CIV 1 the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the public dominion,

Property – Atty. Abaño albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then
Cases explained that it is only upon their sale to a private person or entity as
authorized by the BCDA law that they become private property and cease
Laurel v. Abrogar to be property of the public dominion:
 The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft  For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already
under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or
Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal for the development of the national wealth.
code does not require asportation or carrying away.  Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become
 To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable
"take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the
possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or
through the use of the offenders’ own hands, as well as any mechanical the development of national wealth. Only when the property has become
device, such as an access device or card as in the instant case. patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the
 This includes controlling the destination of the property stolen to deprive public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of Presidential
the owner of the property, such as the use of a meter tampering, as held in Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive prescription
Natividad v. Court of Appeals, use of a device to fraudulently obtain gas,. can commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be
 The act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various classified as alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by
equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDT’s telephone system, the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the development
through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long of the national wealth, or that the property has been converted into
distance calls using respondent PLDT’s facilities constitutes all three acts of patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the State, the land
subtraction mentioned above. remains to be property of public dominion.
 ABANO : Without those facilities of PLDT, Laurel would not be able to
transmit the calls and profit from it.
 The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is ACCION INTERDICTAL
likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under NFQ v GALABO
Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft. - Nenita Quality Foods Corporation v. Crisostomo Galabo, et al.

Dream Village v. BCDA 1. The respondents are the heirs of Donato Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained
 While property of the State or any of its subdivisions patrimonial character Lot No. 722, Cad-102, a portion of the Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi,
may be the object of prescription, those intended for some public service or Toril, Davao City, owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation.
for development o the national wealth, are considered property of public 2. Donato and the respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No.
dominion and therefore not susceptible to acquisition.  Fort Bonifacio 102, per the original survey of 1916 to 1920.
remains property of public dominion of the State, because although 3. When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of the
declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or Arakaki Plantation in the 1950s, it had Lot No. 722 resurveyed. Allegedly,
for the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the conversion the resurvey did not include Lot No. 102; thus, when Donato acquired TCT
of military reservations in the country to productive civilian uses. Needless Lot No. 722 on April 26, 1953, Lot No. 102 was not included. 
to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village has not even 4. When NQFC opened its business in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City in the late
begun to run. 1950s, it allegedly offered to buy Lot No. 102.
 One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village 5. Donato declined and to ward off further offers, put up "Not For Sale" and
is susceptible of acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. "No Trespassing" signs on the property. In the 1970s, Crisostomo fenced
Republic, it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was off the entire perimeter of Lot No. 102 and built his house on it
enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila 6.  The respondents filed on September 17, 2001 a complaint for forcible
 became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that the entry with damages before the MTCC against NQFC, alleging that:
said lands did not thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law a. they had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102; and
makes the express reservation that they are to be sold in order to b. NQFC deprived them of possession through force, intimidation,
raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases in strategy, threats and stealth.
Clark and Subic. 7. The respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they
 The Court noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either "public vacate Lot No. 102. Santos claimed ownership of this lot per the Deed of
service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420(2) of

1
 Transfer of Rights (Deed of Transfer) dated July 10, 1972, which the a. the Bureau of Lands would not have granted Santos free patent
respondents and their mother allegedly executed in Santos favor. application had he not been in possession of Lot No. 102 because
8. On January 3, 2001 and again on a later date, NQFCs workers, with armed continued occupation and cultivation, either by himself or by his
policemen of Toril, Davao City, entered by force Lot No. 102 to fence it. predecessor-in-interest, of the property is a requirement for such
The respondents reported the entry to the authorities. On April 16, 2001, grant under the Public Land Act.
Crisostomo received a letter from NQFCs counsel demanding that he b. By the very definition of "occupy," Santos is therefore deemed to
remove his house from Lot No. 102. NQFC subsequently removed the have possessed Lot No. 102 prior to 1974, the year his free patent
existing fence and cut down various trees that the respondents had planted application was granted, and under the principle of tacking of
on the property. possession, he is deemed to have had possession of Lot No. 102
9. NQFC, for its part, claimed not only from 1972, when the respondents transferred it to him,
a. that Santos immediately occupied and possessed Lot No. 102 after but also from the time Donato acquired the lot in 1948. Thus,
he purchased it from the respondents in 1972 and declared it Santos had no reason to oust the respondents since he had been
under his name for taxation purposes in possession of Lot No. 102 beginning 1972, by virtue of the
b. Santos was also granted Free Patent over the property by the transfer.
Bureau of Lands, and obtained Original Certificate of Title No. c. Second, the respondents had no documents to prove that they
10. NQFC then filed a petition for cancellation of the respondents patent were in actual occupation and cultivation of Lot No. 102 the
application over Lot No. 102, on the ground that Donato failed to reason they did not heed the BOLs request to perfect their title
perfect his title over Lot No. 102 which has long been titled in Santos over it
name. 16. HEIRS OF DONATO:
11. When conciliation failed, the respondents filed on September 17, 2001 a a. They deny ever meeting Santos and they maintain that their
complaint for forcible entry with damages before the MTCC against continued possession and occupation of Lot No. 102 belie this
NQFC, alleging that: supposed sale. Even granting that this sale occurred, Santos could
a. they had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102; and still not have acquired any right over Lot No. 102 for as of 1980, it
b. NQFC deprived them of possession through force, intimidation, was still in the name of the Republic.
strategy, threats and stealth. b. On the other hand, the respondents open, continuous, exclusive,
12. MTC : notorious and adverse possession of Lot No. 102 for three
a. Denied petition of respondents. decades, coupled by a claim of ownership, gave them vested right
b. the respondents relinquished their rights over Lot No. 102 when or interest over the property. 
they executed the Deed of Transfer in Santos favor; c. This vested right is equivalent to an actually issued certificate of
c. the certificate of title over Lot No. 102 in Santos name shows that title so that the execution and delivery of the title is a mere
Santos was in actual physical possession since actual occupation is formality.
required before an application for free patent can be approved; d. To say the least, NQFC did not have to send them a formal
d. and NQFC validly acquired ownership over Lot No. 102 when it demand to vacate and violently oust them from the premises had
purchased it from Santos, entitling it to the right, among others, it been in actual possession of the property as claimed.
to possess the property as ancillary to such ownership.
13. RTC: DENIED APPEAL ISSUE: Whether NQFC had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102?
a. In resolving the issue of possession of Lot No. 102, the RTC also ---- NO.
resolved the question of ownership, as justified under the Rules,
explaining that the NQFCs possession of Lot No. 102 was anchored RULING: WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the
on a Deed of Absolute Sale, while that of the respondents was petition [of NQFC]; the decision dated February 22, 2006 and the resolution
based merely on the allegation of possession and occupation by dated July 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77006 are
Donato, and not on any title.?l1 hereby AFFIRMED.
b. Thus, the question of concurrent possession of Lot No. 102
between NQFC and the respondents should tilt in NQFCs favor HELD:
14. CA : GRANTED APPEAL 1. Possession as an issue of ownership v. Actual possession in a
a.  The CA explained that a plaintiff, in a forcible entry case, Forcible Entry Case
only has to prove prior material and physical possession of a. To prove prior physical possession of Lot No. 102, NQFC presented
the property in litigation and undue deprivation of it by means the Deed of Transfer, Santos OCT P-4035, the Deed of Absolute
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. These, the Sale, and the Order of the Bureau of Lands approving Santos free
respondents averred in the complaint and sufficiently proved, thus patent application. In presenting these pieces of evidence, NQFC
entitling them to recover possession of Lot No. 102. is apparently mistaken as it may have equated possession that
15. BEFORE SC: NQFC maintains that

