges nationaux se
trouvant alors dans lobligation dexaminer les griefs du requrant, faute de quoi
il sadresserait une instance internationale qui pourrait, le cas chant, condam-
ner lEtat en question. Les juges nationaux auraient donc tout intrt tenter de
remdier une ventuelle violation des droits du requrant avant que ce dernier
ne porte son recours devant une instance internationale, en loccurrence devant
le Comit des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels. Par ailleurs, la jurispru-
dence de ce Comit pourrait galement clairer les juges nationaux qui pour-
raient sen inspirer dans linterprtation de la porte des droits conomiques,
sociaux et culturels.
III.
Jaimerais, maintenant, dans la dernire partie de ma brve prsentation,

essayer de voir quelles sont les modalits des mcanismes de contrle que lon
pourrait imaginer. Je crois que ces modalits peuvent varier en fonction de trois
critres. Puisquon est en prsence de requtes individuelles, il faut dabord
examiner la question des personnes qui seraient habilites saisir le Comit des
95
droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels. Ensuite, celle des infractions que ce

dernier pourrait, le cas chant, constater et finalement se pencher sur la ques-
tion de savoir quel pourrait tre le contenu du dispositif des constatations que le
comit pourrait adopter.
1. Quelles sont, tout dabord, les personnes qui pourraient tre habilites
saisir le comit? Je crois quune premire remarque dordre terminologique
doit tre faite. Il conviendrait probablement dviter des expressions ayant une
connotation judiciaire trop marque parce quelle fait peur aux Etats, comme les
expressions de requrant ou de recourant, et de leur prfrer lexpression, qui est
dailleurs habituelle dans ce domaine, dauteur de la communication, qui est une
expression beaucoup plus neutre et qui a un caractre judiciaire moins marqu.
Ensuite, quelle devrait tre la comptence ratione personae du comit? Est-
ce quelle devrait tre limite aux individus ou stendre galement des grou-
pes, voire des tiers? Le projet de protocole reconnat lintrt agir la fois
aux individus et aux groupes. Ses auteurs sont partis de lide que les rclama-
tions collectives peuvent jouer un rle majeur surtout dans les socits o les
groupes ont un rle important jouer comme, par exemple, les populations
autochtones. Sagissant des personnes physiques, il conviendrait de reconnatre
la qualit pour recourir ou lintrt agir non seulement aux victimes directes
mais galement, en sinspirant l aussi de la jurisprudence de la Cour europenne
des droits de lhomme ou de celle dautres instances, aux victimes indirectes
quon appelle victimes par ricochet, voire aux victimes potentielles.
La plupart des traits de sauvegarde des droits de lhomme, on le sait,
rservent la qualit pour recourir aux personnes relevant de la juridiction de
lEtat dfendeur, peu importe leur nationalit ou que les personnes naient pas
un permis de sjour valable. Convient-il de limiter pareillement la qualit pour
recourir dans le domaine de la violation des droits conomiques, sociaux et cul-
turels? On peut, en effet, se poser la question: vu le phnomne de la globalisa-
tion et de linterdpendance entre les Etats, il est permis de sinterroger sur le
point de savoir si une personne tablie sur le territoire dun Etat ne pourrait pas
se voir reconnatre la comptence pour dposer une requte contre un autre Etat
dont la politique conomique aurait pour consquence de violer les droits co-
nomiques et sociaux du requrant. Je crois que cette solution aurait pour avan-
tage de mettre en avant le caractre erga omnes que les Etats assument en rati-
fiant un trait comme le Pacte relatif aux droits conomiques, sociaux et
culturels, et dailleurs on la vu ce matin avec lexpos sur la Charte sociale euro-
penne et les rclamations collectives qui peuvent tre dposes non seulement
par les ONG nationales mais galement par des ONG internationales qui agis-
sent tout simplement dans lintrt du respect de la Charte.
Sagissant maintenant des organisations non gouvernementales ou, de
manire plus gnrale, des personnes morales, la qualit pour dposer une com-
munication devrait leur tre reconnue, me semble-t-il, en tout cas dans deux
hypothses. Dabord les ONG devraient pouvoir reprsenter les victimes se trou-
vant dans lincapacit dagir elles-mmes. Elles devraient galement pouvoir
saisir le Comit des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels dans leur propre
96
intrt, en leur propre nom, en tout cas chaque fois que leur but statutaire leur
confie la tche de veiller au respect des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels.
Par consquent, concernant le problme des personnes habilites saisir le
comit, il faudrait reconnatre cette qualit non seulement aux personnes phy-
siques mais galement des personnes morales sans ncessairement que le lien
de territorialit doive, mon avis, tre une condition.
2. Quelles sont les infractions qui pourraient tre susceptibles dtre cons-
tates? Il sagit l dun problme politique dlicat. Vous savez que, aux termes
de larticle 2, paragraphe 1, du Pacte relatif aux droits conomiques, sociaux et
culturels, chacun des Etats parties sengage agir tant par son effort propre que
par lassistance de la coopration internationale au maximum de ses ressources
disponibles en vue dassurer progressivement le plein exercice des droits recon-
nus par le pacte.
Comme la dj mentionn M. Riedel, les Etats ont pris plusieurs prcau-
tions au moment de ladoption de ce pacte. Evidemment, avec un protocole addi-
tionnel et les requtes individuelles, le comit serait en mesure de prononcer des
condamnations et dire, par exemple, que tel Etat ne respecte pas le pacte. Tou-
tefois, avant de constater une violation dun droit garanti par ce dernier, le comit
devrait, une fois que le protocole sera en vigueur, sefforcer de distinguer dans
chaque affaire dont il aura connatre entre deux hypothses bien distinctes.
Dune part, les cas dans lesquels il sagit dun manque de volont ou dune ngli-
gence de lEtat de respecter, protger ou mettre en uvre un droit garanti par le
pacte et qui se trouvent lorigine de la communication individuelle. Dautre
part, les cas dans lesquels lEtat se trouve objectivement dans lincapacit de
mettre en uvre des droits garantis par le pacte.
Dans la premire hypothse, manque de volont, je pense que linfraction
aux droits garantis par le pacte est vidente. Un Etat dpourvu de la volont
dutiliser au maximum les ressources qui se trouvent sa disposition pour rali-
ser les droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels ne respecte pas ses obligations
conventionnelles. Ce mme Etat ne devrait, cependant, pas tre totalement dis-
culp lorsquil invoque son incapacit objective sacquitter des obligations
engendres par le pacte, par exemple, lorsque la pnurie des ressources le met-
trait selon lui dans limpossibilit de se conformer ses obligations. Je crois que,
pour chapper toute condamnation, lEtat devra alors apporter la dmonstra-
tion quil na nglig aucun effort pour utiliser toutes les ressources dont il
dispose en vue de respecter ses obligations. Le comit devra naturellement
laisser aux Etats une assez grande marge dapprciation mais qui ne devrait pas
tre illimite. Mais lEtat devra en contrepartie apporter la preuve quil a de
bonne foi et ici le critre de la bonne foi est fondamental fourni tous les
efforts raisonnables auxquels lon est en droit de sattendre de lui pour respec-
ter le pacte.
3. Dernier point: quel pourrait tre le contenu du dispositif des constata-
tions? Jutilise le mot dispositif qui est utilis gnralement pour les juge-
ments, mais il est clair que les constatations du comit sapparenteraient un
jugement. Je crois que l aussi il faut faire attention la terminologie et quil
97
conviendrait de prfrer le terme constatations de prfrence celui de dci-

sions qui a une connotation judiciaire plus marque. De toute manire, le
comit ne sera investi ni dun pouvoir de cassation cela tous les Etats le com-
prennent bien ni dun pouvoir dappel ou de rforme ni mme dun pouvoir
dinjonction. Son seul pouvoir serait un pouvoir dclaratoire, celui de constater
que lEtat na pas respect les obligations dcoulant du pacte.
Ceci dit, deux possibilits sont envisageables selon moi. La premire, qui
prsente lavantage dassimiler les droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels aux
droits civils et politiques, consisterait confrer au comit la comptence de
constater une violation je souligne le mot violation des droits conomiques,
sociaux et culturels. Cette possibilit pourrait tre mon avis envisage au moins
dans quatre hypothses.
Dabord, des violations du pacte pourraient rsulter de politiques, de lois
ou de dcisions adoptes par les Etats. Le comit pourrait, par exemple, consta-
ter que telle politique, telle loi ou telle dcision constituent des ingrences inad-
missibles dans lexercice de la libert syndicale ou du droit de grve garanti par
larticle 8 du pacte. Il pourrait galement constater une violation de larticle 11
du pacte dans le cas o des personnes feraient lobjet dvacuation force.
Des violations pourraient galement tre constates par le comit si un Etat
se rendait responsable dune violation du principe de non-discrimination tel quil
est garanti aux articles 2, paragraphe 2, et 3 du pacte. Cest un principe qui est
directement applicable. Je pense que le mme raisonnement pourrait tre fait
lorsque un Etat adopte des mesures dites rtrogressives, lorsquil fait marche
arrire au lieu dassurer progressivement la ralisation des droits conomiques
et sociaux.
Troisimement, le comit pourrait tre habilit prononcer une violation
chaque fois que lEtat mis en cause a manqu lobligation fondamentale
dassurer la satisfaction de lessence dun droit ce que lon appelle en anglais
core obligations. Enfin, en reprenant la clbre distinction que plusieurs den-
tre vous connaissent et qui est familire au comit, puisquil la reprend dans cha-
cune de ses observations gnrales, la distinction entre les obligations de respec-
ter, de protger et de mettre en uvre les droits garantis par le pacte. Jestime
que le comit pourrait constater des violations du pacte chaque fois quil y a vio-
lation des obligations de respecter et de protger, parce qu ce niveau-l, il ny
a pas de diffrence de nature entre les droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels,
dune part, et les droits civils et politiques, dautre part. Quant la nature mme
de lobligation il ny a pas de diffrence, tandis que dans tous les autres cas et
en particulier lorsque lEtat dfendeur ne respecte pas le troisime volet de lo-
bligation, savoir lobligation de mettre en uvre (en anglais obligation de
fulfil), il conviendrait peut-tre de ne pas habiliter le comit constater une
vritable violation. Dans ce cas il faudrait peut-tre limiter sa comptence celle
de constater que lEtat dfendeur sacquitte de manire insatisfaisante, et cest
dailleurs ce que fait aussi le Comit europen des droits sociaux dans certaines
de ses dcisions, dans lesquelles il tablit que lEtat condamn, lEtat dfendeur,
ne sest pas acquitt de manire satisfaisante de ses obligations. Pour un Etat, il
98
est plus acceptable de dire: lEtat ne sacquitte pas de manire satisfaisante que
de dire quil a viol un droit, cette formule tant plus respectueuse de la souve-
rainet des Etats et mieux adapte la nature juridique des droits conomiques,
sociaux et culturels dans cette troisime dimension qui est la dimension de
mettre en uvre.
En conclusion, le but unique de mon intervention tait le suivant, il faut
que je rponde la question que lon a pose, qui tait sous forme interrogative:
faut-il privilgier la soumission de rapports ou lexamen de plaintes dans le
contrle du respect des droits conomiques et sociaux?
Ma rponse est que les deux se compltent. Actuellement, il y a un ds-
quilibre entre les deux pactes quil sagit maintenant de rtablir et il est clair
que sil fallait donner la prfrence lun ou lautre, ma prfrence, vous lau-
rez compris, va vers le systme de plaintes.
Discussion
Guido Raimondi* Je partage dans une large mesure lanalyse faite par le
professeur Decaux en ce qui concerne les risques juridiques lis laccumula-
tion, dune part, des instruments et, dautre part, des mcanismes de contrle. Il
nous a trac un tableau avec des ombres et des lumires, mais, si jai bien com-
pris lesprit de son discours, les lumires ont tendance prvaloir. Cest ce
propos que jaimerais formuler un commentaire marginal. Le professeur Decaux
a voqu larticle 14 de la Convention europenne des droits de lhomme, qui
contient une clause antidiscriminatoire. Comme il la indiqu, il sagit dune
clause ferme, cest--dire qui fonctionne uniquement par rapport aux droits
protgs par la Convention. Le Protocole no 12 vise transformer larticle 14 en
clause ouverte en largissant les critres de discrimination. Le professeur
Decaux a cependant prcis que ce protocole est trs peu ratifi. Tout en parta-
geant son analyse, jai limpression que ce protocole na pas eu que des effets
pervers. Aprs son adoption en novembre 2000, on a assist un dveloppement
spectaculaire de la jurisprudence de la Cour europenne des droits de lhomme
en ce qui concerne larticle 14. Auparavant, la Cour donnait une interprtation
trs stricte de cette disposition. Depuis ladoption du Protocole no 12, elle en a
largi la porte. Elle cherche toujours relier larticle 14 tel ou tel droit pro-
tg par la Convention, mais en utilisant des critres trs larges. Une fois quelle
a tabli ce lien, elle peut identifier une violation de larticle 14 en tant que tel.
Emmanuel Decaux Je suis tout fait daccord avec M. Raimondi, qui

connat bien le Conseil de lEurope. Il semble y avoir une pratique de la Cour
europenne des droits de lhomme consistant anticiper lentre en vigueur de
protocoles. Il a donn lexemple du Protocole no 12, on pourrait aussi citer le
* Conseiller juridique adjoint, Bureau international du Travail.
99
Protocole no 6 et le Protocole no 13 en matire de peine de mort. Dune certaine

manire, la jurisprudence prend dj acte dune volution. On peut aussi rappe-
ler que le Comit des droits de lhomme, par le biais de larticle 26 du Pacte
international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, a dj dvelopp une jurispru-
dence trs importante dans le domaine des droits conomiques et sociaux sous
langle de la protection contre la discrimination. Il serait intressant dtudier la
jurisprudence du Comit des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels concer-
nant lapplication du principe de non-discrimination: on disposerait alors dun
regard crois sur un problme donn.
Blanca Ruth Esponda Espinosa * I wish to ask Mr. Malinverni whether
in his opinion there is any intention under the Protocol to look at the fundamen-
tal differences in the application of international labour standards pertaining to
human rights between the States that follow the so-called monist system and
those having a dualist system.
Giorgio Malinverni Il me semble que le Comit se pose dj, dans le
cadre de la procdure des rapports, la question du systme moniste ou dualiste
dincorporation du Pacte ou, le cas chant, du Protocole additionnel. La ques-
tion nest cependant pas prsente directement sous cette forme. Que les Etats
soient de tradition moniste ou dualiste, ce qui compte cest que le trait soit
incorpor en droit national. Dans le cadre du dialogue que nous avons avec les
Etats, nous leur demandons si les tribunaux internes appliquent le Pacte et consi-
drent que ses dispositions sont directement applicables. Pour nous, le choix
entre un systme moniste et un systme dualiste est relativement secondaire.
Avec un systme de plaintes individuelles, les juridictions nationales seraient
tenues dappliquer les droits garantis par le Pacte pour viter que la requte ne
soit examine directement par le Comit des droits conomiques, sociaux et
culturels.
Alberto Odero de Dios** Je voudrais souligner la contribution de lOIT
et de la commission dexperts au dveloppement des droits de lhomme en droit
international. LOIT a adopt, dans les annes vingt, une convention sur les
heures de travail; dans les annes trente, il y a eu la premire convention sur le
travail forc; dans les annes quarante, les conventions sur la libert syndicale et
la ngociation collective; dans les annes cinquante, les conventions sur lga-
lit. Une jurisprudence trs labore a t construite sur la base de ces conven-
tions. Jaimerais demander au professeur Malinverni dans quelle mesure la
jurisprudence base sur les Pactes des Nations Unies peut tre dveloppe.
Certes il sagit de droits universels, mais les principes consacrs dans les deux
Pactes restent trs gnraux. Les modalits dapplication des droits ne sont pas
universelles, il existe des vues contradictoires, des polmiques leur sujet.
* Member, ILO Committee of Experts.

** Coordinateur, Dpartement des normes internationales du travail, Bureau international
du Travail.
100
Jaimerais donc savoir sil existe un espoir de voir la jurisprudence relative

lapplication des Pactes se dvelopper. Je voudrais galement que le professeur
Malinverni indique sil considre quil serait souhaitable dutiliser, dans le cadre
du contrle de lapplication des Pactes des Nations Unies, les tudes densem-
ble de la commission dexperts, dans lesquelles la commission tablit des prin-
cipes dinterprtation partir des exemples prcis de lgislation nationale, mais
aussi en tenant compte dautres considrations.
Giorgio Malinverni Vous avez parfaitement raison de dire que le Pacte

relatif aux droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels est beaucoup plus concis que
les conventions de lOIT. Si lon fait abstraction des articles 2 et 3 sur linter-
diction de la discrimination, les dispositions de fond figurent dans les articles 6
15 du Pacte, il sagit donc dun texte extrmement court. Cependant, il est pos-
sible de le dvelopper par le biais de la jurisprudence. On peut faire une analo-
gie cet gard avec la Convention europenne des droits de lhomme, qui
contient galement une quinzaine de dispositions normatives. Au fil des annes,
la Cour europenne a lev un monument de jurisprudence en concrtisant de
manire trs prcise ces diffrentes clauses. Il serait possible de procder de la
mme manire avec le Pacte relatif aux droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels.
En droit international, il existe deux sortes de traits. Dun ct il y a lOIT,
qui a donn naissance un grand nombre de conventions extrmement
dtailles. On y retrouve aussi le droit international humanitaire: les quatre
Conventions de Genve et leurs deux Protocoles additionnels constituent un
corps de rgles extrmement dtaill et prcis. Dun autre ct il y a des textes
beaucoup plus courts, pour lesquels la jurisprudence joue un rle. Le Pacte rela-
tif aux droits civils et politiques nest pas trs dtaill non plus, si on le compare
aux conventions de lOIT. Cest probablement pour cette raison que les organes
chargs du contrle de lapplication de ces traits ont pris lhabitude dadopter
des observations gnrales qui clarifient la porte des dispositions. Si le Proto-
cole additionnel entre un jour en vigueur, le Comit des droits conomiques
sociaux et culturels aura comme base de travail le texte du Pacte lui-mme, cest-
-dire le droit primaire, les observations gnrales et les observations finales
quil a adoptes au fil des annes loccasion de lexamen des rapports. Bien
entendu, il disposera galement des conventions de lOIT. Dailleurs, il se rfre
dj actuellement aux conventions de lOIT dans le cadre du dialogue quil mne
avec les reprsentants des Etats, en demandant par exemple pourquoi lEtat na
pas ratifi telle ou telle convention. Comme le disait le professeur Decaux, il y
a une influence rciproque des jurisprudences des diffrents organes internatio-
naux. A lheure actuelle, il nest plus possible de travailler en vase clos. Le vice-
prsident du Comit europen des droits sociaux a dit tout heure quil y a
actuellement deux affaires en train dtre juges par le Comit et qui concernent,
dune part, le pendant de la libert dassociation, savoir le droit de ne pas adh-
rer un syndicat et, dautre part, la question des chtiments corporels. Or, ces
deux questions ont dj fait lobjet dune jurisprudence abondante de la Cour
europenne des droits de lhomme, respectivement sur la base de larticle 11 de
101
la Convention, qui garantit la libert syndicale, et de son article 3, qui interdit

les traitements inhumains et dgradants, y compris les chtiments corporels. La
question est donc de savoir dans quelle mesure le Comit europen des droits
sociaux va prendre en compte la jurisprudence de la Cour europenne des droits
de lhomme dans lexamen de ces affaires. Puisque ces organes dpendent tous
deux du Conseil de lEurope, je ne pense pas que le Comit europen des droits
sociaux puisse ne pas tenir compte de la jurisprudence de la Cour. De mme, si
le Protocole additionnel entre un jour en vigueur, je suis absolument certain que
le Comit des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels des Nations Unies
sinspirera de la jurisprudence des organes de contrle de lOIT, et notamment
du Comit de la libert syndicale.
102
Panel discussion Effectiveness
of international supervision in the field
of social and economic rights
On social participation, public awareness
and social capacity
Tonia Novitz *
I would like to begin by saying how much I have, as an academic research-

ing in this field and a university teacher, benefited from hearing those who are
directly engaged in key supervisory processes and learning from their knowl-
edge of its intimate operation.
As a panel, we have been given a specific remit which I intend to keep to
in these introductory remarks, which hopefully will preface a larger and richer
discussion. We were advised to consider how effectiveness of international
supervision might be assessed, what characteristics might make an institutional
arrangement effective, and whether certain mechanisms not discussed so far,
such as soft law or international trade law could provide greater scope for the
effective protection of socio-economic rights.
I intend to start with a tentative definition of effectiveness, for indeed, it
makes little sense to speak of the effectiveness of international supervision in the
field of social and economic rights without considering how this might be
assessed. I should say at the outset that I do not expect that such assessment will
be straightforward. It seems that we may be looking for the findings of a super-
visory body to have effect in a variety of ways, such as: (1) impact on govern-
ment policy, as manifested in labour legislation and administrative conduct;
(2) effect on workplace relations in practice, such as between employers, work-
ers and their representatives; and (3) application in domestic courts (in monist
systems potentially directly and in dualist systems indirectly for interpretive
purposes).
The evidence for such effect may not be straightforward and we should
discuss this further as a panel. Nevertheless, I would envisage that it might be
* Reader in Law, University of Bristol.
105
possible to provide evidence through both case studies and statistical indicators
of welfare and prosperity.
My interest lies more in the criteria for or characteristics of effective
supervision. It seems to me that we are familiar with many of these criteria. For
example, for a supervisory organ to be effective it must be authoritative, and in
the opening session of this colloquium, Robyn Layton identified eloquently cer-
tain ways in which this status could be achieved. Those appointed to this super-
visory organ may be recognised as having special expertise in the area in ques-
tion, and it may help for them to be seen as independent. Moreover, such a body
may to be authoritative not only be impartial, but appear to be so, and for that
reason it makes sense to seek to achieve geographic spread in the persons
appointed to it. As she rightly pointed out, it is this authoritative status and
respect that the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations has in fact achieved. Additionally, the efficacy of a super-
visory body can be linked to its administrative capabilities, the number of cases
it can handle without significant delays, which may depend largely on its fund-
ing and resources.
Yet, we have been asked to talk specifically about effective supervision of
socio-economic rights and, arguably, particularly labour standards. My sugges-
tion is that the nature of the rights in question is relevant to the criteria for effec-
tive supervision. Labour standards have a social dimension insofar as they are
concerned with the promotion of workers welfare and are economic insofar as
they connect to income and regulation of markets. In particular, labour standards
like other socio-economic rights cannot easily be removed from the people they
are meant to benefit. Although a groundswell of public opinion and political
approval has seen their recognition in key international instruments, these enti-
tlements cannot be viewed in abstract legal terms, without reference to the
people they are designed to protect. It is for these reasons that I want to suggest
that the effectiveness of their supervisory mechanisms cannot only be deter-
mined with reference to the criteria already identified, but rather at least two (or
three) further characteristics. The first could be described as social participa-
tion, while the second could be described as public awareness which is thereby
closely linked with social capacity.
We have to understand social and economic rights as inextricably linked to
civil and political rights and, in particular, rights to freedom of speech and par-
ticipation in both the setting of legal norms and their enforcement. This point
relating to social participation will not come as a surprise to any one within the
trade union movement, given that the collective exercise of this kind of voice and
influence at both the national and international level is a significant legacy of the
labour movement. Today we have the recent creation of the International Trade
Union Confederation, whose 168 million members, no doubt expect this new
entity to continue this tradition. When we evaluate supervisory mechanisms, a
significant sign of their effectiveness is the extent to which civil society, trade
unions and NGO representation of those in the informal labour market, have
access to and utilise their procedures. They may do this both in order to repre-
106
On social participation, public awareness and social capacity
sent victims and to endeavour to protect their own entitlements as collective

entities.
Moreover, while their bare minimum may be referred to in international
instruments, the content of socio-economic rights and workers rights cannot
be understood to be set in stone. Contemporary developments always pose prob-
lems for the implementation of labour standards, as do the conditions peculiar
to any given country, or region, or grouping of people. Both reporting and com-
plaints mechanisms therefore can be understood as providing a discursive forum
for the determination of the content, as well as the application, of workers rights.
Socio-economic rights can only be understood to be efficacious to the extent that
civil society have meaningful access to them and can affect the contours of the
deliberations which take place. In this respect, the tripartite character of the ILO
Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association offers an unusual and
valuable model for supervision. Still, it should also be observed, as it was by the
Chair of the last session, Michael Halton Cheadle, that the ILO Committee of
Experts also uses reports from worker and employer associations to inform its
understanding of state reports, and thereby the observations and recommenda-
tions made to states.
It is this ideal participatory aspect of the enforcement of socio-economic
rights which makes me hesitant to endorse with enthusiasm the introduction of
a social clause within a WTO setting, where the discourse has been dominated
by the trade interests of particular states, and within which labour has yet to exer-
cise significant voice. I also remain sceptical of the so-called soft-law mecha-
nism of the Open Method of Co-ordination within the context of the EUs
endeavours to promote employment. Diamond Ashiagbors excellent recent
book on the European Employment Strategy (Oxford University Press, 2006)
suggests that this may in fact be a more coercive mechanism than it first appears,
in which state peer review and bureaucratic recommendations obscure the rep-
resentations of those most affected.
A second criterion for effectiveness of supervisory mechanisms, which is
perhaps too often neglected, is public awareness and the ways in which this
affects social capacity to implement socio-economic rights. Earlier today, Kari
Tapiola cited some of the successes of the ILO in this regard, but added that he
did not want to launch a public relations exercise, but I suppose that I do, for
somehow the discursive process that takes place at the international level has to
reach those affected on the ground, so as to achieve genuine multi-lateral gov-
ernance and self-determination.
Ideally, we would seem immediate implementation by states of recom-
mendations made by international supervisory bodies concerning socio-eco-
nomic rights, but as speakers have stressed today, we tend not to find states found
to be in breach so very co-operative. In this context, we have also witnessed rel-
ative apathy from the press and other media. We therefore have to look for other
means of achieving awareness and the capacity to implement supervisory find-
ings. There are various means to achieve this. For example, Daniel Blackburn
who is here today from the International Centre for Trade Union Rights (ICTUR)
107
is initiating a project of legal education, so as to encourage the introduction of

submissions concerning ILO standards in employment tribunals and ordinary
courts at first instance. There has also been a new initiative in the form of an
Academic Network on the European Social Charter, which was established last
year, and which with the assistance of the Charter Secretariat is launching train-
ing events, conferences, and publications designed to raise awareness.
The ILO itself has made various efforts in this regard. These include its
long established role of technical assistance to states to assist in compliance with
the findings of ILO supervisory bodies, funded programmes such as the Inter-
national Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour, the 1998 Declaration,
its follow-up and associated projects, as well as the ILO World Commission on
the Social Dimension of Globalization. In this way, the profile of workers rights
as socio-economic rights has been maintained, if not raised. The move to popu-
larise understanding of workers rights as human rights will not, one hopes,
obscure the need for other long-standing and vital ILO standards to be respected,
such as those on health and safety and working time, which might seem less
immediately compelling than the list of core labour rights in the 1998 Declara-
tion, but are of direct relevance to all those in work. My hope is that we will not
confuse the brilliant endeavours of the ILO under the leadership of Juan Somavia
to reinvigorate the protection of workers rights within a framework of global-
ization with abandonment of its traditional supervisory mechanisms. ILO super-
visory organs, such as the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom
of Association, play a vital role in identifying the respects in which the legal and
policy framework of particular states do not comply with their international obli-
gations, and as such serve as a crucial reference point for those who hope to chal-
lenge government policy domestically. This is another respect in which its super-
visory role can be seen as effective.
This celebration of the work that the Committee of Experts has done over
the past 80 years may be regarded as a mark of ILO recognition of its extremely
valuable function and continuing role in the effective protection of socio-eco-
nomic rights. My hope is that the work of the ILO continues in this comple-
mentary vein, and that it can be emulated across the international system. In this
way, it may be possible to promote co-ordination of diverse mechanisms for the
protection of socio-economic rights, and ensure that they are broadly consistent
in their approaches.
108
Facing the realities of supervision of social
rights: The experience of the UN
Rapporteur on indigenous peoples
Rodolfo Stavenhagen *
I. Introduction
Over the last two decades the situation of indigenous peoples worldwide
and the enjoyment of their human rights has become a key issue in the interna-
tional arena. This development is reflected in the establishment of the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in 1982, the proclamation by the
United Nations General Assembly of the Second International Decade for
Indigenous Peoples, 1995-2004, and the establishment of the Permanent Forum
on Indigenous Issues in 2000. The ILO has been a pioneering actor in the con-
temporary saliency of indigenous issues on the human rights agenda, particu-
larly since the adoption in 1989 of the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peo-
ples (No. 169).
In 2001, the Commission on Human Rights established the mandate of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
of indigenous people, in response to the growing international concern regard-
ing the marginalization and discrimination against indigenous people world-
wide. The mandate represents a significant moment for the ongoing pursuit of
indigenous peoples to safeguard their human rights and aims at strengthening
the protection mechanisms of the human rights of indigenous peoples.
The various activities undertaken within the mandate can be seen as a test
case for evaluating the effectiveness of international human rights mechanisms.
The issue is particularly relevant in relation to indigenous rights, many of which
belong to the wider area of economic, social and cultural rights.
* Emeritus Professor, El Colegio de Mxico; UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People.
109
In this article, I discuss the role of the Special Rapporteurs recommenda-

tions in strengthening the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples in their
respective countries. After a brief introduction to the mandate and activities of
the Special Rapporteur, reference will be made to different follow-up initiatives
put in place by governments, international agencies, and civil society organiza-
tions in order to promote a more effective implementation of the Special Rap-
porteurs recommendations. A number of examples will be provided of recom-
mendations that have actually contributed to specific changes in law and policy
in some countries. In the concluding section, I reflect on the overall impact and
effectiveness of the mechanism of the Special Rapporteur as it relates to other
international human rights bodies and procedures.
II. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples
In 2001, the Commission on Human Rights established the mandate of the

Special Rapporteur on the situation on human rights and fundamental freedoms
of indigenous people, as part of the wider system of thematic and country spe-
cial rapporteurs, independent experts, special representatives and working
groups of the Commission (commonly known as special procedures). 1 The
mandate of the Special Rapporteur was renewed for an additional period of three
years in 2004, 2 and subsequently extended by the Human Rights Council for an
additional year in 2006 together with the rest of the Commissions bodies and
procedures. 3
As distinct to the other main pillar of the UN human rights machinery
treaty bodies special procedures are not created by specific international
human rights conventions; they are normally unipersonal; and they do not act
under formal reporting or complaint procedures. They represent a more dynamic
and also more universal side of the UN human rights mechanisms, and the
flexibility of their specific mandates allows for a wide range of different activi-
ties, mixing both elements of protection and promotion.
As defined by the Commissions resolution, the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur is threefold. First, to gather, request, receive and exchange infor-
mation and communications from all relevant sources, including Governments,
indigenous people themselves and their communities and organizations, on vio-
lations of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. 4 Second, to formulate
1
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/57, UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/57
(24 April 2001).
2
(21 April 2004).
3
Human Rights Council Decision 2006/102, UN Doc. A/HRC/DEC/1/102 (13 November
2006).
4
(24 April 2001), para. 1(a).
110
Facing the realities of supervision of social rights
recommendations and proposals on appropriate measures and activities to pre-

vent and remedy violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of
indigenous people. 5 And third, to work in close relation with other special rap-
porteurs, special representatives, working groups and independent experts of the
Commission on Human Rights and of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights. 6
Since my appointment in 2001, I have concentrated on three main areas of
work, which are similar to the ones undertaken by other special procedures: first,
thematic research on issues that have an impact on the human rights situation
and the fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples; second, country visits; and
third, communications with Governments concerning allegations of violations
of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples worldwide.
My first annual report and plan of work to the Commission in 2002, was
followed by three annual thematic reports to the Commission and two to the
Council, each one focusing on specific issues, such as the impact of large-scale
development projects on human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous
peoples and communities; 7 the access to the administration of justice by indige-
nous peoples and indigenous customary law; 8 the hindrances and inequalities
that indigenous peoples face in relation to the access to and the quality of edu-
cation systems; 9 and the question of constitutional reforms, legislation and
implementation of laws regarding the promotion and protection of rights of
indigenous people and the effectiveness of their application. 10 My last report,
presented to the Human Rights Council in March 2007, presented an overall pic-
ture of the state of the rights of indigenous peoples of the world, focusing on new
trends and challenges that have become visible in recent years. 11
Official missions to countries are a crucial component of the mandate, as
they allow for a constructive dialogue with the Government, indigenous com-
munities, and other relevant organizations. Country visits are essential for a
clearer analysis and understanding of the situation of indigenous peoples in dif-
ferent circumstances and also contribute to raise awareness about these issues in
the international community. Since 2002, I have reported to the Commission and
5
Ibid., para. 1(c).
6
Ibid., para. 1(d).
7
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental free-
doms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90 (21 January 2003).
8
doms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/80 (26 January 2004).
9
doms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Doc. E/CN.2005/88 (6 January 2005).
10
doms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/78 (16 February 2006).
11
Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 entitled
Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/32
(27 February 2007).
111
the Council on visits to 10 countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and the
Pacific. 12
Finally, an important feature of the mandate are the communications with
Governments regarding allegations of human rights violations of indigenous
people. This procedure consists of letters to Governments that are typically classi-
fied as urgent appeals in case of imminent danger to persons or communities, and
allegation letters, in less urgent cases. 13 While these communications are indeed
important means to draw the attention of Government and other actors to specific
situations or trends, for the purposes of this article reference is made particularly
to the impact of the recommendations incorporated in my reports to the Council.
III. The nature of the Special Rapporteurs recommendations
The thematic and country visit reports include recommendations that are
important for the advancement of the promotion and protection of indigenous
peoples rights. Although mainly intended for Governments, some are also
addressed to United Nations agencies and programmes, indigenous peoples
organizations, civil society and academic institutions.
These recommendations are not compulsory decisions adopted by an inter-
national court nor are they equivalent to the observations of human rights treaty
bodies. However, in as much as they are incorporated in an official document
prepared by an independent expert for the Human Rights Council, the highest
body responsible for human rights issues in the United Nations, these recom-
mendations have some level of authority that cannot simply be disregarded by
the States concerned.
In addition, they do not operate in a normative vacuum. The Special Rap-
porteurs work is informed by and builds upon existing international standards
regarding indigenous rights, including treaties, customary law and soft law;
the decisions and recommendations of international human rights bodies respon-
sible for monitoring those norms, which have developed a specific jurisprudence
concerning indigenous peoples among others. 14 Thus, the recommendations of
12
The following reports are available: Guatemala (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2), Philip-
pines (UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.3), Mexico (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.2), Chile (UN
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.3), Colombia (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.2), Canada (UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.3), South Africa (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.2), New Zealand (UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3), Ecuador (A/HRC/4/32/Add.2) and Kenya (A/HRC/4/32/Add.3).
13
As a general rule, both urgent appeals and letters of allegation remain confidential until
published in the annual report of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights, now
to the Human Rights Council. A summary of such communications and the replies received from
the concerned Government are formally included in the first addendum to the Special Rapporteurs
annual reports.
14
See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, submitted pursuant to Commission resolu-
tion 2001/57, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/97 (A/HRC/4/32/Add.2), paras. 6-33, and Report of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people,
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/78 (26 February 2006), paras. 7-13, 51-79.
112
the Special Rapporteur are part of the wider system of international norms,
actors and procedures that interact to promote the rights of indigenous peoples,
and from which they also derive their own legitimacy.
The human rights situation of indigenous peoples is derived from complex
historical processes and structural phenomena, and therefore the actions and
strategies required to improve this situation are necessarily multifaceted. At
times, when there is need for specific legal, institutional or constitutional reform
to guarantee the rights of indigenous peoples or to solve possible conflicts
between existing domestic legislation, then the implementation of these recom-
mendations may be relatively easy to assess. In other instances, when for exam-
ple indigenous populations are systematically disadvantaged regarding the deliv-
ery of social services, then recommendations concerning adequate institutional
measures and precise indicators may be in order.
In 2005, the Commission on Human Rights requested the Special Rappor-
teur to study the best practices carried out to implement the recommendations
contained in his reports.15 This preliminary study, presented at the 4th session of
the Human Rights Council in March 2007, records various national level initia-
tives that follow-up on the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur, and
examines their impact including the effectiveness of the mechanism as a whole. 16
IV. Follow-up on the Special Rapporteurs recommendations:

The OHCHR project in Mexico and Guatemala
In 2005, the Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) country offices

in Mexico and Guatemala, in cooperation with the respective Governments, ini-
tiated the project Promotion and protection of human rights of indigenous peo-
ples in Central America with a special focus on Guatemala and Mexico, with
funding by the European Commission. One of the main objectives of this proj-
ect is to provide support to both Governments in implementing the recommen-
dations of the Special Rapporteurs country reports, particularly by setting up
human rights protection and monitoring standards to measure the implementa-
tion of the recommendations, the developments in the legal system, and the
changes in the human rights situation of indigenous peoples and of women in
particular.
In the framework of this project, OHCHR has promoted training courses
for members of the Government, the judiciary and indigenous organizations on
15
(20 April 2007), para. 9.
16
See Study regarding best practices carried out to implement the recommendations con-
tained in the annual reports of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/32/Add.4 (26 February
2007). A preliminary report on the study was presented to the Human Rights Council in 2006; see
Progress report on preparatory work for the study regarding best practices carried out to imple-
ment the recommendations contained in the annual reports of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.4 (26 January 2006).
113
the rights of indigenous peoples. The project also promoted the dissemination of
the reports by way of printed and audio materials in Spanish and indigenous lan-
guages. Two research projects on the recognition of traditional indigenous law
in the official legal system of Mexico, following my recommendations on
indigenous law and access to justice, and one on the situation of the rights of
indigenous women were launched in 2006.
OHCHR Mexico, its counterparts in the Government and indigenous and
human rights organizations held meetings to evaluate the state of implementa-
tion of these recommendations in 2006 and 2007. Similar meetings, widely
attended, have taken place in Guatemala during the Special Rapporteurs follow-
up mission in 2006.
OHCHR Mexico conducted a survey on actions taken by government insti-
tutions, the legislative and judicial branches, as well as national human rights
institutions at the federal and state levels to implement the Special Rapporteurs
recommendations. In Guatemala, the Office has assisted the Presidential Com-
mission on Human Rights (Comisin Presidencial de los Derechos Humanos,
COPREDH) in the elaboration of indicators to improve monitoring of the Spe-
cial Rapporteurs recommendations.
The OHCHR binational project has also helped further the action of
OHCHR country offices in the field of indigenous rights in those two countries.
In Mexico, the Office identified the administration of justice in the State of
Oaxaca as one of the priority areas for 2005. In planning the different activities
in this area, consideration was given to the Special Rapporteurs recommenda-
tions in his report on administration of justice and indigenous law.
Together with the OHCHR initiative, a number of international agencies
have used the Special Rapporteurs thematic and country recommendations in
their programmatic work. For instance, in Guatemala the UN country teams
inter-agency thematic group on indigenous and multicultural issues engages in
training indigenous peoples organizations, as recommended in the Special Rap-
porteurs report. 17
In addition, indigenous peoples and their support organizations also con-
tribute to the practical implementation of the recommendations. A growing
number of experiences in countries visited provide examples of how indigenous
peoples have appropriated these reports and used them as practical tools in the
defense of their rights. This is particularly the case of Mexico, where the Citi-
zen Observatory of Indigenous Peoples (Observatorio Ciudadano de los Pueb-
los Indgenas, OCPI), of the Mexican Academy of Human Rights, in coopera-
tion with the UNESCO Chair on Human Rights of the National Autonomous
University of Mexico, monitors the implementation of the Special Rapporteurs
recommendations after his visit to Mexico in 2003. The Observatory launched a
17
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, submitted in accordance with Commission
resolution 2001/5, Addendum: Mission to Guatemala, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2 (24 Feb-
ruary 2003) [hereinafter Report on Guatemala], paras. 86 and 87.
114
nationwide campaign to promote knowledge of the Special Rapporteurs man-

date and recommendations, and to evaluate their state of implementation through
an information request system (SISI), which is available on the Internet. 18
V. Best practices in the implementation

of the Special Rapporteurs recommendations
The OHCHR project in Guatemala and Mexico, as well as the follow-up

initiatives promoted by international agencies and civil society in these two
countries, offer an unprecedented test-tube to assess the domestic impact of the
mandate. The study on best practices provides a number of examples of how
these recommendations have resulted in actual legal and policy changes in these
two countries in areas that are of direct interest for indigenous peoples. Many of
these best practices are the result of specific governmental and non-govern-
mental initiatives to follow-up on the recommendations of the reports. Despite
these positive steps, however, many important human rights concerns alluded to
in the Special Rapporteurs recommendations have still not been addressed. The
mixed record of implementation suggests a necessary reflection on the limits of
UN special procedures, particularly in the field of economic, social, and cultural
rights, and of the need to rethink ways of enhancing implementation in cooper-
ation with all relevant stakeholders.
1. Guatemala
In Guatemala, the follow-up visit provided an opportunity to recognize an
increasing level of awareness among State authorities of the need to give prior-
ity attention to indigenous issues, as recommended. The Report paid special
attention to the 1996 Peace Accords, which include the Agreement on Identity
and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This agreement defines a comprehensive pro-
gram of action to advance the recognition and protection of the rights of indige-
nous peoples. But the Report noted that the full implementation of the Agree-
ment was behind schedule and recommended that appropriate measures be taken
to overcome this delay. 19 An encouraging development in this regard is the adop-
tion in August 2005 of the Framework-Law on the Peace Agreement (Decree
No. 52-2005) which makes the implementation of the Peace Agreements a legal
commitment of the Guatemalan State.
In connection with the Peace Agreements, the Special Rapporteur also
welcomed a number of initiatives seeking redress for the atrocities committed
during the civil war against indigenous people. In 2004, in implementation of
the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Masacre de
18
See http://www.amdh.com.mx/ocpi (last consulted 12 March 2007).
19
Report on Guatemala, op.cit., supra, paras. 4, 71.
115
Plan de Snchez case, concerning a massacre in a Mayan village in 1982 com-

mitted by the military, the Government organized a public event at which it
acknowledged its responsibility for the atrocity and apologized to the victims
and their relatives. In 2006 the Presidential Commission on Human Rights
(Comisin Presidencial de Derechos Humanos, COPREDEH) initiated the com-
pensation to the victims of the massacre.
The Special Rapporteurs report emphasizes the need to strengthen and pri-
oritize measures to combat the high level of racism and discrimination in the
country. There have been a number of court decisions in recent years regarding
cases of racial discrimination, which is a crime under the Guatemalan Penal
Code. Institutional action in this regard has been reinforced with the establish-
ment of the Presidential Commission to Combat Discrimination and Racism
against Indigenous Peoples (Comisin Presidencial contra la Discriminacin y
el Racismo contra los Pueblos Indgenas en Guatemala, CODIRSA). As a
follow-up to a specific recommendation in the Special Rapporteurs report, 20
CODIRSA, with the technical assistance of OHCHR Guatemala, announced the
launching in 2007 of a national campaign for coexistence and elimination of
racism and racial discrimination.
Addressing the situation of serious and systematic discrimination faced by
indigenous women, the Report recommended the adoption of special meas-
ures, including greater political, legal and economic support to the Office for
the Defense of Indigenous Women [Defensoria de la Mujer Indgena, DEMI]. 21
A positive development in recent years has been the strengthening of the work
of DEMI, with the support of international organizations and agencies, includ-
ing OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF and others. DEMI is now a key actor in the
national human rights machinery, and requires continuous support to perform its
important task.
The Report further recommends that Guatemala strengthen the educational
system as a national priority, including the extension of bilingual education to
all areas of the country. 22 An important measure of the implementation of this
recommendation is the establishment of a Vice-Ministry of Bilingual Inter-cul-
tural Education in 2003 and the adoption of Government Agreement No. 22-
2004 on the extension of multicultural bilingual education in the school system,
including the development of appropriate curricula. In addition, in 2003 Con-
gress passed the Law on National Languages (Decree No. 19-2003), which offi-
cially recognizes the Mayan, Garifuna and Xinka languages and promotes their
preservation and use in the Administration. This new legal and institutional
framework has been welcomed by indigenous organizations and experts, who
now demand its full implementation.
20
Ibid., para. 67.
21
Ibid., para. 79.
22
Ibid., para. 77.
116
2. Mexico
After the controversial constitutional reform of 2001 regarding indigenous
peoples, a number of federal states (Nayarit, Campeche and Quintana Roo
among others) adopted their own laws on indigenous rights and culture, in line
with the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur. 23 Nevertheless, the federal
constitutional review on indigenous issues remains at a stalemate.
Important efforts to promote the implementation of recommendations con-
cerning the review of the administration of justice in order to address the spe-
cific needs of indigenous peoples have been initiated, such as the consolidation
and extension of the system of bilingual translators in the courts, the training of
bilingual legal aid services, including university students in Oaxaca. 24 In Chia-
pas, the Office of the Prosecutor on Indigenous Justice (Fiscala de Justicia Ind-
gena) was created in 2005, and is staffed by indigenous lawyers who receive spe-
cial training to ensure that the rights of indigenous peoples are respected in cases
involving indigenous communities and individuals. In Quertaro, the Public
Prosecutors Office established a mobile office specializing in indigenous issues.
Several states, including the State of Mxico, Michoacn and Puebla, now have
programs to train legal translators and interpreters in indigenous languages.
In line with the Special Rapporteurs recommendation to incorporate
indigenous law in the judicial system, 25 new indigenous courts or peace and
reconciliation courts have been established in Campeche, Chiapas, Hidalgo,
Puebla, Quintana Roo and San Luis Potos, comprised of members of local
indigenous communities, with power to hear civil and family cases, as well as
minor criminal cases, on the basis of indigenous law and custom. The National
Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples (Comisin Nacional
para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indgenas, CDI) has conducted studies on
indigenous law and its compatibility with human rights norms and national
legislation.
The Special Rapporteurs recommendation to review the case files of
indigenous persons prosecuted by the different courts in order to remedy any
irregularities has been addressed by CDI, which has reviewed thousands of case
files and is preparing a census of the indigenous population in national prisons.
Similar programs have been implemented in Hidalgo, Michoacn and Oaxaca. 26
A best practice is the implementation of the Special Rapporteurs recom-
mendation to strengthen and provide adequate institutional resources to bilingual
23
doms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Addendum: Mission to Mexico, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.2 (23 December 2003) [hereinafter Report on Mexico], para. 66. See
CNDI, La vigencia de los derechos indgenas en Mxico (2006). Electronic book available at:
http://cdi.gob.mx/derechos/vigencia_libro/vigencia_derechos_indigenas_mexico.pdf (last con-
sulted 12 March 2007).
24
Report on Mexico, op.cit., supra, paras. 82, 85.
25
Ibid., para. 93.
26
Ibid., para. 86. The Special Rapporteur recommended particularly (para. 87) that CDI
should be assigned a greater role in this regard.
117
intercultural education in the country. 27 The Ministry of Public Education has

recently expanded bilingual secondary education, already provided in preschool
and primary school, through a special course on indigenous peoples taught in
several indigenous languages, and a number of intercultural high schools and
communitarian high schools, with adapted curricula and teaching in indige-
nous languages, have been created in areas of Chiapas, Oaxaca and Tabasco.
Eight intercultural universities have been set up in indigenous regions in the
States of Chiapas, Guerrero, Mxico, Michoacn, Puebla, Quintana Roo,
Tabasco and Veracruz. The use of indigenous languages in education and in other
spheres of public life has also been reinforced by the recently created National
Institute on Indigenous Languages, responsible for the implementation of the
General Law on the Linguistic Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2003).
VI. Conclusions
The various cases reviewed suggest that my thematic and country reports
have had differential impacts. As official United Nations documents providing a
fully independent viewpoint, thematic reports are part of ongoing discussions
and policymaking concerning issues of special relevance for indigenous peoples,
and their impact cannot be easily evaluated in terms of the implementation of
the specific recommendations they contain. The Special Rapporteurs country
visits have generally had a more direct impact on legal, social and political
dynamics at the national level. These reports, and the visits themselves, have
helped promote spaces of dialogue between States and indigenous peoples, have
contributed to educating government actors, civil society and the general public
on the situation of indigenous peoples in their own countries, and have been
appropriated by indigenous peoples and human rights organizations as an advo-
cacy tool.
The recommendations in these reports do not provide a magic fix, and
do not generate automatic and speedy changes in the situation of the rights of
indigenous peoples. Their level of implementation varies according to different
country situations and issues addressed. The various cases of initiatives to mon-
itor and promote their implementation indicate that successful results cannot be
left to traditional institutional routines alone, but require specific push actions
based on the cooperation between governments, the United Nations, civil soci-
ety and indigenous peoples themselves.
In countries where follow-up mechanisms exist, such as in Mexico and
Guatemala, institutional efforts towards implementation have been more sus-
tained, leading to concrete changes in law and practice. These mechanisms take
different forms, such as monitoring bodies, national forums and follow-up mis-
sions, and involve a myriad of governmental and non-governmental actors, as
27
Ibid., para. 102.
118
well as international agencies. The process of implementation of the Special

