Coast Artillery Journal - Apr 1937
Coast Artillery Journal - Apr 1937
Coast Artillery Journal - Apr 1937
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ORDER FROM
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
By MAJOR EDWIN E. SCHWIEN, U. S. Army
Instructor at the Command and General Staff School (1932-36) ;
Graduate of bcole Superieure de Guerre (1932)
A frank expose of former fallacious military intelligence doctrines.
By means of numerous historical illustrations, it invites the reader's attention to the dangers of ap-
plying stereotyped tactical formulre to the solution of tactical situations in which the enemy is not
fixed, stupid or inanimate.
It shows the close and indispensable relation between Intelligence and the decisions of a commander.
The application of Intelligence principles to the operations of small units - a thing never before
attempted - is covered in two troop-leading chapters by actual historical situations.
There is a very detailed and logical exposition of the methods to be employed in the formulation of
reconnaissance missions with careful coordination of time-and-space factors.
Although written primarily for the use of small units of Infantry, this work should be
read by all officers whether on staff or command duty
124Pages HandsomeBinding 17Maps
$2.00 Postpaid
Contents
OUR COMMANDER IN CHIEF 98 243D C.A. (HD) WINS COAST ARTILLERY AS-
SOCIATION NATIONAL GUARD TROPHY 153
GUN DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT
ATTACK 99 COMMAND POST TRAILER 154
By Ma;or K. McCatty
WIRE-LAYING APPARATUS 155
AND THE FLOODS CAME 107 By Staff Sergeant Cletus L. Luebbe
By Captain Paschal N. Strong
COAST ARTILLERY ACTIVITIES 157
SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS OF THE Fort Monroe News Letter-Hawaiian News Letter
FUTURE 112 -Fort Totten News Letter-Panama News Letter
By Ma;or Charles W. Bundy -Corregidor News Letter-San Francisco Notes-
Washington Chapter-Fort Barrancas Notes.
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC AND MODERN WAR-II 116
By Captain J osePb I. Greene NEWS AND COMMENT 172
Pay Increase - Sound Preparedness-Seacoast De-
AN ARTILLERY EPIC 123 fenses - Colonel Charles J. Mund - Unnecessary
By Lieutenant W. J. Verbeck Secrecy-Spanish War-Bombardment Aviation-AA
Artillery-One Hundred Per Cent Subscribers-
A BATTLE OVER A BATTLE 126
Winston Churchill-Mastering the Air Peril-Long
THE WILL OF THE LEADER-III 127 Range Fire Control-Bombardment Aviation-
By Ma;or Ricbard G. Tindall Transportation for AA Searchlights-Transporta-
tion of AA Fire Control Equipment-Officers' Sta-
THE DISPERSION SLIDE RULE 137 tion List-A Public Benefactor-A Sense of Humor
By Captain N. A. Burnell or Both-Scholarships-Rensselaer Polytechnic Insti-
tute-Searchlight Battery, Battery A, 251st CA.
FLAG OF TRUCE 139 (AA)-Hq. Battery, 7th C.A.-Battery H, 241st
By Lieutenant Sewell T. Tyng CA. (HD)-Toulmin Trophy to 535th C.A.-
212th CA. Wins Hines' Trophy-Overhead Cover
FORT HANCOCK'S GUN No.2 142 for Fixed Armament-Gunners' Instruction Pam-
TRANSPORTATION PROGRESS 143 phlet Submarine Mining No. XII.
Opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in articles are solely tbose of tbe autbors and are in no sense official.
They sbould not be considered as tbose of tbe Cbief of Coast Artillery or any otber brand) of tbe War Department.
K
TIAIRCRAFT gun-
nery and the tech- Initial density of fire is es- but conclusions wi II be left
l~lore or less open to discus-
nique of fire at towed
targets have developed to the
sential to success for if we sion.
The airplane is free to ma-
stage where we must look to don't get him with the first neuver in three dimensions. It
the ordnance and the me-
chanics of the materiel rather burst we will be lucky if can turn and change its direc-
tion, its altitude and also vary
than to the science of its
service for any considerable
we get near him again. its forward speed. It can do
these things one at a time or
improvement. Before we Ratter ourselves that we have simultaneously and in almost any degree. Subject only to
solved the antiaircraft gun defense problem to the limits the limitations of large tight formation Ryjng, it can initi-
of the capabilities of the materiel, it may be well that we ate any or all of these maneuvers a split second after the
stop to consider the nature of our true target and its tac- impulse is given or the decision made. There is no use in
tics, what our chances are of getting in war the results' counting on modern bombers being limited in maneuver-
t!lat we have come to expect as a result of target prac- ability because this is not the case, for while they, of
tI,ces,and further, how best to employ tactically the pre- COutse, have a wider turning radius than smaller ships, the
CISeand powerful weapons that have been entrusted to us, advance of aerodynamic engineering has given these great
If the ~rend of th?ugl?t in our Corps may be judged by ships an ever-increasing speed, speed range and ceiling. It is
the artIcles appeanng 111 the JOURNAL, not much consider- somewhat needless to point out that any maneuver which
Jtion is being given to these questions for there have been is initiated or under way at the time the shell leaves the
dozens of articles on fire adj~lstment, preparation of fire gun will upset the calculations of the best director and
Jnd the like to everyone mentioning the true functions entirely confuse the best efforts at fire adjustment. So we
of ~h.etechnical processes in the tactical employment of should give thought to when and where maneuver can
antiaircraft gun batteries against hostile airplanes. The and will be employed by the airplane in its attempt to
fo.Howing is offered with the hope that thought may be avoid ground fire.
stlmu~ated concerning the employment of antiaircraft gun The two types of combat aviation which are normal
battenes when they are shootll1g at something even more targets for antiaircraft guns are observation and bombard-
lusive than the Knox Trophy. ment planes. Pursuit and low Rying attack planes, due to
The first proposition, whi.ch should be accepted without their characteristics and tactical employment, will seldom
argument, is that the tactics of the location and fire of anti- be targets for antiaircraft guns and therefore have no place
aircraft gun batteries must conform to the tactics of the in the planning of the gun defense. Our considerations
kostile aerial attack. As this attack is in turn predicated ~hould therefore be confined to observation and bombard-
n the nature of the objective ment planes and the prob-
i\\'ecan, to a large extent. able tactical evolutions of
Hetermine from our mission these two types on their
~ e correct tactical employ- normal missions.
tnt of our batteries. Facts Observation planes, by the
hich are generally accepted nature of their missions.
our service and which operate alone and are prob-
ar on this subject, and ably the onl~, type of plane
me facts which have been likelv to Rv solo over our
educed from personal ob- batt~ries. I~ will be shown
rvations will be presented later how unlikelv the solo
100 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
bombardment plane will be except as an element of a This is only an average value and vanes with the train-
force mission. In the observation plane the appointed ing of the crew and bombing conditions. It is, however,
cask is flown alone and at an altirude which will not be the time of rectilinear flight which we count on to get in
excessive, for obvious reasons. Even mapping missions our aimed fire. However, the plane must be placed on
are flown usually at altitudes not over 19,000 feet and only the line P-T by means of the bomb sight and between
under ideal conditions. The course on an observation P and A there will be some adjustment of direction to
mission will usually be fairly steady, for both visual and accomplish this. A is the point at which the direction is
photographic observation are upset by erratic flight. \Ve correct and the bomber is all set to pull the release. It is
are therefore likely to find observation planes flying more problematical how long B is before A and it may be an)'-
or less rectilinear courses at mid altitudes. Nothing is where from 0 to 45 seconds.
more important to the observation team than that they The m:lneuver between P and A will not be violent-
get b:lck with the inform:ltion they h:lve secured. \Vith merely adjustment of direction :It constant altitude. How-
the arrival of the first shell in the vicinity of the pbne we ever, the bet remains th:lt the only true rectilinear flights
may reasonably expect th:lt the pilot will immedi:ltely rbt there is any reason to count on is the flight from A
:lbandon his rectilinear flight and employ every m:lneu- to B. If our fire is adjusted on the basis of observed bursts
vcr he h:ls ever he:lrd of to :lvoid the shells he knows will on the course from P to A the :ldjustments will probably
follow. No amount of heroism will justify the observer- throw us off the course from A to B. It is on this pan
pilot letting himself be shot down if he C:ln :lvoid it. If of the course that our m:lximum effort must be concen-
we don't get him with the first burst we will be lucky trated. After dropping the bombs :It B the bomber should
if we ever get ne:lr him :lgain. \Vh:lt is required to b:lg l1:lve every re:lson to be quite sick of gunfire and there
our duck is :l trcmcndous burst of well aimcd hre right
:It thc starr, and maybe a little splattering :lround wouldn't
do :lny h:lrm. Thc obscrv:ltion pbne is :l t:lrgct of oppor-
tunity whosc probable route of :lpproach cannot be pre-
dictcd. :lnd the t:lctical cmploymcnt of :lntiaircraft guns
whcn comb:lting them revolves around the simple prob-
or larger target will \'ar)' with the well known mles. Also
the above conclusions would be affected by increased ac-
curacy of the new bomb sight. Calculations of this nature
are accepted by bombardment tacticians as arbitrarily dic-
tating the employment of large bombardment forces in
the attack of any objective which is worthy of the risk
of an expensive bombardment plane, to say nothing of its
PATH OF SINGLE PLANE, BOMBING TARGET "T:' AND USI NG FREE MANEUVER TO
AVOID A.A. GUN FIRE
LATERAL SPEED
VECTOR (40 MPH)
OF' CROSS WIND
- ---------------~
T
p: POINT WHERE FREE MANEUVER IS ABANDONED
A: POINT WHERE DIRECTION IS CORRECT TO HIT TARGET. "T"
B: BOMB RELEASE POINT
FIGURE I.
102 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
hindered to his attack on the target. The tactics of the de-
fense must contemplate:
I. The destruction of the maximum number of air-
planes.
2. The prevention of precise sighting operation in the
A-B zone, by the concentration of fire on all planes enter-
ing this zone.
3. Provisions agJinst the defensive bJtteries going Out
of action through over-heating before the last element of
the attack formation is engaged.
A definite area objective is one in which its vulnerability
is more or less evenly distributed over an area of well de-
fined limits and in which the maximum results can best be
obtained by a distribution of bombs over the entire area.
Such an objective is an oil tank farm, an airdrome, a
cantonment, an ammunition dump or a factory area. To
assure coverage with bombs, the simplest and most ef-
fective method is to fly over the objective along one of its
SCALE
axes, in a formation the width of which is the width of
I I
I MIN. FLIGHT. 3 MILES. 100 SHOTS FROM ONE the area. The bombs are dropped in trail at predetermined
BATTERY intervals. on signal from the formation leader, in whose
FIGURE 2. plane the sighting operation is performed. The number of
GUN DEFENSE - EXTENSION. planes employed is determined not by the laws of proba-
Objective one mile in diameter. bility but by the area of the objective and by the bomb
Bomb Release Line 2.700 yards from the objective, based on bom- density or amount of destruction desired. A large number
bardment from 15.000 feet altitude by plane flying 180 miles of small bombs are most effective against this type of objec.
per hour.
tive and the distribution is gained by the shape of the
One Minute Flight Line 5.280 yards from the Bomb Release
Line. formation and the bombing interval. As accuracy is nor
Batteries arranged to give maximum coverage to the critical zone. essential, such an attack may be expected from the maxi-
Course A: 110 shots can be fired on incoming plane from one mum altitude and either by day or night. The necessary
battery. illumination for night operations will normally be pro-
COl1rse B: 100 shots can be fired on incoming plane from one
vided by accompanying observation.
battery, 20 shots from another; total 120 shots.
Course C: 62 shots can be fired on incoming plane from each of The vulnerability to gun fire of bombardment flying in
two batteries; total 124 shots. close formation is accepted and consequently this method
will not be employed in the attack of a well defended ob.
atmospheric conditions. New bomb sights greatly reduce jective. When bombardment aviation is forced by enemy
this probable error. Since bombing at night will present pursuit aviation and antiaircraft artillery to resort to spe-
illumination and navigation difficulties, night attacks will cial night operations against this eype of objective, it will
be made normally on point objectives only when the defen- employ a scheme of maneuver designed to confuse and
sive measures render day attacks too expensive and when confound the sound locators, the searchlights and the gun-
the objective is of real vital military importance. The ef-
fectiveness of night bombing on point objectives has not
been demonstrated.
Tactical employment of guns in defense of a point ob-
jective.calls for concentration of fire on a succession of tar-
gets, the bursts of fire to be short and of maximum in-
tensity and the time allowable for shifts to subsequent
targets a minimum. A barrage might be established if the
axes of the attack were known in advance, but with the
time factors as they are the best hope lies in aimed fire.
Certainly in this eype of action the results to be expected
from adjustment of fire in pursuing anyone target are not
encouraging because there will never be time enough if
subsequent targets are to be engaged. The doctrine of
bombardment is to accept the losses which may be neces-
sary if by so doing the mission is accomplished. A defense
will not be effective if the last bomber gets through un- Boeing PurSllits, 34th Squadron, Corona, Cal.
GUN DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT ATTACK 103
1937
ners. Several such schemes have been worked oue by our
own air corps. It can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of
the tactician that any intelligently directed attack against
a well defended objective of definite area will have the
following general features:
I. Confinement of the attack to a comparatively nar-
row sector with the axis of attack along the line where
the antiaircraft defense is thought to be weakest with a
view of permitting the engagement of bue the minimum
number of defensive batteries. C 125 S
2. Simultaneous employment of three or more attack-
ing elements with a view of causing the antiaircraft bat-
teries to concentrate on one element of the attack while
the others proceed to the accomplishment of the mission.
3- Freedom of maneuver to the last possible moment
with a view of minimizing the chance of hits when ob-
served and fired on.
4. High coordination. It was once conceived that the
final attack would be delivered from all altitudes and SCALE
angles of approach, in order that the complete absence of
system confuse the defense. Such an attack by a large I MIN. FLIGHT. 3 MILES. 100 SHOTSfROM ONE BATTERY
force would cause danger of collision and loss, and by FIGURE 3, •
spreading over a wider sector they would come under the GUN DEFENSE - CONCENTRATION.
fire of batteries which might otherwise be forced to remain Objective one mile in diameter.
out of action. Bomb Release Line 2,700 y.ards from the objective, based on bom-
bardment from [5,000 feet altitude by plane flying [80 miles
Further consideration of the gun defense of a definite
per hour.
area can best be taken up after disposing of the remain- Batteries withdrawn to the perimeter of the objective.
ing type of objective. CO/lrse A: Incoming plane comes under fire of one battery fot
The indefinite area objective is one whose limits are im- 37 seconds, and two more batteries for 20 seconds, a total
posed more by the amount of materiel available for its of [27 shots fired.
COllrse l3: Incoming plane comes under fire of one battery for
defense than by its exact area. An example of this eype
35 seconds, one battery for 24 seconds, and a third battery
is a city where the number of gun batteries and other de-
for [6 seconds. A total of 125 shots can be fired.
fensive means available determine how much of the su- COllrse C: Incoming plane comes under fire of two batteries for
burbs can be included within the defensive cordon. The 30 seconds and a third battery for IS seconds. A total of
forward area of a field army, with certain restrictions, is [25 shots can be fired.
objective, do not control, and the routes are not restricted, sents a gun defense of an objecrive one mile in diameter.
the bombardment attack is led into and out of the de- The bomb release line is placed 2,700 yards from the ob-
fended zone on the line along which the smallest number jective, which is approximately correct for a ISo mile-per-
of antiaircraft shells can be delivered. The selection of hour bomber at 15,000 feet. The critical zone for one
this line or axis is a matter of simple calculation, and re- minute of Hight is 5,280 yards wide. In order to give the
quires only a scale made to conform to the scale of the maximum coverage to the critical zone, and at the same
map, with divisions of one hundred shots per minute of time afford mutual support, the batteries are placed sym-
flight (25 rounds per gun per minute). With the AA metrically 6,000 yards apart, which brings them just in-
gun batteries plotted, each with its 6,000 yard radius of side the BRL. Around each battery has been drawn a small
effective fire, the scale is applied in various positions and circle (1,000 yards diameter) representing the dead space
that axis selected along which the minimum number of at 15,000 feet and a larger circle, in broken line, repre-
shells can be delivered from all the batteries. The results senting approximately the dead space at maximum alti-
of this procedure often indicate as the weakest line of the tude.
defense an axis which from a casual examination of the A scale is prepared on the basis of 100 shots per minute
dispositions would seem to be the strongest. As will be of Hight. Applying this scale to Course A, coming in di-
shown later, an extension of the defense in the expected rectly over the bartery, it will be seen that IIO shots can
direction of attack may have an effect entirely opposite to be fired at the target before it reaches the BRL if the bat-
the one intended, when subjected to examination by this tery dead area is not considered, and 105 if it is. On this
method. Antiaircraft gun batteries are usually sited on the course only one battery can fire up to the time the plane
presumption that the bombardment attack will probably reaches the BRL, so any additional targets coming in dose
be deliver~d from a certain direction, while bombardment to Course A will not be fired on. Furthermore, the last
tactics are designed to exploit any weakness in the dispo- twenty seconds of the flight will be under conditions that
sition of the batteries, whose positions will be known or are increasingly unfavorable to accurate fire, due to the
predicted in advance. angular height. Now consider Course B about thirty de-
The gun defense will not be considered in detail. It is grees from A. On this course one battery can fire for one
not the purpose of this discussion to go into the question ot minute, or' 100 rounds and another battery about 20
how many guns there should be per director, or any other rounds, making a total of 120 rounds. On Course C the
organizational or equipment problems, but simply to ex- plane comes under fire of two batteries simultaneously.
amine into the proper tactical use of antiaircraft artillery, each being capable of firing 62 rounds before the BRL is
organized and equipped as it now is, in the light of our reached. From the above it is quite obvious that Course
knowledge of the proposed aerial attack. Take, for ex- A is the line of weakest defense and Course C is the
ample, a simple geometric defense established by a three strongest.
battery regiment in accordance with the present doctrine Cooperation of attack aviation with bombardment will
and measure its chances of success against the bombard- be discussed later at more length. It is obvious that, if such
ment attack. The only deviation from the basic data pre- cooperation can be made effective, Course A lends itself
sented in the CAFM will be that bombardment must be particularly to the success of the bombardment mission,
conceded the speed and altitude it has now unquestionably because only one battery must be neutralized to entirely
attained. Also in the interest of exactness it is necessary to eliminate the antiaircraft defense. Unquestionably it will
take into consideration the dead space existing over a be chosen as the axis of attack. Even if the enemy is un-
battery. The disc of 6,000 yard radius accepted as the field able to definitely locate the batteries, there exist three
of fire of an AA battery is in reality a ring, with a hole ap- weak lines of defense and one of these lines is vety likely
proximately 1,000 yards in diameter (at 15,000 feet alti- to be the line along which we expect to meet the enemy
tude) which is an important factor in the measuring of the by our greatest extension.
strength of an AA defense by the methods of the bom- The inherent weaknesses of the arrangement of gun
bardment tactician. batteries as shown in Figure 2 ate .as follows:
Any established gun defense of a small objective is a I. Only one battery can engage the attacking planes if
compromise between extension and concentration. Our they come in along the axis of attack which would nor-
present tactical doctrine favors extension. Quote, CAFM: mally be selected by the enemy if his intelligence service
"If batteries are available in addition to those required to is adequate.
cover a critical zone of the normal width of one minute of 2. While the extension of the batteries permits the en-
flight, this additional strength should be utilized in such a
gagement of targets for more than one minute of Hight for
way as to increase the depth of the defense-to I}Iz minutes
of flight or more--all portions of this wider zone--covered by approximately half of the perimeter, the outer third of this
the fire of at least one battery." fire will be at targets which are free to maneuver. Thus the
In the light of our knowledge of bombardment tactics, advantage of extension is lost in parr by the difficulty of
it is desired to present a comparative analysis of extension firing at a maneuvering target.
and concentration as a basic principle of defense. 3, Not more than two of the three batteries can partici-
The principle of extension will be considered first as it pate in the defense in the critical zone on any axis of ap-
is in keeping with our published doctrine. Figure 2 repre- proach.
1937 GUN DEFENSE. AGAINST BOMBARDMENT ATTACK 105
4, Along the weak line of defense, the dead area of the cated in the first defense, it would seem that they have
most favorably located battery is entered just at the time been corrected.
the battery should be capable of delivering its most ef- I. There is no weak line of defense and consequently
fective fire, i. e., at the bomb release line. The fire of this no indicated best axis of attack. On all avenues of approach
battery cannot be utilized to prevent the target from pro- the fire of three batteries will be received before reaching
ceeding to a point from which other parts of the objective the bomb release line and three target planes can be fired
can be bombed. on simultaneously. The neutralization of all three bat-
Consider a defense in which the principle of concentra- teries by attack aviation is necessary before the gun defense
tion is predominate as shown in Figure 3, The same objec- is neutralized. On all lines of attack the defense is as
tive, one mile in diameter is defended by three gun bat- str?ng as the best defense offered by the extended bat-
teries. The bomb release line is again 2,700 yards from the tenes.
objective. Acting on the assumption that the attacking 2. While extension has been sacrificed a much greater
bomber will fly a rectilinear course for 20 seconds prior to volume of fire can be delivered in the zone in which the
the BRL, a circle indicating this zone is drawn. For 180 bomber is forced to fly in rectilinear flight.
mph bombers this zone will be one mile wide. The bat- 3, All three batteries participate in the defense against
teries are located symmetrically on the perimeter of the an attack from any direction.
objective. Analyzing this defense by the same line of 4. The dead area over a battery is not entered by any
reasoning as the former, the following is disclosed. target plane which is still an immediate threat against
I • Targets coming in on Course A can be fired on by any part of the objective. All the fire against approaching
one battery for 37 seconds, 61 shots, and by two batteries planes will be delivered at favorable angular heights.
for 20 seconds, 33 shots, each. A total of 127 shots. The It is evident that the searchlight problem in support of
20 second zone is covered by the fire of all three batteries. the concentrated defense is much simpler.
2. Targets coming in on Course B can be fired on by In the organization of the Air Force, attack aviation is
one battery for 35 seconds, 58 shots, the second battery 24 made an organic part of the Air Division for the purpose
seconds, 40 shots, and the third battery 16 seconds, 27 of facilitating the support of bombardment in the attack
shots. A total of 125 shots. The 20 second zone is covered on an objective defended by antiaircraft artillery. The
by the fire of two batteries and the last 16 seconds of it object of this support is the neutralization of the artillery
by three. either immediately prior to the arrival of the bombardment
3, Targets coming in on Course C can be fired on by or immediately after the guns disclose their positions by
two batteries for 30 seconds, 50 shots each and one battery opening fire. Neutralization is effected by blinding the bat-
for 15 seconds, 25 shots. A total of 125 shots. The 20 teries by smoke screens or by direct assault with fragmen-
second zone can be covered by the fire of two batteries tation bombs, chemical spray and machine-gun fire or the
and the last 15 seconds by three. combination of these means which offers the best chance
The above is based on the assumption that all the at- of success in the particular situation. The strength as-
tacking planes are bombing the near edge of the objective. signed to a mission is in the general proportion of one
If the attack is directed at the center of the target, an in- flight element of 3 attack planes to each battery to be
crease of fifty shots is possible on all axes of attack as the neutralized, or, in daylight actions, three flight elements
dead space of no battery will be entered until the bomber (nine airplanes) to each two batteries. The assaulting
has passed beyond the danger zone. strength which can thus be brought to bear on a gun
There is little to choose from in these three courses in battery is consequently in excess of the organic defensive
selecting the axis of attack. Along all three approximately strength of the gun battery and it would seem to follow
the same number of shells will be delivered and three that a gun battery would not offer sustained resistance to a
batteries engaged. Course A presents the greatest exten- bombardment attack effectively supported by attack avia-
sion and the fire of all the batteries completely covers the tion unless the attack aviation could itself be neutralized.
