Property Cases CD
Property Cases CD
Property Cases CD
Whether the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement adjudicating ownership Eventually, the trial court ruled that both parties were in good faith but then a
over the questioned fishpond in favor of the Maneclangs are valid. forced lease was ordered whereby Dumlao retains the kitchen but he shall pay a
rental to Depra at P5.00 per month. But Depra refused to receive the rental
HELD/RATIO: payments from Dumlao, instead, Depra filed an action for quieting of title against
Dumlao. In his defense, Dumlao raised the defense of res judicata considering that
NO, the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement are null and void and have no the nature and purpose of the initial unlawful detainer case and that of the
legal effect for being contrary to law and public policy. The stipulations partake of subsequent quieting of title case is ejectment.
the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of the Maneclangs of the
ISSUES: Victoria Tinagan bought two parcels of land in 1950. She and her son Agustin
took possession of the said land thereafter.
1. Whether or not the order of forced lease decreed in the unlawful detainer case is
valid. Sometime in 1960, petitioners occupied portions of the land whereat they built a
copra dryer and put up a store wherein they engaged in the business of buying and
2. Whether or not the subsequent case of res judicata is barred by prescription due selling copra.
to the prior case of unlawful detainer.
On 1975, Victoria and Agustin died, the latter survived by his wife and children
HELD: who are the private respondents in the instant case.
1. No. The judgment of forced lease is improper. A forced lease, just like co- The private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession against the
ownership is not favored. It should be considered that the parties themselves petitioners asking the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental that they be
stipulated that Dumlao, the builder, was in good faith and it was later found that declared the absolute owners of the said parcels of land and that petitioners be
Depra, the owner, was also in good faith. Hence, what applies is the provisions of ordered vacate the same, to remove their copra dryer and store, to pay actual
Article 448 of the Civil Code, which provides in sum that: damages (in the form of rentals), moral and punitive damages, litigation expenses
and attorney's fees.
a. Builder in good faith entitled to retain the possession of the land on which he
built in good faith until he is paid the value of the building he built in good faith; The trial court ruled in favour of the private respondents, hence this petition.
b. Owner in good faith has the option to either (i) pay for the building OR (ii) The petitioners put up the defense that the contested parcels of land are public
sell his land to the builder in good faith but builder cannot be forced to buy said lands, making them qualify to become beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian
land if the same is considerably more than the value of the building. reform program and rightful possessors of the land in virtue of their occupation of
the same for 20 years.
Forced rent only comes in if the owner exercises his right to sell the land but the
builder rejects it by reason of the price thereof being considerably more than the The petitioners also contend that the copra dryer and the store are permanent
value of the building in such case, the parties shall agree to the terms of the structures as they are made of hollow blocks and cement.
lease, if they cant agree then they may bring the issue to court.
Private respondents on the other hand offer overwhelming evidence of their
2. No. The action for quieting of title is not barred by reason of res judicata. The ownership and possession of the land and contended that they merely tolerated the
cause of action in the unlawful detainer case involves possession while the cause petitioners occupation of the disputed property.
of action in the quieting of title case involves ownership. Furthermore, the Rules
of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case shall not bar an action ISSUE:
between the same parties respecting title to the land.
WON the petitioners have ownership over the portions of land where the copra
dryer and store are located.
Alviola v. CA
HELD:
FACTS:
No.
The petitioners defense that the said parcels of land are public lands is rebutted Mores vs. Yu-Go
by the Private respondents' tax declarations and receipts of payment of real estate G.R. NO. 172292
taxes, as well as other related documents which prove their ownership of the July 23, 2010
disputed properties. The record further discloses that Victoria S. Tinagan and her
son, Agustin Tinagan, took possession of the said properties in 1950, introduced Principle:
improvements thereon, and for more than 40 years, have been in open, continuous, Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises
exclusive and notorious occupation thereof in the concept of owners. until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one
who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply
The Court brushed as an afterthought the petitioners later defense that the where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it
portions where the copra dryer and store are located were ceded to them by would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his
Victoria in exchange for a prior debt since it was not supported by any document property.
pointing to Victoria transferring the ownership of the said portion and the lack of
declaration on the part of the petitioners. The Court also ruled that though the FACTS:
petitioners were in occupation of the portions of land in question for 20 years, This case stemmed from an injunction suit filed by plaintiff-appellants Yu-go
they were able to do so out of the tolerance of the private respondents and thus, et.al, alleging that, sometime in March 1983, appellees Mores, pleaded to
their posture that they have acquired the property by "occupation" for 20 years appellants that they be allowed to stay in the subject property in the meantime that
does not have any factual or legal foundation. they did not own a house yet. Said property was co-owned by plaintiff-appellants.
They readily agreed without asking for any rental but subject only to the condition
As correctly ruled by the respondent court, there was bad faith on the part of the that the said stay would last until anyone of appellants would need the subject
petitioners when they constructed the copra dryer and store on the disputed property. Forthwith, appellees and their children occupied the same as agreed
portions since they were fully aware that the parcels of land belonged to Victoria upon.
