The First Russian Revolution and It's Impact On Asia

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"1'he first Russi.an revolution:

its irxcact on Asia. Snglewood
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THE FIRST
RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
ITS IMPACT ON ASIA
Ivor Spector
A SPECTRUM BOOK
Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

1962 by
PRENTICE-HALL, INC.
ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be repro-

duced in any form, by mimeograph or any other means,
without permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress
Catalog Card No.: 62-9312
Printed in the United States of America

Preface
This work, to the author's knowledge, is the first attempt to

interpretfrom the Western vantage point the impact of the Russian
Revolution of 1905 on Asia.
In the Soviet Union, some pioneer work was undertaken in the
mid-Nineteen Twenties and appeared in such publications as
Novyi Vostok (The New Orient), Krasnaia Letopis (Red Almanac),
and Krasnyi Arkhiv (Red Archives). During the same period two
poems, "Lieutenant Shmidt" (1926) and "1905" (1927), by the late
Russian poet, Boris Pasternak, reflected Soviet interest in the field.
Aside from this beginning, however, the field was relatively neglected
until 1954, largely because the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the
so-called October Revolution, overshadowed it.
In anticipation of the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution of
1905, a virtual avalanche of books, articles, pamphlets, albums,
and documentary materials was published in the Soviet Union from
1954 to 1955, and more of the same had to be held over until 1956.
From 1950 to 1955, in Soviet higher schools of learning, more than
150 dissertations were devoted to this First Russian Revolution.
With the exception of these Soviet sources, there is no compre-
hensive definition of the Revolution of 1905 and its impact on the
Orient. Because this Revolution was national in scope, it had a
strong appeal, both inside Russia and abroad, stronger
in many
respects than the October Revolution of 1917. The 1905 Revolution,

which emphasized politicalfreedom and constitutional government
for Russia, appealed to many parties and classes, whereas the Bol-
shevik Revolution, which stressed social transformation, called for
the dictatorship of one class, the proletariat, and of one party, the
Communist. The real strength of the Revolution of 1905 lay in the
absence of messianic zeal on the part of its leaders to disseminate
any
its was the example of Russia that counted. Most
ideas abroad. It
Western historians have emphasized the impact of Anglo-French
constitutional democracy on Asia to the exclusion of the Russian
6303272
viii Preface
constitutional movement, although the latter was much closer to the
experience of Asian countries and in some instances its influence

was more direct. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to fill this
For lack of other sources, the Soviet interpretation of the Revo-

lution of 1905 is now having its own impact on the Asian intelli-
gentsia. To offset this Soviet distortion, I have sought to provide a

fresh theoretical interpretation of the impact of the First Russian
Revolution, based largely on primary sources. The study covers the
impact of 1905 on Asian nationalist movements which, with few
exceptions, have had much more in common with the Russian
Revolution of 1905 than with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
The chief emphasis has been placed on Turkey, Iran, China, and
India, where the impact was strongest.
The significance of the Revolution of 1905 is that it marked a
turning point in Russian influence upon Asia. Prior to 1905, strictly
speaking, there was no ideological or cultural impact of Russia on
Asia. By Asian Muslims especially, Russia was viewed as an aggressor
and an enemy of Islam. The 1905 Revolution, as indicated in this
work, contributed substantially to the awakening of nationalism
and the development of constitutional government in Asia. With
the advent of the Soviet regime, the ideological impact became so-
great that it was feared even more than Russian territorial ex-
pansion.
The First Russian Revolution (1905), the so-called "dress re-
hearsal" for 1917, therefore provides the indispensable background
for an understanding of the October Revolution.
This work was undertaken with the assistance of a grant from

the Rockefeller Foundation in 1959. I am also indebted to the staffs
of the Hoover Library, Stanford University, and the Slavic Division,
Library of Congress, for generous aid in locating and duplicating
materials essential to the preparation of the manuscript. I owe a
special debt of gratitude to Dr. Jung-pang Lo of the Far Eastern

and Russian Institute, University of Washington, for his invaluable
help in connection with Chinese sources pertaining to the Russian

Revolution of 1905.
IVAR SPECTOR
University of WasMngton
Table of Contents
Chapters
ONE The Revolution of 1905: A Definition i
TWO Asia 29
THREE Iran 8
FOUR The Ottoman Empire 51

FIVE China 77
six India 94
SEVEN Conclusions no
Appendixes
ONE Petition of the Workers and Residents of St. Peters-
burg for Submission to Nicholas II on January 9, 1905 117

TWO "The Revolution of 1905 and the East"
by M. Pavlovitch . . m
THREE The Manifesto of October 17/30, 1905 ...... 145
Notes H9
Bibliography .
163
Index 177
The unabridged Russian text of the Manifesto issued by Nicholas

II on October 17/50, 1905, appears on page 144.
CHAPTER ONE
The Revolution of 1905
A Definition
"Dear blood brethren* the bullets of the Imperial soldiers

have killed our faith in the Tsar. Let's take vengeance on him
and on his entire family. Vengeance on all his ministers and
on all the exploiters of Russian soil. Go, pillage the Imperial
palaces! All the soldiers and officers who killed our innocent
wives and children, all the tyrants, all the oppressors of the
Russian people, I herewith smite with my priestly curse."
FATHER GEORGE GABON in a
speech delivered on the evening of
Bloody Sunday.
"To the palace they crept as petitioners.

From the palace they returned as avengers.''
DEMYAN BEDNY
With the exception of Soviet sources, there is no up-to-date

definition of the Russian Revolution of 1905. The official
Soviet definition and, the one universally accepted by Soviet
scholars in the U.S.S.R., irrespective of the emphasis on bour-
geois or Bolshevik leadership is that it was a "bourgeois demo-

cratic revolution/* In view of the facts that the Russian econ-
omy of that period was basically agrarian and that the agrarian
problem emerged as the real essence of the Revolution, most

Soviet scholars admit that it was, at the same time, a "peasant
revolution." Perhaps because of the agrarian nature of the
nineteenth-century Chinese economy, Western historians have

found it equally baffling to define the Taiping Rebellion (1850-
2 The Revolution of 1905
1864). A careful analysis of the programs of the leading Russian

political parties at the beginning of the twentieth century,
which represented a cross-section of the entire
population,
including the minorities, indicates that no matter how divergent
were their views on other issues, all demanded the end of
autocratic government and the adoption of a constitution. To
this extent, the Revolution of 1905 was a "people's revolution";
its target, a constitution.

Members of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, in their
introduction to a comprehensive collection of source materials
on the beginning of the first Russian Revolution, summed up
the situation as follows:
The unique feature of the Russian bourgeois democratic

revolution consisted primarily in the fact that it was basi-
cally an agrarian peasant problem. Therefore, the peasantry,
together with the proletariat, was the moving force in the
Russian bourgeois revolution. The active participation in
the bourgeois democratic revolution of these two classes
the proletariat and the peasantry transformed the Russian
Revolution into a people's revolution. 1
"Bloody Sunday" (January g/%2, 1905) marked the beginning

of the Russian Revolution of 1905. On that day, Father George
Gapon led a crowd of several thousand people, most of them

workers, to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to petition
Nicholas II to ameliorate their plight. The petition, which was
signed by Father Gapon, a priest, and by Ivan Vasimov, a
worker, called for a constituent assembly representative of all
classes to makeprovision for free universal education, recogni-

tion of civil rights, and regulation of relations between capital
and labor.2 It asked for
an eight-hour working day, an increase
in workeis* wages of up to one ruble per day, and better work-
ing conditions. The petitioners, in a spirit o humility rather

The Revolution of 1905 3
than of arrogance, sought to break through the "Iron Curtain"
erected by the bureaucracy and by big business which separated
them from the Emperor, confident that he would administer
justice once he became aware o their plight.
This was a unique demonstration, in effect a religious pro-
cession, in which crowds of unarmed men, women, and children,
bearing ikons and portraits of the Emperor and Empress,

chanted Russian hymns and patriotic songs as they marched
toward the Winter Palace. Even police officers joined the
crowd, making the sign of the cross as they did so.

Had Nicholas II or his representative received the petition
and promised to give it careful consideration, the crowd, in all
probability, would have dispersed as peacefully as it assembled,
and the crisis would have passed, at least temporarily. Instead,
the Imperial Guard, upon by Vladimir
instructions issued
Alexandrovitch, uncle of the Tsar, opened on the unarmed

fire
masses, killing from 75 to 1,000 and wounding from 200 to

2,ooo. The discrepancy in the figures appears to be due in
3
part to the fact that some eyewitnesses reported only what

happened at the Winter Palace, or on that particular Sunday,
whereas the disturbance continued until January 11.* A
committee composed of outstanding lawyers, including A.
Turchaninov, M. Vinaver, O. Gruzenberg, V. Lyustik, A. Pass-
over, P. Potekhin, L, Slonimsky, and V. Planskon, who investi-
gated the incident, was unable to obtain from the police or the
4
military any estimate of the number of victims.
The extent of the atrocities was credited in part to the fury
of the Cossacks, who, because of the demonstration, were com-
pelled to remain on duty during three days of unremitting

cold. They vented their displeasure, especially on the third
* In this
chapter, all dates are according to the Julian calendar (O.S.), which
was used in Russia until February 14, 1918. In the twentieth century, the
Julian calendar is thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar (N.S.).
day, by wanton attacks on people in the streets, in particular
on students and suppressing the demonstration

intellectuals. By
with ferocity, they hoped to discourage any repetition of the
incident.
Some members of the higher aristocracy condoned the atroci-
All too representative of their outlook was the statement
ties.
made by one of their number to a visiting Frenchman:
Quand les enfants ne sont pas sages, il faut bien commencer

par les fouetter. 5
The significance of Bloody Sunday can hardly be overesti-

mated. The act of terrorism against a helpless crowd of peti-
tioners accomplished almost overnight what Russian embryonic
political parties might not have achieved for years. It united
the Russian people, at least until the issuing of the October
Manifesto (October 17/30, 1905), in a solid front against the
Tsar and his Government. In other words, it made the Revolu-
tion of 1905 a people's revolution. Even the young revolu-
tionary, V. I. Lenin, appraised the situation with insight:
The revolutionary uprising of the proletariat accomplished

in a single day what would have taken months and years
under the ordinary everyday living conditions of the down-
trodden. 6
The reaction of loyal citizens to Bloody Sunday was reflected

in the telegram of the popular writer and poet, Leon Geldman
Zhdanov, to the Tsar on January 11. An eyewitness to the
incident, Zhdanov implied that the demonstrators were enticed
closer and closer to the palace, where they were trapped and
shot. 7 Although the Tsarist bureaucracy denounced and dis-
owned Father Gapon after Bloody Sunday, it proceeded never-
theless to adopt his tactics. General D. F. Trepov, reporting to
the Governor-General of Moscow, Grand Duke Sergei Alexan-
drovitch, advised the Government to do exactly what the revolu-
tionaries had wished to do. 8
Immediately following his appoint-
ment as Governor-General of St. Petersburg in January 1905,
General Trepov personally received a deputation of workers.
Encouraged by this experiment, he recommended that the Tsar
himself give audience to a more representative delegation. On
January 19, a carefully screened group of thirty-four workers

was received with courtesy and kindness by Nicholas II, who
greeted them individually, asked them about their backgrounds,
and treated them to tea and cookies. During the course of the
interview, the Tsar read the following statement, undoubtedly
prepared by Trepov, which later appeared in the press:
have received you in order to present my own version

I
of what happened during the past few days in the capital.
Remember it and transmit it faithfully to your comrades.
When the blood of my subjects was shed in the streets of
St. Petersburg, my heart bled too from sorrow for the un-
fortunate, the majority of whom were innocent victims of

the disturbances that took place. Those who are guilty
of this are traitors and thieves, who deceived you and whom
you your own ruin.
trusted, to
with the exception of a handful of unfit
I believe that,
and good-for-nothing people, the majority of the workers
have been, are, and will remain sincere members of the
Russian Orthodox faith, who love God, the Tsar and the
Fatherland, loyal sons of Russia, who forgive wrongdoing.
The life of a working man Is difficult. There is a great
deal that must be improved, also much to be done to
ameliorate and to regulate his living conditions.
know this. I think and worry about all of you, and I
I
shall make arrangements in such a manner that all of your
legitimate needs will be satisfied, with due consideration

also for the rights of your employers.
I will see to it that both the employers and the workers
6 The Revolution of
always will have the legal right to state their needs and that
nobody ever shall be injured and wronged. And now return
to your factories and foundries and with God's blessing
return to work.
Remember that Russia is fighting a strong foreign enemy.
Every Russian, irrespective of rank or station,

who is not
a traitor to his country, must work harmoniously for the
common cause, and then God will grant us victory.9
inviting the workers to Tsarskoe Selo, the Tsar accom-

By
plished, in effect, what Father Gapon had tried to achieve on
January 9. The main purpose of the march to the Winter
Palace was to bring the workers of St. Petersburg closer to the
Tsar. Had Nicholas II made his speech on January 9, instead
of two weeks later, in probability the grateful workers would
all
have dispersed peacefully and violence could have been avoided.

After the Bloody Sunday incident, however, his gesture proved
to be too little and too late. The Tsar made no reference to a
constitution, his promises were general rather than specific,
and the dead could not be resurrected.
Nicholas II nevertheless appeared to be satisfied with the
meeting and with General Trepov for having arranged it. In a
subsequent letter to his mother, Maria Federovna, he paid
tribute to Trepov one who performed the role of an "ir-
as
replaceable secretary" and who had proved to be "experienced,

10
witty, and cautious in his advice."
the events of Bloody Sunday had such widespread
yone reason
repercussions was that they occurred in St. Petersburg, the
Russian capital. Where centralization of political power exists,
as in Russia, the capital sets the tone for the rest of the country.
Had this incident occurred in Kharkov, Tomsk, or Odessa, it is
unlikely that would have evoked such an emotional storm.
it
The Lena gold mine massacre of April 4, 1912, in which 270

workers were killed and 250 wounded, aroused the Social
Democrats, but failed to precipitate a revolution. In 1913, when

the gooth anniversary of the Romanov dynasty was celebrated
throughout Russia, the incident was all but forgotten.

Prior to Bloody Sunday, the bulk of the Russian people
appear to have had no intent to overthrow the monarchy. Their

articulate leaders sought rather to preserve it under a constitu-
tion. Maxim Gorky termed Father Gapon an opportunist whos
object was to become a leader of the workers under a monarchist
banner. This Gapon did not deny.f JHe and others like him
sought reform from above to prevent revolution from below.
Before organizing the demonstration at the Winter Palace, he
had tried ineffectually to obtain redress from the Putilov fac-
tory administration, the city governor, and the Ministry of the
Interior. 11 He substantiated his position in a letter to Count
Witte on January 6, igo$. 12
Father Gapon whose name is identified with Bloody Sunday
was the son of hard-working peasants of Ukrainian Cossack
origin who lived in the small town of Belyaki, Kobelyak County,
in the province of Poltava. His father, a literate man, for thirty
consecutive years was elected to serve as county clerk. George,
the son, began his career as a shepherd, but later became a
priest, having graduated with high honors from Poltava Semi-
nary. During his wanderings, he came into contact with a cross-
section of Russia's "insulted and injured." The plight of the

workers became for him a matter of profound concern. As
chaplain at a deportation center for convicts a position he
owed to the Plehve regime he had a unique opportunity to
acquaint himself with the outlook of Russian political prisoners.
It was during time that he pondered what the Orthodox
this
Church could and should do to alleviate the misery of these

unfortunate persons and to avert the violent upheaval which
their condition seemed likely to produce.
"I must state frankly/' concluded Gapon, "that if the Church
does not identify itself with the people, the pastor will soon
remain without a flock. Already, the entire intelligentsia, which
exercises an influence upon the people, has left the Church. And
if we now fail to extend help to the masses, they too will aban-
13
don us."
Father Gapon made every effort to convince the heads of
the Russian Orthodox Church in St. Petersburg and elsewhere
of the soundness of his position. His role as a priest, the fresh-
ness of his views, and his obvious sincerity gave him access to
Government leaders, including Tchizhov, the factory inspector

for Petersburg Province; General I. A. Fullon, Governor of St.
Petersburg; Sergei Zubatov, Colonel of the Gendarmes, whose

program for the workers has been labelled "police socialism";
and Pobiedonostsev, Procurator of the Holy Synod. Because of
these associations, Lenin expressed some uncertainty as to the
real motives of Father Gapon. He was inclined to believe, how-
ever, that the priest was a sincere religious socialist, who per-
mitted himself to become a tool of Zubatov. 14
With the help of the police, Gapon began to organize what
he called the Assemblies of the Workers of St. Petersburg. The
Assemblies were his version of Russian trade unions. Their
meetings began and ended with prayers for the Tsar and for
Russia. The strongest of these associations was organized at the
Putilov Arms Plant, which employed 13,000 workers and which
was said to rank next in size among munitions plants to Arm-
strong Vickers and Krupp. Gapon brought representatives of

the police and the military to address his workers' organizations.
If the police as some have alleged used him as a tool, it
appears that he did likewise with them. The substance of his
teaching was that the workers could best ameliorate their
plight by peaceful means, by cooperation with the authorities,
rather than by violence.
Through his Assemblies, Father Gapon managed to get his

The Revolution of 1905 g
workers to pursue cooperative methods for their mutual assist-
ance, especially in regard to the issuing of loans, relief work,

and so forth. Gapon himself claimed to have spent virtually
his entire salary as chaplain (2,000 rubles) on this labor move-
ment. His success was such that it aroused concern among the
Social Democrats and Social Revolutionists, whose object was
the forcible overthrow of the existing regime. On tl\e eve of
the Bloody Sunday uprising, S. I. Gusev explained to Lenin
that not only elderly workers but also "enlightened"" workers
of the Social Democratic Party, organized jworkers, and even
some intellectuals from the Social Democratic organizations
regarded Father Gapon as an idealist. 15
Gapon's popularity was strengthened by his espousal of the

eight-hour working day. In 1897 an eleven, and one-half hour
day had been established by law. Certain loopholes providing
for overtime, however, resulted in what amounted in practice
to a fourteen or fifteen-hour day for the average worker, under
deplorable working conditions. In a situation where parents

rarely saw their children or wives their husbands, one of the
main issues was a shorter working day.
At this time, Father Gapon appeared to be fully convinced
of the integrity of the Tsar, whose failure to improve Russian
working conditions he attributed to ignorance. Since the Tsar

was influenced by the well-organized upper classes, including
the bureaucracy, Gapon' s solution was the organization of the
workers, that they might exert a comparable influence on the
monarch. The Tsar would then become a just and impartial
Russian people as a whole.
ruler, of the
tyThus, Gapon's mission was

threefold: to improve the plight
of the workers by peaceful means, without adopting the pro-
professional revolutionists which called

for vio-
gram of the
lence; to save the monarchy by broadening the base on which
it rested; and to see that the Church assumed the leadership in
10 The Revolution of
the labor movement, thereby implementing the teachings of

Christ.
This view of Gapon's objectives was not shared by some high-
placed administrators in the Tsarist Government. V. I. Gurko,
Assistant Minister of the Interior and a member of the Russian
State Council, believed that Gapon's real purpose was to
estrange the workers from the monarchy:
There is no doubt that the demonstration of January 9

was arranged by Gapon and his allied revolutionists in
order to make the workers hostile to the Tsar. Yet so well
had Gapon masked his real purpose that the workers did
not suspect it.
16
doubtful whether Father Gapon, as Gurko alleged, was

It is
allied with the Social Democrats and Social Revolutionists, or,

have contended, that he was a tool of the gendarmerie.
as others
Had he been allied with the Socialists, it is unlikely that he
would have been trapped and hanged in an empty building on
the outskirts of Terioki, Finland, in 1906 by one of the leaders
of the Social Revolutionists, Peter M. Rutenberg. On the other
hand, had Gapon been a willing tool of the police, he would not
have fled from the country in January, nor would he have
published in the fall of 1905 an immediate and unqualified
denunciation of the pogroms against the Jews, instituted by
the Government following the October Manifesto. 17
With Bloody Sunday, Gapon's mission collapsed like a house
of cards. Gapon himself was accused, both by the masses and
by Government supporters, of betraying his cause. His escape
from Russia left the disillusioned factory workers an easy prey
to the Social Democrats and Social Revolutionists from whom
he had sought to save them. The police and the bureaucracy
held him responsible for the uprising which they had relied
upon him to prevent. Under the Soviet regime, the aspersions
cast on his reputation have been perpetuated, and an objective

consideration of Gapon's role and purposes has therefore been
however, it is the general consensus that the
lacking. Today,
Russian Revolution of 1905 began with Bloody Sunday. In
view of Gapon's leading role in organizing the demonstration
that culminated in this catastrophe, it is perhaps no exaggera-
tion to regard him as the priest that made the Revolution of
1905.
Under the devastating impact of the failure of his mission,
it is quite possible that his outlook changed radically, as has
been true of many others in time of crisis, and that he was
guilty of some of the charges levied against
him. There seems
little reason to doubt, however, that prior to Bloody Sunday
he was fully devoted to the cause of the workers, to the Tsar,

and to the Church. It is ironic that this man, whose objective
was to improve the lot of the working masses without revolu-
tion,should spark the Revolution of 1905.
Bloody Sunday was followed by an epidemic of strikes
throughout Russia. There was nothing unusual about the
use
of the strike as a weaponof protest against factory owners and
^the bureaucracy. In a country where there was no freedom of

Social Demo-
'assembly, the strike was the classic weapon of the
crats. It brought the workers out into the streets, where demon-
strations could be organized.
Russian strikes must be sharply differentiated from those
that occurred in Western Europe and the United States at the
beginning of the twentieth century. Where political freedom in

the were motivated
large measure had been achieved,
strikes
primarily by economic
and social considerations. In Tsarist
Russia, however, although the immediate occasion was likely
to be economic, strikes almost inevitably assumed a political
aspect.
the decade preceding the
According to Lenin, throughout
Revolution of 1905 there had been an average of 43,000 workers

on strike each year in Russia. 18 Strikes had been increasing
during the three years prior to this uprising. The Putilov
factory strike in St. Petersburg, January 3, 1905, which led to

the demonstration at the Winter Palace, resulted from the
discharge of four workers affiliated with a factory workers'

association. The atrocities connected with Bloody Sunday, how-
ever,outraged public opinion, and the epidemic of strikes
which followed may be regarded as a national protest against
the Government. In January 1905 alone, 440,000 workers went
on strike more than for the entire decade of 1895-1905. For
the three months of 1905, according to Soviet sources,
first
810,000 industrial workers went on strike about twice as

many as for the previous decade. 19 Tlôml^^jnaber of strikers
in Russia during 1905 was estimated to be 2,800,000.
The indignation of workers over the Bloody Sunday episode
was by no means confined to Russia. As a result of the Russo-
Japanese War, the Tsarist Government was highly unpopular
abroad, especially in England, the ally of Japan, and in the
United The arrest in Riga on January 11, 1905, of
States.
the writer Maxim Gorky, who had participated in the Winter

Palace demonstration and addressed a public gathering the
same evening, provided the occasion for protest meetings and
strikes among workers in various parts of the world. Tsarist
diplomats from France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and South

America reported workers' demonstrations and protest meetings
against the Russian Government's action and against Gorky's
imprisonment at Petropavlovsk, An
20
association of American
writers, under the presidency of Oscar Strauss, wired Nicholas
imprisonment. In London^ the Society of
II to protest Gorky's
the Friends of Russian Freedom, supported by the Fabian
Society, the London Trades Council, and other organizations,

demonstrated their sympathy for the victims of Bloody Sunday
at amass meeting in Queen's Hall and undertook to raise funds
for their benefit. Under the impact of public opinion abroad
the Tsarist gendarmes removed Gorky from Petropavlovsk
prison on February 12 and two days later released him on

10,000 rubles bail, with the understanding that he leave the
capital.
A
careful analysis of the strikes in the spring and summer
of 1905 in Russia indicates that they gave rise to the Soviets, or
councils of workers' deputies. 21 In fact, the committees formed
to lead the strikers provided the nucleus for the Soviets. One of
the first Soviets, established on May
5, 1905, developed out of
the committee of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk strikers. This served
as a pattern for Soviets elsewhere, which mushroomed as a
result of the general strike in October 1905 and in subsequent
months.
Soviet scholars have admitted the nonparty origin of the
1905 Soviets. For instance, during the October disturbances,

when Petersburg soviet was established, Lenin was still
the St.
an emigre. Mensheviks, such as Khrustalev-Nosar, Trotsky, and

Parvus, among others, assumed the initiative in creating the
soviet. On October 13/26, 1905, an election of soviet workers'
deputies was held in all the factories and foundries of St. Peters-
burg. On October 15/28, the establishment of the St. Peters-
burg Soviet of Workers' Deputies was announced. Moscow
followed the example of the capital on October 22/November
4. Throughout Russia in 1905 approximately eighty Soviets of
workers" deputies were created, including twenty-four in Octo-

ber, twenty-nine in November, and eighteen in February 1906.
In December 1905, a soviet of soldiers* deputies was formed in
Moscow, and a soviet of sailors', workers', and soldiers' deputies
in Sevastopol. At the peak of the Revolution, on December

3/16, 1905, about 200 members of the St. Petersburg soviet
22
were arrested.
The impact of the disturbances in the Russian metropolitan

areas was felt in the countryside. Although communications
were inadequate in a country where peasants depended mainly
on oxen and horses, and where they were inclined to distrust
city folk, the reaction in some rural areas came quickly and
violently.
The Russian peasantry had been agrarian-minded since the
land reforms of the i86o's, but it was not, however, in sympathy
with the objectives of the Social Democrats. The latter soon
realized that the factory workers of the cities could not hope to
attain their objectives without the aid of the peasants, who
constituted the vast majority of the population. Disturbances
throughout rural Russia, according to their calculations, would

draw the police and military away from the urban centers.
By 1905 there were in Russia about 30,000 big landowners
in possession of 70,000,000 desyatinas (one desyatina 2.70
acres) of land. It has been estimated that this minority of land-
owners controlled as much
property as did 10,500,000 peasants.
The average landowner held approximately 2,200 desyatinas of
23
land, whereas the average peasant farmer owned but seven.
The inequality of distribution was clear enough to the peasants,
although they were not in agreement as to the means of rectify-
ing the situation.The propaganda aimed at the peasants in

1905 by the better organized city workers was intended to
convince them that no change could be effected other than by
political means. The peasants who responded, instead of resort-
ing to strikes to bring pressure on the Government as did the
means available to them
city workers, used the only expedient
pillage and violence.