Rapporteurs recommendations has opened spaces for dialogue between Gov-
ernments, civil society and indigenous peoples and organizations. In all cases
where substantive advances can be reported, indigenous peoples have been
actively involved in the process.
The comparative analysis of best practices in several countries shows that
the effective changes in implementation of the Special Rapporteurs recommen-
dations are more easily detected in relation to recommendations related to the
areas of social policy and development, as well as to the strengthening of spe-
cific government institutions and policies related to indigenous affairs. However,
many of the main recommendations remain unaddressed, particularly in the
fields of legal and constitutional reform and indigenous land and resource rights,
including the right of consultation in relation to development projects in indige-
nous territories.
These experiences suggest that, despite the advances that can be identified,
the general record of implementation of the Special Rapporteurs recommenda-
tions is gloomy. Much remains to be done by the Governments, international
agencies and other relevant stakeholders to bridge the implementation gap that
divides international and domestic norms and the serious human rights viola-
tions that indigenous peoples continue to experience in all parts of the world.
119
Rflexions sur le paralllisme
dans la mise en uvre des droits
conomiques et des droits sociaux
Brigitte Stern *
Pour reprendre le titre de cette table ronde qui est leffectivit du contrle
international dans le domaine des droits conomiques et sociaux, je dsire, en ce
qui me concerne, faire deux ou trois remarques. Dans un premier temps, je
souhaite articuler quelques rflexions sur le concept deffectivit avant dessayer
de vous vous proposer ensuite une grille des diffrents mcanismes possibles
pour assurer cette effectivit. Je voudrais, enfin, poser la question qui est de
savoir si on peut toujours parler deffectivit dans le domaine des droits
conomiques et sociaux sans distinguer les droits conomiques et les droits soci-
aux. Il semble que dans certains cas il y a peut-tre des contradictions, jen don-
nerai des exemples.
Quelques remarques dabord sur leffectivit. Lorsque lon dit effectivit
du contrle international je vais apprhender cela comme effectivit des
normes, car le but est davoir des normes qui ont une effectivit. Leffectivit
des normes juridiques nest pas, mon avis, un concept strictement juridique,
mme sil peut avoir des liens avec le systme juridique et les mcanismes de
contrle mis en uvre. Leffectivit est, selon moi, un concept sociologique,
social, qui mesure le degr de mise en uvre des normes dans la ralit
juridique. Le but des rgles est quelles soient appliques, donc, au fond,
leffectivit cest tout simplement de savoir si elles le sont.
Selon Monsieur Malinverni, leffectivit se mesure la possibilit dtre
sanctionn. Il sagit l dune remarque qui peut, ventuellement, tre un peu
discut. Cela est vrai, il y a une plus ou moins grande probabilit deffectivit
* Professeur de droit international, Universit Panthon-Sorbonne (Paris I ).
121
lorsquil y a des sanctions, mais ce nest pas vident. Outre la sanction, leffec-
tivit va galement tre en partie lie au caractre, plus ou moins obligatoire, de
la norme. En ralit, ni lune ni lautre de ces affirmations ne sont totalement
justes dans la mesure o il y a des normes dont le non-respect pourrait tre sanc-
tionn sans pour autant que cela donne des rsultats probants. Aprs tout, il ne
se passera rien si un Etat dcidait de ne pas mettre en uvre un jugement de la
Cour international de Justice. En ma qualit de membre du Tribunal adminis-
tratif de lONU, je peux galement me rfrer titre dexemple un avis important
de ce tribunal qui, je le pense, tait important mais na pas plu lOrganisation
puisquelle ne la pas mis en uvre. Voil, par consquent, un certain nombre de
cas o nous avons apparemment une sanction, un processus, et o leffectivit
est tout de mme assez moyenne.
De la mme faon, je pense quil y a des cas o les traits sont assez inef-
ficaces, alors que des normes de soft law, des codes de conduite, sils sont
respects, peuvent tre trs efficaces. Leffectivit nest, ds lors, pas, je le crois,
strictement lie ni la nature juridique, ni au mcanisme juridique de mise
en uvre.
Bien sr, lanalyse de leffectivit dune norme ne peut pas se faire de faon
compltement isole du systme juridique et, en particulier, des mcanismes
juridiques qui assurent la mise en uvre des normes.
Aprs ces quelques rflexions introductives concernant leffectivit, je
voudrais essayer de rflchir un peu aux diffrents mcanismes possibles qui
sont susceptibles de lassurer. Bien sr, on la dit et redit, et plusieurs des con-
tributions sinscrivent dans lune ou lautre de ces catgories, il y a des mcan-
ismes juridiques dont lobjet est de favoriser les normes. Il y a des mcanismes
diffrents stades, aprs la violation, avant celle-ci, des mcanismes plutt juri-
dictionnels ou quasi-juridictionnels et dautres non juridictionnels.
Je vais tout dabord voquer trs rapidement les mcanismes juridiction-
nels et de mise en uvre de la responsabilit, des mcanismes qui interviennent
aprs la violation de la norme. Dans tous les systmes juridiques existe le mcan-
isme de la responsabilit qui intervient une fois quune violation est commise.
La responsabilit, quelle soit nationale ou internationale, est donc le fait de
rpondre de ses actes. Il en va ainsi de la rparation due lorsque lacte en ques-
tion porte atteinte un devoir garanti par la norme ou, dans certains cas,
lquilibre matriel, par exemple dans le cas de responsabilit sans faute.
Nous avons prcdemment parl de compensation: il faut rparer, rtablir
la situation qui aurait exist si lacte lorigine de la responsabilit navait pas
eu lieu. Bien videmment, cette responsabilit est mise en uvre dans le cadre
des mcanismes dj voqus comme la Commission europenne des droits de
lhomme, la Cour interamricaine des droits de lhomme, mais galement dans
dautres enceintes comme lOMC ou lALENA.
Je me propose de marrter quelques instants sur lOMC, qui dispose dun
mcanisme quasi-juridictionnel de rglement des diffrends mais dont on pour-
rait presque enlever le quasi, puisque les diffrents cas examins au sein de ce
mcanisme donnent lieu un corps de dcisions que lon serait en droit de
122
Paralllisme dans la mise en uvre des droits conomiques et des droits sociaux
considrer comme une jurisprudence. Ainsi, bien que stricto sensu il sagisse
dun mcanisme quasi-juridictionnel, je crois que lon peut pratiquement dire
que cest une juridiction. Le plus grand dfaut du mcanisme de lOMC est que
son but est la mise en uvre de la norme, mais par la rparation. Dans le cas o
un Etat aurait, pendant trois ans, viol la norme, il ny a pas de rparation, il ny
a pas de mcanisme de responsabilit, cest un mcanisme de mise en confor-
mit pour le futur. Il y a des cas o cela ne marche pas du tout, par exemple, dans
laffaire de lacier amricain o les Etats-Unis avaient besoin, durant quelques
annes, de protger leur industrie de lacier. Lorsque la dcision tablissant que
cela tait contraire aux rgles de lOMC est finalement intervenue, les Etats-Unis
nen avaient plus besoin. Toutefois, pendant trois ans, la violation na eu aucune
consquence ngative. Il sagit par consquent dune chose laquelle lOMC
devrait, mon sens, rflchir.
Je voudrais maintenant, aprs avoir abord les mcanismes de respons-
abilit qui interviennent aprs la violation, parler des autres mcanismes qui ne
sont pas contentieux et sur les lesquels ce colloque sest trs largement pench.
Ces mcanismes font appel diffrentes techniques. Si nous regardons un peu
au-del de notre domaine, je pense que nous nadoptons pas tout fait les mmes
mthodes dans les domaines du dsarmement, des droits de lhomme
conomiques et sociaux , et dans le domaine de lenvironnement. Trs rapide-
ment, il semble que dans le domaine du dsarmement on utilise surtout lin-
spection on va, par exemple, vrifier sur place le nombre dogives, vrifier que
lIraq na pas darmes de destruction massive ou, plutt, quil en a. Dans le
domaine des conventions des droits de lhomme, qui sont au centre de nos
travaux, ce nest pas tellement la logique de linspection, mais celle de la dnon-
ciation (la mobilisation de la honte), quant au domaine de lenvironnement, il
sagit dune logique daccompagnement, dincitation. Quelquun voquait
prcdemment la diffrence entre lEtat qui ne veut pas et celui qui ne peut pas.
Dans le domaine de lenvironnement, cela est pris en compte et il y a des comits
dapplication, par exemple, dans le cadre du Protocole de Montral, qui mettent
en uvre ce que nous appelons des procdures de non-conformit. Cela est trs
important: ce ne sont pas des procdures de violation mais des procdures de
non-conformit, et nous cherchons voir comment nous pouvons inciter les
Etats se mettre en conformit. Cela est, bien sr, aussi le ct incitatif qui est
sous-jacent un certain nombre des procdures quon a vues dans le domaine
des droits de lhomme et dans celui des droits conomiques et sociaux.
Jen arrive maintenant au troisime point, qui est une interrogation: pou-
vons-nous parler comme cela, sans vraiment y rflchir, des droits conomiques
et sociaux? Nous lavons tout le temps fait, mais ny a-t-il pas des domaines o
il y a une trs grande effectivit de la mise en uvre de droits conomiques dans
lignorance, ou mme au dtriment, peut-tre, des droits sociaux? Je vais donner
un ou deux exemples, et tout dabord celui de lOMC justement, o les droits
conomiques sont trs srieusement mis en uvre, avec possibilit dune sanc-
tion mais o, par exemple, les droits conomiques des Etats (un commerce qui
nest pas discriminatoire, le droit la libert du commerce, etc., ce sont des
123
droits conomiques), peuvent rejaillir sur les entreprises. On sait trs bien que
dans le cadre de lOMC la clause sociale qui tait cense protger les tra-
vailleurs, assurer un minimum social tous les pays de lOMC, a t refuse par
les pays en dveloppement et na pas t intgre dans le droit de lOMC. Nous
avons donc l une grosse efficacit de la mise en uvre des droits conomiques
et assez peu des droits sociaux.
Autre domaine o ce problme se pose, mon avis, de plus en plus, celui
de linvestissement international. Je vais ici dire quelques mots de lALENA
(Accord de libre-change nord-amricain), dans lequel le chapitre 11 permet aux
investisseurs de faire respecter leurs droits face aux Etats, et galement du
CIRDI (Centre international de rglement des diffrents conomiques interna-
tionaux) sous lgide de la Banque mondiale, qui de la mme faon permet des
investisseurs de mettre en uvre ces droits conomiques. Dans ces deux
domaines, on saperoit de plus en plus que le droit conomique, le droit de pro-
prit des investissements, qui est un droit conomique, est assez bien protg
mais quil y a de plus en plus dONG qui interviennent et qui essayent de mettre
en avant les droits sociaux qui ne seraient peut-tre pas aussi bien respects
droits sociaux allant jusquau droit lenvironnement sain, etc. Je voudrais, cet
gard, peut-tre marquer un tout petit dsaccord avec ce qua dit Mme Novitz,
qui a dit there is limited scope for civil society lOMC. Je ne le crois pas.
LOMC a largement ouvert ses portes aux amicus curiae; la socit civile se fait
entendre pratiquement dans toutes les affaires, tant au niveau des panels que de
lorgane dappel. Cest une volution assez remarquable et ce phnomne a
dbord sur larbitrage international, dabord dans le cadre de lALENA o dans
une affaire opposant UPS au Canada, les syndicats des postiers sont intervenus
afin de faire valoir des droits qui nallaient pas toujours dans le sens des droits
conomiques de la socit plaignante. Il est donc vident que nous sommes en
prsence de choses plus complexes que la formule droits conomiques et soci-
aux. Le raisonnement des organes de rglement des diffrends de lOMC a par-
fois t repris textuellement par les tribunaux arbitraux dans le cadre de
lALENA et en mai dernier il y a eu deux dcisions arbitrales dans le cadre du
CIRDI qui, allant lencontre de la volont des parties, ont accept des amicus
curiae qui se proccupaient de la faon dont tait gre leau potable en Argen-
tine dans deux affaires. Voil donc quelques rflexions autour de lide que
leffectivit des droits conomiques et des droits sociaux ne va pas toujours
de pair.
124
Panel discussion
Discussion
Cassio Mesquita Barros * In order to assess the effectiveness of supervi-

sion, it is essential to clearly define the objective of this action. In this context,
the difference between social and economic rights and human rights is key. Yet,
this difference has rather been blurred. The evaluation of social and economic
rights in democratic regimes belongs to the legislator who determines what can
each group demand from society. The decision of the Federal Constitutional
Court of Germany concerning Article 109(2) of the German Constitution illus-
trates this point. The main parameter for the budget of the Federal Government
and the Lander is the general economic balance, and therefore the budget is sub-
ject to what is economically possible. Labour rights share the same characteris-
tics and are subject to the consideration of the economically possible in the
global economy. In contrast, human rights do not carry such considerations.
Human rights only crystallize those principles, where humanity, according to its
experience, accepts that violation leads to arbitrary situations and backward
movement of society. It is therefore crucial to clarify the difference between
social and economic rights and human rights, to be able to decide an appropri-
ate mechanism for assessing effectiveness.
Eibe Riedel** I agree with Ms. Novitz that the subject matter of this col-
loquium is significant. Addressing human rights in the field of labour law and
standard-setting in the ILO is about mainstreaming human rights in the entire
UN system. It is in this context that the discussion about the Declaration plays
such an important political and legal role; the treaty bodies and the Committee
of Experts represent just one facet of the picture.
I concur that soft law often offers an alternative to sanctions. This is to be
taken into consideration, when dealing with the policy aspects of human rights,
strategies and plans of action. For example, the UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, in making suggestions and recommendations, regu-
larly pushes a little bit beyond the text of the Covenant. However, when inter-
preting the Covenant, we are in the strictly legal field and bound by the text.
I also wholeheartedly agree with Ms. Stern that standards of soft law may
be quite effective. What we have increasingly in the field of international law are
standards that can be applied but do not have to be applied. For the millions of
people suffering from poverty, however, it does not matter whether they can be
applied or whether they must be applied. What eventually is important is that
these standards are applied. The can norms, as I call them, or the zebras, as
they have been called in the ILO context, illustrate that, in the end, it is the out-
come for the people affected that matters. This is the genuine human rights
* Former Member, ILO Committee of Experts (1991-2006).

** Professor of Law, University of Mannheim; Vice-Chairperson of the UN Committee on
125
approach: to look at the issue from the point of view of the recipients, and not
from the point of view of the domaine reserv of Member States.
I would further like to refer to the passionate speech of Mr. Stavenhagen.
It is extremely interesting how the combat for greater acceptance of ILO stan-
dards on indigenous people moves ahead, and we all know the reasons why it is
so difficult. For example in the cases that we have had in Canada, the conflict
between constitutional considerations on the one hand, and self-determination
and First Nations approach on the other represented a major stumbling-block.
Solutions to these complex questions need to be found. The Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights has tried from its very inception to take an
approach to show the indivisibility, interdependence, co-variance and equal
treatment of all human rights, be they civil and political or economic, social and
cultural. The issue of indigenous people threatened with extinction is a key area
for human rights law and human rights standards. I therefore fully support Mr.
Stavenhagens comments.
Finally, I would like to address Ms. Sterns point on the mechanisms devel-
oped within the WTO, such as the panel decisions, which each party may either
accept or refer to the appellate tribunal. This is a very subtle way to describe
those decisions as if they emanated from a court. The WTO community would
probably like that but I beg to differ from an international law point of view
particularly when you look at how the exceptions to the GATT Article 20 are
being dealt with. On this point, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights has taken from the outset a very strict and firm view that should not
be ignored.
Giorgio Malinverni* Jaimerais revenir sur la distinction faite par Mme

Stern entre droits conomiques et droits sociaux du point de vue de leffectivit
de leur mise en uvre et de leur contrle. Il me semble que les exemples donns
par Mme Stern sont des droits conomiques, de ltat ou des entreprises. Cepen-
dant, si par droits conomiques on entend droits conomiques de lhomme,
je ne crois pas que lon puisse faire une grande diffrence entre droits
conomiques et droits sociaux. En ce qui concerne le Pacte sur les droits
conomiques, sociaux et culturels, on dit gnralement que les articles 6 8 trait-
ent des droits conomiques, les articles 9 12 portent sur les droits sociaux et
les articles 13 15 concernent les droits culturels. Il nexiste cependant pas de
diffrence de nature quant la mise en uvre et leffectivit de ces diffrents
droits. Cest juste une question de dfinition.
Mohamed Ezzeldin Abdel-Moneim ** Ms. Novitz and Mr. Malinverni

have emphasized the link between the Covenant on economic, social and cul-
tural rights and the Covenant on civil and political rights. I agree that both
* Juge la Cour europenne des droits de lhomme; ancien membre du Comit des Nations
Unies sur les droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels.
** Member, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
126
Panel discussion
Covenants are interdependent, and that they entail the same obligations to fulfil,
to respect and to protect. Yet, the fundamental differences between the two
Covenants should not be overlooked. Some of the rights in the Covenant on civil
and political rights may be suspended temporarily under strict limitations. This
can hardly be the case for the economic rights in the Covenant on economic,
social and cultural rights because they relate to survival. The only limitation
which might seem acceptable in this case is a limitation in scope, not a suspen-
sion of the right as such. That is one of the reasons why the General Assembly,
when adopting its famous resolution in 1966, did not opt for a single Covenant
for political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights, but for two separate
instruments. I think the interdependence of the two Covenants should be empha-
sized and further linkages be explored, while at the same time keeping in mind
the fundamental differences between the two instruments.
Andrzej Marian Swiatkowski * At the European level, there is only gen-

eral regulation in the field of social rights, and therefore international standards
are a necessity. It is quite clear that governments would challenge any decision
relating to standard-setting. The focus must therefore be paced on enforcement.
A recent study on the effective enforcement of EC labour law concluded that
effective enforcement depended on the existence of a relevant legal instrument,
no matter whether regulations are in the form of norms or standards. At present,
there is no legal instrument for enforcing social rights due to the general nature
of some of those rights, e.g. the right to work, where one has to basically evalu-
ate the programmes set up by governments in order to fight unemployment.
There has been some discussion about the possibilities of the European Social
Charter, for instance, the adoption of negative conclusions by the European
Committee of Social Rights, the formulation of recommendations by the Coun-
cil of Ministers, etc. However, the problem is that the Committee is limited to
presenting opinions on standards and has not as yet reached any conclusion as
to whether it should rather regulate those standards. There are, of course, exam-
ples of negative conclusions adopted by the European Committee of Social
Rights since the very first cycle, such as those concerning the entitlement to
social and medical assistance based on the habitual residence test as applied in
the United Kingdom. Such examples illustrate that the decisions of the Com-
mittee are often faced with the stubbornness of certain governments. Nonethe-
less, it remains crucial that existing standards continue to be monitored by insti-
tutions or committees sufficiently empowered to move forward and promote
ideas necessary for the protection of human rights.
Yozo Yokota ** Mr. Mesquita Barros said that, in order to assess effec-
tiveness, it was imperative to clearly define the objective. Evaluating effective-
ness means to see whether certain studies or monitoring done by a supervisory
* Vice-President, European Committee of Social Rights.

** Professor, Chuo Law School, Japan; Member, ILO Committee of Experts.
127
body have, after a certain time, achieved an improvement in the enjoyment of

economic, social and cultural rights of the persons concerned. The main diffi-
culty in the past has been how to measure any amelioration of the situation. Apart
from mere impression, we have no tangible, easily understandable figures for
determining whether the level of economic, social or cultural rights enjoyed in
a particular country has actually improved. I am going to propose something to
try to remedy this situation. Since 1990, the UNDP has been publishing the
human development index, a figure that it has constantly tried to refine. I think
we could use this figure or develop on the basis of this figure a specific index for
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, which would help us
determine whether there is progress in certain countries or for certain commu-
nities, even for the community of indigenous people. It is widely argued that
indigenous people enjoy less economic, social and cultural rights compared to
other groups in the same country. At present, UNDP country-level figures are
not broken down by community. For the purpose of assessing the situation of
indigenous peoples, we could study the human development index of a particu-
lar indigenous community. I therefore propose to use the UNDP figures and try
to improve them for the sake of better assessing the level of economic, social and
cultural rights.
Brigitte Stern M. Malinverni a indiqu que nous ne pouvions pas oppo-

ser les droits conomiques aux droits sociaux. Je ne lui donne que partiellement
raison. Je ne suis pas tout fait daccord avec lui lorsquil affirme que les exem-
ples auxquels je me suis rfre relvent plutt des droits des tats ou des entre-
prises. En ce qui concerne les droits des entreprises, des entrepreneurs indivi-
duels cest--dire des personnes physiques peuvent se prvaloir de
mcanismes tels que ceux de lALENA (Accord de libre-change nord-amri-
cain) ou du CIRDI (Centre international pour le rglement des diffrends rela-
tifs aux investissements). Par ailleurs, il est clair que les droits des entreprises
recouvrent en ralit les droits des actionnaires. Sans entrer dans un dbat sur la
leve du voile social, jestime que ce sont quand mme les droits conomiques
des personnes qui sont en cause. Certes, dans le cadre de lOMC, ce sont les
tats qui grent les procdures. Toutefois, dans laffaire tortues-crevettes par
exemple, la question tait de savoir sil fallait protger le droit des pcheurs asia-
tiques pcher les crevettes avec leurs mthodes traditionnelles ou le droit un
environnement respectant la diversit biologique. Dans ce cas, sagissait-il dun
droit social ou de droit de lenvironnement? En tout cas il y avait un dbat entre,
dun ct, les droits conomiques de certaines personnes (les pcheurs), dfen-
dus par un tat dtermin devant les organes de lOMC, et, de lautre, la ques-
tion de la protection des tortues. Mon propos tait simplement de montrer quil
existe des tensions considrables au sein de ces arnes conomiques.
Rodolfo Stavenhagen I agree that the human development index is a good

instrument, but it is an insufficient one. The figures contained therein must be
enhanced, and I am glad to hear that UNDP continues to work on it. I would also
128
Panel discussion
like to stress in line with my recommendations to a number of countries in my

reports the importance of breakdown data. We need disaggregated data because
so many countries have national averages which do not reflect the distribution
of goods and services, and indigenous peoples are always invariably at the
bottom end of the scale both in poor countries, where they are the poorest of
the poor, and in rich countries, where they are the poor amongst a majority of
well-to-do people.
Tonia Novitz I would be sceptical about the exclusive use of statistical

indices as an indication of compliance. Case studies supplement such informa-
tion and give a degree of detail and explanations of statistical indicators, which
are absolutely vital. While the picture is always going to be incomplete, by using
the two sources and taking evidence, you make the best you can within the given
framework.
On the point relating to the stubbornness of the United Kingdom Govern-
ment, which is a fair point, I think one can underestimate and this is particu-
larly true for the ILO comments on freedom of association in relation to the
United Kingdom, but, more generally, also for the comments made by the Euro-
pean Committee of Social Rights the degree of hope that such comments give
campaigners within countries to actually challenge aspects of legislation.
Progress is incremental. So, in terms of time delay, while you often do not see
results on the ground, you do see them incrementally take place. For instance,
the changes in the United Kingdom in 1997, 1998 and 1999, took place by virtue
of particular comments from the ILO and a committee of independent experts.
My last point relates to the inter-linkages between civil and political rights
and social and economic rights. There are a series of debates about their nature,
and it is often assumed that, simply because workers rights have social and eco-
nomic dimensions, they are costly and impose positive obligations on States.
This is often not true they impose positive obligations on other civil actors and
employers. Assumptions are also made that social and economic rights and
workers rights are inherently collective by nature. The overlap between the
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter, or
between the two Covenants, shows that this is not necessarily the case. For
instance, if you think of the importance of non-discrimination clauses in relation
to wages, you link one civil and political right to a social and economic right.
Other examples would be the importance of freedom of speech and freedom of
association to the enjoyment of collective bargaining, or privacy and its link to
non-discrimination at the workplace. Civil and political rights and social and
economic rights cannot be so readily disentangled in concrete situations. We
need to find better ways of integrating our supervision of the two.
Janice Bellace* In relation to the title of our colloquium, I would like to

cite a great comparative labour lawyer, Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, who said that
* Professor, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania;Member, ILO Committee of Experts.
129
labour law was one of the most important branches of law because it dealt with
workers, and that the vast majority of people depended either upon their own
earnings or the earnings of someone in their household for their ability to live,
and I would add to participate in society.
Even in order to be able to exercise ones human rights, one needs a job,
needs to be able to live, to participate in society. I therefore feel very privileged
to be a member of the ILO Committee of Experts because we are concerned with
having human rights apply at the workplace, which in a sense gives people a
foundation in the society. As to what effectiveness really means, I particularly
liked Mr. Stavenhagens comment that the mere fact of opening up a space for
action may in itself be a sign of effectiveness because it gives people ability in
their own country it empowers them to be able to achieve progress.
130
Dinner address
Friday, 24 November 2006 Evening
Prsent et avenir des mcanismes

de contrle de lOrganisation internationale
du Travail
Ruth Dreifuss *
Mesdames et Messieurs,
Cest un grand honneur que de pouvoir partager ces moments de comm-
moration et de travail avec les minents membres de la Commission dexperts
de lOIT, avec les membres du Comit des Nations Unies sur les droits cono-
miques, sociaux et culturels, avec les participants au colloque consacr au pr-
sent et lavenir des mcanismes de contrle ainsi quavec les hauts responsa-
bles du BIT.
Votre commune mission est le progrs des droits humains (droits de
lhomme), non seulement en ce qui concerne leur formulation mais encore en ce
qui concerne leur application. Ces droits sont indivisibles et ne connaissent pas
de hirarchie. Cependant, ils sont conjugus en divers temps, appliqus diver-
ses situations, prenant en considration diverses catgories de population. Ce
sont autant de prcisions qui attirent une attention particulire sur les personnes
que leur vulnrabilit expose davantage que dautres au risque de se voir priver
de leurs droits. Ce sont autant de rponses dtailles aux questions que posent
les relations spcifiques au sein de la socit. Les droits humains sont indivisi-
bles, mais les gouvernements chargs de les garantir doivent tre rappels
leur responsabilit pratique, envers les enfants, envers les femmes, envers les tra-
vailleurs, envers les migrants et les rfugis, envers les peuples autochtones, et
jen passe. En plaant donc la protection des droits au travail sous la bannire
des droits de lhomme, le colloque daujourdhui et de demain montre la fois
* Ancienne Prsidente de la Confdration helvtique. Discours prononc lors dun dner

offert par le Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).
133
luniversalit et la cohrence des droits de lhomme et le besoin de mode

demploi dtaill, afin quils puissent tre appliqus concrtement en toutes cir-
constances. Ce colloque runit aussi nombre de celles et de ceux qui sengagent,
chacun dans sa structure et son domaine, cette progression des droits humains:
un rseau de bonne complicit pour le respect de la dignit humaine.
Jai parl des diffrentes conventions, chartes et pactes des droits humains
comme dautant de recettes pour leur transposition concrte. Il ne suffit pas
dcrire les recettes, encore faut-il regarder si les cuisiniers les suivent scrupu-
leusement, quitte dailleurs les amliorer. Cest l que se pose, encore et tou-
jours, la question des mcanismes de contrle. Les Etats stant engags au
respect des droits fondamentaux, sont-ils disposs et capables de tenir leurs
engagements? Lefficacit des organes de contrle reste un des problmes cen-
traux de lefficacit des droits proclams: la charnire entre leffort commun
de la communaut des nations et le principe de la souverainet nationale, les
organes de contrle disent le droit, sans avoir toujours suffisamment de moyens
dinvestigation et sans avoir le plus souvent la possibilit dimposer le droit.
Mais dire le droit, cest tenter dinitier une collaboration pour que le droit sim-
pose, en fin de compte, par une double stratgie pdagogique: celle qui ren-
force, lintrieur de lEtat considr, les forces intresses faire reculer le non
droit, et celle qui renforce, lexterne, la pression en faveur du respect des enga-
gements pris. Le systme de contrle de lOIT est certainement un des meilleurs,
parmi tous ces systmes imparfaits et insuffisants: dune part, sa commission
dexperts a pu dvelopper, en huit dcennies, une jurisprudence remarquable et
dune grande cohrence, dautres part parce que les considrants et les conclu-
sions de ses minents juristes se nourrissent des informations reues non seule-
ment des gouvernements mais aussi des organisations syndicales et patronales
de la socit civile et viennent nourrir ensuite les interventions de ces organi-
sations auprs des gouvernements. Par ailleurs, loffre insistante de collabora-
tion avec les Etats qui ne remplissent pas leurs obligations, les suggestions trs
concrtes pour amliorer la situation, lengagement du Bureau international du
travail dans cette procdure itrative dactions, de rapports, danalyse, de
coopration, etc. tout cela concoure ne pas oublier ni abandonner une cause.
Dans les annes quatre-vingt, jai particip, au nom des travailleurs et des tra-
vailleuses de mon pays, au mcanisme dapplication des normes. Jai t saisie,
comme les autres parties prenantes, de ce que Rimbaud appelait une ardente
patience: revenir sans arrt, tant que le problme ntait pas rsolu, sur le ser-
vage en Inde, lesclavage en Mauritanie, la libert syndicale en Pologne, et tant
dautres, au Sud et au Nord, lEst comme lOuest. Cette mme ardente
patience, je la vois en uvre dans le cas du travail forc en Birmanie. Et il arrive
effectivement parfois, selon lexpression allemande, que la constance des gout-
tes finit par creuser la pierre (Steter Tropfen hhlt den Stein). Mais cette
patience nous brle aussi de la souffrance de ne pas agir suffisamment vite, suf-
fisamment fort, pour librer les victimes du joug de leur souffrance. Entre frus-
trations et espoir, entre conviction et dsillusions, les deux prestigieuses com-
missions runies aujourdhui poursuivent une tache lourde et longue. Leur haute
134
Prsent et avenir des mcanismes de contrle de lOIT
autorit morale, leur action assidue et leur vision cohrente inscrite dans la dure
sont la cl de leur influence.
Bien des choses ont chang au cours des 80 annes de vie de la Commis-
sion dexperts. Des rgimes politiques totalitaires sont ns et se sont effondrs,
nous avons assist la fin de la colonisation du Sud par le Nord, lconomie sest
mondialise dabord travers les entreprises multinationales puis travers une
libralisation voulue par les Etats. Alors quaux origines de lOrganisation inter-
nationale du Travail on trouve la claire volont de lutter contre la sous enchre
des conditions de travail entre des conomies relativement proches, on assiste
aujourdhui une revendication accrue de faire jouer les avantages comparatifs,
y compris au niveau des conditions de rmunration, sinon des conditions de tra-
vail au sens plus large. Le rle de lOIT, de ses conventions et de son mcanisme
de contrle, est donc aujourdhui aussi important, sinon encore davantage, quen
1926. Face aux possibilits de contrle et de sanction de lOrganisation mondiale
du commerce, le renforcement du mcanisme de contrle des droits humains
fondamentaux est le dfi que nous devons relever. Dans ce contexte de la mon-
dialisation, il existe un important besoin de repres et daction. Il nous faut mon-
dialiser aussi le respect des droits humains. Nous avons plus que jamais besoin
des institutions internationales capables dinterpeller les responsables et de
signaler les abus: nous devons aussi sans doute les doter de comptences accrues.
Pour terminer, jaimerais souligner linfluence rciproque des normes
nationales et internationales, des jurisprudences nationales et internationales.
De plus en plus souvent, des juges nationaux appliquent des principes inclus
dans des conventions internationales. Mais sommes nous toujours dans une
phase dmulation positive, o les progrs raliss en un lieu, la fois inspirent
les autres pays et permettent de sengager ensemble les accomplir? Mon pays,
la Suisse, qui avait t pionnire dans le domaine de la protection des travailleurs
au XIXe sicle (dure du travail, protection des femmes et des enfants) a pro-
gressivement repris son compte, dans la seconde moiti du XXe sicle, les
avances exprimentes ailleurs puis largement gnralise. Cest peut-tre ce
genre de lenteur qui a inspir Einstein son fameux dsir de venir mourir en
Suisse: les choses les plus videntes sy passant avec vingt ans de retard. Pour
avoir lutter pendant plus de vingt ans pour le cong maternel, pour mtre
appuye sur la convention pertinente de lOIT et les rapports des autres pays,
jaimerais exprimer ici ma reconnaissance toute personnelle face au caractre
exemplaire de lOIT.
Des organes de contrle runissant indpendance, sagesse et expertise restent
la pice matresse du contrle international. LOIT peut tre fire du travail accom-
plis. Genve, et la Suisse, sont heureux davoir, sur leur territoire, une organisation
pionnire dans le contrle des normes internationales en matire de droits humains.
Il ny a chez vous aucune complaisance fter lanniversaire de la Commission
dexperts; je perois bine au contraire la ferme volont de faire mieux encore
lavenir et de relever les dfis du XXIe sicle. Recevez mes meilleurs vux, ainsi
que lexpression du soutien de mon pays, de ses employeurs et de ses tra-
vailleurs, pour la ralisation de vos hautes et si utiles ambitions.
135
CEACR, 42nd session, Geneva, 16-29 March 1972
1. Mr. Edilbert RAZAFINDRALAMBO (Madagascar), Reporter of the Committee

2. Mr. C. Wilfred JENKS, ILO Director-General
3. Mr. Enrique GARCA SAYN (Peru), Chairman of the Committee
4. Bgum Rana Liaquat Ali KHAN (Pakistan)
5. Mr. Kisaburo YOKOTA (Japan)
6. Mr. Isidoro RUIZ MORENO (Argentina)
7. Mr. Jean MORELLET (France)
8. Mr Lazare A. LUNZ (USSR)
9. Mr. Arnaldo Lopes SUSSEKIND (Brazil)
10. Sir Adetokunbo ADEMOLA (Nigeria)
11. Mr. Harold Stewart KIRKALDY (United Kingdom)
12. Mr. Earl WARREN (United States)
13. Mr. Gnther BEITZKE (Federal Republic of Germany)
14. Mr. Pralhad Balacharya GAJENDRAGADKAR (India)
15. Mr. Jo_a VILFAN (Yugoslavia)
16. Mr. Arnold GUBINSKI (Poland)
17. Mr. Paul RUEGGER (Switzerland)
18. Mr. Nicolas VALTICOS, Chief, International Labour Standards Department
19. Mr. Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI (Egypt)
20. Mr. Joseph J.M. van der VEN (Netherlands)
139
Mr. Wilfred Jenks, Principal Deputy Mr. Jean Morellet (France)

Director-General, addressing Member of the ILO Committee of Experts
the members of the Committee of Experts (1965-1973)
on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, Geneva,
17 March 1969.
Mr. Earl Warren (United States) Mr. Robert Ago (Italy)

Member of the ILO Committee of Experts Member of the ILO Committee of Experts
(1971-1974) (1979-1995)
140
CEACR, 43rd session, Geneva, 15-28 March 1973

Chairperson: Mr. Enrique Garca Sayn (Peru)
Reporter : Mr. Harold Stewart Kirkaldy (United Kingdom)
CEACR, 51st session, Geneva, 12-25 March 1981

Chairperson: Sir Adetokunbo Ademola (Nigeria)
Reporter: Mr. Edilbert Razafindralambo (Madagascar)
The Committee of Experts in session with the presence of Mr. Francis Blanchard,
ILO Director-General.
141
CEACR, 51st session, Geneva, 12-25 March 1981

(left to right): Mr. Prafullachandra Natvarlal Bhagwati (India), Sir Adetokunbo
Ademola (Nigeria), Mr. Ian Lagergren (Deputy Director of the International Labour
Standards Department) and Sir William Douglas (Barbados)
CEACR, 59th session, Geneva, 9-22 March 1989

Chairperson: Mr. Jos Maria Ruda (Argentina)
Reporter: Mr. Edilbert Razafindralambo (Madagascar)
The Committee of Experts in session with the presence of Mr. Michel Hansenne,
ILO Director-General.
142
CEACR, 62nd session, Geneva, 12-25 March 1992
1. Ms. Badria AL-AWADHI (Kuwait)

2. Mr. Thiecouta SIDIBE, Director, International Labour Standards Department
3. Mr. Jos Maria RUDA (Argentina), Chairperson of the Committee
5. Mr. Cassio MESQUITA BARROS (Brazil)
6. Baron Bernd von MAYDELL (Germany)
7. Mr. Toshio YAMAGUCHI (Japan)
8. Mr. Fernando URIBE RESTREPO (Colombia)
9. Mr. Kba MBAYE (Senegal)
10. Mr. Semion A. IVANOV (Russian Federation)
11. Sir William DOUGLAS (Barbados)
12. Mr. Prafullachandra Natvarlal BHAGWATI (India)
13. Mr. Boon Chiang TAN (Singapore)
14. Mr. Jean-Maurice VERDIER (France)
15. Mr. Arnold GUBINSKI (Poland)
16. Mr. Antti Johannes SUVIRANTA (Finland)
17. Mr. Benjamin AARON (United States)
18. Sir John Crossley WOOD (United Kingdom)
19. Mr. Benjamin Obi NWABUEZE (Nigeria)
20. Mr. Budislav VUKAS (Croatia)
Mr. Roberto AGO (Italy) does not appear in this photograph.
143
III.
International supervision
at the time of institutional
reform
Saturday, 25 November 2006 Morning session
A fresh start in human rights protection:

The United Nations Human Rights Council
Wan-Hea Lee *
As you may all know, there are many interesting things going on within the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, not least of which the
upcoming opening of the 2nd session of the Human Rights Council which also
explains our inability, despite our best efforts, to bring someone who is in the
heart of developments of the Council to be addressing your symposium. On
behalf of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, we would like to extend
our heartfelt congratulations to the Committee on its eightieth anniversary.
Speaking for an organization that was established only 12 years ago, we
can only hope that at our eightieth anniversary we will be able to look back and
celebrate with the same joy and pride our contributions, however modest, for a
safer and more human world. Unfortunately today it seems that our every
achievement is being overshadowed by ever-growing challenges, even in areas
where relevant norms, human rights norms, were previously universally
accepted, today there is dispute. And perhaps that is why there is so much hope
placed on the historic creation of the Human Rights Council earlier this year.
The context and the evolution of the establishment of the Council is very
recent. As you may know, the idea of upgrading the Human Rights Commission
to a Council was part of the package of widening reforms proposed by the Sec-
retary-General in his report In Larger Freedom last year. In that report, the Sec-
retary-General continued his efforts to firmly establish the priorities of the
United Nations, security, development and human rights across the system. As
he expressed it, these are mutually reinforcing imperatives and a person or
people who would lack anyone of them would not be truly free.
His vision for reinvigorating the United Nations human rights machinery
was endorsed by the experts, particularly the High-Level Panel on Threats,
* Human Rights Officer, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
147
Challenges and Change, and, at the governmental level, endorsed by the 2005
World Summit, which, as expressed by the President of the General Assembly
at the time, is the greatest meeting of world leaders ever assembled. They all
believed that it was time for the Human Rights Commission to be upgraded to a
Council. The idea was to replace the Commission an inter-governmental body
that met in Geneva once a year for a marathon six-week session, once a year
with a smaller, more dynamic standing body. There would be several new fea-
tures: to be elected as members States would have to make voluntary pledges
and commitments for the promotion and protection of human rights abroad and
at home; member States would be subjected to term limitations, so that after two
consecutive terms they could not stand for re-election again immediately (thus
it would not be possible for some States to retain their seats for decades, as had
happened in some cases, and criticize the performance of other States without
committing itself to take action as well).
The Council on Human Rights, at this level, can be said to have been suc-
cessful; pledges have been made and we see among the more common pledges
across the States that are now members of the Council, pledges for ratifying any
outstanding human rights treaties, to which they are not already a party, pledges
to enforce or strengthen their national judicial systems, to better cooperate with
civil society and to cooperate with the international mechanisms of monitoring,
particularly, the treaty bodies and the special rapporteurs. This was not a given
in the previous Commission.
There are other features of the old Commission that are retained within the
Council. The best features despite the many criticisms concerning the credi-
bility of the Commission were unanimously agreed upon as essential for the
evolution of the human rights system, particularly those related to independent
fact-finding, global studies on major issues, retaining geographical balance and
the like, the system of special rapporteurs has been retained and, pending a com-
prehensive review of all the mechanisms, the mandates have been extended for
one year. There are details in the modalities of the functioning of the special rap-
porteur system that are already evidenced within the Council, particularly time
limitations. As a result, special rapporteurs after one renewal of a three-year term
would not be renewed again on the mandate.
Turning to the main criteria for determining whether the Council is truly
an improvement over the Commission, it should be noted that the Council has a
higher profile and it is in more direct access to the decision-making processes
within the United Nations, therefore in this regard there is unanimity that it is an
improvement. However, in dealing with specific human rights issues, is it more
effective? Is it more dynamic? Will it lead to better promotion and protection of
human rights? I think the key here will hinge on one new feature, the true inno-
vation of the Human Rights Council, which is yet to bear out, and that is the
commitments that States take upon themselves to improve their own records at
home and abroad. This is encapsulated in a new process called the universal
periodic review, outlined in the resolution that establishes the Council. The
modalities for this periodic review of all UN member States are currently the
148
The United Nations Human Rights Council
subject of intense negotiations and debate. A working group has been set up on
the universal periodic review to address issues such as: How would it function?
Would it involve the state under review? On what norms will it be based? Most
likely, the consensus seems to be that it must be based on the Universal Decla-
ration on Human Rights. To what extent would it involve the creation of new
machinery to undertake these reviews? To what extent will they rely on infor-
mation that is already produced by the treaty bodies and special rapporteurs?
Will it be based on consensus? What is the follow-up after the review takes
place? What would be the legitimate expectations for the State under review to
implement possible recommendations and would there be any consequences for
not doing so?
It is, of course, too early to give an assessment of this as the universal peri-
odic review mechanism is not yet in place, but these very profound questions are
at the heart, I believe, of the question as to whether the Council is an improvement.
At this stage, we can say that the steps towards creating a more effective
Council are under way, although the road is extremely turbulent and the views
are varied, but I think is beyond dispute that the new body is more dynamic than
the Commission. A number of working groups have been established and have
already produced extensive work. The Council has already held two special ses-
sions on emerging urgent themes, on Lebanon and on Israel, and in this sense it
is much more dynamic than the Commission was before. It was very rare before
that the Commission would hold a special session. Now it is becoming an
accepted part of the way the Council functions.
There is a great deal more that needs to be said about the Council but
because it is a work in progress, because there is much more to be elaborated,
the assessment will have to be made some years down the road. At this point, the
tools that the Council places at its disposal are the right ones: active involvement
of civil society; retention of the system of special procedures; a look at the func-
tioning of the Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection for Human
Rights which is mandated to study new issues for the consideration of the Coun-
cil. These remain in place and reviews are being undertaken to improve their
functioning. Beyond that, it is the responsibility not only of the Council, not only
of the member States, but all of us who have an interest, a stake, in better pro-
motion and protection of human rights to keep the Council on its guard, to pro-
vide it with the information that it needs and civil society has been very keen
across the world to hold the governments that are now members of the Council
to the pledges that they made when they submitted their candidacies.
These are then the main highlights of the newborn Human Rights Council.
The General Assembly has taken note of its first report and the reactions have
been mixed so at this juncture the pressure continues on the Council to prove
itself and within a years time this could perhaps be a much more informative
presentation not only on what is in place but also on how it is working.
149
La rforme des organes des Nations Unies
chargs du contrle de lapplication
des traits relatifs aux droits de lhomme
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos *
lheure actuelle, le vent des rformes des mcanismes de protection

internationale des droits de lhomme souffle tant au niveau rgional que sur le
plan universel. Au Conseil de lEurope, on attend toujours le dernier instrument
de ratification du 14e Protocole la Convention europenne des droits de
lhomme (CEDH) 1, qui vise essentiellement allger la charge de travail de la
Cour europenne des droits de lhomme. Dans le mme sens se situent gale-
ment les propositions rcentes, souvent plus drastiques mais parfois discutables,
du Groupe des sages 2, institu par les chefs dtats et de gouvernement des
tats membres du Conseil de lEurope. Au sein de lUnion europenne, on vient
de crer, enfin, une Agence des droits fondamentaux 3. Celle-ci aura des fonc-
tions bien plus larges que lancien Observatoire europen des phnomnes racis-
tes et xnophobes, sans pour autant satisfaire les attentes de ceux qui espraient
quun tel organe puisse agir directement dans les domaines sensibles relevant du
troisime pilier. Au sein de lUnion africaine, on attend depuis longtemps la
* Professeur associ de droit international, Universit dAthnes; Membre du Comit des

Nations Unies pour llimination de la discrimination raciale.
1
Parmi les 46 tats parties la CEDH seule la Fdration de Russie na pas encore ratifi
ledit Protocole. Pour une analyse de ce texte cf. L.-A. Sicilianos, La rforme de la rforme du
systme de protection de la Convention europenne des droits de lhomme, Annuaire franais de
droit international, 2003, pp. 611-640.
2
Cf. Rapport du Groupe des Sages au Comit des Ministres, 15 novembre 2006, doc.
CM(2006)203.
3
Cf. le rglement (CE) No 168/2007 du Conseil du 15 fvrier 2007 portant cration dune
Agence des droits fondamentaux de lUnion europenne, JO de lUnion europenne L 53/1,
22.2.2007.
151
mise en place de la Cour africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples 4, qui
devrait renforcer le mcanisme de protection plutt faible de la Commission afri-
caine. Aux Nations Unies, la cration du Conseil des droits de lhomme 5 la
place de lancienne Commission des droits de lhomme a suscit un moment
deuphorie auquel semble succder un certain scepticisme.
Cest prcisment dans ce contexte plus vaste que se situe la rforme des
organes des Nations Unies chargs du contrle de lapplication des traits rela-
tifs aux droits de lhomme (dornavant organes des traits). En effet, les efforts
tendant lamlioration du fonctionnement et au renforcement de lefficacit de
ces organes constituent une partie importante de la rforme du systme onusien
de protection des droits de lhomme dans son ensemble.
Encore faut-il, cependant, clarifier les termes. Par rforme des organes des
traits nous nentendons pas seulement les mesures qui impliqueraient la modi-
fication, du reste difficile raliser, de ces instruments. Nous entendons aussi
les changements dans le fonctionnement du systme de surveillance institu par
les traits onusiens relatifs aux droits de lhomme qui ne ncessitent pas la modi-
fication formelle de ces conventions. Autrement dit, nous utiliserons la notion
de rforme dans un sens large pour couvrir lensemble des efforts et des pro-
positions actuellement sous examen.
On rappellera cet gard que dans son rapport intitul Dans une libert
plus grande: dveloppement, scurit et respect des droits de lhomme pour
tous, lancien Secrtaire gnral des Nations Unies, Kofi Annan, estimait quil
conviendrait dlaborer et dappliquer des directives harmonises sur ltablis-
sement des rapports lintention de lensemble des organes crs en vertu dins-
truments relatifs aux droits de lhomme, afin que ces organes puissent fonction-
ner comme un systme unifi 6. Cette approche se situait dans le droit fil des
recommandations adoptes par les prsidents des organes des traits, ainsi que
par les runions inter-comits depuis 2003. On sait, en effet, quaprs labandon
de lide dun rapport unique destin lensemble des organes des traits et
conformment aux recommandations de la runion de Malbun (Liechtenstein),
tenu en mai 2003 7, on sest orient vers llaboration de directives harmonises
pour un document de base commun, accompagn de rapports cibls aux dif-
frents comits existants. Dans le mme ordre dides, quelques mesures concr-
tes ont t adoptes par les diffrents comits en vue de lharmonisation de leurs
mthodes de travail respectives, y compris pour ce qui est du suivi de leurs
recommandations.
Cependant, aprs avoir relev les faiblesses du systme tel quil existe
aujourdhui, et afin dy remdier, la Haute Commissaire des Nations Unies aux
4
Cf. sur ce point la contribution de F. Ouguergouz dans ce volume.
5
Cf. A/Rs. 60/251, 15 mars 2006.
6
NU doc. A/59/2005, 24 mars 2005, par. 147.
7
Cf. Report of a Brainstorming Meeting on Reform of the Human Rights Treaty Body
System, Malbun, Liechtenstein, 4-7 mai 2003, doc. HRI/ICM/2003/4, HRI/MC/2003/4, 10 juin
2003.
152
La rforme des organes des traits des Nations Unies
droits de lhomme, Louise Arbour, avanait une ide plus dcisive en estimant
qu long terme il faudra trouver un moyen de regrouper les travaux des sept
organes existants et de crer un seul organe conventionnel permanent 8, qui
serait compos de 35-40 experts. Le Document final du Sommet mondial de
2005, lui, ne se prononait pas explicitement sur cette ide. Il semblait sorien-
ter plutt vers lamlioration du systme existant 9.
Nanmoins, la Haute Commissaire a persvr avec son ide et son Bureau
a prpar un Document de rflexion 10 qui analysait sa proposition. Celle-ci
sest heurte, toutefois, des rticences plus ou moins vives exprimes tant par
les organes des traits que par les gouvernements. Face ces ractions prlimi-
naires et afin de faire examiner plus en profondeur la proposition de crer un
organe conventionnel permanent unifi, la Haute Commissaire a convoqu une
runion de brainstorming qui sest tenue une fois de plus Liechtenstein du
14 au 16 juillet 2006 11. Pendant cette runion laquelle ont particip des
experts de tous les organes des traits, des reprsentants dEtats, dinstitutions
nationales et de quelques ONG de trs srieuses rserves ont t mises en avant
concernant tant lopportunit que la faisabilit de la proposition de fusionner les
comits de protection des droits de lhomme.
Toutefois, il faut bien reconnatre que cette ide audacieuse de Louise
Arbour a cr une dynamique certaine qui aboutira, esprons-le, des amlio-
rations tangibles du systme actuel. En effet, un groupe de travail inter-comits
a t charg dexaminer plusieurs propositions alternatives et de prsenter ses
recommandations la prochaine runion inter-comits qui se tiendra Genve
en juin 2007 et qui sera suivie de la runion annuelle des prsidents des organes
des traits. Dans cette perspective, il importe dvaluer le diagnostic plutt
sombre tabli par la Haute Commissaire et son Secrtariat quant au fonctionne-
ment et lefficacit du systme en vigueur avant dexaminer les remdes
y apporter.
8
Plan daction prsent par le Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de
lhomme, NU doc. A/59/2005/Add. 3, par. 99.
9
Le Document final du Sommet mondial de 2005 nonait, en effet, que: Nous chefs dtat
et de gouvernement] prenons la rsolution damliorer lefficacit des organes conventionnels soc-
cupant des droits de lhomme, notamment en assurant la prsentation des rapports en temps utile,
en amliorant et en rationalisant les procdures dtablissement des rapports, en accordant une
assistance technique aux tats pour renforcer leurs capacits dtablissement de rapports, et en
veillant la mise en uvre plus efficace des recommandations de ces organes (doc. A/Rs. 60/1,
par. 125).
10
Document de rflexion sur la proposition du Haut Commissaire relative la cration dun
organe conventionnel permanent unifi, Rapport du Secrtariat, doc. HRI/MC/2006/2, 22 mars
2006 (dornavant Document de rflexion).
11
Cf. Report of a Brainstorming Meeting on Reform of the Human Rights Treaty Body
System, Triesenberg, Liechtenstein, 14-16 juillet 2006, doc. HRI/MC/2007/2, 8 aot 2006.
153
I. Le diagnostic
Le diagnostic tabli par le Document de rflexion sur la proposition du