Tinagan. In November 1997, appellants made known to appellees that they were already in
need of the subject property. However, appellees begged that they be given more
But there was likewise bad faith on the part of the private respondents, having time. Extensions of time were repeatedly given to appellee but, instead of heeding
knowledge of the arrangement between petitioners and Victoria Tinagan relative such demand, appellees hired some laborers and started demolishing the
to the construction of the copra dryer and store. Thus, for purposes of indemnity, improvements on the subject property on January 20, 1999.
Article 448 of the New Civil Code should be applied. 32 However, the copra dryer Consequently, appellants instituted the said action for injunction where they also
and the store, as determined by the trial court and respondent court, are prayed for the reimbursement of the value of the residential building illegally
transferable in nature. Thus, it would not fall within the coverage of Article 448. demolished. Appellees filed their Answer where they denied the material
As the noted civil law authority, Senator Arturo Tolentino, aptly explains: "To fall averments of the complaint. They claimed that appellees were the ones who
within the provision of this Article, the construction must be of permanent caused its renovation consisting of a 3-bedroom annex, a covered veranda and a
character, attached to the soil with an idea of perpetuity; but if it is of a transitory concrete hollow block fence, at their own expense, and with appellants consent,
character or is transferable, there is no accession, and the builder must remove the which renovation was made without altering the form and substance of the subject
construction. The proper remedy of the landowner is an action to eject the builder property. Also, appellees argued that what they removed was merely the
from the land." 33 The private respondents' action for recovery of possession was improvements made on the subject property, which removal had not caused any
the suitable solution to eject petitioners from the premises. substantial damage thereto as, in fact, it remained intact. By way of counterclaims,
Petition dismissed. they demanded payment of actual damages, attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
The trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the spouses Mores ruling that principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
Defendants, who are possessors in good faith, were able to prove by impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
preponderance of evidence that they removed only the improvements they With regard to the ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any
introduced without destroying the principal building, after the plaintiffs refused to reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is
pay them the reasonable value of the improvements. x x x caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to retain them by
However, the appellate court disagreed that spouses Mores were in good faith, paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
believing that the relationship between the Yu siblings and the spouses Mores is There is thus no reason for the appellate courts award of moral damages to the
one between a lessor and a lessee, making Article 1678 of the Civil Code Yu siblings. We agree with the trial courts finding that the spouses Mores
applicable to the present case. The options given by Article 1678, the right of "removed only the improvements they introduced without destroying the principal
appropriating the useful improvements after reimbursing 50% of its value or the building, after the [Yu siblings] refused to pay them the reasonable value of the
right of removal of the useful improvements, are given by law to the lessor - the improvements." When the spouses Mores demanded reimbursement, the Yu
Yu siblings. Hence the appellate court ordered the spouses Mores to pay the Yu siblings should have offered to pay the spouses Mores one-half of the value of the
siblings moral damages worthP100,000 and denied Mores Motion for improvements. Since the Yu siblings failed to make such offer, the spouses Mores
Reconsideration for want of merit. had the right to remove the improvements.
Petition is Granted with Modification as to damages awarded to the Yu siblings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court awarding the Yu siblings moral damages in the
amount of P100,000 is rendered with grave abuse of discretion and is not in Robles vs. CA
accord with the decisions of this Court. Posted on August 13, 2013
328 SCRA 97
RULING: GR no. 123509
The petition has merit. March 14, 2000
The good faith referred to by Alida Mores was about the building of the Topic: Property; Quieting of title
improvements on the leased subject property. However, tenants like the spouses
Mores cannot be said to be builders in good faith as they have no pretension to be FACTS:
owners of the property. Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor Leon Robles primitively owned a land in Morong Rizal. When Leon died, his son
in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner Silvino Robles inherited the land. Both of them declared the property under their
thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a name for taxation purposes. Upon the death of Silvino, his widow Maria dela Cruz
rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to and his children inherited the property. They took adverse possession of it and
"improve" his landlord out of his property. paid the taxes thereon. The task of cultivating the land was assigned to one of
The appellate court is correct in ruling that Article 1678 of the Civil Code should Silvinos son, Lucio Roles while the payment of the taxes was entrusted to their
apply in the present case. Article 1678 reads: half brother, Hilario Robles.
If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the
use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the name
property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee of Silvino Robles was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of
one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to Andrea Robles who is the wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel
reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as
security. Somehow, the tax declaration was transferred to the name of Antipolo
Rural Bank and later on, was transferred to the name of defendant Hilario Robles These consolidated cases involve Lot No. 5872 and the rights of the contending
and his wife. In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cadona Rural Bank, parties thereto. The lot has an area of 57.601 sq.m. and is registered in the name of
Inc., using the tax declaration as security. For failure to pay the mortgage debt, the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses died intestate in
foreclosure proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as the 1943 and 1944, respectively. They were survived by six heirs. To settle the estate
highest bidder during the auction sale in October 1968. of said spouse, Angel Chaves, one of the heirs, initiated intestate proceedings and
was appointed administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of the
The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax estates was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project partition. The court
declaration was transferred in the name of defendant Rural Bank. On September approved the partition but a copy of said decision was missing. Nonetheless, the
25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Vergel Santos and estate was divided among the heirs. Subsequently, in 1956, the partition case
Ruth Santos who took possession of the property and was able to secure Free effected and the respective shares of the heirs were delivered to them.
Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names. Significantly, Lot No.5872 was not included in a number of documents. Parties
offered different explanations as to the omission of said lot in the documents.
ISSUE: Petitioners maintain the existence of an oral partition agreement entered into by all
heirs after the death of their parents. To set things right, petitioners then prepared
Whether or not the petitioners have the appropriate title that is essential for them a quitclaim to confirm the alleged oral agreement. Respondents dispute
to avail themselves of the remedy of quieting of title. voluntariness of their consent to the quitclaims. Six years after the execution of
the quitclaims, respondents discovered that indeed subject lot was still a common
HELD: property in the name of the deceased spouses. Eventually, an action for Quieting
Yes. The land had previously been occupied by Leon and later by Silvino Robles, of Title was filed by petitioners on December 22, 1983. The trial court considered
petitioners predecessor-in-interest, as evidenced by the different tax declarations Lot No. 5872 as still a common property and therefore must be divided into six
issued in their names. Also, the petitioners continued occupying and possessing parts, there being six heirs. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which
the land from the death of Silvino in 1942 until they were allegedly ousted sustained the decision of the trial court.
therefrom in 1988.
ISSUE:
The title of the petitioners over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the
registered owner which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession of Whether or not the action for quieting of title had already prescribed.
petitioners under a valid claim of title cannot be defeated by the claim of a
registered owner whose title is defective from the beginning since Hilario RULING:
mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a
mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title to Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased spouses
the property at the time of the institution of the Complaint for quieting of title. Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners ownership over said lot was acquired by
reason of the oral partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses heirs sometime
before 1956. That oral agreement was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims
Maestrado v CA executed by the said heirs on August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977. There was
G.R. No. 133345. indeed an oral agreement of partition entered into by the heirs/parties. A possessor
March 9, 2000 of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant
establishes a better right. In the instant case it is the petitioners, being the
FACTS: possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a superior right thereto by
virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed by the notarized quitclaims Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan, where spouses Yu paid Ramon
of the heirs. Partition is the separation,division and assignment of a thing held in P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the subject
common among those to whom it may belong. It may be effected extra- judicially property. But on Oct. 12, 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed a complaint for annulment of
by the heirs themselves through a public instrument filed before the register of the deed of sale to Javier, alleging that the deed of sale executed between him and
deeds. his late first wife Angelita was spurious as their signatures were forgeries.
Meanwhile, on Nov. 23, 1995, spouses Yu filed an action for forcible entry
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an against respondent with the MTC alleging that they had prior physical possession
inherent element of a contract of partition. Since registration serves as of the Langcaan Property through their trustee Ramon until the latter was ousted
constructive notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no by respondent in Sept. 1995. MTC ruled in favor of spouses Yu, affirmed by the
creditors are affected. Moreover, even the requirement of a written memorandum RTC, but set aside by CA. His first action for annulment of deed of sale having
under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where been dismissed, respondent filed action for removal of cloud from title on May 29,
no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of 1996, contending that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife and
property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and Rebecca del Rosario could not have been executed on Feb. 27, 1992, because on
segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. said date, he was residing in the U.S. and his late first wife died 20 years ago.
During pendency of the case, respondent died, succeeded by his surviving spouse
and representatives of children with his first wife. RTC held that spouses Yu are
purchasers in good faith, but on appeal, CA reversed and set aside lower courts
Spouses Yu vs. Pacleb decision and ordered for the cancellation of the annotation in favor of spouses Yu
G.R. No. 172172 on the TCT of Langcaan Property.
Feb. 24, 2009
FACTS: ISSUE:
Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife Angelita Chan are registered owners of an Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in good
18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmarias, Cavite, faith.
covered by TCT No. T-118375 (Langcaan Property). On Feb. 27, 1992, Spouses
Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan sold the property to Rebecca del Rosario.On HELD:
May 7, 1992, the lot was thereafter sold to Ruperto Javier. On Nov. 10, 1992, a Petitioner spouses are not innocent purchasers for value, and they are not in good
Contract to Sell was entered into between Javier and Spouses Yu wherein faith. Several facts should have put petitioner spouses on inquiry as to the alleged
petitioner spouses agreed to pay JavierP200,000 as partial payment and P400,000 rights of their vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan property. First, the property
to be paid upon execution of the contract, and Javier undertook to deliver remains to be registered in the name of respondent despite the 2 Deeds of
possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign a deed of absolute sale within 30 Absolute Sale from respondent to Del Rosario then from the latter to Javier, and
days from execution of contract. All the aforementioned sales were not registered. both deeds were not even annotated in the title of the subject property.