20 second zone. Along Course C the fire of two batteries is Obviously, the simplest means of accomplishing this
encountered at tlle same point well outside the 20 second would be to withdraw the gun batteries as deeply into the
zone and the third just inside. An even more effective de- machine-gun defense of the objective as possible and still
fense would result if the batteries were withdrawn 5 permit them to perform their missions. This consideration
seconds inside the perimeter of the objective in which case would favor withdrawing the gun batteries to the peri-
all parts of the twenty second zone would be covered by meter of the objective or within it even in situations in-
the fire of three batteries. It will require the neutralization volving objectives of large area where this withdrawal
of all the gun batteries to eliminate the gun defense. In would not present the advantages indicated in the second
examining this defense the bombardment tactician will defensive arrangement discussed above. This is entirely in
be forced to select his axis of attack on the basis of some accord with the conclusions drawn from the comparison
other reason than the weak line in the defense. of extension and concentration methods of siting the gun
It appears that the principle of concentration has defi- batteries.
nite advantages over the principle of extension in the de- In the endeavor to ascertain whether any tactical con-
fense. Taking in order the weaknesses which were indi- clusions could be drawn from the actual performance of
106 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-April
gun batteries firing under different target practice con- fired on, but if such was the case it would only support
ditions, an analysis of all the practices of the year 1934 the argument in favor of concentrating the bulk of the fire
was made. The 1934 records were the latest that were in the zone of certain rectilinear Hight. The indications of
available. The first presumption made in the analysis was these data are that, even with batteries of two guns firing
that one hit is all that is necessary to destroy or drive back under the 1934 conditions, by far the greater number of
a plane. A hit, unless it is accidental, indicates that the targets were hit well within the twenty seconds of Hight
target is in the hitting area. If it in itself is not conclusive, which is the allowed limit in the concentrated defense, and
it will be immediately followed by others. The other pre- there is a reasonable expectancy that with batteries of four
sumption was that a battery can open fire at such a time guns firing at their maximum rate, the time required to get
that the first shot can arrive at the target at the maximum the first hit would be materially reduced.
range. The first object was then to find out how much There are not enough data to draw any definite con-
time is required to get the first necessary hit, and then to clusion as to the tactical effectiveness of fire in comparison
discover any other generalities that would have a bearing to slant range. The following analysis is, however, pre-
on tactical employment. sented for what it is worth:
There is no need of tabulating all the data extracted, but r-0 Dei1'ee Courses~ r-90 Degree Coorses~
CoUI'lles
hll Hits to Cour.e. hit Hit. to
the results are interesting and a recapitulation is given to courses total shots to courses total shots
T
HE great Ohio flood of
1937 has passed. Ri ver
The papers raised the were working without regard to
hours, food, or sleep. And as the
towns have emerged from
the debris, and although a bit
cry of red tape. flood waters rose to heights that
drowned out all previous high
punch-drunk, have taken a tuck records, the engineer units scat-
in their belts and set about rebuilding their homes and tered up and down the river becam~ nuclei of civilian
restoring their economic lives. The papers have been full relief organizations.
of the activities of the Red Cross, the WPA, disaster com- The mission of the Army Engineers during flood emer-
mittees, state organizations, and other civilian agencies gencies is twofold: First, they must protect government
whose energetic and essential activities have been duly property, which in this case represented millions of dollars'
reported to the public through the proper publicity de- worth of floating plant and lock and dam installations.
partments. Second, they may render all possible assistance to local
But what of the Army? Vas you dere, Sharlie? Or vas authorities whenever requested. The first phase of this
you too busy to tell the newspapers about it? mission is simple, well-defined, and reasonably easy to
The Army was there-very much there-with its en- execute. The second phase is complex and vague, and
gineers, its signal troops, its doughboys, its transporta- though capable of elastic interpretation it must be kept in
tion, its medical units. In one way or another, practically bounds or the engineer department would become the
every arm and service was represented. Only one thing s?le custodian of the relief problems of river communi-
did the Army forget to bring with it - a publicity de- ties.
partment. When the great flood struck, the Army Engineers from
The Army was there. Let's look back and see what it river foreman to division engineer found themselves under
did. If, in this backward glance, the Engineers seem to tremendous pressure to forget their mission and accede to
loom too large, let the reader remember that the writer the demands of certain communities that they move in
was on duty with the Army Engineer headquarters at the and take charge. Only by withstanding this pressure could
Ohio River division office, and is inclined to write what they prevent their vessels from being "frozen" to thos~
he saw rather than what someone else saw. localities that made the most noise. Only by adhering
The beginning of the flood found the engineer fleets in to their mission could they dispose their floating plant
winter guarters, undergoing annual repairs. The flood it- and personnel to lend maximum assistance to the suffer-
self found every available engineer hull, from the lowliest ing valley.
skiff to the mightiest dredge, on active duty twenty-four The Engineers have permanent offices or sub-offices
hours a day. The personnel of every engineer district along the Ohio River at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; 1vfar-
108 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
ietta, Ohio; Huntington, West Virginia; Cincinnati, the Engineers could furnish the steamboats and the river
Ohio; Louisville, Kentucky; Owensboro, Kentucky; and barges needed to transport large quantities of food and sup-
Paducah, Kentucky. In addition, there are forty-nine locks plies. Hence they soon found themselves doing the bulk
and dams along the Ohio, manned with personnel and of river supply for stranded communities.
small floating plant. Some of these locks and dams were They did more than that. Their towboats stood by at
used as engineer bases. To supplement these bases, ad- sizable towns where only roof tops showed above the
ditional offices were set up at Tell City, Indiana; Evans- waters, and evacuated the stranded population to places
ville, Indiana; Golconda, Illinois; and other places. Thus that could be reached by road. Their smaller boats roamed
the river was studded with nerve-centers. among the inundated farm lands, carrying the farmers
Engineer problems during flood pivot on information, and the farmers' daughters to safety.1 Their flatboats as-
evacuation, and supply. In the lower Ohio these prob- sisted in removing live stock to high ground. In Cin-
lems were accentuated by the parti:ll or complete isola- cinnati, where a $3,000,000 fire was caused by a gasoline
tion of the river towns. NIany of these towns were built storage rank floating away and igniting, they battled with
on river bluffs higher th:ln the immediate interior. The other g:lsoline tanks to secure them or haul them to safety.
result W:lSthat highway :lnd r:lilw:lY communication were But it was :It places like Paducah where a concentration
severed first, with telegr:lph and telephone lines soon fol- of engineers and engineering facilities prevented a catas-
lowing. Consequently, these towns, confirmed in the trophic loss of life. Fortunately there was a large engineer
belief that it was contr:lry to n:lture for a flood to go higher sub-office, repair yard, and depot at Paducah. The big
than it ever had before, suddenly found themselves, first, dredges, towbo:lts, barges, survey boats, quarter-boats,
completely isolated, :lnd second, huddling in second launches, :lnd other items of plant were in for the winter.
stories and attics to keep their feet dry. The city, with about 25,000 inhabitants, was nearly
In order to keep informed of the needs of river towns, 100% flooded. Evacuation in large numbers in a mini-
the river was divided into sections which were patrolled mum time was essential. And the Army engineers, in
daily by fast boats. These p:ltrols kept in touch with charge of a vast fleet of small boats which arrived from
designated engineer bases, and the inform:ltion tlms gained hundreds of miles around, took over the job and saw it
was transmitted to the Red Cross and other interested safely through.
3gencies. Then the cry for boats beg:ln. Boats and more So far we have given a thumbnail sketch of the non-
boats. The Engineers furnished bO:lts and crews to the military activities of the Army. There remain the military
limit of their capacity. The Coast Guard shipped in hun- 3ctivities and these involved Regular troops, the National
dreds. Priv:lte bO:lt owners don:lted generously. But only Guard, Reserve units, the ROTC, and the CCc. With
the exception of the Regulat troops, all of these units could
be brought into action with a little impetus from local and
state authorities. But the participation of federal troops
in local situations is definitely restricted by law, by regu-
lation, and by'policy. Before picturing the activities of
federal troops in such critical situations as existed at Louis-
ville, a brief review of these restrictions may be in order.
The law says in part:
It is unlawful to employ any part of the Army of the
United States, as a posse comitatHs or otherwise, for the pur-
pose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under
such circumstances as such employment of said force may be
expressly authorized by the Constitution or by Act of Con-
gress.
The penalty for violation of this law is a fine not exceed-
ing $10,000, or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or
both.
The regulations, of course, repeat these legal restrictions,
and outline a very definite procedure to follow before fed-
eral troops may enter the local scene. This procedure is
based on the provisions of the Constitution and on various
Acts of Congress. Stripped of legal hocus-pocus it boils
down to the following essentials:
( 1) The President alone may otder federal military par-
ticipation in local situations.
(2) Such participation will normally be resorted to
when illegal violence must be met by a show of force.
P1ctures. hlc.
Militarist - 1937, 1\Vonder what happened to the farmers' sons ?-ED.
1937 AND THE FLOODS CAME 109
(3) The request for such participation must be made
to the President by the legislature of the state involved,
or, w~en the legislature is not convened, by the state
executive.
(4) In emergencies due to public calamity which dis-
rupts the normal process of government, where it is dan-
aerous to await instructions, an officer of the Army may
~ke such action as the circumstances of the case appear
to require, and as he may reasonably expect to be able to
justify before the civil courts upon a plea of necessity.
(5) Troops cannot be directed to act under the orders
of any civil officer.
(6) The use of troops should end the moment the
necessity for them ceases.
Bearing these essentials in mind, let us now see where
the military forces of the Army were, and what they did.
The garrisons nearest to the scene of action were Fort
Thomas, Kentucky; Fort Hayes, Ohio; Fort Knox, Ken-
tucky; Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; Fort Sheridan,
!llinois; and Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. Each of these
posts formed a reservoir of federal troops and essential sup-
plies, such as tentage, cots, bedding, and the like.
Early flood predictions gave little cause for alarm. There
was no reason to believe that a flood of catastrophic pro-
portions was just around the corner. The water on the
ground, plus the precipitation that could be foreseen, led Pictures, Inc.
only to the belief that a mildly exciting flood was on the Chow Line.
way, and that the usual lowlands would be flooded out in
the usual manner . the state executive, or the Army's hands were tied.
And then, for nearly a week, the heavens opened in . As soon as the reports of the staff officers began coming
riotous abandon, and the valley awoke to the fact that an 10, the several corps areas were able to differentiate be-
unprecedented flood was upon them. The trickle of re- tween hysteria and need, and recommendations flashed to
quests to army posts for transportation and supplies sud- Washington. Soon the Regulars were speeding to the
denly swelled to a deluge of urgent appeals. The Army, critical points-Frankfort, Louisville, Paducah, and south-
recalling the Mississippi flood of 1927' swung into action. ern Illinois. And the most critical of these was Louisville.
The National Guard, the Officers' Reserve Corps, and A very delic.at~ situation ~ad arisen in Louisville. A city
the CCC were already in the field, and Regular troops of a quarter-million population suddenly found itself three-
were issued warning orders. Staff officers from the corps quarters subm?rged, with all power and water gone, and
areas involved were dispatched on reconnaissances by blanketed at Olght by desolate darkness. No fire or police
motor, by rail, and by plane. The supply organization signals functioned - but for that matter little could be
of the Army found itself on a war-time basis, and the large done had the signals functioned. The threat of pestilence
depots hummed with more activity than they had experi. hung over the population, looting was prevalent, and the
enced since the war. people panicky. Pares of the city, higher than the rest,
Then, as the cities found themselves without light, were islands, their darkened streets and buildings jammed
power, or heat, panic set in. Local police protection be- with refugees. In other parts of the city upper stories
came woefully inadequate; looting commenced, and housed those die-hards who had refused to be evacuated,
some sizable communities tottered on the brink of an- and who therefore had to be furnished food and water.
archy. National Guard troops, though doing yeoman No blame can be attached to the mayor of the city when,
service, were insufficient in numbers. The Reserve Corps foreseeing this emergency, he remembered the Regular
had no troops. Inevitably came the call for the Regulars. troops at Fort Knox, thirty miles out, and sent out an
Some of the calls were based on hysteria, some on an im- 50S.
proper conception of the functions of federal troops, and Now from such records as are available, it appears that
some on a very real need. It became the duty of Corps the mayor at first wanted the Regulars to move in, take
Area to appraise these requests and to keep Washington over the city and declare martial law. When he was in-
informed. One of the most difficult things was to con- formed that such a request would have to come from the
vince various municipalities that the request of the city governor, he suggested that the troops move in and operate
fathers direct to the Army could not get the Regulars under the civilian authorities. This, under the law, was
there. The requests had to be made by the legislature or manifestly impossible.
110 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-April
At once the papers raised the cry of red tape and lack of was wild talk of a general jailbreak, and the heavily
cooperation on the part of the Army. This, in spite of the burdened people thought they faced an additional tribula-
fact that prior to the mayor's call the Regulars at Knox tion-hundreds of desperados loose in the city. An im-
had been busy evacuating West Point, Kosmosdale, and provised tent city for the convicts, surrounded only by
other river towns, in issuing supplies where needed, and barbed wire, was not calculated to reassure the citizenry,
in caring for thousands of rerugees at the post. Fortunately, so the Regulars were dispatched to assist the National
a proposal was soon worked out whereby the Regulars Guard and state troopers in keeping order.
moved into Louisville in a cooperative capacity. Returning to the Ohio again, we find Paducah in the
At the same time, the need for communication between state of Hood siege previously described. Long before the
the isolated parts of the city and the high ground of the crest of the Hood arrived, the city was completely inun-
interior became apparent, and a request was sent out for dated, and the city manager and the Hood committee
a regular engineer company with pontoon equipment. radioed a request to the governor, through the Engineer
Fort Belvoir, Virginia was the neatest Engineer post, and officer on the scene, for federal troops. National Guard
Company B, 5th Engineers, was immediately dispatched. troops were on hand, and the need for federal troops was
The need for medical troops was growing rapidly, and not apparent at that time. As the waters continued to
Company G of the 1st Medical Regiment was sent from rise, the request was repeated, and Companies Band C,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 2d Infantry, were dispatched to Paducah from Fort Sheri-
By the time the Louisville situation reached its gravest dan. There they cooperated with local authorities, estab-
phase, the following Regular troops were in Louisville: lished a tent camp, assisted in police, and helped handle
( I ) Troop A, 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) from Fort the never-ending stream of refugees.
Knox with additional scout cars from Brigade Head- The Army made extended preparations in southern
quarters and Headquarters 68th Field Artillery. These Illinois to handle the refugees from the towns of the lower
armored cars and other vehicles assisted in evacuation, and Ohio. The burden of these preparations fell on the 6th
cooperated with local police and National Guard troops Infantry at Jefferson Barracks, which responded promptly
in patrolling such parts of the city as were out of water. and efficiently. Several CCC camps in lower Illinois were
Their radio equipment proved particularly valuable. at once made ready to care for refugees, and the Regulars
(2) Truck transportation from the 68th Field Artillery. took the field with their troops, trains, and supplies.
In addition to the usual transportation mission, these Companies A and E of the 6th Infantry were at Camp
t'rUckswere of use in handling heavy electrical equipment Anna. Company B was at Camp Marion, and detach-
which materially speeded up the return of light and ments of the 6th were at camps at Hutchins, Carbondale,
power. and other places. Overland evacuation was accomplished
(3) Maintenance detachments of Quartermaster and by the 6th from the towns of Villa Ridge, Mound City,
Ordnance personnel. Homestead, Rosiclare, and Metropolis. An emergency
(4) A composite battalion of the IIth Infantry from hospital was set up at Marion with doctors and nurses to
Fort Benjamin Harrison. These troops were used largely care for the sick among the refugees, and a Signal Corps
for police duty. detachment assisted the engineer base at Golconda in
(5) Company B, 5th Engineers, from Fort Belvoir, keeping in touch with engineer rescue work up and down
Virginia. This outfit brought heavy pontoon equipment, the river. It should be mentioned that all of this was done
transportation, and a water purification truck. The dis- in cooperation with the National Guard of Illinois, and
tances to be spanned exceeded the length of the pontoon that a National Guard Engineer company from Chicago,
bridge, and pontoon fetries were used to ferry supplies, with pontoon equipment, was of great assistance in main-
mail, and refugees. The water purification unit proved taining overbnd communication from the river base at
invaluable. This company also constructed a tent camp Golconda. The CCC personnel and facilities were also of
for refugees. prime help.
(6) Company G, 1st Medical Regiment, from Carlisle Although the presence of Federal troops was evident in
Barracks. This company was largely engaged in super- a relatively small number of cities,-the Army's contribu-
intending sanitary measures and rendering medical aid. tion of essential supplies was a major factor in alleviating
Leaving Louisville for the moment, we find Company suffering along the entire valley. Among the supplies
K of the loth Infantry en route from Fort Thomas, Ken- dispatched to the Hooded states in the Fifth Corps Area
tucky to the state capital at Frankfort. Frankfort is on the were ~,ooo blankets, 42,000 cots, 26,000 mattresses,
Kentucky River, whose Hoodwaters were rushing down to 23,000 bed sacks, and thousands of such items as pillows,
swell the Ohio. A sudden storm of cloud-burst proportions comforts, socks, raincoats, hip boots, overcoats, mess
sent a Hash crest down the already swollen river, and tents, large tents, canteens and cups, sheets, clothing,
water began rising ominously in the cells of the state peni- towels, shoes, and candles. These supplies were issued
tentiary. The prisoners had to be removed in a hurry-or from depots to the Red Cross and other relief agencies,
drown. The evacuation was handled by National Guard and do not include those that the troops carried directly in
troops, but the imperative haste made close supervision the field. The Fifth Corps Area issued similar items for
impossible and several prisoners escaped. For a time there the lower river. and the Fourth Corps Area contributed
1937 AND THE FLOODS CAME 1 11
to the Mississippi area. It is safe to say that witl10ut these labor in transporting food, supplies, boats, etc.
supplies which were promptly made available to relief Procurement of food supplies and distribution to relief
agencies, the suffering among refugees would have in- centers.
creased tremendously and the death rate would have Custody and care of government property.
soared ..
Service on relief committees of various sorts.
The story of the Army in the flood would not be com- Establishment of sub-bases along the river to furnish
plete without mention of the Officers' Reserve Corps. In liaison between engineer boats and local relief agencies.
each flooded community there was a great need of large Establishment of message centers to coordin:lte city and
numbers of responsible individuals, working in a going relief agencies.
org:mization, and trained to leadership. The Officers' Re- The CCC has a large part on the Army canvas. Every
serve Corps exactly filled that need, and responded un- camp in the long, broad zone of the Ohio River laid aside
selfishly to the demands m:lde upon them. The procedure its norm:ll functions and turned to rescue work. Supplies
adopted in Cincinn:lti W:lS typical of that in effect in were sent out, evacuation assisted, herculean labors ac-
every large community. City officials :lnd relief agencies complished in keeping roads open, and bcilities est:lb-
were contacted and the assist:lnce of the Regular officers ished to provide food :lnd shelter for thousands of the
in ch:lrge of Reserves proffered, together with such Re- homeless. ~v[otor tr:lnsportation from camps outside of the
serve officers as might volunteer. Then a letter W:lS sent zone of activity W:lSmobilized :lnd disp:ltched to the front.
by special messenger to all Reserve officers, requesting To the ch:lrge that the N:ltional GU:lrd, the CO:lst
volunteers. The response was immedi:lte. In Cincinnati, Guard, and other agencies have been neglected in this
over 500 out of 700 officers volunteered. These officers account, the writer must plead that he is dealing only
furnished a splendid example of te:lmwork by voluntarily with the narrative of the Regular Army. No one is more
pbcing themselves under the direction of responsible he:lds aware than he of the splendid part they played, no one
of relief org:lnizations. A p:lrti:lliist of the type of service more appreciative of the whole-hearted cooperation with
rendered is indic:ltive of their achievements: which they worked side by side with the Regulars during
Supervision of refugee stations which were est:lblished the emergency. Come wh:lt m:lY, the Regulars ask no
in schools, churches, and other public buildings. more than the privilege of ag:lin working side by side
Superintendence of volunteer and government relief with their g:lliant comrades of the late high water.
H
EADLINES such as
"Great Britain to Refort-
Overhead Protection vided \vith major caliber long
range batteries for firing on bat-
ify Hong Kong, Singa- from Hostile Aviation tleships, and medium and minor
pore, and Home Bases"-"T ur- caliber batteries for firing on less
key to Build New Fortifications is Necessary. heavily armored ships and for the
at tbe Dardanelles"-"Ceuta- protection of mine fields.
Spanish Fort-Big Fortifications to Rival Gibraltar" are Since nearly all of their targets will be those of op-
carried nearly every day in the press. It is evident that an portunity, it is most important that seacoast batteries be
era of world wide seacoast refortification is being initiated. so emplaced as to give the utmost protection to tbe guns
Our foreign neighbors are apparently turning away from and personnel serving them, to the end that when the
being "air mad" to a state of rational preparedness. necessity arises the guns will be fit and ready for action.
NIany laymen offer positive curbstone opinions to the Seacoast targets will be exposed normally to fire for but
effect that seacoast fortifications are obsolete and that sea- short intervals. Naval commanders may be expected to
coast forts are unnecessary if we have a strong navy and take full advantage of high speed, rapid turning move-
sufficient aviation. The military man, who reasons things ments and sinuous courses, smoke screens and low visi-
out in an intelligent manner, is convinced that a navy bility in order that the time ships will be exposed to sea-
with unfortified bases is in almost as bad a fix as an air- coast artillery fire be reduced to a minimum. As compared
plane without a landing field; and that an air force frittered to heavy artillery in land warfare, the' requirements of
away to protect harbors is lo~t as an effective weapon of seacoast artillery are much more severe, for its successful
war. Airplanes are best employed as offensive weapons. operation will depend upon the rapidity with whicb ac-
The real purposes of seacoast fortifications are to deny curate fire can be delivered upon short notice. Opportuni-
the use of harbors and their facilities to the enemy, to ties for effective fire will be rare; so it follows that when
assure the use of harbors and their facilities to the friendly one presents itself it should not be lost due to neutraliza-
navy and to protect friendly ships and harbor facilities tion of the seacoast batteries.
from enemy attacks. Seacoast batteries may be neutralized from the sea by
To accomplish these purposes fortifications are pro- naval gunfire or by attack from the air. It has been demon-
strated repeatedly in the past that little material damage ships at anchor ll1 restricted harbors, and similar area tar-
is to be feared from naval bombardment :md although gets. They alone have sufficient range to cover the de-
neutralization may be accomplished by this means it is bouchment of a friendly fleet.
highly improbable. Effective fire from the sea depends, Let us suppose that a friendly fleet has met a reverse at
in a large part, upon accurate spotting and it is here that sea and has retreated to a fortified base to be refitted, has
naval artillerymen are greatly handicapped. Against area left control of the sea to the enemy and that control of the
targets such as cities and ships at anchor in a restricted air has also passed to him. Let us further suppose that the
harbor, long range naval bombardment can obtain results, base is strongly fortified with medium and minor range
whereas against. relatively small targets, such as seacoast batteries but has only two modern long range batteries
batteries, the damage to be expected, will hardly justify and that the enemy is in close pursuit, realizing that if the
the required expenditure of ammunition. Consequently, friendly fleet can be further damaged and bottled up, the
in the emplacing of seacoast batteries, no great considera- temporary control of the sea can be made permanent and
tion need be given to protection against naval gun fire, the war probably won. The friendly fleet is at anchor in
other dun to concealment from observations from the sea. the harbor undergoing repairs, with ships in drydock.
The other method of neutralization or destruction of \Vhat armament prevents the enemy from completing
seacoast batteries is by attack from the air. Although an his job by long range bombardment of ships helplessly at
air attack on any type of seacoast battery is a possibility, anchor, of the repair facilities of the base, of the ships in
there seems to be little probability that minor or medium drydock? The answer is, the two long range batteries.
armament will be subjected to attack by hostile aviation. Can the enemy destroy or neutralize these batteries by
due to their comparatively short range and the small naval gun fire? Probably not. But, if these batteries are un-
target that they present. For modern long range batteries, protected from aerial attack, it is very probable that they
it is far different. Long range batteries will probably out- will be neutralized or destroyed by attack from the air. It
range considerably any armamem carried by modern seems reasonable to expect that the importance of these
battleshi ps. These batteries have sufficient range to pre- two batteries would lead to air attacks of the greatest in-
vent hostile long range naval bombardment against cities. tensity :lIld persistence, and that such attacks would be
TSINGTAO
15 em. l3tJtI/'ry at HlIi Isch'lIen Huk.
/'vlembers of the IOlSt Artillery manhandling materiel across a rice paddy. Note that the per-
SOn/lei have camouflage material wrapped around their caps.
Highw-ay Traffic and Modern War-II
By CAPTAIN JOSEPH L GREENE, Infantry
I
NPart I we studied the traffic on the primary high- lane occupied, is very limited. In passing forward along
way net and determined the maximum capacity of the column, individual vehicles must move at high speeds
typical primary roads for war-time motor movements. whenever they find the left lane open, and must fre-
We saw that this maximum How can be realized by set- quently dart into and out of the column itself, which can-
ting highways aside for exclusive military use during the not be done very often without seriously interfering with
passage of motor columns, and by using two-lane roads the column.
for one-way traffic with both lanes occupied by vehicles. The study of Dean A. N. Johnson2 referred to in Part I,
For many motor movements, however, these excellent contains the statement that "when traffic on two-lane roads
conditions may not exist. Only secondary roads may be is 80 to 100 per cent in one direction congestion does not
available; or a single feasible primary highway route may occur until vehicles are passing at a rate exceeding 1,300
make two-way traffic unavoidable. Of course, there will per hour." Thus, if 1,020 vehicles per hour are passing-in
often be no need to strain every nerve to get motor the right lane of a two-lane highway occupied by a single
columns over the road in the shortest possible time. But motor column, the left laue may have at best a working
whatever the circumstances, we cannot begin to calcu- capacity of some 280 vehicles per hour. If, however, both
late modern logistics until we take into consideration lanes are occupied by motor columns travelling in opposite
every factor that may affect the capacities of the routes we directions, the highway can be used to its full capacity of
plan to use. A Hat rate of march for motor movements, 1,020 vehicles per lane. On a two-lane road, this, of course,
varied only to allow for movement at night with and permits no other traffic in either direction, and no passing.
without lights, is far too simple to fit the facts. True, a In free-Howing civil traffic, when vehicles are moving
recent official text1 states that "liberal allowances must be in roughly the same numbers in both directions, con-
made for retarding conditions, such as ... bad roads gestion begins when 1,000 vehicles are passing per hour.
... " But we must have something more definite to go As high as 2,100 civil vehicles per hour have been counted
on than this general statement. Therefore, in this article, on a two-lane road, but only when congestion was great,
we shall consider what some of these "allowances" must with vehicles crowding up far below safe road distance and
be. moving at much slower speeds than 30 miles per hour.
'*' '*' '*' '*'
When two-way traffic is necessary, the amount of mili- '*' '*' '*' '*'
Now let us consider the matter from the viewpoint of
tary traffic that a given primary highway can carry de-
operating motor columns through existing non-military
pends on: (I) The types of military traffic; (2) The
traffic-a factor that may otten have to be considered.
amount of non-military traffic on the highway; (3) The
number of lanes; (4) The amount and types of cross It is now taught in our Schools, in view of peace-time
traffic, and the methods used to get it across the main convoy experience, that the best way to superimpose a
military column on the general traffic is to use long driv-
route.
ing distances (100 to 250 yards) in the open country; and
From the viewpoint of motor movements, the most im-
in passing through urban districts, to close up to 20 or 25
portant type of two-way traffic is that in which a motor
yards driving distance. Thus, out in the country, faster
column, with vehicles moving at regulated driving dis-
non-military vehicles have room to drive between the
tances, travels in the right-hand lane. The left lane is pre-
vehicles of the column when they must wait for opposite
sumably left free for traffic by individual vehicles in either
traffic to pass, and the same obtains in cities to a lesser
direction. On a road closed to all but military traffic, the
extent at the slower speeds and shorter driving distances.
left-lane traffic may be typically composed of antiaircraft
Actually when such a peace-time convoy gets into heavy
and antitank units moving by bounds; and of command,
traffic, in either country or city, the civil traffic wedges in
staff, and messenger vehicles.
and all advantage of driving distance is lost. Each driver
With the road closed to cross traffic, the maximum
in the convoy must then take his opportunities like the
capacity of the motor-column lane would be as given in
driver of the delivery truck just ahead, or of the freight
Part I: 1,020 vehicles passing a given point per hour, at
van behind.
an average speed of 30 miles an hour, a maximum running
speed of 40 miles an hour, and a driving distance (includ- In considering the ratios of civil and military traffic on a
ing vehicle length) of 52 yards. In the other lane, the given highway, it should first be noted that no highway
maximum capacity would be rhe same, but only if all carries its full capacity except for brief periods usually
ttaffic in that lane moved in one direction. For two-way measured in hours. This is readily apparent from data ob-
traffic, the capacity of the left lane alone, with the right tained in various traffic surveys. In one survey covering
23,000,000 vehicle-miles of travel in I I Western States.