Haut Commissaire relative la cration dun organe conventionnel permanent
unifi est non seulement sombre, mais parfois aussi assez svre peut-tre un
peu trop svre pour le systme actuel. En analysant ce diagnostic, on sera
amen voquer les problmes qui rsultent de la prolifration des organes
conventionnels et des arrirs dans lexamen des rapports tatiques et des plain-
tes individuelles, ainsi que les questions relatives la visibilit et laccessibilit
du systme, lautorit des organes des traits, voire lintgration et leffi-
cacit du systme.
1. La prolifration des comits et la non soumission de rapports

La premire constatation de ce document est lie au nombre des comits
existants, auxquels sajoute dsormais le Sous-comit pour la prvention de la
torture et dans lavenir les comits qui seront crs en vertu des nouvelles
Conventions sur les disparitions forces et les droits des personnes handica-
pes 12, ce qui fera neuf comits au total plus le Sous-comit. Il est vident que
cette multiplication des instruments juridiques et des comits chargs de la sur-
veillance de leur mise en uvre saccompagne de la prolifration des obligations
des Etats parties, y compris de celles concernant la prsentation de rapports
initiaux et priodiques.
Sur ce point la Haute Commissaire nhsite pas de souligner et elle a
raison que de nombreux Etats acceptent le systme conventionnel mis en
place dans le domaine des droits de lhomme en thorie mais ny participent pas
rellement ou alors ne le font que de faon superficielle par manque de moyens
ou par manque de volont politique 13. On remarque, en effet, quen 2006 seuls
huit Etats sur 194 taient tout fait jour avec leurs rapports, les 186 autres
devant prsenter au total 1,442 rapports aux diffrents organes conventionnels.
Certains de ces rapports sont dus depuis une dizaine dannes, voire mme plus.
Il est vrai que statistiquement parlant 70 % des rapports attendus ont t soumis.
Toutefois, ce pourcentage premire vue plutt encourageant rsulte dune
astuce qui consiste prsenter simultanment plusieurs rapports regroups en
un seul document.
Il est vrai aussi que les diffrents comits disposent, dans la plupart des cas,
dune masse dinformations, provenant de sources onusiennes ou dautres sour-
ces non gouvernementales, qui leur permet dexaminer la situation dans un pays
donn en labsence de rapport. Il nempche que dans une telle ventualit il ne
peut pas y avoir de dialogue constructif avec lEtat partie, ce qui prive le pro-
cessus de sa fonction pdagogique, voire de lessentiel de sa raison dtre. Les
12
Pour le texte de ces deux instruments cf. A/Rs. 61/177, 20 dcembre 2006, annexe et
A/Rs. 61/106, 13 dcembre 2006, annexe, respectivement.
13
Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2, prcit, par. 16.
154
recommandations adoptes, le cas chant, suivant la procdure dite de bilan

auront, ds lors, peu de chances dtre suivies par les Etats concerns. Autrement
dit, la procdure en question permet aux comits de sacquitter de leur devoir
moral vis--vis dun Etat donn et davoir pour ainsi dire la conscience tran-
quille, sans pour autant avoir les effets escompts sur le terrain.
2. Les arrirs dans lexamen des rapports

et des plaintes individuelles
Le deuxime constat du diagnostic constitue, dans une certaine mesure,
lautre face de la mdaille puisquil concerne principalement non pas les retards
dans la soumission des rapports par les Etats parties, mais les arrirs dans leur
examen de la part de certains comits. Il est vrai que le problme nest pas gn-
ral, tant donn que le Comit pour llimination de la discrimination raciale,
par exemple, na pratiquement pas darrirs, les rapports des Etats tant exa-
mins, en principe, la mme anne ou lanne qui suit leur soumission, selon les
circonstances. Il est vident, toutefois, que si un rapport est examin deux, voire
trois ans aprs sa soumission il risque de ne plus reflter la situation relle sur le
terrain. Une mise jour est ds lors ncessaire, ce qui implique un travail sup-
plmentaire plus ou moins important tant pour les Etats concerns que pour les
comits eux-mmes.
Des considrations analogues valent mutatis mutandis pour les retards dans
lexamen des communications manant de particuliers ou de groupes de parti-
culiers, selon le cas. lheure actuelle et malgr le fait que les procdures rela-
tives aux communications individuelles sont sous-utilises, il scoule en
moyenne 30 33 mois entre le dpt de la plainte et ladoption dune dcision
finale son sujet, ce qui remet srieusement en question la capacit du systme
offrir une rparation aux particuliers victimes de graves violations de leurs
droits 14. Par ailleurs, la situation risque de saggraver en cas daugmentation du
nombre de requtes, due soit une sensibilisation des milieux juridiques et une
meilleure connaissance des procdures onusiennes soit une prolifration des
Etats qui acceptent la comptence des comits concerns 15 connatre des plain-
tes individuelles.
Autrement dit et pour reprendre les termes du Bureau du Haut Commis-
saire, les organes conventionnels manquent de moyens et leurs sessions ne
durent pas assez longtemps pour quils puissent absorber leur charge de tra-
vail 16. Do la ncessit, selon Louise Arbour, de crer un organe convention-
nel unifi qui sigerait en permanence.
14
Ibid. par 18.
15
On rappelle cet gard que cinq comits sont habilits actuellement examiner des com-
munications individuelles: le Comit des droits de lhomme, le Comit pour llimination de la dis-
crimination raciale, le Comit contre la torture, le Comit pour llimination de toutes les formes
de discrimination lgard des femmes et le Comit pour les droits des travailleurs migrants.
16
155
3. La visibilit et laccessibilit du systme

Le troisime problme de ce diagnostic plutt sombre concerne la visibi-
lit du systme conventionnel des Nations Unies pour la protection des droits de
lhomme et des organes des traits. Selon lapprciation contenue dans le
Document de rflexion sur la proposition de la Haute Commissaire, le sys-
tme en question est peu connu en dehors des milieux universitaires, des admi-
nistrations et des fonctionnaires publics qui sont directement en contact avec les
organes conventionnels ainsi que des juristes et des ONG spcialises 17. On ajou-
terait cette numration les institutions nationales pour la promotion et la pro-
tection des droits de lhomme, tablies conformment aux Principes de Paris 18
et fonctionnant dans plusieurs dizaines de pays dans le monde, institutions qui
sont souvent activement impliques dans le travail des organes conventionnels.
Certes, cela fait dj pas mal de monde. Il nempche que le systme mri-
terait dtre mieux connu des milieux judiciaires et des agents responsables de
lapplication des lois, voire du grand public. Il mriterait aussi dtre mieux
connu des mdias, dtre mieux promu par les mdias. Il en rsulte que ce pro-
blme de visibilit est un problme rel, il faut bien le reconnatre.
La question de la visibilit du systme est intimement lie au quatrime
constat du diagnostic, savoir laccessibilit des mcanismes onusiens tout par-
ticulirement pour les individus et les ONG. Il est inutile dinsister sur limpor-
tance de cet aspect, tant il est vrai que lapport des ONG aux travaux des orga-
nes des traits est dcisif pour la crdibilit du systme 19. Or la complexit de
celui-ci fait que par rapport au grand nombre dONG qui ont le statut consulta-
tif auprs de lECOSOC il y en a relativement peu qui connaissent les mandres
des procdures, qui sont en mesure de prsenter des rapports alternatifs et de par-
ticiper activement aux travaux des diffrents comits.
Dun autre ct, les procdures de communications individuelles qui exis-
tent auprs de cinq comits sur sept 20 sont relativement peu exploites. Cest
ainsi que le Comit pour llimination de la discrimination raciale, par exemple,
a examin plus ou moins 35 affaires jusqu ce jour, malgr le fait que plus de
45 Etats ont fait la dclaration de larticle 14 de la Convention concerne, per-
mettant au Comit de connatre de telles communications.
4. Lautorit des organes des traits

Le cinquime constat du diagnostic concerne et l Madame le Haut Com-
missaire est trs svre lautorit des organes de suivi. Le Document de
rflexion fait tat des disparits entre les organes conventionnels composs
dexperts temps partiel non rmunrs et dsigns par les Etats parties pour un
17
Ibid. par. 21.
18
Cf. A/Rs. 48/134, 20 dcembre 1993, annexe.
19
Cf. sur cette question G. Cohen-Jonathan et J.-F. Flauss (d.), Les organisations non gou-
vernementales et le droit international des droits de lhomme, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2005.
20
Cf. supra note 15.
156
mandat dune dure dtermine renouvelable, du point de vue des comptences

et de lindpendance ainsi que de la rpartition gographique, de la reprsenta-
tion des principaux systmes juridiques et de lgalit entre les sexes 21.
Faire une critique constructive du systme existant quand on veut propo-
ser des changements est bien. Discrditer le systme aux yeux de lopinion mon-
diale quand on est Haut Commissaire aux droits de lhomme lest peut-tre
moins. Quoi quil en soit, la question des disparits des comptences, voire du
degr dindpendance des membres dorganes internationaux de contrle nest
certainement pas un problme propre aux comits onusiens de protection des
droits de lhomme. Le mme problme existe malheureusement dans bien
dautres fora que ce soit au niveau universel ou rgional. Sur un ton bien plus
diplomatique, cette question est voque, par exemple, dans le rcent rapport du
Groupe des sages du Conseil de lEurope pour ce qui est des juges la Cour
europenne des droits de lhomme 22. Pourtant, eux, ils sont trs bien rmunrs,
contrairement aux experts onusiens, et ils sigent en permanence.
Par consquent, le problme nest pas dordre financier, comme semble le
suggrer la Haute Commissaire, en parlant dexperts temps partiel et non
rmunrs. Il sagit notre sens dun problme politique ayant trait la qualit
des experts (ou des juges internationaux) proposs par les gouvernements. On
peut donc se fliciter du fait que le Protocole facultatif se rapportant la Conven-
tion contre la torture, entr en vigueur en 2006, contienne des dispositions sp-
cifiques sur les qualifications et les comptences professionnelles exiges des
membres (art. 5, par. 2). Encore faut-il que les Etats suivent de telles indications
lorsquils prsentent des candidats, voire au moment du vote.
Plus gnralement, lautorit des organes internationaux de contrle
dpend essentiellement de la clairvoyance, de la sagesse, de la pertinence, de la
qualit de leurs recommandations et dcisions. Encore faut-il, cependant, que
lon sattache assurer une harmonisation plus pousse des mthodes de travail
des organes des traits pour que le systme onusien de protection des droits de
lhomme fonctionne de manire plus intgre et efficace.
5. Lintgration et lefficacit du systme

En effet, le sixime et dernier constat de ce diagnostic souligne le fait que
le systme des organes des traits a t dvelopp ad hoc et ne fonctionne pas
comme un cadre intgr et indivisible de protection des droits de lhomme, ce
qui affaiblit son efficacit globale 23. Il est vrai que le systme de contrle des
organes des traits a t tabli sur une priode de plus de quarante ans, depuis
ladoption de la Convention pour llimination de la discrimination raciale, en
1965, puis des deux Pactes des Nations Unies de 1966, jusqu nos jours. Il sagit
21
22
Cf. la partie du rapport prcit du Groupe des Sages concernant le statut institutionnel
de la Cour et des juges.
23
157
dun systme cr progressivement et, par consquent, il est vrai que chaque
comit a son histoire propre, a dvelopp peu peu ses procdures, ses propres
mthodes de travail, ses propres coutumes, pour ainsi dire 24. Dans ces condi-
tions, il est naturel quil y ait des divergences dans le fonctionnement des diff-
rents comits, voire mme dans la terminologie utilise.
Il sagit l dun facteur qui ne manque pas de crer certaines confusions
auprs des dlgations tatiques qui se prsentent, que ce soit Genve ou New
York, pour lexamen de leurs rapports. Les institutions nationales pour la pro-
motion et la protection des droits de lhomme et les ONG, surtout les ONG
nationales, affrontent souvent des difficults analogues lorsquelles souhaitent
prsenter leurs propres rapports alternatifs, ou en tout cas leurs observations, que
ce soit en pr-session, pendant la session, pendant le premier jour de la session,
en relation avec la prsentation dun rapport tatique particulier, etc.; autant de
variantes dans les mthodes de travail suivies par les diffrents comits qui com-
pliquent la tche des usagers du systme.
Dans un ordre dides voisin, le Document de rflexion sur la proposi-
tion du Haut Commissaire fait tat galement du risque dinterprtations diver-
gentes, voire contradictoires, qui peuvent dboucher sur des incertitudes au
sujet des normes et des principes fondamentaux en matire de droits de
lhomme, ce qui nuit une interprtation holistique, approfondie et commune
des dispositions relatives aux droits de lhomme 25. Il nest pas exclu, en effet,
quen interprtant la convention en vertu de laquelle il a t cr chaque comit
mette laccent sur tel ou tel aspect qui lui semble prioritaire. Dans la mesure o
certains droits apparaissent dans deux ou plusieurs instruments la fois dans
des contextes certes diffrents on peut aboutir, il est vrai, des recommanda-
tions qui contiennent des nuances quelque peu diversifies, ce qui, du reste,
pourrait tre un facteur de richesse. Cependant, de l parler dinterprtations
contradictoires des principes fondamentaux, au sens strict des termes, il y a un
dcalage trs considrable. Le risque voqu par le Document de rflexion
existerait notamment en relation avec lexamen de communications individuel-
les. Cest dans ce contexte que les comits comptents sont appels se pro-
noncer en termes strictement juridiques. Pour linstant, toutefois, il est difficile
de dceler de vritables contradictions dans la jurisprudence des diffrents comi-
ts en matire de communications individuelles. Il est vrai, nanmoins, que le
risque dinterprtations sinon carrment contradictoires, du moins divergentes,
ne saurait tre cart demble.
Plus gnralement, on constate quil existe un certain manque de coordi-
nation et de collaboration entre les diffrents organes des traits. Ceci est accen-
tu par le fait que les comits ne sigent pas au mme moment ncessairement
et, par consquent, il y a relativement peu de contacts parmi leurs membres. Les
24
Pour un examen comparatif des procdures et des mthodes de travail des sept organes
conventionnels, cf. Report on the Working Methods of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Relating
to the State Party Reporting Process Note by the Secretariat, doc. HRI/MC/2006/4, 17 mai 2006.
25
158
runions annuelles inter-comits, institues depuis 2002, auxquelles chaque

comit est reprsent par trois de ses membres commencer par son prsident,
constituent une occasion significative pour faire avancer un esprit de corps et,
partant, pour promouvoir une harmonisation progressive des procdures et des
mthodes de travail des organes des traits. Encore faut-il que les recommanda-
tions importantes formules par ces runions et entrines par la suite par les
prsidents eux-mmes se transforment en actions et que les rformes ncessai-
res avancent un rythme soutenu. On est ainsi amen examiner plus avant les
remdes au diagnostic dress jusquici.
II. Les remdes
La premire question qui se pose dans ce contexte est celle de savoir si la

proposition de la Haute Commissaire de crer un organe conventionnel perma-
nent unifi est le bon remde face la situation actuelle. Cependant, indpen-
damment de lopportunit de cette proposition, il faudra examiner sa faisabilit.
tant donn que celle-ci soulve des problmes srieux, il importe denvisager
galement des propositions alternatives, qui consistent crer un organe unique
pour examiner exclusivement des communications individuelles, ainsi que
dautres ides pour faire avancer lintgration du systme.
1. Lopportunit de la proposition
de crer un organe permanent unifi
Lavantage primordial de la proposition en question est quun organe
conventionnel permanent unifi aurait probablement bien plus de visibilit que
les diffrents comits dexperts, sept actuellement, plus le Sous-comit pour la
prvention de la torture, neuf dans lavenir. Par ailleurs, un organe unifi pour-
rait tre plus accessible pour les usagers du systme, puisque sa cration
entranerait une simplification du point de vue institutionnel et procdural. Cette
nouvelle structure, mme si elle fonctionnait en chambres 26, devrait avoir des
mthodes de travail homognes, ce qui assurerait, thoriquement du moins,
lintgration du systme et renforcerait son efficacit.
En revanche, il nest pas sr du tout que la proposition de fusionner
lensemble de ldifice, en quelque sorte, constitue une rponse adquate au pro-
blme de la non soumission ou de la soumission tardive des rapports tatiques.
On ne croit pas non plus que ce remde contribue rsoudre le problme des
arrirs dans lexamen des rapports et des communications individuelles. Au
26
Le Document de rflexion voque plusieurs hypothses sur ce point: un organe unique
sans chambres, des chambres fonctionnant paralllement, une chambre par fonction, une chambre
par trait, une chambre par thme ou une chambre par rgion (doc. HRI/MC/2006/2, prcit, par.
40-45). Une chambre par trait serait, notre sens, la seule solution envisageable, sauf quelle
reproduirait en substance le systme actuel.
159
contraire, la situation actuelle risquerait de saggraver. On observe, en effet, que

les sept comits qui fonctionnent actuellement sigent pas moins de 57 semai-
nes par an (pendant plusieurs semaines certains comits se runissent simulta-
nment) et quils comportent 115 experts au total pour se partager le travail
(rapporteurs par pays, rapporteurs sur les communications individuelles, etc.).
On voit mal, par consquent, comment un seul organe, qui sigerait tout au plus
46-47 semaines par an, absorberait plus efficacement sa charge de travail
qui serait lagrgat de celle de tous les comits existants et venir avec
35-40 experts mis contribution!
Par ailleurs, la proposition de crer un organe unifi risquerait de faire
perdre la spcificit de certains instruments. L rside le problme le plus aigu
avec cette proposition, ainsi quil a t soulign abondamment lors de la runion
de brainstorming qui sest tenue au Liechtenstein, au mois de juillet 2006. On
sait, en effet, quau fil du temps chaque comit a su faire apparatre la richesse
et les potentialits de chaque instrument 27. Chaque comit a bti peu peu une
vritable vision de la convention dont il surveille lapplication, en allant vrai-
ment au fond des choses pour ce qui est de la discrimination raciale, des droits
des femmes, des droits de lenfant, des manifestations infinies de la torture et
des autres formes de mauvais traitements, etc. Chaque comit a pu crer des liens
privilgis avec des agences spcialises lUNICEF, par exemple, pour ce qui
est du Comit sur les droits de lenfants , des ONG ayant une exprience par-
ticulire en la matire ou avec dautres acteurs du systme international. Bref,
grce lapproche sectorielle du systme actuel, chaque convention dispose
aujourdhui dun acquis prcieux qui risquerait dtre diffus, de se perdre, de
svaporer peu peu avec le systme dorgane unifi. En dautres termes,
lapproche unitaire quimpliquerait la cration dun tel organe pourrait aboutir
la marginalisation de certains instruments spcifiques. Ceci est dautant plus
vrai quil sera difficile de trouver des experts capables de matriser le vaste ven-
tail des questions poses par lensemble des traits existants.
Encore faut-il dissiper un malentendu. En effet, au long des dbats sur la
proposition de Louise Arbour on a parfois voqu lexemple de la Cour unique
Strasbourg. Cependant, il ne faudrait pas perdre de vue que mme si la Cour
europenne des droits de lhomme a une place privilgie dans lordonnance-
ment du Conseil de lEurope en tant quorgane juridictionnel au sens propre du
terme, elle nest lunique organe de protection des droits de lhomme qui fonc-
tionne au sein de lOrganisation rgionale, loin de l. On ne saurait sous estimer,
en effet, la contribution extrmement importante du Comit des droits sociaux,
fonctionnant sur la base de la Charte sociale europenne, telle que rvise; du
Comit pour la prvention de la torture, cr par la Convention de 1987 sur le
27
Pour ce qui est, par exemple, de la richesse et les potentialits de la Convention pour
llimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, telles quelles apparaissent travers la
pratique du Comit pour llimination de la discrimination raciale, cf. L.-A. Sicilianos, Lactual-
it et les potentialits de la Convention sur llimination de la discrimination raciale, Revue
trimestrielle des droits de lhomme, octobre 2005, pp. 869-921.
160
mme thme; du Comit consultatif de la Convention-cadre pour la protection

des minorits nationales; ou de la Commission europenne contre le racisme et
lintolrance (ECRI), fonctionnant sans base conventionnelle. On mentionnera
aussi lorgane qui sera cr au titre de la nouvelle Convention sur la traite des
tres humains, adopte en mai 2005. Bref, linstar du systme onusien, tel quil
existe aujourdhui, les mcanismes du Conseil de lEurope se fondent sur
une approche sectorielle. Sans mme vouloir parler des problmes normes
quaffronte actuellement la Cour europenne des droits de lhomme, qui a plus
de 90.000 affaires pendantes, le paralllisme entre la Cour unique Strasbourg
et lorgane conventionnel unifi qui est propos pour les Nations Unies nest nul-
lement convaincant. On dirait mme que jusquici cest le Conseil de lEurope
qui sest inspir du modle onusien et non pas linverse.
2. La faisabilit de la proposition
de crer un organe permanent unifi
Un autre problme relatif la proposition de fusionner tous les organes des
traits est celui de la faisabilit de cette ide. Les organes des traits ont la vie
dure, prcisment parce quils ont t crs par un texte conventionnel 28. Il ne
faudrait pas perdre de vue, en effet, la diffrence fondamentale entre les orga-
nes conventionnels et les organes intergouvernementaux caractre subsidiaire.
Le discours relatif la rforme du systme onusien des droits de lhomme a
donn parfois limpression dun certain amalgame entre ces deux catgories
dorganes. On a pu avancer, en effet, quune volont politique forte serait un l-
ment ncessaire, certes, mais aussi suffisant pour rformer rapidement le sys-
tme. Ceci est tout fait vrai pour ce qui est des organes intergouvernementaux
caractre subsidiaire. Abolir un tel organe et crer un autre prsuppose uni-
quement, dun point de vue juridique, une dcision en ce sens de la part du ou
des organes principaux intresss. Il en alla ainsi, on le sait, de labolition de
lancienne Commission des droits de lhomme organe subsidiaire de lECO-
SOC et de la cration du Conseil des droits de lhomme par la rsolution
60/251 de lAssemble gnrale des Nations Unies.
Les organes conventionnels, en revanche, ont une existence autonome, lie
au trait dont ils relvent. Contrairement aux organes intergouvernementaux
caractre subsidiaire, les organes des traits ne sont pas subordonns un
quelconque organe politique principal. Tout en fonctionnant au sein de lOrga-
nisation et en tant appuys par le Secrtariat de celle-ci, les organes conven-
tionnels sont rgis par linstrument qui les a crs. Par consquent, la fusion
des diffrents organes des traits impliquerait ncessairement la modification des
traits existants.
28
Ceci vaut pour lensemble des comits onusiens dans le domaine des droits de lhomme
lexception du Comit pour les droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels, cr par la rsolution
1985/17, 28 mai 1985, de lECOSOC.
161
tant donn le caractre institutionnel de la rvision propose, les instru-

ments y relatifs devraient prendre la forme de Protocoles damendement. Ce
genre dinstrument doit tre distingu dun Protocole additionnel. Celui-ci ajoute
de nouveaux droits substantiels (ou de nouvelles interdictions, comme celle de
la peine de mort, par exemple) ou prvoit de nouveaux droits procduraux, et
notamment celui de soumettre des communications individuelles. Les Protoco-
les additionnels sont de nature optionnelle. Ils entrent en vigueur une fois acquis
le nombre de ratifications quils prvoient eux-mmes. En revanche, le Proto-
cole damendement entre en vigueur lorsquil est ratifi par le nombre dtats
parties linstrument principal prvu par ce dernier. Cest ainsi, par exemple,
que, selon son article 51, lamendement du Pacte international relatif aux droits
civils et politiques (PIDCP) requiert, outre lapprobation de lAssemble gn-
rale des Nations Unies, la ratification par une majorit des deux tiers des tats
parties au Pacte. Des dispositions analogues rgissent lamendement des autres
traits qui nous concernent.
Cependant, si lon se contente dune ratification par les deux tiers des tats
parties aux diffrents instruments amender, il y aura deux systmes qui fonc-
tionneront paralllement: le nouveau systme, qui sappliquera aux tats qui
auront ratifi les Protocoles damendement, et le systme actuel, qui sappliquera
aux autres tats. Or, il est vident quune coexistence de lorgane unique, dune
part, et des sept et bientt neuf comits actuels, dautre part, crerait une situa-
tion chaotique, impossible grer. Pour viter cette situation intenable, il faudrait,
par consquent, une ratification universelle des instruments damendement des
traits existants, cest--dire une ratification par les 194 tats parties aux traits
en question 29. Il suffit de songer aux problmes que rencontre actuellement
lentre en vigueur du 14e Protocole la CEDH, faute dune seule ratification sur
46 tats europens, pour raliser les difficults normes, voire limpossibilit
dobtenir des amendements qui feraient lobjet dune ratification universelle 30.
Outre ces paramtres dordre essentiellement juridique, il apparat gale-
ment quil nexiste pas de volont politique pour examiner plus avant la propo-
sition de la Haute Commissaire. En effet, lors de la runion au Liechtenstein,
tenue en juillet 2006, le Groupe africain a t clairement dfavorable cette pro-
position; le Groupe des Etats asiatiques tait tout aussi rticent, alors que les
Etats occidentaux ont adopt une position mi-figue mi-raisin. Dans ces condi-
tions, il est opportun dexaminer des ides alternatives.
3. La proposition alternative du CERD : un organe unique

pour examiner des communications individuelles
Parmi ces propositions alternatives, on mentionnera, tout dabord, une pro-
position manant du Comit pour llimination de la discrimination raciale, qui
29
Cest prcisment ce qua constat le Service juridique des Nations Unies dans un
document officieux, distribu lors de la runion susmentionne qui sest tenue au Liechtenstein en
juillet 2006.
162
tend faire crer non pas un organe conventionnel unifi, qui traiterait de tout,
mais un organe unique pour examiner exclusivement des communications indi-
viduelles 31.
En tant que membre de ce Comit, nous avons la faiblesse de croire que
cette proposition aurait plusieurs mrites. Elle assurerait la cohrence de la
jurisprudence en matire de communications individuelles, en rpondant pour
lessentiel la proccupation, voque prcdemment, dinterprtations diver-
gentes des instruments onusiens de protection des droits de lhomme. Par
ailleurs, un tel organe aurait probablement une visibilit accrue, tant il est vrai
que les mdias, mais aussi les milieux juridiques au sens large sintressent bien
plus aux affaires concrtes qui conduisent des dcisions prcises qu des
recommandations dordre gnral. La notorit de la Cour europenne des droits
de lhomme nest-elle pas due, en grande partie, cet lment?
La proposition tendant crer un organe unique qui traiterait exclusive-
ment des communications individuelles assurerait, en mme temps, une plus
grande accessibilit du systme pour les particuliers. On rappellera cet gard
quactuellement il y a, pour ainsi dire, cinq portes dentre au systme, cinq pro-
cdures de communications individuelles auprs de cinq comits diffrents 32,
avec des rgles de procdure qui ne sont pas toujours les mmes. Cette com-
plexit entrane des difficults certaines pour les plaignants et semble expliquer
le fait que les procdures en question restent largement sous-exploites. Avec la
cration dun seul organe comptent se prononcer sur des communications
individuelles il ny aurait quune seule porte dentre au systme au lieu de cinq,
ce qui simplifierait singulirement les choses. De plus, il nest pas exclu quune
plainte puisse concerner des droits reconnus par deux ou plusieurs instruments
la fois. Avec un organe unique on aurait pu trs bien soumettre une plainte qui
se baserait sur lensemble de ces instruments, ce qui nest pas le cas aujourdhui.
Pour ce qui est de la faisabilit de la proposition du CERD, on observe que,
contrairement la proposition de la Haute Commissaire, elle nimplique pas
ncessairement la modification des traits existants. Un organe unique pour
30
On pourrait songer, le cas chant, une mise en application provisoire du nouveau sys-
tme, mais, selon larticle 25 de la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traits: 1. Un
trait ou une partie dun trait sapplique titre provisoire en attendant son entre en vigueur: a) si
le trait lui-mme en dispose ainsi; ou b) si les tats ayant particip la ngociation en taient ainsi
convenus dune autre manire. 2. moins que le trait nen dispose autrement ou que les tats
ayant particip la ngociation nen soient convenus autrement, lapplication titre provisoire dun
trait ou dune partie dun trait lgard dun tat prend fin si cet tat notifie aux autres tats
entre lesquels le trait est appliqu provisoirement, son intention de ne pas devenir partie au trait.
Autrement dit, la mise en application provisoire du systme de lorgane conventionnel permanent
unifi prsupposerait une acceptation universelle dune telle solution, ainsi que dune clause qui
exclurait la possibilit dy mettre fin unilatralement, chose extrmement difficile. Pour un examen
approfondi de la problmatique et de la pratique internationale en matire dapplication provisoire
des traits, cf. A. Geslin, La mise en application provisoire des traits, Paris, Pedone, 2005.
31
Cette proposition a t prsente dans ses grandes lignes lors de la cinquime runion
inter-comits, tenue Genve en juin 2006, pour tre explicite ensuite, lors de la runion sus-
mentionne, tenue au Liechtenstein en juillet 2006.
163
examiner des communications individuelles pourrait tre cr non pas par un

protocole damendement, mais par un protocole facultatif, cest--dire avec le
soutien des Etats qui seraient intresss par un tel mcanisme.
Lors de la runion du Liechtenstein au mois de juillet 2006 certains experts,
notamment des membres du Comit des droits de lhomme, ont soulev
quelques questions dordre pratique, concernant par exemple les difficults qui
existeraient leurs yeux par la coexistence du Comit des droits de lhomme et
de cet organe unique qui traiterait des communications individuelles. On se
demandait notamment dans quelle mesure les experts de lorgane unique sui-
vraient les observations gnrales du Comit des droits de lhomme. Avec tout
le respect d ces collgues, nous ne pensons pas que ces questions soient dif-
ficiles rsoudre. Afin dapaiser ces craintes dapproches divergentes, on pour-
rait trs bien envisager dinsrer une clause particulire dans le protocole facul-
tatif, disposant que dans lexercice de ses fonctions lorgane unique sinspire des
observations gnrales et des recommandations gnrales adoptes par les dif-
frents organes des traits. Il ne sagit pas dinventer la roue. Il sagit de se baser
sur le formidable acquis que constitue la multitude des recommandations gn-
rales et des observations gnrales adoptes par les comits comptents 33.
Bref, en mettant en balance les avantages certains que prsente notre sens
la proposition du CERD et les quelques difficults pratiques qui pourraient rsul-
ter de la cration dun organe unique pour se prononcer sur des communications
individuelles, on pense que les premiers lemportent et que, par consquent,
ladite proposition mrite dtre examine de faon plus approfondie 34.
4. Les autres propositions tendant promouvoir lintgration

du systme
Toutes les autres propositions nimpliquent ni la modification des traits
existants ni llaboration de nouveaux instruments caractre facultatif. Elles
peuvent tre ralises, dans la plupart des cas, par simple dcision des comits
concerns. Si elles ont des implications financires, de telles dcisions devront
tre entrines par la cinquime Commission de lAssemble gnrale. On men-
tionnera ainsi la proposition du Comit sur les droits de lenfant, qui consiste
crer un bureau permanent, compos des prsidents des organes des traits,
charg de coordonner les activits de ceux-ci. Il sagit dune proposition int-
32
Cf. supra note 15.
33
On mentionnera cet gard le prcdent de la Cour spciale pour la Sierra Leone, dont le
Statut se rfre diverses reprises la jurisprudence et la pratique du Tribunal pnal international
pour le Rwanda et du Tribunal pnal international pour lex-Yougoslavie. Cf., par exemple, larti-
cle 19, par. 1 du Statut de la Cour spciale et tout particulirement larticle 20, par. 3, stipulant que:
The judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court shall be guided by the decisions of the
Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. () .
34
Cest effectivement de qua recommand le groupe de travail inter-comits lors de la ru-
nion qui sest tenue Genve les 27 et 28 novembre 2006, doc. HRI/MC/2007/2, 9 janvier 2007,
par. 26.
164
ressante, quitte trouver, bien sr, des prsidents disponibles pour sinstaller
quasiment en permanence Genve. Encore faudrait-il prciser le mandat du
bureau et ses relations avec les comits.
Une importance toute particulire devrait tre accorde, enfin, lide
manant du Comit pour llimination de la discrimination lgard des femmes
qui consiste crer non pas un organe conventionnel unifi, mais un systme
harmonis et intgr dorganes conventionnels. Cette formule catch all va
dans le sens des recommandations des runions inter-comits depuis cinq ans,
recommandations entrines par les prsidents des organes des traits. Par exem-
ple, lors de la cinquime runion inter-comits, tenue en juin 2006, les directi-
ves harmonises pour ltablissement du document de base commun 35, que nous
avons voques en introduction, ont t acceptes, et il appartient maintenant
aux diffrents comits de rviser leurs propres directives pour ltablissement de
rapports cibls, de rapports spcifiques au titre de chaque instrument.
Par ailleurs, tous les comits tablissent aujourdhui des listes de questions
qui sont envoyes aux tats pour que les diffrentes dlgations qui prsentent
leur rapports sachent lavance les principales proccupations des comits et,
partant, le cadre dans lequel sera men le dialogue constructif avec eux. Il sagit
l dune mthode de travail particulirement importante pour la qualit et la
transparence du processus dexamen des rapports tatiques.
Dans le mme contexte, il faudrait galement que la coopration avec les
ONG soit intensifie. Il en va de mme de la coopration avec les institutions
nationales pour la promotion et la protection des droits de lhomme. Les rapports
alternatifs de ces institutions ou leurs observations aux rapports des tats sont
dune grande utilit pour les comits 36. Les institutions nationales pourraient
galement intensifier leurs efforts au niveau de la mise en uvre des observa-
tions finales et des recommandations des organes conventionnels.
Lapprofondissement du dialogue avec les tats parties passe galement
par le renforcement de la collaboration des organes des traits avec les autres
composantes du systme onusien, commencer par les agences spcialises ou
les rapporteurs spciaux ou experts indpendants de lancienne Commission et
bientt du Conseil des droits de lhomme. Cette coopration permet denrichir
la perception par les comits de la situation qui prvaut sur le terrain et savre
prcieuse au moment du dialogue avec les tats parties.
Encore faut-il, cependant, insister tout particulirement sur limportance
du suivi aux observations finales des organes des traits. Actuellement, il y a
35
Cf. doc. HRI/MC/2006/3, 10 mai 2006.
36
Dans cet ordre dides, le Comit pour llimination de la discrimination raciale encour-
age les institutions nationales participer de faon spare des dlgations tatiques, afin de ne
pas entamer lindpendance des institutions nationales aux sances officielles pendant lesquelles
est examin le rapport de ltat concern et de rpondre directement avec lassentiment, certes,
du chef de la dlgation tatique aux questions des membres du Comit. Il sagit l dune nou-
veaut, instaure depuis lexamen du rapport irlandais, en mars 2005, qui mriterait peut-tre dtre
suivie par dautres comits.
165
trois comits sur sept qui disposent dun mcanisme de suivi: le Comit des
droits de lhomme, le Comit contre la torture et, depuis 2005, le Comit pour
llimination de la discrimination raciale. Le rapporteur pour le suivi est enca-
dr, certes, par les services du Secrtariat. Il nen reste pas moins que mme l
o ils existent les mcanismes de suivi sont relativement faibles. Lexamen
priodique universel, qui sera mis en place prochainement au sein du Conseil
des droits de lhomme, pourrait changer la donne sur ce point, condition que
le Conseil prenne comme base de dpart les recommandations, les observations
finales des diffrents comits, non seulement pour viter les duplications, mais
aussi pour apporter un certain soutien politique aux organes de contrle, soutien
qui manque cruellement dans le systme.
ct de ce suivi aux observations finales, il y a une autre forme de suivi
concernant les opinions formules loccasion de communications individuel-
les. Gnraliser et intensifier cette forme de suivi contribuerait certainement
lefficacit des travaux des organes des traits dans le domaine des communica-
tions individuelles. Dans le mme ordre dides, on pourrait harmoniser gale-
ment les procdures de communications individuelles, y compris en modifiant,
le cas chant, les rglements des diffrents comits, ce qui faciliterait laccs
des individus aux mcanismes concerns.
En vue de promouvoir le fonctionnement des comits en tant que systme
intgr, on pourrait envisager galement ladoption dobservations gnrales
conjointes dans des domaines dintrt commun deux ou plusieurs comits; la
tenue de sessions communes (du moins en partie); linstitution dun secrtariat
commun tous les comits; le renforcement des ressources au sein du bureau du
Haut Commissaire, y compris pour offrir plus frquemment une assistance tech-
nique, etc. Ce ne sont certainement pas les ides qui manquent. Il y en a dautres
qui sont actuellement sous examen.
En guise de conclusion, notre proposition semble tre plutt facile rali-
ser: plusieurs ides concernant la rforme du systme figurent dj, sous forme
de recommandations, dans les rapports des runions inter-comits qui se sont
tenues depuis 2002. Ces recommandations ont t entrines par les prsidents
des organes des traits. Faisons un rcapitulatif de lensemble de ces proposi-
tions, et essayons de les mettre en uvre! Ce sont des propositions qui manent
de nos comits, ce sont des propositions qui ont t entrines par nos prsidents.
Il faut les mettre rapidement en application si lon veut tre crdible. Esprons
que la prochaine runion inter-comits, qui se tiendra Genve en juin 2007,
constitue une occasion pour passer laction.
Discussion
Mohamed Ezzeldin Abdel-Moneim * I wonder whether it would not be

right to expect that this phenomenon of non-reporting to treaty bodies will grad-
* Member, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
166
ually decrease. One might even assume that the phenomenon will eventually
disappear as States become fully aware that the new UN Human Rights Coun-
cil is going sooner or later to embark on the periodic review, irrespective of
reports being received. States might therefore think that it would be in their inter-
est to report to treaty bodies in a timely fashion and interact with the Council in
handling their case. I therefore tend to think that this phenomenon of non-report-
ing might eventually decrease, if not disappear altogether.
Regarding the two presentations on international supervision at the time of
institutional reform, I have to emphasize that the concept of supervision might
vary from one treaty to another, from one instrument to another, and we have to
be cautious since the scope of the mandate is sometimes too limited to ensure
effective supervision. On institutional reforms, I think the reform proposals have
to be taken as a package, not separately, and be analyzed and examined thor-
oughly as a whole. Reform has to be comprehensive, it has to consider the over-
all human rights machinery, not one part of this machinery. This is the only effi-
cient way of dealing with this and unless you manage efficiency you cannot
reach effectiveness.
Apart from the strictly institutional aspects of the current reforms, e.g. new
mandate, new composition, method of work etc., there is also an extra-institu-
tional aspect of crucial importance, that is to say the experience and echoes from
the field. It is not within some bureaucratic confines that you can best reflect on
how to reform but in the field, in all these places out there where human rights
are being honoured or violated. Such extra-institutional factors have to be looked
at thoroughly before institutional approaches to reform are defined, otherwise
there is a risk of putting the cart before the horse. While I was listening to
Mr. Sicilianos presentation, I was looking into the ILO publication which was
distributed to us, The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations Its Dynamic and Impact, in particular as regards the
synergy between the various supervisory bodies of the ILO, which reads in part:
The Committee of Experts was created at the same time as the Conference
Committee on the Application of Standards. Although there have been at times
been differences in approaches between the two Committees, they have devel-
oped a close collaborative relationship especially in recent years and each relies
on the work of the other. I think this offers a good example to follow in pursu-
ing the current reforms.
Budislav Vukas* This has been an extremely objective and informative

report on a new body from which having followed the UN bodies for almost
half a century I do not expect any major changes since there is nothing really
new that an organization with 192 member States can deliver. First of all,
Ms. Lee mentioned that one of the changes introduced by the Human Rights
Council relates to composition; but what is the difference if you only decrease
* Professor of Public International Law, University of Zagreb; Member, ILO Committee

of Experts.
167
membership by just six members? Secondly, the question to whom you report,
whether you report to the Economic Committee or to the General Assembly, this
can hardly be qualified a real change. The number of terms does not really matter
either. I therefore have the feeling and my suspicions are confirmed by read-
ing some very critical reports and articles on the work of the Council that the
Council was basically remodeled to serve specific purposes. It is a fact that for
the time being the Council deals only with Lebanon and Israel; it does not seem
to worry about the hundreds of thousands of people dying in Darfur simply
because there is a majority of States that has no particular interest in addressing
the human rights situation of this poor population. I would be grateful if you
could respond to these criticisms.
Wan-Hea Lee You might dream of a cake but when you look in your
kitchen and find you are missing this or that you might end up with something
resembling a cake, yet not quite what you wanted. In the case of the Council, the
intention was to have a much smaller and dynamic body. The original idea was
to have 17 Council members who would meet frequently and who would not be
embroiled in too many broader issues and political discussions. However, in the
process of negotiations regarding geographical representation, the formula that
was agreed upon was 47 members. I would therefore agree that at the end there
may not be significant difference although the Council was intended to be
smaller and much more flexible than its predecessor.
Does the Council deal with only certain situations and not others? This was
one of the major criticisms of the old Commission, namely politicization of the
Commission. I do not think anyone would deny that the same problem exists in
the new Council simply because the Council continues to be an intergovern-
mental body and preferences with respect to particular situations continue to
depend on the will of governments. After all, this is a reality in the United
Nations system; this is the existing decision-making process within the UN.
How can the new Council be less driven by political considerations? I think
this concern is upper-most in the minds of most observers and to some extent the
universal periodic review is hoping to address such concerns although I would
not suggest that this problem could be completely overcome. I am not in a posi-
tion to advance any reasons why the Council held two special sessions on Israel
and Lebanon and not on Darfur, and I would leave it to the participants to make
their judgment in this regard.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos With respect to non-reporting, the pessimistic

view, if I may, is that once a particular State has reported to the Human Rights
Council, that is the governmental body, it may fail to come before the different
committees of experts. However, I prefer to think that this problem will seriously
decrease. As far as the coordination is concerned, Mr. Abdel-Moneim mentioned
the synergies within the ILO and the different supervisory organs; in fact, the
ILO paradigm was specifically referred to during the Liechtenstein brainstorm-
ing meeting and also mentioned in the final report which reads in part: in con-
168
nection with the proposed unified standing treating body, reference was made to
the system of the International Labour Organization which provided for a single
body of a non-standing nature, to handle States reports, one that was able to
process some 2,000 reports per year. While [] systems were not comparable
in other respects, the ILO model could nevertheless be useful in considering the
possible creation of a unified standing treaty body. I therefore stand in admira-
tion before the work the ILO Committee of Experts is accomplishing and I
believe that this positive comment is well deserved.
Yozo Yokota* Ms. Lee said that the Council has decided to maintain the
existing system of special procedures. My question is how the special proce-
dures, and in particular the country-specific mandates, would be coordinated
with the universal periodic review. Are they going to be carried out separately or
in parallel? In any case, there is the risk of duplication, and even of conflicting
reviews. Secondly, as regards the possible participation of the civil society and
non-governmental organizations in the process of Council discussions, my ques-
tion is who is going to decide on the consultative status of NGOs eligible to par-
ticipate in the activities of the Council? Will the Human Rights Council screen
them or will it automatically accept the NGOs currently recognized by the
ECOSOC? My last point relates to the work of the sub-commissions. The Sub-
Commission on the promotion and protection of human rights held its last ses-
sion in August under the instructions of the Human Rights Council. I understand
from your presentation that the Council is thinking of retaining an expert body
similar to the Sub-Commission to be mainly engaged in research studies. How-
ever, the Sub-Commission on the promotion and protection of human rights had
also been engaged in standard-setting activities the best example being the UN
Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was subsequently
adopted by the Human Rights Council in its first meeting. My question is
whether any thought is given to the possibility of conferring such standard-set-
ting function to the new expert body which will replace the Sub-commission on
human rights.
Wan-Hea Lee The first question is actually being discussed quite vigor-
ously, i.e. in what respects the universal periodic review may be different from
those institutionalized review processes that are already in place. How would the
universal periodic review be distinguishable from the treaty bodies if it draws
upon their work? This is still under discussion, but the intention is to introduce
the universal periodic review in a way that complements and harmonizes with
the existing systems and not duplicate them easier said than done.
There has not as yet been any discussion about ECOSOC status granted to
NGOs, but I think the presumption is that ECOSOC status will be the main
determining method for accrediting NGOs also to the Human Rights Council,
even though some other formula may not be excluded at this stage. On the work
* Professor, Chuo Law School, Japan; Member, ILO Committee of Experts.
169
of the Sub-commission, the Council seeks to retain both the research and the
standard-setting functions. However, the body that will replace the Sub-com-
mission is unknown at this point, the question having been deferred at the
Councils last session.
Bob Hepple* My question is whether changing the treaty bodies can pro-
ceed with the harmonization of certain conventions on the substantive side and
I am thinking particularly of discrimination. Here, the ILO has set a wonderful
example 50 years ago, in the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
Convention, 1958 (No. 111) where all branches of discrimination are covered in
employment and occupation. It has been realized as long ago as the 1950s that
these methods have to be looked at together. I happen to be the chairman of a
body called the European Roma Rights Centre, which takes cases on behalf of
the Roma, which is the oppressed minority in Europe and we once had an issue
of compulsory sterilization of Roma women. Was that an issue for the Commit-
tee on Racial Discrimination? Was it an issue for the Committee on Discrimi-
nation against Women and you can imagine in the future with the convention
about disability, how far one can go. As it happens, we made the right choice and
we went to the Committee for Discrimination against Women and they have
given a very important ruling on this issue. But it seems to me, in an area such
as that there really ought to be harmonization on each of the conventions because
they came into force at different times and there are important inconsistencies,
anomalies but also things like special measures. Linked to that is the question of
the possible merger of committees. Even without substantive changes, what
about having a single committee to deal with all issues of discrimination?
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos Concerning the harmonization of the con-

ventions, in particular in respect of discrimination, you mentioned the example
of the sterilization of Roma women. This case also came before our committee
the Committee on Racial Discrimination in respect of some countries. We
have said that this phenomenon happened in the past but has since progressively
disappeared, and we have been able to envisage and to examine this phenomenon
on the basis of our general recommendation No. 25 concerning the so-called
double discrimination based on gender and race or ethnic origin. Beyond that,
there is an effort towards harmonization of the conventions in regard of discrimi-
nation based on the new guidelines for common basic document. In part three of
these very recent guidelines, adopted last June, there is a whole part concerning
discrimination, precisely because discrimination, as you very rightly pointed out,
is present in almost all human right treaties of the United Nations system. States
are therefore invited to give coherent and global information about discrimina-
tion in respect of all relevant conventions. This is indeed an extremely pertinent
point that we are trying to address through these new guidelines.
* Emeritus Master of Clare College and Emeritus Professor Law, University of Cambridge.
170
Concerning the second question on the merger of committees, I am quite