When a wave of revolutionary violence swept the country-
side in the spring and summer of 1905, the Russian Govern-
ment recognizedthat it had two wars on its hands: one against
Japan and the other against the Russian population. It was

sometimes difficult to tell whether there were more soldiers

on the Japanese front in the Far East or on the home front to
suppress internal disturbances. As the situation became aggra-
vated, it was clear that, in order to save the throne, one of the
wars must be liquidated. The Treaty of Portsmouth, Septem-
ber 5, 1905, humiliating as it was to Russian pride, enabled

the Government on its domestic front.
to concentrate
Pressure was brought immediately, even from the most
conservative quarters, for a solution of domestic problems. The
to become
plight of the landowners, for instance, threatened
as serious as that of the landless peasants. As early as January
1903, was
it estimated that 127,400 estates covering an area of
52,600,000 desyatinas of land, were mortgaged to the banks. By
1903, these Russian landowners owed the banks two
billion
gold rubles. In other parts of Russia, more than seventy per

24
cent of the land was mortgaged. Thus, in a country where the

basic economy was agricultural, expropriation or even nationali-
zation of the land threatened doom, not only to the land-
owners but also to the country's bankers. Under such circum-

stances, it was natural that some landowners and bankers should
be in sympathy with certain objectives of the revolutionaries,
and that they should exert pressure upon the Government to
make concessions.
Under the impact of military reverses in the Far East, the
worsening domestic situation, and anti-Russian agitation abroad,

the Russian Government decided to assume the initiative by
granting a measure of political reform. On August 6/19, 1905,

it announced its own program for an Imperial Duma, based
largely on the State Council.
25
Since this program, known as
the Bulygin plan, envisaged neither a constituent nor a legisla-

tive assembly, but merely a consultative body chosen by indirect
election on the basis of a narrowly restricted franchise con-
ferred mainly on landowners, it failed completely to appease
i6 The Revolution of 1905
the opposition or to put a stop to internal disturbances through-

out Russia.
As conditions rapidly deteriorated, Count Witte, then Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers, offered the Tsar two alter-
natives: (i) to think in terms of a constitution, or (2) to invest
a proper person with dictatorial powers to crush all popular
manifestations of discontent. For the second alternative, Witte
recommended Grand Duke Nikolai
the appointment of the
Nikolayevitch. The Grand Duke, however, though no democrat,

supported a constitution, on the ground that Russia's armed
forces were inadequate to accomplish the suppression of the
Revolution. The Tsar capitulated, and on October 15 asked
Witte to draft a Manifesto to provide for the first alternative,
a constitution. The Manifesto was prepared by Prince A. D.
Obolensky, who was Procurator-General of the Synod, under
Witte. It was amended by N. I. Vuitch and Witte. The Tsar
then sent Count Witte's report to General Trepov, who con-
trolled the police of the Russian Empire. Trepov recommended
its publication in abridged form.
Only after these preliminaries
and after two days of painful cogitation, did Nicholas II
sign
the Manifesto. 26 When it was finally published on October
17/30, 1905, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevitch confessed

to Witte his belief that this action had saved the
dynasty. Accord-
Ing to Witte, the Grand Duke reached this conclusion under
the influence of a prominent Russian labor leader, Ushakov. 27
This did not prevent him, however, within a few weeks of the
publication of the Manifesto, from conspiring with members
of the Black Hundred Party to undermine the constitutional
28
regime.
The October Manifesto startled even the most radical Social-
istsby the liberality of its provisions, since it granted most of
the demands of the liberal and moderate elements in
opposi-
tion to the Government. With its
guarantees of personal in-
The Revolution of 15)05 17
violability, freedom of speech and of assembly, as well as of the

right to form unions, the Manifesto was, In effect, a Russian
Bill of Rights. 29 It
broadened materially the franchise provided
by the law of August 6/19, at the same time holding out the
prospect of universal suffrage. In language reminiscent of the
Magna Carta, the Manifesto stated unequivocally "that no law
can become effective without the sanction of the Imperial
Duma/' and guaranteed to the people's representatives the
right to pass upon the legality of action taken by the adminis-
tration.Although did not grant a constituent assembly, it
it
authorized a legislative body and a substantial measure of con-

stitutional government.s yRussians far and wide spontaneously
celebrated the end of autocratic government and there followed
a general relaxation of tension. The Tsar appeared to demon-
strate hisgood faith in regard to the implementation of the
Manifesto by granting a partial amnesty for political prisoners,
by abolishing press censorship, and by relieving peasants of
further redemption payments, once they had remitted fifty
per cent of the amount due in 1906.

In retrospect, it seems that two main factors saved the Tsarist
regime and brought to an end the Revolution of 1905: the
October Manifesto and the return of the Russian armed forces
from the Far East upon the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese
conflict.
Although the Manifesto has been subject to various inter-
pretations, it
appeared to satisfy the vast majority of the Russian
people, especially their most articulate leaders. With few

exceptions, the peasantry, who numbered 70,000,000, were not
political-minded. To them
the Revolution signified more land
and less taxation, but not the overthrow of tsardom. Only the
Social Revolutionists, a minority which claimed to speak for
the peasantry, clamored for the overthrow of the monarchy. The

creation of any sound alliance between the workers and the
i8 The Revolution of 1905
peasants was hampered by the Social Revolutionists (SR's).

These conditions, according to Soviet scholarship, constituted
one of the most important reasons for the defeat of the revolu-
tion. 31
Neither was the vast majority of the middle and upper classes
prepared to remove Nicholas II. To most of them the Manifesto
was an answer to prayer, and they were appeased. Even business-
men like Sawa Morozov who had helped Maxim Gorky finance
the revolutionists did not wish Government control to pass
from the middle class to the proletariat. The extreme Rightists
had already organized to offset the concessions granted and to
restore the autocracy.
Only the Social Democrats and other extreme Leftists rejected
the compromise and continued to raise aloft the banner of

revolution. Although violence continued, and in some cases
spread, the extremists constituted a minority whose program

lacked universal appeal. In 1905 the Bolsheviks, the left wing
of the Social Democrats, numbered only 8,500. They enjoyed
no following among the masses nor among the middle and
upper classes. Without the broad-based support of the other
classes, the revolutionary parties stood no chance of success.
Whether or not the Manifesto represented a conscious effort on

the part of the Government to divide and rule, as Paul N.
Miliukov has contended, in practice this was the result. 32 The
Manifesto split the opposition.
By appeasing the vast majority of the population, the Mani-
festo provided the necessary breathing spell for the Govern-
ment to bring the armed forces back from the Far Eastern
front to deal with the continued disturbances instigated by the
minority of the extremists. Because of war fatigue and disillu-

sionment arising from military defeat, the bulk of the army was
in no mood for revolution. The peasants, who formed the basis
of the armed forces, were eager to return to their villages.33
Although the Manifesto saved the throne, once the revolu-

were crushed, there were many conservatives who
tionists
denounced the concessions as the unwarranted mistake of Count

Witte and the Jews. 34 Among them, especially the Black
Hundreds, were those who engineered the pogroms that
drenched the Manifesto in blood. The opponents of the Mani-
festo, gaining the upper hand with the suppression of the
soon exercised a strong influence over the Emperor.
revolt,
Among the most hostile and influential opponents of the

constitution was the Empress Alexandra Fedorovna who, accord-
ing to Witte, liberally subsidized two ultra-reactionary papers,

Russkoe Znamya and Moskovskiya Vedomosti, mouthpieces of
the Black Hundreds. 35 The Empress herself spread rumors to
the effect that Witte literally wrung the concessions of the
Manifesto from the Tsar.
The Russian Monarchist Party went so far as to claim that
the Emperor's reference to himself as autocrat in the Manifesto
virtually abrogated the constitution, since the two terms were

incompatible. On the other hand, their opponents retorted
that the term autocrat, as applied to Russian rulers after the
breakdown of the Mongol control, signified that the Tsar was
a6
independent of any foreign yoke.
Nicholas II was convinced by his immediate associates that
his greatest mistake in 1905 lay in yielding to pressure, in mak-

ing concessions to the people, and that in any future outbreak
he must stand firm. In 1917, when the great blow was struck,
these associates, led by the Empress, urged the Emperor to
remember 1905 and to make no concessions to the Fourth
Duma. This misinterpretation of the significance of the October
Manifesto in saving the dynasty led to the downfall of the last
of the Romanovs and to the assassination of the Tsar's family,

thus paving the way for the advent of the Soviet Government.
The October Manifesto promised freedom of the press. In
general, the press, including such organs at Natchalo (Social

Democrat), Novaia Zhizn, Syn Otetchestva (Social Revolution-
ist), and Russkoe Bogatstvo, supported
the Revolution and the
October general strike. In the process of suppressing the revolt,
however, the press was restricted. Within one month, from
December 12, 1905, to January 12, 1906, the Government shut
down seventy-eight periodicals in St. Petersburg, Moscow, War-
saw, Lodz, Petrokov, Tiflis, Baku, Piatigorsk, Odessa, Elizavet-
grad, Kharkov, Poltava, Kiev, Novotcherkassk, Perm, Riga, and

Libau. Fifty-eight editors were arrested, most of whom were
freed on bail.37
The October Manifesto had widespread and favorable reper-
cussions abroad, especially in the Western World. The climate
of opinion toward Russia changed appreciably among both
liberals and conservatives. Pope Pius X, on his own initiative,
issued a special Encyclical to Roman Catholic Bishops in
Russia, urging them to use every possible means to pacify the
populace in the Vistula area and to strengthen feelings of loyalty

toward the Emperor among the Polish population. 38
The French Government, in particular, had reason to ap-
prove the stability which it was assumed the new constitutional

regime in Russia would provide. France was not only an ally
of Russia, but was also her creditor. About one-quarter of
French foreign investments, amounting to approximately 12,-
000,000,000 francs, had been placed in Tsarist Russia; the
disorders following Bloody Sunday therefore threatened French
financial interests. In France, moreover, the substantial body
of French Socialists strongly sympathized with the Russian
Revolution.
Improved Russian relations with the West soon led to the
easing of the Tsarist Government's financial crisis. With a

national deficit in 1905 of 481,000,000 rubles, the Government
sought to borrow money abroad. 39 By the end of 1905, Paris

bankers, responding to the efforts of Count Witte, granted the
Tsarist Government a loan of 100,000,000 rubles, and German
banks extended the time-limit for the payment of Russian
debts contracted earlier. Even prior to the opening of the
Duma in the spring of 1906, the British Foreign Office took the
unprecedented step of approving the flotation on the London
Stock Exchange of a gigantic Russian loan. In 1906 French
banking interests extended new loans to Russia, amounting this
time to 843,000,000 rubles. The total amount of the loans to the

Tsarist regime from English, French, and Belgian banks in
1906 amounted to 2,500,000,000 francs. Only a man of Witte's
40
stature could have secured these loans from the Western democ-
racies.This foreign aid program, coming when it did, saved the
Tsarist Government from bankruptcy and contributed to the
suppression of internal disturbances. On this basis, it was loudly

denounced by Russian Leftists, including Maxim Gorky. 41
But opposition to the loans was not confined to the Leftists. In
Paris Prince P. Dolgorukov and Count Nesselrode, for reasons
42
they refused to divulge, likewise opposed the French loans.
In spite of his service to the State and to the Tsar, Witte no
longer enjoyed the confidence of Nicholas II, who held him

in low esteem both as a statesman and as an individual. In a
letter to his mother, Maria Federovna, on January 12, 1906,
the Tsar declared that Witte was despised by everyone, with
the possible exception of the Jews abroad. 43
The Revolution of 1905, which began in January with
Bloody Sunday, strictly speaking, came to an end in December
of the same year with the defeat of the Moscow uprising of
workers and their sympathizers. V. A. Galkin has attributed the
44
defeat primarily to lack of weapons and ammunition. Although
there were more basic reasons, as indicated above, the workers
22 The Revolution of
learned their lesson. In 1917, under the Kerensky regime, they

secured ample supplies of weapons through the Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
When the Revolution of 1905 had been suppressed, and
especially after the dissolution of the First and Second Dumas,
there was a widespread feeling that the Emperor had betrayed
the Revolution that, in fact, it had been a failure. Large
numbers and representa-
of disillusioned Russians, Poles, Jews,
tives of other minorities joined the exodus from Tsarist Russia
to Western Europe and the United States. For many of these
emigrants, there was no horizon left in Russia, and they aban-

doned all hope of return.
Soviet interpretation of the Revolution of 1905, generally
consistent as to the nature and essence of the movement, has
veered first in one direction, then in another, on the matter of
its leadership. Soviet books, which appeared on the eve of. the
fiftieth anniversary of 1905, labeled the Revolution a "failure"
resulting from bourgeois democratic leadership. Further study

of the period soon led to a substantial modification of this
judgment. The "partial success" of the Revolution was then

attributed to proletarian backing of the bourgeois democrats.
As Soviet foreign policy focused more and more on Asia, Soviet
scholars became more conscious of the international impact of
the Revolution of 1905. Their position shifted once again to
emphasize the "success" of the Revolution because of the lead-

ing role played by the Social Democrats or Bolsheviks. This
Soviet emphasis on the "success" of the Revolution of 1905 was
intended to condition Asians for proletarian leadership. Asia,
to a greater extent than Tsarist Russia, was predominantly
agricultural.The Soviet Government, especially since 1955, has

tried to promote the development there of an Asian proletariat.
With this objective in mind, every evidence of the indis-
pensabillty of proletarian leadership in revolutionary move-
The Revolution of 1^05 23
ments has been culled from the works of Marx, Lenin, and
other Socialist writers.45 Some scholars questioned this shift
in emphasis, among them, one who had the temerity to write to
the chief Party organ, Kommunist, which responded ex cathedra
In no uncertain terms, demanding conformity with the new
Party line on the role of the proletariat in the Revolution of
Early Soviet interpretation of the Revolution of 1905 appears

to have been more scientific and closer to the truth than recent
versions, which have concentrated exclusively on the role of
the workers. In the beginning, Soviet writers admitted that
Itwas not a Party Revolution, but essentially bourgeois demo-
cratic. They conceded that the leadership was not Bolshevik;
rather that It reflected a cross section of the entire population,
and thus was a people's or national revolution, with a constitu-
tion as Its main goal.

It was true as Count Witte pointed out that a constitu-
tion did not mean the same to all participants.

47
To the nobility
it indicated the concentration of power in the hands of the
aristocracy. The intelligentsia envisaged a

democratic constitu-
tion after Western models, French or English. To the middle
class, it ensured a new economic

deal, especially the develop-
ment of capital in Russia. To the proletariat, it meant shorter

hours, higher wages, and better working conditions. The
land and less taxation.
peasantry expected it to bring them more
Even the Russian minorities looked for a constitution to provide
them with national cultural autonomy or complete emancipa-
tion. To one and all, constitution was a magic word in 1905.
to define the
Although the masses were unlikely to be able
term, It was not unfamiliar, even to the illiterate. They had
toyed with the word since December 14/26, 1825,
when the
abortive Decembrist uprising occurred. One thing is clear: the
Revolution of 1905 for constitutional government was no mo-
nopoly o the Social Democrats; it represented the thinking and

the leadership of the broad strata of Russian society of that
time, especially of the intelligentsia.
M. Pokrovsky, until his death in 1932 the foremost historian
of the Soviet regime, recognized full well that the Revolution
of 1905 was not a Social Democratic revolution. According
to him:
. . . the mass of Russian workers in 1905 was not revolu-

tionary minded. Their revolutionary activities were spon-
taneous. This spontaneity, however, could be turned in any
direction, as was the case on February 19, 1902, when the
workers gathered before the monument of Alexander II to
pay tribute to his memory. It could also follow the priest

Gapon, which in reality it did. This revolutionary spontane-
ity had no very stable or dependable foundation. Thus,
when the workers of Ivanovo- Voznesensk in the summer of
1905 heard the slogan: "Down with autocracy!", they shied

away in horror and began to shout: "No, not that, not
that!"48
Pokrovsky likewise acknowledged that the Revolution of 1905

was not led by the workers, the Social Democrats:
In spite of the fact that the problem of the workers* party

already existed, and the party was taking shape, neverthe-
less, during the first revolution there is no doubt
. . .
that ideologically, the leading role belonged to the intel-
ligentsia. It could not be otherwise.
The Social Democratic paper, Natchalo, in November 1905,

claimed that the real achievement of the Revolution was that it
49
provided the Social Democrats with a socialist intelligentsia.
Pokrovsky dated this development from 19 is:
The turning point . . . was Lena, the Lena events of April,
1912. From this moment we may date a conscious revolu-
tionary workers* movement, no longer inspired by the intel-
ligentsia.
The main contribution of the Social Democrats in 1905 was

their organization and instigation of strikes. Important as these
strikes were, however, they were not a decisive weapon. The
Tsarist Government was concerned, not so much about the
strikes per se ? as about the opportunities they provided to in-
fluence idle men

in the streets. Although the general strike of
October 1905 was believed to have been effective in bringing
about the capitulation of the Government and the issuing of
the October Manifesto, this view has been challenged by Sir
50
John Maynard. was also challenged by Count Witte, author
It
of the Manifesto, who claimed that it was the violence of the
peasant movement and not the Soviet of Workers' Deputies

which directed the general strike that led the Emperor to accept
51
the Manifesto.
With one or two exceptions, the strikes in 1905 did not
seriously incapacitate the nation as a whole. Russia was not
a highly industrialized country. Westerners, as is natural, are
inclined to view Russian strikes of this period through Western
Yet the Russian countryside was often unaware of or
glasses.
unconcerned about strikes in the urban areas. The peasant,
who visited town infrequently, depended on his oxen or
horses for transportation. In Russia there was no daily distribu-
tion of milk at the doorstep. Peasants and most urban families
baked their own bread and were not dependent on daily trips
to the corner grocery Only a small minority enjoyed the
store.
benefits of electricity in a country where the candle and the

kerosene lamp still prevailed. There was no compulsory educa-
tion to require the transportation of large numbers of children
to school. The izvostchik (coachman, who drove a horse and
buggy for hire) was always ready to take the place of the street-
car operator. The workers, except in the large cities such as St.
Petersburg and Moscow, ordinarily walked to work. Nor did

the newspaper in 1905 have the same significance as in 1917;
outside the metropolis few were able to read them and sub-
scriptions were very limited.

Under suchconditions, the workers at a particular factory
involved in a strike were the ones who felt the brunt of it. It
was not the strike at the Putilov factory that made the impres-
sion on Russians. It was the wanton attack on helpless demon-
stratorsby the troops on Bloody Sunday which aroused the
emotions of the people. Had this incident not occurred in the
capital, it is doubtful it would have evoked such violent reper-
cussions.
Thus we may conclude that the Revolution of 1905, Soviet
interpretation notwithstanding, was not the property of the

Social Democrats. It was rather a people's or national revolu-
tion, led by various parties and organizations, all striving for a

constitution. Prior to 1905, Russian revolutions and revolts
were supported by a small segment of the population or by
discontented and oppressed minorities. The Revolution of 1905,
until the promulgation of the constitution, was backed by a
substantial and truly representative cross section of the Russian
people.
There a wide divergence of opinion as to the success of
is
the Russian Revolution of 1905. By some, including Paul

Miliukov, it has been labeled an abortive revolution. 52 Others,
like Crane Brinton, have denied that it was a revolution at 53
all.
As previously indicated, even Soviet scholars have redefined it
several times in recent years, their estimate ranging from failure

"
to partial success. U'il d'-Uv.. r4.-Vv t ^
!
: ^S 'V *-*;>.
No one is likely to contend that the Revolution of 1905 was

a complete success. In large measure, however, It
proved suc-
cessful. The primary target of the articulate segment of the
Russian people was a constitution, and a constitution was

granted, which limited the power of the autocracy and provided
for a measure of legislative control. To this extent the Revolu-
tion of 1905 was politically successful.
The political revolution was also instrumental in bringing
about a program of social reform inaugurated from above by
the Government and implemented by Peter Stolypin from 1906
to 1911. Stolypin's agrarian reforms were designed to make
farmers of landless peasants, thereby creating a middle class.
Since this program was generally acclaimed by the peasantry,
it is apparent that the trend in agrarian circles was not toward
collectivization but toward private ownership toward the
completion of the emancipation of 1861.
The experience of revolutions in Russia, including the Revo-
lution of 1905, suggests that for them to be successful, or even
partially successful, certain conditions ordinarily are indis-
pensable. Since the administration is highly centralized, any

successful revoltmust take place in the capital. There have
been many revolts in Russian history which have been crushed
because they occurred on the periphery or in an area remote
from the administrative center.
A second prerequisite indicated by Russian experience is
that a successful revolution must be led and actively supported,
not by the national minorities, but by the Great Russians, a
solid bloc constituting more than fifty per cent of the popula-
tion. At least one important reason for the collapse of the
eighteenth-century Pugachev Revolt was that it was basically

the revolt of minorities, although led by a few Russians. Great
Russians, no matter how sympathetic they may be to a cause,
will not actively support a movement designed to place a
national minority in control of the country.

A third prerequisite is that a revolution, to be successful, must

secure the support of the nation's armed forces. In a country
where there has never been a civilian government in the West-
ern sense of the term, the army constitutes the backbone of the
regime; it is not only necessary for defense against external
enemies, but for protection against domestic upheaval as well.
In the Revolution of 1905, the minority of extremists who
sought to continue the struggle after the constitution had been
granted was crushed by the return of the armed forces from
the Far East. Although there was some disaffection among the
troops and seamen, it was due in part to their impatience to

get home rather than to their desire to join the revolutionary
ranks; the bulk of the armed forces remained loyal. In 1917,
however, the Tsarist Government lost the support of the army.
In retrospect, it would seem to be a blessing in disguise that
the Revolution of 1905 stopped where it did and failed to
precipitate a social upheaval. The disillusionment of the intel-

achievement and the political
ligentsia over the limited political
reaction that followed was natural. Had the Revolution pro-
ceeded, however, inevitably it would have devoured the intel-
ligentsia, as did the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
Although the terms intelligentsia and intellectuals are used

synonymously in the West, it must be understood that the
Russian intelligentsia did not embrace all intellectuals. The
intelligentsia as such represented no party, but rather the
conscience of the people as a whole. For the most part, its
members were idealists. On the other hand, the intellectuals
who claimed to represent the proletariat actually represented
parties in the case of the Bolsheviks, one party. They were
ideologists rather than idealists. The Revolution of 1905 was

led by the intelligentsia, with the participation of some party
intellectuals. It was the Bolshevik intellectuals that devoured
the Russian intelligentsia in the October Revolution of 1917.

CHAPTER TWO
Asia
"In the life of the Asian peoples, the Russian

Revolution (of 1905) played the same tremendous
role as the great French Revolution formerly
played in the lives of Europeans"
M. PAVLOVITCH
Two developments during the opening years of the twen-

tieth century had significant repercussions in the Near East, the
Middle East and throughout Asia. These were the Russo-
Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of 1905.
The Russo-Japanese War was geographically an Asian con-
flict in which Japan, a rising Asian power, defeated backward
European Russia. It had a profound impact on many Asians,

making them conscious of events in Tsarist Russia to an extent
that might not otherwise have been the case. From the safe
vantage point of Western Europe, the still relatively unknown

Lenin grasped the significance for Asia of the Tsarist defeat.
Writing in Vperyod (Forward) for January i, 1905, on "The
Fall of Port Arthur/* he hailed the triumph of Japan as the
triumph of Asia over Europe: "A progressive and advanced
Asia has inflicted an irreparable blow on a backward and
*
reactionary Europe."
^yJapan's victory over Russia in 1905 her second Asian
triumph within a decade Japanese nation? By
electrified the
the defeat of China (1894-1895), Japan had enhanced her pres-
tige in Asia. Her defeat of Russia, a European nation, now trans-

go Asia
formed Japan from an Asian into a world power. The reper-

cussions of her victory were felt throughout Asia. As Sun
Yat-sen pointed out, Japan's success gave the nations of Asia
"unlimited hope" and "raised the standing of all Asiatic peo-
ples" (San Min Chu I, tr. Price, Shanghai, 1927, p. 15). What
Japan had achieved in 1905, Chinese, Indians, Iranians, Turks,
and other Asian peoples dared to hope they could achieve in
the foreseeable future.
The defeat of Russia by Japan proved to be as much of a
stimulus to China as to Japan. In one respect the war, which
was fought mainly on Chinese accentuated the helpless-
soil,
ness of the Manchu dynasty before foreign encroachment. On

the other hand, the Japanese victory over a first-rate Western
power eased China the sting of her earlier defeat in the

for
Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895). At least temporarily, it raised

the prestige of Japan in Chinese eyes, gave impetus to the
migration of Chinese students to Japan, and encouraged the

belief that China, too, by adopting Western tools, could
achieve independence from Western imperialism.
It is not always possible to distinguish between the impact
on Asia of the Russo-Japanese War and the impact of the

Russian Revolution of 1905, which took place concurrently.
Western scholars, with few exceptions, have been prone to
attribute to Japanese victory the subsequent national and
constitutional upsurge in Asian countries from Turkey to
China, often ignoring completely the revolution in Russia.