2
 is at issue as an attribute of ownership to actual possession in the concept of owner " but not necessarily of the
possession. actual possession required in forcible entry cases.
b. The evidence do not show prior possession. 4. Elements of a forcible entry suit: (Sec 1, Rule 70 Rules of Court)
the plaintiff must allege and prove:
2. We agree that ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession a. prior physical possession of the property; and
contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the b. unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force,
possession in issue in a forcible entry case. intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth
a. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de c. As in any civil case, the burden of proof lies with the
facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing complainants (the respondents in this case) who must establish
out of ownership; these are different legal concepts for which the their case by preponderance of evidence.
law provides different remedies for recovery of possession. d. In the present case, the respondents sufficiently alleged and
i. the word "possession" in forcible entry suits refers to proved the required elements.
nothing more than prior physical possession or 5. As to the principle of tacking possession
possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal a. To support its position, NQFC invokes the principle of tacking of
possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is possession, that is, when it bought Lot No. 102 from Santos on
not the issue and the absence of it "is not a ground for December 29, 2000, its possession is, by operation of law, tacked
the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an to that of Santos and even earlier, or at the time Donato acquired
ejectment case. Lot No. 102 in 1948.
ii. Thus, in a forcible entry case, "a party who can prove b. NQFCs reliance on this principle is misplaced. True, the law allows
prior possession can recover such possession even a present possessor to tack his possession to that of his
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in possession of the
character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior property for the period required by law . Possession in this regard,
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him however, pertains to possession de jure and the tacking is made
to remain on the property until a person with a better for the purpose of completing the time required for
right lawfully ejects him." acquiring or losing ownership through prescription.We
iii. He cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror -- not reiterate possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing
even by its owners. more than physical possession, not legal possession.
iv. For these reasons, an action for forcible entry is summary 6. The issue of ownership can be decided in a question of possession
in nature aimed only at providing an expeditious means if the issue is intertwined with ownership (an exception)
of protecting actual possession. a. The Rules in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the
v. Ejectment suits are intended to "prevent breach of x x x Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be
peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of
of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership.
obtain what he claims is his." b. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this
vi.  Thus, lest the purpose of these summary proceedings be limited instance-- to determine the issue of possession and only if
defeated, any discussion or issue of ownership is avoided the question of possession cannot be resolved without
unless it is necessary to resolve the issue of de facto deciding the issue of ownership.
possession. c.  Save for this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all
material, as in the present case.
7. As a final reiterative note, this Decision deals only with de facto possession
and is without prejudice to an appropriate action for recovery of possession
3. As to evidence presented: based on ownership.
a. We agree with the respondents that instead of squarely
addressing the issue of possession and presenting evidence
showing that NQFC or Santos had been in actual possession of Lot
No. 102, the former merely narrated how it acquired ownership of
Lot No. 102 and presented documents to this effect.
b. Its allegation that Santos occupied Lot No. 102 in 1972 is
uncorroborated.
c. Even the tax declarations under Santos name are hardly of
weight; "tax declarations and realty tax payments are not
conclusive proof of possession. They are merely good indicia of