In 1993, spouses Yu filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance and Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale were executed only 2 months apart containing
damages against Javier, contending that Javier represented to them that the identical provisions. Third, the fact that the Langcaan Property is in the possession
Langcaan Property was not tenanted, but after they already paid P200,000 as of Ramon, son of the registered owners, this should have made petitioner spouses
initial payment and entered into the agreement of sale on Sept. 11, 1992, they suspicious as to the veracity of the alleged title of their vendor, Javier. Petitioner
discovered that it was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, son of Baltazar Pacleb. spouses could have easily verified the true status of the subject property from
Subsequently, spouses Yu demanded for the cancellation of the agreement and for Ramons wife, since the latter is their relative. The law protects to a greater degree
the return of their initial payment. On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu, Ramon, and a purchaser who buys from the registered owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a
the latters wife executed a Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the
registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is registered. While The antecedent facts as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the
certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is The spouses Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a complaint in the
expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances Municipal Trial Court against defendants Maximo Gabrito, et al., alleging that
necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, they are the possessors and legal owners of the property situated at No. 107
or in his capacity to transfer the land. Therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be Gordon Ave., New Kalalake, Olongapo City as evidenced by Tax Declaration No.
considered as innocent purchasers in good faith, and respondent has a better right 4-2046. The defendants are leasing portions of this parcel of land, each paying the
over the Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof. corresponding monthly rentals due thereon.
__________________________________________________________________ On the leased portion, the defendants constructed buildings and have allowed
____________ other persons to sublease the same for commercial purposes.
G.R. No. 77976 November 24, 1988 As the spouses Tan have no other property where they could construct their
residential house, the spouses Tan notified the defendants (in January 1984) that
MAXIMO GABRITO, ROGER LIBUT, CARMELITA UY, LIZA DE they intend to personally use the land to build their house thereon and gave
VERA, thru her Attorney-in-Fact, JESUS DE LOS SANTOS, petitioners, defendants three (3) months to vacate the premises and remove the structures and
vs. improvements which defendants had constructed thereon.
THE HON. NINTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. NICIAS
O. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo In April 1984, defendants requested for an extension of time within which to
City, ET AL., respondents. vacate, which was granted by the spouses Tan. However, from that time on,
defendants also stopped paying monthly rentals due on the land they leased.
Cornelio C. Cardenas and Valeriano S. Peralta for petitioners.
In view of this, in July 1984, defendants were told to leave the premises and to
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for respondents. pay rentals in arrears. As defendants refused to comply with both demands, the
matter was brought to the Barangay Council for settlement. As no agreement was
reached, a certification to file action was issued to the spouses Tan. Hence, the
BIDIN, J.: Tans filed an action for unlawful detainer with damages against Gabrito, et al.
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary injunction and In answer to the complaint, defendants Gabrito, et al. denied the material
restraining order of the decision of the Court of Appeals * dated March 4, 1987 in allegations of the complaint and alleged that: they are builders in good faith over
CA-G.R. No. SP No. 08710, "Maximo Gabrito et al. vs. Hon. Nicias O. Mendoza the land as provided in Article 448 of the Civil Code; the land where the houses of
and Roberto Tan et al.," affirming the April 2, 1986 decision of the Regional Trial defendants were built is a public land, not yet awarded nor titled to anybody;
Court of Olongapo City ** which also affirmed the decision of MTCC, Branch V, plaintiffs's alleged predecessor-in-interest not being the owner thereof could not
Olongapo City, and the Resolution of respondent court dated March 30, 1987 have passed nor transferred ownership thereof to them (plaintiffs) considering that
denying herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Gloria Carillo's Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (X-4-4320) has not yet been
acted upon by the Bureau of Lands; plaintiffs and their predessors-in-interest are
The appeal originated as an unlawful detainer complaint filed by herein private absentee applicants over the land, hence, are disqualified to own the same;
respondents with the Municipal Trial Court, Branch V, Olongapo City. plaintiffs have never been in possession of the land while the defendants are in
actual physical possession thereof; the sale of plaintiffs' alleged predecessor-in-
interest in favor of plaintiffs is null and void for being in violation of P.D. No.
1517 as defendants being lessees of the land have the right of first refusal thereof. On review, herein respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision rendered by
the Regional Trial Court Branch LXXIV, and ruled;
Defendants brought a counterclaim for damages against the plaintiffs. (Rollo,
Annex "C", pp. 39-40). WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review herein is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
(Rollo, Annex "C", p. 44).
Respondent Municipal Trial Judge applied the rule on summary procedure in this
case, rendered its decision dated November 22, 1985, the dispositive portion of On March 16, 1987, the petitioner filed their "Motion for Reconsideration and
which reads: Opposition to the Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Further Proceedings"
which was denied by the Ninth Division of respondent Court of Appeals in its
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for all the defendants to vacate the Resolution dated March 30, 1987 and granted the Motion for Immediate Issuance
parcel of land described in par. 3 of the complaint, removing therefrom the of a Writ of Execution filed by private respondents (Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 57-58).
buildings and any other improvements respectively owned by them; and to pay
plaintiffs the following as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises: Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed on April 13, 1987.
Maximo Gabritoat On April 21, 1987, Acting Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, authorized the grant of
P250.00 per month from April 1984 until he vacates the premises; Temporary Restraining Order in this case which was confirmed by the Second
Roger Libutat Division of this Court in its Resolution dated April 27, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 86, 87,
P150.00 per month from May 1984 until he vacates the premises; 88).