"The Russo-Japanese War, by and large, appears to have under-
lined the possibility of the over-throw of Western imperialism
in Asia. The Russian Revolution of 1905 indicated the feasibil-
ityof the overthrow of autocracy, native or foreign, and the

establishment of constitutional regimes. In most Asian coun-
tries, where the two objectives were fused, the fact of Russia's
Asia 31
defeatand the example of Russia's revolution together pro-

duced a resounding and durable impact.
The Revolution of 1905, which was national in scope, had
a strong appeal,both inside Russia and abroad, perhaps
stronger in some respects than the October Revolution of 1917.
With its focus on political freedom and constitutional govern-
ment for Russia, it appealed to many parties and classes,
whereas the Bolshevik Revolution, which stressed social trans-

formation, called for the dictatorship of one class, the pro-
letariat, and of one party, the Communist. The real strength
of the Revolution of 1905 lay in the absence of any messianic

zeal on the part of its leaders to disseminate ideas abroad. It
was the example of Russia that counted.
In Western Europe, where the labor and socialist movements
already were well established and their members were polit-
as a tonic, especially
ically conscious, the revolution served
to Social Democrats and the promotion of social
Socialists, for
unrest. In the blow to Russian autocracy, German and Austro-
Hungarian Social Democrats and French and Italian Socialists
saw, as In a mirror, the ultimate success of their own struggle
against the ruling classes

and reactionary forces in their own
societies. French Socialists heralded the revolution In Russia
as the most significant event since the

Paris commune of 1871.
An epidemic of labor meetings and conferences occurred

tribute to
throughout Western Europe, their leaders paying
the achievements of Russian workers and excoriating Tsarist
policies.From 1905 to 1906 the Governments of Germany,

France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy were plagued by a wave
of strikes organized by miners, textile workers, and railroad
employees. In Hungary,
where agrarian conditions most closely
resembled those In Tsarist Russia, widespread peasant disorders
occurred, as well as ferment among the Slavic minor!-
political
32 Asia
ties in favor of national liberation. Even in the Balkan States

of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Rumania
the pattern of events in
revolutionary Russia was reproduced on a smaller scale. Al-

though these various manifestations of social, national, and
political unrest were essentially an outgrowth of local condi-
tions, the Russian Revolution of 1905 served to increase the
tempo and broaden the scope of the demonstrations.

In Asia, the Russian Revolution contributed to political
and national, rather than social, unrest. Western influence
already had made the politically conscious elements in Asian
lands adjacent to Russia constitution-minded. It was the Revo-
lution of 1905, however, which afforded a practical demonstra-
tion to them that a constitution could be won from an
autocratic ruler in a country that was agrarian rather than
still
industrial, and where the masses were both heterogeneous in
origin and largely illiterate. These conditions were part of

Asian experience and had their counterparts in every Asian
country, whereas Western industrial democracy was still largely
alien to them. The Russian demonstration on their very door-
steps, so to speak, of the establishment of a constitutional
regime could not fail to make a profound impression. The con-

temporary parallel of the rapid industrialization of Soviet
Central Asia and the "liquidation" of illiteracy there within
the span of a single generation has had a comparable impact
in Asia since World War II.
Soviet scholars themselves admit that the impact of the 1905

Revolution was not the same throughout Asia. In every in-
stance, its impact was greater and more direct in countries
contiguous to Tsarist Russia, where cross-border communica-
tions were commonplace, as in Iran, Turkey, and China. For
example, in December 1905, a revolution started in Iran that

continued until the close of 1911. In 1905 there was a re-
surgence of the revolutionary movement in the Ottoman
Asia 33
Empire, the outcome of which was the Young Turk Revolution

of 1908. In 1905, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, anti-
Manchu activities in China and abroad were coordinated in
Japan into one effective organization, the T'ung-meng Hui, the
main objectives of which were achieved in the Chinese Revolu-
tion of 1911. From 1905 to 1908 in India there developed a
strong anti-imperialist movement, manifested chiefly by strikes
and internal disorders.
Maurice Baring, writing from the Near East in 1909, was
keenly aware of the impact of the Russian Revolution on the
Muslim population of the British Empire.
The British Empire includes large dominions inhabited by

Moslims, and ever since the Russo-Japanese War, in all the
Moslim countries which are under British sway, there have
been movements and agitations in favour of Western
methods of government, constitutionalism, and self-govern-
ment. There has been a cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians/'
and of "India for the Indians," and in some cases this cry
has been supported and punctuated by bombs and assassi-
nations. 2
As Soviet writers are prone to point out, Russia as an im-
perialist power differed from England, France, and Germany

in that she had within her own borders Persians, Turks,
Armenians, Georgians, Chinese, Koreans, and Mongols. What-
ever happened inside Russia, therefore, was bound to have its
repercussions across Asia. In some instances, as in Iran and

China, the Russian Revolution of 1905 helped to galvanize into
action revolutionary groups which successfully overthrew a
long-established autocracy and substituted, at least temporarily,

a new constitutional regime. In Turkey, the very example of
Russia was an important factor in accelerating the movement
of the Young Turks for the restoration of the constitutional
regime of 1876, abandoned long since by the Sultan.

34
This is why Communist writers, such as M. Lentzner, 3 called
the Russian Revolution of 1905 "Favant-coureur des revolu-
tions nationales d' Orient. . ." Writing for a French audience
.
in the mid-Twenties, at a time when Communists were

highly
conscious of the importance of the Orient, he elaborated on
this point:
La revolution de 1905 ouvrit des mouvements nationaux

revolutionnaires en Orient. Les rapports sociaux et econ-
oniiques, la lutte des classes en Orient rappelle beaucoup
ceux de la Russie. C'est pourquoi la revolution russe devait
eveiller les peuples opprimes de Chine, de Perse, de Tur-

quie, et donner le signal de la revolution en Orient. 4
Of all the minorities of Asian origin within the borders of

Tsarist Russia, the Muslims were the most significant from
the standpoint of the Orient. They constituted around twelve
per cent of the population. In 1905 there were approximately

20,000,000 Muslims of Turkic origin in Russia, divided as
follows: (i) eastern Muslims Siberian Tatars, Chinese Ui-
ghurs, (2) southern Muslims Othmans, Azerbaijanians, and

Turkmenians, and (3) central Muslims Tatars, Kirghiz, Bash-
kirs, and Nogai. For purposes of administration the Muslim
population was organized in sixteen regions.

The sixteen regions, and their administrative centers, were:
the Caucasus (Baku), the Crimea (Simferopol), Moscow-St.
Petersburg (St. Petersburg), Lithuania (Minsk), the Lower
Volga (Astrakhan), the Upper Volga (Kazan), Ufa (Ufa), Oren-
burg (Orenburg), Turkestan (Tashkent), Siberia (Irkutsk), the
Steppe (Uralsk), Omsk (Omsk), Semipalatinsk (Semipalatinsk),
Semiretchensk (Vemyi), Akmolinsk (Petropavlovsk), and the
5
Transcaspian (Ashkhabad).
According to Russian sources, the Tsarist Government had
expropriated the richest Muslim lands in Siberia, Kazan, the
Asia 35
Volga area, the Caucasus, the Transcaucasus, the Crimea, and

Turkestan. It is claimed that, during the two centuries prior
to the Bolshevik Revolution o 1917, the Tsarist rulers de-
prived the Muslims of 41,675,000 desyatinas o land, as well
as other forms of wealth. The Crimean Tatars, in particular,
bore the brunt of Tsarist persecution, with the result that on

several occasions there was a mass exodus to Turkey. At the
time of the Russian annexation of the Crimea, Catherine the
Great (1762-1796) bestowed hundreds of thousands of acres of
land on her favorites Potemkin, Bulgakov, Zubov, Zotov,
Katchioni (a Greek) on the ground that the Crimean Tatars,
not being members of the nobility, had no right to hold land.
In 1791, as a result, approximately one hundred thousand
Crimean Tatars left Russia for the Ottoman Empire. Follow-
ing the Crimean War, about 1861, several thousand more
escaped to Turkey. In 1901, due to the Government's Russifica-
tion policy which the Muslims regarded as a threat to their
Islamic faith and heritage, more than fifty thousand Crimean
Tatars left Russia. Not content with the expropriation of the
private property of the Crimean Tatars, the Russian Govern-

ment took over the waqf lands and institutions, thus depriving
these Muslims of their community centers, schools, and so
forth. On the eve of World War I, the streets of Turkish cities
were teeming with Tatar refugees, commonly referred
literally
6
to as Urus-muhadjiry (Russian refugees). Not all Russian
Muslims, however, were persecuted as relentlessly as were the

Crimean Tatars.
Under the impact of the Revolution of 1905, several attempts
were made to organize the Russian Muslims. The first Muslim
Congress was held on August 15, 1905, in Nizhni-Novgorod,
and was followed by a second congress in St. Petersburg, Jan-
of the Muslim
uary 13-26, 1906. Whatever the original motives
leaders, the two congresses indicated clearly that, in spite of
36 Asia
a wide divergence of opinion on many issues, there was no

disposition toward secession from the Russian Empire. More-
over, delegates to the second congress, instead of establishing
a separate Muslim party, expressed their readiness to join the
Constitutional Democrats (Kadets).
In the first Imperial Duma, where there were twenty-five
Muslim deputies, no Muslim faction existed. In the second
Duma, when their numbers increased to thirty-five, after much
effort aMuslim faction was organized under the chairmanship
of Ali Mardan bey Toptchibashev, a Baku oil industrialist and
leader in the two Muslim congresses. The dwindling of their
representation to ten in the third Duma and to six in the

fourth Duma rendered any perpetuation of the Muslim faction
impractical.
Many Muslims, especially the more articulate leaders, had
a vested interest in the regime, some having acquired wealth
and titles, others having become army officers during the
Russo-Japanese War. These Muslims had no desire to organize
a radical political opposition, especially one that veered to-
ward atheism and revolution. This disposition toward con-
servatism was characteristic of the military, clerical, and busi-
ness elementsamong the Muslims. In 1905, the majority of
the Muslims in Russia appear to have been concerned pri-
marily with the attainment of local cultural and religious

autonomy. Police records indicate the existence of Muslim
secret societies which attracted a radical minority, but did not
represent the leading spokesmen of the Muslim population. 7

Such societies were especially prevalent in Kazan, the virtual
capital of Russian Islam.
The intensification of Turkic political and national activity,
however, during the years 1905 to 1907, was a source of grave
concern to the Russian Government. Although there was no
appreciable demand for secession, the Tatars made a strong
Asia 37
bid for leadership of all the Turkic peoples Inside Russia.
This drive for unity found expression in efforts to promote
a common language and in the resurgence of Islam. Thus, the
third All-Muslim Congress resolved to introduce the Ottoman
Turkish language in all Russian Muslim schools. Islamic mis-
sionary zeal during this period led to the wholesale defection
to Islam of 49,000 Muslim converts to Christianity in the Volga
8
Region.
The political, and cultural ferment among the
religious,
Muslims inside the Russian Empire, stimulated and articulated
by the Russian Revolution of 1905, had widespread repercus-
sions among the followers of Islam beyond the Russian borders,
especially in the adjacent Islamic country of Iran and in the

Ottoman Empire. These "Russian" Muslims were instrumental
in transmitting the ideas and objectives of the 1905 Revolution
to their co-religionists abroad. According to Friedrich-Wilhelm
9
Fernau, Turkish national consciousness emerged first among
the Turkish-speaking peoples of the Tsarist regime, some of
whom were educated in Russian universities, and was trans-
mitted by them to the Ottomans, when, at the beginning of
the twentieth century Constantinople became "the national
center" for Turks.
CHAPTER THREE
Iran
". . . had a most astound-

the Russian Revolution has
ing Events in Russia have been watched with
effect here.
great attention, and a new spirit would seem to have
come over the people. They are tired of their rulers, and,
taking example of Russia, have come to think that it is
possible to have another and better form of govern-
ment"
An "eye-witness" quoted by Edward
Browne in The Persian Revolution
of 1905-1909.
Of all Asian countries, the one which felt the most direct
and immediate impact of the Russian Revolution of 1905 was
Iran (Persia). Long-established educational contacts had drawn
an appreciable number of Iranian students to Russian uni-
versities. Traditionally close economic ties between Russia and
Iran stemmed in part from business contacts between Iranian

and Russian merchants. Even more important was the large
Iranian labor force of migrant workers employed in the Trans-
caucasus, especially at the oil centers of Baku and Grozny, as
well as at factories in Tiflis (Tbilisi), Erivan, Vladikavkaz,
Novorossiisk, Derbent, and Temir-Khan-Shuro. These condi-
tions contributed to the rapid dissemination in Iran of news
and views of the revolution.
According to Tsarist statistics, during the last decade

official
of the nineteenth century from fifteen to thirty thousand
migratory workers (Otkhodnikt) bearing passports crossed the

border from Iranian Azerbaijan in search of employment in
Iran 39
1
Russia. In the year 1905 alone, when Russian laborers were
mobilized for service in the Russo-Japanese War, these migrants
numbered sixty-two thousand. The above figures do not in-
clude those Iranians who slipped across the border without
benefit of passport (the Iranian counterpart of the Mexican
wetbacks), or those who joined the trek from Gilan and the
other northern provinces of Iran. According to the Persian
consul in St. Petersburg, by 1910 the number of Iranian migra-
tory workers crossing into Russia reached almost two hundred

thousand each year. 2
There were likewise large numbers of Iranian migrants in
Russian Turkestan; in 1897 there were 13,000 in this area,
exclusive of Bokhara and Khiva. By 1911, there were 30,648
in the Transcaspian area, where the Russian population num-
3
bered 48,654. According to A. M. Matveev, the Russian Revo-
lution of 1905, the Iranian Revolution of 1905-11, and the
revolutionary events in Turkestan had a profound influence

on all strata of these Iranian migrants.
In the autumn of 1904 a special Social Democratic Muslim
Party organization, known as Gummet (Power) was created in
Baku for Muslim workers laboring in the oil fields. From Baku
this organizationspread rapidly to other localities throughout
the Transcaucasus. In 1905 an organization of Iranian revolu-
tionaries was created in Tiflis. The result was that when these
Iranian migratory laborers returned to their homeland, they
took with them revolutionary ideas, printed propaganda, and
weapons to incite strikes and disturbances there. It should
occasion no
surprise, therefore, that
the Revolution of 1905
in Iran followed close on the heels of that in Russia.

The Iranian workers' organizations followed the pattern of
those established by the Russian Social Democrats. It is im-
portant to note, however, that they

were formed not in Iran
but in Russia. Iran did not have on its own soil a Social Demo-
4o Iran
cratic Party, although there were some Iranian Social Demo-

crats. Even the so-called founder of the Iranian Social
Democrats (S.D.'s), Itchmayun Amiyun,
better known as Com-
rade N. Narimanov, was from Russia, a native of Tiflis. 4 M. S.
Ivanov, the foremost Soviet authority on modern Iranian his-

tory,maintains that even in Tabriz, the revolutionary strong-
hold in northern Iran, as late as 1908 there was no organized
Social Democratic Party. 5
One reason why the Social Democrats failed to assume
leadership of the Iranian revolution was that they had nothing

important to offer Iranians. For example, there was no sub-
stantial industrial class in Iran. The main weapon of the
Social Democrats in Russia was the strike, but in this respect,
Iranians needed no lessons from Russian Social Democrats. As
early as 1889, the Iranians had effectively employed the strike.

When Shah Nasir-al-Din (1848-96) granted a tobacco monopoly
to an English company, this concession aroused the hostility
of Iranian merchants who, in turn, incited the opposition of
the population. When other means of protest failed, Iranians
resorted to a boycott. In the history of Iran, this boycott is
known as the strike of the tobacco smokers. It lasted from
December 3, 1889, to January 27, 1890, almost two months,
and when it became national in scope, the Shah was forced to
rescind the tobacco concession. 6 This strike was supported, not
only by the merchants and other strata of the population, but

also by the ulema, or Muslim religious theologians, and by
the mullahs.
The Revolution of 1905 in Iran began in December, just as
the Revolution in Russia was in the process of being sup-
pressed. Because the Tsarist regime was fully occupied with

its own uprising and exhausted by the Russo-Japanese con-
flict, Russia could not intervene to support the Shah's regime.
This situation, therefore, worked to the advantage of Iranian
Iran 41
revolutionaries.The Russian Government, which in 1900 and
1902 had granted loans to Iran amounting to 32,500,000 rubles,
had a vested interest in the Shah and, had it been able to do
so, in all probability would have intervened in the Iranian
Revolution at its inception rather than in 1907.

The signal for the Iranian revolutionary movement in
December 1905 was the general strike in Teheran, an out-
growth of the rise in the price of sugar following a ban on its

importation from Russia. Seventeen Iranians, among whom
were merchants and Muslim religious leaders, were cruelly
beaten by order of the Governor of Teheran, Ain-ed-Dowleh.
It was in protest against these atrocities that all bazaars, stores,
and factories were closed. 7 In the midst of these disturbances,

a large number of inhabitants took sanctuary (bast) in the
mosques, demanding the dismissal of the Shah's chief minister

1
and the creation of a "House of Justice/ The Shah, Muzaffar-
ud-Din (1896-1907), promised reforms, which he subsequently
made no effort to
implement.
The perpetuation of repressive measures led to a second,
more extensive strike in June and July 1906. In Teheran, about
14,000 persons took bast in the gardens of the English Legation,
where officials were said to have furtively supported the revolu-
tionary movement in order to prevent further Russian pene-
tration of the country. Even the mosques were closed, and the
ulema threatened to place the country under an interdict. Some
armed forces threatened mutiny if forced
units of the Iranian
to fireon the ulema and mullahs. 8 Following the example of
the Russian Revolution, demands were raised for a constitu-
tional regimeand a Majlis (National Assembly).
As in the case of the Tsar, the Shah bowed to the will of
the people. On July 28, 1906, he dismissed the unpopular Ain-

ed-Dowleh. On August 5 he agreed to grant a constitution.
His concept of a Majlis, however, was not a legislative body
42 Iran
representative of the entire population. He appeared to have

in mind a consultative rather than a legislative Majlis. In
this respect, his action was reminiscent of that of Nicholas II
on August 6/19, 1905, when he called for a consultative Im-
perial Duma. Iranians were no better satisfied than Russians

with such a palliative. On August 7, therefore, the Shah was
forced to permit the election of the Majlis by the people and
to guarantee it against outside interference. The election law
of September 9 established a very restricted franchise, with
the result that deputies to the first Majlis represented the
feudal aristocracy and landlords, wealthy merchants and bour-
geoisie, Muslim religious leaders, and some highly skilled
workers.
Because of the leading role of the Shi'a ulema and mullahs,
both the Government and the population looked with favor
on a legislative body which was called a "Muslim" Majlis, and
raisedno objections to the requirement that its decisions be
based on the Shariat. 10 Accordingly, elections were held at the
beginning of October. On October 7, the Shah, following the
precedent set by Nicholas opened the Iranian Maj-
II, officially
lis. Its first

president, representing the feudal aristocracy, was
Sani-ed-Dowleh, an engineer who had received his education
in Germany and a son-in-law of the Shah.
The position of the ulema in the Iranian Revolution was a
matter of great significance. In Russia, it was Father Gapon
and a few individual representatives of the clergy who sup-
ported the cause of the strikers and called for social and politi-
cal reforms. In Iran, on the other hand, nearly the entire body
of Muslim religious leaders supported the strike in opposition

to the Shah's Government. Whereas in Russia the Orthodox
Church up with the autocracy, and Father
in general lined
Gapon was a phenomenon, in Iran the ulema and mullahs were

Iran 43
in the vanguard of the revolutionary movement for a constitu-
11
tional regime.
There was nothing unusual about efforts for "reform" in
Islam, undertaken either by individuals or by groups. In
Muslim countries, however, these reformers were not political
revolutionists in the Western sense. They were, for the most
part, concerned about religious and social betterment, and they

were frequently persecuted by entrenched religious leaders. In
Iran in 1905, what was unique was that the ulema as a body,
constituting at the time the greater part of the Iranian intel-

ligentsia, became politically conscious and sided with the popu-
lation against the established autocracy of the Shah. They did
so on the ground that the Shah's policy was at variance with
the Shariat. On more than one occasion the Shah's bureau-
crats had tried to seize the income from the waqf lands and to
deprive Muslim religious leaders of their control over the

courts. 12 The number of religious leaders elected to the Majlis
from Teheran four out of fifty was no gauge of their leader-
13
ship of the Revolution in its early stages. Few uleina or mul-
lahs entered the election contest, no doubt on the ground that
defeat would reflect a stigma on their office.
One contrast between the Russian and Iranian revolutions is
to be found in the matter of leadership. The Revolution in

Russia, although begun by a priest, was led by the secular in-
In Iran, where members of a secular intelligentsia
telligentsia.
and politically conscious laborers were still few in number,
the real leadership of the revolutionary movement devolved
upon the Shfa ulema. The influence and prestige of the

Muslim leaders explains in large part the readiness of the
people to line up on the side of reform. The ulema, how-

ever, were not interested in the class struggle. They were
concerned by the fact that the Shah's rale was at variance
44
with the Shariat. What they demanded was social justice, not
the rule of a proletariat.

As previously indicated, the greater part of the Russian
intelligentsia was satisfied with the Tsar's October Manifesto

and the prospect of a constitution. Once the Social Democrats
tried to seize the leadership of the Revolutionand the country
was threatened with Civil War, the intelligentsia broke away
from the revolutionary movement. The Iranian Revolution
affords an interesting parallel. Once the secular forces began
to assert themselves and their demands appeared to lead to
civil war and the overthrow of the monarchy, the ulema staged
a mass retreat, and even joined the counter-revolution. Like

the Russian intelligentsia, they were loath to risk the loss of
a conservative constitutional regime by following the uncom-
promising extremists. They were not opposed to monarchy,

but only to the monarch, the Shah.
Under the impact of the Russian Revolution of 1905 there
was organized in Teheran early in February of 1905 a secret
society called the Endzhumene Makhfi. This society was the
predecessor of the Iranian version of Soviets (Endzhumene),
which sprang up in 1906. The first Endzhumene to be pat-
terned after the Russian Soviets was established in September
1906 in Tabriz, in Iranian Azerbaijan.
The Endzhumene proved to be a heterogeneous organization,
in which some units resembled nineteenth century Russian
zemstvos; others, trade unions, lodges, or political clubs. Mem-
bership was open not only to Muslims, but to Zoroastrians,
Jews, and Christians. In 1906, especially in northern Iran, the
Endzhemene virtually became a government within a govern-
ment. Local units were organized independently of the Shah's
Government on the basis of popular elections. They had all
the earmarks of a people's autonomous regime existing side by

side with, autocracy. Although some liaison was maintained
Iran 45
between local and regional units, as in the case of the Russian
Soviets of 1905, there was no centralization of authority.
During the Revolution, the Endzhumene took over the local
administration of justice, assumed police powers in order to
insure the safety of the population and to maintain order,
and controlled the price and distribution of bread. They
justified their assumption of these functions of government on
the ground of bureaucratic corruption and administrative in-
justice.
In brief, since reforms did not come from above in time,
they came from below. The remarkable factor in this situation
was that was accomplished without fighting, under the lead-
it
ership of the ulema, mullahs, liberal landowners, and mer-

chants. Even the Soviet historian M. S. Ivanov has pointed
out that the number of skilled workers, small landowners,
and peasants in the Endzhumene was insignificant. 14 In an
important sense, however, these organizations served as a
training ground for the masses and prepared the people for
the Majlis, over which the Endzhumene exercised a strong
influence.
In the course of the Iranian Revolution, the Endzhumene
became national in scope. The organization spread rapidly
in 1907 and thereafter from Tabriz to Teheran, Resht, Enzeli,
Maku, Marag, Salmas, Ardabil, Meshed, Kermanshah, and
Kerman. It invaded not only the towns but also the rural areas.
A few Endzhumene were organized abroad among Iranians

living in Ashkhabad, Istanbul, and elsewhere. By August of
1907, there were forty Endzhumene in Teheran alone. By
June of 1908, this number had increased to one hundred eighty.
The most active and influential unit in Teheran was com-
prised of Azerbaijanians; according to official English reports,
there were 2,962 registered members.
15
A
special Endzhumene
for women was likewise established in Teheran in 1907. In
46 Iran
Endzhumene were in operation by July 1908;

Tabriz, sixteen
in Kermanshah, ten; and in Kerman, nine.
Hartwig, the Tsarist ambassador in Teheran, in a dispatch of

April 24, 1908, voiced his serious concern about the growing
power of the Endzhumene:
From my previous reports to the Imperial Government, it
iswell known how all-embracing is the power of the End-

zhumene; have begun to give orders to the
recently, they
representatives of the Government, as if to their own agents,
giving them instructions and interfering directly in all the
affairs of every department. 16
The essential difference between the Russian Soviets and

the Iranian Endzhumene
lay in the fact that the former were
composed chiefly of Social Democrats, whereas the latter were

open to all, and more accurately represented a "people's" or-
ganization, led by liberal landowners, Shi'a religious leaders,
and merchants. As in the case of the Russian Soviets, the
Endzhumene were suppressed when the forces of the counter-
revolution gained supremacy. On June 23, 1908, when the
Shah's troops brought about the downfall of the Majlis, they
likewise put an end to the Teheran Endzhumene.
During the closing months of 1906, the new Iranian Majlis

directed its attention to the important issues of price controls
on bread and meat, the prevention of foreign loans, the estab-
lishment of a national bank, and the drafting of a constitution.
It is significant that the deputies from Iranian Azerbaijan,
especially those from Tabriz, played a key role in the Majlis.

According to Edward Browne, the thinking of these deputies,
"the salt of the Assembly," appeared to reflect the ideas of the
Russian revolutionary reformers. 17
The first part of the Iranian Constitution was adopted on
December 30, 1906. It dealt primarily with the rights and juris-
Iran 47
diction of the Majlis, and conversely, with, the limitation of
the power of the Shah. The Majlis secured control of the
passage of legislation as well as of its implementation,

and
also controlled the budget. The Constitution at this stage
provided for the responsibility of Ministers to the Majlis, in

accordance with the English procedure. In foreign affairs, the
Majlis retained the right to ratify treaties involving conces-
sions, loans, and other commitments to foreign states. Although
the new constitution provided for the creation of a Senate, or
upper house, this measure was not carried into effect.

following year, in October 1907, important amend-
The
ments to the Constitution were carried out by the Majlis and
signed by the Shah. The Shah, whose authority was said
to
emanate from the people, was granted more extensive powers.