3
 decision disposing of a definite area of the subject property in
respondent’s favor because there was a pending judicial partition
proceeding before the CA for Partenio’s estate.
6. A certain Gan filed a motion to intervene who claims to be the actual
and rightful owner of Partenio’s conjugal share. Gan claims to have
purchased Partenio’s conjugal share in the property, and in return, the
latter on November 29, 1990 executed a deed of waiver and quitclaim of
his possessory rights
7. In the partition proceedings of the estate of Partenio, before the CA,
pending the Civil case decision, the CA awarded Oamil specifically
the Canda St. portion to Partenio as his conjugal share.
8. In an order of the RTC in the Civil case,
a. The TRIAL COURT substantially modified its Decision dated
December 26, 1993, by awarding specifically the 21 st St.
portion of the property to Partenio as his conjugal share,
despite the pronouncement in by Court of Appeals which awards
the Canda St. portion to him.
b. the trial court denied the petition for relief because the decision in
Civil Case No. 140-0-93 had become final and executory.
c. It held that only indispensable parties to the case may participate
CO-OWNERSHIP in the proceedings thereof, and since petitioners may not be
considered as indispensable parties because the subject matter of
PANGANIBAN v. OAMIL the proceedings involves Partenio’s conjugal share in the property,
Co-ownership – judicial partition ends the co-ownership; jurisdiction of an they are precluded from filing a petition for relief from the court’s
ordinary court judgment.
FACTS: 8. In an MR, Petitioners moved for reconsideration insisting that they are
1. Subject of the case is the 204.5 square meter property in Olangapo city indispensable parties in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 because as co-owners of
claimed by respondent Oamil to be Partenio’s conjugal share in a parcel of the subject property by virtue of succession to the rights of their deceased
commercial land (subject property) with an aggregate area of 409 square mother, they possess an interest that must be protected
meters acquired by partenion and his deceased wife Juliana during their 9. In the appeal with the CA,
marriage. a. the appellate court sustained the trial court’s ruling that Partenio’s
2. Julita Oamil filed a complaint for specific performance with damages with conjugal share in the subject property consists of the 21st St.
portion,
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, praying that Partenio Rombaua
b. The appellate court based the award of the 21 st St. portion to
(Partenio) be ordered to execute a final deed of sale over the parcel of land
respondent on the ground that petitioners have always
which was the subject of a prior "Agreement to Sell" executed by and
acknowledged their father Partenio’s "acts of ownership" over the
between them over the property.
21st St. portion, thus signifying their consent and thereby barring
3. There are two portions of the subject property in contention:
them from questioning the award.
a. one consisting of 204.5 square meters facing 21 st Street (the
c. Affirmed in toto decision of RTC.
21st St. portion),
ISSUE: Whether petitioners can intervene in the proceedings in Civil Case in order
b. and another consisting of 204.5 square meters facing Canda
to protect their rights as co-owners? - YES
Street (the Canda St. portion).
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
c. Petitioners and their father Partenio are acknowledged co-owners
of Appeals dated March 2, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 57557 and the Resolution
of the subject property to the following extent: one-half to
dated July 10, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with the exception that the
Partenio as his conjugal share, and one-sixth each of the
denial of the intervenor Sotero Gan’s motion for intervention is AFFIRMED.
remaining half to petitioners and Partenio as the surviving heirs of
The Order dated October 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in
Juliana.
Civil Case No. 140-0-93 is hereby DECLARED of no effect. In all other respects, the
4. RTC granted the specific performance, but did not specify which
Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 dated December 26, 1993
portion of the property – the 21 st St. portion or the Canda St. portion –
is AFFIRMED. The said court is moreover ORDERED to abide by the
should be deeded to respondent as buyer of Partenio’s conjugal share.
pronouncement in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 with respect to
5. The RTC decision became final and executory.
Partenio Rombaua’s conjugal share in the disputed property.
a. However, petitioners filed a verified petition for relief
CANDA PROPERTY
claiming that they were  the trial court may not yet render a
4
 c. The court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 is not a partition court but
HELD: one litigating an ordinary civil case, and all evidence of alleged
1. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs acts of ownership by one co-owner should have been presented in
to different persons. During the existence of the co-ownership, no the partition case, there to be threshed out in order that the
individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community property partition court may arrive at a just division of the property owned
until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the co-owner in common; it is not for the trial court in the specific performance
has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land case to properly appreciate.
or thing. d. Being a court trying an ordinary civil suit, the court in Civil
a.  Before partition in a co-ownership, every co-owner has the Case No. 140-0-93 had no jurisdiction to act as a partition
absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the common court. Trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve
property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage this to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because
undivided interest, except as to purely personal rights. The effect it is subject to specific prescribed rules.
of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be 6. It was likewise irregular for the respondent to have obtained a certificate of
awarded to him upon the partition of the property. title over specific property which has not been partitioned, especially where
b. Under Article 497 of the Civil Code, in the event of a division or she concedes awareness of the existing co-ownership which has not been
partition of property owned in common, assignees of one or more terminated, and recognizes her status as mere successor-in-interest to
of the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned Partenio. The spring may not rise higher than its source.
in common and object to its being effected without their 7. It was clear mistake for the trial court to have gone against the final and
concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executory decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 and its original
executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made decision, which does not award a definite portion of the disputed property
notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, to Partenio, precisely because, as a court litigating an ordinary civil suit, it
without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain is not authorized to partition the subject property but only to determine the
its validity. rights and obligations of the parties in respect to Partenio’s undivided share
2. The decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, which is an action in the commonly owned property. As a result of this mistake, the
for judicial partition of the subject property, determines what petitioners are entitled to relief.
Partenio, and ultimately, respondent, as his successor-in-interest,
is entitled to in Civil Case No. 140-0-93. 
3. Thus said, the trial court in Civil Case could not award the 21 st St. portion
to Partenio, since the court in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 specifically
awarded the Canda St. portion to him. 
4.  The decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, as to Partition,
which became final and executory, should put an end to the co-
ownership between Partenio and the respondents, and the award
made to each co-owner of specific portions of the property as their
share in the co-ownership should be respected.
5. It was likewise error for the appellate court to have considered the
alleged acts of ownership exercised upon the 21 st St. portion by Partenio
as weighing heavily against the decreed partition in Special Civil Action No.
340-0-86.
a. The determination of this issue is beyond the ambit of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93. As far as it was concerned, it
could only award to the respondent, if proper, whatever specific
portion Partenio is found to be entitled to in the event of a
partition, in accordance with Article 493 of the Civil Code and the
procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.
b. It could not, in an ordinary proceeding for specific
performance with damages, subject the property to a
partial division or partition without the knowledge and
participation of the other co-owners, and while a special
civil action for partition was simultaneously pending in
another court.

5
 in the names of the respondents' predecessors-in-interest,
namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca, Damasina,
Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and
Florencio, all surnamed Cuison.
b. The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was
evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431.
i. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the
subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their
shares to MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest.
3. The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of
OCT No. RO 2431 prompted MCIAA to sue them for the cancellation
of title in the RTC,
a. alleging in its complaint that the certificate of title conferred no
right in favor of the respondents because the lot had already been
sold to the Government in 1957;
b. that the subject lot had then been declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 00387 in the name of the BAT;
c. and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the
legal obligation to surrender the certificate of title for cancellation
to enable the issuance of a new one in its name.
4. After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to
dismiss the complaint upon the Demurrer to Evidence dated February
3, 1997, contending that
a. the Deed and Tax Declaration No. 00387 had no probative value
to support MCIAA's cause of action and its prayer for relief.
b. They cited Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which
provided that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself."
c. They argued that what MCIAA submitted was a mere photocopy of
the Deed; that even assuming that the Deed was a true
reproduction of the original, the sale was unenforceable against
them because it was only Julian who had executed the same
MCIAA v. Heirs of Ijordan without obtaining their consent or authority as his co-heirs; and
that the tax declaration had no probative value by virtue of its
Doctrine: having been derived from the unenforceable sale.
5. In its order dated September 2, 1997,
A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of a. the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it
the others is unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the pertained to the shares of the respondents in Lot No. 4539
seller. but recognized the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian.
6. The CA affirmed the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Facts:
1. On October 14, 1957, JULIAN CUIZON (JULIAN) executed a Deed of Issues:
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale (Deed) covering Lot No. 4539 1. Whether the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to the
(subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in petitioner? - NO
favor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), the predecessor- 2. Whether respondents are guilty of estoppel by laches. - NO
in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport Authority 3. Whether MCIAA possessed the subject lot by virtue of acquisitve
(MCIAA). prescription. - NO
2. In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the
original certificate of title covering the subject lot. Rulings:
a. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2431 of WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review
the Register of Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 22, 2006.