1ReconnOOSQII.Ce,SeclIrihl, l.farches. Halts. C. and G. S. S.• re-
vised to July 1, 1936.. 'Dept. of Engineering, University of Maryland.
1937 HIGHWAY TRAFFIC AND MODERN WAR-II 117
the average traffic ran from 326 vehicles per day in Wyo- to 6 PM. and 8 to 9 PM. Out in the country there is one
ming to 1,862 per day in California. New Jersey and Con- peak-5 to 6 PM. Sunday traffic is about half again that
necticut roads carry about 5,000 per day.3 These figures, of of week days.
course, cover all kinds of roads from secondary township Allowance must also be made for changes in civil traffic
and country roads with from 20 to 200 vehicles per day, due to war itself. A highway that ordinarily carries a
to super-highways with 17,000 per day. But the fact thousand vehicles per day on the peaceful pursuits of their
remains that the reasonable maximum civil traffic How on owners may carry several times as much civil traffic when
any good two-lane highway of 24,000 vehicles at 35 miles battle threatens in the neighborhood. There may be refu-
an hour is seldom if ever reached. gees by tens of thousands, Heeing in their family cars. And
It is also worth pausing here to ponder brieHy on the the very presence of a friendly force may call out an army
Maryland-Pennsylvania-Virginia areas on which so many of sightseers, peddlers, and local dealers in supplies.
map wars are fought. According to the 1935 registration But if we know what civil traffic to expect, the capacity
figures, this area contains roughly ~75'000 civil ve~icles, of any highway for additional military traffic is simple to
which run more than II,ooo,ooo m1les per day. Is 1t un- find. On a two-lane road the maximum practicable free-
reasonable to suggest that such traffic can hardly be dis- flowing traffic, without congestion, is 1,000 vehicles per
regarded? Indeed, we need to know in every case what hour; for a three-lane road, 2,000 vehicles per hour; and
traffic a road already bears before we can dare to superim-
for a four-lane road, 3,000 vehicles per hour. By subtract-
pose our motor columns upon that traffic.
ing the usual civil traffic from these figures, we can find
We saw above that a motor column on the right lane of
very approximately what room is left for military traffic.~
a highway leaves room for a maximum of 280 vehicles per
This has to be done, of course, for numerous points along
hour, or 6,720 per day. But we must remember als.o.th~t
the highway, since traffic is not uniform.
the daily civil traffic is not even. In suburbs and Cities it
moves in waves, with the busiest times from 8 to 9 AM, 5 Such detailed studies apply mainly to routes that are to
, be used for military purposes for a period of some length.
'All data is from various surveys in Public Roads, U. S. Dept. An army may first bar the roads entirely as it advances,
AI!. and then open them again for.(;ombined military and civil
traffic. All roads in rear areas, which are to bear much
military traffic, will need to be studied similarly; for ex-
ample, highways near cantonments, depots, and other
semi-permanent installations.
traffic there would thus be more allowance than necessary. Traffic circles are still another practicable method of
At busy intersections in cities the rate of cross traffic often handling cross traffic. These, of course, cannot be built
rises above 2,000 vehicles an hour, Ii which is approximately in a few hours. But they already exist on many highways,
the rate of flow of a double staggered column moving at and workable equivalents of most types can be established.
an average speed of 30 miles an hour. For such cross traffic, Figure I shows a common type of traffic circle. Figures 2
the total length of gaps between serials must be equal to to 5 show how the equivalent of a traffic circle can easily
the total length of the serials themselves, thus doubling be established by using a block in a town or city, a court-
the length of the column and increasing its total time of house square, or even a wide street, provided there an:
travel by the time required for the column to move its own cross streets on which the cross traffic can enter and leave.•
closed-up length. This method permits serials to travel at The ideal method, however, of taking care of cross
steady speed, assuming of course, that each cross traffic traffic is by installing temporary or semi-permanent over-
point would be controlled by adequate police personnel, head viaducts for its passage, or for the passage of the
either military or civil. motor column itself. This eliminates conRict of traffic, and
Where the maximum cross traffic intersecting the route what may be most impottant of all, permits two military
is less than that of the column without gaps; for example, columns to cross readily.
1,000 vehicles per hour as compared to 2,000 per hour for Two types of temporary viaducts seem desirable, a light
the column, then the gaps between serials would only need and a heavy. 7 The light viaduct should be strong enough
to be in the ratio of 1,000 to 2,000. Different lengths of to carry any loaded 2 ;h-ton vehicle (a gross capacity of 8
gaps may also be used in various parts of a long column. tons) .8 The heavy viaduct should permit the passage of
In a column expected to cross other traffic at an important 2o-ton vehicles. Both light and heavy types should have a
point between 4:00 and 10:00 AM, an occasional gap one sidewalk for foot traffic.
or two minutes long might take care of the early morning Ordinarily, a single lane of 10 feet, open to continuous
traffic between 4:00 and 6:00. From 6:00 to 7:00 more 24-hour traffic, would be enough to take care of civil cross
gaps would be needed. During the morning rush, from traffic except at busy points, where two such viaducts,
7:00 to 8:30' there would need to be as much gap time one for traffic in each direction, would be desirable. AU
as column-passage time. Then from 8:30 to 10:00, the viaducts should permit the under passage of at least two
ratio of gaps could be somewhat reduced. In calculating columns of military vehicles, and if necessary, one or
this, allowance must be made, of course, for the extension more columns of other traffic.
of the column by splitting it into serials. If heavy cross
In cities where two or more viaducts are necessary,
traffic is expected at two or more points, this fact must also
traffic should be made one-way on all viaducts in accord-
be allowed for. If it occurs at several points well distributed
ance with the main Row of traffic. The direction of Row
along the route, we would then have the maximum case;
can, of course, be changed in accordance with normal
and the total gap time would have to be at least equal to
changes in Row, as in the morning and evening. Bearing
the total column-passage time.
one-way traffic, each single-lane bridge will carry 1,000
Here again the value of the double-staggered column is vehicles per hour. From this can be calculated the number
evident. Its use doubles the number of vehicles in a serial of viaducts necessary to handle the necessary civil or mili-
of given length, thus passing twice as many across a given tary, light cross traffic at any point. Heavy vehicle traffic
intersection per hour. The cross traffic itself should also be could be confined to one or two 2o-ton viaducts at suitable
one-way traffic, using every lane of the street. This of POIntS.
course, is only possible where there are parallel cross routes
Where the erection of heavy viaducts is not feasible,
close together as in cities.
light viaducts could be built to carry all except heavy
In passage through populous districts at reduced speed, traffic, and this could be allowed for by gaps in motor
each serial of a column should be closed up to the mini- columns. Traffic studies of the Bureau of Public Roads
mum safe driving distance for the lower speed of passage. show that the number of vehicles of a gross loaded weight
This should be permitted to occur automatically as the of more than eight tons varies from 6 to ~o cars per
leading vehicle of each serial enters a slow-speed zone. thousand in different States. Hence gaps 10 a motor
There should be no halting of any vehicle simply for clos- column totalling about ten per cent of those which would
ing up. It should often be possible, however, to keep up be necessary for all cross traffic would take care of the
speeds of 30 or even 40 miles an hour through many parts heavy cross traffic.
of a city where cross traffic can be closed off and diverted
Unless there are an unusual number of railroad crossings
to a few main crossings.
on the route of a motor column, interference by trains
When cross traffic is controlled by lights or other signals, should not total many minutes. A passenger train ordi-
it is best to allow for this by providing gaps in the column
beforehand. Otherwise there will be much jamming up. 3Steadflow Traffic p"rinciples, by Fritz Mal~er (Harvard .uni-
Arrangements can be made for the traffic lights to fit the versity Press), contams a thorough analYSiS of traffic Circles
and the manner in which cross traffic filters through.
gaps, thus eliminating stopping by any part of the column. 'A third type for the use of foot troops or pedestrians only may
also be of value.
'On streets three or more lanes in width. SA gross capacity of 9~ tons would support light tanks.
1937 HIGHWAY TRAFFIC AND MODERN WAR-II 119
* * * *
Weather, too, must be fully considered. It affects road
surfa~~, road visibility, hence running speeds and road
CapaCIties.
On primary highways light rainfall will not ordinarily
necessitate reduced running speeds except on slippery
120 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-April
•
stretches.9 On the common road surfaces speeds of 35 to main object of lights is to see the vehicle ahead, and there
45 miles an hour are safe, especially for six-wheeled ve- is no need of brilliant lighting which may easily betray
hicles with their extra traction. On slippery-surfaced roads a motor movement to hostile air observers. This suggests
a reduction of maximum running speed to 30 miles an the necessity for investigation into the practicability of
hour is probably enough. deeply hooded, faint headlights, and-to catch their light
Snow requires a similar reduction. Chains can be used -similarly hooded reflectors on the rear of vehicles.
if there is enough snow to cause skidding. Deep snow, not Movements without lights require a great reduction of
too deep to prevent traffic altogether, slows up the leading running speed, but often not so great as we are accustomed
vehicle and hence, all the vehicles of a column. This points to think necessary. Visibility varies in different weather
to small advance columns sent out to improve the road, and different moon phases. We need experiment to de-
when special equipment is not available. termine what speeds are practicable under these different
Icy roads are difficult at best. Vehicles can usually do conditions, and experiment also in the use of tail lights
better without chains. Advance columns can use chains hooded from air observation. On good roads such lights
to roughen the ice and throw dirt and sand on the worst might permit running speeds as high as 25 miles an hour
stretches. (Tables given later include estimated speeds for except on very dark nights. There is also the possibility
ice- and snow-covered highways.) of using an invisible ray to cause the tail light ahead to
glow.
:II: * :II: * Fog, dust, and smoke may reduce road visibility to zero,
Night, lack of lights, fog, smoke, dust, rain, and snow, especially smoke. Fog and dust, however, may cover
all affect road visibility in varying degrees. Studies show great stretches of road, whereas smoke is more likely to
that the average open highway driving speed of civil cover limited stretches and to dissipate far more quickly.
vehicles is 43,3 miles per hour by day, and 41.5 by night.10 In all three, speeds must be greatly reduced, and in smoke
AIlowing a reasonable safety factor, we can set 35 miles it may be impracticable to move at all. Lights are of as-
per hour as a maximum running speed for night move-
sistance in all three but may at night reflect upward
ments with lights. In one-way traffic on good roads, the
through thin layers of fog, but not through fog of any
'"The U. S. mileage of slippery types of primary highways is thickness.
considerablyless than one-tenth of the whole primary net.
'0Automotive Industries, May 16, 1935. Rain interferes only slightly with road visibility owing
1937 HIGHWAY TRAFFIC AND MODERN WAR-II 121
J(
1
-~---- --..~- .......
II FIGURE 5. North-bound traffic crossing a double staggered column on a wide street or road (at least 50 feet wide). The
double column opens out (travelling on the second and fourth lanes of a five-lane road), thus permitting cross traffic to get
through. South-bound cross traffic can pass through from left to right on another stretch of the highway or street on which
the column is travelling.
to e~cient windshield wipers. A downpour may tempo- hours longer than the same movements would take in
rarily lower maximum running speeds to 30 miles an hour. single column at 30 miles an hour, and, of course, consid-
A heavy snow may require a greater reduction. erably longer still than a double staggered column would
reqUlre.
'*' '*' '*' '*' But even a narrow country road will carry an enormous
To complete our brief survey of the conditions under
amount of traffic if only the bridges are strong enough and
which motor movements may be made we must now con-
the road will stand up-the two main difficulties. Country
sider secondary highways. We have approximately
roads require something like 50 times as much main-
350,000 miles of primary highways, but our secondary
tenance per 1,000 miles of vehicle travel over them, as
road net has nearly eight times that amount, some 650,000
ordinary, two-lane, hard-surfaced highways; and in wet
miles of which is surfaced. In general, motor movements
weather especially, heavy traffic may soon wear them out.
on secondary roads are subject to the laws of road capacity
and speeds of movement heretofore discussed. Bridges form a similar limitation, particularly to mech-
anized columns, although it will often be possible to
Few narrow roads are actually a single track. Most roads
strengthen them beforehand for a motor movement.
narrower than two lanes (I 8-20 feet) have shoulders that
The military use of secondary roads comes, in the end,
give room for passing, at least at occasional points. On the
to one main thing-detailed advance knowledge of the
best of such roads two vehicles can pass at any point with
route. We can and must make much use of secondary
reasonable care in driving, and perhaps two-thirds of our
roads. But foolish indeed is the commander who permits
whole road net falls in this bracket. From the viewpoint
his motor columns to turn off the main highways without
of motor columns, then, such roads are one-lane, one-way
knowing what they will get into; or the commander who
roads on which a small amount of traffic can pass in the
counts optimistically on poor roads to get a large column
opposite direction. On them, motor columns can seldom over long distances with dispatch. When we have to-
travel at an average speed of 30 miles an hour; something yes; we can manhandle vehicles through swamps and over
like half that speed is more probable. rocky broken ground. But when speed is a foremost con-
Assuming 20 miles an hour as maximum running speed, sideration, it pays to remember that ten miles on pavement
with a safe-driving distance of 24.2 yards (Table II, Part are usually better than one through the mud.
I), and an average running speed of 15 miles an hour, the We may now consider more adequate rates-of-march
traffic How of the single column such roads will carry is tables for practical use than those we now have. It should
I,¥ vehicles per hour. Under these conditions it would be understood that Tables XI to XIII are largely composed
take 700 vehicles (a brigade), 10.6 hours to go 150 miles; of the writer's estimates, and are simply presented as
2,000 vehicles (a division), 11.3 hours; and 10,000 ve- samples of what we need. Experiment should determine
hicles (a corps), 19.2 hours. This is between 4 and 5 more closely the estimated speeds given in these tables.
122 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-April
TABLE XI ways. First and most important, he can use days and even
MAXI~m~l SUSTAINED DAYLIGHT-RUNNING SPEEDS ON hours of low air visibility to the greatest advantage, ofu:n
PRIMARY HIGHWAYS basing his plans on the weather forecast. Through this
Conditloo or Road Vblbllit3'
alternative to night movement he can use daylight speeds
T7J>e of Smon
Road Surf_ Good Ro~ Ice Wet Dry Dust Rain Boo." orFoz
from three to six times those of night speeds without
COnerete •••• 4.0 80 5-101 85 '""0 25.85 15-30 1-15a
Asphalt ••••• '""0 80 6-101 80 4.0 25.30 15.80 1-15 lights, thus covering far greater distances, or equal dis-
Gravel. ..... 40 20 201 30-40 80-40 80 25.30 15-30 1-15
&nd-clay ••• 40 20 15 15-40' 25-40 25 15.20 15-20 1-15 tances in far less time.
'
NOTlIfl----lWith ehains on gravel and sand-clay; with Or without on harder The second way of obtaining secrecy is the use of short
roads.
'Sand-c.ay roads lire at their best when slightly wet. dashes. Carefully planned fast movements of from two to
"It is assumed that vehicles ean aeep forward at at leaet one
mile an hour in blinding smoke. four or five hours in duration may well become important
in modern war. To prevent them the enemy would need
TABLExn
to have overwhelming air superiority and would have to .
MAXIMUM SUSTAINED NIGHT-RUNNING SPEEDS WITH LIGHTS
keep up a continuous patrol over vast areas-a patrol of
ON PRIMARY HIGHWAYS
attack and bombing planes preferably, since observation
Condition of Road Visiblllty
Typo of Smoke units by themselves would first have to discover a move-
Road Surface Good Rough Ice Wet Dry Dust Rain Snow or Fo,
Conaete .... 35 25 5.101 80 85 20-80 15-25 1-15' ment, and then report it to the fighting units, which
Asphalt ..... 85 25 5-101 25 35 20-25 15-25 1-15
Gravel. ....• 85 20 201 25.35 25-35 20 20-25 15.25 1-15
would in turn have to fly out to make their attack.
Sand -clay ... 35 20 15' 15.80" 25-35 20 15-20 15-20 1-15
THERE IS A RANK due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if
not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult we
must be able to repel it; and if we desire to secure peace-one of the most powerful
instruments of our prosperity--it must be known that we are, at all times, ready for
war.-GEORGE WASHINGTON.
AIl. Artillery Epic
By 1ST LIEUTENANT W. J. VERBECK
Infantry
tery took we GlI"getunder fire at 600 yards, alternating They kept this up until they reached the angle of the
case with shelL The Confederate commander and his stone wall at the T roscle House. Here a fold in the
horse went down and the mass of infantry melted away ground 50 yards away hid the guns. Hoping to get them
toward the nearest woods. Later, 120 bodies were counted out before the enemy dosed in, Bigelow had just given
in front of the Rose House, and 270 lay around the barn. the order to limber up, when Colonel McGilvery reap-
Neatly every shot had been a direct hit. peared. McGilvery had noted the long gap in the Union
Scarcely had this second target been disposed of when line. The Confederates must be stopped or the main
the men at the guns saw a battle line in blue moving battle position would be broken. There was no infantry at
east from the Emmitsburg Road. Blue infantry attack- hand to throw into the breach. Therefore, Bigelow's Bat-
ing in the wrong direction! Something was wrong. But tery would have to retard the advance until the Federal
the battery had no choice: it withheld its fire. line could be reestablished. McGilvery gave his orders:
The blue line came on until it presented an almost per- Our lines are open between the Round Tops and to the
feet enfilade target, its near Hank being only 200 yards left of the II Corps. You must remain here at all costs and
from the guns. Then suddenly Confederate battle Hags check the enemy until I can form a second line in your
broke out along the line? It was Kershaw's Brigade driv- rear.
ing forward to sweep the Union artillery from the Wheat- The battery was to be sacrificed! Captain Bigelow real-
field Road. A misunderstood order had caused the in- ized this and so did his men. There were no Union troops
fantry to oblique too far to the right thereby leaving the near enough to come to their rescue, and the Confederates
9th Massachusetts Battery undisturbed on its Hank. Here in overwhelming numbers would be on them in a
was the opportunity for which the more devout of those moment.
thoroughgoing artillerymen had doubtless prayed. Cap- Colonel McGilvery rode off to collect what troops he
tain Bigelow did not overlook it. At his command the could to form the line to the rear, leaving the Massa-
gunners raked the Confederate lines with canister. It was chusetts battery to its fate. Captain Bigelow took quick
surprise fire of the most deadly sort and under it the
Southerners broke and disappeared in the woods 500 yards =. F:::
in front of the battery, leaving only rows of dead and -. C""FEDERATES
1The blue uniforms came from the Federal supply depot at Harp- At 4:00 P.M. the full force of Longstreet's infantry attack
er's Ferry which the Confederates had captured a few days before. struck the Peach Orchard.
1937 AN ARTILLERY EPIC 125
S
ELDOM has a com- To sum up, French strategy
mander in chief, in the
French strategy had failed, had failed, French tactics had
early days of a war, French tactics had failed failed and there were grave
faced a bleaker situation than doubts about French leader-
that which confronted Joseph and there were grave doubts ship. At GQG7 Joffre and his
Usaire Joffre, Generalissimo
of the French Armies, on
about French leadership. collaborators knew that many
of their important subordi-
August 24, 1914, as he re- nates had failed miserably.
ceived the evening report at Vitty-Ie-Fran~ois, "The head- But they also recognized the fact that they and they
quarters of lost illusions." alone were largely responsible for what had occurred.
His plan of operations had proved faulty and he had There could no longer be any question about it-German
been strategically surprised. All his armies had been de- skill, not German numbers, had won the first round of
feated with heavy losses, his general reserve had been the World War. France could not afford to lose the
used long ago, and his left wing was being enveloped by second.
superior forces whose rush he was powerless to stem. Some two weeks later the French armies turned and
There had been numerous failures of leadership among attacked. Their strategical situation was excellent. The
his subordinate commanders. There was even a question French and British left wing overlapped and enveloped
as to whether or not the troops would continue to fight. the German right. At the decisive spot the Germans were
Confronted by defeat wherever they looked, it was only greatly outnumbered. Where the French were numerically
natural that the government's confidence in the Army inferior, skillful use of terrain and fortifications made up
should be badly shaken and that Joffre's own posirion for the weakness. French tactics had improved to the point
should swing precariously in the political balance. where they could scarcely be compared to the tactics in
To make matters worse, on the extreme left flank, at vogue two weeks before. Vacillating leaders had been
the decisive spot, stood an army that Joffre did not com- weeded outS and the spirit of team-play had been infused
mand. He could request, he could urge, but he could throughout the Army. Between British and French a
not order the British Army? Furthermore, the relations n:e~sure of cooperation was beginning to replace sus-
between this army and its nearest French neighbor, the pICiOn.
Fifth Army, 2 were badly strained and their commanders In Parts I and II of this study, OHL's contributions to
cordially despised each other. And against these disunited this remarkable reversal have been examined. It is now
forces a powerful German wing, far stronger than any proposed to do the same for Joffre9 and GQG.
French force that could be brought against it, was sweep-
AUGUST 24
ing down in the direction of Paris, the heart of France.
This German right wing had beaten the British at Mons On this day Joffre realized that he must play for time-
(Map I) and tl1.eFifth Army on the Sambre. The French time to regroup his forces and fill up his shattered ranks
ThirdS and Fourth~ Armies had suffered a like fate in with replacements. Later he could try his fortune again,
their attack in the Belgian Ardennes. The First~ and but not at once. Now, the whole of his left and c~nter
Second6 Armies had come to grief in Lorraine and in the must go back, fighting a delaying action. True, this was
Vosges. Along the entire front there was but one faint one of the things which French pre-war tacticians had pro-
ray of light: On the extreme right, where it mattered nounced impossible, but since so I?-any of their cherished
little, the situation was favorable.
'Grand Quartier General or General Headquarters.
The fundamental ideas on which French tactics were SIn the first two months of the war, two army commanders, 10
based-the uselessness of liaison between units advancing corps commanders out of 25 and 42 division commanders out of
about 80 were relieved.
to battle; insistence on a headlong and simultaneous at-
"The typical routine for Joffre was as follows. He rose at 5:00
tack along the entire front; security obtained solely A.M., ate breakfast, and went to GQG at 6 :00 A.M. The Grand Re-
through the rapidity of the attack-all these had proved port at which Joffre "took his bearings" was held in his office at
7:00 A.M. First Belin, Chief of Staff, and Berthelot, Deputy Chief
to be illusions. of Staff, read the news of the night, commenting upon this. Joffre
then made the necessary decisions. After this he received other
'Commander, Field Marshal Sir John French; two and a half staff representatives and handled matters dealing with supply,
corps. materiel and transport. Lunch at 11 :00 A.].{. was followed by aquick
.Commander, General Lanrezac; I, III, X, XVIII Corps and tour of GQG, and a walk for exercise. The afternoon he spent in
three reserve divisions. the office. Shop talk was forbidden at dinner, which was at 6 :30
P.M. At 8:00 P.M. he received the evening report. At 9:00 or 10:00
'Commander, General Ruffey; IV, V, and VI Corps.
P.M. he went to bed and only a national crisis justified awakening
'Commander, General de Langle de Cary; II, Colonial, IX, XI. him.
XII, XVIII Corps, and two reserve divisions. Joffre was capable of original ideas at times but for the most
.Commander, General Dubail; VIII, XIII, XIV, XXI Corps part he worked on suggestions and proposed solutions furnished
and some reserve divisions. him by his staff. He accepted, rejected and altered. Somewhat
.Commander, General de Castelnau; XV, XVI and XX Corps; slow, careful and thorough, he nevertheless was able to transact
18th Division and some reserve divisions. an immense amount of business.