As supreme commander of the armed forces, he had the power
to make war and to conclude peace. The
principle of cabinet
responsibility to the Majlis was nullified by conferring
on the
Shah the power to hire and fire Ministers. Islam, as represented
by the Shi'a sect, became the state religion. All legislation,
before being signed by the Shah, had to pass the censorship

of a commission of five top religious leaders to insure that it
was not contrary to the spirit of Islam.
The adoption of the Constitution marked the culmination
of the stage of the Iranian Revolution.
first Prior to this time,
according to the Soviet historian M. S. Ivanov, public opinion

was not divided on a class basis. The main desire of all classes
was to put an end to arbitrary rule, to carry out reforms, to
establish a Majlis, and to work for the adoption of a Constitu-
tion. The revolutionary movement, as already indicated, was
also directed against foreign imperialism, especially against

further control of the economic life of the country by foreign
capital. yet there existed neither an independent peasants*

As
nor a workers* movement, and no demands of peculiar interest
48 Iran
to peasants and workers were advanced. 18 As in the case of

Russia, the majority of the middle and upper classes, including
the religious leaders, were satisfied with the attainment of the
Majlis and the Constitution.

TheAnglo-Russian Entente of August 1907 accelerated the
collapse of the Iranian Revolution of 1905 by dividing Iran
into Russian and English spheres of influence, with a buffer
area between them. The entente constituted an abrupt re-
versal of the foreign policies of both England and Russia. The
English Government, especially since the iSgo's, had been on

the qui vive to prevent Russian expansionism in Central Asia
and the Middle East. As allies of Japan, the English were
hostile to Russia throughout the Russo-Japanese War. From
1904-1905, in spite of conflict abroad and the outbreak of

revolution at home, the Tsarist Government affirmed its readi-
ness to advance all necessary aid to the Shah's regime in order
to prevent a British-sponsored partition of Iran into spheres of
influence. 19
Four main paved the way for the formation of the
factors
Anglo-Russian Entente. These were summed up during a con-

ference on the Afghan question under the chairmanship of
A. P. Izvolsky, Russian Minister of Foreign on April 15,
Affairs,
20
igo^: (i) The rapid rise of Germany had forced England to
change her traditional policy toward Russia. (2) The under-
standing with England made it easier for Russia to find a com-
mon understanding with Japan, already an ally of England.
(3) The common fear of the development of national liberation
movements in the Orient brought England and Russia closer.
The Revolution of 1905 had exerted a considerable influence

in Oriental countries, especially in Iran. (4) England's fear that
she might lose her colonies as a result of revolution, with the
consequent loss of prestige, impelled her to make concessions

Iran 49
to Russian absolutism and to enlist the support of Russia as
a gendarme to help preserve order among Asian peoples.

Fear of revolution in the Orient and the growing strength
of Germany in Europe, together with the threat of Germany's
"Drang nach Osten," confronted England and Russia with

common problems. As early as 1903, Lord Ellenborough de-
clared in the House of Lords: "I much prefer to see Russia
in Constantinople, than the German fleet on the shores of the
21
Persian Gulf." England had encouraged the constitutional
movement in northern Iran at its inception with a view to
stemming the tide of Russian expansion in Asia. When the
revolutionary virus threatened India and Egypt, however,
England, as
many Iranians and Russians suspected, made the
deal with Russia, with the object of preventing the further
22
spread of constitutional ideas in Asia.
Encouraged by the success of the forces of reaction in Russia,
Shah Mohammed AH assumed the offensive against the Iranian
revolutionaries in June 1908. His chief support came from
Russians, one of whom was S. M. Shapshal, the Shah's former
tutor and a graduate of the University of St. Petersburg's
Oriental Department. Another was Colonel Liakhov, head of
the Cossack Brigade and its staff of Russian officers, including
Captains Perebinosov, Blaznov, and Ushakov. Created in 1882

by Nasir-al-Din, the Brigade was financed by the Russian Gov-
ernment. 23 On June 11/24, 1908, having been directed to
suppress the constitutional regime, the Cossack Brigade bom-
barded the Majlis, killing many of its representatives and im-
prisoning others. Henceforth, the center of revolutionary
activity shifted from Teheran to Iranian Azerbaijan, especially
to Tabriz.
Russian citizens were likewise active, although not so effec-
tive, on the side of the Iranian revolutionaries in the north,

50 Iran
who were led by Sattar Khan, an "Azerbaijanian Pugachev."

The Baku Social Democrats dispatched twenty-two armed
workers to support the defense of Tabriz. Caucasian revolu-
tionaries, who appeared to be equally willing to fight the Tsar
or the Shah, made common cause with the Iranian rebels in
the historic defense of Tabriz, which was besieged for nine
months by the Shah's forces. Alarmed by the prolongation of
the struggle, the Tsarist Government dispatched an occupation
force from Baku in April 1909 to break the siege and, os-
tensibly, to rescue foreigners entrapped by it. Russian inter-

vention in Iranian Azerbaijan, according to Lenin, indicated
what Nicholas I had
that the Tsarist regime was doing in Asia
done in Europe in 1849 at the time of the Hungarian Revolu-
tion.24
Russian intervention failed to prevent the march on Teheran

by other revolutionists, supported by the Bakhtiaris and by
Baku 25
which culminated in July 1909
additional desperadoes,
in the seizure of the capitaland the overthrow of the Shah.
The revival of the Majlis under his successor did not put an
end to domestic discord and corruption in Iran. The complete
suppression of the Iranian Revolution of 1905 was assured by
the Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran in 1911.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Ottoman Empire
"Look at Russia, look at Iran. . /'

DR. ABDULLAH JEVDET
January 21, 1907
Unlike the Russians, the Turks had some tradition of con-

stitutional development, dating from the Constitution of 1876.
This fact in itself produced a contrast between the Russian and
Turkish revolutionary movements. Whereas the Russians in
1905 were struggling for a constitution, the Young Turks in
the decade of the twentieth century were seeking the
first
restoration of the so-called Midhat Constitution. The Russian

Revolution of 1905 therefore served as a challenge to the Turk-
ish reformers,whose sense of pride and superiority would not
brook their being forced to take a back seat to Russia and
Iran in the constitutional race.
Sporadic efforts for the political reform of the Ottoman
Empire followed the Napoleonic Era, the Tanzimat Reform, in
particular, covering the period from 1839 to 1876. In the
i86o's the first secret organizations directed against Turkish
absolutism were formed. 1 They were strongly reminiscent of
the circles (kruzhhi) organized in Russia after the abolition of
serfdom in 1861. This may have been wholly coincidental, or
due to the fact that both Russian and Turkish intellectuals
were influenced by the tactics of Freemasonry and the Italian
5*
52 The Ottoman Empire
Risorgimento. The reforms of Alexander II of Russia, how-

ever, served as an example to the Turks in an era when liberal-
ism and national unification were becoming the order of the

day in Europe.
In 1865 there came into being in Istanbul an organization
known as the New Ottomans (Yeni Osmanlilar), with a mem-
bership of two hundred forty-five. Basically, the New Ottomans
worked for a constitutional regime, thus reflecting the views
of the liberals of the middle and upper classes, especially of
the army officers. Prior to 1908, the Turkish intelligentsia for
the most part belonged to the officer corps, as was the case in
Tsarist Russia, at least until the Crimean War.
The New Ottomans, forced to work abroad because of censor-
ship at home, conducted extensive propaganda through 116
newspapers ninety-five in Turkish, twelve in French, eight in
Arabic, and one Hebrew. Their propaganda campaign
in
directed European attention toward Constantinople (Istanbul),
a situation which Sultan Abdul-Aziz viewed with alarm be-
cause it afforded a pretext for foreign intervention. Since the
New Ottomans did not envisage the abolition of the Sultanate,
Abdul-Aziz preferred to have them inside the country where
they could be under surveillance. In 1871, therefore, he granted
them amnesty and most of the exiles returned to Turkey. They
were not responsible for the palace revolution of May 30, 1876,
which deposed Abdul-Aziz and placed his nephew on the
Murad V. Three months later the mentally deranged
throne as
Murad was replaced by Sultan Abdul Hamid II.
In view of the position of Muslim spiritual leaders at the
time of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, it is interesting
to note that the Sheik-ul-Islam's fetwah of May 30, 1876, sanc-
tioned the deposition of Sultans Abdul-Aziz and Murad V

on the following grounds: 2
The Ottoman Empire 53
If the head of the believers shows symptoms of mental
derangement, if he manifests ignorance in state affairs, if
he appropriates state funds for his own personal needs in
greater measure than the nation can afford, if he causes
confusion in political and spiritual affairs, if the preserva-
tion of power in his hands constitutes a threat detrimental
to the people, he may be deposed.
With the idea of using the New Ottomans to stabilize his
position, Abdul Hamid at first professed liberal views and

agreed to introduce a constitution in Turkey, Once in power,
however, he rejected the kind of constitution they envisaged.
When ultimately he capitulated in order to forestall interven-
tion by the Conference of Ambassadors, the reasonably good
constitution drafted by Midhat Pasha, the Turkish Witte, was
published in abridged form with drastic amendments. Article

V, which conveyed broad powers upon the Sultan, read: "The
Sultan is accountable to no one. His person is sacred/* Article
VII conferred upon the Sultan the authority to appoint and
and to appoint provincial administrators. He
recall Ministers
was declared commander of the Turkish armed forces, and

was granted authority to declare war, to make peace, to con-
clude agreements with foreign powers, and to dissolve parlia-
ment.
Because of their dissatisfaction with the Constitution, Abdul
Hamid exiled the most articulate leaders of the New Ottomans,
Namik-Kemal, and Zia-Bey. Many others joined them abroad.
The persecution of the Turkish intelligentsia of that period
caused no commotion among the masses of the population,
who were not yet politically conscious.
Having dispersed the opposition, Abdul Hamid convened

the first Turkish Parliament on March 19, 1877. It was dis-
solved the following June. The second Parliament was con-
vened in December 1877 only to be prorogued two months
later following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War. Some
of the deputies, including Midhat Pasha, were arrested, exiled,
or put to death. After this denouement, no Parliament was
called for thirty years, although the Sultan made no attempt
to rescind the Constitution. On May 30, 1878, Ali-Swavi, a
Turkish republican, attempted to organize a revolt to over-
throw Abdul Hamid* The effort proved abortive, and he, to-
gether with twenty-two accomplices, was sentenced to death.
This marked the final uprising of the New Ottomans. A
political nightmare, known as the Zulum (Yoke) prevailed
throughout the Ottoman Empire.
The Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878, inflicted a heavy blow
on Turkish marked the beginning of the

liberals. It likewise
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Rumania became an

independent state, and foundations were laid for the future
independence of Bulgaria. Austria-Hungary was permitted to
occupy Bosnia-Herzogovina. Even the Western powers that
went to Turkey's aid against Russia took advantage of the
Sultan's predicament. In 1879, England secured "peace with
Cyprus"; in 1881, France seized Tunisia; and the following
year England occupied Egypt.
Having blamed the New Ottomans for the catastrophe that
overtook the country, Abdul Hamid, jealous of his authority,
ruled as an absolute monarch until 1908. So rigid was the
censorship designed to isolate the population from Western
influences, that thewords republic, constitution,, liberty, equal-
3
ity, tyranny, and patriotism were banned from the press. The
works of Voltaire, Tolstoy, Byron, and Solovev were prohibited.
Shakespeare's Hamlet was banned from the stage, lest the audi-
ence witness the murder of a king. The Sultan's elaborate spy
system operated in the schools, the army, and even in families.

Opposition to the Sultan once again found expression in
1889, when the students of the Imperial Military Medical

School in Istanbul formed a secret society patterned after those
of the Italian Carbonari and known as the Committee of
Progress and Union.4 Prominent among its members were

Ibrahim Temo, an Albanian; Abdullah Jevdet, a Turk from
Harput; Ishak Siikuti, a Kurd; and Cherkes Mehmet Reshit, a
Circassian. One member came from the Caucasus and one from
Baku. This organization was the nucleus of the future party
of the Young Turks, Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terakki).
Forced, as were its
predecessors, to operate abroad, the
society established a center in Paris, where in 1892 its members

launched the newspaper Meshveret (Debates), edited by Ahmed
Riza-Bey. This newspaper was circulated in Turkey through the
foreign post offices, which enjoyed extraterritorial privileges.
Following the discovery of the secret society by the Sultan's
police in 1892, many of its members were arrested and exiled;
others sought asylum abroad. Among them was Murat Bey,
who founded another anti-Hamidian journal, Mizan (Scales),
in Cairo, and then proceeded to Paris, where he became one
of the leaders of the movement. Murat was from Daghestan
in the Russian Caucasus and was probably educated in St.
5
Petersburg. Even at this stage of the Turkish revolutionary
movement, exiles from the Tsarist regime constituted an im-
portant factor.
As a two developments in 1897 the Young Turk
result of
organizations of this period were dealt a crushing blow at

home and abroad. Following the exposure of their conspiracy
to overthrow the Sultan in 1896, eighty-one ringleaders were
tried by court martial and subsequently condemned to death,
exiled, or imprisoned. The morale of the Istanbul organization

was dealt an equally devastating blow by the capitulation of
Murat to the Sultan's blandishments and by his return to
6
Turkey. Not until 1906 was it possible to build anew. Since
the majority of the Young Turks abroad followed the example
of Murat Bey, only the staunch corps under the leadership of
Ahmed Riza continued to carry on the struggle.
The rift between Ahmed Riza and the more popular Murat
Bey was all too characteristic of the problems that have beset
emigre groups engaged in a struggle to overthrow the existing

regime in their native land. Basically, both men stood for the
same objectives: the restoration of the Constitution of 1876,
the removal of Abdul Hamid, and the establishment of an
Ottoman rather than a Turkish state. The very name "Young
Turks," adopted in Paris, was more correctly translated into
Turkish "Young Ottomans" (Gene Osmanlilar). Ahmed
as
Riza was a Positivist and an evolutionist, rather than a revolu-

tionist, whose moderate program of reform was designed for
all peoples of the Empire. Murat was a Pan-Islamist, not a
Turkish nationalist. Ahmed Riza, with singleness of purpose
continued to perpetuate the opposition movement to the
Sultan's regime, chiefly through his publications, and he
eventually became the first President of the Chamber of
Deputies in 1908.
Within the Ottoman Empire, it might have been expected
that the stronghold of the so-called Young Turks would have
been European Turkey, especially the capital, Istanbul. As
confirmed by Ali-Haidar Midhat, son of Midhat Pasha, how-
ever, it was Asian Turkey that assumed this role. The Euro-
7
pean great powers, which had the Ottoman Empire under

constant surveillance, were primarily concerned about Euro-
pean Turkey and the Straits. Anatolia and the rest of Asian
Turkey was them a comparatively unknown hinterland
for
that attracted attention except by such extraordinary
little
events as the Armenian massacres of the 1890*5. A good illus-

tration of the lack of awareness of what went on in the Asian
provinces is to be found in the memoirs of Sir Edwin Pears,

who although he spent forty
refers only twice to Anatolia,
8
years in Constantinople. By choosing Asia for their operations
inside the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks had no fear of
European complications, no fear of foreign intervention. When

Young Turk activity was uncovered in European Turkey, it
was ruthlessly crushed. Although the subversive Young Turk

movement spread its propaganda throughout the Asian prov-
inces of the Ottoman Empire, there it remained virtually un-
noticed and, when detected, it was often ignored. An English
army officer who travelled in Anatolia in 1906 commented on
the freedom from supervision at Sinope prison, where he con-
versed freely with a Circassian bey exiled for active participa-
tion in the Young Turk movement. 9 In this respect, exiles in
Anatolia and Siberia had much in common. Siberian exiles
who were not condemned to hard labor enjoyed greater free-
dom of speech than Russians west of the Urals, perhaps due
to the fact that they could be exiled no farther. The chief
center for Young Turk was Erzerum, In eastern
activity in Asia
Anatolia. It was here that the stage was set for what later
occurred in Macedonia.
The importance of the capital in the Ottoman Empire was
comparable to its significance in Russia. For a revolution to
succeed under a centralized autocracy, there are three essen-
tials. First, it must involve the capital. Second, it requires the
support of the armed forces. Third, it must be led by the

dominant rather than by minority groups. In
nationality,
Turkey, especially after the breakdown of the Young Turk
organizations in 1897, the Sultan's policy prevented the or-
ganization of revolutionary activities in the capital. Revolu-
tionists therefore had to concentrate in the provinces.
In an effort to restore some semblance of unity among the

various revolutionary factions abroad working for the over-
throw of the Turkish autocracy, the first Congress of the
Young Ottomans was held In Paris, February 4-9, 1902. The

forty-seven delegates Included Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Kurds,
Albanians, Armenians, Circassians, and Jews from the Ottoman
Empire. They were in agreement on the overthrow of Abdul
Hamid, but that was about all.
Two basic theses, around which the entire debate revolved,
were presented to the Congress. 10 One faction maintained that
no revolution could be accomplished by propaganda alone, be-
lieving the participation of the Army to be indispensable. The

opposition forces insisted that the implementation of a reform
program required foreign aid. The first proposition was sub-
mitted by Ismail Kemal Bey, who claimed to represent a sub-
stantial part of the armed forces. The second was advanced by
Armenian representatives, who insisted that the Sultan neither

would nor could carry out the reforms he promised. To depose
him, the Armenians regarded foreign intervention as indis-
pensable.
The
national minority problem was also injected into the
thinking of the delegates to the Congress of Ottoman Liberals.

Prince Sabaheddin, nephew of the Sultan, championed the
cause of the national minorities by advocating a program of
"Decentralization and Private Initiative," to be accomplished
by foreign intervention. The followers of the staunch Turkish

nationalist, Ahmed Riza-Bey, however, rejected any program
that would lead to the dismemberment of the Empire or which
involved the intervention of the European powers. The rift
between the two factions was too broad to be bridged, at least
until the Russian Revolution of 1905.
Prince Sabaheddin and his followers proceeded to work out
a project for an Ottoman Federation, with broad autonomy
for the national minorities under a constitutional
monarchy.
Ahmed Riza and his followers continued to stand for a cen-
government under the existing dynasty,

tralized constitutional
in which leadership would devolve on Turkish nationalists.
Both factions represented the outlook of the liberal land-
owners and the middle class, who had no desire to enlist the
participation of the masses in a revolution, which might well

produce a social upheaval at their expense. More radical than
the Young Turks of the Committee of Union and Progress, the
Ottoman Federation included in its program a shorter working
day, increased wages, pensions for workers, and the advance-
ment of credit to peasants and workers. Of the two factions,
the Committee of Union and Progress had greater influence
and remained the stronger. 11 The movement for separatism,
supported for the most part by the minorities, complicated and
12
handicapped the movement against the Sultan for reforms.
The situation in Turkey was strongly reminiscent of that
in Russia. Both countries were multinational and multilingual.
To grant a constitution that would satisfy all the dissident
elements involved the disintegration of the Empire Turkish
or Russian. The threat of partition, which came from within
as well as from without, was a basic cause for the defeat of
the Turkish Revolution. Since political freedom under such
circumstances would have meant political disintegration, revo-
lution could succeed only under dictatorship. Unlike the
populations of England, France, and America, which were

relatively homogeneous, those of the Ottoman Empire and
Tsarist Russia were concentrated in geographical areas along
.the periphery. When revolution succeeded in Russia in 1917,
It was under the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks. In the Turkish
Revolution, 1918-1923, Kemal Pasha, who served his apprentice-

ship in 1908, made Turkey a national state largely free of
minority groups in order to secure the success of his program.

Histories of Turkey by Western scholars, practically with-
6o The Ottoman Empire
out exception, have failed to convey any indication of the
impact of the Russian Revolution of 1905 on the Ottoman
Empire. They have overlooked also the Impact of the Iranian
Revolution, 1905-1907. Until recently, they have tended to
overemphasize the role of the Turkish Emigres In Western
Europe, especially in Paris, as the agency directly responsible
for the Turkish Revolution of igoS. 13
Undoubtedly, the Young Turk Intelligentsia abroad de-

rived Its inspiration from the West, where members studied
Its
the French, English, and American Revolutions, and the rise

and development of constitutional government. The theoretical
knowledge acquired in Paris, Geneva, and other West European

centers, however, was of little use for practical application
to the conditions of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the
Young Turk ^migrfe were often bribed by Sultan Abdul
Hamld to abandon the cause and return to Turkey. The fac-
tionalism characteristic of those who carried on the work of
revolutionary propaganda abroad accomplished little In the

way of action in Turkey. The Revolution of 1908 was basically
an outgrowth of the resurgence of revolutionary activity Inside
theOttoman Empire from 1905 to 1908. If the Young Turks
and Ottomans abroad did play a role in freeing Turkey from
Abdul Hamld, especially during these crucial years, it was not
a leading role. 14
The Impact of the Russian Revolution In Turkey, although
less decisive than in Iran, was nevertheless direct, via the
Caucasus, and Indirect, via Iran and Western Europe. The

example of a revolution in Tsarist Russia, a neighboring
autocracy, was not something remote from Turkish experience.
It constituted a real challenge, as something they could emulate.
A member of the British embassy staff In Istanbul sensed the

rebuff to the proud Young Turks of events In Russia and
Iran.
The success of Japan over Russia the traditional enemy

of the Turk madeevery fibre of the latter's body tingle.
His national pride that of a race with a great past, was
wounded at seeing the "contemptible" Persians making a
bid for a new national life, at a time when Turkey owing
to the despotism of the Sultan was more than ever threat-
ened by the degrading and increasing tutelage of Western
Powers in the European provinces. 15
The outbreak of the Russian Revolution of 1905 had im-

mediate repercussions inside the Ottoman Empire. Russian
Ambassador Zinoviev, reporting to V. N. Lamsdorff, Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs., on January 11/24, 1 95 claimed
that incredible rumors were being circulated in Istanbul about
the St.Petersburg factory workers who were threatening the
safety of the Russian capital and the Tsarist regime. He begged
for reliable information, in order to offset such rumors. In
spite of the Sultan's rigorous censorship, however, news and

views about events in Russia continued to reach Istanbul by
way of foreign embassies and consulates, foreign newspapers,
tourists, and other channels.
Sultan Abdul Hamid, whom Lenin termed the Turkish
Nicholas was quick to see the implications for the Ottoman
II,
17
Empire of the Revolution of 1905 in Russia. Tsarist Russia
and the Ottoman Empire were the two remaining autocratic
monarchies in Europe. A
revolution against Nicholas II was
therefore sure to raise the hopes of Turkish revolutionists
intent upon overthrowing the Sultanate. During the reign of
Abdul Hamid, moreover, Russian expansionism, long a major
threat to the Ottoman Empire, had veered toward Central
Asia and the Far East. Thus the Sultan, when congratulated
by one of his officers on the defeat of Turkey's traditional

enemy, Russia, by Japan in 1905, was said to have replied that
the defeat of the Tsar was a blow to the principle of autoc-
os; l he Ottoman Empire
Although Abdul Hamld was not noted for consistency,

18
racy.
after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War he had no reason
to regard the Tsar as a danger to his throne and to the Otto-
man Empire. 16
What disturbed more than Bloody Sunday,
the Sultan even
Tahsin Pasha, was the mutiny
according to his private secretary,
of the crew of the Russian warship Potemkin. 20 Fearful lest the
news of the Russian mutiny should produce similar disaffection
in the Turkish armed forces, Abdul Hamid at once took
measures to strengthen the defenses of the Bosphorus in order
to prevent the Potemkin from entering the Straits. Although
these measures evoked an official protest from Zinoviev, the
Tsarist Government was quickly reconciled to the situation

when informed of the Sultan's objective. Nicholas II even
called on the Sultan for aid to intercept the Potemkin, a
situationwhich Lenin found incongruous. 21
In an attempt to isolate Turkey from the revolutionary virus
that had attacked Russia, Abdul Hamid continued to rein-
force the Turkish armed forces, the police, and his notorious
spy system. He assigned spies to follow all persons entering

the Ottoman Empire from Russia. The same policy was pur-
sued in regard to immigrants from Iran after December 1905.
He clamped a rigid censorship on all news pertaining to the
Russian Revolution. Many Turkish coffee houses (the clubs
of the Orient) were closed because Russia became the
subject
of conversation there. 22 Turkish newspapers were not
only
forbidden to describe events in Russia, but even to use the
term Russian. The sale of Russian newspapers was also banned,
and the Sultan asked theTsarist Government's cooperation in
preventing the export to Turkey of Baku newspapers in the

Azerbaijanian language. Turkish authorities even interfered
with Muslim pilgrims en route from or via Russia to
perform
the traditional hajj to Mecca and Medina.23 Islam
Oglu,
correspondent in Istanbul for the Baku newspaper Hayat,

claimed that Muslim students arriving from Russia were ex-
cluded from the higher schools of learning in the Ottoman
24 To
capital. contain the Iranian Revolution and prevent its
spread to Turkey the Sultan dispatched Turkish troops to

Iran.
Among the factors that should be considered in connection

with the impact of the Russian Revolution of 1905 on the
Ottoman Empire is its
impact on the Muslim population in-
side Tsarist Russia. The
defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese
War and the Revolution of 1905 called forth an unprecedented
upsurge of activity among Russia's Muslims, especially among

the Turco-Tatars. 25 This political and national awakening re-
sulted in the holding of three all-Turkish congresses in Russia,
1905-06. The first, held in Nizhny-Novgorod in August 1905,

proclaimed the need for Tatar or Muslim unity in order to
deal effectively with social, cultural, and political problems.
The second, convened in the Russian capital, St. Petersburg,
January 13-23, 1906, prepared for Muslim participation in the
first Russian Duma, and decided in favor of backing the
Russian Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), headed by Paul