6
 without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the
HELD: mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
 Whether the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to the
petitioner? – NO WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;
and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 22, 2006.
No, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the
respondents' shares in the subject lot were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share.
Their conclusion was based on the absence of the authority from his co-heirs in
favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. We have no reason to
overturn the affirmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership
with Julian. Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant
to the Deed did not bind the respondents for lack of their consent and
authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in
the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract in
the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law
a right to represent him; the contract entered into in the name of another by one
who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person
on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting
party.

But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect
with respect to his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546
square meters by virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of property on
his part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid:

x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his
own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the thing owned in common.

2.  Whether respondents are guilty of estoppel by laches. - NO

No. MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary
claim of ownership of their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance.
 The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who were parties to
the contract and their privies or successors-in-interest.
 Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the contract that was
declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there was
nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no
adverse effect on the rights of the respondents in the subject lot.

3.  Whether MCIAA possessed the subject lot by virtue of acquisitve

prescription? No.
 MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside
from the absence of the satisfactory showing of MCIAA's supposed
possession of the subject lot, no acquisitive prescription could arise
in view of the indefeasibility of the respondents' Torrens title.
 Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could deprive the
registered owners of their title by prescription. The real purpose of the
Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its
legality forever. Thus, once title is registered, the owner may rest secure,

7
 2. Despite two letters of demand sent by Generoso PNB failed and refused to
vacate the area.
3. PNB asserted that they acted in good faith when it acquired the lot and the
building sometime in 1981 from then Mayor Ignacio, the encroachment
already was in existence and to remedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio
offered to sell the area in question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to
PNB at P100.00 per square meter which offer the latter claimed to have
accepted.
4. The sale, however, did not materialize when, without the knowledge and
consent of PNB, Mayor GGG later mortgaged the lot to the Development
Bank of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Is PNB considered as builder in good faith? – NO, 448 does not apply as
well. The fact that the building, constructed on the land by Mayor Ignacio, has in
actuality been part of the property transferred to PNB, PNB is not a “builder” and
cannot invoke 448.

 Who is a builder in good faith?

o The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of
one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is
considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates
o In order, however, that the builder can invoke that accruing
benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choice
be made by the landowner, he should be able to prove good faith
on his part.
 Right of a builder in good faith
o A builder in good faith can, under the foregoing provisions, compel
the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to
pay the price of the land.
o The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords
with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around.
o Given the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court, it
should be evident enough that petitioner would fall much too short
from its claim of good faith. Evidently, petitioner was quite
aware, and indeed advised, prior to its acquisition of the
land and building from Ignacio that a part of the building
sold to it stood on the land not covered by the land
conveyed to it
 Choice given under 448 is preclusive. Choose 1 only.
ACCESSION o Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for
PNB v Generoso
instance, compel the owner of the building to instead remove it
FACTS:
from the land.
1. Generoso filed a complaint against PNB for recovery of ownership and
 When can you invoke 448?
possession with damages over the questioned property. Generoso stated
o Article 448, of the Civil Code refers:
that he acquired a parcel of land; he had caused a verification survey of
 to a piece of land
the property and discovered that a building owned by PNB was encroaching
 whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties,
upon the northern portion of the lot.

8
  one of whom has built some works (or sown or planted
something) NHA v. CA
 AND NOT to a case where the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership FACTS:
of the land by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated, 1. By virtue of Proclamation No. 481 issued by then President Ferdinand
"where the true owner himself is the builder of works on Marcos, a 120 hectare portion of land in QC was set aside, owned by
his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is National Housing Authority, as reserved property for the site of the
entirely irrelevant. National Government Center ("NGC").
o The fact that the building, constructed on the land by Mayor 2. President Marcos then issued Proclamation No. 1670, which removed a
Ignacio, has in actuality been part of the property transferred to seven-hectare portion from the coverage of the NGC. Proclamation No.
PNB, PNB is not a “builder” and cannot invoke 448. 1670 gave MSBF usufructuary rights over this segregated portion.
3. MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670. Over the years,
MSBF’s occupancy exceeded the seven-hectare area subject to its
usufructuary rights. By 1987, MSBF occupied approximately 16 hectares. 7,
MSBF leased a portion of the area it occupied to BGC and other
stallholders.
4. Eventually, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127
("MO 127") which revoked the reserved status of "the 50 hectares, more or
less, remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as
site of the National Government Center." MO 127 also authorized the
NHA to commercialize the area and to sell it to the public.
5. Acting on the power granted under MO 127, the NHA gave BGC ten days to
vacate its occupied area.
6. MSBF’s survey shows that BGC’s stall is within the seven-hectare area. On
the other hand, NHA’s survey shows otherwise. The entire controversy
revolves on the question of whose land survey should prevail.

ISSUE: Whether the premises leased by BGC from MSBF is within the seven-
hectare area that proclamation no. 1670 granted to MSBF by way of usufruct?
SEGUE: BGC claims that the issue is now moot due to NHA’s demolition of BGC’s
facilities after the trial court dismissed BGC’s complaint for injunction. BGC argues
that there is nothing more to enjoin and that there are no longer any rights left for
adjudication. SC disagreed. BGC may have lost interest in this case due to the
demolition of its premises, but its co-plaintiff, MSBF, has not. The issue for
resolution has a direct effect on MSBF’s usufructuary rights. There is yet the central
question of the exact location of the seven-hectare area granted by Proclamation
No. 1670 to MSBF. This issue is squarely raised in this petition. There is a need to
settle this issue to forestall future disputes and to put this 20-year litigation to rest.
HELD:
 A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such
conditions as the parties may deem convenient subject to the legal
provisions on usufruct.
 A usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct.
o Thus, the NHA may not evict BGC if the 4,590 square meter
portion MSBF leased to BGC is within the seven-hectare area held
in usufruct by MSBF.
o The owner of the property must respect the lease entered
into by the usufructuary so long as the usufruct exists.
o However, the NHA has the right to evict BGC if BGC occupied a
portion outside of the seven-hectare area covered by MSBF’s
usufructuary rights.
USUFRUCTUARY