Liza de Veraat:
P150.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises; Carmelita In a Resolution dated June 8, 1987, petitioners were required to comment on the
Uyat motion dated April 26, 1987 (Rollo, p. 94) of counsel for respondents, praying to
Pl 70.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises. set aside the temporary restraining order issued on April 21, 1987 and to issue a
writ of execution pending appeal or to allow the Court of Appeals to proceed with
for all defendants to pay, in equal shares, damages by way of attorney's fees in the the execution of the decision pending appeal (Rollo, p. 115), which was complied
amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS ( P1,000.00 ) as well as costs. with by petitioners on July 22, 1987 (Rollo, p. 143).
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35). In the resolution of October 5, 1987 (Rollo, p. 187) the petition was given due
course and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda within
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. 450-08-5), the decision of twenty (20) days from notice. Petitioners' memorandum was submitted on
the Municipal Trial Court was affirmed in its decision dated April 2, 1986, the December 3, 1987 (Rollo, p. 196). Respondents submitted their memorandum on
dispositive portion of which reads: April 12, 1988 (Rollo, p. 235). Petitioners raised the following issues:
WHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing consideration and finding no 1. That a Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
prejudicial and reversible error was ever committed by the lower Court, the Court case for Unlawful Detainer under Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, where
affirms in toto the decision being appealed, with costs against the defendants- the plaintiffs are merely the legal possessors and recent transferees of a public
appellants. land, and the defendants are the absolute owners of the building existing on the
same land, for a number of years already.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex 'B' p. 38).
2. That the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXIV, Olongapo reverse the Decision of the Court of Origin: the subject Decisions, have not
City, ought to have dismissed the action for Unlawful Detainer and as the same considered the due process rights of petitioners toward their residences and
was also heard on appeal by the said Court on this jurisdictional challenge. structures, the same are facing the risk of condemnation and destruction without
fair hearing, and such improvements have an aggregate value of Pl70,000.00,
3. The market value of the residential houses or buildings of the defendants more or less.
on the said land is approximately P170,000.00, and it was with plaintiffs'
predecessor-in-interest, one Gloria Carillo-Potente that defendants caused said 9. Respondent Honorable Judge Mendoza of Branch LXXIV, Regional
structures to be erected on said land plaintiffs having only acquired from said Trial Court, Olongapo, may have been misled by the citation of authority, case of
predecessor, by means of a Deed of Sale of such rights sometime on January 5, Vda. de Bocaling vs. Laguna, et al., 54 SCRA, 243, relied upon by appellees, said
1984. case being totally inapplicable to the facts of this case.
4. Upon this frame of facts which are admitted in the Decision of both 10. Respondent Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Lumanlan, without regard to the
Courts, only a Court of General Jurisdiction, a Regional Trial Court, can have the fif'teen (15) days period finality of the Order and/or Writ of Demolition, harrassed
competence to try and decide the same: the Court of Special Limited Jurisdiction, herein petitioners, notwithstanding the pendency of matters involved to their
cannot take cognizance of such facts as an action for Unlawful Detainer. extreme discomfort and anxiety.
5. Arguendo, that the Court of Origin has jurisdiction to take cognizance of 11. The Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Annex "C", sustained
the cause of action for Unlawful Detainer, it should have not heard the case in the Decision of the Regional Trial Court and ignored the vital issues posed for
accordance with the Rules of Summary Proceedings, and based its Decision on an resolution: A Motion For Reconsideration, copy is hereto attached as Annex "D",
Affidavit hearing, as the question of ownership was being contested between was presented, precisely to stress the same but, a pointed or precise ruling upon
plaintiffs and defendants, with respect to whom was the preferred grantee to the such issues was avoided in the Resolution dated 30th of March, 1987, true copy
same land, and which falls under the complete administration and control of the attached herein as Annex "E".
Bureau of Lands.
12. On the other (sic) upon Motion of private respondents, the Tans, despite
6. In fact, the Court of Origin, Branch V, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Opposition thereto, Writ of Execution pending appeal was issued and respondent
Olongapo, should have suspended the proceedings, as there was an Administrative Deputy Sheriff Lumanlan enforced the same, copy of which is hereto attached as
Protest being heard by the District Land Office of Olongapo City. Annex "F": true copy of Notice to Vacate served by said respondent Deputy
Sheriff to petitioners is attached as Annex "G" herein.
7. On the question of suspension of proceedings denied by the Court of
Origin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch V, Olongapo City, an action for 13. Per Annex "D" Motion For Reconsideration a constitutional point, was
certiorari was filed before Branch LXXIII of Regional Trial Court, Olongapo reared forth, on first impression, per proviso of Sec. 10, Art. XIII-new, 1986
City, Civil Case No. 399-0-85, and although a Restraining Order against Constitution, relevant to demolition and resettlement, and, Resolution, dated 30th
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch V, City of Olongapo, was issued, the March, 1987, Annex "E", of the Honorable Appellate Authority, avoided said
same was already academic as by that time said Municipal Trial Court, Branch V, constitutional question, without passing upon the same.