Miliukov, The fact an important one for the Muslims
that they won twenty-five seats in the first Duma led to a
third All-Muslim Congress on August 16, 1906, at Makariev,
near Nizhny-Novgorod, for the purpose of organizing a Muslim
Party in Russia and inaugurating a Turkic cultural and social
program with a strong Pan-Turkic bent. The organization of
26
a Muslim faction in the Russian Duma also demonstrated the

active role of the Turco-Tatars in the new Russian constitu-
tional regime. The second Duma
included thirty-five Muslim
deputies, and even after the revision of the electoral law, there
were ten in the Third Duma of 1907.
After the Revolution of 1905 and the October Manifesto,
about forty Tatar periodicals came into existence, an important
medium for the spread of Muslim political activity inside
Russia and abroad. In Azerbaijan, the Revolution led to the
organization of new schools, theaters, and newspapers. Two

outstanding news organs, Hayat and Irshad, were established
in 1905. Not only did they report news about Muslims inside
Russia, but they also reported or reprinted much about Young

Turk revolutionary activity in the Ottoman Empire.
TheRevolution of 1905 served not merely as an example
of the overthrow of autocracy in a neighboring country but as
a revolution which had led to the active participation of Mus-
lims, especially of kindred Turco-Tatars, in the operation of
a constitutional regime. Although much has been written to
substantiate the impact of Pan-Turkism inside Tsarist Russia,
to date there is comparatively little direct evidence of the effect
of Muslim activity in revolutionary Russia upon the Young
Turks. The measures taken to isolate the Turks seem to in-
dicate that the Sultan's administration was fully aware of the
danger of the spread of the revolutionary virus from Russian

Muslims to Turkish Muslims, including the Turkish minori-
ties, especially when Russia became a center of Pan-Turkism.
Itseems that the Young Turks would have been impressed by
Muslim participation in the Russian Revolution of 1905 and
it is to be hoped that both Soviet and Turkish scholars will
uncover additional material pertaining to this phase of the
subject.
The on Turco-Tatar political life and educa-
restrictions
tional activity after 1907 must likewise have been known to
the Young Turks. There is corroboration of Young Turk
propaganda in South Russia and Turkestan, especially through

the medium of Muslim schools (medrassahs)*7 Once the reac-
tion was in full swing in Russia, large numbers of Russian
Muslims emigrated to Turkey, with a view to securing Turkish
aid for their co-religionists In Russia and their liberation from
Russian domination. Among them was Yusuf Akôraoglu
(1876-1933), poet and writer from Kazan, who had taken part
in the All-Muslim Union Ittifak, and who sewed as a deputy
to the Russian Duma. Once in Istanbul, he established a Pan-
Turk periodical, Turk Jurdu-
Dr. Abdullah Jevdet, a founder of the Committee of Union
and Progress of the Young Turks, revealed In his brochures a
keen awareness of the Russian Revolution of 1905 and its sig-
nificance. 29
In 1905 he issued a stirring appeal to the popula-
tion of the Caucasus, during the Tatar-Armenian massacre In
Baku, to stop serving as a tool of Russian bureaucracy, with

1
Its slogan of "Divide and Rule/ and to

put an end to fratricidal
strife. In this brochure, he made reference to the events of
January 9, 1905, In Russia, when enough blood had been shed
30
to open the eyes of even the blind. In a subsequent appeal to
his Turkish compatriots, January 21, 1907, he urged all the
subject peoples to unite, following the example of those in

Trapezund, Erzerum, and Kastroma. "Look at Russia," he
urged, "look at Iran. ." 31 . .
One incident in the Russian Revolution produced strong

repercussions among Turkish army and navy officers: the
execution, on March 6, 1906, of Lieutenant Pyotr Petrovitch
Schmidt (1867-1906), the leader of the Sevastopol uprising of
December 1905, and three of his associates. The Incident has
been commemorated by the well known Russian poet and
novelist, Boris Pasternak, author of Doctor Zhivago, who dedi-
cated a poem to Lieutenant Schmidt (1926) which was widely
acclaimed In Soviet Russia.32
The
Indignation of Turkish army and navy officers over this
event found expression in an address to the victim's family.
Twenty-eight officers, Including several representatives of the

Turkish intelligentsia dared to affix their signatures. The letter
clearly reflects the revolutionary sentiments of its authors.
We, too, make a pledge to the great citizen Schmidt. We

make a vow over his corpse, which is dear to us and to the
Russian people. We swear that we will fight to the last
drop of blood for sacred, civic freedom, for which cause

many of our great citizens have perished. We vow that we
will exert all our strength and means to acquaint the
Turkish people with events In Russia, so that by our com-
mon effort we may achieve the right for ourselves to live
as human beings.
83
It Is significant that the authors of this letter were, for the

most part, natives of the Caucasuswho occupied prominent
positions In the Turkish Army and Navy. Among them were
commanders of cruisers and mine sweepers, colonels, majors,
lieutenants, a navy doctor, and an instructor of mathematics
in a military school. A breakdown by nationality reveals thir-
teen Circassians, seven Turks, two Georgians, two Kurds, two
Laz, one Arab, and one Albanian,
The fate of the twenty-eight reckless officers is unchronicled.
Although they urged the victim's family to keep their message

secret, their effort was of no avail. Years later, Schmidt's sister
In Leningrad Informed A. M. Valuisky that the letter never
reached its destination, having been intercepted by the Tsarist
secret police/5
The reaction caused by the Lieutenant Schmidt episode,
which A. M. Valuisky has termed "unprecedented in the history
of the revolutionary movement In
Turkey," provides some
Indication of the extensive Infiltration of the Turkish armed
forces by Muslim refugees from the Russian Caucasus, the
Crimea, and Central Asia. 36 The Turkish Army was honey-

combed with Muslim exiles from Russia, who at first were
welcomed by the Sultan's Government because of their hostility
toward the Tsarist regime. The Revolution of 1905, however,
made them persona non grata in the Turkish armed forces,
and as a result, many joined the Turkish revolutionary move-
ment with the intent to overthrow the Sultan instead of the
Tsar.
News of the October Manifesto in Russia aroused the hopes
of the Young Turks for the restoration of their own Midhat
Constitution of 1876. This reaction is evident in the telegram
of congratulation dispatched to President S. M. Muromtsev
by Ali-Haidar Midhat, son of Midhat Pasha, on May 13, 1906,

on the opening of the first Russian Duma.
I express the opinion of those who remain true to the prin-

ciples of my father, Midhat Pasha, and I congratulate the
noble Russian people on freedom, wholly deserved. . . .
We hope that Turkey, when it becomes free, will be bound

by friendly relations and mutual trust with great and free
Russia. 37
The Young Turks drew from the West their ideas of constitu-
tional government. But when they saw these Western concepts
being implemented in Tsarist Russia, their autocratic neighbor,
they were eager to follow the Russian example.

News of events in Tsarist Russia in 1905 stimulated un-
wonted activity among the various Young Turk factions in
the Ottoman Empire. Since the Sultan's policy after 1897 pre-
cluded the organization of revolution in the capital, the new
developments occurred in the provinces. In January 1905, the
young Mustafa Kemal, who became subsequently the first
president of the Turkish Republic, graduated from the Gen-
eral Staff Academy in Istanbul, where he seemingly acquired
a reputation for revolutionary activity. He was arrested forth-
with and dispatched to Damascus. There he and his associates
were instrumental in establishing a secret society, known as
Vatan (Fatherland), a forerunner of the Committee of Union
and Progress. The society established branches in Jaffa and
Jerusalem, drawing Its membership largely from the Fifth Army
Corps stationed in the Levant.
In the spring of 1906, Mustafa Kemal and his associates
transferred their activity to the more promising center of
Salonika, In Macedonia. Here, close to the frontiers of the

Balkan and enjoying a measure of protection from the
states,
European gendarmerie Imposed upon the Sultan by the great

powers in 1903, the movement spread rapidly among the officers
of the formidable Third Army Corps.38 One of KemaFs as-
sociates at this time In theThird Army Corps was AH Fuat
Cebesoy, who later became his collaborator in the making of
the Turkish Republic. 39 Both men joined the Committee of
Union and Progress of the Young Turks In 1906. By July 1908,
a certain Petraev, manager of the civilian agency in Macedonia,
reported that more than fifty per cent of the officers of the
Young Turk
Third Army Corps belonged to the 40
Party.
Under the Impact of the Russian Revolution, efforts were
made at this time to effect a rapprochement between the Young
Turks and the various Armenian and Macedonian revolution-
ary organizations. Even Young Turk migr6s in Paris sought
to establish contact with Russian revolutionists and anarchists
in Europe.41
Thus, by 1905 Abdul Hamid began to reap the results of
his policy of banishing to the remote provinces, especially to
Anatolia and Macedonia, all those suspected of opposition to
his regime. 42 These exiles to the Sultan's "Siberia," most of
them men of ability, courage, and action, became the focal
point of the revolutionary conspiracy. According to Sir Edwin

Pears, who spent forty years In Constantinople, 1873-1915,
43
they prepared the Ottoman Empire for revolution. In some
provinces, as in Erzerum, he reported the exiles to be so
numerous and of such superior ability and intelligence, that
they had become in effect the real rulers. By 1908, it was gen-
erally believed that at least 20,000 of the most intelligent officers
of the Turkish Army and Navy had been banished to these
remote areas. 44
In the provinces, especially in Anatolia, these Turkish exiles

came in contact with a multitude of refugees from Tsarist
Russia Tatars, Armenians, Georgians, and representatives of
other minority groups from the Caucasus. The Muslims re-
garded the Tsar's Russification policy as a threat to their

Islamic faith and heritage, and in 1901 more than 50,000
Crimean Tatars left Russia. Within a few years the streets of
Turkish cities were teeming with Tatar refugees, commonly
referred to as Urus-muhadjiry (Russian refugees). 45
In 1905 and thereafter, these refugees brought with them
revolutionary literature, newspapers, and pamphlets, which
were circulated widely in Turkey. They convinced the Turks
of the importance of joining forces with the minority groups
in their struggle against the Sultan's regime. It was no accident
that the years 1905-1906 marked the beginning of the co-
ordination of various revolutionary organizations into one
movement, with centers at Erzerum, Salonika, Cairo, and
Damascus.
As in Iran, large numbers of peasants from eastern Anatolia
were in the habit of migrating to the Russian Transcaucasus
in search of employment. Here they, too, became imbued with
the idea of revolution. The Turkish Government, fearing that
upon the return of these peasants the ideas of the Russian

Revolution of 1905 would spread, tried to halt the migration.
Events in the Caucasus soon made Turkish administrators as
anxious to isolate themselves from this area as from a plague.
When they closed the boundary to provide a cordon scmitaire
around the eastern vilayets, their action threatened to deprive
the migrants of a livelihood a situation which served only to
Increase local discontent. 46 A certain Russian consul named
Brandt observed in his report for December 29, 1905, that
since the beginning of the year there had been a substantial
decrease in thenumber of peasants crossing the Russian fron-
tier in search of work. When this movement stopped in Novem-
ber 1905, he claimed that it had "a tremendous influence on

the economy of the people In that area, who, for the most part,
47
lived off the Russian ruble." In January 1906, Russian vice-
consul Maevsky in Rlza reported the reaction of Turkish
authorities to the revolutionary conditions in the Caucasus.
Offer the Turks gratis the opportunity to recover Kars,

Ardahan, and Akhaltsikh: They will turn it down. 48
Consul-General Scrlabin In Erzerum, emphasized In his report

to Constantinople on March 15, 1906, the great discontent
existing in the Turkish vilayets along the Russian border,
resulting from the imposition of higher taxes.
The people of Erzerum, however, took their grievances
directly to the Sultan. Unlike Nicholas II, Abdul Hamid ex-
pressed his willingness to hear them. The people at once
responded with the cry: "Long live the Sultan!" Although
Abdul Hamid made many mistakes, he seems to have profited
by the folly of Nicholas II, thereby appeasing the crowd and
avoiding what might have become a Turkish "Bloody Sun-

*
day."
Even upon the outlying African possessions of the Ottoman
Empire, the impact of the Russian Revolution of 1905 was
felt. In Cairo, for
example, the newspaper Turk made fre-
quent references to the Russian and Iranian examples, urging
Itsreaders to Implement "the sublime ideas of the Russian
Revolution/' or "to blush for shame" before what had been
50
accomplished In Iran.
Thus, on the eve of the Young Turk Revolution of July
1908, Istanbul resembled an Isolated island in the midst of a
stormy sea of opposition to the Sultan's regime. Temporarily,
at least, there emerged a kind of united front, comprising
Turks and non-Turks, intent on securing the overthrow of
autocracy and the restoration of the Midhat Constitution of
1876.
In the Constitution, the Young Turks saw not only freedom
from autocracy, but a deterrent to foreign intervention. Two
incidents which occurred during the first half of 1908 and
which appeared to forecast further dismemberment of the
Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers served to expedite the
uprising. The announcement In January by Foreign Minister
51
Aehrenthal of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that the Sultan

had agreed to the construction of a railroad to Salonika
threatened ultimate absorption of Macedonia by the Austrians.
The subsequent conference in June between Edward VII of
England and Nicholas II of Russia at Reval, with a view to
promoting a broader program of reforms in Turkey, suggested
the alternative of Anglo-Russian control a follow up to the
Anglo-Russian Entente over Persia In 1907, These factors, in

addition to the ever-present danger of the discovery o the
organization's plans by the Sultan's spies, impelled the Young

Turks to take action. The flag of revolt was first raised on
July 5 by Niazl Bey, one of the Salonika Army leaders, who
already had openly declared himself In favor of a constitution.
At this juncture, the stand of Muslim religious leaders in
the land of the Caliph assumed particular significance. De-
termined to suppress by armed force the rapidly spreading in-
surrection in Macedonia, the Sultan confronted an unexpected
but decisive wall of resistance from the foremost Turkish ulema
the fruit of his indiscriminate persecution and banishment of
Muslims as well as Christians who had
criticized the regime.
Because the Sharlat explicitly forbade the war of Muslims
against Muslims, the Sultan sought from the Fatwa Emin, the
head of the chief Muslim Court of Sacred Law, a decision
which would authorize Ms use of the army against Muslim
rebels who had revolted against the sovereign authority of the
52
state. The opposing forces awaited in suspense the issuing of
a Fatwa. 53 The decision, when It came, clearly stated that the
demands for reform and for a constitutional regime were not
contrary to the Shariat and therefore did not justify a war of
Muslims against Muslims. The Sultan's hands were tied at
the crucial moment when troops were already en route from

Smyrna to suppress the revolt. In response to an ultimatum
from the Young Turk forces, the Sultan capitulated on July 22,
1908, and agreed to convene Parliament. Through the timely
support of Muslim religious leaders, the Young Turks secured
an almost bloodless revolution.
Thus, In Iran under the Shf a sect and in Turkey under
Sunnl leadership, the success of the Revolution was assured
by the unqualified support of the Muslim ulema against
tyranny. In Iran, the ulema and mullahs assumed leadership
of the revolt against the absolute autocracy of the Shah. In
Turkey, their moral and legal support of the Young Turks in

time of crisis, spelled doom to Abdul Hamid's autocratic re-
gime. This attitude of the Islamic leaders of Turkey and Iran,
temporary though It was, helps to explain why they were saved
from thefate which overtook the Russian Orthodox Church in
1917. By Its failure to protect the people against the Tsar, the
Russian Orthodox Church, especially after Bloody Sunday,
became thoroughly unpopular with the working masses In
Russia, The Revolution of 1917 swept the clergy from their
posts,brought persecution and death to large numbers, and

transformed churches Into stables and museums. In Turkey,
even with the separation of church and state under Kemal
Pasha (Atatiirk), there was no persecution and massacre of the
ulema and mullahs, and the mosques were undefiled.
The immediate reaction to the restoration of the constitu-
tional regime was a spontaneous outburst of approbation, in
which both Turks and non-Turks joyously participated. 54
People of every rank and class, imbued with the revolutionary
spirit, acclaimed the Constitution and the Sultan. Mullahs and
softas(theological students) denounced the espionage system
and fraternized with Armenians and Orthodox Christians and
Jews in a remarkable demonstration of liberty, equality, and
fraternity. The Sultan swore before the Sheik-ul-Islam to
defend the Constitution. As the news spread, similar demon-
strations of joy occurred in the provinces. 55 The sudden in-
crease in popularity of Abdul Hamid in Turkey led the
Illustrated London News (August 22, 1908) to place under his
portrait the caption: "Once Abdul the Damned, now Abdu'l
the Blessed."
In a private audience with the Russian Ambassador, August
8/21, 1908, Abdul Hamid explained his reason for restoring
the Turkish Constitution. In 1876, he acted upon the advice
of his Ministers to grant a constitution for the security of his
empire and the welfare of his people. Having soon discovered

by experience that were not ripe for the intricacies
his people
of constitutional government, he suspended the Constitution.
In 1908, however, his Ministers convinced him that because of
his solicitude for the education of his people, they were now
more mature, that the time was ripe for a constitution; he
therefore granted it. 57
Following the example of the Russian revolutionaries who

established Soviets in 1905 and the Iranians who organized the
Endzhumene, the Young Turks also set up a network of "Com-
mittees" throughout the country. For a time there existed a
virtually dual form of government. Under the impact of the

on Turkey from the outside, especially by the
defeats inflicted
Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars, these "Committees" disin-

tegrated or were liquidated.
On December 17, 1908, following in the footsteps of Nicholas
II, the Sultan opened the new
Parliament, which comprised
119 Turks, seventy-two Arabs, and thirty-five advocates of a

policy of decentralization, most of them representatives of the
other national minorities. For most of the Young Turk leaders
the Revolution had accomplished its purpose. Like the Kadets
in Russia they had no desire to proceed to social revolution or
to share their newly-won political gains with the proletarian
masses.
Once victory was achieved, there was division in the Young
Turk camp. Some who had taken part in the Revolution, in-
cluding Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, objected to the

Young Turk compromise with Ottomanism. They believed
the time was ripe to liquidate the Ottoman Empire and to
establish a new and strong Turkish state, free from minorities
and from foreign intervention. They retired from political life
and devoted themselves exclusively to their military duties. 58
The Young Turks, however, were not prepared to tolerate
the Sultan's counter-revolutionary measures, which soon
threatened to deprive them of their hard-won victory. Fol-
lowing an attempted counter-revolution in Istanbul, the

Parliament and Senate, with the authorization of Muslim
religious leaders, deposed Abdul Hamid on April 27, 1909,
and placed on the throne his brother, as Muhammed V.
1
"Thus/ according to Zeine N. Zeine, "passed into history the

last real Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, the last 'Shadow of
God* which fell upon a medieval and a legendary East and

with him ended the old destiny of the Turks which had been
linked for nearly six hundred years with that of Asia and the
m
peoples of Islam." Although Abdul Hamid in some respects
resembled Nicholas II, whose role in the Russian Revolution
of 1905 he carefully studied, in the final analysis he had more
in common with the Nicholas of 1917 than of 1905.
Paul N. Miliukov, the well known Russian Constitutional
Democrat, travelled to Istanbul and Salonika at the time of
the inauguration of the new Sultan, Muhammed V, in 1909.
In his Memoirs, he points out that he was received by the
Turks as a comrade-in-arms and was eagerly questioned about
the Russian Revolution of 1905. The Turks evidently recog-
nized a bond between the Revolution of 1905 in Russia and
the Revolution of 1908 in Turkey.
Russian Muslims who joined the Young Turks against the
Sultan's tyranny, 1905-1908, were influential thereafter in the
Pan-Turkist movement. They threw their weight in favor of
Turkey's entry into World War I on the side of the Central

Powers. In 1915, Russian Turkic emigres in Istanbul formed
a Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Muslim Turko-
Tatar Peoples of Russia. Included in this Committee were
Yusuf Akchurin, R. Ibrahimov, who was closely associated with
the rapprochement between Russian Muslims and Russian
liberals in Hussein Zadeh and Agaev of Azerbaijan,
1904,
Mulla M. ch. Jihan (Crimea), and Mukin Edin Beijani. This
Committee was warmly supported by the Young Turks, whose
objective it was to annex to Turkey all the Turkic regions of
Russia, once the victory of the Central Powers was assured.
Pan-Turkist political agitation reached its climax on the
eve ofWorld War I. Pan-Turkist journalists, especially those
among the Russo-Turkic refugees, envisioned the rise of a
Turanian empire on the ruins of Tsarist Russia. Primarily to
eliminate the Armenian obstacle to this goal, the Young Turks
involved themselves In the massacre of over 500,000 Armenians
from 1914-16.
The Young Turk Revolution died in World War I when
the Ottoman Empire was defeated as an ally of the Central
Powers. The dream of Pan-Turkism, encouraged by the Ger-
mans, came to naught. Disillusioned by the conduct of the
Turkish minorities, especially by the Arabs who lent support
to the British and French armies, the Turks, under the leader-
ship of Kemal Atatiirk, abandoned the concept of a multi-
national state for that of a Turkish national state.
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 differed from previous
Turkish revolutions and revolts. Prior to 1908, the Ottoman
Empire confronted many palace revolutions and minority up-
risingsproduced by small segments of the population. The
1908 revolution, led by the upper and middle classes, received
widespread popular support from the peasants, the minorities,
and the armed forces. To this extent, like the Russian Revolu-
tion of 1905, it, too, was a people's revolution. It is significant
that Soviet scholars regard it as the Turkish version of the
1905 revolution in Russia and describe it in similar terms.
According to the Soviet historian, A. F. Miller:
. . . the Young Turk bourgeois revolution of 1908 is a

factor of colossal historical significance ... in the struggle
against feudal medieval despotism in the Orient and world
imperialism.
Soviet historians
still admit that the
Young Turk Revolution
was a "bourgeois" revolution, without benefit of
proletarian
leadership. The leadership was provided by the Turkish in-
telligentsia.
CHAPTER FIVE
Chima
"The revolutionary storm in Russia has profoundly

shaken the entire world...
Although the peoples of
.
Russia have not yet received freedom? the domestic

policy has changed, and this in turn has exercised a
great influence on the reform movement in China."
FENG TZU-YU
in Min-pao (No, 4)
As in Iran and Turkey in the Near and Middle East, China

in the Far East felt the impact of the Tsarist defeat in the
Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of 1905.

This influence was due, not only to geographical proximity
and to improved trade relations, but also to the facts that the
Russo-Japanese War was fought in large part on Chinese soil,
and Russian troops in substantial numbers occupied Man-
churia. 1 These conditions made the Chinese Russia-conscious.
With the attention of the Western World focused on the Far
East, Chinese intellectuals at home and abroad followed the
course of the conflict and the domestic repercussions inside
Russia. In particular, the uprisings in the Russian Transbaikal
and in the Khabarovsk area, the strikes in Harbin and along
the Chinese Eastern Railroad, manifestations of discontent
among the Russian troops in Manchuria all of these had a
direct influence upon the growth of the revolutionary move-
ment in China. 2
Many Chinese living and working in Russia like the

Iranians also living there were strongly influenced by the
77
*j8
China
events of the Revolution o 1905. When

an appreciable num-
ber of these Chinese returned from Russia to Manchuria, they
organized or helped to organize the strikes of 1906-07 on the
Chinese Eastern Railroad. On January 9/22, 1907, to com-
memorate the second anniversary of Bloody Sunday, Chinese
and Russian workers united to organize a "political" strike.
Propaganda leaflets for the occasion were published in both
Chinese and Russian. 3 Chita was the Siberian center from
which Bolshevik agitators and literature were dispatched to
Harbin and other parts of Manchuria. Soviet sources claim
that approximately 3,500 members of the Bolshevik Party were
operating in Manchuria among the Russian troops, who grew
4
increasingly Impatient over the delay of demobilization.
General Linevltch described Harbin In 1905 as a "city re-
sembling a nest of various types of revolutionaries and agi-
tators/' In which a variety of leaflets was being distributed
in great quantities among the rank-and-file of the troops, some
of it being thrown from the trains. 5
In the course of her history, China has been the scene of

many revolts. The Taiping Rebellion (1851-64) and the Boxer
Rebellion (I-ho T'uan, 1899-1901) were still fresh in the minds
of Chinese intellectuals when the Russian Revolution of 1905
occurred. According to Red Chinese sources, the Chinese
"democratic," as distinct from the "socialist/* struggle began
with the Opium War (1838-42). Mao Tse-tung has insisted,
however, that this democratic movement assumed a "compara-
tively distinct" form only with the organization of the T'ung-

mengHuiln 1905:
The anti-imperialist, antifeudal, bourgeois-democratic revo-

lution In China, strictly speaking, began with Sun Yat-sen,
and It continued more than fifty years.
6
China 79
Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) produced
in China the new reform movement of 1898, led by intellectu-
als among the Chinese landowners such as K'ang Yu-wei, Liang
Ch'i-ch'ao, and T'an Szu-t'ung. These landowners,

closely
associated with the Chinese capitalists, favored a constitutional
monarchy and the development of capitalism in China. One

of their supporters, Chang Chien, a Nan-t'ung landowner, was
also president of the Ta-Sheng textile mill. Politically, he
worked for a constitutional regime in opposition to the Manchu
Government, and as a factory manager he sought to improve
working conditions. After the failure of this reform move-
ment, which tried to achieve its program by evolutionary
means, some of its members became revolutionists. Others,
likeK'ang Yu-wei, retreated before the prospect of violence and
formed the Emperor's Protective Society. 7
The defeat of China by Japan (1895), Russian failure to
evacuate Manchuria in April, 1903, the Russo-Japanese War
and the Revolution of 1905 all these factors led to the mush-
rooming of Chinese revolutionary organizations inside China,
as well as among Chinese students and emigres in Japan. China
had become the "Sick Man" of the Far East. The revolutionists
in China as in Turkey, Iran, and Russia blamed the dynasty
for defeat and foreign intervention. Unlike the Chinese re-
formers of 1898, they were determined to overthrow the Man-
chu regime rather than to reform it. Chief among the organiza-
tions formed at this time were the Hsing-chung Hui (League
for the Resurrection of China), the Hua-hsing Hui (League of
Chinese Entrepreneurs), and the Kuang-fu Hui (League for
the Restoration of Chinese Independence).
Sun Wen, one of these revolutionists who had an appreciable
following among the Chinese middle class and peasantry, be-
came Russia-conscious as a result of the Revolution of 1905.
80 China
As did Lenin, he regarded the defeat of Russia by Japan as a
victory of Asia over Europe. He and his followers supported

an armed struggle to overthrow the Manchu Government.
Sun Wen was not concerned primarily with ideologies, doc-
trines, and creeds, but with race. He was convinced that the
future would bring a conflict between Asians and whites. He
predicted that Russia, despised by the West, would become

the ally of the Asians in this struggle. 8
Whereas Paris became for the revolutionists of Turkey and
Iran the focal point of their organization and propaganda
abroad, it was Tokyo that provided the Chinese revolutionists
a measure of freedom for planning. Here Chinese students
were exposed to Western science, studied revolutionary theories
which found their way there from Western Europe and Russia,
and formed revolutionary underground groups. They trans-
lated into Chinese large numbers of West European books as
well as some Russian books.
Whenthe Russian Revolution broke out, there were ap-
proximately 2409 Chinese students in Tokyo. Within six

months the number had almost doubled. 9 The Japan Weekly
Mail, reporting somewhat different figures, claimed that the
number of Chinese students there increased from 2,641 in
10
July 1905 to 8,000 in December of that year. By 1907 their
numbers had soared to 17,860. Chinese students in Japan were
organized into seventeen groups, according to the provinces
from which they came.
In July 1905, Sun Yat-sen returned to Japan from Europe,
and immediately contacted Chinese revolutionary groups in
that country. As early as 1894, he had been connected with
Chinese mlgrs in the Hawaiian Islands, where he created the
firstrevolutionary organization, called the Society for the Re-
birth of China. The following year he took part in his first
uprising in China, but when it failed he took refuge in Japan,