skeptical about this idea. Having a committee to deal exclusively with issues of
discrimination presupposes the creation of a new instrument, and a new instru-
ment should be created legally speaking by a new protocol. Yet, a new protocol
to which convention? Should there be a common protocol to all conventions
since the issue of discrimination is related to all conventions? I am not sure this
is feasible. It is certainly an interesting idea but one should not forget that each
committee has its specificities. Each committee is approaching the issue of dis-
crimination in a different manner and this is also part of the richness of the system.
Eibe Riedel* My first question is addressed to Ms. Lee, who has given
us such a courageous outline of the problems. She mentioned the word new
machinery in the process of being set up and the relation to existing treaty
bodies. I am sure that in the Office of the High Commissioner there must be
floating various models of new machineries. Could you perhaps mention just a
few of those models? The second question is how are we to avoid the surperfi-
ciality of the universal periodic review in the country analysis if one just goes
through the motion of having 192 States reporting regularly perhaps on a
yearly, tri-annual or six-annual basis or drawing upon the work of the treaty
bodies. I think we all agree that the universal periodic review would be an
improvement compared to the existing Charter-based petition system. But the
value added would still have to be shown. Finally, the third question is about the
concept paper discussed by Mr. Sicilianos. I see the concept paper as a pike in
the pond. It was intended to provoke reaction and get things moving especially
by the rather complacent treaty bodies, and in this sense, it is already a success.
However, no matter its intrinsic merits, I still think the concept paper was a pro-
posal made mainly for financial reasons. Having a single unified treaty body
would probably be cheaper than having more than 100 independent experts.
Financial imperatives therefore might have prompted the initiative of the Office
of the High Commissioner.
Wan-Hea Lee As regards the models I would not even call them
models there is no a single systematic or comprehensive proposal that is
being scrutinized but rather different ideas that are being examined or discussed.
How to avoid superficiality of country analysis? I think this is a challenge all
mechanisms are facing, not only the universal periodic review but also the exist-
ing processes. We are all subject to constraints and there is a difference in the
mandate of each mechanism, Geneva-based or country visits. Even country
visits cannot be carried out every time there is a problem in a particular country.
Special rapporteurs may visit a country once in 10 or 15 years time. In the
case of the universal periodic review, I think part of the question is who will
be involved and what will be the nature of the incoming information. Will it be
* Professor of Law, University of Mannheim; Vice-Chairperson, UN Committee on Eco-

nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.
171
Geneva-based? Will be in situ? For the 47 members of the Human Rights Coun-
cil who have pledged to cooperate there should be no problem, but what about
the other 150 UN Member States who are not members of the Council? If they
do not cooperate, can it not help but to be superficial or are there other ways of
getting around it? What we have seen across the UN system but also beyond the
UN, is that a great deal of it depends on the level of support and research that is
brought to the system.
Can the Office of the High Commissioner cope with a review mechanism
that is very ambitious? Probably not immediately, although I can say that this is
a time of probably the greatest renewal for the Office. This is a time where
resources are being made available to the Office at an unprecedented rate, not
specifically tied to the universal periodic review but to UN human rights machin-
ery reform in general. The universal periodic review replacing the Charter-based
petition system may well be one of the ideas in the minds of the members of the
Council. At this point, however, the Charter-based petition system would be
retained while the periodic review modalities are being worked out. At resent,
there is a working group on review of the mechanisms, so it might look differ-
ent in the future but at this point there is no direct linkage between those peti-
tion systems and the periodic review.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos Vous me permettrez dajouter une rflexion

concernant le premier point du professeur Riedel au sujet du caractre ven-
tuellement superficiel de cet examen priodique universel. Je vais citer lexem-
ple du Conseil de lEurope, qui nest peut-tre pas transposer tel quel: il faut
y rflchir et ladapter videmment. Lexemple concerne la convention-cadre
pour la protection des minorits nationales. Il y a l deux niveaux de contrle: le
comit consultatif, qui est un comit dexperts indpendants, et le comit des
ministres, qui est un organe. Le comit des ministres, dans son examen, qui est
peut-tre un peu superficiel, renvoie lensemble du rapport du comit consul-
tatif, puis choisit deux ou trois sujets qui lui semblent prioritaires et fait des
recommandations insistantes auprs de lEtat concern pour que, sur ces deux
ou trois points, on aille de lavant et lon adopte des mesures efficaces. Cest un
examen assez superficiel de la part de lorgane politique, du comit des minist-
res, mais cette ide pourrait savrer efficace, quitte la transposer, la roder,
travailler dessus.
Concernant votre deuxime point, je le partage parfaitement, je lai
dailleurs dj dit. La proposition de Madame la Haut-Commissaire a cr une
dynamique certaine qui a abouti des propositions alternatives et cest vrai
quau sein de nos comits, nous pouvons mieux faire. Jai eu le sentiment, aprs
avoir particip des runions intercomits, que chaque comit veut faire la
rforme sa manire et voudrait que les autres suivent ses propres mthodes de
travail. Mais il faut que chaque comit aille vers les autres pour voir comment
ils travaillent. Le secrtariat a publi un document extrmement intressant sur
les mthodes de travail des diffrents comits. Il faut que chaque membre des
diffrents comits lise ce document de travail, parce quil y a beaucoup de choses
172
en tirer sur les bonnes pratiques suivies par les diffrents comits. Chacun ne
peut pas camper sur sa propre position et dire: Voil ce qui sapplique chez nous
depuis 1970, depuis que je suis membre de ce comit, cest--dire depuis le
dbut de notre comit. Il y a des voix comme cela au sein de notre propre
comit mais on ne peut pas fonctionner ainsi, les temps changent. Depuis 1970,
il est vrai que certaines choses ont chang dans le monde.
Franois Vandamme * En coutant les interventions de ce matin, je met-

tais en permanence en parallle les avantages de la commission dexperts de
lOIT et ceux de la rforme des organes de contrle que nous a prsents M. Sici-
lianos. Je voudrais vous faire part de trois points qui mettent en vidence, me
semble t-il une inspiration que le systme des Nations Unies pourrait prendre du
fonctionnement de la commission dexperts de lOIT.
A mon avis, cette commission a trois arguments majeurs en sa faveur. Pre-
mirement, ses membres sont capables de traiter au sein dun organe unique des
conventions extrmement diffrentes. Certes, elles se rapportent au domaine du
mandat gnral de lOIT. Mais entre la convention sur lemploi, la convention
sur la libert syndicale, la non-discrimination, il y a des spcificits importantes
quelle est capable de grer elle-mme, grce au support efficace du secrtariat
et la spcialisation de ses membres. Deuximement, elle est assez prvisible
dans ce quelle dit, puisque son rapport est entirement crit et que lon en dis-
cute par la suite. Il ny a plus, ensuite, dinterventions et de demandes compl-
mentaires qui pourraient surprendre les Etats. Troisimement, il y a chaque
anne un dbat global avec lensemble des parties contractantes de toutes les
conventions au sein de la Commission de lapplication des normes de la Conf-
rence internationale du Travail. Il sagit l dun autre organe, mais cest le fonc-
tionnement des deux commissions ensemble qui cre une dynamique.
Lenseignement que jen tire par rapport ce qua dit M. Sicilianos est que
tout dabord largument du maintien de la spcificit de chaque comit conven-
tionnel nest peut-tre pas si convaincant que cela, puisquil y aurait moyen, par
lorganisation ou par la spcialisation des membres, de voir ventuellement
lorganisation de chambres. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue dans ce dbat le traite-
ment des plaintes individuelles sur la base des protocoles qui les permettent et
dont on a parl hier.
En ce qui concerne la prvisibilit, lexprience de mon gouvernement est
que les comits spcialiss ont t un peu imprvisibles et cest ce qui cre par-
fois des difficults. Au-del de lanalyse des rapports et des questions compl-
mentaires soumises avant les comparutions orales, il y a encore des questions
totalement imprvisibles et qui donnent parfois limpression que les comits
tendent leur intrt sur les champs de comptence dautres comits. Il y a sans
doute une tentation de chaque comit vouloir se profiler, avec les meilleures
intentions du monde, et cela na pas toujours t facile grer. En fait, le pro-
blme est quaprs la comparution les gouvernements, les Etats Membres
* Directeur, Service des affaires internationales, Ministre du Travail, Belgique.
173
oublient un peu lexistence du comit jusqu la comparution suivante. On ne

peut pas imaginer, dans le systme des Nations Unies, linstallation dun comit
unique avec des spcialisations organises ventuellement en son sein, mais
qui accepterait aussi dorganiser un dbat priodique avec lensemble de ses
membres pour quil y ait cette pression permanente et cette connaissance de
ces recommandations qui sintgreraient dans les politiques des gouvernements.
Je trouve que cela redonne un certain intrt lide dun comit unique
qui serait un peu contre-courant de la tendance des travaux dont M. Sicilianos
a parl mais je ne pensais pas que cette proposition devait tre vacue aussi
rapidement.
Je termine avec une autre recommandation. Tout le monde parle ici des
Etats. Nous avons eu hier lexemple dune discussion trs intressante et humo-
ristique sur la volont politique. Je crois quil faudrait que, tant aux Nations
Unies qu lOIT, on puisse dgager des moyens pour la formation aux droits de
lhomme de tous les corps dcentraliss et dconcentrs des Etats. Les Etats ne
sont pas uniquement les gouvernements centraux. Ils font ce quils peuvent mais
connaissez-vous les conditions et les contraintes de la dcision politique dans les
Etats et encore plus dans les dmocraties? Dans les niveaux subordonns il y a
galement tout un travail de connaissance, de formation aux droits de lhomme
qui est important pour amliorer la qualit des dcisions prises ce niveau l,
car il y a tout de mme des entits rgionales qui ont des pouvoirs forts et ten-
dus dans le cadre des Constitutions et on ne parle pas tellement de cette disper-
sion des comptences et des mcanismes qui rend parfois difficile la comparu-
tion des Etats.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos Vous dites quil faudrait organiser le futur

organe unique, si jamais un tel organe voit le jour, en chambres en fonction des
spcialisations, cest--dire en fonction des traits. Dans ce cas, on reproduirait
plus ou moins le mme schma qui existe aujourdhui. Ctait une proposition
qui a t faite par Madame le Haut-Commissaire et qui figure effectivement dans
le document de rflexion qui a t longuement discut lors du brainstorming du
Liechtenstein. Tout le monde a considr que cest effectivement une possibilit
qui rsoudrait, le cas chant, le problme des spcificits. Cependant, si lon
devait crer quelque chose de nouveau qui reproduirait le systme actuel, cela
nen vaudrait pas la peine.
Pour ce qui est de limprvisibilit, je partage tout fait votre point de vue.
Il est vrai que lors de lexamen des rapports tatiques, nous nous sentons obli-
gs dajouter chacun une ou deux questions qui nous viennent en tte aprs avoir
lu la documentation, le rapport, et aprs avoir entendu les ONG, le cas chant,
la toute dernire minute. Cest imprvisible. Les ONG qui font un briefing
juste avant la prsentation du rapport tatique peuvent avoir des informations
extrmement intressantes et on aimerait quand mme, ne serait-ce qu la der-
nire minute, demander une question ce sujet la dlgation tatique. Je dirais
que limprvisibilit fait, en quelque sorte, le charme du systme lorsquune
dlgation y est bien prpare, et la dlgation belge est extrmement bien
174
prpare dhabitude, elle est prte rpondre tout, y compris des questions
tout fait imprvisibles.
Il y a une pression permanente. Cest pour cela quon a essay de crer ce
systme de suivi, de follow-up aux observations finales, dans le cadre duquel on
demande deux ou trois questions prioritaires chaque dlgation et on prie cette
dlgation de bien vouloir nous donner des informations supplmentaires dans
un certain dlai pour instaurer prcisment un dialogue, sinon continu du moins
rapproch, entre les deux rapports.
Enfin, quant la qualit des dcisions des entits rgionales, voire des enti-
ts fdres, il y a un besoin de formation ce niveau, je partage votre avis. Je
suis parfaitement conscient des difficults quont un certain nombre dEtats,
notamment quelques Etats fdraux, qui disent devant les comits que le gou-
vernement central fait tout ce quil peut mais quil y a aussi les entits fdres,
les entits rgionales et locales, qui ont leurs pouvoirs en vertu de la Constitu-
tion et pour lesquelles le gouvernement central ne peut rien. Je sais que, dans
lesprit de mes collgues constitutionnalistes, ceci est un argument trs fort que
nous respectons parfaitement. De notre point de vue, en vertu du sacro-saint
principe du droit international, lEtat est unitaire. Un organe international de
contrle considre lEtat comme une seule entit et, comme la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice le dit depuis plusieurs dcennies, ce qui se passe lintrieur de
lEtat, cest un pur fait du point de vue du droit international. On ne peut pas
faire autrement, vous peut-tre non plus, et cest une diffrence dapproche entre
les constitutionnalistes et les internationalistes, je le reconnais volontiers mais
je nai pas de rponse cette discordance.
175
Reforming the Council of Europes system
of human rights protection:
Current developments
Jutta Limbach*
I. Introduction
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Convention), which came into force
in September 1953, pursues the aims of maintaining and further realising human
rights and fundamental freedoms. It is the first international instrument which
did not only lay down individual rights legally binding on all States parties, but
also set up a mechanism for the enforcement of these rights. The most distinc-
tive feature of this mechanism is the right of individual application. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the Court) is the only international
court to which any individual, or group of individuals, may have access for the
purpose of enforcing their rights under the Convention, in accordance with Arti-
cles 34 and 35 of the Convention. This right of individual application is both an
essential part of the system and a basic feature of European legal culture.1 Since
1998, the task of supervising State compliance with the Convention standards is
performed by a single, full-time Court replacing the original Convention organs,
namely, the Commission and the former part-time Court. The role of the Court
within the Convention system is twofold: Firstly, the Court has been assigned
the task of supervising the States parties respect of the Convention rights in the
* President of the Goethe-Institut; Former President of the Federal Constitutional Court of

Germany; Member of the Group of Wise Persons for the strengthening of the system of human
rights protection under the European Convention on Human Rights.
1
See the Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers,
CM(2006)203, 15 November 2006, para. 23.
177
individual cases brought before it. Secondly, it has been given a specific con-
stitutional mission, consisting of laying down common principles and standards
relating to human rights and of determining the minimum level of protection to
be observed by the contracting States. 2 If the Court is to retain its leading role in
the system of the international protection of human rights, both these principles
have to be preserved.
With the accession of the East European member States to the Convention
following the fall of the iron curtain, the Courts caseload increased dramati-
cally. This may be illustrated by the following numbers: during the 35 years
between the setting up of the Convention organs in 1955 and 1990, an overall
number of some 54,000 applications were lodged with the Convention organs;
in 2004 alone some 44,000 applications were lodged with the Court. 3 By the end
of September 2006, 89,000 cases were pending before the Court. Even though
more than 90 per cent of these applications will eventually be declared inad-
missible, the processing of these cases bind the judges and their supportive Reg-
istry staff and prevent them from concentrating on those cases which merit more
intensive consideration. This leads to an increasing backlog of cases which
cannot be processed within the time-limits set by the Court itself in order to
ensure the effectiveness and the credibility of its work.
The exponential increase of the Courts caseload jeopardises the function-
ing of the whole system. In order to ensure the future effectiveness of the Court
system, the Council of Europe launched a number of initiatives, culminating in
Protocol No. 14 to the Convention which opened for signature in May 2004. This
Protocol will enter into force three months after all the Parties to the Convention
have ratified it. To date, only one ratification is missing.
In addition, the Council of Europe Third Summit of Heads of State and
Government, held in Warsaw in May 2005, established a Group of Wise Persons
in order to develop a long-term strategy for the Convention system. The group
was assigned the task to submit proposals which went beyond the measures
established by Protocol No. 14, while preserving the basic philosophy of the
Convention. 4 This group submitted its report on 15 November 2006. Some of the
recommendations contained in this report are outlined below.
The subject-matter of todays lecture compels me to focus on the difficul-
ties the Court is facing in the wake of the accession of the East European member
States to the Convention. However, I should not do so without recalling that this
was a highly fortunate event which placed the Council of Europe and its Court
right into the heart of Europe. When discussing the issue of reforming the system
of European human rights protection, we should keep in mind the eminent role
that the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Court as its executing
organ, play in safeguarding democratic values across Europe, as well as in
2
Ibid., para. 24.
3
See the Courts Annual Report 2005.
4
Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Counsel of Europe (Warsaw,
16-17 May 2005), Action Plan, CM(2005)80 final 17 May 2005, para. I(1).
178
Reforming the Council of Europes system of human rights protection
setting an example even beyond the borders of its member States. The Conven-
tion and the Court have become genuine pillars in the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. 5 More than that, the Convention has been
rightly depicted as both a symbol of, and a catalyst for, the victory of democ-
racy over totalitarian Government, as well as the ultimate expression of the
capacity, indeed the necessity, for democracy and the Rule of Law to transcend
frontiers. 6 Bearing this in mind, it is essential to ensure that any reform steps
taken do not curtail the Courts aptitude to continue performing this role.
II. The changes introduced by Protocol No. 14
Under the present procedural system, incoming applications are allocated

either to a Committee of three or to a Chamber of seven judges. The Committee
of three judges may decide, by unanimous vote, to declare inadmissible appli-
cations where it can do so without further examination, which means in cases
which are clearly inadmissible. All remaining applications have to be considered
by a chamber of seven judges.
Protocol No. 14 endeavours to provide the Court with the necessary pro-
cedural means and flexibility to process applications within a reasonable time.
It seeks, in particular, to reduce the time spent by the Court on manifestly inad-
missible and repetitive cases. The main changes introduced to the procedure of
the Court are the following:
(i) A single judge will acquire the competence to decide on cases which are
plainly inadmissible. 7 He or she will be assisted by non-judicial rappor-
teurs, that is to say, by lawyers from the Courts Registry. 8
(ii) The powers of the three-judge Committees are extended. In addition to
their existing competency to declare an application inadmissible or to strike
it out of the Courts list of cases, they will be competent to declare an appli-
cation admissible and render at the same time a judgment on the merits, if
the underlying question in the case is already the subject of well-estab-
lished case-law of the Court. 9 This measure aims at unburdening the Cham-
bers from giving judgment in cases which are clearly well-founded, such
as repetitive or so called clone cases.
(iii) A new admissibility criterion is introduced. The Court will be empowered
to declare inadmissible any individual application where the applicant
has not suffered a significant disadvantage. However, cases may not be
5
See Report, op. cit., supra n. 1, para. 15.
6
See speech given by Luzius Wildhaber on the occasion of the opening of the judicial year,
20 January 2006.
7
New Articles 26 and 27 of the Convention.
8
New Article 24(1).
9
New Article 28(1)(b).
179
dismissed on this ground if respect for human rights requires an exami-

nation of the merits or where the case has not been duly examined by a
domestic tribunal.10
(iv) Protocol No. 14 also provides that the admissibility and merits of an appli-
cation shall be examined jointly, unless the decision-making body decides
otherwise. This regulation merely endorses a practice which has already
been adopted by the Court and which leads to a considerable acceleration
of the processing of cases. As a matter of current practice, in fact, the Court
disposes of the majority of admissible cases by giving a joint decision on
the admissibility and the merits of an application, eliminating one proce-
dural step, namely the separate examination of the admissibility.
(v) Lastly, Protocol No. 14 contains a number of provisions on the execution
of Court judgments and on the judges election and terms of office.
III. The Group of Wise Persons proposals

The Group of Wise Persons expressly welcomed the changes introduced
by Protocol No. 14, which we deemed extremely useful. 11 We considered, how-
ever, that the measures proposed in this Protocol would not be sufficient to
enable the Court to find any lasting solution to its serious problem of conges-
tion. Accordingly, we took this Protocol as a starting point and proposed further
measures designed to ensure that the Court is able to perform its specific func-
tions fully and on a long-term basis. 12
During our deliberations, we considered a number of proposals. For exam-
ple, it had been suggested that the Court should be given a discretionary power
to decide whether or not to take up cases for examination, comparable to the
certiorari procedure before the United States Supreme Court. While such a
measure might to a certain degree ease the burden of the Courts workload, the
price to be paid for this relief would be too high. As I have already pointed out,
the right of individual application has to be regarded as a key element of the
European human rights protection system. The Courts authority stems to a sig-
nificant degree from the fact that every applicant claiming a violation of a Con-
vention right has the assurance that his or her case be heard in Strasbourg. The
introduction of a certiorari procedure would run contrary to this assurance and
thus undermine the public confidence in the Convention system. At the same
time, such a measure would be alien to the philosophy underlying the Conven-
tion. It should further be noted that the Courts credibility relies on its political
neutrality. Granting the Court a greater margin of appreciation as to which appli-
cations it wishes to accept for adjudication would entail a risk of politicising the
system as the Court would have to select cases for examination. The choices it
10
New Article 35(3)(b).
11
See Report, op. cit., supra n. 1 para. 30 .
12
Ibid., para. 33.
180
Reforming the Council of Europes system of human rights protection
would make might have led to inconsistencies and might even have been con-
sidered arbitrary. For these reasons, we decided not to endorse this proposal. 13
Instead, we decided to go beyond the reforms envisaged by Protocol No. 14
by proposing to establish a new judicial filtering body that would be attached to,
but separate from the Court. We called this new judicial body the Judicial Com-
mittee. The purpose of this measure would be to guarantee, on one hand, that
individual applications result in a judicial decision thus upholding the tradi-
tion that every case be heard in Strasbourg while assuring, on the other hand,
that the Court is relieved of a large number of cases, enabling it to focus on its
essential role. The members of the Judicial Committee would be judges enjoy-
ing the same guarantees of independence and disposing of similar qualifications
as the other judges of the Court. Their term of office would be limited in time.
The composition of the Judicial Committee should reflect a geographical bal-
ance as well as a harmonious gender balance and should be based on a system
of rotation between States.
The Judicial Committee would, in particular, perform functions which,
under Protocol No. 14, are assigned to committees of three judges and single
judges. Accordingly, the Judicial Committee would have jurisdiction to: (a) hear
all applications raising admissibility issues; (b) hear all cases which could be
declared manifestly well-founded or manifestly ill-founded on the basis of well-
established case-law of the Court; and (c) award just satisfaction in cases in
which it found a violation of a Convention right. The decisions of the Judicial
Committee should, in principle, be taken by benches of three judges. However,
since the Judicial Committee would perform, among others, functions which,
under Protocol No. 14, are assigned to a single judge, we considered it appro-
priate that provision should also be made for manifestly inadmissible cases to be
heard by a single judge. We considered that it would be inappropriate to provide
for the possibility of appealing against the decisions of the Judicial Committee.
Providing for such a possibility would place an additional burden on the control
system and jeopardise the aim of easing the Courts workload. However, the
Court should be given a special power allowing it, on its own motion, to assume
jurisdiction to review any decision adopted by the Judicial Committee. 14
By creating a Judicial Committee within the Courts administration, we
would avoid the problems of a dual system such as those that arose between the
old Commission of Human Rights and the Court. Furthermore, the Judicial
Committee could dispose of applications more effectively than the old Com-
mission, as it would be competent to give binding decisions not only in inad-
missible, but also in clearly cut, well-founded cases. For these reasons, we con-
sider that the establishment of a Judicial Committee would contribute to a
substantial degree to the solution of the Courts present problems.
In order to achieve a long-term effect, this measure is corroborated by a
number of other suggestions. For instance, consideration was given to the
13
Ibid., para. 42.
14
Ibid., paras. 51-65.
181
principle of subsidiarity as one of the cornerstones of the system for protecting

human rights in Europe, 15 implying that violations of Convention rights should
be first and foremost remedied by the member States themselves. As the Presi-
dent of the Court has rightly put it, the task consists in achieving a balance
between national and international protection; both components must function
effectively if the system is to work. 16 Accordingly, we suggested a number of
measures aimed at strengthening the co-operation between the Court and the
States parties, such as ensuring a broad dissemination of important judgments
within the member States 17, allowing certain national courts to request the
Courts advisory opinion 18 and encouraging the member States to improve their
domestic remedies for redressing violations of the Convention.
Furthermore, we suggested that certain tasks could be delegated by the
Court to the domestic authorities, such as the award of just satisfaction after the
Court has found a violation of the Convention. Being closer to the subject-matter
at issue, the national authorities are frequently better placed than the Court to
assess the actual damage.
Finally, we also encouraged the Court to continue giving pilot judgments
and proposed certain modifications to the Courts procedural rules which would
allow the parties to have recourse to mediation during proceedings.
IV. Final remarks
Now that the Group of Wise Persons has submitted its report, the next step
will consist in discussing our proposals in the decision-making bodies of the
Council of Europe and its member States with a view to a swift implementation
of reform measures. At this stage, it is of crucial importance that all member
States detach themselves from any short-term political interests, in order to
ensure not only the survival, but also the thriving of the European system of
human rights protection. I suppose that you all know only too well how ambi-
tious projects can get watered down by nitty-gritty politics. However, bearing in
mind that the Heads of State, in their Warsaw summit, have clearly expressed
their determination to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention []
by all appropriate means, 19 I am confident that last and this years work was not
in vain and that the joint efforts of the member States, the organs of the Council
of Europe and last but not least the Court itself will effectively safeguard the
future of the European system of human rights protection.
15
Ibid., para. 16.
16
See Luzius Wildhaber, Consequences for the European Court of Human Rights of Pro-
tocol No. 14 and the Resolution on judgments revealing an underlying systemic problem Practi-
cal steps of implementation and challenges, in Reform of the European human rights system
Proceedings of the high-level seminar, Oslo, 18 October 2004, Council of Europe, 2004.
17
See Report, op. cit., supra n. 1, paras. 66-75.
18
Ibid., paras. 81-86.
19
See Action Plan, op. cit., supra n. 4, para. I(1).
182
Reforming the Council of Europes System of Human Rights protection
Discussion
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos* With reference to the Judicial Committee, I
am personally enthusiastic about this major proposal. The problem is, however,
that this proposal originated from the Court itself, four years ago during the
travaux prparatoires of the 14th Protocol and more than two-thirds of the
Member States of the Council of Europe were against this proposal for fear that
it would in a way recreate the European Commission of Human Rights.
Although I fully agree with Ms. Limbach that there are some important differ-
ences between the Judicial Committee and the European Commission of Human
Rights, I believe that the political will is lacking and therefore it would be very
difficult to convince the governments concerned at the present juncture.
My second comment is somewhat more critical and relates to the proposal
to delegate to the national authorities the issue of just satisfaction. I think this
may affect the credibility of the whole system. Applicants are mostly interested
in this very practical, and evidently very important issue. Should they see that
the European Court is referring this issue back to the national authorities, which
by definition have already rejected their claims, there would certainly be an ele-
ment of frustration and scepticism. I am therefore in doubt as to how such a pro-
posal would be viewed from the applicants point of view, and I would very
much like to have Ms. Limbachs views on this.
Jutta Limbach I think we have made our point very clear that there is a
distinction between the former Commission of Human Rights and the proposed
Judicial Committee. There are certain characteristic features which should leave
no doubt that this is far from being a repetition. According to the Group of Wise
Persons final report, for instance, the Judicial Committee has to adjudicate
under the aegis of the Court and a member of the Court will be the chairman of
the Judicial Committee. It is true, however, that we might need to argue further
in favour of such measure.
The second point concerning just satisfaction was very intensively dis-
cussed in the Group of Wise Persons. According to our proposals, individual
applicants, if they consider that the amount of compensation obtained is not
appropriate, or not in compliance with the European Convention on Human
Rights, would have the possibility to go back to the Judicial Committee, or to
the Court, in order to challenge the decision of a national body. This is not the
only remedy but I think that our proposal can be formulated in a way that gives
reassurance that the Court not only pronounces itself on principles but keeps a
close grip on practice too.
Laura Cox** It might interest those of you that are here to know that, in
fact, earlier this year I handed down a judgment in which I found that there had
* Associate Professor of International Law, University of Athens; Member of the UN

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
** Justice of the High Court, Queens Bench Division, United Kingdom; Member, ILO
Committee of Experts.
183
been a violation of article 2 and had to assess compensation myself under our
own Human Rights Act and, in fact, although the Act requires us to look to the
Strasbourg Court for guidance on all these matters, the one thing that the Stras-
bourg Court has not been terribly consistent on is how they arrive at compensa-
tion. There is no clear structure as to how awards are to be calculated. Actually,
I regarded this as a very good opportunity. It presented me, as the judge, to for-
mulate some guidelines as to how one should go about assessing compensation
and I laid them all down. I now wait, of course, to be overturned by the Court of
Appeal whenever the case will turn up. Whatever the concerns about national
courts, in some cases it might actually be quite an advantage because in this par-
ticular case I feel I was probably more generous than the Strasbourg Court might
have been.
Budislav Vukas * I wonder whether the Group of Wise Persons was wise
enough to reconsider the question of the protection of persons belonging to
minorities. In the past, it has been suggested that the Council of Europe should
set up a mechanism to enable persons belonging to minorities to have access to
the Court or earlier to the Commission. In 1993 a group was established to draft
a special protocol on the protection of minorities but in 1996 the group was dis-
solved and it was decided to adopt the current framework convention which in
essence is soft law. Apart from the clause on the prohibition of discrimination,
there is nothing specific in the European Convention relating to the protection
of minorities. On several occasions, the idea of a protocol was floated but it was
never really intended to move forward with such a project. My question is
whether the Group of Wise Persons has given thought to any fresh initiative in
this regard.
Jutta Limbach I have a very short answer. It was not our task to re-exam-
ine concrete, substantive issues. We only made proposals aiming at easing the
burden of the workload of the Court and, therefore, we addressed exclusively
procedural questions. There might be need for another Group of Wise Persons
to reflect on the possible establishment of future committees and commissions.
I am afraid I am not in position to provide a better answer to this very important
question.
Eibe Riedel** The idea of the Judicial Committee is, of course, a very
interesting proposal. I would be interested, however, in hearing more about cost
and also about the extent to which this new body is expected to reduce the case-
load. One might have just increased, or even doubled, the number of judges
instead of having two parallel institutions with all potential difficulties. At the
* Professor of Public International Law, University of Zagreb; Member, ILO Committee

of Experts.
** Professor of Law, University of Mannheim; Vice-Chairperson of the UN Committee on
184
Reforming the Council of Europes System of Human Rights protection
same time, the Judicial Committee would conceivably come very close to the
old Commission, with the addition that its members will be fully established
judges and will have to be treated alike. After all, this would appear to be the
court of the first instance of the European community.
Beyond this, a point of real concern is the issue of subsidiarity. I think that
in the long run we have to look very closely at the old common law development
of itinerant justices, or something similar to that, and go back to the national
level having European judges travelling around and overseeing that the common
standard of Strasbourg is maintained because statistical figures will inevitably
continue to rise. They have continually gone up, and therefore the 80,000-case
figure is only a temporary one. What if the workload were to mount at 150,000
cases? I would really like to know your personal views on this.
Jutta Limbach I know that our proposals would have been warmly wel-
comed if we had managed to put forward solutions that would cost nothing.
However, you cannot validly expect to reach any meaningful results without
being prepared to allocate sufficient resources to such extraordinary task. The
Group of Wise Persons has, in fact, suggested that the membership of the Judi-
cial Committee should not necessarily correspond or otherwise be related to the
number of Member States. It was also suggested that the Committee of Minis-
ters should reconsider whether the Court should continue to be composed of
46 judges. There must be a reduction, not only for reasons of cost but also in the
interest of guaranteeing uniform jurisprudence. Therefore, I think that a double
court, or a Judicial Committee as a court of the first instance, is not what is
envisaged. This was also the view of the Chairperson of the Group of Wise Per-
sons, and former President of the European Court of Justice, Mr. Rodriguez Igle-
sias. Regarding the principle of subsidiarity, it is undeniably very important and
Mr. Riedel is totally right in saying that the best way to protect human rights is
to do so within national borders. Yet, standards differ considerably across Europe
and the European Court of Human Rights has a challenging task in this regard.
Finally, the concept of itinerant justices would merit to be given serious con-
sideration as an alternative proposal.
185
La fusion de la Cour de Justice de lUnion
africaine et de la Cour africaine des droits
de lhomme et des peuples
Fatsah Ouguergouz *
Je voudrais, pour commencer, vous dire le grand honneur et limmense pri-

vilge que je ressens davoir t convi participer aux travaux de ce Colloque
commmoratif du 80e anniversaire de la commission dexperts de lOIT. Je suis
dautant plus honor que je ne suis probablement pas la personne la plus indi-
que pour parler de la mtamorphose du systme rgional africain de protection
des droits de la personne humaine et plus particulirement du projet de fusion
de la Cour africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples et de la Cour de Jus-
tice de lUnion africaine. En effet, je ne suis pas un vritable praticien des droits
de lhomme ou un membre du corps acadmique spcialis dans la question. Ce
nest que trs rcemment que jai t impliqu professionnellement dans le
domaine des droits de lhomme sur le continent africain. A cet gard, je tiens
indiquer que jutiliserai les expressions droits de lhomme pour le gnrique
et sans aucune connotation particulire ou droits de la personne humaine,
certes un peu plus longue, mais non le concept de droits humains que jexcre.
Mon engagement rcent dans ce domaine auprs de la Cour africaine des droits
de lhomme et des peuples na, en effet t rendu possible quaprs avoir dmis-
sionn de mes fonctions de Premier Secrtaire de la Cour internationale de Jus-
tice et quitt mes penses noyes dans les brumes de la mer du Nord et engour-
dies dans le silence du Palais de la Paix La Haye. En effet, depuis dbut 2006,
jai le redoutable privilge de compter parmi les membres de ce premier organe
judiciaire international lchelle du continent africain ce qui me vaut trs cer-
tainement lhonneur dtre en mesure de madresser aujourdhui vous pour
vous parler du prsent et du futur de cet organe judiciaire et de la question
* Juge, Cour africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples.
187
complexe de la fusion de cette Cour avec la Cour internationale de Justice. Ne

confrez toutefois pas mes propos une autorit quils nont pas car ce nest pas
vraiment un expert qui vient aujourdhui vous parler de la mtamorphose du sys-
tme rgional de protection des droits de lhomme en Afrique et de la fusion
envisage des deux Cours mais plutt un nophyte, un confrencier occasionnel
frachement revtu de lhermine du juge international.
Mon propos sinscrira dans le droit fil de lensemble des travaux de ces
deux jours consacrs essentiellement la dimension institutionnelle ou orga-
nique de la pratique de la protection des droits de la personne humaine et des
droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels en particulier. Jexaminai cette dimen-
sion institutionnelle ou organique dans le cadre particulier du continent africain.
Toutefois, avant de me pencher sur cette question de la mtamorphose du sys-
tme rgional de protection des droits de l homme en Afrique et de la question
particulire de la fusion des deux cours, jaimerais tout d abord esquisser
grands traits les contours du systme gnral de protection des droits de la per-
sonne humaine sur le continent africain et dire quelques mots sur la Charte afri-
caine des droits de lhomme et des peuples adopte en 1981.
Je commencerais donc tout dabord par le systme gnral de protection
des droits de lhomme sur le continent africain. Jaimerais faire cette prsenta-
tion lintention de celles et ceux dentre vous qui ne seraient pas vraiment fami-
liers avec cette question et jajouterais galement quen ma qualit de juge je me
sens galement un devoir de participer la promotion de cet instrument juridique
international et den assurer la visibilit.
La protection des droits de lhomme sur le continent africain est assure
par un rseau dense et complexe dinstruments juridiques internationaux qui ont
t adopts, pour la plupart, avant mme lindpendance des Etats africains. Je
citerais la Dclaration universelle des droits de lhomme de 1948 et un trs grand
nombre dinstruments juridiques valeur obligatoire, de conventions interna-
tionales adoptes dans le cadre de lONU, au premier rang desquelles le Pacte
de 1966 auquel un trs grand nombre dEtats africains sont parties. Aux conven-
tions conclues dans le cadre des Nations Unies stricto sensu, jajouterais toutes
les conventions qui ont t adoptes dans le cadre de cette belle Organisation
quest lOrganisation internationale du Travail, et galement les conventions qui
ont t adoptes dans le cadre de lUNESCO. Il convient de mentionner gale-
ment les instruments qui ont vocation sappliquer en situation de conflits arms
internationaux ou non internationaux, savoir le droit de Genve. Si toutefois je
devais limiter mon examen aux seuls instruments internationaux valeur juri-
dique obligatoire, cest--dire aux seuls instruments conventionnels adopts par
les seuls Etats africains et pour les seuls Etats africains, je dirais quil faut
dabord mentionner la Charte africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples qui
est le pendant rgional de la Convention europenne des droits de lhomme en
Europe et de la Convention amricaine des droits de lhomme en Amrique.
La Charte africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples, dois-je le souli-
gner, nest pas le seul instrument africain relatif la protection des droits de
lhomme sur le continent africain. Elle nest quun des lments de ce que
188
La fusion de la Cour de Justice de lUnion africaine et de la Cour africaine
jappellerais ldifice rgional de protection des droits de lhomme sur le conti-

nent africain. Pour utiliser une image, je dirais que tel quil a t conu par les
Etats africains eux-mmes cet difice repose sur quatre piliers de solidit ingale
dont certains ont t renforcs au cours des ans. Dun point de vue chronolo-
gique, le premier pilier a t coul Addis-Abeba en 1963. Il sagit, en loccur-
rence, de la Charte constitutive de lOrganisation de lunit africaine. A mon
sens, il sagit l du pilier le plus fragile de tout ldifice. Cet important document
politique et juridique consacre, en effet, une place trs faible la question des
droits de lhomme si on le compare, par exemple, la Charte des Nations Unies,
la Charte constitutive de lOrganisation des Etats amricains ou encore au
Statut du Conseil de lEurope. Contrairement ces dernires qui accordent une
plus grande importance aux peuples, la Charte de lOUA est un document plutt
orient vers la souverainet de lEtat et le territoire.
Le deuxime pilier de cette construction a t coul en 1969 sous la forme
de la convention rgissant les aspects propres aux problmes des rfugis en
Afrique. Il sagit dune convention importante et gnreuse sil en est puisquelle
est venue sensiblement largir la dfinition de la notion de rfugi donne par
la convention des Nations Unies de 1951 telle que complte par son protocole
de 1967, en ne se limitant pas la protection des seuls rfugis politiques mais
en protgeant galement toute personne qui, du fait dune agression, dune occu-
pation extrieure, dune domination trangre ou d vnements troublant gra-
vement lordre public, est oblige de quitter son pays.
Le troisime pilier, le plus solide, a t coul en 1981. Il est constitu par
la Charte africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples sur laquelle je revien-
drai plus tard.
Enfin, le quatrime et dernier pilier de cet difice date, pour sa part, de
1990 et consiste en la Charte africaine des droits et du bien-tre de lenfant.
Le premier pilier de cette construction rgionale, le pilier le plus fragile,
savoir la Charte de lOUA, a aujourdhui t remplac par un pilier beaucoup
plus solide avec lentre en vigueur de lActe constitutif de lUnion africaine, le
26 mai 2001. Ainsi, ce pilier qui tait, pour ainsi dire en pis, en terre battue, a
t remplac par un nouveau en bton arm, beaucoup plus solide, dans le cadre
de la mutation fondamentale qua subie lOrganisation panafricaine en 2001.
Comme jai dj eu loccasion de le mentionner, lOrganisation de lunit
africaine vouait un culte immodr la souverainet nationale et la protection
des territoires des Etats membres. LActe constitutif de lOrganisation de
lUnion africaine, pour sa part, place la protection des droits de la personne
humaine au centre de ses proccupations. Ainsi, alors que lOrganisation de lu-
nit africaine tait centre sur les territoires et sur lEtat, lUnion africaine est
davantage centre sur lindividu et les peuples africains. En effet, sans le citer
dans son intgralit, il convient de mentionner que larticle 3 de lActe consti-
tutif de lOrganisation de lUnion africaine accorde une grande importance aux
droits de lhomme et envisage mme un droit dintervention humanitaire de
lUnion africaine dans certaines circonstances, en particulier les situations de
violations graves et massives des droits de lhomme comme par exemple le
189
gnocide ou la violation des normes de jus cogens. Dsormais le non-respect des

prescriptions de lorgane suprme de cette organisation quest la Confrence des
chefs dEtat et de gouvernement expose les Membres une intervention de lOrga-
nisation voire des sanctions. Cela tmoigne dune mutation fondamentale les
dispositions juridiques restent tre mises en uvre mais leur simple adoption
tmoigne indubitablement dun changement desprit des dirigeants africains.
Le troisime pilier, savoir la Charte africaine des droits de lhomme et
des peuples, a galement t renforc. Il a t renforc deux reprises par le biais
de protocoles. Le premier renforcement est intervenu au moyen de ladoption du
protocole portant cration de la Cour africaine des droits de lhomme et des peu-
ples en juin 1998. Il a galement t renforc en 2003 par ladoption du proto-
cole relatif aux droits des femmes en Afrique. A mon sens, la Charte africaine
des droits de lhomme et des peuples constitue la cl de vote et le noyau dur du
systme rgional de protection des droits de lhomme en Afrique.
Laissez-moi aborder brivement maintenant les caractristiques principa-
les de la Charte africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples. En ce qui
concerne le contenu matriel, je serai assez rapide. Ce quil convient de retenir,
cest que la Charte consacre deux catgories de droits individuels dans un seul
instrument: les droits civils et politiques dun ct et les droits conomiques,
sociaux et culturels de lautre, contrairement au modle europen et interamri-
cain. Elle consacre tant des droits dabstention ou des droits immdiatement ex-
cutoires que des droits programmatoires ou des droits de crance. Au niveau uni-
versel, comme vous le savez, la question de savoir sil fallait adopter un seul
pacte ou deux pactes distincts a t longuement discute, pour finalement se
solder par ladoption de deux pactes un pour chaque type de droits avec deux
mcanismes de supervision diffrents. La deuxime originalit importante de la
Charte africaine est quelle consacre des droits de solidarit ou les droits de la
troisime gnration. Il sagit du premier instrument juridique valeur obliga-
toire consacrant des droits tels le droit des peuples au dveloppement ou le droit
des peuples lenvironnement. Jaimerais, dailleurs ce stade, rappeler que
dans son Historia natural, une vaste encyclopdie des connaissances de son
temps, Pline lAncien crit: ex Africa semper aliquid novi, de lAfrique il sort
toujours du nouveau. Le moins que lon puisse dire, cest que les Etats africains
nont pas fait mentir ce naturaliste romain dcd il y a presque 2000 ans aujour-
dhui. La troisime originalit de la Charte est quelle consacre le concept de
devoir et prvoit la cration dune Commission africaine des droits de lhomme
et des peuples qui a deux attributions principales: la promotion des droits de
lhomme dun ct et la protection des droits de lhomme de lautre. Cet organe
avait, en fait, des prrogatives trs faibles dans le cadre de la Charte africaine
mais il a peu peu subi des mtamorphoses. En effet, cette Commission a vu ses
prrogatives largies, en mme temps que diminuaient celles de lorgane
suprme de lUnion africaine, la Confrence des chefs dEtat qui voulait garder
la main haute sur cet organe de promotion et de protection des droits de
lhomme. Ceci tmoigne donc dj dune mtamorphose au niveau de lvolu-
tion de la Commission africaine elle-mme quon a parfois beaucoup accus de
190
La fusion de la Cour de Justice de lUnion africaine et de la Cour africaine
ne pas avoir fourni beaucoup de travail durant ses 20 annes dexistence. Pour
ma part, je ne serai pas trop critique son gard, dans la mesure o cet organe n
a pas vraiment de moyens matriels ni de moyens humains sa disposition puis-
quil nest constitu que de onze commissaires qui ne sont pratiquement pas
assists. Il faut, par ailleurs, rappeler une chose importante qui est que la Com-
mission africaine na pas hsit se prononcer sur la justiciabilit des droits co-
nomiques, sociaux et culturels et il convient de mettre ceci son crdit. Il ne fau-
drait, par consquent, pas tre trop critique son endroit. Comme lcrivait
Roger Caillois, en voquant lhistoire du mythique Sisyphe, il ny a pas
defforts inutiles, Sisyphe se faisait les muscles. A lobjection que le temps est
maintenant venu pour cette Commission dagir, je rpondrais que la situation
risque maintenant dvoluer avec la rcente installation de la Cour africaine
des droits de lhomme et des peuples avec laquelle elle est appele travailler
en tandem.
En effet, la Cour africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples a t ta-
blie au dbut de cette anne suite lentre en vigueur en janvier 2004 du Proto-
cole prvoyant sa cration. Llection des juges qui devait initialement interve-
nir en juillet 2004 na, en fait, t possible que 18 mois plus tard, savoir en
janvier 2006. Je reviendrai plus tard sur les raisons de ce retard. La Cour est com-
pose de 11 membres et peut tre saisie aussi bien par des Etats que par la Com-
mission africaine elle-mme, ou encore par des organisations intergouverne-
mentales africaines. Il sagit dun accs direct et automatique dans la mesure o
les Etats parties la Commission africaine et les organisations intergouverne-
mentales peuvent accder directement la Cour. Les individus et les ONG peu-
vent galement accder la Cour, mais seulement sur une base consensuelle
lEtat partie dfendeur doit, au pralable, avoir fait une dclaration daccepta-
tion de cette comptence. Il sagit l, mon sens, dun point faible de ce proto-
cole. La comptence matrielle est, quant elle, beaucoup plus intressante dans
la mesure o la Cour africaine na pas uniquement pour objet de connatre des
violations de la Charte africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples, comme
cest le cas dans le cadre interamricain ou europen, o il y a un instrument de
rfrence unique. La Cour africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples peut
connatre de la violation de tout autre instrument pertinent relatif aux droits de
lhomme et ratifi par les Etats parties. En dautres termes, la Cour africaine
pourrait, en thorie, tre saisie dune violation du premier ou du second Pacte
des Nations Unies de 1966, ou dune violation dune quelconque convention de
l OIT, laquelle serait partie un Etat africain. La Cour pourrait ainsi venir assis-
ter la commission dexperts de lOIT et le Comit des droits de lhomme des
Nations Unies ou le Comit des droits socio-conomiques et culturels dans leur
lourde et prcieuse mission. La dernire chose importante que jaimerais dire
propos de cette Cour est que ses jours sont compts. Comme vous le savez, elle
natteindra jamais lge trs respectable de cette auguste commission dexperts
indpendants du BIT.
Nous arrivons ainsi la question de la fusion de la Cour africaine des droits
de lhomme et des peuples et de la Cour de justice de lUnion africaine. Cette
191
question rejoint dailleurs celle du retard expliquant llection des juges. Alors
quelle devait initialement lire les juges en juillet 2004, la Confrence a finale-
ment dcid de fusionner les deux cours. Un certain nombre de raisons cono-
miques comme la rationalisation des organes de lUnion africaine ont prsid
cette dcision et la principale raison invoque ft le manque de moyens finan-
ciers de disposer de deux cours. Je me rfrerais ici nouveau Pline lAncien
qui disait quil sort toujours du nouveau de lAfrique. Fusionner deux cours a
vocation totalement diffrente. En effet, la Cour de justice de lUnion africaine
est prvue par lActe constitutif de lUnion africaine et en particulier par le
Protocole de Maputo adopte en 2003. Cette cour peut tre compare la Cour
de justice de Luxembourg dans la mesure o elle a comptence pour connatre
tout le contentieux constitutionnel de lUnion africaine, mais galement de tout
autre contentieux international. En fait, la Cour de justice de lUnion africaine
est la fois une Cour du Luxembourg et une mini Cour internationale de justice.
Les chefs dEtats africains ont dcid de fusionner la Cour africaine des droits
de lhomme et des peuples et la Cour de justice qui a, elle-mme, deux casquet-
tes. En pratique, cela reviendrait fusionner la Cour de Strasbourg, la Cour du
Luxembourg et la Cour internationale de justice.
Il sagissait l dune gageure trs importante que certains, comme moi-
mme, ont considr non comme une fusion mais comme une confusion, qui
pouvait tre une manire pour les chefs dEtats africains de repousser aux calen-
des africaines la cration dune cour africaine. En juillet 2005, linstigation du
ministre algrien des Affaires trangres, M. Mohamed Bedjaoui, la Confrence
des chefs dEtat a finalement pris la dcision de rendre oprationnelle la Cour
africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples et de poursuivre le projet de
fusion. M. Bedjaoui qui est actuellement ministre des Affaires trangres de la
Rpublique dmocratique algrienne et ancien membre et Prsident de la Cour
internationale de Justice a dit, je cite: On oprationnalise la Cour africaine des
droits de lhomme et moi je moccupe de vous aider rdiger un protocole. En
effet, lide des chefs dEtat tait davoir trois protocoles: un protocole qui cre
la Cour africaine des droits de lhomme et des peuples, un protocole qui cre la
Cour de justice de lUnion africaine et un protocole de fusion. Voici la raison
pour laquelle je vous parlais de confusion pour que cette nouvelle cour
puisse voir le jour, il fallait que les Etats parties ratifient trois protocoles. Trois
protocoles pour une seule cour. Pourquoi faire simple quand on peut faire com-
pliqu, nest-ce pas? M. Bedjaoui a donc propos lide dun instrument unique
en disant que nous devons tout effacer et construire de nouveau. Deux mois
aprs sa proposition, il a effectivement soumis un projet qui est, actuellement,
toujours en cours de ngociation. Le projet devait tre discut par une runion
dexperts ainsi que par une runion de ministres de la Justice, mais cette discus-
sion a t reporte lanne prochaine.
192
CEACR, 71st session, Geneva, 23 Nov.-8 Dec. 2000
1. Ms. Ewa LETOWSKA (Poland)