Olongapo City, has already rendered its Decision in favor of private respondent
hereat, plaintiff therein. 14. Of Jurisdictional matters: Decision dated March 4, 1987, of the
Honorable Court of Appeals was, received on March 6, 1987, Motion For
8. Branch LXXIV, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo, in its Decision Reconsideration was filed on March 16, 1987, and Resolution dated 30th of
rendered on appeal, did not pass upon such matters, specified supra, so as to
March, 1987, denying Motion for Reconsideration was received on April 1, 1987: The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good
thus, this Petition is filed within the 15 day period. (Rollo, pp. 4-8). faith because he knew that their occupancy of the premises continues only during
the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their
All of which boil down to the main issue of whether or not an action for unlawful improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are
detainer is the proper action to oust petitioners from their occupation of the land in reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which
dispute. allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements
if the lessor so elects.
There is no question as to the ownership of the land in litigation as both
petitioners and private respondents admit that the same is a public land and owned Petitioners contend that the above cited case is "completely inapplicable to the
by the government. The bone of contention is, who has a better right to possess case at bar, because the genesis case of Ejectment therein was subjected to a
the land which definitely falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court compromise Agreement" (Rollo, p. 18). Such contention is, however, untenable.
and the rule of summary procedure may properly be applied. One of the issues raised in the above-cited case was whether or not lessees are
builders and/or possessors in good faith entitled to reimbursement for the value of
In a preliminary conference held pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary their improvements. The Court categorically resolved the issue in the negative
Procedure, defendants admitted that they entered the premises as lessees and had without qualification nor even a reference to the compromise agreement alluded to
been paying rentals for the use of the land to Gloria Carillo, private respondents' by the petitioner.
predecessor-in-interest (Order dated May 15, 1985 in Civil Case No. 2511, MTC,
Olongapo City, Branch V; Rollo, pp. 72-73).<re||an1w> When requested to In a later development, petitioners filed a supplemental memorandum submitting
vacate the premises, petitioners asked for an extension of time which request was the decision of the Bureau of Lands dated June 7, 1987, the dispositive portion of
granted. However, petitioners failed to vacate the premises and also stopped which reads:
paying rentals. In view of said admissions, petitioners had unquestionably
recognized private respondents' prior right of possession over the questioned IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Miscellaneous Sales Application No.
property. 4320 of Benita Ching Tan should be, as hereby as it is rejected forfeiting to the
government whatever amount had been paid on account thereof. The
Petitioners' allegation in their answer that they are builders in good faith over the miscellaneous sales application of Maximo Gabrito, Carmelita Uy, Roger Libut
land as provided for in Article 448 of the Civil Code is untenable. As ruled by this and Liza de Vera shall continue to be given due course after a subdivision survey
Court, Article 448 of the Civil Code, applies only where one builds on land in the of the portion occupied by them shall have been made at their pro-rata expense.
belief that he is the owner of the land, but does not apply where one's interest in
the land is that of a lessee under a rental contract (Balucanag v. Francisco, 122 SO ORDERED.
SCRA 498 [1983]). More than that, it has been settled that the mere fact that, in
his answer, defendant claims to be the exclusive owner of the property from which In view thereof, petitioners maintain that they are the lawful owners of the
plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest the Municipal Trial Court of buildings and the legal possessors of subject land and that the records of the court
jurisdiction (Vivar v. Vivar, 8 SCRA 847, 849 [1963]; De Santa vs. Court of proceedings show the pendency of the administrative protest before the Bureau of
Appeals, 140 SCRA 52 [1985]). Lands between the same litigating parties (Rollo, pp. 166-167).
In addition, this Court held in Bocaling v. Laguna, et al (54 SCRA 243, 250 Respondents countered that the decision of the Bureau of Lands granting
[1973]) that: preferential right to the petitioners to apply for the subject parcel of land is still on
appeal before the Department of Natural Resources.1 Hence, said decision which
is not yet final, cannot affect the outcome of this case because the authority given
to the land department over the disposition of public land does not exclude the lands. The jurisdiction of courts is limited to the determination of who has the
courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the character of the land actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry
notwithstanding (Rollo, pp. 246-247). cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana, in cases before the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court).
The contention of private respondents is well taken.
And even more recently in the case of Guerrero v. Amores, et al., G.R. No.
This issue has long been laid to rest by this Court. As early as the case of Pitarque L-34492 promulgated on March 28, 1988, the Court clearly stated that "pending
v. Sorilla (92 Phil. 55 [1952]), this Court ruled that: final adjudication of ownership by the Bureau of Lands, the Court has jurisdiction
to determine in the meantime the right of possession over the land." Corollary
The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose of, and thereto, the power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and turn over the
alienate public lands must not be understood as depriving the other branches of possession of the land to the party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs only to the
the Government of the exercise of their respective functions of powers thereon, courts of justice and not to the Bureau of Lands.
such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of peace by the police
and the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory In the same case, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and remedies with reference to public lands, was further clarified by this Court as
disposition. follows:
Said ruling was reiterated in Bahayang v. Maceren, 96 Phil 390 (1955); in Molina On the other hand, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
v. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 56 (1967) and in Rallon v. Ruiz, Jr., 28 SCRA 331 (1969). remedies as a condition precedent to the filing of a juridical action is confined to
In the latter case, the Court specifically ruled on the jurisdictional question, as controversies arising out of the disposition of public lands (Geukoko vs. Araneta,
follows: 102 Phil. 706 (1957); Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil. 128 (1957), alienation of
public lands (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra) or to the determination of the respective
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public lands to rights of rival claimants to public lands (Pitarque vs. Sorilla, supra) and not to
determine the issue of physical possession (in forcible entry cases before the possessory actions involving public lands which are limited to the determination
inferior court) on the better right of possession (in accion publiciana cases before of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question
court of first instance). And this is because the issue of physical possession raised (Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra
before the courts is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of
public lands which should be threshed out in the Bureau of Lands. In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of June 7, 1987, admitted the
jurisdiction of the courts to decide the case on the question of physical possession,
The above ruling was further reiterated in Francisco v. Secretary of Agriculture although not on the question of ownership (Rollo, p. 179).
and Natural Resources (121 SCRA 380 [1983]) and in a recent case of National
Development Co., et al. v. Hervilla, G.R. No. 65718, June 30, 1987 (151 SCRA Under the circumstances, a careful study of the records failed to show any cogent
520), where it was held that: reason to disturb the findings of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and of the
Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo City, and finally of the Court of Appeals.
It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are
committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately to the WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of the temporary restraining order is lifted. Costs against petitioners.
Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants
of public lands or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public SO ORDERED.
Whether or not the MSBF has the right to determine the subject 7-hectare
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur. portion of land
HELD:
G.R. No. 148830. April 13, 2005 Yes. Art. 565 states that, the rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, those provided in the title constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in
versus case it is deficient, the provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be
COURT OF APPEALS, BULACAN GARDEN CORPORATION and observed. In the present case, Proc. No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct.
MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION, INC., respondents. It categorically states that the 7-hectare area shall be determined by future survey
under the administration of the Foundation subject to private rights if there be any.
FACTS: It authorized MSBF to determine the location of the 7-hectare area. This authority,
Pres. Marcos issued Proc. No. 481 (1968) setting aside a 120-hectare coupled with the fact that Proc. No. 1670 did not state the location of the 7-hectare
portion of land in Quezon City owned by the NHA as reserved property for the area, leaves no room for doubt that Proc. No. 1670 left it to MSBF to choose the
site of National Government Center (NGC). Subsequently, he issued Proc. No. location of the seven-hectare area under its usufruct. However, the Court cannot
1670 (1977), which removed a 7-hectare portion from the 120-hectare land, giving countenance MSBFs act of exceeding the 7-hectare portion granted to it by the
the usufructuary rights to the xxx Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc., for use proclamation. A usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary
in its operation and projects, subject to private rights if any there be, and to future has the duty to protect the owners interests. Article 601 of the Civil Code states:
survey, under the administration of the Foundation. This parcel of land, which the usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person,
shall embrace 7 hectares, shall be determined by the future survey based on the of which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of
technical descriptions found in Proclamation No. 481, and most particularly on the ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had
original survey of the area, dated July 1910 to June 1911, and on the subdivision been caused through his own fault. The controversy would not have arisen had
survey dated April 19-25, 1968. Over the years, MSBF occupied the area but it MSBF respected the limit of the beneficial use given to it. Hence, there is a need
exceeded the 7-hectare subject of the usufruct and occupied 16 hectares instead. for a new survey, conducted jointly by the NHA and MSBF, consider existing
By then the land occupied by MSBF was bounded by Epifanio de los Santos structures of MSBF and as much as possible include all of the facilities of MSBF
Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the within the 7-hectare portion without sacrificing contiguity.
south and a creek to the north. On 1987, MSBF leased a portion of its area to BGC
and other stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA, which occupies Another point in the case: Article 605 of the Civil Code states: Usufruct cannot be
4,590 square meters of the 16-hectare area. On November 1987, Pres. Corazon constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or association for more than fifty
Aquino issued MO 127 which revoked the reserved status of the 50 hectares, more years. If it has been constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town
or less, remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of is abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be
the NGC. It also authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and to sell it to extinguished by reason thereof.Proc. No. 1670 was issued in 1977, or 28 years
the public. On August 1988, acting pursuant to MO 127, the NHA gave BGC 10 ago. Hence, under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22 years
days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind after the expiration of left.MO 127 released approximately 50 hectares of the NHA property as reserved
the 10-day period will be demolished by NHA. BGC then filed a complaint for site for the NGC. However, it does not affect MSBFs 7-hectare area since under
injunction on 21 April 1988 before the trial court. On 26 May 1988, BGC Proc. No. 1670, MSBFs 7-hectare area was already excluded from the operation
amended its complaint to include MSBF as its co-plaintiff. Both the NHA and of Proc. No. 481, which established the NGC Site.
MSBF conducted survey on the subject parcel of land.
Facts: - He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property
since he was not a party to the civil case.