9
  Article 565 of the Civil Code states: The rights and obligations of the much as possible include all of the facilities of MSBF within the
usufructuary shall be those provided in the title constituting the seven-hectare portion without sacrificing contiguity.
usufruct; in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the provisions  A final point. Article 605 of the Civil Code states:
contained in the two following Chapters shall be observed.  605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation,
o In the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is the title constituting or association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and
the usufruct. Proclamation No. 1670 categorically states that the before the expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the
seven-hectare area shall be determined "by future survey under corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished
the administration of the Foundation subject to private rights if by reason thereof. (Emphasis added)
there be any. o The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a
o The appellate court and the trial court agree that MSBF has the corporation or association to 50 years.
latitude to determine the location of its seven-hectare usufruct o A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant. Unlike a natural
portion within the 16-hectare area. person, a corporation or association’s lifetime may be extended
 To prefer the NHA’s survey to MSBF’s survey will strip MSBF of most of its indefinitely. The usufruct would then be perpetual.
main facilities. Only the main building of MSBF will remain with MSBF since o This is especially invidious in cases where the usufruct given to a
the main building is near the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue. The rest corporation or association covers public land. Proclamation No.
of MSBF’s main facilities will be outside the seven-hectare area. 1670 was issued 19 September 1977, or 28 years ago. Hence,
 On the other hand, this Court cannot countenance MSBF’s act of exceeding under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22 years left.
the seven-hectare portion granted to it by Proclamation No. 1670. A (50 yrs)
usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary
has the DUTY TO PROTECT THE OWNER’S INTERESTS. One such
duty is found in Article 601 of the Civil Code which states:
o ART. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of
any act of a third person, of which he may have knowledge, that
may be prejudicial to the rights of ownership, and he shall be
liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had been
caused through his own fault.
 A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the
obligation of preserving its form and substance , unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
o This controversy would not have arisen had MSBF respected the
limit of the beneficial use given to it. MSBF’s encroachment of its
benefactor’s property gave birth to the confusion that attended
this case.
 To put this matter entirely to rest, it is not enough to
remind the NHA to respect MSBF’s choice of the location
of its seven-hectare area.
 MSBF, for its part, must vacate the area that is not part
of its usufruct. MSBF’s rights begin and end within the
seven-hectare portion of its usufruct.
o This Court agrees with the trial court that MSBF has abused the
privilege given it under Proclamation No. 1670. The direct
corollary of enforcing MSBF’s rights within the seven-hectare area
is the negation of any of MSBF’s acts beyond it.
 Which survey should be preferred?
o At this point, the determination of the seven-hectare portion
cannot be made to rely on a choice between the NHA’s and
MSBF’s survey.
o There is a need for a new survey, one conducted jointly by the
NHA and MSBF, to remove all doubts on the exact location of the
seven-hectare area and thus avoid future controversies. This new
survey should consider existing structures of MSBF. It should as

10
 EASEMENT

Goldcrest v. Cypress Gardens

FACTS:
1. Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress
Gardens, a ten-storey building. Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and
Declaration of Restrictions which constituted Cypress Gardens into a
condominium project, and incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens
Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage the condominium project
and to hold title to all the common areas.
2. Title to the land on which the condominium stands was transferred to
Cypress but Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level penthouse unit
on the ninth and tenth floors of the condominium registered under
Condominium Certificate of Title Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and
assigns likewise controlled the management and administration of the
Condominium until 1995.
3. Following the turnover of the administration and management of the
Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was
discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress were being
occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest.
4. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to
compel the latter
a. to vacate the common areas it allegedly encroached on and to
remove the structures it built thereon.
b. Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest along the
stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door built
in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal of the
cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Cypress likewise prayed that
Goldcrest pay damages for its occupation of the said areas and for
its refusal to remove the questioned structures.
5. Goldcrest averred that
a. it was granted the exclusive use of the roof deck’s limited
common area by Section 4(c)4 of the condominium’s Master Deed.
b. it constructed the contested doors for privacy and security
purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it
are unusable and inaccessible to other condominium unit owners.
6. Two ocular inspections were conducted on the condominium project.
During the first inspection, it was found that
a. Goldcrest enclosed and used the common area fronting the two
elevators on the ninth floor as a storage room.
b. It was likewise discovered that Goldcrest constructed a
permanent structure which encroached 68.01 square meters of
the roof deck’s common area.6 During the second inspection, it

11
 was noted that Goldcrest failed to secure an alteration approval 3. it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than
for the said permanent structure. that previously established;
4. it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for
ISSUES: the use and preservation of the easement;
1. Whether failure to conduct actual measurement on roof deck encroached 5. it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome;
areas making CA directive impossible to implement? 6. it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to
2. Whether there was impairment of easement by Goldcrest? make necessary works on the servient estate;
7. it should choose the most convenient time and manner to
RULING: build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the office [is] modified as owner of the servient estate.
follows: Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the
1. Directing respondent to immediately remove any or all structures which easement.
obstruct the use of the stairway from the eighth to tenth floor, the passage  Goldcrest’s acts shows that it breached a number of the
and use of the lobbies at the ninth and tenth floors of the Cypress Gardens aforementioned restrictions.
Condominium; and to remove any or all structures that impede the use of o First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office
the unlimited common areas. structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the
2. Ordering the respondent to pay an administrative fine of ₱10,000.00 for roof deck’s limited area.
its addition of a second penthouse and/or unauthorized alteration of the o Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on
condominium plan. the condominium’s foundation and on the roof deck’s common
All other claims are hereby dismissed. limited area, making the easement more burdensome and adding
unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit owners.
Issue 1: Whether failure to conduct actual measurement on roof deck o Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went
encroached areas make CA directive impossible to implement? – NO beyond the intendment of the easement since it illegally altered
HELD the approved condominium project plan and violated Section 427
 There is no merit in Goldcrest’s submission that the failure to conduct an of the condominium’s Declaration of Restrictions.
actual measurement on the roof deck’s encroached areas makes the
assailed directive of the Court of Appeals impossible to implement. As aptly
pointed out by Cypress, the limited common area of the roof deck is
specifically identified by Section 4(c) of the Master Deed.