128 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-April
NE
z
SITUATION AS KNOWN 10 GOG ON THE
EVENING OF 24 AUGUST, 1914
_ FRENCH
IIlIIll!lIl BRITISH
_ GERMANS
SCALE
o MI
MAP I - The French right .. must be weakened in order to strengthen the critical flank.
tactical preconceptions had proved false, this, too, could bination of infantry and artillery.
well go overboard. Every combined operation comprises a series of minor
operations which have as objectivesthe gaining of supporting
The French right, not so hard pressed as the left, must
points. Whenever it is desired to occupy a supporting point,
be weakened in order to strengthen the critical flank. This the attack must be prepared by artillery, the infantry must
was robbing Peter to pay Paul and Joffre knew it, but it be held back, and the assault must only be launched from
was a case of paying Paul or else. So an order was issued such distance as will permit the objective to be reached with
coordinating the withdrawal of the left and center armies, certainty. Whenever the infantry attack has been launched
while emergency steps were taken to ward off the German at too great a distance, and without the artillery having had
time to make itself felt, the infantry has fallen under machine-
envelopment. Joffre gave orders for railway demolitions gun fire and has suffered losses which might have been
and directed that prepared inundations be effected near avoided.....
the English Channel. The 61st and 62d Divisions, sent The practice has been to immediately throw forward nu-
to Arras from Paris, were given the mission of covering the merous units in dense formations, which are at once exposed
left flank of the British, and Cordet's Cavalry Corps, which to hostile fire and are decimated. The result is that the of-
was south of Maubeuge, was ordered to pass behind the fensive is stopped dead and the infantry is often left at the
British and gain the outside flank. Joffre likewise ordered mercy of a counter-attack.
the VII Corps withdrawn from Alsace and moved by rail The combat must be carried out by a line of skirmishers in
sufficiently extended order, continually fed from the rear
to the west. He thus starred building up a mass of ma-
and supported by attillery. The fight can thus be carried on
neuver on the extreme left. until the moment when the assault can be launched under
By this time Joffre's liaison officers had thorougly ac- the most favorable conditions.
quainted him with the tactical errors prevalent in recent
fighting. He now took steps to correct these. The note he Joffre also prescribed that cavalry divisions should al-
issued on this subject may sound elementary today, but to ways have the support of an infantry detachment, and
the French of 1914 it was revolutionary. In part it read: emphasized
The lesson to be learned from the fighting up to date is ... the absolute necessity of insuring complete co-
that attacks cannot be carried out without an intimate com- operation between infantry and artillery. The one has at-
1937 THE WILL OF THE LEADER-III 129
tacked in too much of a hurry, the other is too often en- preferences, applied himself with the utmost energy to ensur-
gaged after much delay, hesitatingly and spatingly. It is to ing by every possible means the success of the new plan.
this capital error that the greater part of the losses of the
infantry are imputable. The nature of the plan, which has been called The
Genesis of thc Marnc, is indicated in the following para-
He called for better coordination and more massive em-
graphs of the insttuction:
ployment of artillery and directed that the use of airplanes
It being impossible to carty out the offensive maneuver
in conducting artillery fire be made more general. which had been projected, the object of future operations
Joffre believed in supervising subordinates. Therefore, will be to reform on our left a mass of maneuver capable of
after issuing this note, he took steps to see that its pro- resuming the offensive. This will consist of the Fourth, Fifth,
visions were being carried out. Liaison officers got special and British Armies, together with new forces, drawn from
instructions to observe and report upon the tactics of lower the eastern front, while the other armies contain the enemy
as long as necessary.
units. The next offensive must be made effective. True
During the retirement, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies
enough, the French Army was retreating now, but during will conform to the movement of their neighbors, and each
that retreat it would study offensive tactics. will remain in liaison with the others. The retirement will bf'
covered by rear guards established on favorable topographical
AUGUST 25
positions so as to take advantage of every obstacle to arrest
While liaison officerswent to the armies to transmit the or at least delay the advance of the enemy by short and vi(\-
new tactical Bible, and ascertain the morale and condition lent counter-attacks, the principal elements of which will be
artillery ....
o! troops, Joffre and his collaborators estimated the situa-
A new group comprising formations transported by rail
tton.
(VII Corps, four reserve divisions, and perhaps in addition
Colonel Dupont, G-z, submitted a report showing that another active corps) will be formed between August 27 and
most of the German regular corps had been recently identi- September 2 in front of Amiens ... or behind the Somme .
fied on the French front. The question of the German . . . This group will be in readiness to assume the offensive
reserve corps, some of which had been identified, was also in the general direction of St. Pol-Arras or Arras-Bapaume.
discussed. Colonel Dupont concluded that not more than While the basic decision for the future employment of
28 reserve divisions could be employed against France. As all the French armies was being made, reports flowed in
a result of his estimate Joffre was given a definite idea of from the front. French forces near Verdun were making
the total strength of the German forces opposing him, but a successful counter-attack against the left flank of the
there was still considerable question as to their distribu- Crown Prince's army. It promised considerable results if
tion.10 the advantage were followed up. Joffre, however, sacri-
Joffre and his principal assistants then took up the ques- ficed the local success. Here was a place where he could
tion of the forthcoming French offensive, which all felt lay hands upon troops to strengthen his left. Major Bel,
was imperative. When should it be launched and what one of his liaison officers, was sent to Verdun with orders
form should it take? for the attacking troops to fall back on the defensive and
General Berthelot, the Deputy Chief of Staff, strongly give up two divisions. By 4:00 P.M. Joffre was assured
urged a central maneuver. He wanted to concentrate all tl1at the 55th and 56th Divisions were being directed to-
available forces behind the Fifth Army, and as the Brit- ward entraining points.
ish fell back, to strike at the inner wing of the German The First and Second Armies were both engaged in a
forces pursuing them. By this offensive from east to west violent battle, so Joffre felt he could not weaken these
he hoped to separate the German right from the rest of armies for the present.
the German forces. He pointed out that the plan was There remained the matter of coordination on the left
simple and could be executed rapidly. wing. Sir John French and Lanrezac were both going
Joffre's own conception was to build up a mass of ma-' their own way and operations were suffering. Of course,
neuver on his left, capable of enveloping the German en- the success of the new offensive plan depended on the
velopers. The discussion of these two plans lasted the British and the French Fifth Army delaying the enemy,
entire day. Berthelot returned to the charge again and thus giving time for the formation of the new mass of
again. In the evening, after weighing all factors, Joffre de- maneuver. In view of this, Joffre wished to discuss his
cided in favor of his own envelopment idea. Accordingly, new orders with the British and therefore arranged for an
General Instruction No. z was signed and sent out. In his interview with Sir John French and Lanrezac at St. Quen-
memoirs Joffre says: tin the next day. Perhaps the three of them could reach
My decision once made, Berthelot, putting aside his own an understanding.
Late that evening Joffre received a telegram from the
100f the active corps actually enga~ed on the Western Front, Minister of War, directing him to send three regular corps
the French at this time had not identified the III Corps (Kluck's
First Armv), any units of Hausen's Third Army, or the III to defend Paris "if victory does not crown our arms and if
Bavarian Corps (Lorraine). Moreover they were still skeptical our armies are forced to retreat." Considering as undesir-
as to whether all the reserve divisions had been grouped in corps,
for only two reserve corps had been definitely identified. Therefore,
able both governmental interference in the conduct of
to a certain extent the French still persisted in their erroneous operations and the proposed weakening of his forces, Joffre
estimate of German reserve formations, which was one of the took advantage of the wording of the telegram, and de-
principal reasons for their faulty original deployment. However.
the estimate of 28 reserve diviaions was quite accurate. cided to suspend the execution of these instructions.
130 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-April
AUGUST 26 AUGUST 27
Joffre and Berthelot reached St. Quentin at about 10:30 Early on the 2qth Joffre learned that the Fifth Army
A.M. where they met French and Lanrezac. The feeling was still retreating. Lanrezac had promised that he would
between these two key commanders was unmistakable. counter-attack just as soon as he reached terrain favorable
They acted like two strange bulldogs. French complained for the employment of artillery. Joffre believed that the
that Lanrezac had let him down by retreating without time for the counter-attack had now arrived. He thought
giving warning. Lanrezac's attitude indicated that he it necessary for two reasons: first, to help the hard-pressed
considered the British commander an ignorant amateur British; and second, to gain time for the execution of the
not worthy of a reply. new offensive plan. He therefore ordered the Fifth Army
After this auspicious start, Joffre got down to the prin- (now about to retreat behind the Oise east of Guise [Map
cipal purpose of his trip--'<l discussion with Sir John 2]) to execute a counter-offensive to the north, and urged
French of the part the British were to play in the new the British to slow up their retreat while this army at-
offensive. As Joffre began to explain the details of his tacked.
plan, French appeared puzzled. Suddenly the British During the afternoon Joffre learned that the British
commander exclaimed: "But I know nothing of this had evacuated St. Quentin. Upon receipt of this unwel-
orderl" come word GQG called Sir John French on the telephone
A British staff officer then stepped forward and ex- and again emphasized the undesirability of the British
plained that the instruction had been received during the uncovering the Fifth Army's Hank at the very moment
night but had not yet been studied. To learn that the that army was about to attack.
British staff had not studied such a fundamental order, or Meanwhile, Maunoury had reported at GQG for in-
even taken the trouble to notify their commander of its structions relative to the organization of the new Sixth
existence, was a bewildering blow to Joffre. He went over Army. There he was directed to dispose his forces, as they
the plan again, but obviously the conference had failed. arrived, in such a manner as to be able to act offensively
It disintegrated, rather than ended. Joffre went back to against the German right Hank. But shortly after Mau-
Vitry with the impression that the Allied left was fragile noury left Vitry with the directive for the new army, bad
in more ways than one. news came in. The German right wing was advancing so
However, he had been able to take one step toward rapidly and the Allied left was in such disorder, that Joffre
improving Franco-British relations. During the conference realized that his plan for an Amiens-Laon-Reims bat-
he had learned that part of the British forces were engaged tle was about to fall to pieces. It appeared that the Sixth
in a desperate struggle at Le Cateau, and therefore he at Army would not only be too weak but too late. One
once sent orders to Sordet's Cavalry Corps to intervene in chance remained.
the battle "with all available forces and the greatest en- G-2 reports dealing with the German units detached to
ergy." Sordet's action helped take pressure off the British. besiege the fortress of Maubeuge led Joffre to believe that
The evening of the 26th was a bad one for Joffre. The pressure from the north against the French Fifth Army
reports he found awaiting him at Vitry were anything but would be relaxed. Therefore, it seemed to him that the
encouraging. The Fourth Army was falling back behind Fifth Army, now behind the Oise, could attack toward
the Meuse; the Germans had already forced a crossing St. Quentin-northwest instead of north-and at the
near Mezieres; counter-artacks had failed. Joffre ordered same time protect its north Hank. Joffre hoped that this
the Third and Fourth Armies to at least delay the Ger- attack would strike those units pursuin~ the British,
mans from behind the Meuse. thereby helping their ally, and perhaps give the Sixth
To make matters still worse, a ministerial crisis was on Army time to concentrate and strike. Orders for this
and the Minister of War, a staunch supporter of Joffre, change were sent to the Fifth Army about TOO P.M.
had lost his position. A liaison officer soon afterward informed Joffre that
But the climax to this evil day came in the form of a Lanrezac strongly objected to the new orders.11 GQG at
telegram from Colonel Huguet, French liaison officerwith once sent Lanrezac another message insisting upon strict
the British. That telegram read: execution of the orders and Joffre, himself, decided to go
Battle lost by British Army which seems to have lost all to Lanrezac's headquatters the next day.
cohesion. !t will demand considerable protection to enable it About 10:00 P.M. Joffre learned the result of his inter~
to reorganIZe. vention with the British. They would fall back again,
For the moment Joffre could send no more ttoops to despite plans for the Fifth Army's attack. This retreat
the left Hank. However, he could organize an army out of would uncover the left of the attacking Fifth Army, as
the miscellaneous French units that were to operate on well as the right Hank of the newly formed Sixth Army.
the left Hank of the British. And this task he immediately
began. He selected General Maunoury, then at Verdun, nA dangerous and difficult operation had been thrust on Lanre-
zac. It involved a change of front of his entire army and a flank
to command this army and directed him to report to GQG march in the immediate presence of a victorious enemy. The
for instructions. Thus did the famous Sixth Army come logistics of the movement are alone sufficient to drive the average
staff officer into hysterics. In any case, a violent scene resulted be-
into being. tween the liaison officer, Lanrezac, and Lanrezac's G-3.
1937 THE WILL OF THE LEADER-III 131
- FRENCH
-=m BRITISH - GERMANS
9 I!, 2!' 30
SCALE IN MILES
MAP 2 - GQG learned that there was grave danger of a penetration in the large gap between the Fourth and Fifth Armies.
A letter from Huguet, written a few hours earlier, painted All in all, though it was still touch and go on the left
the following picture of the British: flank, there remained at least three French armies capable
For the moment the British Army is beaten and incapable of driving home a successful attack. After the agonizing
of any serious effort. The right column, the 1st and 2d Di- doubts of the last few days, Joffre's faith in his troops was
visions, ... still presents some aspect of cohesion; the same
now restored.
may be said for the 4th Division, but the 3d and 5th Divi-
AUGUST 28
sions ... are nothing more than disorganized bands in-
capable of offering the slightest resistance. On the morning of the 28th, GQG learned that there
In contrast was the situation of the First and Second was grave danger of a German penetration in the large gap
Armies. These forces had been rather successful in a vig- between the Fourth and Fifth Armies. Upon receipt of
?rous counter-offensive. Joffre issued an order congratulat- this information, Joffre decided to form an army detach-
Ing them upon their courage and tenacity and directed the ment charged with the mission of linking these two armies
Fi~st Army to send a cavalry division back to entraining together. The oversized Fourth Army would furnish the
POInts. He felt that he would soon be able to draw still necessary troops. A general officer named Foeh, then in
more troops from the east to help the west. command of the XX Corps in Lorraine, would assume
Early in the morning Joffre had indicated to the Fourth command of this army detachment. General Foch would
Army his desire that it strengthen its left at the expense of report to GQG at once. He would bring with him a cer-
its right. Major Gamelin,12 liaison officer to the Fourth tain Colonel Weygand,13 whom Joffre had selected to be
Army, reported to Joffre that evening at dinner. He told chief of staff of this new command.
Joffre that a successful counter-attack had been made Having made these arrangements, Joffre left for Fifth
against German troops that had crossed the Meuse below Army headquarters at Marle to see Lanrezac. Immediate-
Sedan. The coolness of General de Langle and his chief of ly upon his arrival, Lanrezac, rired and nervous, broke
staff had particularly impressed him. He had also noted a into a torrent of complaints and objections to the pro-
marked improvement in French tactics. posed attack. Joffre suddenly interrupted. He threatened
1SPresent French Chief of Staff. "General Gamelin's predecessor as French Chief of Staff.
132 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-April
to depnve Lanrezac of his command. He told hIlll he blunder. _Joffre warr:e~ _this army that its VI Corps, a
w0l!ld have to obey orders without this eternal procrasti- crack umt of three dIvISIons,would be taken from it for
natIOn and apprehensiveness. He told him that the Brit- employment elsewhere.
ish grievances against the French were all his fault, that By this time the counter-offensive of the First and Sec-
he had let the British down, and now they distrusted o.lld Armies was be~ng checked. Joffre did not persist,
everything French. Slllce he was preparlllg to weaken them. He informed
Lanrezac then complained that he had not received a these armies that their mission now was merely to hold.
written order, whereupon Major Gamelin sat down, wrote
one of some thirty words, and Joffre signed it. Lanrezac AUGUST 29
professed himself satisfied. At the Grand Report Joffre learned that the Germans
A few moments later, General de Mas Latrie, com- were about to break into the detraining area of the Sixth
mander of the XVIII Corps, reported at army headquarters Army. l!0wever, he still had a faint hope that the attack
with a long string of complaints and a longer tale of woe. of the FIfth Army would reestablish the situation suf-
Lanrezac turned on him vigorously, and passed on some hciently to let him fight a decisive battle north of Paris.H
of Joffre's expressions which were fresh in his memory. At about 9:00 A.M., Joffre arrived at Lanrezac's head-
Joffre added a few new ones for good measure. The crest- quarters. To aU appearances the Fifth Army commander
fallen.Mas Latrie left in a hurry. had recovered his calmness and confidence. Therefore
T?ereafter the tensi?n lessened perceptibly. Just before Joffre did not relieve him. However, he remained at MarIe
leavlllg Joffre placed hISlarge hand on Lanrezac's shoulder throughout the morning, watching Lanrezac conduct the
and said: "It's a question of the salvation of two armies-- battle. The attack to the northwest was launched success-
cl1eBritish and the Sixth. I am counting upon you." fully but soon afterward the Fifth Army was struck from
. Nevertheless Joffre's impressions of the Fifth Army and the north by forces crossing the Oise-forces that Joffre
Its commander were so unfavorable that he decided to re- believed to be about Maubeuge.
turn to Made on the 29th, the day of the attack. He even Joffre left Lanrezac at noon. Strong intimations had
~onsidered relieving Lanrezac on the spot but after think- reached him that Sir John French was going to call off the
lllg the m~tter over he decided to wait at least until the war for a week or ten days, retire somewhere and refit.
next mornlllg. This, of course, I would have created an immense gap be-
Although previous efforts to obtain British participation tween the Fifth and Sixth Armies and would have pre-
in the St. Quentin attack had failed, Joffre made another eluded any chance of launching the Allied counter-offen-
attempt on this day. He asked Sir John French to main- sive. So Joffre went to French's headquarters at Com-
~ain liaison ~eween the Fifth and Sixth Armies, point- piegne and put up his best arguments.
lllg out that It would only be necessary for the British to He met with little success. Joffre says he saw cl1eBrit-
halt rear guards behind the Crozat Canal (west of La ish Chief of Staff, Sir Archibald Murray, twitching
Fhe). At 8:30 P.M. the British reply came through French's tunic, as if to prevent him from yielding. French
Huguet: said he would cooperate after his troops had had 48 hours
of rest.
Sir John French regrets that he cannot cooperate in the
general action to the extent requested by you. His troops are Joffre started back to Vitry in a thoroughly bad humor.
worn out and require at least one day of rest in the quarters By accident he met the one Englishman he thought might
they occupy this evening. The day after tomorrow they will help him-General Sir Henry Wilson, the Deputy Chief
be capable of holding the line of the Crozat Canal if neces- of Staff and a friend of Foch. Joffre talked to Wilson
sary. If, later on, the French Army is victorious the Field frankly and the Englishman promised to try to change Sir
Marshal will put his troops at your disposal as reserves. John French's attitude.
Thus the British Army, located one to two days' march On arrival at Vitry, Joffre learned that the French Fifth
bac~ of its ~rench neighbors, was to rest on August 29th Army had suffered a slight reverse on its left and scored a
whIle the Frfth Army attacked to help it. success on its right. Various reports indicated that this at-
Then more bad news came in-this time from the de- tack had succeeded in diverting some of the German col-
training Sixth Army. The line of the Somme had been umns that had been marching against the British and the
lost. The F?urth Army was fighting hard on the Meuse. Sixth Army. Joffre thereupon issued an order for the Fifth
De Langle lllformed Joffre that he had received instruc- Army to withdraw.16
tions from GQG which called for withdrawal behind the Joffre's last hope of executing his plan of August 25th
Aisne, but the situation was favorable and he had ventured without radical alterations was now gone. He realized
to postpone execution of the retreat. Joffre authorized a that he had underestimated the power and mobility of the
short delay for the sake of morale, but added that de German right wing and that his time and space calcula-
Langle must then resume the retreat in conformity with tions had been faulty. On the evening of August 29th all
adjacent forces.. ---"This hope was founded on an overestimation of the forces left
The Third Army's situation appeared relatively good, to besiege Maubeuge and a consequent underestimation of the
but there were reports that the army commander was los- strength of the German right wing.
ing his o-rip and that his staff had made blunder after ""Through an inexcusable error by GQG's message center, the
0-- order was not dispatched for ten hours.
1937 THE WILL OF THE LEADER-III 133
that remained of his plan was the fundamental idea of With the British at least temporarily out of the war,
strenghtening his left and gaining a decision over the Ger- and the Sixth Army in disorder, there seemed little chance
man right wing. in the near future of building up a mass of maneuver on
This strengthening of his left was proving difficult. His the German right flank. GQG therefore abandoned the
subordinates kept insisting that it was not an easy thing strategic conception of August 25th and seems to have
to pluck entire divisions out of the battle front. During swung back on this day to Berthelot's idea of a central
the evening a message came in from General Ruffey, the offensive, directed against the German right wing. But
Third Army commander, protesting against giving up the this still demanded the transfer of troops from east to west
VI Corps. Ruffey said he was about to be attacked by to build up a strong left wing. These various considera-
strong forces at any minute. Ruffey was known to have tions resulted in an order to the Sixth Army to fall back in
a vivid imagination, and Joffre suspected that his appre- the direction of Paris.
hensions were groundless. But in view of the protest In the afternoon Joffre went to the Third Army. There
Joffre ordered that only the 42d Division of the VI Corps he verified the reports concerning Ruffey and his staff. He
be withdrawn to reinforce Foeh's detachment. shook up the staff, relieved Ruffey, and turned over the
However, the opposition to giving up the VI Corps Third Army to Sarrail, who at that time commanded the
again focused Joffre's attention on the fact that the Third VI Corps. He capped off his cyclonic visit by inviting the
Army command and staff were not "clicking." He de- relieved army commander to dine with him at GQG.
cided to investigate personally the next day. Ruffey accepted.
From the Third Army Joffre motored to the Fourth.
AUGUST 30 He found the contrast striking. De Langle was calm and
The 30th statted off with word that the Sixth Army, full of fight. He wanted to resume the offensive and Joffre
attacked while detraining, had fallen back behind the authorized a strong counter-blow in conjunction with the
Avre in confusion. The Fifth Army, owing to the delay Third Army.
in transmitting orders for its withdrawal, was in great The evening closed with a jolt. The Russians, who had
danger of being enveloped and cut off. This army was been counted on to take off some of the German pressure,
much farther north than its neighbors, since it had been had been badly defeated at T annenberg in East Prussia.
halted on the Oise for two days during the battles around Intercepted German radios exulted about 70,000 prisoners
Guise and St. Quentin. Its flanks were exposed and there and an annihilated army.
was considerable doubt as to whether it would be able to On every hand discouragement and despondency were
escape mtact. increasing; not even GQG was immune. But Joffre main-
Under tllese circumstances Joffre was more than grate- tained an Olympian calm. Although he did not know it,
ful to learn that Sir John French had agreed to slow up his the blow he had dealt the Germans on the Gise had, to
retreat and maintain contact with the Fifth Army by quote the British General Spears, "set the wheel of fortune
means of rear guards. He wrote immediately to thank turning in his favor."
French. He stated that he intended to withdraw all the AUGUST 31
French armies, avoiding any general engagement for the The next morning at the Grand Report things looked
present. He added that the British should keep in close better. G-2 had unmistakable evidence that the Germans
touch with the Fifth Army so as to take advantage of all were moving troops from the western front to face Russia
favorable opportunities "to give the enemy a severe lesson, in the east. Thirty-two trains had been counted in Bel-
such as that of yesterday." gium and checked again as they went through Berlin.
But Joffre was too optimistic. A shott while after the Furthermore, it was evident that the Fifth Army had
dispatch of the thank-you note, word came in that the struck a hard blow at Guise. Intercepted German radios
British had resumed their retreat. A letter from French spoke of "concealing the repulse from the troops." More-
stated that the British Army would not be fit to take its over, in spite of the delayed GQG order, the Fifth Army
place in line for another ten days and therefore could not had made a successful daylight withdrawal from the
hold the front between the Fifth and Sixth Armies. The German forces with which it had been in contact. At
British ~ommander wanted to fall back behind the lower present, its exposed left flank was the danger point.
Seine, northwest of Paris, and reorganize. He wanted to Joffre now issued an order to tlle Fifth and Sixth Armies
make the movement by marching and thought it would to fall back only if pressed. He even felt up to trying his
take four or five days. This rather remarkable proposal luck with Sir John French again. He asked that the British
seemed to ignore the fact that such a movement would cut commander
squarely across the lines of communications of the Sixth ... at least handle his rear guards in such a fashion as to
Army. prevent the enemy from getting the impression that a dis-
Joffre accepted French's propositions on the conditions tinct retreat is under way and that a gap exists between the
Fifth and Sixth Armies.
that the British first retreat to the east of Paris behind the
Marne and then go to their destination by moving south French replied that he would retire to a certain line
of Paris. In this way they would not interfere with the which he would hold as long as the Fifth and Sixth Armies
Sixth Army. -' remained in their present position. If those armies fell
134 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-April
~
Sm.>tJIoN AS _ 10 GQG ON
10 2J)
SCA1..E IN lUl.£S
MAP 3 - The fact that the whole German First Army was advancing to the sOlltheast was clearly exposed.
back, he would fall back too. The joker in this lay in the formed about the location and operations of the German
fact that the line indicated by the Britisher was about a right wing than was German OHL back in Luxemburg.
day's march behind the French front line. It was obvious Early in the morning a bold suggestion came in from
that Sir John was not even willing to fight a rear-guard ac- General Maunoury. He had been informed of the danger
tion; this in spite of reports that a German cavalry corps, threatening the flank of the Fifth Army (Map 3) and
followed by two of Kluck's corps, were moving across the proposed that his own battered and disorganized Sixth
British front to strike the Fifth Army's exposed flank. Army launch an attack to the northeast to help Lamezac.
In characteristic fashion Joffre did what he could. He Joffre had the will power to avoid the temptation and
directed that a cavalry corps made up of troops being ordered Maunoury to fall back on Paris.
railed from the east, be assembled so as to protect the At Bar-sur-Aube, where GQG was now established,
flank of the Fifth Army. Unfortunately, this cavalry Jo!fre spent most of the day in an estimate of the situation.
would not be available for one or two days. He concluded that all his forces must continue to fall back
The proposed counter-blow of the Third and Fourth until the Fifth Army had made good its escape. Until that
Armies and Foch's detachment did not materialize. De army was out of the toils, battle could not be joined under
Langle was ea~er to attack; in fact, he had even issued favorable conditions. Joffre had resolved to have the
orders to his Fourth Army. But when Joffre consulted chances on his side when he resumed the offensive. The re-
Foch about the attack, Foch stated that he thought the sult of the day's meditation was General Instructions No.
conditions were unfavorable. Joffre agreed with this view 4. This prescribed the limit of the French retirement and
and thereupon ordered the Fourth Army and the Foch foreshadowed an offensive in which all troops, including
detachment to fall back while the Third Army pivoted Maunoury's Sixth Army, would be employed. Joffre was
about Verdun.16 careful to state that the limit of the retirement need not
necessarily be reached at the time of the counter-offensive.
SEPTEMBER 1
To comply with the ministerial order that three active
On the morning of September 1st, G-z gave Joffre the
corps garrison Paris, Joffre placed the Sixth Army under
first complete and accurate picture of the German armies.
Gallieni, the Governor of Paris. He then took steps to
Ably assisted by the British Intelligence,1'l'Colonel Dupont
have Gallieni placed under his orders. Thus he complied
was beginning to call the turn. From this point on, Joffre with the order of the Ministry without weakening his
was to be, if not perfectly informed, at least better in-
combat strength for, as shown earlier, he intended to use
'"It was this countennanded counter-attack which Moltke be- the Sixth Army in his offensive.
lieved to be a supreme French effort to gain a decision.
That evening a highly impottant document, sent post
~"The Royal Flying Corps achieved remarkable results and
seems to have been most ably handled. haste from the Fifth Army, arrived at GQG. It was a
1937 THE WILL OF THE LEADER-III 135
stained and crumpled map with a few numbers and pencil Nevertheless the time for the counter-offensive was
marks on it. That was all, but it was enough to make eyes obviously approaching. Colonel POD:tand his Operations
grow big :md hearts beat faster at Fifth Army headquarters Bureau were clamoring for an attack. But on the other
and at GQG. hand, Berthelot did not think the troops were up to it yet.