China 81
When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, he was in

Europe. Twenty years later, in a speech in Kobe (November
28, 1924), and in terms strongly reminiscent of Lenin's article
on "The Fall of Port Arthur" (Vpered, January i, 1905), Sun
Yat-sen assessed the Russian defeat and its implications for Asia
in forthright terms.
In former days, the coloured races in Asia, suffering from

the oppression of the Western peoples, thought that eman-
cipation was impossible. We regarded the Russian defeat
by Japan as the defeat of the West by the East. We regarded
the Japanese victory as our own victory. It was indeed a
happy event. Did not therefore this news of Russia's defeat
by Japan affect the peoples of the whole of Asia? Was not
tremendous? 11
its effect
He emphasized the impact of the Japanese victory on West

Asians in particular, who were constantly subject to European
"oppression" and who therefore responded more quickly to
the news of the Russian defeat than did the peoples of the Far
East.
There appears to be little evidence that Sun Yat-sen was In

direct contact with Russian revolutionists before or during
the Revolution of 1905. Some Soviet historians, without speci-
fic citation, claim that he was In touch with Russian revolu-
tionary exiles In London, Japan, and China. Lenin pointed out
on one occasion, however, that although Sun Yat-sen developed
a revolutionary democratic program and received a European
education he was "apparently wholly unfamiliar with Russia/*
and his understanding of theChinese question was "completely
independent of Russia, of Russian experience, of Russian liter-
ature." 12
The only specific reference cited by the Red Chinese
historian Jung Meng-yuan is to an interview by Sun Yat-sen
with Russian Social Revolutionist G. A. Gezshuni, who In
1906 escaped from a Siberian prison to Japan. ls

8s China
Upon Sun Japan in 1905, in cooperation

Yat-sen's return to
with another Chinese revolutionary leader, Huang Hsing, he
proceeded to coordinate all anti-Manchu activities in China
and abroad into one effective organization. On August 28, 1905,
they summoned in Tokyo a conference of Chinese student
representatives of revolutionary groups. At this meeting, at-
tended by seventy Chinese delegates, a resolution was adopted

to unite on an individual basis the members of several revolu-
tionary organizations especially the Hsing-chung Hui, Hua-

hsing Hui, and Kuang-fu Hui into one united revolu-
tionary party. This party came to be known as the T'ung-meng
Hui (Chung-kuo T'ung-meng Hui). It was the league of
first
Chinese intellectuals in modern times. The constituent Con-
gress of the T'ung-meng Hui was convened in Tokyo on Sep-

tember with 302 delegates participating. Included on
18, 1905,
the committee to draft the organization's constitution were
Sua Yat-sen, Huang Hsing, Ch'en T'ien-hua, and Ma Chun-wu.
The main objectives of the new organization, which can-
didates for membership swore to implement, were the ex-
pulsion of the Manchu dynasty, the restoration of Chinese
sovereignty, the establishment of a republic, and equitable
distribution of the land. In many respects, the T'ung-meng Hui
was a Chinese counterpart of the Russian Constitutional Demo-
crats (Kadets), divided into Rightists, Leftists, and Centrists.
They looked for leadership not to the monarchists and land-

owners nor to the masses, but rather to the middle class, es-
pecially to the Chinese intelligentsia. In this respect they were
implementing the ideas of Yang Shou-jen, the founder in 1902
of New Hunan, which became one of the most influential
organs among the Chinese revolutionaries, especially after 1904

when a Tokyo edition appeared. 14
In August 1905, the T*ung~meng Hui agreed to transform the
monthly magazine Twentieth Century China, edited by Sung
China 83
Chiao-jen, Into their own press organ, the newspaper Min-pao.

The according to Chinese sources, appeared on Nov-
first Issue,
ember 26, igo5. 15 It continued intermittently until February i,

1910, when Its twenty-sixth and final Issue appeared. On Its
editorial board were several Hunanese, Including Ch'en "Tien

hua and Sung Chiao-jen. The three people's principles of Sun
Yat-sen were made public for the first time in the first Issue
of the Min-pao. The paper succeeded In winning to the cause
of the T'ung-meng Hui a large number of Intellectuals in China
and abroad, who had theretofore supported the constitutional
monarchists. 16 It appears to have been the Chinese equivalent
of Herzen's Kolokol (The Bell}^ published in London, or
Lenin's Iskra.
By 1906, the membership of the T'ung-meng Hui reached

about 10,000, and there were branches In all the Chinese prov-
inces and abroad. 17 From 1894 to 1911 the League member-
ship was responsible for ten uprisings In China. In spite of
the fact that these uprisings met with defeat, they were of
more than negative significance. In Lenin's terminology, they
were dress rehearsals for 1911.
The Manchu Government, once it became aware of the
designs of the T'ung-meng Hui, made representations to the
Japanese Government to secure its dlsbandment Following
a fiery speech by Sun Yat-sen on December 2, 1906, the first
anniversary of the founding of the Party, the Chinese Minister
In Tokyo renewed his protests. As a result, Sun Yat-sen was
provided with 20,000 yen by the Japanese Government and

asked to conduct Ms activities elsewhere. On March 4, 1907,
he left for Indo-Ghina.
The succession of defeats brought discouragement and dis-
illusionment to the T'ung-meng Hui. Sun Yat-sen thereupon
convened the Executive Committee toward the end of 1910 00
the Island of Penang (Malaya). Attributing previous failures to
84 China
lack of preparation and lack of organization, he urged that

sound foundations be laid for the forthcoming uprising
scheduled for Kuang-chou (Canton). To direct this revolt, a
center was established in Hong-Kong. In spite of all precau-
tions, however, this new revolt organized by the T'ung-meng
Hul and carried out in April 1911 shared the fate of its
prede-
cessors; seventy-two lives were lost.
Success was finally achieved In October 1911. The big up-
rising began on the evening of October 10, with soldiers and

some officers of the Eighth Combat Battalion participating.
A number of other military units came to their supports As
in Iran and Turkey, the support of the Army contributed
significantly to the success of the uprising. By the morning

of October the revolutionists had captured the residence of
1 1
the Governor and the police department. Thus, in the course

of three days, the entire Wu-Han area fell into the hands of
the rebels. This Wu-Han revolt marked the real beginning of
the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Although it was not the direct
work of the T'ung-meng Hul, it was a product of that organiza-
tion's
prolonged efforts. 18 On November 3, 1911, a constitution
was proclaimed. Sun Yat-sen, himself, returned to China on
December 25. Four days later he was elected provisional presi-
dent of the Chinese Republic.
The Russian revolutionists were quick to grasp the impor-
tance of the Chinese Revolution of 1911. At the Sixth Confer-
ence of the Bolshevik Party In Prague In January 1912, Lenin
drafted a special resolution greeting the revolutionary re-
publicans of China, acknowledging the world-wide significance

of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people which was
bringing liberation to Asia, and undermining the domination

of the European bourgeoisie. 19
Soviet scholars; who have been highly critical of the T'ung-
ineng Hul in some respects, have admitted that this was the
China 85
first "bourgeois" revolutionary party in China, that it was
this Party that led the struggle against the reactionary Manchu
regime, and that it was responsible for the overthrow of the
20
monarchy and for the establishment of the Chinese Republic.
As for Sun Yat-sen, they have acknowledged that he was not
merely a theoretician, nor a lawyer who argues for or against
a case, but "an active revolutionary fighter." 21 Mikhail Pav-
lovitch, editor ofNovyi Vostok and the pioneer of Soviet Ori-
ental Studies, went even further. Sun Yat-sen, he claimed, was
for the Chinese revolutionaries what Lenin was for the Bol-
shevik Party. 22 Pavlovitch nevertheless recognized that Sun Yat-
sen and his followers had no intention of deliberately imitating
or emulating the Russians, but insisted that China should itself
setan example to the entire world,

Mao Tse-tung, in comparing the Russian Revolution of 1905
and the Chinese Revolution of 1911, claimed that the former
was victorious and the latter "a miscarriage." 23 The Chinese
Communist leader, laboring under the illusion that the Russian
Revolution of 1905 was conducted by the proletariat, attributed
the failure of the 1911 Chinese revolution to two factors: the
lack of proletarian participation in the struggle and the lack
of a Chinese Communist Party. He and his associates never-
thelesspay tribute to Sun Yat-sen as "a great democratic revolu-
tionary/' the one who began the "anti-imperialist, antifeudai,
24
bourgeois-democratic revolution in China.'*
Judging by material extant in both Chinese and Russian
were impressed as much by the
sources, Chinese intellectuals
Russian Revolution of 1905 as by Russia's defeat at the hands
of Japan. Western historians and some Chinese students who
have studied in the West have placed more emphasis on the
impact of Russia's defeat than on the impact of the Revolution
against autocracy. Perhaps one of the most useful contributions
of Red Chinese historians in this field has been to sum up the
86 China
Chinese press on the Russian Revolution of 1905, thus re-

flecting the reaction of the Chinese "bourgeois" revolutionaries
of that time to events in Russia. 25
The Min-pao provide the best proof of the impact
issues of
of the Russian Revolution of 1905 on Sun Yat-sen and his

followers. Practically every issue included articles, pictures,
and references to events in revolutionary Russia, including
frequent admonitions to the Chinese to profit by the Russian

experience.
Thevery first issue of Min-pao expressed serious reserva-
tions as to the wisdom of patterning the T'ung-meng Hui pro-
gram Europe and the United States, where workers

after that of
controlled by labor unions conducted strikes and where an-
archism and socialism were on the increase. "If we follow their
example/* concluded the party organ, "it stands to reason that
we cannot avoid a second revolution/' 26 The T'ung-meng Hui,
it is clear, was no more favorably disposed than the Russian
Kadets toward domination by a proletariat. The same issue
of Min-pao, however, included a portrait of Sophia Perovskaya,
a nineteenth-century Russian Populist who was tried for at-
tempted political assassination.
Subsequent issues focused attention on events in Russia.

The second featured "The Independence of Liflandia" and a
photograph of the Russian anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin (1814-
7
76). If Lifiandia/ which was one-thousandth the size of China
could carry on the struggle for freedom, why, asked Min-pao,
could China not do the same? In the third issue, Sun Yat-sen
himself provided an article on "The Russian Revolution of
1905" in which he called attention to the disturbances among

the intelligentsia, workers, and peasants dissatisfied with the
Tsarist regime, as well as to the uprising on the Potemkin,
and student demands at the military school in Manchuria for
political reforms. Two groups of photographs of Russian revo-
China 87
lutionists were published In the thirteenth issue, one taken
at a Siberian hard-laborcamp. The twenty-first issue presented
two sketches: one of an underground meeting of Russian revo-
lutionaries, the other, the dispersal of a demonstration by
Tsarist Cossacks. It is clear that the Russian Revolution of
1905
was very much in the foreground of the thinking of the T'ung-
meng Hui. This was emphasized by Feng Tzu-yu, a Chinese
democrat, in the fourth issue of Min-pao:
The revolutionary storm in Russia has profoundly shaken

the entire world. Although the peoples of Russia have
. . .
not yet received freedom, the domestic policy has changed,

and this in turn has exercised a great influence on the re-
form movement in China.
The T'ung-meng Hui, judging by its press, was particularly

concerned with the application of Russian experience to the
Chinese situation. On the matter of the necessity for a revo-
lutionary press organ, there was disagreement among Its mem-
bers. One of their number, Hu Han-min, seeking to emphasize
the significance of Min-pao, stressed the importance of the

Russian revolutionary press and concluded therefrom that a
"revolutionary press is essential if the people are to understand
the revolution" (No. 3). Having learned, on another occasion,
that many Russians distrusted the Tsar's intention of carrying
out the pledges of the October Manifesto, Min-pao (No. 4}
warned the Chinese to be equally wary of believing the Mancfau
dynasty's professions in regard to the granting of a constitution,
especially since it was declared to be ten times more backward
than the Russian regime. Writing on "Parallels between the
Social and Political Revolutions" (No. 5), Chu Chih-hsin de-
tected In the Russian situation a reflection of conditions in
China. In particular, he pointed to the Russian economy, not
yet emancipated from feudalism, and to the ruling classes
88 China
the nobility, clergy, and landowners who dominated the

Russian economy and controlled its politics. The Russian
Revolution was thus recognized to be political and social.
From time to time, the followers of Sun Yat-sen sought to
morale in the face of adversity by citing the ex-
fortify their
ample of the Russians. In 1906, after having sustained de-

feat in several uprisings in Plng-hsiang, Liu-yang, and Lei-ling
counties in Hunan Province, Min-pao (No. 11) declared:
In spite of the fact that the political organization of the

Russian absolutist state is much stronger and more per-
fected than that of the Manchu regime, the Russian revo-
lutionists, in spite of bloodshed, do not give up the struggle.
The Chinese revolutionaries pay them sincere homage.
Many Chinese revolutionists had a very foggy concept of

the real nature and composition of Russian political parties
at the time of the Russian Revolution of 1905. Since they
appear to have had little or no access to primary source mate-

rial, the members of the T'ung-meng Hui depended largely on
the **muddy sources" of the Japanese newspapers and journals
for their knowledge and interpretation of events in Russia.
Thus Min-pao (Nos. n, 17), in articles dealing with "The
History of the Nihilists," lumped together the Decembrists,
the Narodniki (Populists), the Marxists, and the workers strik-
ing in Russia. It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that

some Chinese authors reached the conclusion that only Nihil-
ists took part in the Russian Revolution of 1905 (Min-pao, No.
2), whereas others affirmed that the Kadets, Social Democrats,
and Social Revolutionists, in particular, were said to include
anarchists, nihilists, and workers.
This confusion of terms by Chinese revolutionists has had
its
counterpart in our own era, in which the Communist press
has labelled as Fascists all manner of persons whose ideas were
China 89
at variance with theirs, and even In democratic countries,
where the terms Fascist and Communist have been upon oc-
casion applied indiscriminately to persons of conservative and

liberal persuasion respectively.
Min-pao was not the only Chinese press organ that reflected
Chinese interest in events in Russia. In the wake of Bloody
Sunday the Chinese reformer and scholar Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,
writing in the paper, Hsin-min Ts'ung-pao (Nos. 13, 14), pre-
sented articles on "The Influence of the Russian Revolution."
In these articles, he interpreted events in Russia as a warning
of what could happen to the Manchu dynasty. The fact that
Russia "the one and only despotic state on the globe/* with
a dynasty much more strongly entrenched than that of China
could not escape revolution should, he claimed, make leaders
of the Manchu regime who had any awareness of the seriousness
of the Chinese situation take action without delay to introduce
reforms.
j
Many other reformers joined Liang Ch i-ch*ao in calling for

a strong movement among the Chinese people for the establish-
ment of a Chinese constitution. It seemed to be their belief
that a constitution, if granted in time, might prevent a revolu-
tionary movement such as had developed in Russia. These con-
servative reformers interpreted the Russian Revolution of 1905

as a struggle for a constitution, in which the leaders were
persons of rank and substance. To avoid bloodshed, Liang Ch'i-

ch*ao therefore urged his compatriots, especially Chinese land-
owners and capitalists, to take a stand in favor of a constitution.
The movement for a constitutional regime in China early
in 1905 was not confined solely to the reformers. Many in-
fluential Chinese monarchists, alarmed by the uprising against
Nicholas II in Russia, urgently demanded the introduction of

a constitution. They advised the Ch'ing Government to take
immediate action in order to avoid popular disturbances. 2*
go China
Otherwise, they warned, demagogues might exploit the people's

wrath to stir up revolution, thereby confronting the Empress
with a accompli. The granting of a constitution was for

fait
them, as for some Russian monarchists, the lesser evil, because

it presented no obstacles to the perpetuation of the ruling
29
dynasty.
The Manchu regime was slow to heed the urgent warnings
of Its
loyal monarchist supporters. As the momentum of revo-
lution was stepped up In Russia, however, the regime finally
made a gesture of appeasement toward the monarchist reform
wing. According to Min-pao, because of the great influence of
the constitutional struggle in Russia the Empress agreed to sum-
mon a consultative body to consider important political prob-
lems. 30 Although an agenda was drafted and the meeting was
set for March 6, 1905, no subsequent action was taken. The
Impression was given that the Empress was stalling for time.
More appeals were made, directly and indirectly, on the ground
would save the monarchy. The newspapers
that a constitution
Min-pao and Tung-fang-Tsa~chih (II, No. 4) published articles

by Chinese monarchists, attributing the Japanese victory to
the fact that Japan had a constitution, and Russian defeat to
the absence of a Russian constitution. 31
Until the summer of 1905, the mam efforts of these con-
servative reformersand monarchists were directed toward the
attainment of a constitution. As the revolutionary movement
In China spread and appeared to constitute a threat to the
dynasty, many of them transferred their efforts to the suppres-

sion of revolution. This about-face was encouraged by another
gesture on the part of the Ch'ing Government. On July 16,

1905, it undertook to send five Ministers abroad to study
foreign constitutional systems. When this decision was an-
nounced, there was great enthusiasm in the monarchist camp,
where It was Interpreted as an indication of the Government's
China gi
sincerity In moving toward a constitutional regime. 32 The mon-

archists promptly chided the revolutionists for their persistent
disbelief in the sincerity of the Ch'ing Government's intent to
reform.
In June 1905, Ministers Yuan Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-
tung, in order to forestall a repetition of the Russian Revolution
in China, advanced a plan for the establishment of a constitu-
tion within twelve years. Minister Tuan Fang, 33 on his return
from a trip to Russia, reported to the Empress Tz*u-hsi that
it was absolutely essential to study the steps taken in Russia
for the introduction of a constitution. According to him, the
Tsar was forced to agree to a constitution for his own personal
security, after having slept first in one room and then in another
in order to avoid assassination. Tuan Fang was convinced that
Russia's constitution was her only salvation under existing
circumstances. On the basis of the Russian experience, he con-
cluded thatit was likewise
indispensable for China to inaugu-
rate a constitutional regime. Since this could not be ac-
complished in China overnight, he advised the Government

to stall for time under the pretext of making the necessary
preparations for a constitution. The Ch'ing Government ac-
cepted Tuan Fang's recommendation and in 1906 declared it-
self ready to undertake preliminary arrangements for the
eventual introduction of a constitutional regime. In September
of the same year the Government issued its first decree per-
taining to the early introduction of a constitution.

After 1905, when it was no longer possible to halt the
spread of the revolutionary movement in China, the monarch-

ists severed their relations with the Ch'ing Government and
came out openly in support of Yuan Shih-k'ai and his followers*
Recent Communist interpretation of the Chinese Revolution
of 1911 has followed the same pattern as Soviet interpretation
of the Russian Revolution of 1905. In other words, the 1905
92 China
Revolution in Russia provides the indispensable background
for an understanding of Red Chinese evaluation of the Chinese
Revolution of 1911. Soviet and Red Chinese historians agree
that the real leadership in both revolutions Russian and
Chinese was provided by the intelligentsia and bourgeois
democrats, not by the proletariat. These leaders, they claim,
were interested primarily in political change of advantage to
them. Both revolutions were, therefore, bourgeois democratic,
not proletarian-socialist.
The objective of the revolutionists in both Russia and
China the overthrow of a semifeudal and decadent dynasty
was achieved by the "bourgeois democrats." The Chinese ac-
complished the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911. In
Russia, the same bourgeois forces that won a constitutional
regime in 1905 overthrew the Romanov dynasty in 1917. Com-

munists had nothing to offer either the intelligentsia or the
bourgeois forces which overthrew these dynasties, since the
political revolution they sought had been achieved. But in
achieving it, they either exhausted their strength or the victory
made them complacent. Communist leaders, most of whom
were themselves intellectuals of bourgeois origin, then turned
to the inarticulate masses.
A
comparative study of Chinese and Soviet sources inter-
preting their respective "bourgeois democratic** or "bourgeois
capitalist** revolutions leads to the conclusion that the pre-
requisite for a proletarian revolution is the overthrow of an
entrenched regime by the intelligentsia and the bourgeois cap-

italists. From the
standpoint of the Communists or proletarians,
these "bourgeois democrats" served as the guinea pigs who did
the spadework for their Communist successors.
In view of what happened in Russia and China, it is legiti-
mate to ask whether the intelligentsia and bourgeois democrats
should be expected to bring about a constitutional middle-
China 93
classregime only to become the precursors of a Communist or
proletarian revolution which inevitably destroys them. Are
they really expendable for the proletarian cause? The study
of the Russian and Chinese revolutions should cause the in-
tellectuals and
middle-class representatives in the emerging
nations of Asia and Africa today to ponder whether they are
ready to sacrifice their heritage and their leadership for the

benefit of the proletariat.
Today there isreason for hope in the
fact that in some Muslim countries of the Middle East the
forces that have carried out the political revolution are them-
assuming the leadership in securing social reform. They
selves
may be more successful than the Kadets and the T*ung-meng

Hui in bypassing a proletarian revolution.
CHAPTER SIX
India
"Once the Government resorts to repressive meas-

ures in the Russian spirit, then the Indian subjects
of England must imitate, at least in part, the
methods [of struggle] of the Russian people"
BAJL GANGADHAR TILAK
(190S)
Although India was subject to Great Britain, the impact of

the Russian Revolution of 1905 was felt there, both directly
from Tsarist Russia and indirectly from Iran, Turkey, and
China. So closely was the domestic situation in Russia related
to world conditions, according to the Times of India, that the
January 1905 disturbances in St. Petersburg evoked general

1
apprehension. In his opening address to the Indian National
Congress in 1906 Dadabhai Naoroji, "the grand old man of
India," a Moderate (Liberal) rather than an Extremist, him-
self raised the question.
At the very time that China in East Asia, and Persia in

West Asia, are awakening, when Japan has already awak-
ened, and Russia is struggling for liberation from despotism,
is itpossible for the free citizens of the British Empire in
India the people who were among the first to create world
civilizationto continue to remain under the yoke of des-
2
potism?
Commenting on the Shah's grant of a constitution to Iran,

where conditions were believed to be "barbarous" compared
94
India 95
to India, the Indian newspaper Gujarati (September 23, 1906)
confessed that Indians "cannot help envying the Persians/' s

The young Turk movement, according to Jawaharlal Nehru,
was regarded in India with mixed emotions, especially among
the Muslims, most of whom were in sympathy with the Sultan. 4
In the early years of the twentieth century, he points out, the
Muslim intelligentsia in India displayed great interest in other
Islamic countries, especially in the Ottoman Empire, the seat
of the Caliphate. Many of the younger Muslims, however, such
as Abul Kalam Azad, were enthusiastic about the Young Turk
program of constitutional government and social reform. In
1908, Azad was in contact with Iraqi, Arab, and Iranian revo-
lutionaries abroad as well as with Young Turks in Cairo, who
expressed surprise that Indian Muslims were content to remain
"mere camp followers of the British" instead of leading the
national struggle for freedom. 5 These contacts, according to
Azad's own admission, confirmed his political beliefs.
There were other external factors which created an impres-
sion on the receptive minds of discontented Indian intellectu-
als, who had grown impatient with British control. The Italian
defeat at the hands of the Ethiopians in 1896 revealed the
vulnerability of one Western power. The stubborn struggle of

the Boers in the South African War (1898-1900) lowered the
prestige of British arms in India. The Russo-Japanese War
(1904-05) was hailed as a striking blow to European ascendancy
in Asia, the first such triumph in several hundred years. It
opened new horizons to those Indians who worked for libera-

tion from the British "yoke." "If," as Sir Valentine Chirol in-
terpreted Indian reaction, "the young Asiatic David [Japan]

could smite down the European Goliath [Russia], what might
6
not 300,000,000 Indians dare to achieve?"
It is significant that the historians of twentieth-century
British India, with the exception of some Indian nationalists,
96 India
have been far more conscious of the impact of the Russo-

Japanese War on India than of the Russian Revolution of
1905, which they usually overlooked. This Is true even of such
a standard work as The Cambridge History of the British
Empire.
7
Sir Valentine Chirol, historian and journalist, while
taking cognizance of the Russo-Japanese War and Its reaction

on the Indian mind, In his contemporary accounts appeared to
be oblivious of the Russian Revolution of 1905. His later
works, however, published following World War I, Indicate a

strong awareness of Indian adoption of Russian revolutionary
tactics. 8 One logical deduction appears to be that the Bolshevik
Revolution of 1917 was an Important factor in producing an

awareness of the impact on India of the Russian Revolution
of 1905. An important contributing factor, undoubtedly, was
the publication in 1918 of the Report of the India Sedition
Committee (the Rowlatt Committee), which clearly revealed
the Influence of the Russian example and tactics on the Indian
9
nationalists, especially on the Extremists. In more recent years,
as in the case of other emerging nations, the tendency of Indian
historians to rewrite Indian history in the Indian rather than
In the British Image has brought to light additional informa-
tion as to the Russian impact on Indian leaders in the first
decade of the twentieth century. Finally, since World War II

10
Soviet historians have vigorously exploited the impact of the

Russian Revolution of 1905 as the prelude to India's national
liberation movement.
In the last analysis, the real explanation of the period of
Indian unrest, 1905 to 1908, which coincided with the first
Russian revolutionary movement, is to be found in domestic
conditions in India. As in the case of China, India had a long

record of mutinies and revolts against central authority and
foreign encroachment. The Indian Mutiny of 1857 st*& rankled

India 97
In the minds of Indian The
Indian National Congress,
patriots.
established In 1885, marked an important step forward in the
development of Indian political consciousness. Its emergence

at that particular time, however, Isnow being interpreted In
some quarters as "a precautionary move against an apprehended
Russian Invasion of India/' rather than as a response to Indian
national aspirations. 11 In other words, it was designed to divert
Indian agitation Into safe channels and to forestall Russian
efforts to foment trouble against Great Britain.
It was the policy of Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India (1898-

1905), that provided the occasion for the Indian crisis of 1905.
In particular, his educational reforms, which threatened the
interests of the politically conscious Intellectuals, and his
decision to partition Bengal brought an upsurge of national

sentiment coincident with the Russo-Japanese War and the
Russian Revolution of 1905. The Viceroy, himself, In 1905 was
the author of a state paper which drew a parallel between the
dangers confronting Tsardom in Russia and those threatening

British domination of India. 12
The consensus of Indian historians In recent years seems to
be that the Indian revolutionary movement was really set In
motion in igo5. 13 "In India," states Hirendranath Mukerjee,
"there began in 1905 a movement towards liberation of a kind
never known before." 14 He specifically attributes this move-
ment to the defeat of the Tsar and the First Russian Revolution
which, In spite of Its ultimate suppression, "opened the Hood-
gates of the people's movement" and produced an awakening

In the East. Another Indian historian of the freedom move-
ment, Major-General A. C. Chatterji, puts the Issue as follows:
It was from this time [1905] that the people of India began
to realise that the English would not be Influenced in the

least by the academic debate and discussions that were car-
gS India
ried on by the Indian National Congress. From this. . .
time onwards, revolutionary movements started. The ex-

treme section resorted to high explosive bombs and fire-
arms. 15
As in Russia, it was mainly the Indian intelligentsia and

members of the middle class, not the destitute and unorganized
masses that provided the leadership for the years of Indian
unrest, 1905-08. Soviet, as well as Western historians, have
recognized this fact.