Issue 2: Whether there was impairment of the easement by Goldcrest? –

YES
HELD
 Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof deck’s common limited
area is for its exclusive use, building structures thereon and leasing the
same to third persons do not impair the subject easement.
 The question of whether a certain act impairs an easement is undeniably
one of fact, considering that its resolution requires us to determine the
act’s propriety in relation to the character and purpose of the subject
easement.
 Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the limited common
area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only did
Goldcrest’s act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the
condominium plan, in violation of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 
 The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the
following prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient
estate, to wit:
1. it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the
easement; 
2. it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the
immovable originally contemplated;

12
 Bogo-Medelin v CA

DOCTRINE:

 Physical indications relate only whether easement is “Apparent” v. “non-

apparent”, not whether it is continuous easement which will give right to
ownership by acquisition by way of easement by right of way. It is the
manner of the exercise of the easement which categorizes easement as
continuous or discontinuous.
 Discontinuous easements may only be acquired by title, not prescription.

FACTS
1. On December 9, 1935, Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. (father of herein
respondents), purchased from Feliciana Santillan a parcel of unregistered
land with an area of one hectare, 34 ares, and 16 centares, located in
Barrio Dayhagon, Medellin, Cebu
2. Prior to the sale, the entire length of the land from north to south was
already traversed in the middle by railroad tracks owned by
petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co, Inc. (BoMedCo), which the latter
used for hauling sugar cane from the fields to petitioner’s sugar mill
3. In 1948, the respondent heirs inherited the land after their father passed
away
4. Unknown to them, BoMedCo was able to have the disputed middle lot
which was occupied by the railroad tracks placed in its name in the
Cadastral Survey of Medellin, Cebu in 1965
5. The entire subject lot was divided into three: Cadastral Lot Nos. 953 and
955, which remained in the name of private respondents, and Cadastral Lot
No. 954 (the narrow lot where the tracks lay), which was claimed by
BoMedCo as its own and was declared for tax purposes in its name
6. In 1989, private respondents discovered the aforementioned claim of
BoMedCo

13
 7. On June 8, 1989, respondent heirs filed a “Complaint for Payment of 2. Whether the expiration of the period of easement convert possession into
Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession of Real Property and an adverse one? – NO
Damages with Application for Restraining Or-der/Preliminary 3. Can the doctrine of laches apply to defeat the claim for compensation or
Injunction” against Bomedco before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu recovery of possession by respondent heirs? – NO
a. They presented an ancient document ― an original copy of the 4. Whether BoMedCo acquired ownership by virtue of Acquisition of Easment
by Right of Way Art. 620 of the Civil Code? - NO
deed of sale written in Spanish and dated December 9, 1935 9 ― to
evidence the sale of the land to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr.; several
RULINGWHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision dated
original real estate tax receipts
November 17, 1995 and resolution dated March 2, 1996 of the Court of Appeals are
8. According to them, Santillan granted to SoMedCo, in 1929, a railroad
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Company, Inc. is
right of way for a period 30 years, before she sold the subject land to
hereby ordered to vacate the subject strip of land denominated as Cadastral Lot No.
Valdez, Sr
954, remove its railway tracks thereon and return its possession to the private
a. When Valdez, Sr. acquired the land, he respected the grant that
respondents, the heirs of Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. It is also hereby ordered to pay
expired sometime in 1959
private respondents attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000
b. Still, respondent heirs allowed BoMedCo to continue using the land
because one of them was then an employee of the company
9. BoMedCo’s defense: HELD
a. It was the owner and possessor of Cadastral Lot No. 954, having ISSUE 1: Whether BoMedCo gained ownership of land through
allegedly bought the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior extraordinary acquisitive prescription under art. 1137 of the Civil Code - NO
to the sale of the property by the latter to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr.  There is no dispute that the controversial strip of land has been in the
in 1939 continuous possession of petitioner since 1929. But possession, to
b. Petitioner also contended that respondents were already barred by constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under
prescription and laches because of the former’s open and a claim of title, that is, it must be adverse. Unless coupled with the
continuous possession of the property for more than 50 years element of hostility towards the true owner, possession, however long, will
10. Trial court rejected BoMedCo’s defense of prior ownership but held that not confer title by prescription
BoMedCo had been in possession of Lot No. 954 in good faith for more than  An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal
10 years thus, it has already acquired ownership of the same under Article immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain
620 of the Civil Code from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property, for
11. CA reversed the ruling of the lower court, the benefit of another thing or person.
a. holding that BoMedCo only acquired an easement of right of way o It exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to
by unopposed and continuous use of the land, but not ownership, two different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an
under Article 620 of the Civil Code incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto.
b. Bomedco’s claim of a prior sale to it by Feliciana Santillan was Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an
untrue. Its possession being in bad faith, the applicable admission that the property belongs to another
prescriptive period in order to acquire ownership over the land  In this case, for several years 1930, 1937, 1949, 1962 and 1963, petitioner
was 30 years under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. unequivocally declared the property to be a "central railroad right of way"
c. Adverse possession of the property started only in 1965 when or "sugar central railroad right of way" in its real estate tax receipts when it
Bomedco registered its claim in the cadastral survey of Medellin. could have declared it to be "industrial land" as it did for the years 1975
Since only 24 years from 1965 had elapsed when the heirs filed a and 1985.
complaint against Bomedco in 1989, Bomedco’s possession of the o Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, these receipts showed
land had not yet ripened into ownership. that all petitioner had was possession by virtue of the right of way
granted to it. Were it not so and petitioner really owned the land,
12. Petitioner Bomedco reiterates its claim of  petitioner would not have consistently used the phrases "central
a. ownership of the land through extraordinary acquisitive railroad right of way" and "sugar central railroad right of way" in
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code and  its tax declarations until 1963. Certainly an owner would have
b. laches to defeat the claim for compensation or recovery of found no need for these phrases
possession by respondent heirs  Having held the property by virtue of an easement, petitioner cannot now
c. acquisition of the easement of right of way by prescription under assert that its occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of an owner.
Article 620 of the Civil Code. Neither can it declare that the 30-year period of extraordinary acquisitive
prescription started from that year.
ISSUES:
1. Whether BoMedCo acquired ownership through extraordinary acquisitive ISSUE 2: Whether the expiration of the period of easement convert
prescription under art. 1137 of the Civil Code – NO possession into an adverse one? – NO
14
  Petitioner, maintains that even if a servitude was merely imposed on the b. opportunity to sue defendant after obtaining such
property in its favor, its possession immediately became adverse to the knowledge and
owner in the late 1950’s when the grant was alleged by respondent heirs to c. delay in the filing of such suit.
have expired. It stresses that, counting from the late 1950’s (1959 as  Records show that respondent heirs only learned about petitioner’s claim
found by the trial court), the 30-year extraordinary acquisitive prescription on their property when they discovered the inscription for the cadastral
had already set in by the time respondent heirs made a claim against it in survey in the records of the Bureau of Lands in 1989. Respondents lost no
their letters dated March 1 and April 6, 1989. time in demanding an explanation for said claim in their letters to the
 The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioner dated March 1, 1989 and April 6, 1989. When petitioner ignored
petitioner’s possession into an adverse one. Mere material possession of them, they instituted their complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to Cebu City on June 8, 1989.
vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess
as an owner. There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised ISSUE 4: Whether petitioner BoMedCo acquired ownership by virtue of
under such circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the Acquisition of Easement by Right of Way Art. 620 of the Civil Code? - NO
possession is under a claim of right.  Rule  Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue
 In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or conduct by petitioner of a title or by prescription of ten years.
sugar mill from which an adverse claim can be implied, its possession of o What lower courts said  that the railroad right of way was,
the lot can only be presumed to have continued in the same character as according to them, continuous and apparent in nature due to the
when it was acquired (that is, it possessed the land only by virtue of the more or less permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent and
original grant of the easement of right of way), or was by mere license or they continuously occupied the subject strip of land from 1959.
tolerance of the owners (respondent heirs).  What SC said  Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the
o It is a fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of use of vehicles or the passage of persons is permanently cemented or
possessory character executed by virtue of license or tolerance of asphalted, then the right of way over it becomes continuous in nature. The
the owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the reasoning is erroneous.
period of prescription.  What is a “continuous” v. “discontinuous “easement?
 The only time petitioner assumed a legal position adverse to respondents’ o Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either
was when it filed a claim over the property in 1965 during the cadastral continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are
survey of Medellin. Since then (1965) and until the filing of the complaint exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or
for the recovery of the subject land before the RTC of Cebu in 1989, only physical indications of the existence of such easements.
24 years had lapsed o Ex. Thus, an easement is continuous if its use is, or may be,
incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the
ISSUE 3: Can the doctrine of laches apply to defeat the claim for easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at
compensation or recovery of possession by respondent heirs? – NO intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of
 The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and right of way.
unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could o The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because
or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody
the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or declined to assert it. else’s land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an
NOT MERE LAPSE OF TIME OR DELAY easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous
 The essential elements of laches are: because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by
1. conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom a person passes over another's property. In other words, the
he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or
2. delay in asserting complainant’s rights after he had intervention of man which is the very essence of
knowledge of defendant’s acts and after he has had the discontinuous easements.
opportunity to sue;  Physical indications relate only whether easement is “Apparent” v.
3. lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the “non-apparent”, not whether it is continuous easement which will
complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; give right to ownership by acquisition by way of easement by right
and of way. It is the manner of the exercise of the easement which
4. injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is categorizes easement as continuous or discontinuous.
accorded to the complainant  Discontinuous easements may only be acquired by title, not
 The second element (which in turn has three aspects) is lacking in the case prescription.
at bar. These aspects are: o The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not
a. knowledge of defendant's action, in any way convert the nature of an easement of right of way to
one that is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or
15
 physical indications showing the existence of an easement, but demand of the heirs. Furthermore, it tenaciously insists on ownership
rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such thereof despite a clear showing to the contrary.
easement into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of
physical or visual signs only classifies an easement
into apparent or non-apparent. 
o Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which
evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while Please find attached draft for our manifestation.
an easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-
apparent.