The map had belonged to a German officer, apparently He preferred to retire behind the Seine and reorganize
from the Guard Cavalry Division, who had been shot before attacking. Belin, the Chief of Staff, advised avoid-
when his motor car ran into a patrol of the French III ing decisive action for a few days more. He said the thing
Corps. The numbers on the map referred to the corps of to do was to last, to hold out. The enemy would grow
the German First Army, thus verifying its order of battle. weaker. Finally, delay would allow the completion of
The marks showed the line of advance and destination of troop movements in progress to strengthen the French
each corps for the night of September Ist-2d. The fact that left and center. Joffre rallied to this idea.
the whole army was advancing to the southeast was clearly A note went out to the armies, slightly altering General
exposed. Instruction No.4-The object of the new plan was to
Joffre began to feel that the opportunity for a decisive relieve the French forces from hostile pressure by a con-
blow might come sooner than he had expected-that is, tinuation of the retirement, to fill up the ranks with re-
if the Fifth Army could only escape. Kluck now appeared placements, to reinforce the center19 by two corps taken
about to give the Allies a chance to build up a maneuver- from the right, and then pass to the offensive. In this
ing force on his flank, after his vigor and rapidity had offensive the garrison of Paris (Sixth Army) would act
prevented their first attempt to do so. The envelopment in the direction of Meaux. The note stated that the Brit-
conception again began to take form. ish would be asked to attack from the line of the Seine in
Another document of the highest significance reached conjunction with the Fifth Army.
GQG about the same time. The French Minister of War Joffre also issued an order of the day to the troops, in
enclosed a general plan of action, approved by none other which he said that the purpose of the retreat was to pre-
than Sir John French! He urged Joffre to accept it. The pare a general offensive, the order for which would be
plan envisaged a defensive action behind the Marne with given in a few days. And then he added:
strong forces on the left, available to counter-attack. The
The safety of the nation depends upon the success of this
important thing was not the nature of the plan itself, but offensive which must break the German armies.
the change in French's attitude. He was back in the war
and seemed willing to fight, provided both his flanks were The exact form the offensive would take was somewhat
well covered. difficult to determine at this time, for the movements of
The change of heart evidently had been the result of a Kluck on this day indicated that he might, after all, ad-
conference in Paris to which French had been summoned vance on Paris. The direction of his march no longer
by Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War. The seemed to be to the southeast.
plan had been drawn up at the end of the conference.18 During the evening of this day, which, incidentally,
Joffre slept on French's proposition. Meanwhile the was the anniversary of the capitulation of Sedan, the
IV Corps had been withdrawn from the Third Army and French government decided to leave Paris for Bordeaux.
directed to Paris, and the First and Second Armies were This movement attracted world attention, for it seemed
told to designate one corps each, to be sent to another part to foreshadow a repetition of 1870' However, in Lorraine,
of the front. at the other end of the long battle front, a more significant,
SEPTEMBER 2 if less publicized movement was in progress. The XV
Joffre believed that a defensive battle on the Marne was and XXI Corps were withdrawn from the First and Sec-
no solution, and that things were not yet ripe for a counter- ond Armies to strengthen the French center,20 which had
offensive. Realizing that Sir John French's susceptibilities been weakened by its contributions to the left. These two
must not be hurt again, Joffre wrote a nice, tactful letter , corps were sent to that part of the front where, on Septem-
thanking French and eXplaining that the unfortunate
"'The wording of the note said "reinforce the right army by two
situation of the Fifth Army would not allow it to cover corps taken from the Nancy and Epinal (First and Second)
the flanks of the British adequately, so the proposition had Armies." The note had been referring to those French armies west
of Verdun, so the Third Army was meant by the expression "right
to be regretfully declined. He suggested that the Brit- army." Actually, one corps went to the Third and one corps to the
ish first hold the line of the Marne and then retire to the Fourth Army.
left bank of the Seine, which they might hold to the ""The use of these corps has been adversely criticized, notably by
Gallieni, who thought they should have been sent to the Sixth
southeast of Melun. Army. However, these corps arrived just in time to save the Third
and Fourth Armies in the Battle of the Marne. \Yithout these
:mwhen Kitchener received a series of reports from French, corps, the center would have been beaten. This defeat would have
showing his refusal to cooperate with the French Army, Kitchener forced the First and Second Armies to retire. It is useless to
became alarmed. One particularly ominous phrase spoke of the speculate whether or not this would have decided the war, but
necessity of retaining "independence of action and power to retire subsequent events certainly justified Joffre's use of these two
on my base when circumstances render it necessary." French also corps. To focus attention almost exclusively on the Allied left and
stated that he had lost confidence in the French higher leadership. German right, as is the tendency in English-speaking countries, is
Kitchener promptly rushed to Paris and ordered French to keep to see only a part of the campaign. It is quite possible that ad-
his troops in the fighting line and conform generally to the move- ditional corps could have been taken from the east to reinforce
ments of the French. the weak Sixth Army. But that is a different question.
136 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-April
ber 5th, Moltke would order his main effort. The parry" About 10:00 P.M. Huguet again called GQG and
thus preceded the thrust. stated that it was possible that Sir John French, who had
received numerous replacements, might move to the east
SEPTEMBER 3 to attack in the evening of September 4th, "especially if
Early reports showed that the Fifth Army had crossed the Sixth Army, which appears to have nothing in front
the Marne and probably escaped the threatened envelop- of it, should begin on the same day a similar movement to
ment of its left flank. But there was still some danger. the left of the British."
Moreover, days of battle and forced marches had left the Shortly before midnight Joffre dictated letters to Gal-
bulk of this army in sad condition. lieni, Governor of Paris. Gallieni had reported the weak-
Even so, the hour of battle was approaching and Joffre ness of the Paris defenses and his fears for the capital.
mentally passed his army commanders in review. He was Joffre referred to his previous orders and reiterated that
satisfied with all except Lanrezac--once the brilliant pro-- when the offensive was launched, it was his intention
fessor and far-sighted strategist-now the discouraged, to use the active and reserve troops of Paris to attack to-
complaining general whose authority over his own staff ward Meaux.
and troops was weakening. In a personal note to Gallieni, Joffreindicated that a pot-
Joffrefelt that he had to have a lighting man at the head tion of the Sixth Army should be pushed forward at once
of the tired and disheartened Fifth Army. In two battles so as to be in position to threaten the German right flank
this army had been struck both in front and in flank. It and support the British left: He also directed Gallieni to
had made the longest retreat of any French army. Even keep in constant touch with Marshal French.
now it was staggering back over the Marne in a disorgan- The Paris garrison had been reinforced by the 45th Di-
ized condition. And yet, when the time came for the vision, an excellent regular unit, and the IV Corps was
French offensive,the Fifth Army could again expect to be beginning to arrive. These two units brought the total
on the spot. This army, obviously, needed a strong char- striking force available in Paris to four regular divisions.
acter in command-strategist or not. five reserve divisions and three cavalry divisions.
Lanrezac might have done once, but he would not do By their own errorsthe Germans had thus allowed Joffre
now. The strain of the campaign had told upon him. He to return to his conception of August 25th-to envelop
had frequently objected to carrying out orders. On occa- the German right flanl-.. The Allied left was now favor-
sion his conduct of operations had been weak and hesitant. ably located with respect to the German right; further-
His attitude was being reflectedin his troops. Cooperation more, it was steadily growing in strength as Joffrestripped
with the British would remain a vain hope so long as his eastern armies. Meanwhile, the German right was
Lanrezac commanded the Fifth Army. Joffredecided that constantly diminishing; troops had been detached to in-
Lanrezac must go. - vest Maubeuge and others were being continually dropped
He drove to Lanrezac's headquarters and relieved him. off to guard the ever-lengthening line of communica~ions.
To Franchet d'Esperey he entrusted the Fifth Army, with The situation was definitely on the mend for the Alhes.
the warning to "get along with" the British. Whether Joffre should strike at once or wait a while
Back at GQG Joffre received Foch's answer to an in- longer was a question. The favorable strategical opporrun-
quiry as to whether or not his command was fit for im- ity might be lost through delay. But, on the other hand,
mediate battle. The answer was no; not for several days. the French center and left would be materially stronger if
The first reports that came in on this day had puzzled the blow.could be deferred a few days longer.
G-2, for they seemed to indicate that Kluck might head Joffre thought the time near but not yet at hand. He
for Paris after all. However, at 7:00 P.M. Maunoury re. believed that the Third, Fourth, Ninth,21 and Fifth
ported that the Germans opposed to the Sixth Army had Armies were not quite ready for a decisive battle. If the
moved southeast toward the Marne. A French air recon- Sixth Army struck now, it would have to strike almost
naissance saw a column ten miles long approaching the alone. Even when reinforced by the IV Corps, he did not
Marne. Then Huguet telephoned: believe that it would be able to reverse the situation on
Reliablereports,comingfrom the Britishair forceand all the western front by itself. It might gain a spectacular local
confirmingeach other,indicatethat the entireGermanFirst successbut he would have to call it off, just as he had had
Army, except the IV ReserveCorps, is moving southeast to call off the First and Second Armies in Lorraine, the
with the object of crossingthe Marne between CMteau- Verdun forces in the midst of their success against the
Thierry and La-Ferte-sous-Jouarre and attacking the left of
the Fifth Army. The headsof columnswilldoubtlessarrive Crown Prince, de Langle's counter-offensive on the
at the riverthis evening. Meuse, and Lanrezac at Guise.
Another message stated that the British air force now Joffre felt that he must play for higher stakes. There-
reporred that the Germans were marching southeast and fore, on the evening of September 3d he decided.to defer
the decisivebattle until the Allied forces as a whole were
not southward, that there were no more troops in front of
the British and that it looked as if the entire German First ready. Then, and not until then, would he strike.
Army would cross the Marne. "'TheFochdetachmenthad nowgrownintothe NinthArmy.
(To be concluded)
The Dispersion Slide Rule-Modified
CAPTAIN N. A. BURNELL, C.A.C.
T
HE dispersion slide rule is, as the name implies, a daily drills. It has been used extensively at the Coast Ar-
device by which gun dispersion may be simulated. tillery School and has proved to be of great value for
It is used to furnish deviations during drill so that training in adjustment of fire.
the person who adjusts fire may be trained in the operation The modification consists of a dispersion tape to be
of the fire adjustment board (or the bracketing adjust- used with a deviation scale-Scale A of the original
ment chart) and in the application of the rules for fire ad- model--on a different type of mount. This eliminates the
,ustment. use of a dispersion bag (or dice) and Scales Band C of
This device was first described in the 1934 edition of the first model, without affecting any of the functions for
Special Text No. 35, a publication of the Department of which the rule was designed.
Extension Courses, Coast Artillery School. It is based on The dispersion tape consists of a large series of "canned"
the usually accepted theory that the fall of shots is distrib- deviations or splashes grouped about their center of dis-
uted according to the law of accidental errors and that persion according to the fall of two dice of different colors,
such distribution ma)' be simulated b)' the fall of dice or as described in the original discussion in Special Text No.
the drawing of appropriately marked cubes from a bag. 35, The center of dispersion is represented by the center
\Vhen the dispersion slide rule was designed it was in- of the tape. The splashes are presented in some four
tended that a dispersion bag or a set of dice be used with it hundred and eighty "frames" or sections on each of
to determine deviations, but it soon became apparent that which are placed four vertical marks. One of these marks
its operation would have to be simplified a great deal be- bears a cross (X), another bears a circle (0), a third a
fore many persons could be induced to use it. double bar (=), and the fourth is left plain. The tape
The purpose of this article is to describe a modified is placed on rollers and is covered so that onl)' one frame
form of dispersion rule which is well suited to use during appears at a time in a window in the covering.
I J
210 220 270 240 ::50 ::£C "70 28C 310 :20 330 340 3510 3 -., ,8e 3,,0 -c
~. ,--,-1 LL L 1 LL I
230' 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 310 320 330 340 350 360 370
J) 11 1111111111111111111111111111111'111/1'1111111
1
PE.060~. (I lNC"h071f.)
! 111111111111111111111111111111m.tluu111111111111111111111I1II11I1 titvlATtON
' I, "I
~-8RACI(£TING
, I "11/",,11111
""EiHOD
L
\._-
I he deviation scale is made on a separate piece of card- mount to mark that position, and should not ordinarily be
board and is placed in a guide next to the window. This moved until the problem is completed. This procedure is
scale is a duplicate of the one used with the fire adjust- equivalent to saying that the probable error of preparation
ment board, except for the spacing of graduations. For of fire is about the same as the gun probable error-an as-
the bracketing method of adjustment, the deviation scale sumption which is often justified.
may be marked to show "Overs," "Shorts," and "Hits." If an adjustment correction is ordered during an aCtual
The spacing of the deviation scale should be proportional practice, the application of that correction to the firing
to the probable error of the armament manned. The num- data will presumably move the center of dispersion and
ber of graduations per inch may be determined in the the succeeding splashes a like amount. If the deviation
following manner: l'he depth of the dispersion zone repre- scale is so moved that the graduation corresponding to the
sented on the tape is 6.8 inches. Hence, 6.8 inches = 8 adjustment correction with which any shots was fired is
P.E. Substitution in this equation of the value of the opposite the pin marking the initial position of the 300-
probable error will give the desired scale of graduations. graduation when the deviation of the splash is reported,
For example, if the probable error of the armament is the effect of all adjustment corrections ordered will have
0.60 % of the range, the scale of graduations should be I been correctly reproduced on the dispersion slide rule.
inch = 8 x 0.60/6.8= 0.706%. Note that the deviation scale does not have to be moved
, The operator of the device determines the deviations by as soon as an adjustment correction is ordered. In fact, it
reading from the deviation scale opposite the marks on the should not be moved until the fall of the first shot fired
tape. He reads as many deviations from a frame as are with that correction.
needed fot the salvo and moves the tape a predetermined The only reason for moving the pin that marks the
number of frames .to get the next set of deviations. An initial position of the target is to simulate a shifting
exceedingly great number of combinations of deviations center of dispersion. If such action is desired, shift both the
may be secured by changing the selection of marks to be pin .and the deviation scale in the desired amount and di-
read or the number of frames to be turned between read- rectlOn.
ings. The tape may be turned in either direction. The Proper simulation of timing is one of the most import-
only precaution necessary is to insure that the dispersion ant, and at the same time difficult, elements of successful
depends on chance and not on the whim of the operator. drill. Except for such preliminary instruction as may be
The selection of frames and marks should be made ac- necessary, all problems should be conducted with the
cording to some predetermined rule which should be fol- same timing as would be required during the firing of an
lowed until the end of the problem. For instance, it actual practice. No deviation should be reported before
might be decided to turn two frames between readings the end of the time of Hight plus five to ten seconds al-
and to read opposite the X for a single shot, or opposite the lowance for the normal functioning of the spotting sectiou.
X and the 0 for a two-gun salvo. Corrections should not be applied to the firing data sooner
Besides providing a means for simulating gun dis- than could be done normally. A divergence from correct
person the device is intended to permit relative movement timing in either of these operations might make consider-
between the center of dispersion and the target to repre- able difference in the trend of the problem and in the re-
sent (I) the result of initial adjustment or preparation of sult.
fire, (2) the application of adjustment corrections ordered, The operation of the modified dispersion device may be
and (3), when desired, a shifting center of dispersion. At summarized as follows:
the same time, it allows the determination of deviations I. Place the deviation scale in position under the
always with reference to the target. window, move the normal (300-graduation) to the de-
The target is represented by the normal (300-gradu- sired initial position, and mark this position with a pin
ation) of the deviation scale. If it is not opposite the placed in the mount.
center of dispersion when a problem is begun, the effect 2. Turn the dispersion tape until the selected frame is
is the same as though there were a systematic error as a in the window and, at the proper time, read the deviatior
result of preparation of fire. The amount of the error is from the deviation scale opposite the mark that repre-
proportional to the distance between the normal and sents the splash.
the center of dispersion. Since preparation of fire is rarely 3, If an adjustment correction is ordered, move the
perfect for an actual practice it should not be so represented deviation scale until the correction ordered is opposite
for drill. As good a way as any to select the amount of the the pin, timing the move to synchronize with the fall of
error is to do so by means of the dispersion tape, as though the shot on which the new correction is applied.
a deviation were being determined. For example, if the 4. To simulate a shifting center of dispersion, move
range officer has decided to have the tape turned two bot~ pin and deviation scale the desired amount and di-
frames between readings and to have the mark bearing the rectlOn.
X represent single splashes, the problem may be started by Copies of the deviation tape and plans for constructing
turning the tape and placing the normal of the deviation the mount may be obtained, upon request, from the Presi-
scale opposite the X. A pin should then be put on the dent of the Coast Artillery Board, Fort Monroe, Virginia.
Flag of Truce
By LIEUTENANT SEWELL T. TYNG, Military Intelligence Reserve
I
N.
the opening days of September, 1914, the German
armies, victorious in the hard-fought battles of the the Third Army's right Hank, occupied Heut:rfgiville.
frontiers, were pushing southward towards the Beyond a casual statement in a radio message to the
Marne on the heels of the retreating French, and the Second Army, that "the capture of Rheims is desirable,"
great cathedral city of Rheims stood squarely in their no definite orders had come from OHL. Von Moltke,
path. Though in no sense comparable to Verdun and as was his custom, apparently intended that Bulow and
the other bulwarks of France's eastern frontier, Rheims Hausen decide between them which army should take
was classified as a fortified city. Although antiquated it and when.
and demoded, its defenses might nevertheless serve as a In point of fact the French had no intention of making
center of resistance should the French attempt to make a a serious stand at Rheims. Intent upon a general strategic
stand along the heights of the Aisne. The question then, retreat and a regroupment of forces for a counter-offen-
was this: Would Rheims be defended or would Joffre sive on a grand scale, Joffre had no thought of diverting
abandon it without a struggle? To be on the safe side, any part of his strength for a secondary operation. The
von Moltke made preparations for a siege. forts of Rheims, with their out-oE-date armament and
His instrUctions for August 27th read: equipment, were in no condition to offer serious resist-
The siege equipment necessary for the capture of Rheuns ance to a well-organized attack unless reinforced by sub-
will be assembled and in due course will be placed at the stantial mobile forces. Moreover, the damage that the
disposal of the Fourth Army. city would suffer if resistance were offered, outweighed
At this time it seemed that the reduction of the city any possible military advantage. Accordingly, during the
would fall to the lot of the army commanded by Duke day of September 3d the last French units' marched out
Albrecht of Wiirttemberg, but in the succeeding days of Rheims, leaving it open and undefended.
the general direction of the German advance shifted from From the nature of the rear-guard actions fought by
southwest to south, so that on September 2d when the the French during the preceding days, von Hausen
invaders' advance guards approached the outskirts of rightly conjectured that Rheims would not be defended.
Rheims, that city no longer fell within the zone of the Then, too, he knew that the Second Army was preparing
Fourth Army. Instead, it lay between the right wing of to take the ciry, for his headquarters had intercepted a
the Third Army and the left wing of the Second Army, radio message to that effect from von BUlow to OHL
almost in the center of the German battle line. in the early hours of September 3d. However, in the
The ancient capital, where Jeanne d'Arc had placed absence of any express direction from the High Com-
the crown of France on the head of Charles VII, offered mand, he saw no necessity for giving his Prussian col-
a rich and tempting prize. Both von Bulow, commander league the right of way. Here was an occasion when
of the Second Army, and von Hausen, commander of vigorous action might be richly rewarded.
the Third Army, coveted the honor of ano.ouncing its Accordingly, late in the afternoon of September 3d
capture. There was no doubt that its fall would be and without notice either to OHL or the Second Army,
proudly announced and joyfully received in Germany. von Hausen turned his 23d Reserve Division against the
Here was an opportunity fot the successful army com- forts of Vitry-Ie-Reims and Nogent l'Abesse on the east-
mander to cast off the unwelcome cloak of anonymity ern outskirts of Rheims. Finding the French gone, Cap-
that shrouded military operations and enjoy a pleasant tain von Humbracht with a patrol of Saxon hussars2
moment of popular acclaim. Moreover, a natural rivalry boldly entered the city.
animated the two German commanders. Von Biilow The patrol made its way through the darkened and
was a Prussian of distinguished family, high in favor at deserted streets, and at n:oo P.M. drew rein before the
the Imperial Court, and an eminent example of the mili- mairie. The French mayor, M. Lenglet, who had waited
tary caste that dominated the German Army. Von at his office in anticipation of this, received the German
Hausen, a Saxon by birth and former Saxon Minister of troopers and was forthwith arrested and held as a hostage
War, bitterly resented the Prussian assumption of su- to insure the peaceful behavior of the civilian population.
periority. There was no love lost between the two; It seems fair to doubt whether the invaders' arrival and
jealousy and distrUst marked both their personal and the arrest of the mayor reassured the inhabitants of the
officialrelations. city to the extent that General von Hausen has suggested
On the night of September 2d, General van Bulow in his memoirs; but in any case no resistance was ~ffered
established his headquarters at Fismes on the Vesle. On and Rheims remained undisputedly in German hands
the left Hank of his army the 2d Division of the Guard until after the Battle of the Marne.
held the little town of Jonchery, whi~h lay south of the
'Elements of Foch's Army Detachment.
river and almost ten kilometers due west of Rheims. To
"The patrol consisted of three officers, two noncommissioned of-
the east of the city von Hausen's Saxon~ had made cor- ficers and seven troopers of the Saxon Regiment of Reserve Hussars.
140 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-APril
A few minutes after midnight van Hausen sent a completed his statement Lanrezac merely said, "Take
jubilant radio to von Moltke: "Rheims is in the hands of them back to the lines." Puzzled and confused, the Ger-
the Third Army. almost without combat." The fol- mans were again blindfolded, loaded into their car and
lowing morning the main body of the 23d Reserve Di- driven back to the front. It may be that their perplexity
vision entered the city and its suburbs. influenced their subsequent conduct, for on crossing the
Meanwhile, von Bulow had also turned his attention to lines they lingered-or so it seemed to the French-sur-
Rheims, but with somewhat more regard to form and to veying the French positions and dispositions with an in-
the military protocoL Early in the afternoon of the 3d, terest unbecoming to their privileged character. Suspici-
a parry under a flag of truce left the headquarters of the ous of their intentions and good faith, a French patrol
Guard Corps to demand the formal surrender of the quickly pushed forward and again took them into cus-
city. The mission was composed of Captain von Arnim, tody. Once more they made the journey to Fifth Army
wearing the red tabs of the Great General Staff, and Headquarters, not blindfolded this time, but handcuffed
Captain von Kummer, personal aide to General von and as prisoners. For a while there was talk of summary
Plettenberg, commander of the Guard Corps, Captain execution for abuse of a flag of truce; but investigation
Scholvinck of the Motor Transport Corps, a noncom- of the matter indicated that their conduct did not merit
missioned officer and trumpeter. The noncom, who had such drastic action. Moreover, it was certain that any mis-
been a music-hall artist in Berlin, conceived the curious treatment of officers sent under a flag of truce would
notion of ingratiating himself with his enemies by wear- lead to German reprisals on British as well as French offi-
ing on his field-grey tunic the violet ribbon of the cers. In view of this, the British liaison officer, Lieu-
French civilian order of Palmes Academiques which had tenant E. L. Spears,4 took it upon himself to urge cau-
been awarded him before the war. tion and moderation on the French army commander.
Approaching Rheims from the west-the opposite di- The lives of the whole parry hung in the balance for
rection from that taken by the Saxons-the staff car seyeral hours. Finally the matter was referred to Joffre.
carrying the German envoys ran into a French cavalry With sound good sense, the French commander in chief
patrol at La Neuvillette, a suburb some four kilometers directed that von Bulow's representatives be detained un-
outside the city. This patrol, part of the French X Corps, til any information they might have picked up became
withheld their fire at the unexpected sight of an automo- valueless. A few days later the crestfallen party was
bile filled with Germans and proceeding under a white moved to Bordeaux. From there they were placed on
flag. Uncertain how to treat their unlooked-for visitors, board a neutral vessel bound for Germany.
the French delayed while the Germans with some diffi- In the meantime, General von Plettenberg had been
culty explained their presence. Meanwhile, angry civil- aroused to a state of high indignation by the disappear-
ians crowded around the car, eager to do violence to the ance of his mission. Though von Hausen's radio an-
enemies thus delivered into their hands. However, the nouncing the capture of Rheims had been intercepted by
French troopers succeeded in extricating von Biilow's emis- the Second Army, it was not transmitted to von Pletten-
saries from this embarrassing situation and started with berg, who was totally unaware of the presence of Saxon
them for corps headquarters. troops in the city. Therefore, convinced that his repre-
When the parry reached corps headquarters the corps sentatives had been detained in violation of the flag of
commander stated that he had no authority to deal with truce, he dispatched another group at dawn to announce
such a case, declined to receive them, and ordered them the imposition of a fine of 50,000,000 marks, with in-
taken still further to the rear to the army commander. structions to state that it would be raised to 100,000,000,
At last, in the middle of the afternoon, the German en- if the German envoys had' not safely returned within two
voys, weary and bewildered, stumbled blindfolded into hours.
the courtyard of the Chateau de Rebais, the headquarters The second parry met with better success than the
Df the French Fifth Army. first. They entered the city without mishap, and pr~
Warned in advance of their coming, General Lanrezac, sented themselves at the mairie. There they found a
the army commander,s had prepared a disconcerting wel- detachment of Saxons already in possession. The mayor
come. Seated behind a table in an upper room, with the protested that he had no knowledge of the fate of the
officers of his staff grouped about him, he acknowledged earlier envoys, but von Plettenberg's officers remained in-
the Germans' salutes with a cold inclination and waited exorable; the fine must be paid.
in silence. Captain von Arnim stated his mission halting- For some reason this second parry seemed in no great
ly and with evident embarrassment. hurry to get back to their headquarters. Perhaps they
Knowing that the French had already evacuated stayed to swap stories with their Saxon comrades whom
Rheims and suspecting that the German mission con- they had not seen since the opening of the campaign. In
cealed some ruse, Lanrezac not only made no reply to any event, as time passed and his second group of emis.-
the demand for the city surrender, but made no response saries did not return, von Plettenberg reached the end of
to any part of von Arnim's speech. When von Arnim his patience. Without further delay or inquiry he directed
General von Winckler, commanding the 2d Division of
aLater the same day Lanrezac was relieved of the command of the
French Fifth Anny and replaced by Franchet d'Esperey. 'Now Brigadier General Spears, author of Liaison, 1914.