2. Sir William DOUGLAS (Barbados), Chairman of the Committee
4. Ms. Janice R. BELLACE (United States)
5. Ms. Robyn A. LAYTON (Australia)
6. Ms. Blanca Ruth ESPONDA ESPINOSA (Mexico)
7. Mr. Boon Chiang TAN (Singapore)
8. Ms. Laura COX (United Kingdom)
9. Baron Bernd von MAYDELL (Germany)
11. Mr. Prafullachandra Natvarlal BHAGWATI (India)
12. Mr. Andre ZENGER, Director a.i., International Labour Standards Department
13. Mr. Amadou S (Senegal)
14. Mr. Benjamin Obi NWABUEZE (Nigeria)
15. Mr. Jean-Maurice VERDIER (France)
17. Mr. Sergey Petrovich MAVRIN (Russian Federation)
18. Mr. Anwar Ahmad Rashed AL-FUZAIE (Kuwait)
19. Mr. Lee SWEPSTON, Chief, Equality and Employment Branch
Mr. Toshio YAMAGUCHI (Japan) and Mr. Miguel RODRGUEZ PIERO Y BRAVO
FERRER (Spain) do not appear in this photograph.
195
CEACR, 76th session, Geneva, 21 Nov.-9 Dec. 2005
1. Ms. Laura COX (United Kingdom)

2. Ms. Angelika NUSSBERGER (Germany)
4. Ms. Cleopatra DOUMBIA-HENRY, Director, International Labour Standards
Department
5. Ms. Robyn A. LAYTON (Australia), Chairperson of the Committee
6. Ms. Janice R. BELLACE (United States)
7. Ms. Blanca Ruth ESPONDA ESPINOSA (Mexico)
8. Mr. Michael Halton CHEADLE (South Africa)
9. Mr. Denys BARROW (Belize)
10. Mr. Yozo YOKOTA (Japan)
11. Mr. Mario ACKERMAN (Argentina)
12. Mr. Amadou S (Senegal)
13. Mr. Miguel RODRGUEZ PIERO Y BRAVO FERRER (Spain)
15. Mr. Pierre LYON-CAEN (France)
16. Mr. Anwar Ahmad Rashed AL-FUZAIE (Kuwait), Reporter of the Committee
Mr. Sergey Petrovich MAVRIN (Russian Federation) does not appear in this
photograph.
196
Opening session of the international colloquium on the CEACR 80th anniversary

(left to right): Ms. Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry, Director of the International Labour
Standards Department; Ms. Robyn Layton, Chairperson of the Committee of Experts;
Mr. Kari Tapiola, Executive Director of the Standards and Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work Sector; Ms. Mara-Anglica Ducci, Executive Director, Office of
the Director-General
International colloquium on the CEACR 80th anniversary

(left to right) : Mr. Pierre Lyon-Caen (France), Mr. Budislav Vukas (Croatia),
and Mr. Anwar Ahmad Rashed Al-Fuzaie (Kuwait)
197

(left to right): Ms. Robyn Layton (Australia) and
Mr. Michael Halton Cheadle (South Africa)

(left to right): Ms. Laura Cox (United Kingdom) and Mr. Denys Barrow (Belize)
198

(left to right): Ms. Blanca Ruth Esponda Espinosa (Mexico) and Ms. Janice Bellace
(United States)
Dinner on the occasion of the international colloquium on the CEACR 80th anniversary
Geneva, 25 November 2006
(left to right): Mr. Francis Maupain, Special Adviser to the ILO Director-General and
Ms. Ruth Dreifuss, former President of the Swiss Confederation
199
IV.
Future approaches
to international regulation
and supervision
Saturday, 25 November 2006 Afternoon session
Cdigos de conducta y regmenes

voluntarios de cumplimiento:
es la autoregulacin una respuesta?
Adrin Goldin *
I. Unas cuestiones previas
Para ensayar una respuesta al interrogante planteado en el ttulo, nos ha

parecido necesario abordar inicialmente dos cuestiones previas en cuyo marco
se insertarn luego consideraciones de contenido ms especfico: procuraremos,
en primer lugar, identificar cul es, entre las diversas significaciones que es posi-
ble asignar al movimiento de la denominada Responsabilidad Social Empresa-
ria, la que nos parece de la mayor importancia poltica y conceptual (i); en
segundo lugar, poner de manifiesto la notable diversidad de formas que asumen
las iniciativas voluntarias que se reconocen como emergentes de aquella idea y,
por cierto, las implicaciones de tan amplia variedad (ii).
1. Las iniciativas voluntarias y la relacin de las empresas

con el sistema de proteccin
Con la ligereza que impone el objeto de este documento hay que decir
que si bien las iniciativas que buscan sustento en el mbito de la RSE suponen
invariablemente una actividad empresaria que se reivindica voluntaria y no vin-
culante, el ideario en el que abrev en sus orgenes responde en verdad a la pre-
ocupacin por el medio ambiente y el principio del desarrollo sostenible enun-
ciado por primera vez por el informe de la comisin Brundtland a fines de los
80, consagrado luego en la Cumbre de la Tierra de Ro de 1992 y prolongado
ms tarde en la formulacin de la dimensin social del desarrollo sostenible, esta
* Profesor de Derecho, Universidad de San Andrs, Argentina.
203
ltima de filiacin ms bien sindical. 1 En cualquier caso lo notable y significa-

tivo, a los fines de nuestra reflexin, es que las empresas exploran y reinterpre-
tan ese espacio y asumen un rol activo en su desarrollo. 2 No est ausente en esa
opcin, por cierto el componente colateral de las polticas de liberalizacin,
desregulacin y privatizacin, que asocia la bsqueda de polticas de bajo costo
y poco mantenimiento. 3
Ms all de los cuidados con los que conviene evaluar esas experiencias en
cuanto tienen de unilateralidad empresaria de ello nos ocupamos ms abajo
el carcter extenso y sostenido de ese movimiento sugiere la conveniencia de no
minimizar la significacin de su ocurrencia, sino, por el contrario, de conside-
rarla en el marco de la problemtica situacin en que encuentra al sistema de
tutela.
En efecto, no parece que quepa dudar de la idea de que la finalidad mani-
fiesta del marco institucional del rgimen de proteccin laboral es an y lo ser
en el futuro - la de proteger al trabajador en tanto protagonista dbil de las rela-
ciones de produccin. En ella convergen los propsitos de tutela, de compensa-
cin y de construccin y sostenimiento del sistema de relaciones laborales. 4
Es, en cambio, el modo en que evoluciona el conjunto de funciones del
ordenamiento una de las tendencias sustantivas uno de los rieles sobre los
que transita aquel marco institucional rumbo a nuevas denotaciones.
Desde esa perspectiva, existe un difundido consenso terico en torno de la
idea de que la funcin inicial del derecho del trabajo fue la de producir la inte-
gracin de las clases trabajadoras 5 por medio de la juridificacin de las contra-
dicciones entre las necesidades de los trabajadores y los intereses de la empresa
y la consiguiente institucionalizacin del conflicto en el trabajo asalariado. 6
Desde una ptica de frontal contestacin, en cambio, se le percibi ms bien
como concesin calculada de la burguesa para hacer tolerable la explotacin de
la clase obrera. 7 En cualquier caso, an si no cupiera aplicar aqul propsito inte-
grador ms que a sustentar la permanencia y desarrollo del sistema de
1
Cf. Dwight W. Justice (del Departamento de Empresas Multinacionales de la CIOSL), El
Concepto de responsabilidad de las empresas: desafos y oportunidades para los sindicatos;
www.ilo.org/public/spanish/dialogue/actrav/publ/130/1.pdf .
2
En lnea con la idea del triple fundamento financiero, medioambiental y social del
rendimiento de las empresas.
3
Dwight W. Justice, op. cit., nota 1.
4
Cf. A. Martn Valverde y otros Derecho del Trabajo Ed. Tecnos, Madrid, 2000,
pgs. 57/59.
5
Ibid., pg. 61. En el mismo sentido, Manuel Carlos Palomeque, La funcin y la refun-
dacin del Derecho del Trabajo, Relaciones Laborales, Madrid No. 13 del 8 de Julio de 2000, pg.
21 y sgtes y Eduardo Rojo Torrecilla, Pasado, presente y futuro del Derecho del Trabajo, Rela-
ciones Laborales, Madrid No. 18, septiembre de 1996 pg. 16,citando a su vez a Alonso Garca y
Jeammaud.
6
Cf. Manuel Carlos Palomeque, op. cit., nota 5.
7
Al invocar esta perspectiva, Martn Valverde y otros, op. cit., nota 4, esta vez en su 4ta Edi-
cin pag. 55) recuerdan que ella se encuentra ya, con una retrica convertida luego en estereotipo,
en el folleto de V.I. Lenin, La ley de multas de fbricas, 1987.
204
Cdigos de conducta y regmenes voluntarios de cumplimiento
produccin capitalista y las paredes maestras de la sociedad burguesa, habra

igualmente que admitir que el Derecho del Trabajo devino desde una perspec-
tiva histrico-evolutiva ...un elemento bsico para el bienestar de los trabaja-
dores. 8
Podra afirmarse que esa ambivalencia funcional de origen no abandon
nunca al Derecho del Trabajo y probablemente (al igual que su finalidad tute-
lar), tampoco haya de dejarlo slo en los tiempos por venir. Proteger a los tra-
bajadores y preservar el sistema econmico, legitimar y luego limitar los pode-
res empresariales, arbitrar un delicado equilibrio estructural entre libertad de
empresa y poder empresarial por un lado y proteccin tutelar del asalariado, por
otro. 9 Todo ello, tras su funcin ltima (tambin, paradjicamente, la inicial): la
de proveer legitimidad al sistema social y a su orden econmico 10 (ambivalen-
cia que merecer mayor reconocimiento o rechazo segn cual sea la perspectiva
ideolgica desde la cual se contemple el fenmeno).
Hay que decir, sin embargo, que ese equilibrio funcional, construido otrora,
parece haber colapsado como consecuencia de transformaciones profundas con
incidencia directa sobre el sistema de relaciones de produccin: entre otras, inno-
vacin tecnolgica y consecuente renovacin de los modos de organizar el tra-
bajo y la produccin, profundizacin sin precedentes de las cotas de interna-
cionalidad de los flujos del comercio, las finanzas y los procesos de inversin
directa, alteracin notable de las relaciones de poder 11, presiones desregulato-
rias, debilitamiento sindical, desaparicin, con el fin de la guerra fra, de la ame-
naza comparativa que planteara la existencia misma del socialismo real. 12
Desde esa perspectiva podra pensarse que si aquel equilibrio basado en
un cierto consentimiento crtico del empresariado respecto del ordenamiento
imperativo que se sustenta en el concepto del orden pblico declin como
8
9
Cf. Manuel Carlos Palomeque, idem nota anterior, quien da cuenta de que, por lo dems,
se trata de un equilibrio contingente, que opera redistribuyendo en expansin, y procurando preser-
var la viabilidad de la ecuacin econmica en tiempos de contraccin. En la misma lgica, la final-
idad de tutela que detenta el sistema de relaciones laborales en su condicin de productor norma-
tivo asume su propia ambivalencia bajo la forma de nuevos cometidos: la instrumentacin de
medidas especialmente traumticas de gestin crtica de las relaciones laborales (despidos, sus-
pensiones colectivas, otras medidas de crisis) (en ese sentido, Mara Emilia Casas Baamonde, Las
transformaciones del trabajo y de las relaciones colectivas en Relaciones Laborales, Madrid No.
23, diciembre de 1997, pg. 1). Ambivalencia que defini expresivamente G.Lyon-Caen bajo su
hiptesis de la reversibilidad del Derecho del Trabajo en Le droit du travail, une technique
rversible Dalloz, Paris, 1995. Tambin Rodrguez Piero, en El Derecho del Trabajo a fin de
siglo, Relaciones Laborales, Madrid No. 24 1999, pg. 1, reivindica esa funcin de sostener el
modo de producir en la economa de mercado y de libre empresa a la bsqueda de un equilibrio
entre los intereses contrapuestos de trabajadores y empresarios.
10
11
Cf. Adrin Goldn, El Derecho del Trabajo en la Encrucijada Derecho del Trabajo,
1999-B-2469.
12
Cf. Francis Maupain, Persuasion et contrainte aux fins de la mise en uvre des normes
et objectifs de lOIT, en Les normes internationales du travail: un patrimoine pour lavenir.
Mlanges en lhonneur de Nicolas Valticos, BIT, Genve, 2004, pg 687.
205
consecuencia de aquellas transformaciones, otros fenmenos sobrevinientes,

relacionados esta vez con la transnacionalizacin de las cadenas de produccin
y abastecimiento activadas por las empresas multinacionales (EMNs) y la con-
secuente reaccin de consumidores, sindicatos, gobiernos, ONGs, de los mer-
cados, de los medios, de la sociedad en su conjunto, estn generando (en su
lugar?) este nuevo tipo de vinculacin de las empresas con el sistema de tutela. 13
Se tratara esta vez de un modo de relacionarse que no hace eje, como fuera
entonces, en una aceptacin crtica de la norma imperativa, sino que exalta el
perfil estrictamente voluntario y no vinculante de las iniciativas que en l se
generan.
Habr que ver en qu medida puede alumbrarse desde aqu alguna nueva
manifestacin de equilibrio en torno de la idea de la proteccin del trabajo cuya
realizacin en este esquema es ciertamente ms compleja, pues supone una pro-
puesta de legitimacin del sistema econmico, del rgimen de la proteccin
laboral que demanda una armonizacin de no fcil ni segura materializacin
entre la norma imperativa y vinculante y la oferta empresaria, esta ltima basada
en la reivindicacin sostenida de su soberana voluntad.
En cuanto a sus motivaciones ltimas, antes se trataba de legitimar un
modelo econmico en competencia con el socialismo real; ahora, de legitimar
la liberalizacin de los intercambios contra el riesgo acuciante de la desilusin
global sobre sus proyecciones 14.
En ambos casos, se tratara de la construccin en esta instancia, por el
momento slo meramente hipottica - de un equilibrio que hace de proteccin y
sistema econmicos dos dimensiones que se proveen recproca sustentacin.
2. Amplsima variedad de iniciativas voluntarias

Variadas son, como veremos luego, las motivaciones que conducen a la
consagracin de las iniciativas voluntarias 15. Muy diversas son tambin estas
13
Como respuesta a la publicidad negativa generada por los informes acerca de las condi-
ciones de trabajo peligrosas, las jornadas de trabajo inhumanas, los salarios de hambre, las con-
ductas brutales y la utilizacin de la mano de obra infantil en la produccin, de prendas de vestir,
calzado, juguetes y otras actividades mano de obra intensivas (cf. Neil Kearney y Dwight Justice
Los cdigos de conducta. Algunas preguntas y respuestas para Sindicalistas en Herramienta de
los trabajadores o truco publicitario? Una gua para los cdigos de prcticas laborales interna-
cionales Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Sdwind, Instituto de Economa y Ecumenismo, 2003, pg. 53.
14
En la Conferencia Ministerial de la OMC reunida en 1996 se exalt el compromiso de
respetar las normas fundamentales del trabajo y la labor de la OIT para evitar que las esperanzas
que, a juicio de los participantes, genera el proceso de liberalizacin comercial no se transforme en
desilusiones. http://www.wto.org/spanish/thewto_s/minist_s/min96_s/wtodec_s.htm
15
Para un examen ordenado de esa amplia variedad, vase Janelle Diller, Una conciencia
social en el mercado mundial dimensiones laborales y de los cdigos de conducta, el etiquetado
social y las iniciativas de los inversores, Revista Internacional del Trabajo vo. 118, 1999 nm 2
pg. 111 y siguientes y Jean-Michel Servais, Normes internationales du travail et responsabilit
sociale des entreprises en Quelle responsabilit sociale pour lentreprise, Actes du Sminaire
International de droit compar du travail, des relations professionnelles et de la scurit sociale
Comptrasec, UMR, CNRS, Universit Montesquieu, Bordeaux IV, 2005, pgs. 37 y siguientes.
206
iniciativas segn el grado de unilateralidad/multilateralidad que exhiben (en su

elaboracin, en su adopcin, en el control de su funcionamiento); de tal modo,
pueden ser el producto de una pura elaboracin corporativa o, de modo ms
extenso pero anlogamente unilateral, de elaboracin al interior de un sector
empresario o una industria. Pueden, en cambio, ser resultantes de alguna forma
de participacin, alianza, combinacin o acuerdo entre una empresa (o una
industria o sector) con gobiernos, sindicatos, ONGs, asociaciones de la comu-
nidad local, etc; manifestaciones todas ellas a su vez distintas entre s segn el
grado de participacin e influencia relativa asumida en cada caso por cada uno
de esos sujetos. 16
Puede tratarse tambin del acto de adhesin a un cdigo propuesto por
organismos internacionales (como la OCDE, la ONU, la Comisin Europea o la
propia OIT) 17, adhesin que en todo caso puede ser total o slo parcial, y en este
ltimo supuesto, con muy diversos criterios selectivos. O derivacin de un
acuerdo marco de una empresa multinacional (EMN) con una federacin sindi-
cal internacional.
Ni que decir hay que semejante grado de diversidad ha de dar lugar a un
espectro de contenidos, criterios selectivos, modos de elaboracin y redaccin,
efectos y alcances, correlativamente amplio.
Otro factor distintivo puede referirse esta vez a los alcances del rgimen
voluntario: puede, en efecto, ser slo aplicable a la propia empresa que los emite,
que participa en su concepcin o que a l se adhiere (a sta y sus filiales) o pre-
tenderse aplicable a toda su cadena de produccin o abastecimiento.
Diverso tambin puede ser el tipo instrumental mediante el cual se expresa
la iniciativa voluntaria: puede tratarse de un cdigo de conducta, de alguna forma
de label o etiquetado social o programa de acreditacin o certificacin, de la pro-
duccin de informes sociales o de la aplicacin de inversiones socialmente res-
ponsables.
Mltiples son tambin los sistemas de monitoreo, seguimiento, supervisin
y control a que pueden dar lugar. Meramente internos o asignados a terceros, y
en este ltimo caso a consultoras o entidades privadas, o a mecanismos con par-
ticipacin sindical, o a ONGs u otras entidades comunitarias.
16
Cf. Codes of Corporate Conduct - An Expanded Review of their Contents, OECD (2001).
OECD, por ejemplo, se examinan 246 cdigos de conducta de los que 118 fueron emitidos por
empresas de modo individual, 92 por asociaciones industriales y comerciales, 32 por asociaciones
entre diversos tipos de entidades, incluyendo sindicatos y ONGs y 4 por organizaciones intergu-
bernamentales.
17
Se trata en este caso de instrumentos que forman parte de un marco internacional de prin-
cipios acordados por gobiernos, empleadores y sindicatos y recomendados a las empresas. Su pre-
ocupacin no pasa por garantizar la soberana de los gobiernos sino que, por el contrario, abordan
situaciones que se crean cuando los gobiernos nacionales y la sociedad internacional no adoptan o
no hacen cumplir normas laborales aceptables. Estn pensados para ser aplicados internacional-
mente, independientemente de dnde se realice el trabajo; generalmente estn dirigidos a ser apli-
cados en las prcticas laborales de los proveedores y subcontratistas de las empresas (cf. Ingeborg
Wick, Herramienta de los trabajadores o truco publicitario? Una gua para los cdigos de prcti-
cas laborales internacionales Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, Sdwind, Instituto de Economa y Ecu-
menismo, 2003, pag. 47).
207
En un contexto de tan amplia diversidad es necesario establecer, en primer

lugar, que toda generalizacin que aqu se formule inevitables en razn de las
naturales restricciones de espacio y tiempo impuesto a este documento y, en
especial, de la respuesta que se requiere deber someterse a reservas, matices
y salvedades que quedarn implcitas y diferidas al juicio crtico del lector; una
presentacin analtica ms minuciosa deber necesariamente referir esos juicios
a cada especfica variante del espacio de la denominada RSE.
II. Sobre la filiacin disciplinar de las iniciativas voluntarias
1. Desde el derecho
Pese al tiempo relativamente breve transcurrido desde la aparicin de las
primeras manifestaciones de este modo empresario de vincularse con el sistema
de tutela, son cuantiosos los esfuerzos que se han dedicado a establecer su filia-
cin disciplinaria.
Desde luego, desde el territorio de los juristas no ha dejado de advertirse
que, sea cual se crea que es su condicin, tienen de una u otra manera origen
por creacin, participacin o adhesin en la empresa como uno de los mbitos
de produccin de normas 18 o, en s misma, orden de derecho objetivo o, en tr-
minos ms kelsenianos, centro de imputacin de ese orden formativo. 19
En ese marco, fluye naturalmente un ejercicio de asimilacin con otras de
las manifestaciones de regulacin unilateral propias de ese mbito, como lo es
el reglamento interno de la empresa. 20 ste, sin embargo, como derivacin del
poder de direccin del empleador y de la consecuente facultad de especificar
dentro de ciertos lmites los contenidos del contrato de trabajo, funge como un
instrumento de imputacin de obligaciones, mientras que las iniciativas volun-
tarias se proponen, en cambio, manifestar la disposicin a proceder de un cierto
modo que se pretende funcional al sistema de tutela. 21
A partir de all, los interrogantes en clave jurdica se multiplican (sin que
sea este el momento para darles respuesta). son entonces esas iniciativas expre-
siones singulares de esa aptitud reglamentaria o no lo son?; o expresan en
cambio una oferta contractual aceptada que convoca la aplicacin del derecho
18
Condicin esta recordada por Sylvain Nadalet, en La responsabilit sociale des entre-
prises lchelle globale: quelle responsabilit juridique, en Actes du Sminaire International de
droit compar du travail, des relations professionnelles et de la scurit sociale Comptrasec, UMR,
CNRS, Universit Montesquieu, Bordeaux IV, 2005, pg. 239.
19
Por ello mismo, no conviene dejar de advertir que las iniciativas voluntarias provenientes
de ese nivel el de la empresa - tienen lmites insuperables en cuanto a objetivos sociales que tra-
scienden del nivel de la empresa, como los que se vinculan con el empleo, la formacin profesional,
la distribucin del ingreso, el desarrollo o la pobreza.
20
Cf. Sylvain Nadalet, op. cit., nota 18, pg. 243.
21
Ibid. Manifestar una disposicin es el modo en que se nos ocurre traducir una voluntad
que no necesariamente parece implicar asumir obligaciones vinculantes, ni reconocer derechos.
208
de los contratos 22? Implican, por el contrario una obligacin unilateralmente

asumida cuya insatisfaccin da lugar a una responsabilidad civil de naturaleza
delictual? 23
Como es propio del ms moderno pensamiento jurdico, no se trata de elu-
cidar una cuestin ontolgica, sino de establecer los efectos de estos instrumen-
tos en trminos de la consiguiente responsabilidad que generan. Responsabili-
dad como condicin virtuosa atribuida a un determinado sujeto (en este caso,
una empresa) por medio de ciertos matices del lenguaje 24 o, de modo ms con-
cluyente, responsabilidad jurdica? Y en este ltimo caso, qu tipo de respon-
sabilidad?: la de aquel que obtiene el beneficio (ubi emolumentum ibi onus) o
la de quien pone el producto en circulacin? 25; la de quien hace nacer una espe-
ranza legitima de terceros en su cumplimiento, al modo de la que nace de los
usos de empresa? 26 Todo lo que demanda, en cualquier caso, una previa toma de
posicin en relacin con el carcter voluntario que deviene de su propia desig-
nacin y que los empresarios reivindican de modo sistemtico y enrgico:
voluntarios en su adopcin o tambin y con qu alcances en su ejecucin y
cumplimiento?
Las preguntas en clave jurdica no se detienen ah. Si hay un tal efecto vin-
culante en qu medida ha de alcanzar a sujetos como los que integran las
cadenas de produccin o abastecimiento que no han asumido por s mismos ese
compromiso? Cul es, en su caso, su exigibilidad en un pas distinto del emisor,
vg. el de los proveedores o contratistas (pas de acogida)? Y, esta vez en cuanto
a la actuacin vicaria y la representacin, por ejemplo, pueden los sindicatos
internacionales actuar en representacin de trabajadores que carecen de sindi-
cato en los pases de acogida? Ms complejo an y si en los pases de acogida
s existen esos sindicatos? 27
2. Entre la gestin de los recursos humanos y las relaciones

industriales
En todo caso, y ms all de que los productos de la RSE merezcan una cali-
ficacin jurdica que, como se ve, no es fcil asignar, la recurrente insistencia
empresaria en su condicin estrictamente voluntaria los refiere a una condicin
de unilateralidad que parece incluirse ms bien en el terreno de la gestin que en
22
Interrogante que se formula Jean- Michel Servais, op. cit., nota 15, pg. 39.
23
Ibid.
24
Ver ste entre otros sentidos del trmino responsabilidad en Introduccin al anlisis
del derecho de Carlos Santiago Nino, 2da. Edicin ampliada y revisada, Buenos Aires, 2001 pag.
184, quien recuerda el modo en que Hart ilustrara esa diversidad de significaciones.
25
Son los supuestos de imputacin de responsabilidad jurdica que invoca Alain Supiot en
De nouveau au self-service normative: la responsabilit sociale des entreprises en Etudes ofertes
a Jean Pelissier, Analyse juridique et valeurs en droit social, Paris, Dalloz, 2004, pgs. 541 a 558.
26
Cf. Emmanuel Docks, Lengagement unilateral de lemployeur, Droit Social, 1994,
pg. 227.
27
Son los interrogantes que, entre otros tantos, se formula Sylvain Nadalet, op. cit., nota 18.
209
el jurdico-normativo. 28 Desde esa perspectiva, parece pertinente asociarlo al

mbito de las tcnicas de gestin de recursos humanos, denotadas por su unila-
teral condicin de funcin del management, bien que en el caso de las iniciati-
vas voluntarias de RSE expresen algo singular en el marco de la mencionada
funcin, como lo es el de manifestar la disposicin 29 a observar ciertos stan-
dards de tutela que algunas veces (las menos) se remiten a normas del ordena-
miento jurdico nacional o internacional, y otras (las ms frecuentes), se definen
con la misma unilateralidad. Pese a que las iniciativas voluntarias exhiben cier-
tas notas comunes con el trayecto de autopista o el denominado camino alto,
pese a que incluso pueden formar parte un mismo continuo y a que en algunos
casos sus fronteras pueden ser difciles de discernir y sus productos se confun-
dan, responden a motivaciones habitualmente diversas: en tanto el trayecto de
autopista se propone optimizar el rendimiento y la productividad mediante
prcticas que, precisamente por tener un satisfactorio desempeo social, tienden
a satisfacer aquellos objetivos, las iniciativas voluntarias de RSE, en cambio, se
proponen (como lo sealamos luego) atender otros objetivos y otras motivaciones.
S parece claro que si las iniciativas voluntarias de RSE adscriben ms a la
categora de la unilateral gestin de los RRHH y se distancian por ello del mbito
de las industrial relations (en clave continental, relaciones laborales o rela-
tions profesionnelles) basadas en la bilateralidad, el reconocimiento de la opo-
sicin de intereses, la negociacin y el intercambio de concesiones 30. Buscando
analogas, podra tambin decirse que, de algn modo, las iniciativas volunta-
rias de RSE son a la gestin de RRHH, lo que la negociacin colectiva es al sis-
tema de relaciones laborales. Tambin que la participacin sindical de diversa
intensidad en los modelos hbridos de RSE (cuyas manifestaciones ms conspi-
cuas toman la forma de acuerdos marco entre EMN y federaciones sindicales
internacionales), expresan otro continuo que liga esta vez gestin de RRHH y
relaciones laborales mediante expresiones intermedias que contienen a esos
rdenes a diverso dosaje.
III. Para elaborar una respuesta
Ms all de cul sea la significacin funcional de la denominada RSE o la

adscripcin disciplinaria de las iniciativas que la expresan, particular atencin
debe ponerse sobre el modo en que esas manifestaciones de voluntarismo empre-
sario se articulan con el ordenamiento tutelar histrico montado sobre la idea de
orden pblico y el principio de norma mnima. Este ltimo forma parte indes-
plazable del patrimonio jurdico de la humanidad, de modo que el voluntarismo
tutelar empresario debe relacionarse con l de un modo que le potencie y no le
debilite ni le ponga en cuestin. Un breve examen analtico concebido con ese
28
Tal lo que sugiere Dwight W. Justice, op. cit., nota 1, pg. 14.
29
Ver esa calificacin de la intencionalidad empresaria en nota 21.
30
Cf. Dwight W. Justice, op. cit., nota 1.
210
propsito nos sugiere la conveniencia de considerar, en un primer momento, las

motivaciones de los criterios de RSE expresado en los diversos tipos normativos
que lo exteriorizan (i), la determinacin de sus objetos regulatorios sus conte-
nidos - y del modo en que se formulan (ii), de los criterios de control y verifica-
cin de su realizacin (iii) para abordar luego tambin sintticamente como lo
exige la oportunidad el modo de vincularse con la ley (iv), con la negociacin
colectiva (v) y con las normas internacionales del trabajo (vi)
1. Sobre las motivaciones de las iniciativas voluntarias

Las iniciativas voluntarias emergentes del mbito de la RSE se proponen,
entre otros fines, obtener ventajas competitivas, ms lealtad de los consumido-
res y de su personal, mejoras en el desempeo comercial; 31 influir en consumi-
dores, socios, inversores y los medios de prensa, fortalecer o reconstituir la
imagen de las empresas, preservar las marcas 32, satisfacer requerimientos del
mercado, de las bolsa de valores y de textos legales como la ley Sarbanes-
Oxley. 33 Responden tambin a objetivos de gestin, tal como mejorar el desempeo
del personal), orientar la toma de decisiones y reducir el nivel de supervisin 34.
Tambin, desde luego, puede estar presente el inters especfico por producir
progresos en trminos de la sostenibilidad social de los procesos econmicos.
En cualquier caso, esas y otras motivaciones utilitarias de ningn modo
desvalorizan los emprendimientos voluntarios 35, como no invalida la negocia-
cin colectiva el hecho de que los empresarios acten en ella motivados por el
deseo de contener el conflicto y mantener la produccin y las ventas. Se trata,
eso s, de conocer esas motivaciones para poder establecer qu aptitudes tienen
las propuestas normativas de la RSE para satisfacer las demandas de sosteni-
bilidad social de los procesos econmicos y qu rol pueden jugar en relacin con
el ordenamiento jurdico tradicional, sujeto al criterio del orden pblico, la impe-
ratividad de sus normas y la vigencia del principio de norma mnima. De esta-
blecer, en suma, en qu medida son funcionales a los objetivos del ordenamiento
de tutela.
Parece cierto que cuando los estndares de tutela se asumen voluntaria-
mente para satisfacer esos objetivos utilitarios, es razonable esperar que los cri-
terios de seleccin de los contenidos, el modo de su formulacin de su lectura,
31
Tales las motivaciones que se reconocen en el estudio de la OCDE, ver nota 16.
32
Cf. Jean-Michel Servais, op. cit., nota 15, pg.38.
33
Motivaciones estas ltimas evocadas en Lynn, Payne, Rohit Deshpand, Joshua D. Mar-
golis y Kim Eric Bettcher, (de la Havard Business School de Boston), Se ajusta la conducta de su
empresa a estndares de clase mundial, Publicado en Harvard Business Review Amrica Latina,
Santiago de Chile, septiembre de 2006 pg. 36 y siguientes.
34
Ibid.
35
Sobre esa condicin utilitaria y su valoracin, ver Antonio Monteiro Fernndez, propos
de la responsabilit sociale de lentreprise, en Actes du Sminaire International de droit compar
du travail, des relations professionnelles et de la scurit sociale Comptrasec, UMR, CNRS, Uni-
versit Montesquieu, Bordeaux IV, 2005, pg. 37.
211
su interpretacin los criterios de monitoreo y control, etc, se sujeten a cuanto

conviene a la realizacin de aquellos fines. De tal modo, cuando la preocupacin
que prevalece es la del fortalecimiento de la imagen de la empresa, los conteni-
dos han de vincularse ms con la preferencia del pblico que de los propios
beneficiarios. 36 Naturalmente, cuando los intereses de tal modo determinantes
convergen con los de tutela en la forma de su concrecin, sus efectos sern pro-
bablemente valiosos; pero si tal convergencia no se verifica y ello sucede con
frecuencia - es probable que los efectos de las iniciativas voluntarias no sean
satisfactorios en trminos de su contribucin social y que, por el contrario sean,
en algunos casos, hasta contraproducentes. 37
Y de vuelta tambin en trminos comparativos - sobre los procesos y pro-
ductos de la negociacin colectiva, parece obvio que la anloga finalidad utili-
taria de las posiciones que asumen los empresarios en esos procesos se encuen-
tra, a diferencia de cuanto sucede en la elaboracin de las iniciativas unilaterales,
mediada por la intervencin sindical en la identificacin de las demandas socia-
les y consiguiente control a la hora de su incorporacin y redaccin. Va tambin
sin decirlo, por lo tanto, que cuanto ms intensa sea la intervencin sindical y
tambin la de otros actores, como gobiernos, ONGs, entidades comunitarias, etc-
en la elaboracin de de las iniciativas de RSE y ms negociados sean los pro-
ductos de ese intercambio, ms alto sea probablemente el rendimiento tutelar del
instrumento del que se trate.
En otras palabras: la apreciacin frecuentemente utilitaria e interesada de
los estndares que se incluyen en las iniciativas voluntarias no las descalifica por
esa sola condicin, pero advierte acerca de su posible disfuncionalidad en
clave tutelar, y ello debe ser tenido en cuenta a los efectos de su valoracin.
2. Los contenidos de las iniciativas voluntarias

y el modo en que se formulan
Por las razones ya expresadas, se seala con frecuencia el carcter selec-
tivo que determina el modo en el que se incorporan los estndares de tutela a las
iniciativas voluntarias. 38 Esa selectividad se percibe, en trminos absolutos, de
la sola lectura de cada una de las iniciativas, pero se hace tanto ms elocuente
cuando se comparan los contenidos notablemente ms restrictivos - de las ini-
ciativas estrictamente empresarias (de empresas individuales y de entidades del
36
As se seala en OIT, Consejo de Administracin, GB.273/WP/SDL/1, 273 reunin, Gine-
bra 1998, pg. 15.
37
En ese sentido, Jean-Michel Servais, op. cit., nota 15, pg. 55.
38
En el estudio de la OCDE citado en la nota 16 se advierte, por ejemplo que el tema de la
libertad de asociacin se menciona slo en el 29,7% de los instrumentos (contra cuestiones como
un entorno razonable de trabajo que aparece en el 75% de los casos y la no discriminacin, que
se registra en el 60,8% de ellos. Tambin en la investigacin de la OIT referida por Janell Diller
(op. cit., nota 15, pg. 124) que registra que mientras las cuestiones de seguridad social se encuen-
tran consideradas en el 75% de los 215 cdigos que fueron objeto del estudio, los temas de liber-
tad sindical aparecen apenas en el 15%.
212
comercio o de la industria) con los de otras que cuentan con diversas instancias
de participacin de gobiernos, sindicatos, ONGs y otros actores no empresa-
rios. 39 Muy especialmente, cuando se compara a aquellos con los cdigos pro-
venientes de organismos internacionales de carcter intergubernamental, como
la OCDE, la OIT, las Naciones Unidas y la Comisin Europea.
Se advierten, adems, diferencias de contenidos de carcter sectorial que
responden en cada caso a los intereses especficos del sector y a las demandas
del pblico o del mercado que a esas empresas o sectores empresarios les
importa satisfacer.
Se puede percibir, de tal modo, una notable ausencia de referencias a las
normas internacionales del trabajo en las iniciativas unilaterales, en tanto esas
normas alcanzan presencia ms notable en las que cuentan con la participacin
de otros actores, adems del empresario, y, en especial, en las que se originan en
organismos internacionales. Ciertos derechos, tales como la seguridad y la salud
en el trabajo as como la discriminacin, suelen encontrarse en las iniciativas
unilaterales con alguna frecuencia, en tanto otros, como la libertad sindical y la
negociacin colectiva aparecen de modo mucho menos habitual. Son tambin
infrecuentes las referencias a los mnimos salariales, cuando se trata de iniciati-
vas a aplicarse en pases con niveles salariales por debajo del nivel de subsis-
tencia; en estos casos, ms comn es la asuncin del compromiso de aplicar la
(de suyo menguada) ley nacional.
La elaboracin de las iniciativas voluntarias suele llevarse a cabo en pro-
cesos no transparentes ni participativos, ora de modo reservado y unilateral, o
por medio de negociaciones entre partes desigualmente informadas y con asi-
mtrica capacidad negocial. Suele no ser tampoco transparente la provisin de
informacin acerca de las prcticas de las cadenas de abastecimiento, y eludirse
la presencia de observadores externos
El modo de redaccin de los estndares autoimpuestos suele obstaculizar
la viabilidad de todo reclamo formal o difuminar la naturaleza de la prescrip-
cin. 40 A modo de ejemplo, es frecuente que en esas iniciativas las empresas no
39
Mientras que los cdigos empresarios o puros prestan mucha ms atencin al bienestar
econmico de la empresa y a las responsabilidadades de los empleados, los hbridos guardan silen-
cio respecto a asuntos como la diligencia en la ejecucin de los negocios de la empresa, la pru-
dencia en el uso de sus recursos o el cuidado en la proteccin de sus activos. Los cdigos hbridos
estn ms orientados hacia los empleados y el pblico en general. La mayora de ellos reconocen
el derecho a la libre asociacin y a la negociacin colectiva, mientras que son pocos los puros que
lo hacen. Las salvaguardas al empleo y el aviso con anticipacin antre grandes alteraciones en el
empleo reciben atencin en los hbridos y no en los puros. Mientras los principios CRT piden una
compensacin que mejore las condiciones de vida de los trabajadores, los cdigos de negocio
favorecen un pago que sea justo o competitivo (de la comparacin efectuada en op. cit., nota 33,
pg. 42 y 43.
40
Por medio de la redefinicin o reinterpretacin de los estndares o eludiendo las defini-
ciones y la jurisprudencia de los rganos de control de la OIT (cf. Dwight Justice, op. cit., nota 1
pg. 8), o recurriendo a las normas de la OIT de modo unilateral y selectivo, con el riesgo de que
...se logre una apariencia de legitimidad dando la impresin al pblico y al consumidor de que la
OIT se encuentra asociada a la iniciativa... cuando en realidad no es as (OIT, Consejo de Admin-
istracin, GB.273/WP/SDL/1, 273 reunin, Ginebra 1998, pg. 16).
213
se inhiban de recurrir a proveedores que no respeten los estndares internacio-

nales, sino que slo manifiesten su disposicin a preferir a quienes s los obser-
van; en el tema salarial, suelen prever el ofrecimiento de compensacin justa y
razonable y otras calificaciones de anloga imprecisin y vaguedad, que pre-
vienen, por ello mismo, cualquier intento de exigibilidad. 41 Las iniciativas volun-
tarias sirven con frecuencia para redefinir o reinterpretar las normas que en rigor
- por imperio de la ley se deben cumplir, de modo que en esos casos la RSE
no agrega proteccin sino que, por el contrario, limita los alcances de la que est
vigente. 42
3. Mtodos y criterios de control y verificacin

Cuando se les prev, suelen suscitar interrogantes en relacin con sus obje-
tivos e inspiracin, con el grado de independencia de los agentes de control, con
su capacitacin y experiencia, con la duracin, frecuencia y confiabilidad de los
controles 43, con su sensibilidad para la denuncia de otras transgresiones referi-
das esta vez al ordenamiento legal, con el diseo interesado y tambin selectivo
de los mtodos de evaluacin, con la transparencia (confidencialidad o publici-
dad) de los informes; las empresas prefieren los informes internos con el objeto
de evitar filtraciones que limiten la confidencialidad que se pretende.
Frecuentemente, lo que se presenta como supervisin no descansa ms que
sobre visitas nicas o tan espaciadas que impiden la constatacin eficaz del cum-
plimiento. 44 La heterogeneidad de los mtodos de aplicacin suele impedir su
comparabilidad y limita la posibilidad de verificar la credibilidad de sus consta-
taciones. Naturalmente, la selectividad interesada no suele estar ausente en el
diseo de los mtodos de vigilancia y evaluacin. Muchas veces el cdigo se
conoce en el pas de origen de la EMN y, en cambio, es absolutamente desco-
nocido en los pases de acogida.
Por otra parte, se suscita tambin la cuestin relativa a la relacin de los
agentes de control con la inspeccin del trabajo, los sindicatos, los grupos de
reclamo. Si no se definen adecuadamente las competencias de aquellos agentes
de control en relacin con estos ltimos, se asumen los riesgos de sustitucin
privatizacin de relevantes agentes que expresan la vigencia inderogable del
orden jurdico imperativo.45
Como en el caso de las motivaciones determinantes y la seleccin de los
contenidos, suele destacarse la relevancia de la presencia de sindicatos ONG,
41
Vase, a modo de ejemplo, el Codex GBS (Global Business Standards), elaborado por los
autores del documento citado en nota 33, que se reproduce all mismo.
42
As lo seala Dwight Justice, op. cit., nota 1.
43
Cf. Jean-Michel Servais, op. cit., nota 15, pg. 42; tambin Janelle Diller, op. cit., nota 15,
pag. 134.
44
Cf. Neil Kearney y Dwight Justice, op. cit., nota 13.
45
Cf. Justine Nolan, paper delivered on 5 September 2002 at Monash University, Clayton,
based on an article by Michael Posner and Justine Nolan to be published in the Stanford Law Jour-
nal http://www.law. monash.edu.au/castancentre/events/2002/nolan.html, pg. 4
214
organizaciones legales, grupos de mujeres, de derechos laborales, religiosos, etc,

en los instrumentos capaces de generar sistemas eficaces de monitoreo y super-
visin. 46
4. Las iniciativas voluntarias y la ley

Por el tipo normativo en uso en los sistemas de tutela sujeto al principio
de orden pblico, la norma imperativa y la regla de norma mnima no hay otro
espacio para las iniciativas voluntarias que el de la estricta sujecin a la ley, tanto
en el pas de emisin de la norma cuanto en el de acogida. En lo jurdico, ello
significa precisamente lo que se viene de decir: sometimiento a la ley y de
ningn modo opcin. En lo poltico, implica que debe cerrarse acceso a toda ini-
ciativa que procure un efecto sustitutivo (hacer la ley a un lado...) y, en cambio,
alentar toda aquella otra que, por el contrario, pueda generar un aporte de com-
plementariedad y mejoracin.
Desde esa perspectiva, debe cuidarse que la iniciativa voluntaria no legi-
time jurdica ni fcticamente la inobservancia selectiva de ciertos contenidos
de la ley (exaltando la asuncin de ciertos compromisos que se est dispuesto a
pagar a cambio, de la remisin de otros que, por el contrario, se prefiere
eludir), ni su redefinicin o reinterpretacin parcial o interesada. Que no aliente
la apreciacin de la conducta socialmente sustentable como un producto del puro
voluntarismo o generosidad del actor empresario (para sugerir la idea de que las
empresas no necesitan de la intervencin estatal para operar con propiedad) 47, ni
genere un debilitamiento de la funcin regulatoria e inspectiva del estado. 48
5. Las iniciativas voluntarias y la negociacin colectiva