ON DISCONTINUOUS EASEMENT ACQUISITION:

 In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner’s
trains denotes the existence of an apparent but discontinuous easement of
right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous
easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by title.
o Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title over
the use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation,
testamentary succession or contract.
o Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its
acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622, the
discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be
acquired by title and not by prescription
 But WHEN IS A PARTY DEEMED TO ACQUIRE TITLE OVER
THE  USE  OF SUCH LAND (that is, title over the easement of right of
way)? In at least two cases, we held that if:

(a) it had subsequently entered into a contractual right of way with the

heirs for the continued use of the land under the principles of voluntary
easements or NPC v Tiangco
(b) it had filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a legal
easement of right of way under Article 629 of the Civil Code, then title over FACTS
the use of the land is deemed to exist.
1. Respondents are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 152,187 sq.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 629 is
meters at Brgy. Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.
subject to proof of the following:
1. it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway; 2. NPC is a GOCC created for the purpose of undertaking the development and
2. payment of proper indemnity; generation of power from whatever source. NPC’s charter authorizes the
3. the isolation is not the result of its own acts; and corporation to acquire private property and exercise the right of eminent
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the domain.
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, the
distance from the dominant estate to the highway is the
3. NPC requires 19,423 sq. meters of respondent’s property for its Kalayaan
shortest.
San Jose Transmission Line Project. NPC’s Segregation Plan for the purpose
 None of the above options to acquire title over the railroad right of way
shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents’ land, in
was ever pursued by petitioner despite the fact that simple resourcefulness
such a manner that 33,392 square meters thereof will be left separated from
demanded such initiative, considering the importance of the railway tracks
99,372 square meters of the property. Within the portion sought to be
to its business.
expropriated stand fruit-bearing trees.
 No doubt, it is unlawfully occupying and using the subject strip of land as a
railroad right of way without valid title yet it refuses to vacate it even after

16
 4. After repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents, NPC filed with 1. WON value of the land should be based on the 1993 valuation. - NO
the RTC of Tanay a complaint for expropriation against them. 2. WON NPC should be limited to paying 10% of the market value of the land
considering that the purpose is merely for the establishment of a safe and
free passage for its overhead transmission lines. - NO
5. The trial court granted NPC the right to take possession of the area sought
to be expropriated.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED in part in that the decision of the
6. The RTC ordered the parties to nominate their respective commissioners to Court of Appeals dated March 14, 2005 vis a vis the award of ₱116,538.00, as and
determine the amount of just compensation. by way of just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of the respondents’
property, is SET ASIDE, and the case is ordered REMANDED to the court of origin
7. The trial court directed NPC to pay and deposit P81,204 as temporary for the proper determination of the amount of just compensation for the portion
provisional value of the area. According to the municipal assessor, the value thus taken, based on our pronouncements hereon. The same decision, however, is
of the respondent’s property is P21,000 per hectare. AFFIRMED, insofar as it pertains to the award of ₱325,025.00 for the improvements,
with legal interest from the time of actual possession by the petitioner.