18
Viscount Morley, who assumed the
direction of the India Office in 1905, at the time of Lord
Curzon's departure from India, observed in his Recollections 17
that it was "the fairly educated Indians" who were thoroughly
dissatisfied with the old order and who took note of the
Japanese victories and the revolutionary movements in Turkey,

China, and Persia.
The Indian nationalist leader who set the tone for much
of the political thought and action in India from 1885 to 1920,
and especially from 1895 was Bal Gangadhar (Loka-
to 1908,
manya) Tilak (1856-1920), sometimes known as "the father

of Indian unrest." 1S Since 1956, the looth anniversary of his
birth, Soviet historians have been emphasizing Tilak' s "great

progressive role" as the first Indian to raise the banner of in-
19
dependence.
Tilak was a Chitpawan Brahman from Poona, a Sanskrit
scholar, and a journalist of some repute. In the closing decades
of the nineteenth century he emerged as a champion of Hindu
orthodoxy, a leader of the movement for "national" schools

and colleges to offset Western influence and to produce a
renaissance o Hindu culture. Among the first to discern that
the coniict of interest between the British rulers and the
Indian ruled was irreconcilable and incapable of solution
through petitions and protests, his guiding passion was the
termination of British domination of India. For him, political
India 99
emancipation was the prerequisite to the solution of all other

matters of concern to the Indian people.
As a result, Tilak broke away from the Moderates (Liberals),
who sought redress from the British administration, and be-
came the acknowledged leader of the Indian Extremists. By his
speeches, the organization of mass meetings, the establishment

of press organs such as the journal Mahratta and the news-
paper Kesari, and his activity in the Indian National Congress*

Tilak won a large following throughout India, especially
among students and youth. This popularity stood him in good

stead when he was sentenced to six years imprisonment in
1897 for seditious activity, and secured his release in September

1898. His second period of political activity coincided with
the years of Indian unrest, 1905-1908, during which time he
was the prime instigator of disaffection aimed at British rule.
Jawaharlal Nehru, who has called Tilak "the real symbol of
the new age/* claims that in his 1907 clash with the Indian
National Congress the sympathy of "the majority of politically
minded people in India" was with Tilak and his followers
20
rather than with the Congress. Another Indian admirer has
credited Tilak with having "Indianized" the Congress move-
ment and brought it to the masses. 21
Tilak was not one to overlook either the significance of
the Russo-Japanese War or the Russian Revolution of 1905.
On June 4, he conducted a public meeting in Poona to
1905,
congratulate the Japanese on their recent military
and naval
successes, emphasizing the effect of this conflict in the Far
East and importance in exploding the myth of European

its
ascendancy over Asia. 23 Next to the Japanese victory in Asia,
however, it was the Russian Revolution of 1905 which im-

and determined the course of his political and
pressed Tilak
nationalist activities for the rest of his life.
23 The extent of
this impact was evinced in his speeches, articles, and associa-

loo India
tions. It was epitomized in the statement he made at his trial
in July 1908:
Once the Government resorts to repressive measures in

the Russian spirit, then the Indian subjects of England
must imitate, at least in part, the methods [of struggle] of
the Russian people. 24
Nehru himself has confirmed the fact that the Russian Social
Revolutionists, who incited and performed acts of terrorism,
exercised some influence on Tilak and the Extremists. 25
Although Tilak inherently abhorred violence, in following
the course of the Russian Revolution of 1905 he was impressed
by the results achieved by acts of terrorism and armed uprisings.

His newspaper, Kesari, which had grown steadily in influence
and popularity since its founding in 1898, served to incite
such disturbances in India. By 1907 its circulation had reached
20,000 copies per week. Among its favorite topics were the
comparison of Tsarist autocracy and British administration in
India, the alleged "Russianization" of the Indian administra-
tion,and the consequent need for Indians to adopt Russian
methods of agitation in dealing with the British regime. 26
Tilak and his followers were members of the intelligentsia,
but after the Russian Revolution of 1905 they soon recognized
the need to work among, and to organize, the laboring masses
In accordance with patterns already established in England,
the United States, and Russia. Only by such means, Tilak
contended, could the grievances of the people be placed be-
fore Government authorities and strikes become effective. 27
In the early years of the twentieth century, India had the

largest proletariat in Asia 1,200,000 industrial laborers. In
1905 there were 1,545 factories employing 632,636 workers, of
whom 93,000 were women and 38,000 children. The vast
majority of these workers were employed in the textile and
India 101
railroad industries located in Bombay, Calcutta,and Madras. 28

In such industries, the fifteen-hour day was prevalent and
some workers labored for twenty or twenty-two hours. In India,
as in Russia, these conditions bred discontent and unrest.
Workers' organizations were just emerging in India at the

beginning of the twentieth century; the Kamgar Sakhiakari
Mandli was organized in Bombay in 1904 and the Maratta
Aik'ia Itchu Sabha in 1905. At the end of September 1905, the
latter organized a mass meeting of 8,000 laborers who, in terms
reminiscent of Father Gapon's activity in St. Petersburg, passed

a resolution to petition the Viceroy to end the inhuman prac-
tice of overloading the workers and to establish a twelve-hour
working day.
As in the case of Father Gapon in Russia and the Shi'ah
ulema in Iran, Hindoo religious preachers in India were in
daily touch with factory workers. Many of these religious
leaders helped to spread the Tilak gospel among the millhands
Bombay and other cities. The tone of the propaganda

29
in
disseminated among the workers was strongly anti-British and
every effort was made to educate them to support the boycott.

Tilak himself addressed the millhands of Bombay in order to
indoctrinate them with his belief that swadeshi (native industry;
economic independence) was the only remedy for starvation
and destitution.
As a result of these tactics and in response to the unpopular
partition of Bengal, strikes in Indian factories increased in
1905. In 1906, during the first strike on the East Indian Rail-
road, the laborers demanded higher wages, better housing, and
vacations. As an indication of growing national consciousness
(at least among
their leaders) they called for the substitution
of the term "Indian" for "native/*
Tilak's arrest on June 24, 1908, and his trial in July, pro-
duced an upsurge of unrest and a series of sporadic strikes
1O2 India
among factory workers. The Bombay Millhands Defense As-

sociation was organized to express sympathy for the father of
Indian unrest. Tilak's twenty-one hour speech at his trial was
printed and dispatched far-and-wide throughout India. In the
course of his remarks, he claimed that India was on the thresh-
old of a great constitutional struggle which would put an end
to unrestricted bureaucratic rule. Even at this time, Tilak
made reference to the Russian revolutionary movement in
order to illustrate the justice of the Indian cause. On his con-
viction, there occurred a succession of strikes in mills and
railway workshops, fomented for the most part by Hindoo

workers rather than by Muslims.
30
According to the Bombay Commissioner of Police, there
was no unanimity or integrated organization among Indian
workers, nor did they have firearms. He was clearly apprehen-
sive, however, that the time was not far distant when conditions
would be different. The labor disturbances in Bombay from
June 29 to July 27, 1908, represented the first substantial ex-
pression of popular discontent among Indian workers.

By 1905 Tilak and his followers were convinced that Swaraj
(self-government; political Independence) could not be won
without an eventual resort to force. Since most of the Ex-
tremists were from the intelligentsia and middle class, and
had or no practical experience in military tactics and
little
physical training, to attain their objectives they encouraged the

infiltration of the armed forces and the pursuit of military and
gymnastic training by Indian youths. In 1905 and early in

1906 Tilak himself approached the Russian consuls Tcherkin
and Klemm Bombay, seeking ways and means of sending
in
Indian youths abroad to European military schools for train-
ing- He wished that the future officers of the Indian Army
should not be imbued with British "propaganda," but with
the determination to oust the British from India.31 In 1906,
India 103
perhaps as a result of his activity, one Indian student was sent

to Switzerland for military training.
More promising results were obtained through the infiltra-
tion of the armed and the spread of propaganda

forces in India
among Indian soldiers stationed abroad in such posts as Hong-

Kong. Sikh Emigres to the United States, on April 25, 1907,
appealed to Indian troops (through the newspaper India)
to riseand cast off the British "yoke."
Tilak and his followers watched the military tactics of the
revolutionary movement in Russia with keen interest. Some
of them were under the impression that Russian officers- sym-
pathized with and supported the "patriots." Tilak himself

attributed the failure of the Russian Revolution of 1905 to
the Tsarist regime's modern military equipment, which was
used to suppress the uprising.32
As one of the foremost champions of swadeshi the boycott
of British goods with a view to the encouragement of Indian
industry Tilak approached the Russian consul In Bombay,

seeking Introductions to Russian firms In order to purchase
machinery for the establishment of Indian factories. This ap-
peal to the Russians for economic and technical aid was no
more productive than his efforts on behalf of military training,
Tilak was urged to look elsewhere on the ground that under
33
existing conditions In Russia such assistance was not feasible.
It Is significant, however, that Tilak and his Extremists felt
sufficiently confident of the revolutionary bent and sympathetic
response of the Russian people to expect aid for an Indian

revolution.
Tilak closely scrutinized both the tactics of the Russian
revolutionaries and those of the Tsarist regime. At a meeting
In Nasik in 1906 he discoursed on Russian methods of inciting
unrest, pointing out that the Russian people, students, and
lawyers joined forces In the straggle for liberty/

4
The 1m-
1O4 India
plication, of course, was that Indians should coordinate their

efforts in the struggle for national liberation from England.
Tilak's speeches and his newspaper, Kesari, contain frequent
comparisons between the policy of the Tsarist Government
and that of the British bureaucracy in India. Protesting a
Government of India circular prohibiting students from taking
part in political activity, he termed the measure "oppressive,

30 In
annoying, and Russian/' spite of the fact that in Russia,
as in India,newspapers were suppressed, editors sentenced and
deported, he assured his audience that the Russians had
achieved at least fifty per cent of their demands, and that the
Indians would be no less successful
Tilak and the Extremists were not the only ones to compare
the Indian bureaucracy with the Tsarist administration. Lord
Morley placed the blame for Indian acts of terrorism and

"unrest" squarely on the shoulders of British bureaucrats in
India, whomhe appropriately labelled "Tchinovniks/* 3e He
likewise found occasion to compare British deportation and
imprisonment of Indians with Siberian exile under the Tsarist

regime. Although Tsarist policy was designed to frighten the
anarchists out of their wits, Lord Morley noted that it not
only failed to achieve its purpose in Russia, but it did not save
Russia from a Duma. 37
Tilak's arrest and imprisonment in 1908 for the publication
of "seditious" articles in Kesari, which justified revolution
and denounced British rule as foreign domination, struck a
severe blow to the Indian Nationalist movement* The move-
ment did not die, however, because Tilak and his followers
had trained their successors.
The network of secret societies that spread throughout India
before the Russian Revolution and during the years of 1905-
190*7 provided a ready means for the dissemination of the Tilak

India 105
program and of even more radical revolutionary propaganda.

The organization and tactics of these societies reveal the im-
pact of the Russian revolutionary movement and of Russian
Nihilism. In the words of Shijarnaji Krishnavarma, editor of
the Indian Sociologist:
It seems that any agitation in India must be carried on

secretly and that the only methods which can bring the
English Government to its senses are the Russian methods
vigorously and incessantly applied until the English relax
their tyranny and are driven out of the country. 38
Some of the material unearthed by the East India Sedition

Committee (1918) and that collected by the Government of
Bombay (1958) to form the basis of a history of the freedom
movement in India read like a chapter from Dostoyevsky's The
Possessed*
The Mitra Mela> a secret society established about 1899
in Nasik and composed largely of young Brahmans, was led by
two well-known revolutionaries, the brothers Ganesh and
Vinayak Savarkar, both of whom were disciples of Tilak and
familiar with Russian revolutionary and anarchistic tactics.
They conducted secret meetings where the biographies of

patriotic revolutionists Mazzini, Shivaji Ramdas were stud-
ied; they composed revolutionary songs, emphasized physical
training, campaigned for the collection of arms and ammuni-
tion, and discussed the ways and means of driving the British
out of India. When Ganesh was arrested in June 1908, a copy
of "How the Russians Organize a Revolution" was found on
his person. 46 In his home, police investigators located a well-
thumbed copy of "Forst's Secret Societies of the European
Revolution, 1776-1876," which described the secret organiza-

41
tions of the Russian Nihilists.
io6 India
By 1906, because o the efforts of the Savarkar brothers, the

Mitra Mela developed into a more extensive secret society
known as the Abhinav B karat (Young India). Its objectives

were clearly revolutionary and beyond what Tilak himself had
envisaged. According to the Sedition Committee, Young India
was obviously founded on Russian models.42 In general, the
pattern was similar to that o its predecessor revolutionary
songs, secret oaths, and the study of the Russian Nihilists.
Small groups or Russian term was kruzhki} were

circles (the
established whose members had no contacts with one another
although they had common and secured bombs,

objectives
as well as manuals and other literature, from a common
source. This association was in touch with Indian anarchists in
Paris and had members ia India House, in London, a center for
the dissemination of seditious literature. Its chief goal was to

paralyze the British bureaucracy in India by a series of assassina-
tions and dacoities (robberies carried out by bands). Since
these were certain to produce reprisals, the association ex-
pected to have its own martyrs, a situation which in turn

would arouse the populace.
The Anusilan Samiti, which began as a society for the promo-
tion of culture and training under the leadership of Barinda
and Abarinda Ghosh, was strongly influenced by Russian
methods.48 One of the strongest and most widespread of the
secret associations, it expanded from centers like Dacca, in
Eastern Bengal, which had 500 branches, to Calcutta, Benares,
and other parts of India. Its objective was to create and build
up public opinion through newspapers, leaflets, songs, lectures,
secret meetings, and so on all intended to promote "unrest."

One of the press organs of this society was Jugantar (New
Era); it was established in March 1906 and by 1907 had a
circulation of 7,000. The issue of August 12, 1907, encouraged
India 107
the Indian manufacture of weapons, pointing out that "the
very large number of bombs" manufactured in Russia came

from the secret factories of the Russian revolutionists. 44 The
same issue encouraged the infiltration of the Indian Army,
just as Russian revolutionaries had established themselves
among the Tsar's forces in Russia, with the object of subse-
quently going over to the revolution and taking their weapons

with them. In India this was not easy, since the British ad-
ministration preferred to recruit its forces from the more
reliable Sikhs and Muslims than from the Hindoos,
As in the case of Russian societies, branches of the Anusilan
Samiti successfully penetrated the Indian school system, stirring
youthful imaginations with tales of patriotism and daring, im-

buing students with a desire to serve their country, and en-
listing their services as messengers or in some other minor
capacity until they were inextricably enmeshed in conspiracy,
The Anusilan Samiti provided a variety of "textbooks" and
guides for its members. Among them were the Bhagamd Gita,
the biographies of Indian and foreign revolutionaries, and the
Bhawani Mandir, a pamphlet published in 1905 which outlined
revolutionary objectives and attributed Japanese success against
Russia to the strength of Japanese religious sentiment. An-
other pamphlet, Bartaman Ramanati (The Modem Art of
War), which appeared in October 1907 preached the in-

evitability of war whenever oppression was perpetuated and
could not be cast off by less drastic means. The Anusilan
Samiti was suppressed in Dacca in 1908, but continued its
activities in Calcutta and stirred up dissension against British
rule during World War I.
During the investigation of a robbery in Calcutta in Septem-

ber 1909, documents were discovered which afforded further
evidence of the study and use by Indian revolutionists of
io8 India
Russian revolutionary tactics. The first of these documents was

entitled "General Principles/' which were based on the history
of the Russian revolutionary movement. 45
1) A well-coordinated organization of all revolutionary ele-
ments in the country.
2) The division of the organization
into different branches
or departments, including military, finance, and terror, the
members of each being unknown to the others.
3) Severe discipline, especially
in the military and terroristic
branches, members of which were expected to make the su-
preme sacrificewhen necessary.

4) The observance of strict secrecy.
5) The use of paroles, ciphers, and so on in connection with
conspiracy.
6) The
gradual development of action, beginning with the
organization of an educated nucleus, which would then dis-
seminate ideas among the masses. Next came the organization
of "technicalmeans" (military and terror), followed by agita-
tion culminating in rebellion.
The second document described fifty years of Russian revolu-
tionary activity and presented the function of the terrorist

department of the Russian revolutionaries, which included
dacoities and assassinations. As the Rowlatt Committee re-
ported in 1918;
The revolutionary societies in Bengal infected the prin-

ciples and rules advocated in Bhawani Mandir with the
Russian ideas of revolutionary violence.46
With the passage of time, the religious elements in this strange

mixture of propaganda faded into the background and terror-
ism predominated. From 1906 until the issuing of the Sedition
Report in 1918 there were 210 revolutionary outrages in Bengal
India 109
and 101 such attempts, involving altogether 1,038 persons. 47
Mikhail Pavlovitch, during a sojourn in Paris on the eve
of World War I, 1909 to 1914, mingled with Indian revolu-
tionary emigres in that city. In an article, "Revolutionary
Silhouettes," he refers in particular to an Indian woman named
Kama, who served Indian emigres in Europe. 48
as leader of the
Kama, he reported, was greatly interested in the Russian

Revolution of 1905 and very much impressed by the Russian
writer Maxim Gorky.
British, Indian, and Soviet sources all provide evidence of
the impact of the Russian Revolution of 1905 on Un-
India.
likeTurkey, Iran, and China, India at that time was not an
independent state, but a part o the British Empire. Nor did
India have a common boundary with Tsarist Russia or a
migratory population that imbibed Russian revolutionary prin-

ciples and tactics at first hand. To Indian nationalists, however,
Russian autocracy appeared to have its counterpart in British
administration of India. The example of the Russian revolu-
tionists, although not always clearly or accurately interpreted
in India, intensified Indian revolutionary and Nihilistic ac-
tivity and the use of Russian techniques to achieve national

liberation. Although there was a revolutionary movement,
marked by strikes and terrorism, with independence as its ob-
jective, there was no revolution in India comparable to those
1
in Iran, Turkey, and China. The period of "Indian unrest/

intensified by the Russian Revolution of 1905, nevertheless
marked an important step in the direction of Indian national
independence.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusions
From a study of the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the

chain of revolutions and revolutionary movements it helped to
set in motion, certain conclusions can be drawn. All these
revolutions were initiated and led by the intelligentsia of the
upper and middle classes. The motives for their participation

may have but the leadership was basically the same.
differed,
In these revolutions there was no proletarian leadership, ex-
cept as a minor auxiliary force.
The experience of the Revolution of 1905 and those that
followed in its wake indicates that where autocratic govern-
ment political revolution, even if successful, is not
exists,
enough. Social changes should accompany political transforma-

tion. The satisfaction of the major part of the intelligentsia
with the inauguration of a constitutional regime and their
willingness to bring the revolution to a halt at that point
afforded an opportunity to others to proletarian leaders
to organize and work for a social revolution. This was what
happened in Russia in 1917, when the Bolsheviks took over

the reins of power from the Provisional Government, and in
China after World War II, with the rise to power of Mao
Tse-tung. Today, the same problem confronts the emerging
nations of Asia and Africa, where political independence
should go hand in hand with economic and social transforma-
tion. Otherwise the new regimes may serve as stepping stones
to the establishment of Communist governments. This transi-
110
Conclusions 1 1 1
tion was contemplated by the "Programs of the Communist

Parties of the East/' drafted from 1928 to 1931 and published
In 1934, which are still being Implemented In Asia.*
This study of revolution likewise suggests why Islam has
acquired such a hold on the Islamic peoples. In the Muslim
lands of Turkey and Iran, revolution found the Muslim re-
ligious leaders supporting the revolutionary cause against en-

trenched autocratic misrule. Taking their stand on Islamic
law and in support of justice, they rendered vital assistance
at a critical stage of the revolutionary movements In the lands
of the Caliph and the Shah. In Iran, at that time, there was
no appreciable lay Intelligentsia. There the mullahs and the
ulema, the religious Intelligentsia, were to be found in the
vanguard of the revolution against the tyranny of the Shah,

their object being to re-establish social justice, even at the
expense of the overthrow of the government. They were not

tools of the government; nor did they kowtow to the masses of
the people. In both Turkey and Iran they provided a real
deterrent to the emergence of extreme radical movements, such
as occurred in Russia. Their basic concern was that justice,
the cardinal point of Islam, should prevail. Therefore they
enjoyed the confidence of all strata of society.

As this study has shown, the Russian Revolution of 1905
did have a strong Impact on Asian countries, especially on
Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and China, as well as on the "Ex-
tremists" of the budding Indian nationalist movement. It
created an effervescent atmosphere, in which the overthrow of
autocracy or of an Imperialist overlord came within the realm

of possibility once the Autocrat of All the Russias was forced
to grant a constitution. stimulating the struggle against
By
foreign intervention and control, tolerated by decadent auto-
*See ITOT Specter, The Scmet Union and the Muslim World,
pp, 104-80.
us Conclusions
cratic regimes, helped to pave the way for the rise and
It In-
tensification of nationalism and anti-colonialism in Asia.

The Impact on Asia of the Russian Revolution of 1905 was,
with few exceptions, generally overlooked by the Soviets, at
least until the Fifties, because It was overshadowed by the
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. By comparison with the October

Revolution of 1917, the Revolution of 1905 was not, In their
opinion, a genuine revolution, but only a rehearsal for one,
In the first place, the Revolution of 1905, as envisaged by
the Soviets, was limited In scope to Russia. The purpose of
the Bolsheviks, on the other hand, was world-wide revolution
a transformation of the universe. It was apocalyptic
literally
In nature. The Revolution of 1905 stood for partial adjust-
ment, with political changes to be followed gradually by social
reforms. The Bolsheviks sought to achieve a complete trans-
formation of all Russian Institutions, political, social, and

economic, at one fell swoop. Moreover, the Revolution of
1905 had a target a constitution for Russia and when that
goal was achieved, the nation In general withdrew its support
from the minority of extremists which sought to continue the
revolution. To the Bolsheviks, on the other hand, revolution
was something permanent, as interpreted by Trotsky, by
Vladimir Mayakovsky in his play Mystery-Bouffe, and by
Boris Pllnyak in his novel The Volga Falls to the Caspian Sea.
In their negotiations with the West since World War II, the
Soviets have revealed a similar outlook in their demands for
complete disarmament, as against the partial or step-by-step

procedures recommended by the Western powers.
In the second place, the Soviets, with a few exceptions such
as Lenin and Mikhail Pavlovitch, were slow to appreciate the
Impact of the Revolution of 1905 on Asia, slow to realize that

In many respects it had for Asians a stronger appeal than did
the Revolution of 1917. Once Soviet leaders grasped its sig-
Conclusions 113
nificance, as in the Fifties, they proceeded toadopt it as their

own and to make it an integral part of the October Revolution
of 1917 a stepping stone to world revolution by asserting
that the real leadership in 1905 was provided by the Bolsheviks.
Since the Revolution of 1905 was national in scope and con-
tributed greatly to nationalist movements in Asia, the Soviets
have found it to their advantage to continue to instigate among
the emerging nations revolutions of the 1905 vintage rather
than that of 1917. Thus they have used a nationalist tool to
achieve a Communist objective. As recently as June 10, 1961
(Pravda, June 11, 1961), Achmed Sukarno, President and
Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, in a Moscow
speech reminded Soviet leaders that what is going on in Asia
and Africa is national, not international or world, revolution
and that recognition of this fact is basic to an understanding
of the peoples of these two continents.
The study of the Revolution of 1905 is
indispensable to an
understanding of the Russian Revolution of 1917. It likewise
provides a key to what is taking place in Asia and Africa today.
Unless there is more intensive research on this revolution in
the West, and also in those Asian countries that were influenced
by the Soviet interpretation, which since 1955 has been

it,
widely disseminated in Asia and Africa, may ultimately prevail.