Tambin la negociacin colectiva se configura como norma imperativa res-
pecto de los productos de la autonoma individual (de los de carcter bilateral, y
con ms razn de las expresiones de pura unilateralidad). Valen por lo tanto an-
logas advertencias: los convenios colectivos vigentes deben ser escrupulosa-
mente observados y, ante el carcter obviamente voluntario de la concertacin
de los convenios, es necesario prevenir que las iniciativas voluntarias sirvan
para debilitar el espacio de negociacin: suele alegarse, en efecto, que la nego-
ciacin colectiva es innecesaria cuando de todos modos la empresa est produ-
ciendo unilateralmente sus compromisos de tutela y se registran casos en que los
proveedores se muestran reticentes a la negociacin, alegando que no pueden
autorregular sus relaciones de trabajo porque deben necesariamente cumplir las
iniciativas voluntarias emitidas por las EMNs. 49 La experiencia comparada
muestra de qu modo una forma regulatoria alternativa en este caso, la inicia-
46
Ibid., pg. 7.
47
En ese sentido, Dwight Justice, op. cit., nota 1, pg. 13.
48
Cf. Janelle Diller, op. cit., nota 15, pag. 137.
49
Cf. Kearney y Dwight, op. cit., nota 13, pg. 51.
215
tiva voluntaria puede ser altamente eficaz en un emprendimiento tendiente a

debilitar la accin sindical y la negociacin colectiva. 50
Pero conviene tener tambin en cuenta que si las iniciativas voluntarias
pueden ser un factor de deterioro de la negociacin colectiva, pueden muy bien
tambin servir de puerta de acceso a un valioso espacio de negociacin; toda
accin que sirva para hacer de los compromisos de solidaridad un mbito nego-
ciado y vinculante contribuir ciertamente a matizar las tendencias selectivas en
la definicin de los contenidos y en su modo de expresin. Es, por cierto, un acti-
vidad en la que el sindicato puede aliarse con otros sujetos interesados (inver-
sores, ONGs, gobiernos, consumidores) para fortalecer esa negociacin; le
corresponde, de todos modos he aqu un caveat preservar cuidadosamente la
titularidad de esa funcin, pues tambin en ella estn presentes los riesgos de
sustitucin (la empresa puede preferir negociar con otros agentes con menor
poder de conflicto).
De ese modo, puede reconocerse en ciertas manifestaciones vinculadas con
la RSE y la negociacin de solidaridad sealadamente, en los acuerdos marcos
entre EMNs y federaciones sindicales internacionales - un proyecto in fieri de
negociacin colectiva internacional 51. Hay en ellos, ciertamente, contenidos de
la denominada RSE pero esta vez sujetos a ciertas manifestaciones de contrac-
tualidad que se expresan en otros modos de definicin y otros modos de control
(v.gr. ms independencia de los agentes que lo llevan a cabo, ms efectividad en
la supervisin).
En esa lnea, una de las cuestiones ms sugerentes que plantean las inicia-
tivas voluntarias cuando se sustraen a la absoluta unilateralidad y, por el contra-
rio, abrigan componentes de participacin sindical, se vincula con la delimita-
cin entre el espacio de la RSE y el de la negociacin colectiva transnacional.
Por una parte, habr que computar la frecuente integracin de otros agentes al
proceso de negociacin (como dijimos, gobiernos, ONGs, inversores, etc) y el
grado de influencia que tienen los sindicatos en ese marco de pluralidad (en su
definicin y luego en su seguimiento y aplicacin).
Hay que admitir, adems, que tanto en las iniciativas voluntarias como en
la negociacin colectiva hay un componente voluntario (para este ltimo mbito,
expresamente consagrado en el Convenio 98 de la OIT), y ambas tambin, de
modo ms o menos intenso, ms o menos directo, estn sujetas a un componente
de exigencia y de presin (de los sindicatos, en el convenio colectivo; tambin
de estos, pero sobre todo de los consumidores, del mercado, de otros agentes con
50
En Costa Rica, la habilitacin legal (y la utilizacin masiva) de los denominados arreg-
los directos entre el empleador y un grupo de trabajadores no sindicalizados explicara, a juicio de
vastos sectores del pensamiento sindical y de la academia, la correlativa vertical cada de la nego-
ciacin colectiva en el sector privado (en ese sentido, Bernardo Van der Laat, El arreglo Directo
en la legislacin costarricense en La negociacin colectiva en Amrica Latina Antonio Ojeda
Avils y Oscar Ermida Uriarte (editores), Editorial Trotta pag. 97 y siguientes).
51
un aspecto de la evolucin normal de las relaciones laborales en una era de global-
izacin se les considera en el documento de OIT, Consejo de Administracin
GB.288/WP/SDG/3 288 Reunin, Ginebra 2003, pg. 6.
216
capacidad de influencia, en el caso de la iniciativas voluntarias). En el grado de

incidencia de esa presin de origen, en el conjunto de sujetos sindicales y no
sindicales - que conciertan el producto de la negociacin de solidaridad y en la
intensidad de su respectiva influencia, en el tipo y modo de formulacin de los
contenidos, en los criterios de seguimiento y supervisin (grado de participa-
cin, autonoma, experiencia), en los modos en que se prevea sancionar las
inobservancias, estarn los factores que determinarn el lugar de inclusin de la
iniciativa en un continuo que va desde las formas ms puras de iniciativa volun-
taria hasta las ms acabadas expresiones de la negociacin colectiva.
6. Las iniciativas voluntarias y las normas internacionales

del trabajo
Como lo apuntara con agudeza Francis Maupin hace no mucho, el proceso
de elaboracin de normas internacionales del trabajo est sometido a renovados
desafos. 52 Los productos de la RSE, bajo la forma de las iniciativas voluntarias
agregan uno adicional y no desdeable: el del hipottico trnsito del tripartismo
al voluntarismo unilateral en el nivel internacional.
Una es la cuestin relativa a la situacin de las NIT relativas a derechos
fundamentales en el trabajo, as como a aquellas contenidas en otros convenios
ya vigentes. Hay que decir que, por el momento, la respuesta de las iniciativas
puramente unilaterales (de empresa, de asociaciones empresarias) es cuanto
menos decepcionante a su respecto. Las invocaciones expresas de las normas
internacionales es infrecuente, las referencias a los derechos fundamentales es
selectiva (v.g., es mucho menos habitual la referencia a los derechos de libertad
sindical y de negociacin colectiva), y los derechos fundamentales que s se
recogen habitualmente trabajo infantil, eliminacin de la discriminacin y, en
menor medida, del trabajo forzoso - se formulan conforme criterios propios de
sus elaboradores, soslayando la experiencia normativa internacional, suficiente-
mente expresiva y enriquecida por sus instancias de interpretacin y aplicacin.
Ciertamente, la situacin es ms matizada en las iniciativas en las que par-
ticipan otros agentes sociales como los sindicatos, los gobiernos, las ONGs, etc
y, particularmente, en los cdigos de organismos internacionales interguberna-
mentales como la OCDE, las Naciones Unidas, y, naturalmente, la propia OIT.
52
Cf. Francis Maupain (op. cit., nota 12, pg. 687) sintetiza algunas de esas dificultades
sobrevinientes; entre ellas, los cuestionamientos a la continuidad del ritmo regular de concertacin
de convenios internacionales en nombre de la desregulacin y la presin a la baja de las condiciones
de trabajo ejercida por el modo en que se ejerce la concurrencia comercial vis a vis el carcter vol-
untario de las ratificaciones. En otras palabras, la accin normativa internacional sufre una marcada
desvalorizacin como consecuencia de dos puntos de vista opuestos entre s: el de la desregulacin
y el de la clusula social. Simultneamente, se debilitan los sindicatos y con ellos la presiones inter-
nas dirigidas a la ratificacin de los convenios, en tanto desaparece, con el fin de la guerra fra, la
amenaza comparativa que plantea la existencia misma del socialismo real, mientras cae el clima de
prosperidad y optimismo de los treinta aos gloriosos, durante los que los pases industrializados
afrontaran sin preocupacin la competencia, pues su competitividad resultaba asegurada por el
avance tecnolgico y la persistencia de las protecciones aduaneras.
217
Ms compleja se presenta la continuidad de la actividad normativa inter-

nacional. Los empresarios, que no pueden definir por s la accin legislativa
nacional y ni siquiera la intensidad de la presin sindical a que quedan someti-
dos en los espacios locales y an internacionales de la negociacin colectiva,
tienen s autonoma para definir el modo en que han de participar en la forma-
cin de las normas internacionales. Si los factores antes evocados explican la
creciente renuencia empresaria a asociarse a esos procesos de accin normativa,
las manifestaciones de RSE les habilitan un espacio argumental de justificacin
de esas opciones y les marcan otro trayecto para su vinculacin con el sistema
de proteccin. De ese modo, se hace evidente que tambin por esto se afronta
un desafo crtico en el campo de la accin normativa internacional que deman-
dar creatividad conceptual, aptitud poltica y liderazgo.
IV. Ensayando una respuesta
Del somero anlisis precedente se sigue sin dificultad que las iniciativas
voluntarias de RSE no son en modo alguno una respuesta admisible si lo que se
pretende mediante ellas es sustituir, desplazar o circunscribir los espacios que
ocupa el subsistema de proteccin del trabajo (en el marco ms amplio del sis-
tema de proteccin social) que se fundamenta en la idea del orden pblico y se
manifiesta operativamente sobre las normas legales, los convenios colectivos y
los estndares internacionales. Ello es as, en efecto,
por el tipo de selectividad temtica que responde a diversos incentivos
inespecficos, y no necesariamente a las necesidades objetivas propias del
sistema de tutela, contra cuya vigencia puede en ocasiones conspirar;
por el modo en que se definen en el marco de la RSE las reglas y princi-
pios, frecuentemente no alineados con los que, tras larga experiencia, con-
forman el acervo jurdico y axiolgico del sistema de proteccin;
por la frecuente ausencia de participacin de los beneficiarios y de otros
agentes sociales relevantes en la concepcin de las reglas y la consecuente
falta de transparencia de su elaboracin, que suele prolongarse luego en
reticencias informativas, especialmente en lo relativo a las prcticas de los
contratistas;
por la insegura suficiencia de los modos de aplicacin, supervisin y con-
trol, que se expresa en falta de independencia, conocimiento o experiencia
de los sujetos que ejercen la funcin, en la insuficiencia cuantitativa fre-
cuencia, continuidad, profundidad de los controles, en la utilizacin de
indicadores que adolecen de los mismos reparos de concepcin selectiva
invocados antes, adems de frecuentes dficits de comparabilidad;
porque su indeclinable carcter voluntario puede esgrimirse en un ejerci-
cio de desvalorizacin del sistema de proteccin basado en la idea de orden
pblico instrumentado en normas imperativas;
218
porque el proceso de voluntaria eleccin de contrapartes, modos y agentes

de aplicacin puede servir para debilitar a sujetos relevantes, como los sin-
dicatos, al sistema formal de control que ejerce la administracin y , en
especial, el servicio de inspeccin del trabajo, as como a las fuentes tra-
dicionales del sistema de tutela, como la ley y la negociacin colectiva;
porque las iniciativas voluntarias tienen lmites insuperables en cuanto a
objetivos sociales que trascienden del nivel de la empresa, como los que se
vinculan con el empleo, la formacin profesional, la distribucin del
ingreso, el desarrollo o la pobreza; 53
porque no se ha acreditado hasta hoy que esos ejercicios de RSE hayan
incidido de modo significativo en la calidad de vida y de trabajo, ni se ha
producido an conocimiento relevante sobre eventuales efectos secunda-
rios sobre las empresas de los pases en desarrollo, sobre el eventual des-
plazamiento de la mano de obra hacia sectores menos protegidos, sobre la
evolucin de la demanda hacia productos no etiquetados y, por consi-
guiente, menos costosos. 54
Esa denunciada ineptitud de las iniciativas voluntarias de RSE no debe ser
obstculo, sin embargo, para agregar algunas reflexiones algo ms matizadas a
modo de sntesis.
En efecto, como queda dicho, las dificultades por las que atraviesa el sis-
tema de proteccin social y, a su interior, el de proteccin del trabajo dependiente
no encontrarn en las iniciativas voluntarias las respuestas que requiere. La bs-
queda de ms efectividad y eficacia, tanto en lo que concierne al universo alcan-
zado por las normas de proteccin cuanto en lo que se refiere a su vigencia efec-
tiva, su aplicacin y su control, debe ser dominante consigna tanto en los niveles
nacionales, transnacionales e internacionales, como en el propio espacio de la
autonoma.
Desde esa misma perspectiva, una utilizacin equvoca y no controlada de
las iniciativas voluntarias puede ser disfuncional para la integridad de los siste-
mas de proteccin, en tanto se admita su uso para debilitar a los sindicatos, pos-
tergar o desplazar a la negociacin colectiva, sustituir la accin normativa inter-
nacional o legitimar el uso selectivo de las normas nacionales de tutela.
Hay que decir, no obstante, que si las iniciativas voluntarias no son la res-
puesta, tampoco merecen que se les tenga por irreconciliable adversario del
orden pblico y las normas imperativas de tutela. Si tras la desarticulacin del
denominado pacto socialdemcrata y del debilitamiento del doble rol funcional
del sistema de proteccin mejorar la situacin de la clase trabajadora; legiti-
mar el sistema econmico de mercado la RSE es el modo en que el empresa-
riado vuelve a vincularse positivamente (bien que de modo tenue y por otras
motivaciones) con el rgimen de la proteccin social, ese movimiento no debe
ser objeto de radical desestimacin. Por el contrario, deben habilitarse para l
53
Restriccin sta sealada por Jean-Michel Servais, op. cit., nota 15, pg. 55.
54
As lo seala Janelle Diller, op. cit., nota 15 en especial pg. 124.
219
sus instancias de valor: promover su actuacin (slo) en grado de complemen-

tariedad mejorativa respecto del ordenamiento imperativo, preservar su contri-
bucin respecto de empresas que se desempean sin controles en pases de baja
intensidad tutelar 55, limitar por fin su unilateralidad propiciando una creciente
participacin sindical (junto a los gobiernos, las ONGs y otras organizaciones
provenientes de la sociedad civil) en su diseo, aplicacin y control.
55
Sobre esta cuestin, ver OIT, Consejo de Administracin GB.273/WP/SDL/ 1 273
Reunin, Ginebra 1998, en especial pgina 20. Ver tambin Jean-Michel Servais, op. cit., nota 15,
pg. 43.
220
Does law matter?
The future of binding norms
Bob Hepple *
I. The question
A story is told about a former Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. William

Temple, who was asked: Does law matter? He replied by way of an example:
When I travel on the train I think it morally right to purchase a ticket. But the fact
that there is an inspector who can penalise me for not doing so just clinches it.
The question I have been asked to address, does law matter?, seems rather
old-fashioned. It recalls the famous debate between the French scholar Michel
Foucault and his critics. Foucault appeared to think that law no longer matters
because it has been replaced by the normalising disciplines that have come to
dominate modern social life in the factory, the school, the hospital and else-
where. He argued that there had been a decline in what he called the juridical
matrix of power. His critics said that in contrasting juridical power and disci-
plinary power Foucault was guilty of over-simplification, and was ignoring the
vast range of regulatory forms and strategies that contemporary law uses. Some
of Foucaults supporters say that his critics have misunderstood him, 1 but if that
is so he had himself to blame because he explicitly used the word juridical to
mean the exercise of coercive power by the state. The message of the critics is
that the place of coercive power in a wide spectrum of forms of regulation is
changing. The issue is not does law matter? but rather, how can we conceptu-
alise the tasks and forms of regulation today?. 2
* Emeritus Master of Clare College and Emeritus Professor Law, University of Cambridge.
1
See V. Tadros, Between Governance and Discipline: The Law and Michel Foucault,
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 18, 1998, pp. 75-103.
2
See R. Cotterell, (ed.), Law in Social Theory (Aldershot, Ashgate), 2006.
221
The change in the question is not accidental. It reflects the huge changes
in modes of social regulation. We live now in a network society where global
production systems produce goods and services where costs are lowest. 3 In post-
modern globalised society, manufacturing industries in Europe and North Amer-
ica, once reliant on the unionised labour of men, have been greatly reduced and
standardised terms of employment have been eroded. They have been replaced
in the developed countries by an increasingly feminised non-unionised work-
force of part-time, temporary and self-employed workers engaged in service
industries, and in the developing countries by both manufacturing and service
industries that rely on low-wages and relatively low labour standards to achieve
their competitive advantage. This is not the era of disciplinary normalisation
that Foucault described, but that of deregulation and flexibilisation. Transna-
tional corporations (TNCs), with flatter, decentralised, less hierarchical struc-
tures than the traditional corporation, are the driving forces in this new economy.
The welfare state and organised labour are in decline. The post-modern empha-
sis is on self-help, self-regulation and individualised rights.
The Foucauldian analysis assumes that rules of social and industrial organ-
isation are national and universal within the nation-state, that there are national
governmental and non-governmental organisations that undertake social regula-
tion, and that these organisations shape individuals, their identity, expectations
and responsibilities. In the world today regulation has an increasingly transna-
tional character, for example the TNC codes of conduct, collective agreements
between TNCs and international trade unions and NGOs, the rules of regional
trading blocs, the rules of the World Bank and IMF, as well as ILO conventions
and recommendations. Regulation operates not only through the sovereign
power of nation states but also through dispersed entities such as supranational
bodies, TNCs and NGOs. Above all, regulation now relies for its effectiveness
heavily on market mechanisms.
So the question we have to ask, in the context of transnational labour reg-
ulation, is not does law matter? but rather, where in the spectrum of globalised
regulation do binding norms lie? And, since I have been asked to talk about the
future of binding norms, where realistically should they lie?
II. Binding norms
Two fundamental points need to be made. The first is that the there is no
hard and fast line between hard law and soft law, or hard regulation and
soft regulation. The hard end of the spectrum of regulation refers to binding
legal instruments with enforcement mechanisms. This includes ratified ILO con-
ventions. The soft end covers a wide range of techniques which are not directly
legally enforceable. This includes ILO recommendations, codes of practice and
3
See N. Fraser, From Discipline to Flexibilisation? Rereading Foucault in the Shadow of
Globalization, Constellations, vol.10, 2003, pp. 160-171.
222
guidelines. Maupain has pointed out the distinction between ILO conventions
and recommendations is more a matter of theory than practice. Recommenda-
tions have some significant features in common with conventions, they are
drawn up by the same lengthy and careful tripartite procedures, and are subject
to the same follow-up procedures, apart from those specifically dedicated to
monitoring the application of ratified conventions. Maupain concludes that rec-
ommendations like unratified conventions can exercise a real influence on
national law and practice, with the degree of influence varying widely depend-
ing on the subject matter. 4 Is the 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Princi-
ples and Rights at Work, hard regulation or soft regulation? The unique legal
character of the Declaration is that obligations are placed on all Member States
not by reason of ratification of conventions but from the very fact of member-
ship. This is therefore, a constitutional obligation not one which rests on volun-
tary acceptance. But it is not a binding norm in the traditional sense because
the Declaration is regarded as purely promotional. The follow-up procedures rest
entirely on reporting mechanisms and not on sanctions. However, there can be
no doubt that the Declaration has had a huge impact in persuading States to ratify
the core ILO conventions. The time is approaching when these principles will
be regarded by courts as part of customary international law. This will occur
when the principles enter habitual state practice which States perceive to be
required by international law. However, at the other end of the regulatory spec-
trum there is an increasing number of voluntary TNC codes and guidelines
which are not directly legally enforceable, either as a matter of international or
national law.
The second point that must be made is that the most fruitful way of look-
ing at binding norms is through the spectacles of what has been termed respon-
sive regulation. 5 This is the idea that regulation needs to be responsive to the
different behaviours of the organisations subject to regulation. The point is that
a soft or voluntary approach may work in influencing the conduct of some
organisations but not others (e.g. an export company threatened by bad public-
ity will readily agree to restrict the use of child labour, while a domestic com-
pany facing strong competition may not). A regulatory strategy will not work if
it simply uses one form of regulation (e.g. soft measures/voluntarism) to the
exclusion of others (e.g. coercive sanctions). Enforcement can be viewed as
having a pyramidical structure. At the base, the regulator assumes voluntary
compliance, imparts information and seeks to persuade. Then the regulator tries
to secure promises of cooperation and encourages voluntary plans to achieve
stated goals. If this fails the regulator goes up the pyramid to investigate
or inspect and sets out what must be done in order to comply. Only then do
4
See F. Maupain, International Labour Organisation: Recommendations and Similar
Instruments in Shelton, D. (ed.), Commitment and Compliance - The Role of Non-Binding Norms
in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press), 2000 at p. 383.
5
See N. Gunningham, P. Grabosky, D. Sinclair, Smart Regulation Designing Environ-
mental Policy (Oxford, Clarendon Press), 1998.
223
coercive sanctions come into play, such as judicial enforcement, fines, compen-
sation and loss of government contracts. In order to work, there must be gradual
escalation and, at the top, sufficiently strong sanctions to deter even the most per-
sistent offender.
In the light of these general considerations, what weaknesses are revealed
in the present framework of enforcement of transnational norms? I am going to
focus on five of these, and then I shall suggest some possible solutions.
III. Weaknesses of the present framework of enforcement
1. Absence of positive obligations on Member States to require

TNCs to observe both core and core-plus standards
A crucial element in designing an enforcement pyramid is to identify the
potential participants in the regulatory process. Modern regulatory theory offers
two critical insights in this respect. The first is that private forms of social con-
trol are often far more important in changing behaviour than state law enforce-
ment, and more can be achieved by harnessing the enlightened self-interest of
affected parties than through command and control regulation. 6 The second
insight is that the quality of regulation can be improved by bringing into the reg-
ulatory process the experience and views of those directly affected. The ILOs
tripartite structure is the leading example of how supranational regulation can be
organised to achieve this second aim, but the same lesson has not been ade-
quately absorbed in the enforcement of norms at national and local levels. In
some countries, like the United Kingdom, tripartism is in decline. The real prob-
lem with the social dialogue model when applied to enforcement is that in many,
if not most States, independent trade unions and employers organisations are
weak or non-existent.
A serious weakness of ILO conventions is that they address only state
actors and not the TNCs and other non-state actors who need to be persuaded
and, if necessary compelled, to see that their self-interest lies in compliance with
binding norms. Some violations of binding norms involve legislation for which
the government is directly responsible. But there are also many in which private
corporations are in violation of the norms. The Committee on Freedom of Asso-
ciation (CFA) has gone further than other ILO supervisory bodies when it finds
violation of the principles of freedom of association by a private employer,
advising the State to take measures to ensure compliance (e.g. the reinstatement
of a worker dismissed for anti-union reasons). But this practice has not been gen-
erally followed by other ILO bodies.
This state of affairs is a consequence, in part, of the 1919 Versailles Treaty
which rejected the demands by the workers movement (and defeated Germany)
for a Parliament of Labour which would not produce international conventions
6
See N. Gunningham, Introduction in Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair, op. cit.
at p. 12.
224
without legal effect but international statutes which should have the same effect
as national statutes on their ratification. 7 The ILO has to rely on States, often
those most weakened by globalisation, to bring TNCs into line. Not surprisingly,
vast disparities exist between an elite of industrialised countries with strong and
stable governments which comply with a relatively high number of conventions,
and the great mass of developing countries, with weak or unstable governments,
which have few ratifications and high levels of non-compliance. 8
In a few countries, with monist theories of international law, direct legal
effects have been given to ratified ILO conventions; in some others with a dual-
ist approach, the courts are required to interpret national laws so as to give effect
to ratified conventions. But in a majority of countries this is not the case. The
ILOs regulatory system can be contrasted with that of the EU where treaty pro-
visions, regulations and directives may have horizontal legal effects (between
persons) as well as vertical legal effects (by persons against the State). For exam-
ple, the European Works Councils Directive (94/54) provides legally enforce-
able duties aimed at improving information and consultation in TNCs. By con-
trast, the ILO Tripartite Declaration on Principles concerning Multinational
Enterprises, although rich in principle in relation to matters such as informa-
tion and consultation is remarkably weak in enforcement. 9 A comparison may
be made with supranational regulation of financial services and intellectual
property where strict substantive commitments are placed on states to ensure
compliance.
2. Absence of effective enforcement through national labour laws

A second weakness is that national labour laws, which embody ratified
ILO conventions, are not effectively enforced especially in developing countries.
This leaves TNCs which observe those laws at a competitive disadvantage in
comparison with other foreign or domestic companies which flout the legal
requirements, so they have little incentive to comply. TNCs benefit from the
National Treatment principle (embodied, for example, in the ILO Tripartite Dec-
laration) that there must be no less favourable treatment of TNCs than that
accorded in like situations to domestic companies so a government cannot
target TNCs for enforcement if it is not doing the same against domestic violators.
The main reason or the effective enforcement of EU labour law is that it is
not only supranational; it also depends on laws and industrial relations processes
at the level of the Member States. References for preliminary rulings and
infringement proceedings before the European Court of Justice are the main
means of enforcement at EU-level. There is a symbiotic relationship between
enforcement at this level and national labour law. National remedies, which must
7
See T. Ramm, Chap.7 in B. Hepple, (ed.), The Making of Labour Law in Europe: a Com-
parative Study of Nine Countries up to 1945 (London, Mansell), 1986 at p. 283.
8
See B. Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade (Oxford, Hart Publishing), 2005 at p. 47.
9
Ibid. at p. 83.
225
be effective and deterrent, have to be relied upon to bring home the treaty obli-
gations as interpreted by the ECJ. These national remedies may be primarily
administrative (as in France), or through negotiations between the social part-
ners (as in the Nordic countries), or through the judicial process (as in the UK).
3. Absence of enforceable determinations

Neither the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations (CEACR) nor the CFA adopt adversarial procedures and their
conclusions do not have legally-binding force. The CEACR has justifiably
expressed satisfaction with the progress made in many thousands of cases by
diplomacy, technical assistance and direct contacts. But there are well-known
cases where the conclusions of supervisory bodies have been deliberately
ignored, such as by Mrs. Thatchers government in respect of trade union rights
in 1984. 10 The lessons of regulatory theory also make ask whether satisfactory
results might have been secured more rapidly and effectively had these bodies
been able to issue binding determinations.
At present the only way in which a legally binding finding that a Member
State has breached an obligation under a convention can be made is through the
conclusions of a Commission of Inquiry. A Commission may be set up by the
Governing Body following representations by a workers or employers organi-
sation made under Articles 24 and 25 of the ILO Constitution, or a complaint by
a Member State or a delegate to the International Labour Conference under Arti-
cle 26. The conclusions of a Commission become binding when the Member
State agrees explicitly to accept them, or abstains from referring the matter to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under Article 29 of the ILO Constitution.
In none of the cases in which a Commission has reported has the government
exercised this right of appeal. Failure to appeal means that the findings cannot
be re-opened: the only issue is how to implement them. The 35-year long and
continuing saga of the case of forced labour in Myanmar shows that the threat
of sanctions under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, following a Commission
report, coupled with sensitive and difficult negotiations, at first led to some
response from a dictatorial government. 11 But the failure to enforce trade sanc-
tions has enabled the government to stall indefinitely, and not even to agree on
mechanisms for dealing with complaints of forced labour. The world awaits with
interest the outcome of the threat by the Governing Body of the ILO to refer the
matter to the UN Security Council and to the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court. One may be sceptical as to whether this will in itself change the
governments intransigence, but concerted international action may persuade
those states which have tolerated the dictatorship to exert pressure for change.
10
Ibid. at p. 38.
11
See F. Maupain, Is the ILO Effective in Upholding Workers Rights?: Reflections on the
Myanmar Experience in P. Alston, (ed.), Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford University
Press), 2005 at p. 85.
226
4. Absence of selective sanctions

There are two obstacles to the use of Article 33 to impose sanctions against
a State which fails to observe a Commission recommendation, one political, the
other legal. The political one and the main reason why Article 33 has been
invoked only once, and then over the objections of several countries, especially
from Asia is the general hostility to trade sanctions as a means of enforcing
international labour standards. It is sometimes argued that imposing sanctions in
respect of ratified conventions would act as a disincentive to ratification. Against
this, sanctions can be justified on the grounds of reciprocity: one country cannot
be expected to ratify if other ratifying countries are flouting the provisions of
conventions they have purported to ratify. The argument is strongest when there
is a flagrant breach of fundamental rights.
The second obstacle is the legal ambiguity as to the scope of the action
that can be authorised under Article 33. Before 1946, Article 28 of the ILO Con-
stitution allowed the Governing Body in response to findings of a Commission
of Inquiry, to recommend the measures, if any, of an economic character that
should be taken against a defaulting government. Either party could then
approach the Permanent Court of International Justice which was to make the
final decision on the merits and on any measures of an economic character. This
was dropped in 1946, no such measures ever having been recommended, and
replaced by the current Article 33 which refers only to such action as may be
deemed wise and expedient to secure compliance. Maupain believes that the
change in wording does not rule out economic sanctions. The wording of the
Myanmar Resolution in 2000 deliberately left Member States and international
organisations with a wide discretion in this respect. They were asked to review
their relations with Myanmar and to take appropriate measures. Without this
ambiguity, leaving responsibility with the Member States, it is unlikely that the
Resolution would have been adopted. 12 The key issue, Maupain points out, is the
compatibility of trade sanctions imposed by Member States with their commit-
ment as Members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a matter to which I
shall return.
5. Absence of effective protection for international solidarity action

In theory, a consumer boycott or industrial action may be just as important
as legal sanctions as a means of securing compliance. Yet, in practice transna-
tional boycotts and strikes are subject to severe legal restrictions under national
laws. These restrictions have increased over the past two decades. A recent
survey 13 indicates that among Members of the Organisation for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) only Belgium appears to leave national and
12
Ibid., pp. 105-108.
13
See P. Germanotta, Protecting Worker Solidarity Action: A Critique of International
Labour Law (London, Institute of Employment Rights), 2002.
227
international solidarity action unregulated. Outright prohibition is found in some

countries (e.g. the United Kingdom) and in most OECD countries solidarity
action is permitted only if certain strict conditions are satisfied. The ILOs stance
on this has been equivocal and contested. 14 Although the Director-General has
spoken strongly about the need for the ILO to contribute to the empowerment of
workers, the Governing Body has not moved beyond inconclusive discussions,
even within the framework of the 1998 Declaration. The crucial issue is the
extent to which the CEACR and CFA are willing to recognise that solidarity
action, particularly across national boundaries, is encompassed by the freedom
of association. The CEACR and CFA have generally taken the position that a
general prohibition on sympathy action could lead to abuse, and workers should
be able to take such action, providing the initial strike they are supporting is itself
lawful. The main problem with the CEACRs approach is that it makes lawful
sympathy or solidarity action dependent on the lawfulness of the primary dis-
pute. If the law applied is that of a country in which the primary dispute occurs,
this limitation may make it impossible to take solidarity action with workers in
a country where strikes are prohibited or severely restricted. Testing the legality
of the primary dispute by the law of the country in which the sympathy actions
occurs is also beset with difficulties because of the different institutional arrange-
ments and collective bargaining procedures in each country. Application of the
law of the country in which the sympathy action occurs would involve artificial
modifications of unfamiliar systems. The CFA has been moving towards testing
the legality of primary action by whether the legislation in question complies
with the ILOs principles on freedom of association. But, in my view, it would
make more sense for the ILOs supervisory bodies to apply a simple test of
common interest between the workers involved in the primary and secondary
action. 15
IV. The future of binding norms
In order to remedy these weaknesses I believe that the following are among
the key reforms that need to be made.
1. Framework conventions with positive obligations

The artificial distinction between conventions and recommendations
should be abolished. There should instead be a few framework conventions that
set out fundamental principles and States must be placed under positive obliga-
tions to ensure compliance by TNCs and others within their territory of these
principles. A step in that direction is the ongoing review and integration of
14
See T. Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (Oxford Uni-
versity Press), 2003.
15
See Hepple, op. cit., supra n. 8, pp. 186-189.
228
standards. A model is the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention replacing about

65 maritime labour instruments and laying down a firm set of principles and
rights for seafarers, a simplified amendment procedure. There is a strong
enforcement regime backed by a certification system, as well as a clause ensur-
ing that a ship flying the flag of a country which has not ratified the convention
will not be more favourably treated than a ship flying the flag of a state which
has ratified. Another example is the 2006 Promotional Framework for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Convention (No. 187). Framework conventions should
be supplemented by regulations and codes of practice directed at specific groups
of countries at a similar level of development. These reforms would allow for a
concentration on basic principles and, at the same time make specific recom-
mendations which are relevant to countries at a similar level of development.
Empirical evidence 16 indicates that the decision to ratify a convention depends
crucially on whether or not peer countries have done so. A virtuous circle of rat-
ifying countries depends on the initiative being taken by a competitor with sim-
ilar factor advantages. Targeted guidance would encourage ratification and
greater compliance. In the absence of regional authorities such as the EU, the
ILO will have an important role in developing methods of coordination of
national employment policies of countries at a similar stage of development. In
order to maximise peer pressure, an effective surveillance system of cross-border
monitoring and inspection between countries in the target group will be essential.
2. Core conventions should be updated and expanded

The four core principles in the 1998 Declaration are selective. The Decla-
ration has been a useful means for promoting ratification of the eight core con-
ventions, but there is no obvious reason why health and safety should not be
included among the core. The recent ILO proposals for reinvigorating and
strengthening labour inspection worldwide are essential for the enforcement of
all these core principles and rights. Moreover, the Declaration needs to be linked
to the Decent Work Agenda so as to extend the core principles to all kinds of pro-
ductive work.
The wording of the Declaration suggests that countries can adhere to these
vague principles without observing the more numerous specific rights conferred
by the eight core conventions. It is only ratification that can confer rights and
obligations in international law; the Declaration creates no more than an unen-
forceable constitutional obligation. There is no express linkage between the
follow-up mechanism under the Declaration, and the regular supervisory
machinery of the ILO. Consideration should be given to the creation of a Gov-
erning Body committee, similar to the CFA, which would consider complaints
by States, or individual delegates to the International Labour Conference, of
16
See N.H. Chau and R. Kanbur, The Adoption of International Labour Standards Con-
ventions: Who, When and Why? in S.M. Collins and D. Rodrik, Brookings Trade Forum 2001
(Washington, Brookings Institution), 2001.
229
breach of the core standards other than freedom of association which is already
dealt with by the CFA . The GB should be able to consider action under Arti-
cle 33 on the basis of the recommendations of such committees, where the
evidence is clear, without the need first to set up a Commission of Inquiry.
3. Selective use of trade sanctions

I have argued at length elsewhere that sanctions for breach of international
labour standards imposed unilaterally are undesirable, and that WTO trade sanc-
tions would be both undesirable in principle and unlikely to work in practice. 17
This does not mean that trade sanctions should be absent from the system of
transnational labour regulation. On the contrary, persuasion and conciliation will
not work unless there is ultimately an effective sanction that can be invoked.
First, it would not be unreasonable to insist that no country which is in flagrant
breach of fundamental human rights should be admitted to the ILO or WTO.
These pariah states (hostis humani generis) who wish to join or remain mem-
bers of the WTO or ILO should have to demonstrate respect for democracy and
human rights, as is the case for membership of the EU. They should be forced
to withdraw from the WTO or ILO if they are ruled by corrupt or dictatorial
regimes which grossly abuse human rights. The forced withdrawal of apartheid
South Africa from the ILO in 1964 was a significant landmark in the long strug-
gle for democracy in that country. The WTO-ILO linkage could be strengthened
if the WTO were to ask the ILO to certify that a country is taking steps to respect
rights at work. This would ensure that the ILO retains prime responsibility in
respect of core labour standards. Once a State is so certified, it should be able to
enjoy the benefits of WTO membership. Another fruitful approach is to provide
positive, as distinct from negative, conditionality in granting trade preferences.
Here the EUs Generalised System of Preferences provides a model. Apart from
these measures the ILO should show more willingness and urgency than it does
at present in the application of Article 33. The Constitution needs to be amended
so as to make it an obligation (not simply a request) for Member States to take
action within the permitted limits of the WTO agreements. The emphasis, how-
ever, should be on carrots rather than sticks. The ILOs supervisory bodies
should give interpretations of freedom of association which make it possible for
international solidarity action to take place. This is essential if local actors are
to be empowered.
4. An International Mediation Service and Labour Tribunal

Beyond the ILO a whole new world of transnational labour regulation is
emerging. This includes the growing number of corporate codes of conduct and
collective agreements between TNCs and international trade unions. ILO stan-
dards need to be integrated into these codes and agreements. One way that the
17
See Hepple, op. cit., supra n. 8, chapters 4, 5, 6.
230
ILO could encourage this would be through a framework convention of the kind
I have suggested. Another way would be by facilitating dispute resolution under
these agreements. Here the emphasis, in the first instance, should be on the well-
tried industrial method of mediation (or conciliation). The ILO has been unable
or unwilling to date to provide such a mediation service. It should, therefore,
support the establishment of an independent mediation service available to TNCs
and unions to resolve their differences over the application of codes and
agreements.
In the longer term an International Labour Tribunal, set up under the aus-
pices of the ILO (possibly in collaboration with the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration), will be necessary to resolve transnational labour disputes. Such a Tri-
bunal might also serve the purpose of giving authoritative interpretations of
international labour conventions and the ILO Constitution (replacing the ICJ
which is unsuitable). This has become an increasingly pressing issue because of
the adoption of regional instruments and multilateral and bilateral treaties, which
adopt sometimes subtle differences from the wording of ILO conventions. The
primacy of ILO standards could be ensured and confusion overcome, by an
International Labour Tribunal where authoritative interpretations could be given.
V. Conclusion
I have argued that in the new globalised economy, labour regulation has an
increasingly transnational character. This regulation operates less through the
sovereign power of nation states than through dispersed entities at supranational,
regional, national and local levels, and it relies for its effectiveness heavily on
market mechanisms. Regulation ranges across a spectrum, with no fixed bound-
aries, between the hard end of binding legally enforceable instruments and the
soft end of voluntary codes and guidelines. These two ends of the spectrum are
not in opposition to each other. Indeed, a regulatory strategy will not work if it
uses simply one form of regulation to the exclusion of others. Persuasion and
voluntary compliance will usually not change conduct unless there is a creative
dialectic between the threat of sanctions and their actual use. 18
I have identified five of the weaknesses of the current framework for the
enforcement of transnational norms, namely (i) the absence of positive obliga-
tions on Member States to require TNCs to observe both core and core-plus stan-
dards; (ii) the absence of effective enforcement through national labour laws;
(iii) the absence of enforceable determinations; (iv) the absence of selective
sanctions; and (v) the absence of effective protection for international solidarity
action. I have proposed some key reforms such as the development of framework
conventions with positive obligations, the updating and expansion of core con-
ventions, the selective use of trade sanctions, and the establishment of an inter-
national mediation service and labour tribunal.
18
See Maupain, op. cit., supra n. 11 at p.105.
231
I have no illusions that these reforms can be quickly or easily achieved,

because transnational labour relations depend so much on power relations. But
the task of an expert is not to second-guess whether the political will exists to
carry out reform. The experts duty is to show the reforms that are needed if the
noble aims of the ILO are to be fulfilled as the Committee of Experts approaches
its centenary.
Discussion
Geraldo von Potobsky * Professor Hepples comments and remarks are

very challenging. I would not agree, however, with his remarks on the dividing
line between soft law and hard law. I think there is a dividing line and it
relates to the possibility for judicial enforcement of hard law not of soft law.
Another point concerns ILO standards which do not only have a vertical effect,
but also an horizontal effect, even more than the directives of the European
Union. This is being recognized in an increasing manner by national judiciaries
which apply ILO standards and refer to comments and interpretations made by
the Committee of Experts and even the Committee on Freedom of Association.
The ILO is promoting the dissemination of international labour standards for
judges and the Turin Training Centre is very much involved in this type of
activities. One must admit, however, that there is a lack of knowledge in most
countries about ILO standards and how they could be applied by judges and
lawyers at the domestic level.
Budislav Vukas ** I was struck by Mr. Hepples statement in favour of

framework conventions. To give you but one example, a framework convention
is the type of instrument that a body like the Council of Europe adopts when it
does not want to adopt a real convention for the protection of minorities. They
adopt instead a framework convention which is nothing but a set of pious wishes
and suggestions.
I fully concur with the views expressed by Mr. von Potosbky about the
danger of blurring the borderline between hard and soft law. Keeping the dis-
tinction between binding and non-binding is essential to international law, think
of Security Council resolutions taken under chapter 6 or 7, think of law students
and the difficulty we often have to convince them that international law is law.
* Former Chief of the Freedom of Association Branch, International Labour Standards

Department, International Labour Office.
** Professor of Public International Law, University of Zagreb; Member, ILO Committee
of Experts.
232
Eibe Riedel* I think the most inspiring part of Mr. Hepples contribution
was his idea of elaborating the pyramid of normativity into responsive regula-
tion as a much more subtle instrument in the field of labour law, in that regula-
tions need to be responsive to, first of all, at the bottom level, voluntary compli-
ance, then promises of cooperation and partnership, then inspection field
missions, and only in the last resort, coercive measures. I also found fascinating
the suggestion of sanctions in the form of either suspension or termination of
membership in the WTO, which is something that really matters and hurts.
Oscar de Vries Reilingh ** When Mr. Hepple was pleading for the con-
cept of framework conventions, he added that they should be targeted on partic-
ular countries. I would like to know what he meant. Did he mean regionalization
of universal standards or should they be focused on constituents in particular
level of economic and social development which, by the way, would amount to
the same.
Mohamed Ezzeldin Abdel-Moneim*** With reference to Chapter 7 of the

UN Charter, I wonder whether you envisage that things or sanctions can go that
far in relation to the application of international standards related to human
rights.
Paraskevi Nastou **** Si jai bien compris, M. Hepple nie aux con-
statations de la commission dexperts de lOIT un caractre obligatoire ou con-
traignant. Et si cest le cas, ne fallait-il pas dissocier le caractre obligatoire de
la constatation de lventualit dattacher une sanction ventuelle?
Anne Trebilcock***** I have a question for Professor Hepple in relation

to the idea of having an independent panel of mediators and I just wondered if
he could more specifically describe the parameters that such an institution would
have and how it would be structured in a way that would not be competing with
or would not undermine existing arrangements within the ILO and how it would
in effect be positioned to be something complementary.
Bob Hepple Concerning Mr. von Potobskys point about the dividing line
between hard and soft law, my point is that it is the wrong way to look at the
question because it means saying that that is law and that is not law. I think we
should change our mindset, that we look at this as a spectrum of regulations and
I also presented this model of the Egyptian pyramid with the idea that we must
* Professor of Law, University of Mannheim; Vice-Chairperson, UN Committee on

** Former Director of the Sectoral Activities Department, International Labour Office.
*** Member, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
**** Etudiante doctorante, Universit Paris I.
***** Legal Adviser, International Labour Office.
233
realize that sanctions at the end are absolutely essential in order to make per-
suasion work in many cases. I therefore think that our focus has been too much
on should we go for soft or should we go for hard law. In very much an academic
discussion, we get a lot of debates about what is hard law/soft law and I think it
is not really the issue.
Secondly, about the ILO standards horizontal effect, I think I recognized
that some national courts are giving direct application. We had a very notable
role in the history of labour law in South Africa. I think the message from what
you say, which I fully agree with, is that we need a lot more training of judges,
we need judges to be more receptive. But there are obstacles; sometimes they
are constitutional obstacles in a particular State, sometimes they are just con-
servative judicial attitudes or the traditions of a country. I think that is something
we will have to overcome.
In response to Mr. Vukas comment concerning framework conventions, let
me say that I am quite influenced by the model of the European Union think
of health and safety as an example. We used to have a lot of detailed regulations
in different European States on health and safety and then the European Union
introduced a general framework directive on health and safety supplemented by
lots of specific directives on specific areas of health and safety. I can only speak
for the United Kingdom here, but this approach of framework directives truly
transformed the approach to health and safety law in the United Kingdom. More
generally, in this modern world of flexibilization, the danger with having very
specific Conventions is that they are too rigid. Drawing on the fact that countries
are very influenced by what neighbouring States do, I think it would be useful
at that stage, for guidelines to be formulated for a group of countries, not depart-
ing from the universal standards but targeting particular problems.
Mr. Abdel-Moneim raised the very interesting question about Chapter 7
and how far I would think this could be the appropriate mechanism indeed I
feel it cannot be the appropriate mechanism for sanctions because of the limited
terms of Chapter 7. But we have to think imaginatively and I believe that we
should, first of all, just look at the question of membership of the ILO and we
should also look at what sanctions can be imposed comparatively with WTO
standards. And also I emphasized the notion of carrots as well as sticks to
encourage people to comply.
Concenring the non binding nature of the findings of the Committee of
Experts, there is of ocurse a procedure; the Conference Committee will look at
the Committee of Experts comment and may decide to insert a special para-
graph, etc. It should therefore be clear that there are ways in which those find-
ings can be supported.
Finally, in reply to Ms. Trebilcocks question, it seems to me that initially
we should try to offer a mediation service to those people acting under interna-
tional collective agreements. As you know, there is a growing number of inter-
national collective agreements. Most of them are very vague and there are also
the corporate codes of conduct which do not always reflect ILO standards. Some
of the collective agreements provide that ILO standards must be followed on
234
certain matters. Under the voluntary codes of conduct, the problem about medi-
ation is that it may be too one-sided because it may just be a unilateral corporate
code and you have to ensure that there is somebody on the other side who has
the strength to speak. But I just simply suggest that the idea of mediation serv-
ices should be explored because I worry that the ILO is not playing a role, a very
strong role, in relation to these new forms of regulation which may come even-
tually to be far more important in some places than Conventions and Recom-
mendations.
Adrin Goldin Una cosa que me parece importante decir es que esas ini-
ciativas voluntarias, porque son empresarias, se reivindican como estrictamente
voluntarias. Se pretenden voluntarias en la solucin y se pretenden voluntarias
tambin en el cumplimiento, y ese es un tema que las coloca mucho ms cerca
del mbito de la gestin que del mbito del derecho, por lo que entonces yo dira
ms cerca de la gestin de recursos humanos aunque expresan otra cosa que en
el mbito de las relaciones profesionales, o las relaciones laborales. Si yo tuviera
que ubicarlas podra decir que las iniciativas voluntarias son a la gestin de
recursos humanos, lo que la negociacin colectiva es a las relaciones industri-
ales. Y finalmente, subrayo que, cuanta ms intervencin sindical, cuanta ms
negociacin, cuanta ms participacin de terceros sujetos haya respecto de las
iniciativas voluntarias ms cerca estaremos de las relaciones industriales en ese
continuo movimiento que va desde lo unilateral a lo multilateral, es decir, que
va desde la gestin de recursos humanos hacia las relaciones industriales, y ms
cualitativos sern sus productos. De modo tal que esto alimenta esa idea de que,
tomando las cautelas, el espacio de la iniciativa voluntaria como una expresin
de reconvergencia empresaria hacia su vinculacin con el sistema de proteccin
debe seguir siendo mirado con extrema atencin.
235
Panel discussion The quest
for new compliance tools: Marrying
the best of the old with the new
Learning or Diversity? Reflections on the
Future of International Labour Standards
Simon Deakin *
The occasion of the eightieth anniversary of the founding of the ILOs com-
mittee of experts system provides a suitable moment to take stock of recent
developments in the law and practice of international labour standards. The ILO
system represents one of the earliest attempts to diffuse good practice through a
process of dialogue between nation states, mediated by the interpretive role of
the experts. The system has stood the test of time and has been remarkably
successful. But as in so many other respects, the functioning of this part of inter-
national labour law is under scrutiny as never before. Labour standards them-
selves are changing, in part as a response to globalization, but also in the light
of new theories of governance which are challenging established conceptions.
This much was clear from the course of the discussion which took place in
Geneva in November 2006. In this short contribution to the published proceed-
ings of that event, I wish to take up the challenge of what might be called learn-
ing-based models of transnational governance, and to consider their relevance
for the future form and function of labour standards.
The case for identifying a series of recent innovations in transnational gov-
ernance in terms of a learning model has been powerfully made by Charles Sabel
in a series of papers, 1 most recently with Jonathan Zeitlin, 2 which focus on the
* Director of the Centre for Business Research and Professor of Law, University of Cambridge.
1
See J. Cohen and C. Sabel, Directly-deliberative polyarchy, European Law Journal,
1997, pp. 313-342; O. Gerstenberg and C. Sabel, Directly-deliberative polyarchy: an institutional
ideal for Europe? in R. Dehousse and C. Joerges (eds.), Good Governance and Administration in
Europes Integrated Market, The Academy of European Law (EUI), Volume XI, Book 1, 2002,
pp.289-341 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
2
See C. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, Learning from difference: the new architecture of experi-
mentalist governance in the European Union, Paper presented to the Theory of the Norm work-
shop, FP6 project Reflexive Governance in the Public Interest, Brussels, 27 October 2006.
239
experience of the European Union, but are by no means confined in their scope
to practices on the European continent. According to this view, distinctive and
surprisingly effective innovations have emerged, the essence of which is that
the EU is creating a single market while constructing a framework within which
the member states can protect public health and safety in ways that grow out of
these traditions and allow them to pursue their own best judgements for innova-
tive advance. 3 This analysis goes further than merely acknowledging, as others
have done, the role of deliberation through the role of comitological commit-
tees, or even the use of forms of multi-level concertation which tend to dissolve
the distinctions between a central core of decision-making and national
peripheries. In addition, a new underlying architecture of public rule making
can be observed; this can neither be mapped from the topmost directives and
Treaty provisions nor read out from any textbook account of the formal compe-
tences of EU institutions, but it nevertheless regularly and decisively shapes
EU governance. Its essence is the establishment, firstly, of framework goals,
jointly set by action between the member states and EU institutions, such as the
goal of a high employment rate set for the Open Method of Coordination (OMC)
on employment policy in the late 1990s; secondly, the devolution to lower level
units, a category including but not limited to member states, of the means of
implementation of these goals; thirdly, the application of a duty on the part of
those units to report on their performance, to benchmark it against agreed crite-
ria, and to take part in a peer review process by which their performance is
judged collectively; and, fourthly, a recursive mechanism through which the
framework itself is periodically revised in the light of the information produced
by the benchmarking process.
The result is distinctive, it is argued, for the following reasons. 4 Firstly, the
goal of deliberation is not, as has been thought, to reach agreement in the sense
of a reflective equilibrium; rather, deliberative decision making is driven at
least as much by the discussion and elaboration of difference. Secondly, the
result is not, necessarily, to replace formal norms with informal ones: those
institutions whose explicit purpose is to expose and clarify difference so as to
destabilize and disentrench settled approaches are typically highly formalised.
It is not simply that formal revisions to directives and national-level laws often
result from the processes concerned; even where formal laws and sanctions are
absent, the consequences of non-compliance can be far-reaching, in terms of
possible economic losses and harm to reputation. Thirdly, new forms of gover-
nance rest not so much upon the imposition from above of supposedly optimal
regulatory solutions, as upon a clear division of labour between EU institutions
with responsibility for devising frameworks of general application, and the
member states whose task is to adapt them to local conditions and to contribute,
through reporting and monitoring, to a collective learning process: the most suc-
cessful of these arrangements combine the advantages of decentralized local
3
Ibid., pp.1-2.
4
Ibid., pp.4-10.
240
Learning models of governance and labour standards
experimentation with those of centralized coordination, and so blur the distinction

between forms of governance often held to have incompatible virtues. What this
adds up to is a type of governance termed directly deliberative polyarchy pol-
yarchy here referring to the element of mutual learning through monitoring by
lower level units which is, in essence, a machine for learning from diversity. 5
The core illustration of the operation of deliberative polyarchy as a dis-
tinctive form of governance in the EU, although by no means the only one, is the
open method of coordination formally adopted at the Lisbon summit in 2000.
Formally, this had four elements: the fixing of guidelines at central level, cou-
pled with timetables for the achievement of goals; the establishment of bench-
marks for tailoring performance and allowing the identification of best practice
at local level; the adoption of specific targets for the implementation of guide-
lines, while taking into account regional and national differences; and a process
of periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual learn-
ing processes. Elements of the OMC were already in existence, in the form of
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines which can be traced back to the Treaty
of Maastricht, and the Employment Guidelines adopted in relation to the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy which was formally embedded in the Treaty of Ams-
terdam. The Lisbon Summit stimulated a proliferation of new OMCs across a
wide range of areas, which now include pensions policy, strategies on social
inclusion, and policies on fundamental rights, while looser variants of the same
idea have been applied in the contexts of research and innovation policy, the
information society, and the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises.
The arrival of the OMC appears to mark a fundamental break with what
came before, and this is often the way in which it has been portrayed by critics
and opponents alike. The authors of the OMC, as Sabel and Zeitlin put it, saw it
as a third way for EU governance between regulatory harmonization and frag-
mentation. 6 However, there is a case for identifying important continuities
between the OMC and some long-standing debates about the proper role of har-
monization within the common, later the single, market.
The theory of deliberative polyarchy sees the EU as simply one case amid
a larger set of emerging governance forms to be found at national, regional and
global level. Thus Sabel and Zeitlin cite instances of experimentalism in the US
including environmental protection, education policy, child protection, and food
safety. To some degree, their emphasis on EU-US similarities may simply reflect
a particular selection of substantive areas of law on which to focus; they do not
discuss labour or company law, both areas of considerable divergence (as we
have just seen), in any detail. Nevertheless, they are prepared to extend the delib-
erative model to cover global-level governance too: developments cast doubt on
the singularity of the EUs innovative regulatory architecture, 7 with the WTO
and ILO, among others, beginning to borrow elements of the OMC approach.
5
Ibid., pp.7-8.
6
Ibid., p.27.
7
Ibid., p.71.
241
Indeed, the influence of learning models is clear in the context of several

ILO initiatives, the most important of which for these purposes is the recent Con-
vention No. 187 of 2006 on a Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety
and Health. Article 5 of this Convention provides that each Member shall for-
mulate, implement, monitor, evaluate and periodically review a national pro-
gramme on occupational safety and health in consultation with the most repre-
sentative organizations of employers and workers, and goes on in paragraph 2
to state that this national programme shall:
(a) promote the development of a national preventative safety and health
culture;
(b) contribute to the protection of workers by eliminating or minimizing, so far
as is reasonably practicable, work-related hazards and risks, in accordance
with national law and practice, in order to prevent occupational injuries,
diseases and deaths and promote safety and health in the workplace;
(c) be formulated and reviewed on the basis of analysis of the national situa-
tion regarding occupational safety and health, including analysis of the
national system for occupational safety and health;
(d) include objectives, targets and indicators of progress (emphasis added);
and
(e) be supported, where possible, by other complementary national pro-
grammes and plans which will assist in achieving progressively a safe and
healthy working environment.
If a learning model is to form an increasingly important part of the ILOs
approach to standard setting in future, this is, in one sense, a natural develop-
ment from what has gone before. Cross-national learning has always gone on in
labour law. Before the first ILO Conventions, the nation states of Western Europe
had made treaty commitments to a degree of harmonisation of laws governing
health and safety at work. Innovations in welfare state regimes were exchanged
from the late nineteenth century onwards. The ILOs system of reviewing
member state compliance with Conventions and with its basic principles in such
areas as freedom of association was an attempt to institutionalise a process of
mutual observation among states. It does not depend upon hard sanctions, but on
publicity and persuasion. In what respects do new forms of governance mark a
potential departure from the existing model?
That new governance forms do mark a departure from previous approaches
can perhaps most clearly be seen from the context in which they have been most
extensively developed, which is the European Union. Like the ILO, the EU did
not suddenly discover learning models in the early 2000s. A division of labour
between central institutions and the member states and a commitment to exper-
imentalism based on diversity of practices were part of the EUs regulatory
architecture from the outset. European directives are like ILO Conventions in
that they are not self-enforcing; although the legal instruments available to the
European Commission for their implementation are evidently more extensive
242
than anything available to the ILO, they nevertheless depend for their effective-
ness, in the final analysis, on measures taken by member states. The limited reg-
ulatory scope of Directives also needs to be kept in view. In the social policy field
are by and large designed to set a floor of rights. This model was established
in the 1970s and, with some modifications and adaptations, remains the princi-
pal approach today. Most directives make explicit reference in their texts to min-
imum standards which states must observe but on which they can improve,
while many also contain non-regression clauses which are intended to prevent
member states from using the implementation of a directive to reduce the pre-
existing level of protection guaranteed by national law. A race to the bottom is
thereby discouraged, but equally important is the implicit encouragement for a
learning process to take place above the level of the basic floor.
This distinctive European approach to the regulation of transnational mar-
kets has been described using the term reflexive harmonization. 8 Rather than
seeing reflexive forms of governance as a third way between the standardisa-
tion and fragmentation of laws, as supporters of the OMC would have it, the
guiding idea here was that the opposition between regulatory competition and
harmonization was a false one to begin with. Regulatory competition, rather than
necessarily involving a race to the bottom, should be seen instead as a process
of discovery through which knowledge and resources were mobilized in the
search for effective and workable rules. This was an adaptation of the idea that
competition is a learning process which depends on norms that establish a bal-
ance between particular and general mechanisms, 9 between, that is, the auton-
omy of local actors, and the mechanisms which ensure a process of collective
learning based on observation and experimentation. As with theories of deliber-
ative polyarchy, an essential prerequisite for reflexive harmonization is the
preservation of local-level diversity, since without diversity, the stock of knowl-
edge and experience on which the learning process depends is limited in scope.
However, there are several respects in which the reflexive harmonization
approach differs from deliberative polyarchy.
The theory of reflexive harmonization was developed as part of an explicit
engagement with, and response to, neoliberal critics of the EUs role in trans-
national rule-making. Those, for example, who argued against the European
8
See, for instance, S. Deakin, Two types of regulatory competition: competitive federal-
ism versus reflexive harmonisation. A law and economics perspective, Cambridge Yearbook of
European Legal Studies, vol.2, 1999, pp.231-260; S. Deakin, Regulatory competition versus har-
monisation in European company law in D. Esty and D. Geradin (eds.), Regulatory Competition
and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives, 2001 (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
pp.190-217; C. Barnard and S. Deakin, Market access and regulatory competition in C. Barnard
and J. Scott (eds.), The Law of the Single Market: Unpacking the Premises, 2002 (Oxford: Hart);
P. Zumbansen, Spaces and places: a systems theory approach to regulatory competition in Euro-
pean company law, European Law Journal, 2006, pp.535-557; B. Caruso, Changes in the work-
place and the dialogue of labor scholars in the global village, Working Paper 50-2007, Centro studi
di diritto del lavoro Europeo Massimo DAntona, Universit degli studi di Catania.
9
See R. Sugden, Spontaneous order in P. Newman, The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law, 1997 (London: Macmillan), p. 487.
243
Commissions social action programmes of the 1980s and 1990s, did so on the
grounds that variety within the Union as a whole should be preserved: hidden
in the historical experience of economic integration, there is [] a very impor-
tant aspect of system dynamics: international competition in the field of the
welfare state serves as a kind of process of discovery to identify which welfare
state package for whatever reason turns out to be economically viable in
practice. 10 As this critique recognized, there was a strong argument against the
use of harmonizing legislation to cement in a single best solution. However,
the theory of reflexive harmonization argued that this was not a good account of
how EU governance worked. It argued, as we have just seen, that European-style
harmonization had evolved to play the role of maintaining the appropriate rela-
tionship between particular mechanisms operating at the sub-federal level, and
the general mechanisms by which learning across the Union as a whole took
place. The model of reflexive harmonization held that the principal objectives of
judicial intervention and legislative harmonization alike were two-fold: firstly,
to protect the autonomy and diversity of national or local rule-making systems,
while, secondly, seeking to steer or channel the process of adaptation of rules
at state level away from spontaneous solutions which might lock in sub-opti-
mal outcomes, such as a race to the bottom initiated by court-led negative har-
monisation. In contrast, the deliberative polyarchy approach is silent on the role
that minimum standards might play in shaping the process of transnational inte-
gration. There is nothing in the deliberative polyarchy approach to suggest, for
example, that experimentalist solutions of a deregulatory type should be ruled
out in principle, and nor is there any clear engagement with the risks which this
type of regulatory competition might pose.
There is a further problem with the learning model proposed by advocates
of an OMC-type approach to transnational governance. This is that, despite
protestations to the contrary, the use of benchmarking sets up the idea of a single
best approach to issues of standard setting. Individual country practices end up
being singled out as illustrations of best practice. An illustration of this is the
current tendency to highlight the many positive features of Nordic systems of
labour regulation in terms of promoting employment growth. The combination
of a wide social security net, coupled with fairly loose employment protection
legislation by European standards, is widely seen as contributing to high
employment levels in the Nordic systems, and they are increasingly held up a
model for other systems to follow, as in the recent European Commission Green
Paper on the future of labour law. 11 The difficulty with this approach is that cer-
tain features of the Nordic model are not being emphasized not least the very
high levels of GDP (up to 5 per cent) being devoted to public expenditure active
10
See K.-H. Paqu, Does Europes Common Market need a social dimension? Some aca-
demic thoughts on a popular theme in J.T. Addison and W.S. Siebert (eds.), Labour Markets in
Europe: Issues of Harmonisation and Regulation, 1997 (London: Dryden), p.109.
11
See Green Paper - Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century,
(Luxembourg: OOPEC), 2006.
244
labour market policy. The removal of so-called rigidities in labour laws, part of
a programme of approximating national laws to the Nordic standard, has been
proposed. But to take just one part of the Nordic model, in isolation from the
others, is potentially highly dangerous. National labour law systems are just that
systems, in which the different parts interrelate in ways which are driven by
history and, quite often, by contingency. Taking parts of one system and trans-
planting them into others is as fraught with difficulty now as it always has been,
a danger which labour law scholars of an earlier generation noted well. 12
It is instructive to compare OMC-type learning with the model implied by
the floor of rights approach taken by ILO conventions and EU directives. Two
points stand out. First, the texts of conventions and directives are distillations of
the experience of many different national systems. They are, necessarily,
abstracted from the experience of any single system. This is not to deny that, on
occasion, one particular country has not provided a significant source of inspi-
ration for a given measure. But in general, these standards embody a collective
learning process, in respect of which many different national traditions make an
input. The second point is the floor of rights approach permits states consider-
able leeway in responding to the signals sent by the international standard. There
is a certain framing of permissible responses which, in principle, constitutes a
countervailing force to a costs-driven race to the bottom. But above the floor,
there is no question of there being a single right path for states.
Diversity of practice at national level is the precondition for learning, but
learning models based on benchmarking run the risk of undermining that diver-
sity. The ILO may well be making increasing use in future of such models. But
if that is the case, it is imperative that emphasis be given to preserving local
knowledge against centrifugal tendencies, as recent work on reviewing the ILOs
social security standards has sought to emphasise. 13
12
See O. Kahn-Freund, On uses and misuses of comparative law, Modern Law Review,
vol.37, 1972, pp.1-27.
13
See S. Deakin and M. Freedland, Updating international labour standards in the area of
social security: a framework for analysis, Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, vol.27,
2006, pp.151-166.
245
The ILO is not a State,
its members are not firms
Brian A. Langille *
I. The rise of global administrative law and global governance
Administrative law is enjoying something of a comeback these days. And

as with many current revivals of legal subject matters much of the impetus for
this revival comes from the globalization of what had hitherto been, in the
main and for most, a domestic inquiry. Equally important, this development has
been accompanied by a privileging of the word governance (as opposed to
government) in discussions of global administration. So we see journal arti-
cles with titles such as The Emergence of Global Administrative Law 1 and
Global Governance as Administration. 2 Much of this is reasonably new and
will remain controversial in academic circles as the debate is joined about the
ability of this combination of ideas to provide sufficient intellectual structure to
satisfy the demands placed upon any effort to articulate a compelling account or
grammar of what used to be called public law. 3 In addition to these difficult
issues of conceptual coherence there is the obvious normative task of overcom-
ing evident problems of democratic and legal legitimacy.
This theorizing about global administration is of great relevance to global
legal institutions, and in particular the ILO, which must, and does, continually
* Professor of Law, University of Toronto; Visiting Fellow, European University Institute.

1
See B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, R.B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 68, 2005, pp. 15-61.
2
See B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, R.B. Stewart, J.B. Weiner, Foreword: Global Governance
as Administration National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law, ibid.
See also A Global Administrative Law Bibliography, ibid., pp. 357-377.
3
See M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford University Press), 1992.
247
question its methodologies, modalities, and means of action as it seeks to effec-

tively advance its goals in these times of globalization. And the new global
administrative governance theoreticians are at the ILOs gate. 4
What should the ILO make of all of this? This is a very complex question
and at first blush these developments are rather disconcerting for the ILO as a
large and formal international agency, with a complex constitution which has at
its heart the creation of international treaties and complex legal mechanisms for
the supervision of their application. The main problem is that the new theoreti-
cal paradigm of global governance as administration is precisely articulated in
terms of disenchantment with, and the inadequacy of, such formal and central-
ized administrative institutions, the law they apply, their techniques of adjudi-
cation and enforcement, and so on. As long ago as 1997 David Kennedy
observed, concerning the emergence of the idea of governance as opposed to
government in international law circles:
By governance, I mean the project, common to public international lawyers for
generations, to build what seem to a particular generation the essential normative
or institutional conditions for international public order. For some international
lawyers this has primarily meant embroidering the doctrines of public international
law and supporting the institutions and incidence of international adjudication. For
some, the great public law institutions of the United Nations system and its pred-
ecessors, or of federal systems at the regional or global level, have seemed more
central. It is now fashionable in public international law circles to treat both these
normative and institutional projects as pass, in favour of what are thought the
more complex, more or less formalized bundles of rules, roles, and relationships
that define the interactions among governmental units and non-state actors alike in
a broader transnational civil society. It is with this latest set of scholars and prac-
titioners that governance has emerged as a distinctive motto for international
public order, consciously distinguished from government and consciously iden-
tified with the group of phenomena that are thought to define the late twentieth-
century international condition: globalization, interdependence, the demise of sov-
ereignty, the apparent futility of further United Nations institution building, and the
emergence of international civil society. These writers identify governance as a
new, distinct phenomenon: either a defining characteristic of the new world order
or a prescription for resolving its pragmatic challenges, or both. Governance in
this literature, as opposed to government, is the complex of more or less for-
malized bundles of rules, roles, and relationships that define the social practices of
state and non-state actors interacting in various issue areas, rather than formal inter-
state organizations with budgets and buildings and authority to apply rules and
impose sanctions. The term has been picked up by an increasing number of liberal
pragmatists in the mainstream of U.S. public international law, as a buzzword for
4
See A.C.L. Davies, Global Administrative Law at the International Labour Organization:
The Problem of Softer Standards (NYU Law School website, http://iilj.org/global_adlaw/
documents/DaviesPaper.pdf)
248
The ILO is not a State, its members are not firms
pragmatic international order, and as a clarion that will resurrect public interna-
tional law as the keystone of international order despite the apparent demise of the
project of United Nations institution building. 5
It does seem plausible to say that the popularity and the rise of the ideas of
governance, and that an expanded account of administration is required to
comprehend it, stem for many from the belief in (and resulting disenchantment
with) the diminishing role of the state and of international institutions caused by
a number of factors including those identified by Kennedy, above, including
globalization (especially the mobility of capital), the resulting diminishment of
sovereignty, the prevalence of conservative neo-liberal politics (ultimately result-
ing in what Harry Arthurs called globalization of the mind) 6, the rise of civil
society as a proffered alternative to formal state ordering, and so on. On the
other hand there are clearly those for whom these developments are welcomed
as liberating precisely because they limit the effectiveness of state intervention
in the natural order of things.
This disenchantment is, perhaps not surprisingly, felt especially keenly in
the United States and as a result some of the foundational writing about the new
global legal dispensation has been developed there. One of the truly breathtak-
ing and groundbreaking contributions to these recent efforts to re-imagine gov-
ernment and administration is to be found in Dorf and Sabels monumental law
review article A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism 7 in which they
offer, as a remedy for our current state of administrative affairs a new form of
government which at its core involves a complex and radical decentralization
of power away from our familiar, central, and formal legislative, administrative,
and adjudicative institutions and towards smaller sub-units of government, other
non-governmental social actors, and citizens engaged in constant experimenta-
tion and learning by monitoring. This in the name of recreating in the sphere of
politics the gains created in the world of firms through the Japanese-led revolu-
tion in corporate organization and processes. As goes the vertically integrated,
top down hierarchically managed, slow-to-react and reinvent firm, in a high
speed and just in time world, so goes government, administration, law, and
regulation as we have known them. It is a dramatic thesis and one which Pro-
fessor Sabel and others have taken to the doorstep, or at least the backdoor, of
the ILO by writing about how all of this is and should be happening in connec-
tion with labour standards. 8
A more recent contribution by Orly Lobel seeks to place the Dorf and Sabel
thesis in even a larger, if still American, context. It is a very useful point of depar-
5
See D. Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law, Utah Law Review, 1997, p. 545.
6
See H. Arthurs, Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of
Legal Fields, Canadian Journal of Law and Society, vol. 12, 1998, p. 219.
7
See M.C. Dorf and C.F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, Colum-
bia Law Review, vol. 98, 1998, pp. 267-473.
8
See, for example, A. Fung, D. ORourke, C.F. Sabel, Realizing Labor Standards, Boston
Review, Feb./March 2001.
249
ture for considering the relevance of all of this for the ILO. In The Renew Deal:
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 9 our author lets a number of cats out of the bag with her title which
nonetheless actually undersells the power and breadth of the central argument.
At its core is the idea that we are witnessing a paradigm shift to a new model
of law, a new legal regime. In the old days, that is the days of the New Deal,
law was national, top down, and sanctioned and gave us the large administrative
agencies such as the National Labour Relations Board with detailed law, adju-
dication, and jurisprudence. In our times of global competition, changing pat-
terns of market organization, and a declining commitment to direct government
intervention the renew deal supports the replacement of the New Deals hier-
archy and control with a more participatory and collaborative model while
highlighting the increasing significance of norm-generating nongovernmental
actors. 10 So law making shifts from command and control to a more reflexive
approach in which scaling up, facilitating innovation, standardization of good
practices, and the encouragement the replication of success stories 11 are pre-
ferred methodologies. The basic idea is that the original New Deal involved a
paradigm shift appropriate to its times and that we are now witnessing another
shift to another model which better melds with our contemporary circumstances.
In constructing this argument Lobel explicitly identifies Dorf and Sabels work
as one of the important threads in the complex theoretical tapestry of the
renew deal.
To this type of theorizing there has been a reasonably predictable set of
replies, especially from those on the left who are not quite so willing to write the
obituary of the state, public law, and public administration as we have known
them and who do not see, at least yet, the circumstances in which the lion will
lie down with the lamb in a world in which familiar forms of legal constraint
upon the exercise of power and self interest are to be diluted, disabled, and dis-
respected. So, for example, William Scheuerman responds to these brave new
ideas, and in particular to Dorf and Sabel, by noting that their creative and intel-
lectually noteworthy programmatic undertaking is flawed because it exhibits
an unjustifiably overstated enmity towards certain traditional liberal democratic
achievements, including the rule of law and uniform central legislation 12 lead-
ing to a proposal in which the traditional idea of the rule of law as requiring
stable, general, and relatively clear norms is unceremoniously dumped. 13
9
See O. Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, Minnesota Law Review, vol. 84, 2004, pp. 342-470.
10
Ibid at p. 345.
11
Ibid.
12
See W.E. Scheuerman, Democratic Experimentation or Capitalist Synchronization?,
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 17, 2004 at p. 102.
13
Ibid. at p. 122.
250
II. The apparent ILO parallel
My interest in these debates flows from their apparent parallel to another

debate one explicitly about the ILO. I refer in particular to claims made by
Philip Alston in his Core Labour Standards and the Transformation of the Inter-
national Labour Rights Regime, 14 to which I responded in Core labour Rights
The True Story. 15 The apparent parallel and I use the word apparent care-
fully is as follows. The central thrust of Alstons critique is that recent devel-
opments in the international labour law regime, especially the ILO Declaration
of 1998, undermine the hard-fought-for ILO legal results in the from of the
international labour code with its detailed laws, the large legal supervisory
machinery, resulting complex jurisprudence and efforts at enforcement. This is
achieved by the Declarations focus on a set of principles articulated at a general
level and its reliance on soft promotional techniques. This represents exactly the
sort of shift away from hard legal enforcement to some sort of soft governance
approach advocated by the new global administrative theorists. In short, Alston
can be seen in the role of Scheuerman. He is a defender of the rule of law virtues
rules (clear, detailed and generally applicable legislation, adjudication by inde-
pendent legal authorities, the elaboration of a coherent jurisprudence over time,
and enforcement of resulting judgements) against a modern tendency in favour
of uncertain norms, the abandonment of authoritative adjudicative processes and
their jurisprudence, and the dismissal of the idea of enforcement. The other
obvious dimension of the parallel is that the defenders of the ILO Declaration,
on the other hand, can be and are easily seen to precisely occupy the renew
deal territory which Lobel celebrates. One debate seems to map perfectly on
the other.
III. An important distinction
It is the apparentness of this parallel which I believe deserves scrutiny.

The point of this essay is that the drawing of such a parallel obscures a very
important distinction mentioned in my title the distinction between states and
firms. In my view this distinction cannot be overlooked and no matter how the
debates about governance and government work out, at either the domestic
or international level, this distinction still does and must do its own work. In
what follows I try to clarify this point.
My views about the appropriateness of the Declarations methodologies,
and its possibilities as a model for further ILO reform, flow from my view that
14
See P. Alston Core Labour Standards and the Transformation of the International Labour
Rights Regime, European Journal of International Law, vol. 15, 2004, pp. 457-521.
15
See B.A. Langille, Core labour Rights The True Story, European Journal of Inter-
national Law, vol. 16, 2005, pp. 409-437. See also F. Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat: The
Real Potential of the 1998 ILO Declaration for the Universal Protection of Workers Rights, ibid.,
pp. 439-465.
251
it is time to rethink the basic purposes of ILO law. Neitszche said that the most
common form of stupidity lies in forgetting what it is you are trying to do. The
question why comes first. Questions of who, what, where, when, and how,
follow.
In my view, there has long been prevalent in debates about the ILO what I
see as a negative rationale for the existence of the ILO and ILO law. On this
long-standing and familiar account their role is to prevent Member States from
pursuing their economic self-interest which, left unchecked, will lead a race to
the bottom in labour standards. This account of the ILOs purposes flows from
a standard account of the purposes of domestic labour law which is, in short, that
there is a trade-off between justice and efficiency and that labour law is a set of
constraints upon market activity, i.e. a tax which we ought to be willing to pay
in the name of fairness, workplace citizenship, and so on. This rationale makes
inevitable a race to the bottom dilemma for nation states as they discover it is
difficult to maintain optimal tax rates in the face of mobile capital. It is in the
self-interest of all States to enter the race (that is the tragic point about such
races). It is the role of the ILO to forestall this race to the bottom by propound-
ing enforceable and binding international agreements (ILO Conventions) which
commit Member States to respecting certain minima below which there will be
no such tax cuts. On this rationale the model of ILO law one requires is a model
appropriate to constraining self-interest, i.e. one like the criminal law, where one
spells out specific norms, puts in place an independent adjudicative mechanism,
and provides for enforcement of the resulting judgments with appropriate sanc-
tions which make the cost of non-compliance higher than that of compliance.
This is simply what is required to prevent races to the bottom. From a certain
account of ILO purposes one gets a certain model of ILO law appropriate to
those purposes, a certain view of the role of the Committee of Experts, its con-
figuration and so on.
My critique of Alston is not that, given this understanding of the role of the
ILO (prevention of races to the bottom), we must revise our regulatory tech-
niques along the lines of the Declaration. Far from it. The whole idea is that
Alstons views about ILO law and enforcement are understandable given his
account of what they are for. I expressed no opinion on alternative regulatory
techniques appropriate to ILO purposes so conceived. My point was more basic
and, as a result, finesses this debate. My point was that our standard rationale for
the ILO, set out above, is implausible and inadequate. The key point remains that
there is a grammatical link between purpose and processes used to advance those
purposes. If our purposes require reassessment so must our methodologies for
advancing them.
My account of the purpose of the ILO is an account which says that it is
not in the self-interest of States to lower labour standards. There is no race to the
bottom. It is not the job of the ILO to prevent members pursuing their rational
economic self-interest. The model of law appropriate to that end (and the famil-
iar model is the criminal law one I just mentioned, but whatever it is) is not,
cannot rationally be, appropriate to a radically different purpose. That radically
252
different purpose is the following: to assist States in identifying their self-inter-

est and in achieving it. The model of law appropriate to this end must be pow-
erfully different than that appropriate to the constraining self-interest. The duty
imposing model of law generally thought to be appropriate to constraining self-
interest (and the rule law requirements associated with it) require clear, know-
able-in-advance rules, independent adjudication of compliance, and effective
enforcement. That is what critics of the Declaration believe we need, think we
had, charge that the Declaration took away or at least undermines, and want
back. But if the role of the ILO is not to prevent Member States form acting in
their self interest, but rather to assist them in seeing it in the first place and then
helping them achieve it, then a different style of law, and a different set of legal
virtues and requirements, are brought into play. The game shifts from a duty
imposing to an educational, capacity building, and power conferring one. Edu-
cation, financial and technical assistance, best practices, benchmarking, contin-
uous learning, and so on, all become of great concern. Enforcement becomes
an odd word in this context. Sanctions even more so. It is at this point that the
desire to draw the Alston/government and Langille/governance parallel seems
irresistible. But to do so would be in my view a mistake a mistake which over-
looks a very important distinction between ILO law and other law.
At the heart of my claim is a point so obvious that it is rarely explicitly
mentioned and can easily be overlooked. That point is that ILO law is, in gen-
eral, addressed to states. It is not addresses to firms, or workers, or consumers,
or citizens. Why is this of significance? The simple answer is that states are not
firms. Here is a very brief explanation of this point. I am quite certain that Cana-
dian workers still need law to protect them. They need, to take just one example,
effective protection of their right to organize. At the moment, this is achieved
through labour relations boards which are independent statutory administrative
institutions, equipped with explicit unfair labour practice laws, effective adjudi-
cation processes, and real hard enforcement measures all in place to deal with
powerful employers who deny workers their right to freely associate and bargain
collectively. And so on. This is not a world in which the lion will lie down with
the lamb, at least not yet, even in Canada. And, perhaps unlike in the United
States, this Canadian legal regime still, essentially, works. Any argument to
change it would require careful scrutiny. 16 It may well be not in the interest of
private firms (maximizing shareholder value) to respect labour rights. It seems
that it is not for some percentage of firms. But it is an entirely different question
whether it is in the interest of the State as a whole to ensure a general compli-
ance with labour laws. It turns out that it is.
One small way, among many, of putting this point is that without the still
large gap between government and private market activity there would be no
16
This is not to say that I am averse to finding new ways of making the protection of worker
rights more effective. My point here is that my argument for embracing of ILO reform is a much
easier and more basic argument which is not and does not need to be directly involved in these more
general debates about governance as opposed to government. The main set of worries that all agree
are appropriate there, simply do not materialize here.
253
space for the theory of public goods to do its work. Another small way of put-
ting this large point is that while the evidence shows that firms invest in coun-
tries which respect core labour rights, the idea of a free lunch (or ride) is pre-
dictably hard for private firms to resist. So, Toyota invests in Canada, rather than
in the southern United States, in part because of the existence of a public health
care system in which health care costs come out of general but higher taxes, and
not payroll, providing a competitive advantage for Canada. 17 It is not necessar-
ily in the interest or capability of the market or any individual firm to provide
such a system. Firms would, in their self-interest, prefer to not pay the taxes to
support such a system. They would prefer a free lunch to a paid one. But they
still need the lunch. That is what States are for. What is in their self-interest is
different from what is in any firms self-interest. A State is not a firm.
So, here is another way of making the point I tried to make in my critique
of Alston. 18 If States were firms I would agree with his worries about a shift away
from enforcement and so on just as I would worry about such a shift in the law
in Canada. Any such shift would have to be carefully examined for important
babies disappearing along with familiar bathwater. But States are not firms.
Their self-interest lies elsewhere. And a style of law appropriate to firms is irrel-
evant to (most recall Myanmar) States. Here is a new way of putting my cri-
tique of existing ILO law and practice, Alstons defence of them, and his critique
of the Declaration; they make the mistake of treating ILO Members as if they
were firms and the ILO as if it were a State. They are not.
IV. A better view of the ILO and the debate about global
administrative governance
To return to global administrative governance the point is that the distinc-

tion between States making laws for firms and the ILO making laws for States
is of great importance. Of course there is much more going on in the world of
international labour law than ILO law making. Much of what the new theorists
are writing about has obvious and important relevance to the real and complete
world of international labour rights. As is well known there are complex efforts
to regulate firms directly by non-state actors, using private incentive and sanc-
tioning, often market based, and so on. And it is the case that the ILO itself is
directly involved in these other sorts of initiatives in many ways the Guidelines
for Multinational Corporations, to take one example. And it may even be said to
be that case that not all ILO conventions are primarily aimed at States. The new
Maritime Labour Convention, for example, is really a form of direct regulation
of an industry, negotiated by its key players, and resembling a global collective
17
See P. Krugman, Toyota, Moving Northward, New York Times, 25 July 2005.
18
See also B.A. Langille, What Is International Labour Law for?, International Institute
for Labour Studies, ILO, March 2005, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/
inst/edu/publecs.htm
254
agreement as much as a convention addressed to Member States. Here, in my

view, the model of detailed law and hard enforcement are correctly deployed,
albeit in a way and following processes of negotiation in which the new admin-
istrative governance theorists will find much satisfaction, for the objects of its
attention are in reality not states but indeed (a large collection of) firms more
effectively dealt with centrally than through national laws. But the ILO Consti-
tution, as I read it, is in general aimed at making conventions which are aimed
at States. Here we require, as I have said, a different model of law.
The point is that there is much to be said for the welcome emergence of a
more complex approach to global administrative governance and it has a diffi-
cult but important set of tasks to tackle first mapping and making sense of, 19
and then establishing standards of legitimacy for, 20 of these new constellations
of actors and forms of norm creation. But it is also critical that we be clear about
when and where we have to worry about abandonment or alteration of traditional
rule of law virtues (clear rules, adjudication, and enforcement) and when and
where we do not. My point is that with a better understanding of ILO purposes
in place we will see that much of the concern expressed about the direction of
the ILO (or much of the ILO law created under the old understanding) is impor-
tantly wrong-headed. This, however, merely removes ILO mainstream lawmak-
ing, properly understood, from one line of fire in the current debates about how
to make this part of our world a better one. It leaves lots of scope, on the other
hand, for the requirement of the evolution of a rigorous theory of global admin-
istrative governance.
The significance of all of this for current ILO practices, including the role
and nature of the Committee of Experts is, I believe, large. If these ideas are
taken seriously and it turns out that we can defend a new purpose for much ILO
lawmaking, then the question of what the Committee of Experts will become,
what its role will be understood to be, what kind of experts they will be, what
kind of law it will be asked to supervise, and so on, will be questions of central
importance. We can only imagine the answers. To those writing 80 years from
now will fall the task of explaining whether these questions were addressed and,
if they were, how these questions were answered. But it is surely the duty of
those writing now to pose them.
19
See, for example, D.M. Trubek and L.G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regula-
tion: Complementarity, Rivalry, or Transformation, Wisconsin Law School Legal Studies Research
Paper Series No. 1022, June 2006.
20
See, for example, A. Buchanan and R.O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Gover-
nance Institutions, Paper presented at the Princeton Centre for Globalization and Governance, Feb.
2006 (unpublished available at http://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/normative/
index.html).
255
Rolling Rule labor standards: Why their time
has come, and why we should be glad of it
Charles F. Sabel*
I. Introduction
Current debates about the role of ILO labor standards notably the acri-
monious dispute regarding the utility of condensing many of the ILOs tradi-
tional and highly specialized conventions into five broad core standards are
part of a vast, often tormented reconsideration of what kind of regulatory regime
will today best protect the interests of working people, in the developing coun-
tries no less than the rich ones, in the informal sector as well as in formal
employment, and regardless of gender and race. Collective bargaining was
viewed from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of this one as the chief
instrument of defending those rights (at least those of them that comported well
with the assumption of the male factory worker as the typical breadwinner in
need of protection). It is everywhere under threat: from legislation mandating
rules concerning pensions, on-the-job discrimination and many other domains
that were, or might once have been expected to become topics of collective bar-
gaining; from private labor standards, elaborated by NGOs and transnational
corporations, governing labor conditions along global supply chains in several
industries; from company participation and incentive schemes that are more
appealing, especially to highly qualified workers, than traditional union arrange-
ments; and (resulting from and contributing to all this) from the slow erosion and
disorganization of domestic law in the advanced countries whose labor regimes
once served as models to the world. Similarly, tripartite or neo-corporatist gov-
ernance at the national level collective bargaining writ large is everywhere
strained, has frequently come undone, and is no longer emulated by countries
which once strove to do so.
* Professor of Law and Social Science, Columbia Law School.
257
Discussion is short circuited when these manifest changes are ascribed to

the disruptions of globalization and the increase in managements power asso-
ciated with it. Globalization is certainly disruptive; management has gained
power through continuing reorganizing occasioned by the disruption. But it is
also true that globalization and reorganization have led to increased decentral-
ization within large firms, and often from them to their suppliers at various levels
in the supply chain worldwide. Surely the extremely limited ability of unions
rooted in collective bargaining to use this re-distribution of power from the top
down to reconstitute themselves, or at least offset some the consequences of dis-
ruption on traditional prerogatives, suggests something more: part of the labors
problem of responding to changed circumstances is the strategy of response -
and so at bottom the assumptions about what constitutes an effective labor
regime - rather than the changed circumstances themselves.
This paper pursues this suggestion. The core idea is simply that regulation,
to be effective, must correspond or mesh with the forms of cooperation whose
effects it corrects in the public interest. When, as now, the forms of cooperation
change, so do the forms of effective regulation. At the ILO and elsewhere we
need to discuss not how to improve the regime we have by shifting, or not, to
standards or international human rights law but, instead, whether we have the
right kind of regime at all. To consider alternative regimes in turn requires
rethinking, or at least contemplating the prospect of rethinking the core concepts
such as compliance definitive of each.
To situate the argument, therefore, Part 2 looks very briefly at three ideas
of compliance, each associated with a distinct area of law, and Part 3 shows how
the contractual concept of compliance, in two variants, became central to the
labor regime of the last century. Part 4 looks at the breakdown of the contractu-
alist regulatory regime at the workplace. Part 5 considers the breakdown of con-
tractualism in its home precincts: private contracting in relations between co-
operating firms. A first argument here is that the generality of the failure points
to a very general cause indeed: not a shift in workplace relations, but a transfor-
mation in the conditions of cooperation out of which contracting or the regu-
lation of on-going exchange arises. A second one is that, discernible amidst the
ruins of the old regime are the lineaments of a new, experimentalist one. In this
regime learning from (by solving problems with) partners is inextricably con-
nected with monitoring their performance, and the requirements of compliance
the very meaning of term are defined for the parties in that process itself. Put
another way, in this regime do enter contracts with agents in which the latter are
incentivized faithfully to realize the plants of the former. Rather, in the course
of executing projects principals learn from agents, and vice versa, blurring
the distinction between the two, but in which that heighten their mutual account-
ability. Part 6 interrupts the development of the argument to respond to the rea-
sonable objection that however sweeping this transformation may be, the last
place it will ever reach are lower reaches the international supply chains that
define the current globalization, and most especially, China. Part 7 concludes
where, in my view, the coming round of debate should start: with the recogni-
258
Rolling Rule labor standards
tion that many global brands, such as Nike and Addidas-Salomon, private inter-
national code makers like the Fair Labor Association, some unions (at least at
the regional level) in countries such as Germany and Denmark and, not least the
ILO in its Maritime Labour Convention and health and safety standard have
already reckonized this shift in the conditions of co-operation and have taken
important, but partial steps to address them. One shorthand for this, recogniza-
ble to compliance mangers working for some of the global brands, but also
workers and production engineers in many sectors world wide, is going lean
on compliance. By the time you hear that phrase again, it should be clear that
there is reason to believe its time has come.
II. Three Ideas of Compliance
Take first contractual compliance, or contract, in which parties exchange

promises and commit themselves to execute the terms of their agreement.
Breaches of the agreement are typically sanctioned by money damages. Because
contracting parties are presumed to know their situations and interests well oth-
erwise they would not enter agreements with each other it is also presumed
that the contracts between them will be richly detailed with respect to the par-
ticulars of their situation. Because contracting is incessant it pulses with the
market the contexts or domains within which specific agreements are struck
are likely to be familiar to courts or other specialized adjudicators, and these
latter can supply default terms to fill gaps individual agreements as the parties
would have filled them given sufficient time and resources to do so. Between the
default rules and the parties specialized terms, therefore, contracts are thought
to come as close as any legal instrument can to specifying the parties obligations,
and thereby guiding as much as law can the determination of non-compliance or
breach. Transacting parties enter contracts precisely because they can subject
themselves to a law suited to their circumstances.
A second idea of compliance derives from criminal law. Call it obligatory
compliance: Criminal law prohibits certain acts, and we are obligated to respect
those prohibitions as a condition of participation in the society that imposes
them. If we dont we lose our freedom, in jail.
A third idea of compliance imposes a duty to act reasonably or responsi-
bly in complex situation. This is the idea of compliance associated with tort law.
If we are negligent in the duty to be reasonably careful in avoiding harm to others
in the products we design, the food we process, or the medical services we pro-
vide then we are liable in tort, not just for money damages equal to the harm
caused, but for punitive fines meant both to correct the injustice we have com-
mitted, and to deter others from negligence in similar situations. Tort law thus
has a regulatory as well as a corrective function.
It is often said that contract law, as the law of the market, is fundamentally
different from tort and criminal law as, respectively, the societal law of regula-
tory duties and unconditional social obligations. These distinctions are, of
259
course, easily confounded. Contract law is entangled in social norms, or embed-

ded in society contracts with (socially) unconscionable terms are invalid.
Commercial contracts are traditionally read, under the United States Commer-
cial Code, in the context of the norms of the industries to which they apply. Con-
versely, the actual application of sanctions under criminal and tort law often
resembles in practice the kind of negotiation of damages associated with con-
tract claims (pleas bargaining between prosecutors and accused in US criminal
cases; creation of administrative grids fixing awards for various classes of
harms in US mass tort cases, and so on).
More important, for present purposes, is the distinction between contract
and tort liability or its obverse, compliance. The former is defined by rules: the
exact content of the promises exchanged by the contracting parties. The latter is
defined with reference to extremely open-ended standards: the designer of a
product is only then not liable for damages caused by design defects if she was
as diligent in anticipating and eliminating those defects as a designer of such
products can reasonably expected to be. To determine what reasonable expecta-
tions of diligence require in the case of a particular defect, the court determines
whether the designer, beyond meeting regulatory requirements, took such pre-
cautions as her peers currently do, or as special information available to her
alone would have likely prompted them to take. Put another way, to comply with
the tort duty to avoid harm through negligence it is insufficient merely to abide
by the current rules specifying acceptable behavior. Rather the duty is, to use
language to be developed in a bit, to anticipate and mitigate risks to the extent
and by the means currently possible.
III. Labor Law as Contract
Labor law was, for most of the last century, a genus of the contract law
family. It came in two species. The first and perhaps most salient was of course
collective bargaining. The state set terms on the parties capital and labor with
the aim of ensuring that their bargains were public regarding. At the limit,
reached in such neo-corporatist arrangements as those prevailing in, say, Austria
in the 1980s (and foreseen by Carl Schmitt in the 1920s) collective bargaining
and the parties to it became the state but this was legitimated (to the extent that
it was, given what came to be seen as the unacceptable exclusion of essentially
everyone but the traditional bread winner and his employer from the negotiating
table) by the conviction that such contracting defined the public good.
The second species was administrative or regulatory: state agencies estab-
lished rules for governing workplace conditions setting terms for compensat-
ing workers for workplace injuries, for establishing pensions systems and unem-
ployment insurance, for reducing health and safety hazards, and proceeding to
protection and racial, gender and other forms of discrimination. Such regulation
of the workplace was contractual in the superficial sense that the dense web of
rules that it produced had the look and feel of the rules produced by successive
260
revisions of collective bargaining agreements. It was contractual in the deeper

sense that in practice the state, in writing regulations in consultation with the
workplace actors, helped the latter overcome prisoners dilemmas and other
familiar collective action problems to impose on themselves, through the rules,
terms they would have agreed were they not hostage to limited, self-defeating
calculations of self interest. If its a useful exaggeration to say that in collective
bargaining the state sets the stage for the labor market parties to write the rules
for themselves that an ideal administration would have written for them, then its
an equally useful exaggeration to say that in regulation the parties make use of
the administration to write the rules they would have bargained under other cir-
cumstances. The continuity between these two contractualist modes of setting
workplace conditions is demonstrated with particular clarity by the French and
other labor law regimes with labor inspectorates that can generalize collective
bargaining agreements and enforce regulatory codes.
This classic form of labor regulation was, of course, rooted (or, in the lan-
guage of Polanyi in which these matters are often discussed, embedded) in the
social or economic conditions of particular epoch the rise of mass production
industry at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Its worth evok-
ing this epochal connection briefly to provide a point of reference for the vast
changes that have occurred since. Once the extraordinary economies of scale
afforded by mass production by means of specialized machines and workers
with correspondingly specialized skills were well established, reformers could
plausibly argue that capital and labor were so manifestly dependent on each
other in the large factory, and society so dependent on their cooperation, that col-
lective bargaining was not just the right but also the obligation of the parties.
Similarly, the prohibition of forms of competition and workplace organization
based on low wages and the minimum possible investment in plant and equip-
ment sweating was good for society and good for workers. Good for the
former because it led to more efficient use of resources; good for the latter
because it penalized the spread of workplace settings that invited, indeed com-
pelled abuse of labor, in favor of settings the large factory where capital
gained from minimal respect for labor standards (the rational for collective bar-
gaining). The ILO was created in the aftermath and spirit of the anti-sweating
campaigns of the World War One period.
IV. The Breakdown of the Labor Law Regime
I put discussion of the contractualist mode of labor regulation in the past

tense because it is, for all practical purposes, history. It has broken down, or is
rapidly crumbling, in such diverse settings in Germany as well as the US; in
automobiles as well as garments and textiles that insofar as it continues to
exist, it is a historical legacy (with all the costs that outlived bequests continue
to have for the living), not the vital, institutional embodiment of the values once
261
and still associated with it. Among the countless examples of this breakdown
let me select just three of particular relevance to the subsequent discussion.
The first is the endless search for a reconciliation between German work-
place collective bargaining (Mitbestimmung) and the forms of continuous work-
place re-organization associated with the Toyota production system and all the
innovations inspired by it. Very crudely, the tension is that Mitbestimmung, like
all forms of collective bargaining, assumes that the workers representative will
periodically bargain away a (now) unworkable rule, in return for a substitute that
respects workers interests. In the continuous reorganization of the new produc-
tion systems, the workers (typically in collaboration with managers and techni-
cians) are themselves involved in devising new procedures, and changes occur
so rapidly and fluidly that it is impossible to bargain them through one revision
at a time. We will return below to the distinction between systems that aim to
conserve as much of the existing rule structure as possible in solving problems
(such as collective bargaining) and those that treat (almost all) rules and provi-
sional, and re-write them as equitable problem solving requires. Here the key
point is just the viscosity of traditional collective bargaining in the face of a sig-
nificant and persistent change in environment: The German Metalworkers Union
and auto industry, particularly VW, has been trying to reconcile flexibility with
contractual control through collective bargaining for 25 years. Since they have
done on much recent evidence far better at this than many of their competitors,
the continuing struggle is surely a sign that there is a deep tension between the
demands of productive efficiency under current conditions and traditional forms
of protecting labor standards. 1
A second indicator of the crisis of the contractualist labor regulation is the
success of the currently much admired Danish flexicurity model. The core of the
model and you will look in vain in Denmark or elsewhere for accounts that go
much beyond the assertion of this core is that workers allow employers a nearly
free hand in creating, abolishing and re-organizing jobs in return for access to
(and financial support for pursuing) continuing training programs of such qual-
ity that workers who complete them have their pick of engaging, well paid jobs.
Employers, correspondingly, have to upgrade their jobs they offer in order to
retain current workers and attract capable replacements. The result is what every-
one wants, i.e. a high skill, low-unemployment economy that is highly resilient
to market changes because it is highly flexible, quickly abolishing jobs that are
no longer needed and creating (quickly filled) ones that are. For present purposes
the interest of this success story is in what it does not contain; although unions
play an important role in the Danish labor market, especially with regard to con-
tinuing education, they do not bargain over the job definitions, or (certain for-
malities aside) over the creation or destruction of jobs at the workplace in the
1
The question mark in the subtitle of an excellent recent book on progress towards this goal
says as much; see Michael Schumann, Martin Kuhlmann, Frauke Sanders, Hans Joachim Sperling
(eds.), Auto 5000: Ein neues Produktionskonzept Die deutsche Antwort auf den Toyota-Weg?,
Hamburg, 2006.
262
manner of contractualist unions. Though the comparison is by itself hardly

conclusive, the Danes success in regulating the labor market without the usual
devices of collective bargaining and the associated regulation of employment
protection together with the Germans persistent difficulties in making collec-
tive bargaining work under current conditions re-enforce our strong suspicion
that the contractualist model of labor regulation is out of joint with the times.
The third example of the breakdown of the contractualist regime in labor
concerns the failures of international codes of conduct regulating labor condi-
tions in multinational firms, particularly, the garment and sport shoe industries.
A reasonable response to the difficulties of traditional labor law in the domestic
settings of the US or other OECD countries was to argue that the problem lay
not in the nature of the regulatory regime, but rather in the newfound ability of
multinational corporations to escape its reach first and foremost through the
globalization of production to suppliers in distant, unregulated jurisdictions. But
this response is unconvincing in light of the recent experience of corporations
such as Nike. Largely out of concern that the sometimes scandalous behavior of
its suppliers could devastate its reputation, Nike, like many other prominent
brands in fashion-sensitive industries, imposed on itself and its suppliers a strict
code of conduct regarding labor standards, and organized an internal inspec-
torate to assure compliance with its terms. Whatever its shortcomings, there is
no doubt that as regards regulation of the work week, payment of and limitation
on overtime, insistence on respectful, non-discriminatory treatment of the work-
force and the like, the code mirrors provisions common in developed countries.
Nor is there any doubt that the inspectorate makes a determined and good faith
effort to enforce its terms, visiting factories subject to it more frequently, and
examining them more thoroughly, than the (now understaffed and underpaid)
labor inspectorates in advanced countries would typically survey like facilities
within their own jurisdictions. 2 A review of Nikes own reports on suppliers
response to periodic review shows the inspections to be, at best, ineffective: find-
ings of non-compliance in one period do not lead to improvements in labor con-
ditions in subsequent ones. The inspectorate system is costly; its very existence
constitutes an acknowledgement by Nike of responsibility (shading into liabil-
ity) for labor conditions in the suppliers. It is hard, therefore, to view the system
as a fig leaf, and easy to understand Nikes apparent frustration at its failure. The
corporation is doing, after all, just what its critics demanded of it applying the
contractualist tradition of labor regulation and rule-based compliance. Surely
this is as fair a test of the viability of that tradition under conditions of global-
ization can reasonably be expected; and the result strengthens, from a transna-
tional viewpoint, the concerns nourished by diverse, domestic experience.
2
Efforts to enforce labor codes in the advanced countries are typically dismissed with
remarks such as the following: The system of monitoring and enforcing compliance with federal
and state labor and employment laws in the US is broken; see Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Orga-
nizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 2006 (ILR/Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY),
p. 264.
263
V. The Breakdown of Contractualism in General
The examples so far are consistent with idea often implicit in discussions
of labor standards that the problems of traditional or contractualist regulation
are specific to, or particularly acute in the workplace: the result of changes in the
organization of heavy industry, or the shift to services or high-tech, or of all of
these combining with globalization to shift power in favor of capital or other-
wise undermine existing arrangements. But a glance at the vast literature on
administrative changes in other domains food safety, reporting in financial
markets, air and maritime safety, operation of energy and telecommunications
networks, and many more compels the conclusion that the crisis of labor reg-
ulation is part an especially acute part of a broader crisis of the contractual-
ist model of regulation. Ill limit the survey of a broad discussion to four salient
aspects:
First, command and control regulation in which a hierarchical superior
(usually a state authority) writes detailed, stable rules to govern action within a
particular domain is today unworkable in almost all domains. The regulated
activity changes too rapidly for the regulator to write rules governing it. More
precisely, change is so rapid in relation to rule writing capacity that the rules on
the books quickly become simply irrelevant to the primary actors, or are easily
gamed by them to simulate compliance.
Second, in response to the breakdown of command and control or tradi-
tional regulation, administration is becoming networked or multi-level. Dif-
ferences of nomenclature aside, the common feature of these alternative regula-
tory systems is to blur precisely the distinction between rule conception (or
definition) and rule execution (or application) that command and control empha-
sizes. This they do by an institutional architecture or decision making process
that focuses on the definition and subsequent elaboration of framework goals. A
notionally super-ordinate (Federal) authority, frequently in networked con-
sultation with notionally subordinate entities (the States, Provinces or
Regions) sets an open-ended goal (e.g. clean water, safe food, schools pro-
viding an adequate education, reasonable accommodation for persons with
handicaps) and provisional definitions of minimally acceptable performance
levels and measures for gauging progress towards the goal. The subordinates
report regularly on their performance, and, together with Federal authorities,
periodically revise goals, minimal acceptable performance levels, and perform-
ance metrics in the light of their pooled experience. Such experimentalist or
rolling-rule regulation is pervasive in the European Union, although it is natu-
rally more fully developed in some domains than others. But administration on
these lines is also evident in the US, for example, in education and child-pro-
tective services. Through recursive revision this kind of regulation plainly blurs
the distinction between rule-based and standard-based compliance associated
historically with contract and tort: in each period the standard is in effect applied
in different rules in different, inferior jurisdictions, and then reinterpreted to
incorporate generalizations that emerge from joint evaluation of the varying
264
applications. The standard reshapes the rules and the rules reshape the standard.
Another variant of this kind of regime, spreading in human service administra-
tions in areas such as child welfare and mental health in the US, is the quality
service review, or QSR. In QSRs, the regulatory center regularly reviews a ran-
domly drawn sample of cases in the lower level jurisdictions. The case record
is supplemented by interviews with a wide range of stakeholders the client and
her family, the therapists, the case worker, the school counselor to determine
whether the diagnosis and the resulting individual service plan were reliable,
whether the services indicated where actually provided and of high quality, and
whether the service plan was revised if necessary. Like the first variant, this kind
of quality review helps detect and correct misjudgments by individuals, flaws in
administrative practice and ambiguities or omissions in the high level specifica-
tion of agency goals.
As the reference to the EU was intended to suggest, the emergence of the
new, experimentalist forms of regulation is not limited to domestic or municipal
law. On the contrary, transnational settings, such as the EU and the WTO, seem
if anything especially propitious to the emergence of the new regulatory model.
One reasons for this is that no incumbent sovereign, accustomed to the prerog-
atives of Westphalian sovereignty the fons et origo of command and control
to oppose the fragile pretensions of the new forms of governance. A corollary to
this is the need, in transnational space, to harmonize many different bodies of
domestic law. Agreement on high-level principal and continuous adjustment in
the light of experience whose import is unpredictable and is therefore unlikely
to systematically favor one national solution over others proves in practice to
be a practical and politically effective means of reaching this end. A leading
example of the spread of what has been called anomalous administrative law
where the anomaly is precisely the deviation from the command and control
assumptions underpinning the traditional law of the administrative state is the
Codex Alimentarius, which though the SPS agreement incorporated into the
WTO plays a key role in setting standards for food safety in world trade.
Third, and more controversially, as the reference to reasonable accommo-
dation was intended to suggest, the new methods of regulations are not limited
to apparently technical matters such as food or aviation safety. They can be, and
are being, applied to the articulation and vindication of rights as well. Here too
leading examples are from the EU, especially with regard to rights against dis-
crimination at the workplace, or on the basis of gender, age, or ethnicity. But the
application of experimentalist or rolling rule methods to rights is only incipient.
It is much less developed than in other domains and remains, partly for that very
reason controversial. Indeed many rights advocates believe that any attempt to
build a rolling rule regime in the domain of rights is self defeating, as rights, in
their view, must be articulated as stable, sharp-edged rules if they are to be effec-
tive at all.
The most comprehensive and fundamental indication of the crisis of the
contractualist model, and the emergence of an alternative, is, finally, a transfor-
mation in the character of contractual relations among firms themselves, and
265
more specifically a deep change in the nature of long-term or relational con-

tracts. The canonical relational contract was a agreement between a coal-fired
electric power station optimized for coal of certain composition, and a nearby
mine producing coal of just that type. As the power station was dependent on the
mine and vice versa, neither party would invest without an assurance from the
other that the relation would continue despite variations in the cost of labor or
of transport at least as long as necessary for both parties to amortize their
investment. The relational contract provided that assurance, binding the parties
to buy and sell to each other for the necessary term of years, and establishing
formulas for sharing the burdens caused by fluctuations in the price of their
respective inputs. Such agreements still exist. But agreements between cus-
tomers and suppliers are today much more likely to be open-ended in the sense
of anticipating the co-development by both parties of the next generations of
product, and establishing a governance committee (with equal representation
from both parties) to determine which of the potential projects that emerge from
collaboration should actually be pursued. In the canonical case, decisions are by
consensus. In case of disagreement, the dispute is reviewed by (a committee of)
the hierarchical superiors of the deadlocked governance committee. Presumably,
no one on either side of the governance committee wants to jeopardize his/her
career by raising an objection that is overruled at the next level; and in any case
the members of the governance committee, who presumably believe deeply in
the project, will always be inclined to think that more time and money will solve
current problems. This creates powerful incentives to minimize obstacles. But
the consensus rule means that any participant, by raising a strong objection can
place the evidentiary burden on the others to demonstrate the feasibility of the
project. So the incentive to proceed is balanced by a device that makes it easy to
question the advisability of doing so, allowing doubters to express concerns in a
form that leads to deliberate investigation, not horse trading.
The upshot is that where the traditional relational contract established rules
to govern the relation, the new relational contract establishes framework goals
and a governance mechanism for periodically evaluating emergent, alternative
interpretations of it. Where the old regime contractualized regulation, the emer-
gent one apparently regulates contract by experimentalist or rolling rule means.
Another way to think about the new relational contract is as a formalization
flexible and corrigible of the traditional tort obligation to act reasonably or
responsibly in complex situation. But here is not the place to explore that limb
of the argument.
In the shift from relatively rigid, rule-based exchange to fluid co-develop-
ment we have, at last, a plausible candidate for the efficient or proximate cause
of widespread distress of contractual regulation and the emergence of networked
or experimentalist alternatives (the causes behind this cause are of course a dif-
ferent question entirely). Beyond that, the close connection between changes in
the form of contract and changes in the form of regulation suggest that we have
in this nexus a starting point for rethinking labor regulation: the diffusions of
new forms of collaborating within and among firms. But before turning to that
266
task we have to address the obvious and reasonable objection that, even if the
breakdown of contractualist regulation is not limited to the world of work, and
even if changes in contracting among firms are somehow implicated in it, the
actual organization of production on a global scale not only does not encourage
collaboration in general and co-development between customers and suppliers
in particular but rather maintains developing economies and thus in effect the
industrial workforce of tomorrow if not already today as the subordinate instru-
ments of advanced country design.
VI. Transformation of Global Supply Chains
The current globalization of production is often said to perpetuate, perhaps

in a new form, the long standing division between a rich, advanced center which
innovates technologically and controls access to markets, and a backward, poor
periphery which performs routine, simple tasks. The multi- or transnational cor-
poration organizes and administers this division of labor, headquartering its
knowledge intensive activities in the world center, and then locating its produc-
tion facilities (formerly internal subsidiaries, now at least nominally independ-
ent suppliers) in the country currently paying the lowest wages and relocating
them should a new entrant offer better terms. The early versions of the literature
on global supply chains presented this view in some empirical detail. Thus this
literature distinguished between producer-driven supply chains, as in autos,
where the a manufacturing firm in the advanced countries directly organizes the
decentralization of production to developing countries, and consumer- or retail-
driven supply chains, as in garments or shoes, where an advanced country
brand designs and markets products, but contracts with independent suppliers
to produce them. Though based on long-range exchange and sophisticated com-
munications and logistics, globalization in this account amounts to a modern ver-
sion of sweating. Factories in the developing world at the limit have only vari-
able, and no fixed costs, and therefore can be costlessly closed when demand for
their output drops, and moved when lower variable costs are available elsewhere.
Though this picture may have captured a key tendency in globalization circa the
early 1990s, and though it is still all to easy to find examples of corporate behavior
that correspond to it, four considerations strongly suggest that globalization today
fosters, or at least creates many opportunities for new forms of collaboration.
The first piece of evidence in this direction is the absence of races to the
bottom in labor regulation worldwide. If the sweating model were correct, there
would be powerful, indeed nearly irresistible, pressures on developing
economies to increase their attractiveness to transnational investors by adopting
permissive labor standards, or none at all. Study after study has shown no con-
nection between inward investment and such deregulation. 3 There is, on the con-
3
See Robert J. Flanagan, Labor Standards and International Competitive Advantage in
Flanagan and Gould (eds.), International Labor Standards, Stanford, 2003.
267
trary, some evidence of a race to the top in competition among corporate codes
of conduct the garment and footwear industries. Consistent with the Nike find-
ings reported earlier, the improvement referred to here is in code terms, not
actual firm conduct. Nonetheless, it seems that corporations would have to be
extremely cynical or shortsighted or both to impose higher and higher stan-
dards of conduct on themselves in global settings while pressing for more and
more abusive conditions in host countries.
A second piece of evidence goes directly to the emergence of new forms
of collaboration rather than the implausibility of the sweating model. It is the
well documented spread of lean production from the auto industry to the gar-
ment industry, and from the advanced countries to the developing ones. Lean
production is to manufacturing what co-design is to development: a method for
treating current solutions as provisional and searching collaboratively, beyond
the boundaries of current routine, for ways to improve it. In lean production, this
is typically done by forming teams representing different production depart-
ments and specialties to trace disruptions, such as machine breakdowns, manu-
facturing defects, back to their (typically distant and counter-intuitive) root
cause. This system requires close coordination and very often co-location of sup-
pliers and assemblers assembly problems often originate in defective parts, or
erratic deliveries of supplies as well as collaboration between customer and
supplier to increase manufacturing efficiency shades into co-design of next gen-
eration parts and products. Lean production was pioneered by Japanese auto-
mobiles firms but variants of it have been introduced by all their competitors,
frequently beginning with the co-location of new assembly and supplier facili-
ties unencumbered by tradition in developing countries or transition
economies such as Brazil, Mexico or the Czech Republic. Crucially, for present
purposes, lean production has been embraced in recent years by just the firms
that traditionally rely on production by semi-skilled seamstresses, and thus, on
the sweating account, would be the last to do so leading producers of garments
and sportswear such as Nike and Addidas-Salomon. These firms and other are
excluding suppliers who show no promise of adopting these methods and are
cooperating more intensively in solving design and production problems with
those who do (though not otherwise sharing the substantial costs of adjustment).
Leading industry consultants routinely provide detailed cost accounting of the
advantages to cut-and-sew producers who simply assembled garments from
textiles supplied by their customers of themselves organizing low inventory
systems able to shift quickly from one product to another as fashion demands:
what the industry calls full package production. And whole regions, Central
America in particular, which only recently built up garment industries to mass
produce t-shirts and the like, are frantically discussing how to attract textile mills
and trim makers able to produce short production runs at competitive prices and
otherwise facilitate a shift towards lean production and co-development. The
garment industry is of course a dominant in the case of countries such as
Bangladesh or El Salvador overwhelmingly dominant component of develop-
ing economies, and often their principal connection to the world economy.
268
A transformation in the organization of the garment industry in direction of more

cooperation within and among producers in that industry is therefore a sign of
deep change in the nature of development: a blurring of the distinction between
center and periphery at the core of the sweating model.
We come to the same conclusion by looking, third, at particular develop-
ing economies rather than key industries. Argentina is a good example of the pro-
fusion of product upgrading in mid-income developing countries, and the
access to export markets it affords. At the beginning of the 20th century Argen-
tine agriculture was frontier of efficiency. By the 1960s, its soils were depleted,
its technology backward. From the late 1980s on Argentina again become a
leader this time in no-till soy cultivation, based on genetically modified seeds
and precision seeders (capable of inserting one seed at a time at a depth and with
the amount of fertilizer that will maximize yield in the particular plot under cul-
tivation). The precision seeders are fabricated domestically. Close collaboration
between the capital goods makers and the users of the equipment allows such
rapid innovation in all the appliances that slit open, tamp down and otherwise
touch the ground that foreign competitors can not keep pace. A similar story of
close collaboration between different specialist firms (and between them and the
national agricultural extension service) explains the transformation of the tradi-
tional wine industry in Mendoza province into a high-quality producer with a
rapidly share of demanding world markets. The same goes for the emergence of
new firms developing worldwide markets for tv-formats: analytic descriptions
(more detailed than a high concept, but much more open than a finished episode
or pilot) of a sopa opera, reality tv or crime show that allows for customization
in other countries. Indeed, influenced by the work of Hausmann and Rodrik on
process of self discovery by which entrepreneurs in developing countries
explore export possibilities, there is now a substantial case study literature sug-
gesting that a key barrier to entry to world markets is not the closure of supply
chains, but rather the limits to the search capacities and production capabilities
of developing country economies.
Consider as a final and crucial entry on the list of counter-examples to the
new sweating view concern the experience of China. With its low wages and vast
pool of workers, authoritarian (but development-oriented government), and
explicit prohibitions on labor organizing, China often stands as the knock down
example or rather, given its weight in the world economy, as proof of the new
sweating interpretation. But detailed recent reports suggest that China too is
beginning to move, and rapidly, in the direction of the Toyota-style, co-design
production methods. A striking indication of this is the emergence of what are
called supply chain cities. This label is applied to two different phenomena.
One is the emergence of huge factories each large enough to constitute a small
city in itself constructed by foreign or domestic firms to integrate design and
manufacturing. The other is profusion of industrial clusters: constellations of
small and medium sized firms in complementary specialties which collaborate
in constantly varying configurations to produce a changing mixture of highly
specialized goods. The common feature is that both variants premise the local
269
integration of conception and execution. In other words, to the extent that the
notion of supply chain cities captures an emergent reality, China, the last fron-
tier of globalization, turns out to provide evidence for the spread of new forms
of cooperation. These revisions in the picture of the global supply chain are all
the more compelling in that they derive from the recent work of Gary Gereffi,
whose earlier research presented the most thoughtful version of the new sweat-
ing view. 4
VII. Traces of a New Labor Law Regime
Suppose then that labor law both in the form of regulation and as collec-
tive bargaining was contractualist. That contactualism including of course con-
tractualism in labor law regimes is in crisis because new forms of co-operation
and co-development require continuing governance of deep uncertainty rather
than periodic adjustment of an enduring body of rules, in global supply chains
and developing countries no less than in the advanced economies. Suppose
finally that a successor labor regime will have to mesh with the new forms of co-
operation if it is to alter, for public benefit, the high-order effects or externalities
of that co-operation. What can we say about the basic features of such a regime?
What, if anything, can we say about its progress and prospects in the world?
The rudiments of an answer to the first question follow from the discussion
of new regulatory and relational contracting regimes. These suggest that we
think of the labor regime on at least two levels. The first, plant or firm based, is
directed at problem solving. Shop floor employees are increasingly being
included in the teams responsible for continuous process improvement in just-
in-time plants, and in the related problem solving teams that aim to get to the
root of, and correct problems that cut across departments or products. Similarly,
workers at various levels are being drawn into the process of continuous re-
organization of plants that go hand in hand with continuous product upgrading
and changes from one model generation to another. As issues concerning work
organization, pay systems, and working conditions are inevitably intertwined
think of the shift, characteristic of the move to Toyota-style production, from pay
systems that incentivize rapid repetition of known tasks to pay systems that
incentive active participation in switching from one product set-up to another
problem solving inevitably shades into activities that impinge on working con-
ditions. But this problem solving only becomes the foundation of a new labor
regime when firms and workers deliberately decide to apply the problem solv-
ing techniques to the issues concern labor: Why are there spells of debilitating
overtime? How can the pay system assure a fair distribution of the gains from
joint problem solving? How can the housekeeping needed to reduce invento-
ries in just-in-time systems make the workplace more accommodating?
4
See Gary Gereffi, The New Offshoring of Jobs and Global Development, ILP Social Policy
Lecturers, Jamaica, December 2005.
270
Still the formation of these first-level problem solving groups or teams is

not by itself a labor regime. On the contrary, taken alone it obviously exposes
workers to new risks competition among problem solving groups, expropria-
tion of their best solutions, or simply of a fair share of the productivity gains to
which they contribute, and so on. To create a protective labor regime rather than
a new threat to well-being, these first-level institutions must be complemented
by a second level that pools the information generated locally in several ways.
One is comparison of the results of problem solving across plants, firms and
industries in order to establish benchmarks for rates of improvement and (peri-
odically revisable) standards of minimally acceptable performance. Information
on what comparable firms are or are not doing allows workers and their rep-
resentatives to turn differences in performance into arguments for (more rapid)
local improvement.
A second and complimentary form of information pooling would be based
on the model of the QSRs. The second-level institution would in effect do
selected diagnostic reviews of the plant or firm level institutions doing root-
cause analysis of labor problems. The results of these reviews would naturally
inform the setting of benchmarks and standards, but its primary purpose would
be to help identify and overcome systemic problems in applying the new prob-
lem solving techniques to labor issues.
What, then, of the prospects of actually realizing this two-tier structure in
the world? The short answer the only kind the facts allow is that there is not
one robust, fully developed example of a regime of this type, at least as far as I
know. But there are surprisingly many institutions, including the ILO, that are
moving in the direction of creating one. While you are considering which fact
should weigh more, here is a short list of what might prove the beginnings of a
new regime:
As noted above, Nike and other brands have encountered the limits of
check-list compliance in their efforts to improve the labor conditions of
their suppliers, and they are obligating their suppliers to shift to just-in-
time, Toyota-style production methods. If nothing else, the simultaneity of
the two developments has prompted many compliance officials in the firms
to see the second root-cause problem solving as an answer to the first
the limits of rule-based (contractualist) compliance systems. Hence the
call, ever more insistent, to go lean on compliance in the way described
above. It is, however, difficult to know how seriously to take this call, given
that the same firms call on their suppliers to go lean, but typically do little
to help them get there. For that reason, it is relevant to note that the call to
go lean on compliance from within the brands is seconded by calls from
the FLA to move in this direction as well.
The FLAs own experience with compliance checking dovetails with that
of the brands. Moreover, the FLA sees the brands shift to lean suppliers.
So far the organization has no fully developed response to these twin devel-
opments, but it is well positioned to act as a second-tier information pooler
271
in both senses. On the one hand, it already complies comparative informa-

tion on performance with regard to labor standards, and on the other it is
actively pursuing pilot projects that could produce QSR type review instru-
ments.
Groups of shop stewards in Denmark and Germany, together with some
local or regional officials, have become actively engaged in linking shop-
floor problem solving to labor issues in their plants and firms, and creating
supra-plant fora (periodic meetings, conferences, etc.) for comparing
results. In both cases, the national level of the unions has limited develop-
ments, apparently out of fear of creating counterpowers within the organ-
ization. But in both cases the regional successes have attracted broader
attention.
With regard to the ILO, I am instructed by those in a position to know, two
developments signal a determination seriously to explore framework or
recursive rule alternatives to the traditional contractualist labor regime. The
first is the Maritime Labor Convention, adopted in 2006. The new conven-
tion, like traditional instruments, sets minimum requirements for work and
employment conditions of seafarers, hours of work and rest, accommoda-
tion, recreational facilities, food and catering, health protection, medical
care, welfare and social security protection. Its novel features include rapid
amendment procedures, akin to the problem solving mechanisms used to
establish detailed provisions to international regimes such as the law of the
sea, and a system of certification under which shipowners make plans for
assuring respect for the relevant law of the flag nation shipmasters are
responsible for carrying out the plans documenting that they have done so,
the flag state reviews the plans and certifies that they are being imple-
mented. The system could easily develop into a version of the two-tier
pooling mechanism describe above, or into a flexible form of traditional
compliance checking.
The second ILO example is the Framework for Occupational Safety and
Health Convention, also from 2006. This instrument is plainly inspired by
the EU framework directives discussed above: national governments, in
consultation with key partners (labor, capital) are to formulate plans for
improving the ensemble of the occupational health and safety policies, and
periodic review of these plans is to lead to improvement in plans and prac-
tice. The affinity with the new forms of co-operation could not be more
explicit: the objective of the convention, stated in Article 2 is that each
Member which ratifies this Convention shall promote continuous improve-
ment of occupational safety and health to prevent occupational injuries,
diseases and deaths, by the development, in consultation with the most rep-
resentative organizations of employers and workers, of a national policy,
national system and national programme. But again developments are too
fresh, and too open, to even begin assessing the probability that this inno-
vation will work, and become a model for others.
272
Panel discussion
So there we are a labor regime in crisis, some stirring of a new age, some
quietly bold proposals by normally cautious, and always well informed partici-
pants about the possibility of using novel forms of organization to safeguard tra-
ditional values in a changed epoch. This is hardly the blueprint (or the CAD
equivalent) for a new labor regime. But it is of such gossamer stuff that new
regimes take shape.
Discussion
Steven Oates* I would like to draw attention to a key aspect of the ILOs
system which I think has not been discussed during this conference so far,
namely tripartism. The social partners are a core element of the ILO system
which is present both in the standard setting and in the supervisory side. I wonder
how much importance the speakers would actually attribute to tripartism and to
voluntary collective bargaining which is, or can be, an important part of both the
standard setting and, at the national level, of the implementation of ratified Con-
ventions and other international labour standards. I wonder whether the panel-
lists think that the ILO system of involving non-governmental organizations is
in any way a model for non-governmental organization participation in other
international standard setting and supervisory bodies and processes. There have
been several references to the fact that ILO Conventions and standards are
addressed to States. In the ILO, we have a representation of States which is dif-
ferent from other organizations; again, it is tripartite. If employers and workers
organizations participate in the formulation and adoption of international labour
standards and can also participate in the implementation of them in terms of the
supervisory processes, do they have a responsibility? This would be addressed
particularly perhaps to representatives of enterprises. Dont they also bear some
sort of responsibility in terms of implementation?
Hedva Sarfati ** I am dealing with issues of labour market reform and

welfare reforms, mainly in Europe but also elsewhere. I just wanted to say how
grateful I am to the three speakers for having shown the pitfalls and the risks
of the changes that we are undergoing now but also for having pointed at
possible positive answers to the challenges of globalization and eventually a
race to the top. This, in turn, might guide possible future ILO action so that
the Organization increases its visibility and becomes an influential actor at the
global level.
* Standards and Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Sector, International Labour
Office.
** Former Director of the Industrial Relations and Labour Administratioon Department,
International Labour Office.
273
Catherine Brakenhielm Hansell * The subject of occupational safety and

health has been brought up on several occasions and, in this context, I would like
to bring to your attention that a new occupational safety and health Convention
was adopted in June 2006. The new instrument actually relates in several ways
to what has been brought up by the three speakers. It has a total different con-
tent from previous instruments. In a nutshell, it introduces a management sys-
tems approach to occupational safety and health and proposes to governments
to undertake to progressively improve their situation as regards occupational
safety and health by adopting national policies, national action plans and so
forth. My proposition is that having such instrument as an international labour
standard may contribute to this possibility of moving to the top rather than the
bottom, although it is true that the specific details in the area of occupational
safety and health are mostly laid down at the national level.
Michael Halton Cheadle ** Charles Sabel gave the example of the coal
mine and the power station, and he suggested a movement from a relational
contract into a framework agreement in which there was a co-development and
governance committee. Such a framework agreement was not rule-based, but
essentially some kind of governance model for regulating the relationship
between the power station and the coal mine, each needing each other. But
earlier on in his presentation, he contrasted the German co-determination model,
which is in a sense a co-determination governance model at the level of the
workplace. I do not think it is right to say collective bargaining takes place at the
workplace in Germany, but certainly there is the works council and that, as I
understood it, is, in a sense, a governance model to regulate relations, for work-
places to be able to adapt to changes. It just seemed to me that both governance
models were meant to be directed towards adaptation and I wondered if you
could comment.
Janice Bellace*** This is directed more towards Brian Langilles point

about identifying what is in a nations self-interest as a way of looking at ILO
standard setting or regulation. One of the things that interests me most in tripar-
tism, and particularly in the present time, is when something is not in the inter-
est of the employers or at least the workers representatives do not see it in their
interest but it might be in the interest of the nation. One example here that
strikes me, at least in the most advanced economies, has to do with keeping older
workers in the labour force. Most of our standards approaches and the conven-
tional wisdom has been that when workers reach their late fifties basically they
are physical wrecks and they would appreciate being put out to pasture for a
* Coordinator, International Labour Standards Department, International Labour Office.

** Professor of Labour Law, University of Cape Town; Member, ILO Committee of
Experts.
*** Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, Wharton School, University of Penn-
sylvania; Member, ILO Committee of Experts.
274
Panel discussion
while. But that is something that gets back to Charles Sabels point. It is an early
twentieth century model thinking about the standard, rather than what are we
trying to achieve which is having labour force participation ages that match the
productive capacity of workers and their educational needs.
I think that you are pointing out that, if we turn around and think about
what is in a given countrys self-interest in light of its stage of economic devel-
opment, we would perhaps have some more flexible approaches towards the
application of certain standards. This also reminds me of night work where the
Committee of Experts had quite a discussion about what we were trying to
achieve, if it is non-discrimination between men and women. The question is,
whether by prohibiting night work of women, we are protecting women, we are
favouring them, or we are disfavouring them. We had a very lively discussion,
getting back to the point about what are we trying to achieve in light of the fun-
damental principles of the Organization.
Simon Deakin Charles Sabel, as I understand it, is arguing that there is a

transformation in forms of production and, more widely, in supply chains, a shift
towards a governance model which would involve the emergence of framework
contracts as a new paradigm of economic organization. I think that is extremely
interesting and that it may well be the case. I can think of similar examples actu-
ally within the field of industrial relations where one observes governance-type
mechanisms of this sort. If the point Charles Sabel is making is that globaliza-
tions competitive pressures really require firms to think up innovative ways of
maintaining their competitive position and there is not necessarily a race to the
bottom and a return to sweating, then I agree with that and I think that we should
not assume that globalization always has negative implications. I would just like
to pose a question. I am not sure whether a transformation of that sort necessar-
ily involves abandoning either collective bargaining or the contract of employ-
ment or employment relationship as the founding notions of labour law. I would
like to keep an open mind about that because I think that the basic concepts we
use, and possibly also our model of international labour standard setting, these
basic ideas are actually very flexible and may well also be capable of some adap-
tation.
Brian Langille Let me pick up the example of the new health and safety
standard. Here is a way of putting the point I am trying to make: what is the
Committee of Experts going to do under that law? Is it benchmarking, noting
progress and learning? Are we going to have the same kind of Committee of
Experts 80 years from now if our Conventions are going to look more and more
like that? That is the question I am trying to get at. If things are changing, could
you get a certain model of what the Committee is for, a certain model of law and
a certain set of purposes without rethinking about the institution?
Concerning Ms. Bellaces question about what happens when employers
and trade unions have one view and it may not be in the interest of the State. Just
to be provocative again, I think it is one of the mysteries why governments in the
275
ILO with 50 per cent of the votes do not run the show a bit more. Why dont
those 50 per cent of the votes speak with more authority than they traditionally
have and I think the reason for that is because we have been wedded to this whole
race-to-the bottom divided set of interests. There is no coherent story that all
States could tell each other about why they are in this scheme, no clear and pos-
itive story. But if there is a coherent, positive story that all States can see then
there is much more possible unity among the governments, much less potential
for divide and conquer by the other members of the tripartite delegations, to put
it bluntly. I therefore think that getting this story right has a lot to do with main-
taining the kind of political coalitions you need. On the old theory, it is really
easy to divide and conquer the governments; on the new theory, it should be
much more possible to have sustainable coalitions over a broader range of issues.
Charles Sabel Let me say a word about tripartism and then come to this
question of new forms of cooperation in relation to the older ones. My presen-
tation was also a non-Canadian presentation, but a non-Canadian presentation
by a non-Canadian is even worse than a non-Canadian by a Canadian. So, in that
same spirit, let me just say that tripartism is bad for you. It is bad for you because
you have three weak partners who need each other because this is one of their
last places of self-legitimation. So, they are willing to make deals with each other
to preserve the status quo to have an excuse for their continuing futility else-
where and that is a disaster for the ILO because it means that you have a little
bit of freedom but you have to keep secret everything you really want to do. This
is like all these other things you well know. Things that an outsider can learn in
two days in an institution, or things that are, by definition, common knowledge
in that institution.
On the question of the relation between the power station example and the
co-development example, this raises, of course, a fundamental issue and it goes
to a key point that Simon Deakin is making as well. The part that was alighted,
and perhaps too compressive is the following: I did not mean to say that in the
current setting the power station and coal mine went to this new kind of agree-
ment. If one looks at these agreements, they look pretty much like they always
looked. The thing that has changed is that is no longer the canonical agreement.
The canonical agreement looks much more like an agreement between a biotech
company and a bio-informatics company developing new tools, or between a
carmaker and a supplier, or even between Adidas and one of its shoe-producing
factories. Those contracts, different as they are, have the features that I men-
tioned. The question that has been you raised is what is the difference between
that and Mitbestimmung, and you can trust me, I do know how that actually
works. The agonizing problem is that if you look at the two in the abstract on
paper twenty years ago, they look equally flexible and the tragedy is that people
thought that countries that had institutionalized that kind of cooperation already
had a flexible adjustment instrument. It turns out that when you bargain contin-
uously over rules, this is very different from setting a framework agreement, set-
ting benchmarks and meeting periodically to re-adjust the whole system in the
276
Panel discussion
light of that result. You would not know that unless you ran the two experiments
and that is the difference between the German production model and the exten-
sion of the Japanese production model. They are both, theoretically, flexible and
they just turn out to be flexible under different domain conditions and that is the
answer and it is an empirical answer.
On Simon Deakins rhetorical question whether we should ditch all the old
things just because there is this difference, I think he is absolutely right. Crazy
as I am in insisting on there being a big new thing, I do not think one knows any
more the limits of the adaptability of the old things for the same reason you did
not know exactly what the results would be of the comparison I made a moment
ago. I think one has to keep an open mind on both sides. For the people who have
been doing the old thing you need to recognize the emergence of a new thing,
for people who believe there is a new thing you must not pretend that there
cannot be some profound hybridization and I accept the latter proposition as
much as I insist on the former.
277
Closing remarks The Future of standards
supervision: Reconciling development
and adjustment
Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry *
The true measure of success for the United Nations

is not how much we promise but how much we deliver
for those who need us most.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
Acceptance speech to the UN General Assembly
Because most people must work in order to live, and because many have
no choice as to the work they must perform, international labour standards and
the protection they confer must clearly be considered as human rights instru-
ments. As Chief Justice Robert Badinter of France has observed, human rights
occupy the summit of the hierarchy of norms and permeate its structure. 1 The
preservation of human dignity is the essence of social protection especially in
times of upheaval and change as was the case when the ILO was created. This
is the continuing challenge that the Decent Work programme of the ILO has
tackled and is securing.
The ultimate success or failure of this process of protection depends on the
quality and the manner in which standards are implemented, and their subse-
quent supervision at both the national and international levels, points to which
we shall return.
* Director, International Labour Standards Department, International Labour Office. The
contribution of Kenneth Schindler, Senior Legal Officer, International Labour Standards Depart-
ment, in preparing this text is gratefully acknowledged.
1
Robert Badinter, The State and Human Rights in Democracy and the Rule of Law, Wash-
ington, CQ Press/Library of Congress, 2001.
279
Globally, the sad reality is that the situation is deteriorating: changing

patterns in the world of work, brought and wrought by globalization, jeopardize
development for some and impose adjustment for others. Extreme working
poverty at the one US dollar a day level continues to grow. 2
Much is written today about successful human rights protection as a move-
ment from exclusion to inclusion. For more than 80 years the ILO has functioned
on just that basis according to the inclusive principles of tripartism. The ILO
embraced this synergy from the outset, and in functional and operational terms
it permeates everything we do. In this regard, it is neither prideful nor exagger-
ation to say that we are the beacon in the lighthouse.
The reality of the protection that the supervisory process confers is wholly
dependent upon the quality of the ingredients that feed into it. As previously
mentioned, this dynamic functions as a duality: both at the national and inter-
national levels, and in the former this begins with good governance. Governance
is not government, rather it is a framework of rules, institutions and practices
that set limits on the behaviour of individuals, organizations and companies. 3
However, the best explanation of the concept of good governance comes from
the UN itself:
In practice, good governance involves promoting the rule of law, tolerance of
minority and opposition groups, transparent political processes, an independent
judiciary, an impartial police force, a military that is strictly subject to civilian
control, a free press and vibrant civil society institutions as well as meaningful
elections. Above all, good governance means respect for human rights. 4
Under these conditions, implementation and supervision of international
labour standards at the national level should be able to function smoothly, rely-
ing on the active participation of vibrant civil society institutions (such as
employers and workers organizations), and an independent judiciary. At the
ILOs Turin Centre, government officials, employers and workers, as well as
judges, and legislators, are trained so that ILO standards are transposed into
national legislation and effectively enforced.
When these structures are functioning well at the national level, they gen-
erate qualitative and statistical information that feeds into the ILO supervisory
system, whose comments then help the International Labour Office to adjust and
re-direct its technical expertise. Accurately targeting ILO technical assistance,
while strengthening the rule of law and good governance, oils the wheels of the
supervisory machinery at the national level. In functional terms, it is somewhat
like an elevator: bringing the information from the national to the international
level, and then returning it enriched and informed to make the process
work better.
2
See Global Employment Trends Brief, Geneva, ILO, 2007, p. 3.
3
See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1999, p. 35.
4
See United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,
Doc.A/54/1, 1999, para. 53.
280
Reconciling Development and Adjustment
The quality of the expertise the ILO supervisory system can provide
depends on the quality of the information the system receives. And it is in this
partnership at the national and international level that the Office can and must
do better, especially as regards information gathering. Report forms must be up
to date and ask the right questions, if we are to get meaningful answers.
A key step in the process is, of course, ratification. Through this important
act Member States confirm their acceptance of obligations as part of the inter-
national community. However, ratification is by no means an end in itself, and
we do not measure the success of international labour standards solely in terms
of the number of Conventions ratified. But ratification is indeed the threshold:
it is both a point of entry and a step in a process the process of implementing
labour standards and securing social protection.
The increase in the number of Conventions ratified is indeed a very posi-
tive step. However, the workload for all is increasing and the system is strained.
We need to be selective as to the information requested through the report forms
to ensure that this is indeed information we can use and feed into technical assis-
tance in order to remedy real problems. Employers and workers organizations
need to be clear and concise in their comments provided to the supervisory
system. Governments need to report fully and on time.
We need to harness the tremendous potential of information technology to
bring reporting into the twenty-first century. Eighty years ago the ILO launched
a revolutionary idea that sovereign States would send reports on the fulfilment
of their obligations under ratified Conventions to an international body for
review. Today, we need to innovate as to the form that reporting obligation takes:
in particular to use the advances in IT, with the Office helping Members as nec-
essary, so that our supervisory system can continue to function efficiently and
produce high quality results.
As we renew our wishes to the Committee of Experts on its 80th birthday,
we must keep in mind that those who need us most will judge us not on what we
promise, but on what we deliver.
281
Appendices
Members of the ILO Committee of Experts
(1927-2006)
Alphabetical list
Mr. Benjamin Aaron (United States) (1985-1994)

Mr. Mario Ackerman (Argentina) (2005-)
Sir Grantley Adams, Q.C. (Barbados) (1948-1971)
Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, C.G.F.R., K.B.E., C.F.R., P.C. (Nigeria)
(1962-1986)
Mr. Roberto Ago (Italy) (1979-1995)
Ms. Badria Al-Awadhi (Kuwait) (1983-1998)
Mr. Rafael Alburquerque (Dominican Republic) (2001-2004)
Mr. Anwar Ahmad Rashed Al-Fuzaie (Kuwait) (1998-)
Baron Frederik van Asbeck (Netherlands) (1947-1964)
Mr. Rabindra Nath Banerjee, C.S.I., C.I.E. (India) (1955-1958)
Mr. Denys Barrow, S.C. (Belize) (2005-)
Prof. Henri Batiffol (France) (1958-1964)
Mr. Gnther Beitzke (Federal Republic of Germany) (1955-1982)
Ms. Janice R. Bellace (United States) (1994-)
Mr. Llio Bentes Correa (Brazil) (2006)
Mr. Paal Berg (Norway) (1945-1958)
Mr. Prafullachandra Natvarlal Bhagwati (India) (1977-2005)
Ms. Hanna Bokor-Szeg (Hungary) (1979-1981)
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt) (1970-1979)
Mr. Choucri Cardahi (Lebanon) (1957-1970)
Mr. Antonio Ferreira Cesarino Jr. (Brazil) (1975-1981)
Mr. Csar Charlone (Uruguay) (1934-1940)
Mr. Atul Chatterjee, G.C.I.E. (India) (1936-1955)
Mr. Michael Halton Cheadle (South Africa) (2004-)
285
Dr. Ta Chen (China) (1947-1950)

Mr. Adam Ciolkosz (Poland) (1940)
Mr. Archibald Cox (United States) (1967-1971)
Ms. Laura Cox, Q.C. (United Kingdom) (1998-)
Prof. Henry Willian Carless Davis, C.B.E. (British Empire) (1927-1928)
Sir William Douglas, P.C., K.C.M.G. (Barbados) (1975-2001)
Prof. Rafael Waldemar Erich (Finland) (1928-1938)
Ms. Bela Erdi-Harrach (Hungary) (1939-1940)
Ms. Blanca Ruth Esponda Espinosa (Mexico) (1995-)
Mr. Isaac Forster (Senegal) (1958-1964)
Sir Selwyn Fremantle, C.S.I., C.I.E. (India) (1927-1936)
Mr. Pralhad Balacharya Gajendragadkar (India) (1971-1977)
Mr. Enrique Garca Sayn (Peru) (1953-1977)
Mr. Jules Gautier (France) (1927-1936)
Mr. Corrado Gini (Italy) (1927-1936)
Mr. Marcel Grgoire (Belgium) (1967-1969)
Mr. Arnold Gubinski (Poland) (1960-1992)
Mr. Paul M. Herzog (United States) (1955-1967)
Mr. Katswichi Ikawa (Japan) (1987-1990)
Mr. Semion A. Ivanov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Russian Federation) (1982-1993)
Bgum Rana Liaquat Ali Khan (Pakistan) (1954-1977)
Mr. Harold Stewart Kirkaldy (United Kingdom) (1946-1976)
Mr. Abdul G. Koroma (Sierra Leone) (2006-)
Mr. E. Korovine (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (1962-1964)
Mr. Ignacy de Koschembahr-Lyskowski (Poland) (substitute member
1927) (1928-1933)
Mr. Shigeru Kuriyama (Japan) (1962-1967)
Ms. Robyn A. Layton, Q.C. (Australia) (1993-)
Ms. Ewa Letowska (Poland) (1992-2004)
Mr. Roman Zinovievich Livshitz (Russian Federation) (1993-1997)
Mr. Helio Lobo (Brazil) (1945-1948, 1950-1955)
Mr. Lazare A. Lunz (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (1965-1974)
Mr. Pierre Lyon-Caen (France) (2001-)
Mr. Waclaw Makowski (Poland) (1934-1940)
Mr. Norman Washington Manley, K. C. (Jamaica) (1948)
Mr. Sergey Petrovitch Mavrin (Russian Federation) (1998-)
Mr. Bernd Baron von Maydell (Federal Republic of Germany, Germany)
(1982-2004)
Mr. Kba Mbaye (Senegal) (1982-1996)
Mr. Frank McCulloch (United States) (1974-1985)
Sir Arnold D. McNair, C.B.E., LL. D. (British Empire, United Kingdom)
(1929-1946)
Mr. Cassio Mesquita Barros (Brazil) (1991-2006)
Mr. Jean Morellet (France) (1965-1974)
286
Members of the ILO Committee of Experts
Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, K.C.S.I., D.C.L. (Oxon.), (India)

(1959-1971)
Mr. von Nostitz (Germany) (1927-1934)
Ms. Angelika Nussberger (Germany) (2004-)
Mr. Benjamin Obi Nwabueze (Nigeria) (1987-2005)
Ms. Ruma Pal (India) (2006-)
Prof. Tomaso Perassi (Italy) (1936-1937, 1947-1957)
Mr. Sture Petrn (Sweden) (1964-1967)
Prof. Otakar Quadrat (Czechoslovakia) (1927-1939)
Mr. Afonso Rodrigues Queiro (Portugal) (1955-1964)
Prof. William Rappard (Switzerland) (1927-1958)
Mr. Edilbert Razafindralambo (Madagascar) (1964-2004)
Mr. Miguel Rodrguez Piero Y Bravo Ferrer (Spain) (1995-)
Mr. Jos Maria Ruda (Argentina) (1977-1994)
Mr. Paul Ruegger (Switzerland) (1958-1979)
Mr. Isidoro Ruiz Moreno (Argentina) (1956-1975)
Mr. Oscar Saraiva (Brazil) (1964-1969)
Mr. Georges Scelle (France) (1937-1958)
Mr. Akira Shigemitsu (Japan) (1982-1987)
Mr. Friedrich Sitzler (Federal Republic of Germany) (1952-1955)
Mr. Amadou S (Senegal) (1996-)
Mr. Max Srensen (Denmark) (1954-1962)
Ms. G. J. Stemberg (Netherlands) (1948-1956)
Mr. Antti Johannes Suviranta (Finland) (1984-1993)
Mr. Arnaldo Lopes Sussekind (Brazil) (1969-1975, 1981-1990)
Mr. Boon Chiang Tan (Singapore) (1978-2003)
Dr. Shao Hwa Tan (China) (1945-1947)
Mr. Paul Tschoffen (Belgium) (1927-1961)
Mr. Senjin Tsuruoka (Japan) (1975-1981)
Mr. Grigory Tunkin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (1974-1982)
Mr. Fernando Uribe Restrepo (Colombia) (1979-1998)
Mr. Joseph J.M. van der Ven (Netherlands) (1969-1984)
Mr. Jean-Maurice Verdier (France) (1974-2001)
Mr. Joza Vilfan (Yugoslavia) (1964-1985)
Mr. Budislav Vukas (Yugoslavia, Croatia) (1985-2006)
Mr. Earl Warren (United States) (1971-1974)
Sir John Crossley Wood (United Kingdom) (1977-1998)
Honourable Charles E. Wyzanski Jr. (United States) (1945-1955)
Mr. Toshio Yamaguchi (Japan) (1991-2003)
Mr. Ilia Yanouloff (Bulgaria) (1937-1940)
Mr. Kisaburo Yokota (Japan) (1967-1975)
Mr. Yozo Yokota (Japan) (2003-)
Mr. Shunzo Yoshisaka (Japan) (1937-1938)
287
Chairpersons of the Committee
Mr. Jules Gautier (France): 1933-1936

Mr. Paul Tschoffen (Belgium): 1927-1932; 1937-1938; 1940; 1945-1961
Mr. Georges Scelle (France): 1939
Mr. Ramaswami Mudaliar, K.C.S.I., D.C.L. (Oxon.), (India): 1962-1969
Mr. Enrique Garca Sayn (Peru): 1970-1975
Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, C.G.F.R., K.B.E., C.F.R., P.C. (Nigeria): 1976-
1986
Mr. Jos Maria Ruda (Argentina): 1988-1994
Sir William Douglas, P.C., K.C.M.G. (Barbados): 1987; 1995-2001
Ms. Robyn A. Layton (Australia): 2002-2006
Reporters of the Committee
Mr. Jules Gautier (France): 1927-1932

Sir Arnold D. McNair (United Kingdom): 1933-1939; 1945
Mr. Georges Scelle (France): 1940
Mr. Harold Stewart Kirkaldy (United Kingdom): 1946-1962; 1973
Prof. Henri Batiffol (France): 1963-1964
Mr. Enrique Garca Sayn (Peru): 1965-1969
Mr. Edilbert Razafindralambo (Madagascar): 1970-1972; 1974-1994;
1995-2002
Mr. Toshio Yamaguchi (Japan): 1995
Mr. Anwar Ahmad Rashed Al-Fuzaie (Kuwait): 2003-2006
Note
ii(i) The dates in parentheses are the dates of admission, death or resignation of Committee
members indicating the overall duration of their term.
i(ii) No CEACR sessions from 1941 to 1944.
(iii) The Committees report of 1940 was neither published nor examined by either the
International Labour Conference or the Governing Body.
288
Statistics concerning the work of the ILO Committee of Experts (1960-2006)
Year Member Conventions Ratifications Experts Comments Days
States by session
Posts Present OBS DR Total
1960 96 115 1957 17 17 209 392 601 12

1965 115 124 3098 18 18 436 829 1265 13
1970 121 134 3567 19 15 502 836 1338 14
1975 125 143 4053 18 18 506 825 1331 13
1980 141 153 4766 19 19 466 767 1233 14
1985 151 161 5167 20 20 451 1000 1451 14
1986 151 162 5248 20 20 505 921 1426 14
1987 151 166 5284 20 20 512 925 1462 15
1988 151 168 5371 20 19 461 1045 1505 14
1989 151 169 5428 20 20 504 876 1380 14
1990 148 171 5508 20 20 554 1164 1718 14
1991 152 172 5562 20 19 619 970 1489 14
1992 162 173 5719 20 20 547 1221 1768 14
1993 169 174 6050 20 18 535 1099 1634 14
1994 171 175 6160 20 20 564 1100 1664 16
1995 173 176 6253 20 18 592 1051 1643 16
1995bis 173 176 6293 20 19 541 892 1433 16
1996 174 180 6319 20 18 527 887 1414 16
1997 174 181 6400 20 18 568 1001 1569 16
289
Statistics concerning the work of the ILO Committee of Experts (1960-2006)
Year Member Conventions Ratifications Experts Comments Days
290
States by session
Posts Present OBS DR Total
1998 174 181 6491 20 18 694 1274 1968 16

1999 174 182 6611 20 19 602 1223 1825 16
2000 175 183 6851 20 18 642 1186 1828 16
2001 175 184 7005 20 18 723 1394 2117 16
2002 175 184 7088 20 19 696 1214 1910 14
2003 177 185 7177 17 16 643 1406 2049 14
2004 177 185 7253 16 16 774 1419 2193 14
2005 178 185 7356 18 15 753 1804 2557 17
2006 179 187 7432 18 18 853 1550 2403 14

2007 180 7438*
* As at 23 February 2007.
Selected bibliography
on the ILO Committee of Experts
Isabelle Boivin, Alberto Odero, The Committee of Experts on the Application

of Conventions and Recommendations: Progress achieved in national
labour legislation, International Labour Review, vol. 145, 2006, pp. 1-14.
Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero, Horacio Guido, Collective Bargaining: ILO
Standards and the Principles of the Supervisory Bodies, ILO, 2000, 103 p.
Eric Gravel, Chlo Charbonneau-Jobin, The Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations: Its Dynamic and
Impact, ILO, 2003, 100 p.
S. A. Ivanov, The International Labour Organisation: Control over Application
of the Conventions and Recommendations or Labour in W. E. Butler (ed.),
Control over Compliance with International Law, 1991, pp. 153-163.
Ernest A. Landy, Effective Application of International Labour Standards,
International Labour Review, vol. 68, 1953, pp. 346-363.
, The Effectiveness of International Supervision Thirty Years of ILO
Experience, 1966, 268p.
, Influence of International Labour Standards Possibilities and
Performance, International Labour Review, vol. 101, 1970, pp. 555-604.
Francis Maupain, Persuasion et contrainte aux fins de la mise en uvre des
normes et objectifs de lOIT in Les normes internationales du travail: un
patrimoine pour lavenir Mlanges en lhonneur de Nicolas Valticos,
ILO, 2004, pp. 687-709.
E. Osieke, Constitutional Law and Practice in the International Labour
Organization, 1985, 266p.
Klaus Samson, The Protection of Economic and Social Rights within the
Framework of the International Labour Organisation in Franz Matscher
291
(ed.). The Implementation of Economic and Social Rights National,

International and Comparative Aspects, 1991, pp. 123-140.
William R. Simpson, Standard-Setting and Supervision: A System in
Difficulty in Les normes internationales du travail: un patrimoine pour
lavenir Mlanges en lhonneur de Nicolas Valticos, ILO, 2004, pp. 47-73.
Lee Swepston, Supervision of ILO Standards, International Journal of
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, vol. 13, 1997,
pp. 327-344.
Nicolas Valticos, La commission dinvestigation et de conciliation en matire
de libert syndicale et le mcanisme de protection internationale des droits
syndicaux, Annuaire franais de droit international, vol. 13, 1967,
pp. 445-468.
, Fifty Years of Standard-Setting Activities by the International Labour
Organisation, International Labour Review, vol. 100, 1969, pp. 201-237.
, Une nouvelle forme daction internationale: Les contacts directs de
lO.I.T. en matire dapplication de conventions et de libert syndicale,
Annuaire franais de droit international, vol. 27, 1981, pp. 477-489.
, Commissions denqute de lOrganisation internationale du Travail, Revue
gnrale de droit international public, vol. 91, 1987, pp. 847-879.
, Lvolution du systme de contrle de lOrganisation internationale du
Travail in Le droit international lheure de sa codification Etudes en
lhonneur de Roberto Ago, 1987, vol. II, pp. 505-521.
, Once More About the ILO System of Supervision: In What Respect is it
Still a Model?, Mlanges H.G. Schermers, 1994, pp. 99-113.
, Des parallles qui devraient s rejoindre: les mthodes de contrle
international concernant les conventions sur les droits de lhomme,
Mlanges Rudolf Bernhardt, 1995, pp. 647-661.
Geraldo von Potobsky, On the spot visits: an important cog in the ILOs
supervisory machinery, International Labour Review, vol. 120, 1981,
pp. 581-596.
Andr Zenger, Les Droits de lHomme et le contrle de leur application au sein
de lOrganisation internationale du Travail in Vlkerrecht im Dienste des
Menschen-Festschrift fr Hans Haug, 1986, pp. 401-416.
292

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Protecting Labour Rights

as Human Rights: Present and Future

Proceedings of the International Colloquium

ILO Cataloguing in Publication Data

Graphic design, Switzerland BIP

Jean Charpentier, Le contrle par les organisations

In early 2006, the International Labour Standards Department of the Inter-

various sessions. Oral interventions, remarks and discussions were edited to

Friday, 24 November 2006 Morning session

I. MONITORING STATE COMPLIANCE WITH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

The Inter-American human rights system . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Friday, 24 November 2006 Afternoon session

II. RETHINKING METHODS, EVALUATING IMPACT ISSUES AND DILEMMAS

PANEL DISCUSSION EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION

Facing the realities of supervision of social rights:

Friday, 24 November 2006 Evening

DINNER ADDRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Saturday, 25 November 2006 Morning session

III. INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION AT THE TIME OF INSTITUTIONAL

A fresh start in human rights protection: The United Nations

Reforming the Council of Europes system of human rights

La fusion de la Cour de Justice de lUnion africaine

Saturday, 25 November 2006 Afternoon session

IV. FUTURE APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

Cdigos de conducta y regimenes voluntarios de cumplimiento:

PANEL DISCUSSION THE QUEST FOR NEW COMPLIANCE TOOLS:

Closing remarks The future of standards supervision:

Members of the ILO Committee of Experts (1927-2006) . . . . . . . . . 285

Statistics concerning the work of the ILO Committee of Experts

Selected bibliography on the ILO Committee of Experts . . . . . . . . . 291

Distinguished guests, distinguished members of the Committee of Experts,

consider it extremely dangerous to organize an improvised tribunal, a council of

Distinguished guests, contributors, participants, colleagues and also ILO

* Chairperson of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and

with as wide a representation of experience in different countries as possible. It

In conclusion, on behalf on my colleagues, I thank the Office and the ILO

Monitoring the 1966 International Covenant

It is a very happy occasion, indeed, for holding an international collo-

* Professor of Law, University of Mannheim; Vice-Chairperson, UN Committee on

II. Monitoring of Covenant Provisions

At the outset, I wish to briefly summarize the monitoring experience of the

1944 Philadelphia Declaration and the ILO Constitution, 4 refer to freedom of

III. General Comments

IV. Institutional Framework and Compliance

responds by submitting extensive answers to the list of issues. 13 In preparing

V. Indicators and Benchmarks

VI. Resource Allocation and Covenant Obligations

Obligations to fulfil embrace duties to inform, promote, educate about cer-

VII. Constructive Dialogue or Violations Approach?

In the literature, an elaborate discussion has taken place, drawing a dis-

VIII. An Optional Protocol for the Covenant

Since the establishment of an Open-ended working group on the elabora-

If an individual communications procedure were to exist, media attention

Je voudrais tout dabord souligner limportance du contexte dans lequel se

dont le fonctionnement repose sur lindpendance de ses titulaires de mandat

me permettent la fois de mettre en lumire diffrentes dimensions du racisme

Rapporteur spcial est libre dans le choix et la formulation des corrections,

rapports de visite, loppos de la pratique actuelle qui, en gnral, se limite

Budislav Vukas * Jaimerais que M. Dine revienne sur un point quil a