1937 FLAG OF TRUCE 141
the Guard, to bombard Rheims. For nearly three hours negligence of various sorts, furthemlore, it had no notable
the guns of the Prussian Guard shelled the city. Then effect on the operations of the Third Army. Neverthdess, I
shall not conceal how strange it seemed to me that I did not
General von Suckow, the Saxon division commander,
receive a word of e.xplanation or excuse after the 2d Division
succeeded in getting word through that his troops were of the Guard had opened fire. despite the danger to which
holding Rheims. Saxon troops were e.xposed. \Vhat a fine row there would
Though tile Saxon forces occupying the city suffered have been if the situation had been reversed and Saxon ar-
no casualties, iliis bombardment killed or wounded some tillery had fired on Rheims while it was occupied by the Im-
perial Guard!
forty civilians and caused serious damage to the cathedral.
Naturally, the French held it up to the world as an act The capture and bombardment of Rheims had little in-
of ruthless and pointless barbarity, but actually it was the fluence on tI:e ~trategic development of the campaign.
tragic result of a series of errors and misunderstandin!!Sv' Indeed, the InCident has been all but forgotten in the
~
of rivalry between two commanders and of defective staff shadow of the greater events that surrounded it. Never-
work. theless, it is significant, for it provides a cardinal illus-
Later General von Hausen wrote: stration of the lack of harmony and cooperation between
the German armies. This constituted one of their most
Never the slightest word of explanation or ... of apol-
ogy in connection with this incident came to me from any conspicuous weaknesses during the early weeks of the
Prussian military authority ... I did not attach any special war. A few days later it would wreak havoc with Ger-
importance to all this episode because it reduced itself to man arms at the Rattle of the Marne.
RESULTS COUNT.
The AA gt/1IS brought them down in tbe past-they can today-they will tomorrow.
ROD~IAI\ 20" S~100TH BORE GUN
Plenty of Historical Backy,rolmd Here.
E
VER since the introduction of stereoscopic height Falls are replaced by a pair of pictures (called a stereo-
finders into the antiaircraft fire-control system, gram) representing the reticle of a height finder. Viewed
there have been efforts to produce a satisfactot;, through the stereoscope, the pair of reticles merge into
device for training stereoscopic observers. Several more or one set of reticle symbols which appear to stand out in
less complex and expensive trainers have been designed relief. Superimposed on each reticle of the stereogram is
and manufactured by commercial concerns, but these have the figure of an airplane. The left figure is fixed. The right
not been issued to all units equipped with stereoscopic figure is placed on a piece of transparent celluloid which
height finders. can be moved laterally, thus changing the distance be-
There is a definite need for a device with which pre- tween the two airplane figures. When viewed through
liminary training can be given before the beginner at- the stereoscope, this lateral displacement of the right-hand
tempts to operate the height finder. Such a device should figure causes the observer to receive an impression of
enable the candidate observer to appreciate the fusion of movement ill depth, that is, toward or away from the
reticle symbols, what stereoscopic contact is, and how it observer.
is obtained. It should also enable the instructor to deter- To demonstrate this same principle in another way, fix
mine the candidate's accuracy in making contacts, and the gaze on a point on a wall, fifteen or twenty feet dis-
provide a means for developing and exercising the stereo- tant. Hold a pencil about fifteen inches in from of each
scopic sense when the use of the range finder is not prac- eye. The two pencils should be identical and should be
ticable. held vertically with the points at the same level. With
The contrivance described in this article does not differ the gaze still fixed on the wall, at first the observer will
<Treadyin principle from some of the trainers used in the be conscious of four pencil images instead of two. Gradu-
past. However, it has other advantages, for it can be built ally the two inner pencil images will merge into one,
in a local machine shop at a cost of approximately two which is known as the "fused image." If the pencils are
dollars. then moved closer together while concentrating on the
The trainer is essentially an old-fashioned parlor stereo- fused image, it will appear to move toward the observer
scope ill which the familiar stereoscopic views of Niagara and as they are moved apart it will appear to recede. This
FIGURE 2.
approximates what happens when the airplane figures in A wood block (0) is fastened to the under side of the
the trainer are moved laterally, and also when the target endless belt. The assembly view of the trainer shows how
image is moved by the measuring knob in the actual block (0) is connected to the threaded shaft of knob
range or height finder. The explanation of this effect is (K) through the brass strip (N) . Turning knob (K)
beyond the scope of this article but if the reader is curious causes a lateral movement of block (0) and the endless
he will find his phenomenon discussed in current texts belt 0) to which it is attached. Thus a lateral move-
on the subject. ment is transmitted to the right-hand airplane figure
The reticle stereogram mentioned above is shown in whenever knob (K) is turned. The knob (K) carries a
Figure I. Its position in the trainer can be seen in Figure paper scale for checking the consistency of readings when
2. The details of construction are shown in Figure 3, making a series of stereoscopic contacts.
The separate parts are lettered and their location is indi- The holder (H) is attached to the stereoscope frame
cated on the assembly views by corresponding letters. through bar (G) which is fixed to holder (H) and drilled
The reticle stereogram, Figure I, should be cut out and so as to slide on the three supporting rods (C) and (D).
glued onto the upper face of the block of wood (I) which With the clamping screw (Q), this arrangement per-
is mounted in the three-sided metal holder (H). The mits adjustment of the distance between the eye pieces
reticle stereogram is covered by a transparent celluloid and the reticle stereogram to suit the individual observer.
slide which carries the righi-hand airplane figure. This The stereoscope prisms can be procured from an optical
figure is made on the slide by placing the right-hand side supply company for approximately seventy-five cents.
of the slide over the left-hand reticle and copying onto The question may be asked "Why bother with a trainer
the celluloid the airplane figure appearing above the cen- at all when the height finder is available?"
tral diamond. The copy is made by cutting into the
The answer to this is that, in the early sta~es of train-
celluloid with a needle and then filling in with black
ing, many candidates find it difficult, if not impossible.
India ink. By gluing the ends of a strip of tough paper
to fuse the reticle symbols and to make stereoscopic con-
to the ends of the celluloid strip. an endless belt (J) is
tact when using the height finder. Some of these candi-
formed. This belt should slide freely over the block (I)
dates might become good observers if given the proper
and the reticle stereogram.
instruction and training. It is probable that good observer
In copying the airplane figure on the celluloid and in
material is sometimes cast aside because the candidates have
forming the endless belt, care should be taken to have the
not experienced the sensation of seeing stereoscopically,
airplane figure on the right, the same distance vertically
above its central diamond as the airplane figure on the through a similar instrument, before attempting the height
left. Failure to do this will cause the observer to see two finder. The trainer should help to overcome this difficulty.
airplanes when the reticle symbols are fused. Practice on the trainer is fascinating. One or more of
1937 A DEVICE FOR TRAINING STEREOSCOPIC OBSERVERS 149
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ASSEMBLY VIEWS
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SELECTION OF FIRING POINT oughly well was made available to them. The training of
the 62d for its service practice and the preparations made
But even the best trained units may not attain good re-
for the practice were not abnormal; they were not char-
sults unless conditions under which target practices are
acterized by departures from well known standard meth-
held are of the best. There are no satisfactory fiting points
ods. These methods are basically sound and sufficient;
near Fort Totten. The one locality in the Second Corps
failure to apply them zealously is more often the cause of.
Area where conditions are propitious is on the South
unsatisfactory results, than all other factors combined.
shore of Lake Ontario near Oswego, N. Y. Visibility over
Lake Ontario is generally good, and there is but little in- THE MATTER OF TRAINING HANDICAPS
terference from passing vessels at any time; moreover,
the axis of fire is to the north and good camera records are It may not be out of place to mention two handicaps en-
obtainable at all hours. I have never made a better decision countered in carrying out the training program. The first
-nor one more appreciated by the regiment-than the is unfortunately prevalent in many if not in all commands.
one to go to Oswego for the 1936 practices. The 380 mile It is the matter of shortage of battery officers.As the target
march from Fort Totten gave fine training in convoy practice season for 1936 approached, the annual walk-out
work. to schools and other duties began. These transfers are nec-
essary, of course. It is only unfortunate that so many of
EQUIPMENT
them occur during the busiest part of the summer season.
A factor which can help or mar a target practice, normal The regiment undertook its target practices with only 1{)
for all commands, perhaps, but of concern, always, from regular officerspresent out of an authorized strength of 3 I .
the regimental commander's viewpoint, is the matter of One captain had trained his gun battery for over a year
equipment and accessories. Close watchfulness was exer- and in all eagerness "pointed" toward this practice as one
cised and checks made to insure that the necessary equip- that would be a real event in his career; he had full confi-
ment and only the best grade of ammunition procurable dence that the practice of his battery would be a record
were always ready, serviceable, and available to subordi-. breaking one. It was. Much against his wish, he was de-
nate commanders when and as needed. tached tor duty at the Camp Perry Rifle Matches, leaving
his battery just three days before the regiment marched
OPPORTUNITY GIVEN BATTERY COMMANDERS from its home station. Because of the greatly reduced of-
Determined effort is made in the 62d CA (AA) to give ficer personnel, there was no replacement available who
battery commanders as near 100% of their personnel for had trained with the regiment. The command of the bat-
training as is possible. The training program of the 62d tery devolved upon a lieutenant who had just arrived for
CA (AA) has for two years contained the following: duty; he took hold and worked with commendable zeal
and a fine grasp of the problems he had to solve, but the
"Every officer and enlisted man must be trained, and at- best he could do could not overcome the handicap. This
tendance at such appropriate training formations as will attain
battery established a "record"-it was the only one of the
this end is required. No officer nor enlisted man may be ex-
cused entirely. The attendance at training formations of of- regiment which was not rated "excellent."
ficers performing essential staff or administrative dury, and of
MORALE
specialists such as radio operators, electricians, supply ser-
geants, mess sergeants, cook and the like, will be so arranged The last factor to be mentioned, but really the first in
as to hours that the primary duties of such personnel shall not
be seriously interfered with, but no officer nor enlisted man order of importance and without which the target practice
shall be excused continually." could never have been so successful, is MORALE. En-
thusiasm and cheerfulness characterized the performance
This regulation was conscientiously enforced; the regi- of all tasks connected with the target practices. After all is
mental commander and staff constantly drew personnel said, the incontrovertible fact stands out in bold rdief-
from other duties, from special duty, detached service and no machine is any berter than the mind and hand that con-
fatigue duty, to insure that the maximum possible num- trol it. In the accuracy and effectiveness of fire direction,
ber of men were made available to battery and detachment the man is everything. The results are due in a very large
commanders for training. Persistent and continuous fol- measure to the fine spirit of the officers and the enlisted
low-up methods were invoked to insure the desired at- men of the batteries, to their pride in themselves and in
tendance at essential training, and that this attendance their organizations, and to their determination to develop
took precedence over all other duty during that phase of a well-rounded, homogeneous team. Each officerand man
training immediately preceding target practice. in the regiment is entitled to generous praise for the part
The foregoing paragraphs may be summarized in the he played in contributing to the winning of this coveted
statement that the regimental commander and staff were trophy.
ever watchful to see that maximum opportunity was af- Battalion and battery commanders functioned with zeal
fgrded subordinate unit commanders in the way of pro- and confidence; therefore it is fitting that they should have
viding personnel, equipment, and facilities; and that the opportunity to record their observations so the stage will
amount of time for accomplishing their missions thor- now be turned over to them.
152 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-April
GUNS chine-gun batteries of the regiment for night training and
By Major L. D. Ftfrnsworth practices, it was impossible to complete record searchlight
practices at Fort Ontario and these practices had to be hdd
Progressive training of the batteries was conducted
later at Camp Upton. However, during the ttaining of
throughout the year. In addition to the usual preparatory
other components, advantage was taken of every oppor_
training of the gun and range sections, both batteries were
tunity to train the personnel in the operation of search-
fortunate in that numerous opportunities to fire were af-
lights, sound locators, control station, and the installation
forded in conjunction with the training of the civilian com-
and maintenance of communications.
ponents of the Army, during the period preceding target
practice. The value of this additional training is reHected Sixty-eight men were tested on the Binaural Training
in the results obtained. Instrument M- I to determine their qualifications as
The pracrices of "B" Battery were held on August 26, listeners. Each individual was tested at least ten times both
August 28, and the night of August 31, 1936. Excellent as to his ability to balance the sound, as well as to keep
results were obtained in all three practices, the scores being a continuous balance with a simulated moving sound
107.65,95'35, and 101.84, respectively. The average rates source. Of the sixty-eight tested, twenty-two were found
of fire for the practices were 21.47,28.84, and 30'99 shots to be consistent. These men were selected for continuous
per gun per minute. That of the first practice was lowered training as listeners and acoustic corrector operators. Rec-
due to malfunctioning of a fuze cutter; and, as a result, on ords were kept, showing the error of each individual. By
one course, but one gun was in action. Hits were obtained this means the personal error for each individual was de-
on all courses except two, which were gliding targets. No termined from the average of his daily errors over a con-
corrections, except those due to trial shot fire, were made siderable period of time.
during the target practices.
IMPROVISED MATERIEL AND METHODS
No special methods of training nor special devices were
employed. In order to facilitate the location of the target plane by
MACHINE GUNS other light sections, after one section had reported
By Major E. H. Taliaferro, Jr. "Listeners on Target," a defended area plan was laid out
on cross-section paper to a scale of 2,000 yards to the inch.
Throughout the training season, all personnel of the two
The positions of the forward lights, advanced listening
machine-gun batteries, who were in any manner associ-
posts, and sector boundaries were plotted. Arcs, gradu-
ated with the determination or application of firing data,
ated to the nearest 100 mils, were described about the for-
were given individual and group instruction in the esti-
ward light positions and a small horizontal range conver-
mation of target speeds and ranges, and the rapid conver-
sion chart to the same scale was laid out at the bottom of
sion of leads into "target lengths." All instructional firing
the plan. This plan was mounted on a sketching board
had as its ultimate goal, the attainment of individual pro-
and covered with celluloid. When one searchlight section
ficiency in controlling fire by means of tracers. Intensive
reported "ON TARGET," the telephone operator also
individual training during the preliminary period was
reported the angular height and azimuth (as read from the
possible, due to the fact that considerable ammunition was
control station) to the platoon c.P. By using the assumed
available. Throughout the target practice season all prac-
altitude it was possible to plot instantly, and with nothing
tices, both preliminary and record, were thoroughly
but a pencil, the approximate posirion of the target plane
analyzed with the result that much valuable information
and give to the adjacent searchlight sections i relocation of
was obtained, thereby making possible the application of
the target plane from their positions both in azimuth and
the proper corrective measures. Both batteries were fortu-
angular height. This enabled these adjacent searchlight
nate in having assigned to them, just prior to target prac-
sections to "pick up" the target plane with their sound
tice, numerous men who had recently returned from for-
locators immediately and without an undue amount of
eign service where they had served with AA machine-gun
batteries. With the benefit of additional training, these searching, and resulted in having an intersection of at least
~en were fitted into t,he team and rendered valuable serv- two light sections on the target long before it reached an
lce. angular height of 625 mils from the nearest searchlight,
Batteries "E" and "F" obtained excellent results for at which point "IN ACTION" was given. The course of
each of their practices, the average record scores being the target plane was readily plotted from intersections
228.1, and 285.1, respectively. During all record practices, from two light sections and checked from a third light sec-
the firing conditions were ideal. The results obtained may tion without difficulty prior to giving the command "IN
~e attributed largely to a high state of morale and train- ACTION:'
mg.
Due to unfavorable weather conditions, rain, fog and
SEARCHLIGHTS
mist, record exercises were not held until the latter part of
By Captain R. E. DeMeTritt October. Although the temperature was at or below the
Due to the training requirements of other components freezing point, personnel and materiel functioned per-
of the Army, and the requirements of the gun and ma- fectly.
LEFT TO RIGHT: GoueT1lor Robert
E. Quinn, of Rhode Islmid, Colonel
Earl C. Webster, Brig. Gen. Wi/-
liam H. Wilson alld Brig. Gen.
Herbert R. Dean.
Jre three large compartments. In rear of the communica- raised and lowered by automobile fixtures. Green and red
aons map board is a box upon which a short wave or a running lights are placed on rear and on sides of the
standard radio set can be placed. Inside the box which is trailer. The Aoor is covered with inlaid linoleum.
ventilated through a wire screen to the outside is found There has been provided in this trailer all the necessary
the power generator driven by a gasoline moror. Auto- means to insure that the commanding officer and his
mobile-eype batteries are also carried here. staff can operate efficiently in the field and under condi-
Entrance is gained from the rear. Glass windows are tions conducive to the attainment of excellent results.
Wire-Laying Apparatus
By STAFF SGT. CLETUS L. LUEBBE, CA.C
O
NE of the most difficult communication problems in a framework which permits them to be moved in both
confronting us today is the rapid laying of wire a horizontal and vertical plane. In addition to the rubber-
over great distances. Units operating in the field tired rollers and their framework. there is installed in the
Jre not equipped at the present time with proper devices wire-laying truck a direct current, gasoline-electric gene-
for this purpose. Since the execution of prescribed tacti- rating set, rheostats for controlling the speed of a series
cal missions and the employment of units would be connected motor and a stand for supporting a reel of wire.
seriously interfered with unless some means were devised The mechanism operates under the theory that the
whereby wire could be laid over great distances in the wire having been pur into motion possesses kinetic en-
minimum of nme, scudy and efforts have bef'n made to ergy. and this energy throws the wire away from the
provide a suitable wire-laying apparatus. conveyance in a manncr similar to that whereby kinetic
The device described in this article was improvised energy sustains the motion of a projectile which has been
from salvage material and tested during the First Army discharged from a gun.
maneuvers and many field exercises. It has demonstrated The feasibility of using kinetic energy to throw wire
that it offers a satisfactory solution to some of the wire- from a truck to a desired distance off the road has been
laying problems before us. Communication officers who repeatedly tested. The most recent tests were held at
are called upon to put in 50 miles or more of wire in a Camp Upton, Long Island. New York, and are sum-
short time will find herein a possible solution to one of marized below:
their most troublesome problems. (a ) Terrain covered.
Everything from paved road to forest trails over
The apparatus consists of a gasoline-electric-drivcn reel
which the wire-laying truck could barely make prog.
from which the wire is led out through a guide to two ress.
rubber-tired rollers, from which it is thrown to the place (b) Road Miles 27,50
where it would normally have to be put by hand. The Wire Miles (Estimated) 3°.25
speeds of these rubber-tired rollers, or wire throwers, are At least 10% more wire passed through ma-
varied in such a manner that the wire can be drawn from chine than road miles covered due to slack put
out for emergency.
the reel and thrown through the air to great distances
:It the desired rate. The rubber-tired rollers are mounted
Executive
COLONEL HENRY T. BURGIN
Personnel Sution Organization and Training Section
MAJOR CLARE H. ARMSTRONG LIEUT. COL. C. M. S. SKENE
MAJOR AARON BRADSHAW. JR.
Materiel (tIld Fina!TceSection
MAJOR W. H. WARREN
MAJOR C. W. BUNDY
MAJOR H. B. HOLMES, JR. Plans and Projects Section
MAJOR S. 1. MCCROSKEY LIEUT. COL. JOHNL. HOMER
post on February 22d. His family followed on March I. In preparation for the seventh annual Third Corps Area
Recent visitors at the Coast Artillery School include Boxing fournament several boxing shows were staged.
Colonel Avery J. Cooper G.S.C (C.A.C); Majors To date, two benefit shows have been held in the central
Aaron Bradshaw, Jr., Clare H. Armstrong and S. L. NIc- garage at Fort ~vlonroe. Both cards, made up with a few
Croskey from the Office of the Chief of Coast Artillery. outside fighters were received with enthusiasm. Staff Ser-
Eleven students were graduated on January 29th with geant George E. (Speedy) Lawrence, well known in box-
the Special Clerical Course, Department of Enlisted .Spe- ing circles, handled the match-making and Corporal
cialists, and a new course opened on February 1st with a Manuel Orthys trained the squad. Roland Potter of Btry.
full complement of twenty students. "A," 51st CA.; C N. Tomalunas of the Quartermasrer
Recent lecturers at the Coast Artillery School have in- Detachment, and Alfred Forbes of Btry. "A," 51st CA.
cluded Dr. Douglas S. Freeman; Commander F. D. Wag- are the outstanding fighters with promising futures in
ner, U.S.N.; and Lieutenant Commander J. L. Holloway, army boxing. It is intended to hold two or three more
Jr., U.S.N. boxing smokers after which several of the best men will
The fall athletic season at Fort Monroe wound up with be sent to Baltimore to compete in the championship
a football smoker on January 14th, held at the Noncom- bouts.
missioned Staff Officers' Club, for the purpose of present- On February 23d at the Fort Monroe Y.M.CA. medals
ing athletic awards to members of the post team. Major were presented to the winning inter-battery teams in swim-
Oliver B. Bucher, acting as master of ceremonies, ex- ming, bowling, volley ball, and cross country. After a
pressed the appreciation of the garrison for the work done short introduction by Lieut. Cordes, the recreation of-
not only by the team and the officers connected with it ficer, Colonel E. B. Walker congratulated the various men
but also by the men behind it, particularly Tech. Sergeant and presented the medals. First and second place in volley
James BeattIe, Tech. Sergeant J. C Todd, and Sergeant ball were ta~en by Btry. "A," 51st CA. and Headquar-
E. J. Bartsch. Lieut. E. W. Thompson, an outstanding ters Battery 51st CA. respectively. Bowling was won by
player, Lieut. George W. McCoy, the medical officer for the CA. School Det. with Btry. "0," 52d C A. second.
the team, and Major J. L. Hartman, the coach, delivered Pvt. Bowen of Btry. "D," 52d CA. second and third.
short speeches. Awards were then presented by Colonel In the swimming competition the honors were rather
H. F. Spurgin. evenly divided between Headquarters Battery, 2d CA.
The post basketball team, after a slow start in which it and Battery "A," 51st CA., Btry. "F," 52d CA. and
lost to the Norfolk "Blue Devils," and the Norfolk the CA. School Detachment. Following the presentation
"Cops," and the Naval Training Station got away to a of the awards coffee and doughnuts supplied by the
fine season. The team was entered in what amounted to Y.M.CA. were served, and everyone proceeded to a box-
three leagues. The Hampton-Roads All-Service League, ing tournament held as part of the entertainment.
formed after the season was already under way, included
The garrison is now looking forward to the arrival of
the Naval Training Station, the Norfolk Marines, Lang-
the new CA. School students and is preparing for the
ley Field, and Fort Monroe. Monroe won all but two of
strenuous spring training at Fort Story, Virginia.
the games in this series, both losses being to the T raini~g
Station. Consequently the "gobs" copped first place With
Monroe second. The battle between these two teams how-
ever was not over. There still remained the "army-navy"
tilt for possession of the Allen-Reeder trophy on which
the training Section already had two legs. After a fast,
hard game on the Langley Field court, on February 13th,
before a crowd of some 600 rooters, Nionroe stalked off
with the trophy; score, 37-32.
The last series in which the Nionroe cagers took part
was the Third Corps Area Championship Series. Posses-
sion of this title was to be decided by a play-off between
the winners of the northern and southern districts, the
latter being subdivided into the Washington and Mon-
roe circuits. Fort Monroe took the first four games for
the best four out of seven from Langley Field, thus clean-
ing up the Monroe circuit. Warrant Officer A. W. Chris-
tensen then took his team to Washington to meet Fort
lvlajor General F. 11'1.Andrews, Brigadier General H. C. Pratt,
Belvoir, the winner of the Washington circuit. There, in Brigadier General/. IV. Gulick, Colone/IV. R. IVeaver, 1St Lieu-
two hard-fought games on the Haurick Court. Monroe tenant A. L. Fuller on Coast Artillery School steps at Escort of
lost, 32-45 and 42-46. Honor for visiting officers. January. 1937.