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land. - His Third Party Claim with prayer to quash the writ of demolition was
denied for lack of merit
- He bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said - The motion for reconsideration as well as the Supplemental Motion for
property. Reconsideration were denied
- The bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel
at a public auction on March 19, 1983. Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed asserting that the existence of the easement of right of way was not
When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its annotated in his title and that he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703,
southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of hence the contract of easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of the Espinolas
right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest could not be enforced against him.
of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit and denied
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had the reconsideration
constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter
easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian Hence, this instant petition.
and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, for
easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or ISSUE: Whether the easement on the property binds petitioner.
restraining order against the spouses Gabriel. 4 As successors-in-interest,
Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement.
HELD:
On May 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On August
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition
1991, it issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels to
is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by
provide the right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on
necessity or a legal easement.
the easement. On August 1991, the Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied. Thus, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the existence of
said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is
conclusive on this Court.
- The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter February 18, 2000
wide easement obstructs the entry of private respondents' cement mixer
and motor vehicle. FACTS:
- One meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses
- It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate determine the Simeon Guzman (naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American
width of the easement. citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate
- Conformably then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan.
obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private respondents' estate.
Petitioner's second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
of easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and registered
pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the it to the RD a year after.
Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos
HELD:
Republic vs Guzman
NO. Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties
G.R. No. 132964
by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as
donor and the (2) consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee. On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled Deed of
However, Helens (3) intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos (Deed of Donation) in favor of
was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to petitioners mother Maria covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from
convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver her husband Crispin.
and renunciation of her rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely
contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of David, On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674
not a donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible. and 676 were issued in Matildes name. On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot
No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration
to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and
Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but an acknowledgment that David owns the testament,devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her remaining
property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his properties including Lot No. 674 to respondent. Matilde died on January 25,
name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accepted the 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.
donation.
On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed before the
However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen in Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, for declaration and
favor David valid. There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages
already accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David, against respondent.
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and
adjudicating between them all the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the The trial court, by Decision of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde
properties were registered in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she
in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and effect. having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation.
Helen still owns of the property.
By Decision of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO courts decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation
ALUAD, and CONNIE ALUAD, Petitioners, mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the
versus formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by
ZENAIDA ALUAD, Respondent. only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with
G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008 Article 805 of the Civil Code.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
ISSUE:
FACTS: Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation mortis causa and have
complied with the formalities of a will.
Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were
raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad RULING:
(Crispin).Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, The Deed of Donation which is one of mortis causa. The donation being
677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observedbut they
Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself. were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following
Article 805 of the Civil Code.Further, the witnesses did not even sign the
attestation clausethe execution of which clause is a requirement separate from the Held:
subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of Decision of trial court reinstated. Danguilan wins.
the pages of the will. Based on the evidence adduced, it is clear that Domingo did intend to donate the
properties to Danguilan. The fact that the donation was executed in a private
document is not material because the donation was onerous- the properties were
Danguilan vs IAC given to the Danguilan in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for
the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it could not come under the
Facts: operation of Article 749 requiring donations of real properties to be effected
Apolonia Melad filed a complaint against Felix Daguilan with CFI Cagayan for through a public instrument.
recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed she had purchased
from Domingo Melad in 1943 and were now being unlawfully withheld by the As to the deed of sale executed between Domingo and Apolonia, the record shows
Danguilan. She claimed to be the illegitimate daughter of Domingo and presented that the Apolonia Melad did not take possession of the disputed properties and
a deed of sale purportedly signed by the latter. She only moved out in 1946 indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of the lands from the
because Danguilan approached her and asked permission to cultivate the land and Danguilan. If she did have possession, she transferred the same to the petitioner in
to stay therein. She had agreed on condition that he would deliver part of the 1946, by her own sworn admission, and moved out to another lot belonging to her
harvest from the farm to her, which he did from that year to 1958. Deliveries later step-brother. She thus failed to show that she consummated the contract of sale by
stopped thus the complaint. actual delivery of the properties to her and her actual possession thereof in
concept of purchaser-owner.
Danguilan, on the other hand, is the husband of Isidra Melad, Domingo's niece.
He presented a private instrument which Domingo Melad also purportedly signed, As consistently held by jurisprudence, ownership does not pass by mere
giving to him the farm in 1943 another private instrument in which Domigo also stipulation but only by delivery. That symbolic delivery was effected through the
gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that the Danguilan would take deed of sale, which was a public instrument, Addison vs Felix controls:
care of the grantor and would bury him upon his death.
"in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is
Lower court ruled in favor of Danguilan. Upon appeal, the IAC modified the necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at
deicision and ruled that the conveyance of the real properties in question were null the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not
and void, as they were donations of real property and as such should have been enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession.
effected through a public instrument. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment
whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the
Apolonia Melad alleges that the deed of sale was allegedly executed when the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public
respondent was only three years old and the consideration was supposedly paid by instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument,
her mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker in a factory. the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and
Danguilan, on the other hand, avers that this contract was simulated and prepared make use of it himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and
after Domingo's death. enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to
realitythe delivery has not been effected."
Issue:
(eventually, the Court said that both claims were weak, but the presumption is in
WON Apolonia Melad can be considered as the owner of the disputed properties favor of Danguilan who is in possession)