Appendixes
APPENDIX ONE
Petition of the Workers and Residents

of St. Petersburg
for Submission to Nicholas II
on January 9, 1905
SIRE!
We, the workers and residents of the city of St. Petersburg, of
various ranks and stations, our wives, children, and helpless old
people our parents, have come to you, Sire, to seek justice and
protection. We have become destitute,, we are being persecuted,
we are overburdened with work, we are being insulted, we are not
regarded as human beings, we are treated as slaves who must endure
their bitter fate in silence. We have suffered, but even so we are
being pushed more and more into the pool of poverty, disfranchise-
ment, and ignorance. We are being stifled by despotism and arbitrary
rule, and we are gasping for breath. We have no strength left, Sire.
We have reached the limit of endurance. For us that terrible

moment has arrived, when death is preferable to the continuance
of unbearable torture.
And so we stopped work and declared to our bosses that we will
not resume work until our demands are met. We have not asked
for much. We only want what is indispensable to life, without
which there is nothing but hard labor and eternal torture. Our
first
request was that our bosses should discuss our needs with us.
But this they refused to do they denied us the light to speak
about our needs, saying that, according to the law, we had no
such right. Our requests likewise were considered unlawful: the
117
n8 Appendixes
reduction of the working day to eight hours; the establishment of
wage levels in consultation with us and with our consent; the

investigation of our misunderstandings with the lower echelons of
factory administration; wage increases for unskilled laborers and
women up to one ruble per day; the abolition of overtime; pro-
vision for medical aid, administered attentively, carefully, and with-
out abuse; the construction of factories so that it is
possible to work
in them without dying from horrible drafts, rain, and snow.
All this seemed, according to our bosses in the factory and
foundry administration to be unlawful, every one of our requests

is regarded as a crime, and our desire to improve our plight is
interpreted as outrageous insolence.

Sire, we are many thousands here; but
us merely resemble
all of
human beings in reality, however, not only we, but the entire
Russian people, enjoy not a single human right, not even the right
to speak, to think, to assemble, to discuss our needs, to take
measures to improve our plight.
We have been enslaved, and enslaved under the auspices of your
officials, with their aid, and with their cooperation. Every one of
us who has the temerity to raise his voice in defence of the interests
of the working class and the people is thrown into jail and sent
Into exile. We
are punished for a good heart and for a sympathetic
soul as we would be for a crime. To feel compassion for an op-
pressed, disfranchised, tortured man this is tantamount to a fla-
grant crime. All the working people and the peasants are at the
mercy of the bureaucratic government, comprised of embezzlers
of public funds and thieves, who not only disregard the interests
of the people, but defy these interests. The bureaucratic
govern-
ment has brought the country to complete ruin, has
imposed upon
it a disgraceful war, and leads Russia on and on to destruction.
We* the workers and the people, have no voice whatsoever in the
expenditure of the huge sums extorted from us. We do not even
know whither and for what the money collected from the im-
poverished people goes. The people are deprived of the opportunity
to express their wishes and demands, to take
part in levying taxes
Appendixes 119
and their expenditure. The workers are deprived of the possibility
of organizing unions for the protection of their Interests.
Sire! Is this In accordance with God's laws, by the grace of which
you reign? Is It possible to live under such laws? Isn't It better to
die for all of us, the toiling people of all Russia, to die? Let the
capitalist-exploiters the working class, the bureaucratic em-

of
bezzlers, and the plunderers of the Russian people live and enjoy
life. This is the dilemma before us, Sire, and this Is why we have
assembled before the wails of your palace. This is our last resort.
Don't refuse to help your people, lead them out of the grave of
disfranchlsement, poverty, and Ignorance, give them an opportunity
to determine their own fate, and cast off the unbearable yoke of
the bureaucrats. Tear down you and your people,
the wall between
and let them rule the country with you. You have been placed on
the throne for the happiness of the people, but the bureaucrats
snatch this happiness from our hands, and It never reaches us. All
we get Is grief and humiliation. Look without anger, attentively,
at our requests; they are not Intended for an evil, but for a good
cause, for both of us, Sire. We do not talk arrogantly, but from a
realization of the necessity to extricate ourselves from a plight un-
bearable to all of us. Russia Is too vast, her needs too diverse and
numerous to be run only by bureaucrats. It is necessary to have
popular representation, necessary that the people help them-
It Is
selves and govern themselves. Only they know their real needs,
Bo not reject their help; take It; command at once, forthwith, that
there be summoned
the representatives of the land of Russia from
all classes, all strata, Including also the representatives of the
workers. Let there be a capitalist, a worker, a bureaucrat, a priest,

a doctor, and a teacher let them all, whoever they are, elect their
own representatives. Let everyone be equal and free In the matter
of suffrage, and for that purpose command that the elections for
the Constituent Assembly be carried out on the basis of universal,
secret, and equal suffrage.
This Is our chief request; In it and upon It everything else Is
based; this is the main and sole bandage for our painful wounds,
iso Appendixes
without which these wounds will bleed badly and will soon bring
us to our death.
But one measure cannot heal our wounds. Still others are neces-
sary, and, directly and frankly, as to a father,
we tell you, Sire,
in the name of all the toiling masses of Russia what they are.
The following measures are indispensable:
I. Measures to eliminate the Ignorance and Disfranchisement
of the Russian People.
1. The immediate release and return of all those who have
suffered for their political and religious convictions, for strikes, and
peasant disorders.
2. An immediate declaration of personal freedom and in-
violability, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assembly,
and freedom of conscience in regard to religion.
3. Universal and compulsory popular education financed by
the state.
4. Responsibility of the Ministers to the people and a guaran-

tee of rule by law.
5. Equality of everyone, without exception, before the law.
6. Separation of church and state.
II. Measures to eliminate the Poverty of the People.
1. Abolition of indirect taxation and the substitution of direct,
progressive income taxes.

2. Abolition of redemption payments, low interest rates, and
the gradual transfer of the land to the people.
5. Procurement orders for the Navy Department must be
placed in Russia and not abroad.

4. Termination of the war by the will of the people.
III. Measures to eliminate the Yoke of Capital over Labor.
Abolition of the institution of factory inspectors.
1.
2. Establishment at the factories and foundries of permanent
committees chosen by the workers, which, together with the ad-

ministration, would examine all claims of individual workers. The
discharge of a worker cannot take place other than by the de-
cision of this committee.
Appendixes 121
3. Immediate freedom for consumer and trade unions.

4. An eight-hour working day and standardization of over-
time.
5. Immediate freedom for the struggle between labor and

capital.
6. Immediate introduction of a minimum wage.
7. Immediate participation of representatives of the working
classes in the drafting of a bill for state insurance of workers.
These, Sire, are our chief needs,concerning which we have
come to you. Only by their satisfaction will the liberation of our
Motherland from slavery and poverty be possible; only thus can
it
only this will make it possible
flourish; for the workers to
organize for the protection of their interests from the brazen ex-
ploitation of the capitalists and government bureaucrats, who
plunder and choke the people. Issue decrees for this purpose and
swear to carry them out, and you will make Russia both happy
and famous, and your name will be engraved in our hearts and
in those of our posterity forever. And if you do not so decree,
and do not respond our supplication, we will die here, in this
to
square, in front of your palace. We have nowhere else to go and it

is useless to go. There are only two roads open to us; one toward
freedom and happiness, the other toward the grave. Let our lives
be thesacrifice for suffering Russia. We do not regret this sacrifice.
We are glad to make it.

GEORGE GAPON, Priest
IVAN VASIMOV, Worker
N. S. Tmsova, et aL f eds. Natchalo Perv&i russkoi Tcvoiivtsii, yamw*- mart

* 9 5 goda. AN SSSR, Moscow, 1955,No. 21, pp. 28-51.
For another translation of the Gapon petition, see James Mavor, An Economic
History of Russia, 2nd ed. (London, 1925), II, 469-73.
*
APPENDIX TWO
The Revolution of 1905

and the East
by M. Pavlovitch
The Revolution of 1905. The Russo-Japanese War and the

East. Lenin on the Results of the Russo-Japanese War.
In a prophetic article, "The Fall of Port Arthur/* published in
Yperyod several days prior to January 9 to be precise, on January

1, 1905 Comrade Lenin explained as follows the role of the un-
successful war with Japan as a mighty propaganda weapon, as the
greatest revolutionary factor:
"The military might of autocratic Russia proved to be trumpery.
Tsarism proved to be an obstacle to contemporary military organi-
zation, which was at a high level, and to which Tsarism was devoted
with all its heart, of which it was more and more proud, and for
which it made unlimited sacrifices, not being blocked by any popu-
lar opposition. A
beautiful apple rotten at the core that is what
the autocracy proved to be in the sphere of external defence,
which was, so to speak, its own particular specialty.
"But why and to what extent does the fall of Port Arthur con-
stitute a real historic catastrophe?
"First of all, we are struck by the significance of this event for
the course of the war. The Japanese have accomplished the main
M. Pavlovitch, "SSSR i Vostok," Revolyutsiannyi Vostok, Part I (Moscow-
Leningrad, 1927), pp. 21-35. This article, by the editor of Navyi Vostok, pub-
lished to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution of 1905,
is the earliest Soviet
interpretation of the impact of that revolution on Asia.
Appendixes 123
goal of the war. A progressive and advanced Asia has inflicted an

irreparable blow on a backward and reactionary Europe. Ten years
ago this reactionary Europe (with Russia at the head) became dis-
turbed over the defeat of China by young Japan and united to
deprive her of the best fruits of victory. Europe preserved the es-
tablished relations and privileges of the old world,, its prerogative,
hallowed by centuries^ its primordial right, to exploit the Asian
peoples. The return of Port Arthur to Japan is a blow, inflicted

on reactionary Europe. Russia held Port Arthur for six years,
having spent hundreds and hundreds of millions of rubles on
strategic railroads, on the construction of ports, on building new
cities, on strengthening fortifications, which the whole mass of
European papers, bribed by Russia, hailed as impregnable. Military

writers say that in strength Port Arthur was equal to six Sevasto-
pols. And
behold, a small, hitherto universally despised Japan took
possession of this citadel in eight months, whereas England and
France together took a whole year to seize one Sevastopol."
And we know that events have substantiated the forecast of
Lenin.The fact that little Japan could defeat gigantic Russia,
up enemy of all the Asian peoples, made
to that time the frightful
the strongest impression on the inhabitants of all Asia. The little
Japanese defeated the strongest military power in Europe. How did

they achieve this? They took lessons from Europe itself and adopted
European Institutions.
The Russian Revolution of 1905 made an even greater im-
pression on the peoples of the East. In the life of the Asian peoples
the Russian Revolution played the same tremendous role as the
great French Revolution formerly played in the lives of the
Europeans.
After the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of
1905, we an upsurge of the liberation movement in Persia* the

see
general strike in August 1906 in Teheran, the calling of the first
Majlis (Parliament) in October of the same year, followed by the

strengthening of the Young Turk movement In Turkey, cul-
minating in the Revolution of 1908 which broke Into smithereens
124 Appendixes
the foundations of the despotic power of the blood-smeared Sultan,
Abdul-Hamid; and thereafter, the revolutionary movement in
China, culminating in the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and
the proclamation of the Republic in 1911.
After the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of
1905, the national liberation movement throughout the East began

to develop a stronger tempo, both as a struggle against internal
reaction and the despotic regime in their own countries, as well

as against the yoke of the imperialistic European powers, who
transformed the entire East into a colony of world capitalism.
For many centuries the Asian looked with fear and trembling on
the European, regarding the latter as an evil and perfidious, but
at the same time as an invincible enemy, the scourge of God,
conflict with whom to failure and accompanied by
was doomed
cruel punishment. Liaotung and Mukden, the retreat of the
countless armies of the White Tsar, the mightiest ruler in Europe,
before the yellow-skinned soldiers of little Japan seemed to have
opened the eyes of the Asians and demonstrated to them that the
struggle with Europe was possible, and that with proper organiza-
tion and persistent onslaught of the yellow masses it must lead to
At the very moment when the hitherto terrifying double
victory.
eagle was unexpectedly defeated, and when, according to VI.

Solovyov, pieces of its banners were given to yellow children to
play with, the hitherto slumbering Asia woke up forthwith to a
new life.
The Political and Economic Premises of the National

Liberation Movement in the Twentieth Century
The decade which preceded the Russo-Japanese War and the

Russian Revolution of 1905 was an epoch of special intensification
of the onslaught of the capitalist powers on the black and yellow
continents. Thus, as regards the Middle Empire, the period be-
ginning with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, which severed from

China a number of its territories, may be characterized as the
Appendixes 125
period of the intensification of the dismemberment of China by

the world plunderers. Germany seized the province of Klaochow,
with the port of Tslngtao; Russia Port Arthur and Dairen;
England grabbed from China Welhaiwei and the territory lying
along the mainland opposite Hongkong; France added to Its posses-
sions Kwangchowan and rounded out Its territory at the expense of
China, In order not to be overtaken In the struggle for the parti-

tion ofChina by the other plunderers. The United States In 1898
declared war on Spain and seized not only Cuba, the key to the
Panama Canal, the shortest route from the east coast of America
to the Chinese coast on the Pacific, but also the Philippines, a base
on the approaches to China. This attack of world capitalism on
China evoked a rebuff from the Chinese people's masses In the
form of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900-1.
Following the Spanish-American War of 1898 there began the

Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1901, a war for the hegemony of England
not only In South Africa and In all the eastern half of the Black
Continent, but likewise In the Indian Ocean, and on the sea route
along the west coast of the Black Continent Into Asia. After England
Its hegemony In South Africa
established Imperialist France, In the
interests of the preservation of the "balance of power" in Africa,
began its on northwest Africa. Having signed secret treaties
attack
with Spain, Italy, and England, France secured freedom of action
In Morocco and began the conquest of this region. While these
events were taking place In China, In South and North Africa,
Germany, "establishing her sphere of Influence" In West and East

Africa and participating in the rape of China, vigorously pushed
ahead In Asia Minor Its
Baghdad railroad, which of necessity
hitched Turkey, with Its tremendous natural resources, to the
victorious chariot of the German Empire, and the question of the
Baghdad became one of the main pivots around which

railroad
international policy began to revolve. At the same time, Tsarist
Russia continued Its drive Into Persia from the north, England
from the south; and from the Turkish boundary came Germany*
which created a plan for the construction, of branch lines from the
126 Appendixes
Baghdad main Hue (Baghdad Haneken Kermanshah Kama-
dam), in order to subject Persia to its economic and political in-
fluence.
It goes without saying, that along with the seizure o African
and Asian territories, the creation there of military bases, and the
building of railroads, there also occurred an intensified penetration
of European and Americancapital into the colonial and semi-
colonial countries. Feverishly railroads and highways were built,
ports and quays were erected, and European goods in ever-increas-

ing quantity penetrated into the most remote points of Persia,
Turkey, India, etc., and the
destroying local handicraft industry,
countries of the East day by day were transformed more and more
into raw material and food bases, into a so-called "economic ter-
ritory" into a "hinterland" on which the industrial countries de-

pended. In the period from 1901 to 1906 the foreign trade of
British India grew from 3,081 million marks to 3,928; that of
China from 1,376 million marks to 2,294; tîat ^ P ers i a from 149
million marks to 251. Thus, for the first five years of the present
century alone, the trade of the three Asian countries increased by

almost 2,000,000,000 marks. At the same time, under the influence
of financial capital, which created factories and foundries in India,
China, and Turkey, exploited coal mines, etc., in the countries of
the East, there began to come
into being at first a very small, but
later an ever-increasing railroad and factory proletariat. 1 This
proletariat in India, China, and Turkey naturally fell under the

influence of the opposition-minded native trade bourgeoisie, which
was dissatisfied with the domination of foreign capital and appre-
hensive in Turkey, Persia, and China of the complete destruction
of the last vestiges of the independence of their countries.
Thus a base was created for the national liberation movement
in the entire East. The Russo-Japanese War and the Revolution
of 1905 provided the first great impetus to this movement.
1
we Jaave in 1905 about 350,000 employees and workers on railroads
In India
and railroad construction, about 300,000 in the cotton and jute industry, about
70,000 in mining, and in general about 800,000 persons, including railroad
personnel, in big enterprises, wnich employ more than 50 workers.
Appendixes 127
PERSIA
Of all the countries of the East, Persia was especially closely

connected with Tsarist Russia economically. As regards imports
and exports, Russia occupied first place among other powers in
the foreign trade of Persia. In 1886 Russian exports to Persia
amounted to 6,100,000 rubles; in 1896, to 14,500,000 rubles; in
Russian imports from Persia were ex-
1907, to 28,300,000 rubles.
pressed in the following figures: in 1886 10,300,000 rubles; in
1896 17,700,000 rubles; and in 1907 20,500,000 rubles. But the
connection between Persia and Russia was not only expressed in
the growth of trade ties from year to year. In the fifteen years prior
to 1905, tens of thousands of poor people left Persia annually for
the Caucasus, where they worked in the oil industries of Bake and
Grozny, where at each factory, at each industrial concern in Tiflis,

Erivan, Vladikavkaz, Novorossiisk, Derbent, Temir-Khan-Shura,
representatives of the Persian toiling masses were to be found. And
in association with Russian and Caucasian proletarians, in work
under a common factory code or inside the four walls of one and
the same stuffy shop, Persian represented by their more
toilers, as
enlightened elements, joined the great revolutionary movement,

the waves of which stormed over the whole Russian Empire.
The events of the Russian RevolutionJanuary 9, the general
strike, the Moscow armed
uprising a made
tremendous impression
on the population of Persia. Illegal Persian literature made its
way into all the cities, demonstrations took place everywhere
against the Shah and his satraps, the cry of "Long live the con-
stitution," reverberated all over the country. Finally, in August
1906, there began the famous general strike In Teheran, In which

all the clergy in the city took part, all the mosques were closed,
all the merchants, having dosed all the shops and bazaars, and than
the artisans, workers, In a word, of the population par-

all classes
ticipated. The general strike resulted In the promulgation of the

constitution In August, 1906 and the calling of the first MajEs
(Parliament) in October of the same year.

128 Appendixes
The firstPersian Majlis did not last long. But even in the short
time it existed, it succeeded in accomplishing a great deal. New
laws were passed, which inflicted a terrific blow on the economic
domination of the mulkadars (big landowners). There began a
radical reform of the tax and administrative systems of Persia. It
seemed as if a new
era was opening for the tormented country.
But the prospect of the rebirth of Persia could not but frighten
the Russian Black Hundreds and the English bourgeoisie.
At first, England supported the Persian national political move-
ment.
Inasmuch as Russian political, economic, and military influence
in Teheran was very strong, thanks to the gravitation of the reac-
tionary Shah toward the Tsarist government which supported the
old Persian regime with a Cossack brigade, trained and guided by
Russian officers, England, in order to undermine Russian influence
in Persia, entered as though into a secret alliance with the Persian
people, made use of the awakening constitutional movement in the

country and, by extending energetic support to the population,
which was struggling for freedom, raised its prestige in northern
Persia to an extraordinary degree, and thereby created for itself a
loyal ally in the 10,000,000 Persian population in the struggle
against the aggressive policy of Russia in Central Asia. But the

friendship of English diplomacy for the Persian liberation move-
ment did not last long. England supported the constitutional
movement in the northern regions of Persia as long as it was
necessary to counteract Russian influence at the Shah's court, but

at the same time England with all her strength suppressed the
liberationmovement in the southern provinces adjacent to the
Indian boundary, and extended in these areas every kind of sup-
port to the Persian satraps who fought against the ideas of libera-
tion. The growth revolutionary movement among the
of the
300,000,000 population in India, as much as fear of Germany, drove
England toward a rapprochement with Russia. It was precisely due

to apprehension that the triumph of revolution throughout Persia
would provide a strong impetus to the revolutionary movement in
Appendixes 129
India that English diplomacy was forced to change its course
abruptly with regard to the liberation movement in Persia. Such

were the basic motives underlying the notorious Anglo-Russian
agreement of 1907 on Persian affairs.
The publication of the Anglo-Russian Convention, which
amounted to the virtual destruction of Persian
independence and
the establishment of an Anglo-Russian protectorate over Persia,
greatly disturbed the enlightened strata of Persian society and intro-

duced much confusion in the domestic of the country, which
life
aggravated the feeling of uncertainty for the future. Anarchy was

everywhere on the increase, reaction reared its head, and the Shah
with particular energy began to prepare for a decisive attack, at
the same time waging a systematic underground war against the
new institutions.
On June n (24), 1908, the head of the Persian Cossack brigade,
Colonel Lyakhov, acting according to a plan worked out by him
jointly with Hartwig, Russian ambassador in Teheran, and Emir

Bohadur Djank, the head of the Persian reactionaries, with the
approval of the commander of the troops of the Caucasian military
district, bombarded the Persian Majlis. Many of the people's repre-
sentatives were killed or executed (Mirza Ibrahim, Mirza Khan,

Mutaqalimin, and others), others were subjected to torture and
thrown into prison, still others were exiled or escaped.
Thus the movement to which the Russian Revolution and the
Russo-Japanese War gave such a strong impetus was temporarily
suppressed by a Russian colonel
The Persian revolutionary movement was closely connected with
the workers* movement in Russia; on the other hand, the Persian
counterrevolution drew its strength from the foot of the Tsarist
throne. It is
very curious that the founder of the Persian Social
Democratic Party (Itchmayun Amiyun) was the late Comrade N.
Narimanav; and, on the other hand, the main instigator of the
Persian counterrevolution was a Russian subject, S. M. Shapshal,
who aroused general animosity against himself in Persia. Shapshal
was graduated from the oriental department of Petersburg Uni-
130 Appendixes
versity, and at the recommendation of the Tsarist government was
appointed tutor of the Shah, Memed-Ali, when he was the heir
apparent. Shapshal and Lyakhov were the main instigators and
leaders of the political revolution of June 23, 1908, of the bombard-
ment and destruction of the Persian Majlis. At this historic moment
of decisive struggle against the Persian revolutionary movement, as
N. P. Mamontov, correspondent of one of the Russian military
periodicals wrote, there remained "with the Shah" only two loyal
and honest men the evil irony of his fate both Russian subjects:
Sergei Markovitch Shapshal and Colonel Lyakhov, commander of
His Majesty the Shah's Cossack brigade. On the other hand, the
Persian revolution found its most loyal allies in Russia. The Baku
Social Democratic organization armed
alone sent to Tabriz 22
workers, who brought with them 40 Berdan rifles and 50 bombs.
With one of these bombs, Governor Maranda was killed. The
Caucasian Regional Committee sent one of its members as a
leader of the Caucasian revolutionaries in Persia in the struggle
against reaction.
Comrade Gurko-Kryazhin, in a very interesting article, "Nari-
manov and the East" (see Novyi Vostok, 1925, No. i [7]), em-
phasizing the fact that Narimanov was the founder of the Persian
Social Democratic Party, posed the question: "How did it happen?
Why did the Transcaucasian revolutionary become the founder of

the Persian political party?** To this question, Comrade Gurko-
Kryazhin gave the following answer:

"In order to understand this fact, it is necessary to bear in mind
that the Transcaucasus in the years of the upsurge of the Russian
revolutionary movement had Its counterpart in the neighboring

countries and Turkey. Just as General Alikhanov-Avar-
Persia
skiiplundered the settlements of the Guri in western Georgia and
Colonel Martynov shot Tiflis workers, another Tsarist colonel,
Lyakhov, dispersed and hanged Persian democrats in Teheran. This
pressure of Tsarism created a solidarity of interests, evoked the
need for common revolutionary action. In particular, this was felt
after the suppression of the revolutionary movement of 1905-1906:

Appendixes 131
the Transcaucasian revolutionaries, including Comrade Narimanov,
arrived at the quite correct conclusion that It did not matter where
one made a revolution, as long as it was a revolution. And thus we
seehow a handful of Caucasian "Fetlayeens" under the leadership
of the Armenian, Yefrera, overthrew Shah Memed-Ali. Another
handful of Caucasian heroes endured for nine months the historic
2
siege of Tabriz. It is curious to note that the news of the Young
Turk Revolution inspired them greatly. Small wonder that Russian
reactionary circles, through the mouthpiece, Novoe Vremya, de-
manded "ruthless extermination of the criminal Fedayeens," on
the ground that "even pure humanity demands atrocities/* The
threats of Novoe Vremya, of course, did not frighten the Caucasian
revolutionaries. One after another, their detachments infiltrated
Persia and took the most active part In the struggle with the
Persian counterrevolution, directed by Tsarist agents.
TURKEY
The Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution likewise
provided an impetus to the national liberation movement in

Turkey. As Miliukov, in Ms time, was forced to admit, the Turkish
revolutionaries, while still in Paris, followed the development of
the Revolution with great attention and drew certain conclusions
(P. Miliukov, The Balkan Crisis and the Policy of

A. L Izuolsky.
St. Petersburg, 1910). But the significance of the Russian Revolu-
tion consisted not so much, of Its Influence on

course, In migr
circles, as in its
profound impact on the broad masses of the
Turkish people and on the Turkish army. Prior to 1906, the
Turkish opposition movement seemed to be concentrated ex-
clusively abroad among the Turkish migrs, In Geneva, Paris, and
in several other European cities. The Young Turk party, Ittihad
(Unity and Progress), exercised the greatest influence among the
2 In
the defense of Tabriz, 22 Caocasioe Social Democrats perisfeed (Vladimir
Dumfoadze, VaMko Bokradze, Nakhviiadze^ Geoigii Emuahvari, Chita, and others).
At the seizure of Reset in January 1909, