Law As An Autonomous Discipline
Law As An Autonomous Discipline
Law As An Autonomous Discipline
Introduction
Claims regarding the autonomy of law can be divided into four different categories which are
as follows:
While in the 20th century the law was considered as an autonomous discipline which could
not gain from the study of other disciplines, the situation is changing now. It is believed that
the study of law is supplemented by other disciplines and that the inter-disciplinary approach
would make the study of law more adequate and adept and helps it adapt to different
situations.
The concern for a separate discipline arises from the fact that it is felt that the distinct nature
of law would be lost if it is studied from an inter-disciplinary perspective. Thus, law should
be considered as a different and autonomous discipline.
This claim can be understood in three different ways. Descriptively, it can be considered as
an account of how the current practices in law are autonomous. Analytically, the purported
claim of autonomy can be analyzed to see whether it stands or not. Prescriptively: whether
the existing levels of autonomy should be replaced by increased or decreased levels of
dependence on other disciplines.
Legal Reasoning
It is understood that when legal reasoning is referred to as being autonomous, it does not
mean that it will not employ basic rules of logic and inference, which it does. So, all extreme
claims which either hold that law speaks in a language completely different from all others or
that there is no field of law and hence, no requirement of legal expertise, do not hold. It is
however, experienced that the reasoning in law is substantially different from other forms as
encountered in pure logic, morality or politics. It is based more on the rules of analogy and
precedents. So, it has a distinctive style which is seen in the form of institutional decision-
making, hierarchy of decision-makers and efforts to systematize rules. Being a set of rules for
practical action, it seeks to achieve coherence, consistency, stability and finality and aims to
be just and fair. Its functioning manifests in the form of statutory and constitutional
interpretation and the working of precedents.
However, legal reasoning can be differentiated from other forms of reasoning particularly,
because of the primary though not exclusive guidance which it finds in rules. It accords a
normative status to rules, agreements, promises and undertakings which is not seen in other
forms of reasoning.
This has different facets as well seen for example in common law judgments when a
particular law can be changed in a decision, creating a conflict between the existing rule of
law and the new one.
Another distinctive feature of legal reasoning is the use of analogy. It is important as well as
difficult to establish the difference between a persuasive and a non-persuasive ideology
because it determines the decision of a case.
The formalists consider law to be based on the logical deductions which are derived out of
the first legal concepts. Thus, decision-making by the Court would depend entirely on the
meaning of generic legal concepts as proposed by them.
The realists critique them by citing two reasons. The first one is that even though judges
claim the autonomy of law, they bring in factors from outside while deciding cases. This
according to Bix is a legitimate observation and something that the realists are capable of
commenting on. However, Bix does not believe that the realists know enough to make the
second point which is that there is an inherent indeterminacy in language as a result of which
it is impossible to give a complete definition of law.
According to this school, legal reasoning is indeed inadequate but if a well-founded lawyer or
judge works on a case then by virtue of his wisdom, insight and experience, he will be able to
give a distinctively legal response to every situation by deciding on the disputes and
evaluating the merits of law. Law thus, has a distinctive legal response to every situation
which is obtained by evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of different institutions of
decision-making.
However, this school fails because of three reasons. The first one is that it tries to achieve an
objective; it is not possible to define a particular objective for a legal system in neutral
terms. Secondly, it makes a number of value-laden assumptions about the human nature, most
of which do not hold actually. Thirdly, the social and policy sciences are still not developed
enough to give straightforward answers to the simplest of questions.
He goes on to talk about the CLS which is very radical in nature and considers law to be
rooted entirely in politics. He does not agree with their observation that judges use the
indeterminacy in legal rules to satisfy their political objectives as he believes that there exist
easy cases in which the result is not determined by this as well as right answers in a number
of hard cases.
Most importantly, he points out how textual interpretation which was considered to be an
example of legal autonomy is being challenged now. Earlier, it was believed that every term
has a distinct meaning in law but now with the advent of social choice and literary theory, it
is established that this claim is hardly true. In fact, the meaning and understanding associated
with each term has become more complex and indeterminate now.
Recent Developments
This section talks about Kelsens theory and autopoiesis. Not relevant. Read if you want to, it
is very small.
Textual interpretation