8. Commissioner for the respondents pegged the price of the area at P30 per HELD
sqm or P582,690 in the aggregate and P2,093,950 for the improvements. ISSUE 1:WON value of the land should be based on the 1993 valuation. - NO
The respondents valued the area at P600,600 and P4,935,500 for the  In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the
improvements. complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in
this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the
9. NPC filed an amended complaint to acquire only 19,423 sqm of the original complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in
20,220 sqm. determining the just compensation due the respondent
 It was certainly unfair for the trial court to have considered a
property value several years behind its worth at the time the
10. For its part, NPC made it clear that it is interested only in acquiring an complaint in this case was filed on November 20, 1990. The
easement of right-of-way over the respondent’s property and that ownership landowners are necessarily shortchanged, considering that, as a
of that area shall remain with the respondents. For this reason, NPC claims rule, land values enjoy steady upward movement. It was likewise
that it should pay, in addition to the adjudged value of the improvements erroneous for the appellate court to have fixed the value of the
only an easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the property property on the basis of a 1993 assessment. NPC would be paying
as declared by the respondents or by the municipal assessor, whichever is too much. Petitioner corporation is correct in arguing that the
lower. respondents should not profit from an assessment made years
after the taking.
11. The trial court made a determination that the market value of the property is
P2.09 per sqm or P40,594.07 and it also found as reasonable the amount of  Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
P324,750 offered by NPC for the improvements. property taken from its owner by the expropriator. In this case,
this simply means the property’s fair market value at the time of
12. Neither did the trial court consider NPC’s reliance on Section 3-A of Republic the filing of the complaint, or "that sum of money which a person
Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree 938, the court placing desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
more weight on the respondents’ argument that expropriation would result in compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and
the substantial impairment of the use of the area needed, even though what received therefor." The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the
is sought is a mere aerial right-of-way. owner’s loss.

13. The CA disregarded the P2.09 per sqm valuation of the trial court which was  In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the
based on a 1984 tax declaration and placed reliance upon a 1993. assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values
determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee; these
values consist but one factor in the judicial valuation of the
14. The CA increased the compensation for the land to P116,538 and
property
improvements to P325,025.

o  The nature and character of the land at the time of its

ISSUE
taking is the principal criterion for determining how much
just compensation should be given to the landowner
17
 o  All the facts as to the condition of the property and its o Moreover, not to be discounted is the fact that the high-tension
surroundings, as well as its improvements and current to be conveyed through said transmission lines evidently
capabilities, should be considered. poses a danger to life and limb; injury, death or destruction to life
and property within the vicinity.
ISSUE 2
 In several cases, the Court struck down NPC’s consistent reliance on o As the Court held in NPC v. Chiong, it is not improper to assume
Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree that NPC will erect structures for its transmission lines within the
938.  property. What is sought to be expropriated in this case is, at its
 True, an easement of a right-of-way transmits no rights except the longest extent, 326.34 meters, and through it may be built
easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of the several structures, not simply one.
property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not gratis.
The limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite period
 Finally, if NPC were to have its way, respondents will continue to pay the
would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the
realty taxes due on the affected portion of their property, an imposition
latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither
that, among others, merits the rejection of NPC’s thesis of payment of a
more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken.
mere percentage of the property’s actual value.

 While the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of

title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, no cogent reason
appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden
upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and
possession.  

 However

o if the easement is intendedto perpetually or indefinitely deprive

the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of
conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and
disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that
are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership,

o or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their

nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or
destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary,
then the owner should be compensated for the monetary
equivalent of the land, in accordance with our ruling in NPC v.
Manubay Agro-Industrial:

 As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature

and the effect of the installation power lines, the
limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite
period would deprive respondent of normal use of
the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to
payment of a just compensation, which must be neither
more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.21

 The evidence suggests that NPC’s transmission line project that traverses
the respondents’ property is perpetual, or at least indefinite, in nature.

18
 6. The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had no
knowledge that the tree was already dead and rotting and that Lerios
merely informed her that he was going to buy the tree for firewood.

a. It ruled that petitioner exercised the degree of care and vigilance

which the circumstances require and that there was an absence of
evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of care
more than that required by the attendant circumstances.

7. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled that petitioner
should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting and
that no matter how hectic her schedule was,. And that the Court of
Appeals ruled that the dead caimito tree was a nuisance that
should have been removed soon after petitioner had chanced
upon

ISSUE: WON petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin -YES
Cardaña.

HELD:
NUISANCE

1. As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the

Capili v. Cardaña (NOV 2, 2006)
school’s premises.
a. The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the
FACTS dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the
responsibility demanded by her position.
2. A negligent act is an inadvertent act;
1. On Feb 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence of
it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may
the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located
be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another
within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death.
because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or
2. Her parents then filled a case for damages before RTC against petitioner
a force of nature.
Capili, who was the school principal of San Roque Elementary School.
A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s
position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an
3. The parents averred that petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of foresight
appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to
caused the death of their daughter. They stress that a year prior to the
do it in a more careful manner.
incident, a resident of the barangay, Lerios, reported on the possible
danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner
the tree that stood near the principal’s office, that she could have known
that the tree was dead and rotting. 3. The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and
harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable.
4. The Cardañas averred that petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of
foresight caused the death of their daughter.
a. As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the
maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children
5. CAPILI denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only
within the school and its premises.
offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was dead
and rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses who attested that
she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a b. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling
meeting on and assigned Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale. branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge
of the responsibility of her position.

19
 4. Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence:

(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;

(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for
whose act he must respond; and

(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and
the damages incurred.

5. The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of

the dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree
was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for
application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

6. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption

or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting
tree, which caused the death of respondents’ daughter, was a result of
petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the school.

Supreme court ordered Capili to indemnify the parents for negligence

resulting to the death of Cardaña and deleted the moral damages.
Because CApili was neither motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis-à-
vis respondents’ daughter’s death. The award of moral damages is
therefore not proper.

20