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade
News Letter
BRIGADE CoMMANDER, BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES A. WOODRUFF
CHIEF OF STAFF, COLONEL BENJAMIN H. L. \'X'ILLIAMS, CA.C
S-I, LIEUTENANT COLONEL E.C DESOBRY, A.G.D. S-3,LIEUTENANT COLONEL RALPH E. HAINES, CA.C
S-2. MAJOR JOHN T. LEWIS, CA.C S-4, LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. P. SMITH. CA.C
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HENRY C DAVIS, JR., CA.C
Com. and Engineer 0!ficer
CHANGING THE GUARD Abernethy succeeds. With the new Commanding General
came Mrs. Woodruff, to whom the Coast Artillery Corps
HE arrival of Brigadier General James A. Wood-
T
is nothing new. Mrs. Woodruff has a military heritage
ruff and the departure of Brigadier General Robert of her own, as her father, the late Brigadier General Henry
S Abernethy were fittingly observed in a brigade W. Hubbell, was with several coast artillery units before
review held on January 15th. Troops from Fort Shafter, he retired in 19°5,
Fort Kamehameha and Fort Ruger all joined in honoring To greet the many officers and ladies of the command.
the former and present Commanding Generals of the General and ivlrs. Woodruff held an "At Home" on
Hawaiian Separate Coast Attillery Brigade. February fourteenth. The officers and ladies called between
General v.,r oodruff comes to the brigade from the San the hours of five and seven, and enjoyed the excellent
Francisco Port of Embarkation, to which post General music of the 15th Coast Artillery Band of the Harbor
P
ERHAPS it is unbecoming for an organization to served that the antiaircrafters are making plans to add
indulge in self-aggrandizement, but there are oc- additional stars to the crown.
casions when it is appropriate to let others know So many things of importance have happened since the
what is happening at places beyond their immediate hori- appearance of the previous Fort Totten news letter that it
zon. Therefore it is hoped that we will be forgiven if we is difficult to single out only those deserving of mention,
use the JOURNALto inform our hosts of friends of the do- but an attempt will be made to cover the most note-
ings at Fort T otten, and at the same time furnish a little worthy. Naturally, the winning of the U. S. Coast Artil-
food for the development of our personal ego; not that we lery Association Trophy is of the greatest importance to
need any additional publicity for truly enough honors the regiment and of paramount interest to the Corps. This
have been garnered by the "archies" to satisfy the desires coveted symbol of excellence is awarded annually by
of the most grasping. The 62d CA. (AA) will never the Association to the regiment that, during the previous
be content to rest on honors won and notice is hereby year, established the best record in target practice. The
162 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL Afarch-April
62d came through wIth all sails set and colors Hying. Two the electric systems by placing the circuits underground;
of the four batteries, viz., Battery "F," commanded by a complete overhaul of the post telephone system; con-
Capt. John W. Dwyer and Battery "E," commanded by struction of a new sewage disposal system; construction
Capt. James L. Hogan, stood at the top of the list of ma- of new roads and the resurfacing of existing roads; the
chine-gun batteries with average scores of 285.1 and 228.1 erection of a boundary fence and the filling of the marshy
respectively. These scores we put up as targets for other land on the southwestern part of the reservation. This
organizations to "shoot at"; time alone will tell whether latter is being done with the assistance of the New York
they can be equalled or exceeded. Battery "B," com- City Department of Sanitation. This department has c0-
manded by Capt. Leon A. White, turned in an average operated by hauling ashes to the reservation. This project
score of 101.6 which placed it well up on the list of AA eventually will prove a boon and materially increase the
gun batteries. Battery "A," commanded by Capt. Robert usable area of the reservation by providing additional
E. DeMerritt, is also found in the "excellent" class with ground for tactical and recreational purposes.
an average score of 151.2. These records have passed into The Y.M.CA., under the direction of Mr. Arthur G.
history but they have not been forgotten and the memory Beck, .not to be outdone by other activities, has launched
of the outstanding performance is kept fresh by the un- an expansion project. The plans contemplate the erection
usual number of "red E's" appearing on the right sleeve of a new gymnasium with seating capacity for approxi-
of nearly all wearers of the 62d insignia. Plans are now mately 1,000 spectators; courts for basketball, indoor ten-
being considered for the presentation ceremonies, and it nis, handball, and squash. Also, an indoor swimming
is planned to mak~ this an occasion long to be remembered pool with the most modern equipment for heating and
by the regiment and its legion of friends. sterilizing water so that the pool can be used throughout
Upon completion of the target practice season, the regi- the year. To this will be added modern locker rooms and
ment assembled at its home station to indulge in other showers, bowling alleys and other gready needed facilities
less spectacular but equally important duties. The first of for the recreation and entertainment of the garrison. Two
these was small arms target practice, held at the beginning new concrete tennis courts recendy have been completed.
of the indoor season. In this more than 60 per cent of the Provision was made so that these courts could be Hooded
regiment qualified as marksman or better. Next in order to provide ice skating, but the mildest winter in the his-
was intensive concentration on gunners' instruction. This tory of N ew York outsmarted us and the garrison will
period is not yet at an end but to date more than 600 have to wait for another winter before "going on a skate."
members of the regiment have qualified as expert gun- With the cooperation of the WP A authorities, the
~er and many others are waiting to take the examina- Y.M.CA. has put on an educational and recreational pro-
tIOn. gram without equal in the Army.
The work of rehabilitating and renovating the post of The Executive Council of the American Legion, repre-
Fort Totten has been under way for many months. This senting thirty-eight Legion Posts located within a radius
is progressing according to schedule and upon its com- of fifteen miles of Fort Totten have officially approved
pletion all barracks and quarters will be in excellent con- the action of the President, Borough of Queens, in adopt-
dition. The WP A furnished all labor and material but ing the 62d Coast Artillery (AA) as "Queens Own."
the work is performed under the supervision of the Post The resolution received the unanimous approval of the
Quartermaster, Major Norman Minus. Practically all duly elected representatives of more than 10,000 World
quarters have been thoroughly overhauled and modern- War veterans comprising the membership of the Ameri-
ized. In the noncommissioned officers' quarters new elec- can Legion in Queens County. So far as is known the
tric ranges have replaced the old coal-burning stoves. An 62d is the only regiment to be officially adopted by a civic
obsolete fire command station has been converted into an group, thus further cementing the cordial relations that
apartment house accommodating four families and at a exist between the garrison and the civilian community in
later date other buildings will be converted into living which it lives.
quarters. The old brick stables have been modified into On February 8th, the 212th CA. (AA), NYNG,
a barrack for the Quartermaster and Medical Detach- tendered a review followed by a reception to Colonel Fer-
ments. Improvements have not been limited to barracks gusson, in his capacity as District Commander, 2d Coast
and quarters but include many post utilities. The unsight- Artillery District. The armory was filled to capacity.
ly fuel storage sheds, near the main entrance, have been After the review, Colonel Fergusson addressed the regi-
replaced by a new concrete coat pit while several of the ment, complimenting the entire command on their fine
buildings formerly used for the storage of submarine mine appearance, soldierly bearing, and the precision with which
property have been converted into maintenance and paint all movements were executed.
shops to facilitate the upkeep of the motor transportation. During the following week, the 244th CA. NYNG,
The renovation of the Officers' Club has been completed, under the command of Colonel Mills Miller, also honored
and Fort Totten now possesses one of the finest clubs to Colonel Fergusson with a review and reception. The ap-
be found in the Army. Other improvements under way pearance and performance of the troops was fully up to
or projected include the erection of new garages and serv- the high standard set by the 212th.
ice station for the motor equipment; the modernization of During the closing days of 1936 Fort Totten under-
1937 COAST ARTILLERY ACTIVITIES 163
went the annual scrutiny of a Corps Area Inspector. In integral part of our own community.
keeping with its history and high standard of perform- "Of course, official records may show where the terri-
ance, the 62d again came through with all colors flying. torial boundaries of the City of New York end and the
The Inspector, notwithstanding the most minute exami- military reservation begins, but human understanding and
nation into all of the administrative affairs of the regi- friendship seem not to heed these boundaries too much.
ment, found little upon which to comment adversely, and There are more than a thousand officersand men stationed
reliable information indicates that a strong commendation at Fort Totten, an outstanding unit of the United States
is forthcoming; this is in keeping with the high standard Army. The families of the married members of Qu~ns
of performance demanded in this regiment .. Own 62d Regiment also live on the post. Their children
Under the supervision of Capt. O. A. Nelson, motor attend the schools of Bayside and district. There is a pleas-
transportation officer, the 62d is btinging its 150 or so ant intermingling of the residents of Fort Totten and us
motor vehicles and trailers out of winter storage, and put- people of civilian life. The 'Men of Totten' are our next-
ting them in the superb condition expected and demanded door neighbors. We think nothing of running over there
of the regiment. to borrow a couple of eggs or a couple of batteries of the
The popularity of the 62d with the residents of Long soldier boys to give that smart military touch to our local
Island is so great that two months ago, Mr. Ernest Levy, parades. In either case, or in similar cases, the soldiers
the publisher of Times newspapers, with headquarters in never say 'No.'
Bayside, L. 1., requested permission from Colonel Fer- "Little wonder then, that we of Bayside and district lay
gusson to include as a feature section of the two local claim to Fort Totten and the 62d Coast Artillery, as may
newspapers published under his management a "Fort we say, 'local talent.' It is with pardonable pride that we
Totten Section" devoted exclusively to news of "Queens take our visiting 'country cousins' to visit the Fort. It is
Ow n." easily understood why, when we watch the big Man-
In the first issue of the Bayside Times, containing the hattan parades, we feel a quicker heartbeat as the 62d
"Fort T otten Section," there was included a full-page edi- rolls smoothly past on its sleek military motor vehicles.
torial, written by Mr. Levy. Following are a few extracts "Now is the time when, however small, one is apt to.
from this editorial: count one's blessings. When counting our blessings this
"In this manner the Times newspapers make their con- time, it might be well to remember that of all the gifts
tribution to further cement the fine, neighborly relation- we may receive, or of all the blessings we may count as
ship that exists between what we shall technically call ours, none surpasses in value the practical gift that our
the military and civilian sections of Bayside and district. Uncle Sam has given to us in the form of Queens Own
In reality, there is no separation. Through the years, 62d Artillery ... which, in the conduct of its duty,
friendships and associations have been created on both holds secure for you, and you, and you-and me-our
sidesof the Fort's gates that long ago made Fort Totten an life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness!"
HE War Department has announced the official nounced and it is not surprising to learn that they will
D
ECEMBER and January, the best momhs of the ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES
year were busy ones. Imensive training for target Due co arrive May I, 1937: Nfajors Francis S. Sweet,
practices by all regimems cominued during Jan- James T. Campbell, Benjamin Bowering, Robert Nt Cars-
uary. The Pope reported and b~gan high-speed cowing well, John H. Harrington; Captains John M. England,
missions on February Ist. Both lugh-speed and low-speed Burgo D. Gill, Harold A. Brusher; 1St Lieut. Allison R.
seacoast practices and AA gun practices will be finished Hartman; 2d Lieuts. Alvin D. Robbins, Robert E. Frith,
by April 2~ .. The period !vfarc~ 15th to 27th is reserve? Jr., George R. Wilkins.
for field tramlng cooperating with the Navy, Army Air Due to depart May 8, 1937: Colonel Paul D. Bunker,
Corps, and mobile army forces. Eight destroyers of the Lieut. Colonel Reinold Melberg, Majors Philip F. Biehl,
Asiatic Fleet have been detailed to assist in making our Lloyd W. Goeppert; Captains Chauncey A. Gillette,
defense problems more realistic. William E. Griffin, James F. Howell, Jr.; 1st Lieuts.
The swimming beach has a new shark net, two ne\v Arthur Roth, Sam C. Russell, Irving D. Roth, Robert A.
Roats, a barbecue fireplace, beer on ice, and a life guard. Turner, Charles G. Dunn, Arthur A. NfcCrary, Frank J.
The Corregidor Club is building a new open-air dance Zeller; 2d Lieuts. Charles L. Andrews, Seymour I. Gil-
Roor adjoining the south side of the club house. Royal man.
palms will continue co lend a tropical atmosphere grow- ATHLETICS
ing in the midst of the new dance Aoor. By Lieutenant E. l,V. J11oore, Ass't Recreation Officer
Captains Nicholson, Krueger and Lieut. Wilson with Athletic interest during the past two months has been
thirty enlisted men (PS) have been tentatively selected centered around boxing and track. Imra-regimental base-
to go co Fort Scotsenburg in March, 1937, co help train ball is just beginning with the promise of a good season
the New Philippine Army. ahead. Boxing in the new athletic arena proved a great
The Eucharistic Congress, February 3d co 7th in Ma- success, and large cowds turned out for all the smok-
nila was an important event to the Philippine people. The ers. In the American division the 59th CA finally won
harbor boats were crowded to the limit to accommodate over the 60th CA, 5)4 to 3)4, in the second cham-
the command and civilians living at Corregidor during pionship try-the first having ended in a thrilling 3~
the period of the Congress. Over 400,000 people crowded to 3)4 tie. The Scout troops also put on an exciting show
into Luneta Park to view the parades and ceremonies. with the 91St CA coming from behind to win the last
three scheduled bouts and the
championship from the 92d,
5 to 4, With the great demand
for boxing now being shown,
two or three professional shows
will be given in the near future
with promise of much success.
The Post Track and Field
Championships were won by
the 60th CA, 71 to S0,-in the
American division, and by the
9ISt CA, 8g to 42, in the Scout
division. Although no records
were broken, the times and dis-
tances compared favorably with
the records of previous years.
Another track meet will be
held in April with both the
59th and 92d hoping to turn
the tables on their rivals.
Basketball had a sudden and
60th Coast Artillery AA machine gun sight improvised by Capt. T. B. White. short revival during the last of
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL ,\larch -A pril
168
December when the 59th and 60th furnished seven play- Battery 0 by a generous margin. In the afternoon the
ers and a coach for the U. S. Army All-American team regiment, and ladies, assembled at the Cine for exercises
which hnished third in the Philippine National Cham- which included remarks by General Bishop and Colonel
pionships. The team was built around the 59th CA De- Bunker and the presentation of athletic awards. lvlassed
partment Champions and made an excellent showing behind the speakers on the stage were the scores of athletic
losing only one game b~' one point and winning four trophies won by the regiment in the past. All batteries
served special meals and other refreshments. In the eve-
games.
The officers have been concentrating on golf during the ning the officers held one of their famous 59th family
past few weeks with great enthusiasm. The Corregidor parties, a dinner and dance at the Officers' Club whereat
Club Championships brought out a new champion, Lieut. native costumes were de rigeHr, and unprejudiced ob-
F. B. Reybold, who decisively defeated Lieut. S. F. Giffin servers reported that if Tilly Losch had been among OHr
during the play-off. At the present time handicap sweep- galaxy of youth and beauty she would have had to look
stakes tournaments every Saturday are keeping all of the ro her laurels.
golfers scrambling for the prizes when they are not dis- The regimental baseball series is now in full swing. The
cussing this and that method of handicapping. Headquarters Battery is in the lead with six games won
Tennis interest has been rather lax recently due chieRy and none lost.
to the absence from the post of a great number of officers Colonel and ~'[rs. Bunker enjoyed a trip ro Southern
:ll1d men. But now with everybody back on the "Rock," Islands and brought back many interesting souvenirs in-
tennis will soon swing into full stride with an inter-regi- cluding a live mouse deer and fawn. Several officers and
menral post tournament scheduled for February and April. enlisted men took advantage of the holidays for short trips
ro points of interest in the Islands. Captain Nlyers and
FIFTy-NINTH COAST ARTILLERY family left January 13th for leave in China and Japan
By lVJajor E. R. Barrows, AdjHtant and to return to the States.
when the best target available can't go higher than 2,800 NINETy-SECOND COAST ARTILLERY (PS)
or faster than 80. The answer apparently being no other By Lieutenant William F. McKee, Adjutant
than hits and lots of them, the avid artillerymen are rapid-
During the month of December, 1st Lieut. Sam C. Rus-
ly transferring their faith from C.A.F.M., Vol. II and
sell and 2d Lieut. George J. Weitzel were granted five days
Special Text 26 to the rabbit's foot. There is one thing,
and four days detached service respectively for the pur-
however, that the serving formula cannot take away from
pose of visiting points of probable military interest on the
us out here-a good field of fire. Anyone who has known
Island of Luzon. Some of the points visited by these of-
the agony of trying to shoot a target practice in the
ficers were Calamba, Balite, Batangas, Lake T aal, Lucena,
crowded water areas around most of our Harbor Defenses
and the rapids of Pags:mjan. "Shooting the rapids at Pag-
cannot fail to appreciate the wide and relatively open
sanjan," says Lieutenant Weitzel, "is one of the most ex-
~paces of water around Corregidor.
citing experiences I have ever had."
Colonel Kimberly remains on the sick list with the
I st Lieutenant Daniel }.If. Wilson has becn designated
rather severely broken arm he suffered when his horse fell
to proceed to Fort Stotsenburg, P. I., early in March for
with him in early December. However, recent reports
the purpose of acting as instmctor to a 155-mm. gun bat-
indicate a complete recovery in the near future. Lieut.
tcry of the Philippine Army.
R. A. Turner has rejoined after a sojourn in Sternberg
The Regimental Commander, Lieutenant Colonel
and recuperation at Baguio. Lieut. Colonel Kemble, Cap-
Reinold ivfelberg and 1st Lieutenant Sam C. Russell ex-
tain T. B. White and Lieut. C. G. Dunn and families
pect to leave the Philippines in March for the United
also enjoyed visits to Baguio during the recent holidays.
States. Lieutenant Colonel }.Ifelberg will visit China and
France en route. Lieutenant Russell expects to visit China.
NINETy-FIRST COAST ARTILLERY (PS)
Effective Febmary 1st, Captain Russell E. Bates was trans-
By Major L. W. Goeppert, Adjutant ferred from Battery F to the U.S.A.M.P. Harrison, vice
The 91st has just wound up another successful athletic Captain Samuel Rubin relicved.
~eason, having won post championships (Scout Troops) Under the direction of the Commanding Officer, 3d
1/1 boxing and track and field. The 92d won the deciding Guard Battalion, the civil prisoners of the Corregidor
game of the three-game championship basketball series, prison stockade, during the holidays, put on their annual
but the 91sr during the course of the Philippine Depan- Christmas program much to the enjoyment of the mem-
170 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL March-APril
bers of the post who attended the various events. The L. LaR. Stuart leaves for \Vashingron in June where he
program extended from Christmas Eve to New Year's will attend the Army War College.
Day, and included dramas, vaudeville, athletic events, Major C. D. Y. Ostrom was detailed on the General
special drills and competitions. A large stage was erected Staff Februarv 1st and is now Assistant Chief of Staff,
in the corner of the Stockade, where each evening were G-1, Ninth Corps Area. Major E. B. McCarthy who
held the plays and native dances. The parades by the has commanded Fort Baker and Fort Barry for more than
prisoners battalion with wooden guns, the acrobatic and a year leaves this month for Denver, Colorado, on Organ-
athletic events were held on the stockade parade ground ized Reserve duty. Captain G. M. O'Connell, Plans and
under supervision of the Guard Battalion. Considerable T raining Officer has been ordered to temporary dury at
talent was discovered among the 700 convicts now in the Headquarters Ninth Corps Area on the staff formed for
stockade. the Army Maneuvers which will be held in August at
Fort Lewis, \Vash. Captain and Mrs. R. B. Pape have
arrived from Japan where for four years Captain Pape was
Harbor Defenses of San Francisco Notes a language student. Lieutenant and Mrs. Miner left this
COLONEL H. E. CLOKE, Commanding month for the Philippines. Captain and Mrs. C. C.
Carter arrived recently from Fort lvIonroe. Captain Career
By Captain W. W. Scott
is aide to General Tracy. First Lieutenant and lv! rs. W.
part May 27 in the exercises celebrating the opening of Fort Barrancas Notes
the $38,000,000 Golden Gate Bridge, longest single span LIEUTENANT CoLONEL G. F. HUMBERT, Commdnding
suspension bridge in the world, which connects the parade
grounds of Fort Scott and Fort Baker. By Captain M. A. Hatch
As the result of winning several important bridge N March 1st at a regimental review Colonel Arthur
tournaments, Captain H. J. Vandersluis has been made a
Full Master.
O formally turned over command to Lieutenant Colo-
nel G. F. Humbert. Later the officers and ladies of the
The Officers' Club at Fort Scott is the center of many post gathered near post headquarters to wish Colonel
post activities, bridge, teas and dances. Under the presi- and Mrs. Arthur bon voyage to their new station in
dency of Colonel H. E. Cloke the Club has been greatly Honolulu. The 13th Coast Artillery band played as Colo-
enlarged during the past two years. nel and Mrs. Arthur drove off the post along the street
The West Point Preparatory School has Colonel Cloke lined on either side with troops. Prior to their departure,
as Commandant, Captain W. S. Lawton as Assistant a post farewell dinner for eighty was given at the Air
Commandant and Lieutenant E. A. Chapman and 2nd Station Officers' Club in their honor. It was followed by a
Lieutenants W. H. Kinard and H. P. Persons as instruc- dance at Gorgas Hall.
tors. There are 42 students in this school of whom seven- The visit of the cruiser HMS Dragon to Pensacola from
teen have already received Congressional appointments to February 12th to 23d was the occasion for many social
the Military Academy. affairs.
The post basketball team having won 17 out of 20
games has been entered in the Gold Medal tournament
in Mobile, Ala., on March 12th and 13th. Intramural
Coast Artillery Reserve Officers' Meeting competition in baseball, softball, volley ball and bowling
Washington, D. C. is in full swing under the direction of Lieutenant Yost,
athletic officer. If the new bowling alleys continue to be
vices Review of February 18, 1937, It is reported that feet will become an impossibility even in clear or moder-
Churchill has stated emphatically, as his matured judg- ately cloudy weather. A straightforward and logical dis-
ment, that within a few years the ground defenses will cussion of the difficulties in bombing and the necessity for
have mastered decisively the air and that airplanes will be great improvement in destructive efficiency, range and
clawed down from the skies in flaming ruins. accuracy are brought forth. This discussion is somewhat
Mr. Churchill apparently has been studying the other at vatiance with the exaggerated claims made by our over
side of the question. He now is convinced a balance will enthusiastic air corps advocates and tend to disprove many
be struck between air attack and defensive measures of their claims for perfection. It is apparently the opinion
against it. The race between aircraft developments and of both the authors of "Air Strategy" and Mr. Rousgeron
counter-defensive measures is not a one-sided affair. The that positive steps must be taken to counterbalance the
great lead claimed by air corps enthusiasts can be success- progress in AA gunnery in order that the task of raiding
fully challenged. Experience shows conclusively that in all air units may be facilitated. The necessity for an appreci-
such races, such as guns against armament and this one at able increase in the velocity and travel of the bomb is em-
hand, that balances can and will result. Confidence in the phasized. Medium-height, horizontal-course and low alti-
ability of antiaircraft defenses to ward off attacks is having tude dive-bombing are rejected on account of the im-
its effect in Great Britain as antiaircraft defense activities proved accuracy of AA guns and of small-bore automatic
of large magnitude are being initiated. weapons. The value of high performance, fighter planes
employed in cooperation with AA artillery, is discussed
in an especially fine manner.
Long Range Fire Control
Battery A began its preparation for the camp period in by Captain W. C. McFadden, 7th C.A. The record of
the early spring. The listeners and lamp operators trained this otganization is most outstanding especially so because
during the armory drill periods under the street lights it was being transformed during the period of the award
of San Diego, the home station. They were very resource- from a nucleus of a small caretaking detachment to an
ful and utilized even Sunday mornings for training in active training battery. Apparently the inexperience of
tracking commercial ships entering and leaving Lind- the men was more than compensated for by their intelli-
bergh Field. They trained so continuously that at the gence and genuine enthusiasm for the vast assortment of
time they left for camp an adequate number of exp4r- duties that they were called upon to perform. The organ-
ienced listeners were available. The difficulties encoun- ization proved itself to be most versatile for during the
tered during the two weeks encampment at Ventura, period in question it successfully conducted a mine prac-
Calif., which are too numerous to elaborate upon here, tice classified as excellent; a test of the Tu Data Trans-
were readily overcome. Such things as overcoming the mission System; a test mobilization for Battery A, 7th
objections of the local utility company to the stringing of C. A. (inactive) and a record practice with AI\. machine
wire on the company's poles were of no moment. Progress guns with a score of 107.83, in addition to its daily routine
during the camp period was hampered greatly due to the duties.
fact that only one night in five was suitable for drill on Although this organization is called a Headquarters
account of fog. Much of the night training was limited Battery it is essentially an active training battery. The
to traversing and elevating drill only. As a result of these men accomplish their training missions, do full guard
interferences, the battery could not conduct its record duty and perform their maintenance work in addition
practice during the encampment period; however, shortly thereto.
after returning to its home station they completed ar- Notwithstanding the intensive training and amount of
rangements to conduct the record practice at March Field, maintenance work required of the battery, it has produced
Cal~fornia, a hundred miles from San Diego, their home winning athletic teams showing that it is a well-balanced
statIon.
At March Field the 63d Coast Artillery was in training
--defending a sector. Their installations, already set up,
I.
organization. During the 1935 baseball season, the Head-
quarters Battery team took second place. took first
place in the soccer contest and first place in the basketball
were loaned to Battery A. The battery made the trip by league, which has just closed.
motor convoy, and had the sections in their stations and On February 26 General Sunderland was pleased to
the lights in action, an hour after arrival and conducted forward a letter of commendation to the commanding
an excellent practice. officer of the Harbor Defenses of Sandy Hook, in which
This battery conducted its record target practice at a he states that he has studied the record of the battery for
time other than during its camp period. The practice was the year ending last fall and that it appears that the battery
conducted one hundred miles from the homes of the mem- is fully entitled to receive the award in question. He also
bers of the battery and during time that normally would stated "I congratulate you and, through you, the com-
be allotted to their personal pursuits. In keeping with their manding officer, officers and enlisted men of the Head-
fine spirit they achieved excellent results. The battery quarters Battery, 7th Coast Artillery, on their fine per-
commander modestly maintained in his narrative report formance in their wide variety of duties undertaken."
1937 NEWS AND COMMENT 177
Battery H, 241st Coast Artillery (H.D.) Mass. 212th Coast Artillery New York National Guard
N.G. Awarded Knox Trophy Wins Hines Trophy
names.
Overhead Cover for Fixed Armament
Battery H, z4Ist c.A. (HD)-7z4.43
Battery M, 24Ist C.A. (HD)-7I6.z5 HE importance of overhead cover must be realized.
Battery D, 24Ist c.A. (HD)-709.24 T From time immemorial it has been recognized as an
established fact that the best protection from an attack
Battery H, 24Ist C.A. (HD) was declared the winner
on the ground is some form of a substantial wall, breast-
and has been presented the trophy. It is commanded by
work or trench and that a strong roof is the best protection
Captain Fred E. Pereira and has as its lieutenants, 1st
from the elements and attack from the air. The lively
Lieutenant Wesley M. Bacheller and 2d Lieutenant Fred
discussion which is taking place relative to the needs for
S. Grant, Jr. overhead cover and its advantages have been given impe-
This excellent battery is to be congratulated on the re-
tus due to the action of foreign governments in providing
sultsattained especially so because this is the third time suitable overhead cover in their rearmament programs for
that it has won the trophy in succession and it now be- seacoast armament.
comestheir permanent possession. Does it not seem reasonable that we also fall in line
with air service progress and provide adequate protection
against air attack?
Toulmin Trophy to 535th C. A. of f of
x
OPEN FORUM
MAY VIGOROUS THOUGHT BE STIMULATED AND CRYSTALLIZE INTO ACTION
Sir:
Reserve Officers' Promotion
There is ever present in the minds of antiaircraft artil-
Sir:
lerymen the many limitations existing relative to our pres-
ent directors. The number of directors of this type or simi- I often wonder if the W.D.G.S. wants or expects Re-
lar modern types that are available is certainly most lim- serve Officers, R.O.T.e. graduates with no actual ex-
ited. The time required for manufacturing them in times of perience in an emergency, and who by virtue of their
1937 OPEN FORUM 179
civilian occupations find it impossible to attend the service This resulted in the selection of candidates from a class,
schoolsprovided, to advance beyond the grade of captain. a peculiarly disgrunted class.
Every regular army officer in the junior grades, whose Marx said: "The arming of the whole proletariat with
professionis arms and who has at his disposal all the texts muskets, rifles, cannon, and munitions must be carried on
and talents of his profession will admit that the A.E.C.- immediately. "
40 Series is no course that can be run thru hurriedly. Trotsky, in the History of The Russian Revolution,
Now, take the case of the civilian officer. Most of us who boasts of his success in arming the proletariat in the coup
adopted military science as an avocation and have been d'<~tatof March 25, 1917..
reasonably successful or exceptionally fortUnate in our Colonel Harvey complains that discipline was foreign
vocationsduring the past ten or twelve years since leaving to world war conscripts; proposes six months in the army
college, have arrived at a critical point in our careers- for CCC's, supposedly to subject them to discipline. But
there will be no retirement with pay for us after thirty if it will be anything like the CMTC, it will be very
yearsservice, unless we ourselves have made it; and, there lovely but not discipline. Where the idea of compulsion
is no assurance that salaries will rise in years of service, is lacking, it is not discipline. It is make believe. It will
unlessour own personal efforts and achievements make it not give Reserve officers "actual experience in the com-
possible.Therefore of necessity we must make our civilian mand of enlisted men" unless the idea of compulsion is
occupation primary, and with the necessary business and fully present. Elsewhere in the same issue Major Charles
social functions, recreation, etc., the amount of time 1. Clark extols the virtUes of drilling CMTC's but they
availableis indeed small. are not under military discipline.
A lot of us are very ambitious to become field officersin At Blacksburg, Va., where I went to school, there were
the O.R.C. but three months is a long time these days to some students who enlisted in the local unit of the Na-
askfor a "leave of absence" from business to attend a serv- tional Guard in order to meet school expenses. This 'was
iceschool. And, to sit down at night after a busy day in in addition to living in barracks, marching to mess, stand-
therealms of commerce and transport one's mind into the ing guard, and enjoying Saturday inspection of quarters
military science requires a lot of time and concentration. and review, etc.
A 40 series A.E.C. can't be picked up and thrown aside H they had been given the opportunity to draw en-
like "Readers Digest" and most of the lessons take the listed men's pay while attending classes, the whole school
averageofficers five hours to do--from start to finish. would have unanimously enlisted. Two-thirds would have
I'm not bellyakin'--or maybe I am. But it's damn little helped to provide an enlisted reserve since only one-third
a Reserve officer gets for what he puts into the Corps, if that entered ever graduated.
he's at all active-two weeks' training one summer in Such a plan would help those loyal enough to believe
three-maybe; so, if promotion above the grade of cap- in military training to receive an education, it would pro-
tain is impractical why not say so and let us get it over vide adequate means for punishing agitators, it would pro-
with.And if it's the less fortUnate group of Reserve officers vide that element of compulsion needed to insure full at-
whohave been unable to tie into a steady job during the tendance at Officer's Reserve meetings and would keep
depressionand have taken advantage of the C. C. c., and active those Reserve officerswho, having attended a school
thereunder conditions more favorable to study completed where compulsion was much in evidence, are forever more
A.E.C. courses and attended service schools for the pay disgusted with the "do it if you want to" spirit which is
involved,that the Army wants for its field officers in fu- prevalent in the Reserve Corps.
ture emergencies, then the rest of us better turn our atten- Of course there is the National Youth Administration
cion to more relaxing and lucrative diversions. to help out college students, there is one of 'em lectures in
A CAPTAIN,Coast Artillery Reserve. my home town of Youngstown; she holds forth at the
central auditorium which is where the local communists
'f 'f 'f
d~ their fist waving, international singing, and advocation
Why Not Enlist ROTC's? of mutiny ..
Sir: For many years our statesmen have told us that Ameri-
. Colonel George U. Harvey's idea of military for CCC's cans are opposed to things military and will not stand for
~not new. In fact, General Glassford, who was the super- a large army. But experience shows that the free Ameri-
II!tendentof the Washington, D. C. police, was the first can will frantically rush to join and pay money to any
oneto prescribe camps as an antidote for unemployment organization which offers titles and uniforms. And if they
and he contemplated military training and MILITARY have ever held a temporary military office or title, their
DISCIPLINE. title and uniform has to be practically scalded off of them.
However, as actually run, with the exception of veter- Maybe our statesmen have been wrong about our not
ans, mere unemployment did not qualify a young man wanting a large army. Why not enlist ROTC's at any
for CCC duty. His family had to be on relief which rate?
.8le:tntin most cases that his father was also unemployed. FIRSTLIEUTENANT, C.A.-Res .
COAST ARTILLERY BOARD NOTES
..
A ny individual, whether or not he is a member of the service, is invited to submit constructive sugges-
tions relating to problems under study by the Coast Artillery Board, or to present any new problems that
properly may be considered by the Board. Communications should be addressed to the President,
Coast Artillery Board, Fort Monroe, Virginia.
Second Lieutenant R. C. Boys, from 11th, Randolph Field, to Hawaii, sailing San Previous orders amended.
Fort H. G. Wright, to Hawaii, sailing New Francisco, March 12. Second Lieutenant W. G. Root, from 61s1,
Vork, April 29. Second Lieutenant Franklin Kemble, Jr., Fort Sheridan, to Hawaii, sailing New
Second Lieutenant C. F. Cordes, Jr., from from 51st, Fort Monroe, to student, C.A. York, April 29.
iZrl, Fort Monroe, to the Philippines, sail- School, Fort Monroe. Second Lieutenant C. E. Spann, Jr., from
iJIg New York, May 27. Second Lieutenant R. H. Kessler, from 52d, Fort Monroe. to the Philippines, sail-
Second Lieutenant S. 1. Gilman, from 52d, Fort Monroe, to U.S.A.M.P. General ing New York, May 27.
I 51st,Fort Monroe, to student, C.A. School, John M. Schofield, Fort Monroe. Second Lieutenant E. H. Walter, from
Fort Monroe. Second Lieutenant J.c. Moore, from 51st, 52d, Fort Monroe, to Hawaii, sailing New
Second Lieutenant H. J. Harrison, from Fort Monroe. to the Philippines, sailing York, April 29.
51st,Fort Monroe, to the Philippines, sail- New York, May 27. Second Lieutenant S. L. Weld, Jr., from
ing New York, May 27. Second Lieutenant J. B. Morgan, from 62d, Fort Totten, to Hawaii, sailing New
Second Lieutenant C. W. Hildebrandt, 52d, Fort Monroe. to the Philippines, sail- York, April 29.
to the Philippines, sailing New York, May ing New York, May 27. Second Lieutenant G. R. Wilkins, to the
19. Previous orders amended. Second Lieutenant W. R. Murrin, from Philipnines, sailing San Francisco, April 9.
Second Lieutenant J. N. Howell, from 7th, Fort Hancock, to Hawaii, sailing New Previous orders amended.
63<1, Fort MacArthur, to Hawaii, sailing York, April 29. Second Lieutenant P. H. Wollaston, to
San Francisco, May 22. Second Lieutenant A. D. Robbins, to the the Philippines, sailing San Francisco, April
Second Lieutenant M. M. Kallman, from Philippines, sailing San Francisco, April 9. 9. Previous orders amended.
Regular Army Batteries Classified as Excellent by the War Department for 1936
Corps Area Corps Area
or Dept. Regiment Battery Caliber Regiment Battery Caliber
or Dept.
I 11th A 12" SCM Hawaii 55th B 155 mm. (Adv.)
II 7th Hq. Mines C 155 mm.
52d C 12" Ry. M F 155mm.
E 8"Ry. G 64th F 3" AAG
62d A S.L. K 3" AAG
B 3" AA G Philippines 59th A 12" BCG
E M.G. B 12"DCG
F M.G. E 14" G (Adv.)
III 52d D 12"Ry. M. F 12" BCG
VI 61st B 3" AA G 60th B 3" AAG
VIII 69th B 3" AAG D 3" AAG
E M.G. F M.G.
IX 63d A S.L. 91st B 155 mm. &6"
E M.G. DCG
Panama 4th A S.L. D 14"DCG
B 3" AAG G Mines & 6" DCG
D 155 mm. & Mines 92d A 3" SC G
Hawaii 15th B 12" BC G B 155 mm.
C 16" BCG D 155 mm.
16th A 155 mm.
Major CHARLES BUNDY, CA.C was born in Massa- in the Artillery, has been with the Coast Artillery Corps
chusetts, April 20, I~. Graduate of the 1912 class at since it was created. He has held many important and dis-
Middlebury College, Vermont, of the Army War Col- tinguished assignments, was placed on the initial General
lege, a distinguished graduate of the Command and Gen- Staff Eligible List and served on the General Staff from:
eral Staff School, and a graduate of the Coast Artillery 1920 to 1924. Is a graduate of the U. S. Military Acade-
School, advanced class. Now on duty in the Office, Chief my. Twice graduated from the Army War College.
of Coast Artillery as officer in charge of the materiel and Graduated from the School of Submarine Defense, 1906.
finance section. Well known to many in the Coast Artil- He was awarded a distinguished service medal for war
lery Corps because of his fine work at Fort Monroe where services. Was a brigadier general during the period of the
he served as Secretary of the Coast Artillery SchooL Is war and following it. He is so well known because of
somewhat bashful about the fine article appearing under his fine achievements that there is very little that can be
his name. In fact refused to have his name appear with added to his well-known record. A leader, a man of pleas-
the article claiming that someone might think that it had ing personality and a true friend.
official sanction. We thought otherwise. Major Bundy
is a very loyal supporter of the JOURNAL,and has aided the Captain JOSEPH 1. GREENE, Infantry, concludes his
editorial staff greatly with his suggestions and other active traffic study in this issue. These two articles are not meant
help. for light reading but for professional study, and military
men should approach them from that point of view. So
Captain NATHANIEL A. BURNELL, CA.C, now on far as we know, the professional values stressed in "High-
duty as an instructor in the Coast Artillery School, was way Traffic and Modern War" have scarcely been touched
born in Maine, September 13, 1~7' Entered the Army before.
from the Military Academy on November I, 1918. Grad-
uated from the Coast Artillery School, Basic Course, 1920, Staff Sergeant CLETUS L. LUEBBE, Coast Artillery
Battery Officers' Course, 1932, and Advanced Gunnery Corps, enlisted in the Regular Army, January 13, 1926.
Course, 1933. Has been particularly active in support of After a brief hitch at the recruit barracks at Fort Thomas.
the JOURNALand Coast Artillery Association, especially Kentucky, he was assigned to the Coast Artillery at
in the services that he has given towards the preparation Fort Adams, R. 1. From there he was sent to Fort Mon-
and revising of Gunners' Instruction Pamphlets. roe in 1927 to take the course at the Enlisted Specialists'
School from which he was graduated in 1928. After
Captain R. W. CRICHLOW, JR., CA.C was born in graduation he was retained at the school as an assisrant
Tennessee, October 6, 18g7. Graduated from the Military instructor for three years. Sergeant Luebbe then had a
Academy, June 14, 1917, and is a graduate of the Coast tour of foreign service with Headquarters Battery, 59th
Artillery School, Basic Course, Battery Officers' Course Coast Artillery at Fort Mills, P. 1., returning to the
and Advanced Gunnery Course. Was on duty as an in- States in May of 1935. Since that time he has been on
structor at the Coast Artillery School during the period duty at Fort Totten, N. Y., with Headquarters Battery.
1932 to 1936. Has had great experience with stereoscopic 62d Coast Artillery (AA).
work. He conducted the training of a group of observers Shortly before he entered the service, Sergeant Luebbe
at Fort Story in the spring of 1935 and collected all the graduated from Elder High School, Cincinnati, Ohio.
data possible for study in future analysis. The resulting His main interest in life has been the solution of practical
report submitted by him has influenced to some degree electrical and mechanical problems. His article in the
the present instruction for training stereoscopic observers. current number shows that he brings to his work a keen
Also spent a period with the United States Navy studying mind and much technical ability.
their methods of training observers. Author of the official
text on the subject of "Stereoscopy and Stereoscopic
Major KENNETH McCATTY, CA.C, was born on
Rangefinding" which is now in use in the school and
July 3, 18g2, in Jamaica, British West Indies. Came to
has been distributed to the AA regiments. Now on duty
the United States in July, 1~3, and became a naturalized
as student, Command and General Staff School. Well
American citizen in 1914. Graduate of the Manual Train-
~nown to many readers of the JOURNALfor his contribu-
ing High School in Brooklyn. Entered the Army in 1916.
tIons.
Claims to have mastered Spanish in three months and to
Colonel FRANK K. FERGUSSON, CA.C, born in have forgotten it almost as.soon. Joined the Cavalry and
Tennessee, February 18, 1874, has spent his whole service went overseas with the 4th Division where he served as
1937 THE CONTRIBUTORS 187
battalion and brigade adjutant and battalion commander. SEWELL T. TYNG was born in New York City on
After the war he found out that horses had no more ap- April 30th, 1~5' After graduating from Groton School
peal in peace time than they had in war so he transferred in 1914, he attended Williams College where the war
to the Coast Artillery Corps where he has had various interrupted his studies as he was completing his junior
tYpesof service. Graduated from the Air Corps T acrical year. Rejected both by the Army and the Navy-three
Schoolin 1936. At present is on duty as a student in the times each--on account of defective eyesight, he entered
Command and General Staff School and boasts that he the American Ambulance Service and arrived in Fmnce
hasnot yet abandoned hopes of graduating. He has three in the latter part of May, 1917. Thereafter until the
children and proudly maintains that he has had the same armistice he served at the front, principally with units of
wifesince 1922. the French Army, in the Ambulance Service, in the
American Red Cross and finally as second lieutenant in
the Corps of Interpreters. In February, 1919' during the
Captain PASCHAL N. STRONG, JR. sent us his article
Peace Conference at Paris, he was attached to the staff
"And the Floods Came" at such a late date that we had
of Mr. Herbert Hoover, then Director General of Relief,
no time to secure any biographical data. Therefore we
He returned with Mr. Hoover to the United States, as
have been constrained to turn to the Army Register
his secretary, in September, 1919.
forinspiration. There we find that our author entered the
On resuming a civilian status, Mr. T yng entered the
Military Academy in 1918 and graduated in 1922. He
Harvard Law School from which he graduated in 1923'
startedout in June of that year with the Air Corps but
Since that time he has practiced law in New York City.
something went wrong somewhere, for the Register
His principal avocation is the study of military history.
recordshis transfer to the Engineers three months later.
He is the author of several articles on military subjects
Captain Strong is a graduate of the Basic Course at The
and one book, The Campaign of the Marne, 1914
Engineer School (1923) and of the Civil Engineering
(Longmans, Green) which was published in 1935,
Courseat Cornell University (1925)' At the present time
heis on duty in the office of the Division Engineer at
First Lieutenant WILLIAM J. VERBECK has had con-
Cincinnati, Ohio. tinuous military service of some sort since 19II, when
To these bare facts we add one mild piece of hearsay. he entered Manlius School, of which his father, then
A fellow Editor states that Captain Strong played a Adjutant General of New York State, was president.
wickedgame of chess at West Point .. Since the chess habit He graduated from the U. S. Military Academy (five-
~ashard to break as an addiction to drugs, it is safe to pre- year course) in 1927' He has served at Madison Bar-
dictthat Engineer Strong still wages bitter battles on the racks, Manila, Zamboanga, Fort Benning, Camp Dix,
chessboardwhen Old Man River gives him a chance. and Fort Jay. Having acquired a diploma from The In-
fantry School in 1934, he became involved in CCC activi-
We duly celebrated Major RICHARD G. TINDALL ties for a spell. This was followed by a hitch as assistant
m this department in our January-February issue. There to the Officer in Charge of WP A, Governors Island.
~nothing new to add to that account save the plaint of Released from his alphabet associations, he took over
the postman that his burden has increased since The Company D, 16th Infantry. While on this duty the
JOURNAL began publishing the Tindall series on "The Manlius School rediscovered him and he is now with the
Willof the Leader." Our subscribers are really taken with ROTC unit of his prep school unit.
thatmagnum opus and we are delighted that they take He confesses to such weakness as a fondness for hunt-
the trouble to write in and tell us so. ing, weapons collecting, and military history.
BOOK REVIEWS
WARFARE. By Spaulding, Nickerson, and Wright. But even here they maintain a nice balance for they
Washington, D. c.:
The Infantry Journal, Inc., 1937, do not allow the science of war to swallow the art of wa~.
601 Pages, charts and maps. $3.00. Both are interwoven in this book as they must be in
~arfare is not a new book. It was originally brought battle. Nor do they lose sight of the intimate and decid-
out in 1925 by Harcourt Brace and Company at $5.00 a ing relationships that exist between a nation and its armed
copy. Like many another standard military work, a num- forces. They are at some pains, and rightly so, to warn
ber of years had to pass before it found its proper place in the reader that these relationships must be constantly
the military world. Today that place seems assured; so considered in studying the great operations of the past.
assured, in fact, that The INFANTRYJOURNALhas pur- The student who sees only weapons, formations, and i
chased the copyright from Harcourt Brace and Company maneuver, sees no farther than the end of his nose.
and is bringing out a new edition. To the military novice this book is both cultural and
As a contribution to the military art, Warfare is unique. instructional. He will have occasion to refer to it often.
It is not. an outline; itJs not a resume; it is not strategy He will find the road we have come well charted and he
and tactIcs made clear in three easy lessons. It is none of will encounter more than one indication of the road that
these things. Therefore, if your inclinations run toward lies ahead. But paramount, perhaps, in both interest and
a get-rich-quick course in the art of war, this book is not value is the inevitable evolution of tactics wrought by the
for you. It is a serious study of the evolution of warfare evolution of weapons. Here, will the young man-at-arms
and it is designed for serious reading. In this, as in all find rich fields for speculation on the tactics of tomorrow,
other worthwhile things, the reader will get out of it ex- for our weapons are also changing and surely our tactics
actly what he is willing to put into it; no more and no less. must change too.
But what he does get out of it will be enduring bone and The older officerswill find in Warfare a splendid means
sinew for the body of his military education. of rounding out their own cultural background along
The study begins with warfare under the early Oriental military lines. In particular will they profit from the con-
monarchies and traces its developments through the epic sistent emphasis placed on the relations between the mili-
battles of the Great Frederick. The authors point out tllat tary and the state, and in the shrewd treatment accorded
the book closes with Frederick because Frederick closed the higher aspects of both the art and science of war.
an era; after him began the epoch of our modern tactical In brief, this extensive, scientific investigation is recom-
systems. What, then, is the value of a study that begins mended for anyone who would acquire with a minimum
in antiquity and ends just when warfare is about to evolve of effort the historical background which is so essential to
into our modern and still existing systems? Perhaps the an intelligent grasp of modern military problems. F.G.B.
best answer is epitomized in the first chapter of the book
itself.... "Strip any military operation of external MESOPOTAMIA: THE LAST PHASE. By Lieu-
identifying details and one will find it hard, to put a place tenant Colonel A. H. Burne, D.S.O. Aldershot: Gale &
and date on the story." In point of fact those "external Polden, Ltd., 1937, III Pages; 12 Maps; I11ustrated;
identifying detai!s" are about all that has changed and Index. $2.00.
that WIllchange in the art of war. The broad underlying
Here is a volume of tactical studies that should gladden
fundamentals were as real in warfare under the ancient
the heart of any man even faintly interested in the profes-
Oriental monarchies as they are today in the fratricidal
sion of arms. The action is fast, the situations varied and
battles of modern Spain.
dramatic, the units small enough to be comprehensible,
This searching volume presents those fundamentals of
the style simple and direct, the fold-out maps clear and
warfare as well as its superficial changes. But to under-
c?nvenient, and the discussions swift, precise and convin-
stand these things it is not enough to know the little un-
Cing. In a word-all right, twelve words then-it is every-
important and uninstructive facts that can be set forth so
thing a military book should be and so rarely is.
glibly on a schematic sketch; more must be shown. And
this the authors do. They detail the various military hier- Colonel Burne wisely devotes his slender volume to the
archies, their titles, their commands, their line and staff last phase of the Mesopotamian Campaign; that is, from
functions. They tell how armies marched, camped, crossed the fall of Baghdad in March, 1917, to the Turkish armi-
rivers, crossed mountains, guarded themselves, fought. stice on October 30, 1918. But hear the author himself:
They explain the systems of supply and tell how those The Mesopotamian campaign ... may be compared to a
Rower-a tulip for choice, of which the stalk represents the
systems worked. They picture the weapons used, their
line of our advance up the Tigris past Quma, Amara and
characteristics, their purposes, and their efficacy. Of such Kut, to Baghdad. At Baghdad the stalk blossoms and bursa
stuff are their battle pictures compounded. into Rower.... It is the Rower portion of the campaign
1937 BOOK REVIEWS 189
that will be dealt with .. the 1:lStphase of the war, when But the value of this modest volume is not restricted to
our troops were no longer glued to the line of the River
those of us whose present chore happens to be of an in-
Tigris, when not only the area of operations but the range of
possibilities blossomed and broadened out. ... Problems of
structional nature. Indeed, in the humble and widely ig-
interior and exterior lines, and problems of time and space, nored opinion of this reviewer, the Regular, the Guards-
which ... were foreign to the early part of the campaign, man, and the Reservist may all ponder with profit these
now abound ..•. I have set myself two chief aims. The first open-warfare battles that their Cousin Tommy fought in
is to present within a small compass, an accurate account of Mesopotamia and the lessons that he learned from them.
the main events of this little known campaign. The second
aim is to bring out some of the main lessons that the cam- e. T.L.
paign teaches us.
MARSHAL NEY: A DUAL LIFE. By LeGette Blythe.
In pursuit of these two aims, Colonel Burne has pro-
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Sons, 1937. $3'50'
duceda book that should be of interest and value to mili-
tary men the world over. In this country it should be par- In 1819, to a small South Carolina settlement called
,Pllarly welcomed by instructors on duty with the civilian Cheraw there came one Peter Stuart Ney, a teacher. The
~mponents and by those harassed souls who are in charge natives were interested. Was there not a great French
ofgarrison schools. For these gentlemen, this little book soldier named Ney? Dh, yes, Marshal Ney, executed a
will solve their chronic problem ot digging out interesting few years back. The newspapers had a good deal to say
andvital instructional material for many a day. Indeed, about that execution. But there were other stories. The
thebattle studies crammed into its III pages literally cry Marshal had not been shot; the Duke of Wellington, be-
lit for group presentation and group study. All the es- ing a Mason, had arranged to have the riRes loaded with
sentialdata are present; the facts of each action are set blank ammunition. Another account stated that ball am-
forthlogically and concisely; the maps are so simple and munition was used, but the firing squad was instructed to
so clear that they can be sketched in on a blackboard in fire over the Marshal's head; that Ney carried inside his
a matter of minutes; and finally, Colonel Burne's critiques coat a bladder filled with red Ruid which sputted out at
arekeen and penetrating. Here, then, is an answer to the the crack of the riRes. Later, so the story went, a man
1D1lective prayer of these instructors and that answer is strangely resembling Ney had left the prison secretly, and
D.o., G.!., complete with handles. galloped off into the night.
*
Bar is of bronze, gold-plated, center enameld red
(for Coast Artillery), with panel of black and gold
at ends designating an officer. Bar equipped with
gold-plated shank back button. Illustration
actual size. Bar, is only part that shows, when
worn. Neat and distinctive in appearance.
is
nation of Enemy Information"; and Part Three, "Appli- .This rev}ewer believes that .every .officer in our Army
cation of Intelligence to Small Units." Will matenally profit by read1l1g thiS book, and that it
Part one explodes completely and finally, it is to be should be an indispensable part of the library of every
hoped, the old school of thought that one can "divine" the commander and every intelligence officer. ,
I
"enemy's probable intentions." It illustrates by historical
examples how futile such a practice is and submits a rea-
I
sonable, logical procedure whereby the future capabilities ORDER OF BA TILE OF THE U. S. LAND FORCES
of the enemy that can interfere with the accomplishment IN THE WORLD WAR. (General Headquarters'l
of your mission are considered and a decision arrived at Armies, Army Corps, Services of Supply and Separate
that will accomplish the mission in "spite of anything the Forces.) Washington, D. c.:
Government Printing
enemy can do to interfere." Office, 1937. 412 Pages. $1.25.
Part two might well be called a manual for division in-
The War Department has just published another of
telligence officers. It covers clearly and in detail the clas-
its volumes of the Order of Battle series which deals with
sification and characteristics of collecting agencies, the
the activities of the units of the A.E.F. during the World
collection of enemy information, the handling of prison-
War.
ers and captured documents, and the evaluation and in-
terpretation of information and its dissemination. In 1931 the first of this series appeared. This new book,
Part three is a complete exposition of the duties of the written like its predecessor in staccato, almost telegraphic
intelligence officer of the infantry battalion. language, gives an outline of the main events in the his-
The principles propounded in the book are convincingly tories of higher and special organizations-GHQ, thea
SOS, the First Army, the Second Army, the Third Army,
supported by historical examples taken from the World
War. These examples appear sufficiently convincing to the nine army corps, the three French corps which served I
disarm even the most determined opponent. under General Pershing, our forces in Siberia, North
The sketches that so completely illustrate the subject Russia, and, finally, in Germany and elsewhere after the I
matter are a joy. Instead of being in a separate folder, Armistice. Rosters of commanding officers and staffs, t()o,
which so often is inaccessible or misplaced, they are bound gether with an enumeration of their respective units duringl.
in the book so that they can be opened and referred to as important periods of activity, are also given. The book, of l
the subject matter is read. course, rests squarely upon official war-time documents.l
Used ~y the
War Department
Built for hard service for Preserving
Simple and efficient War Department
Pamphlets
Capacity 400 Sheets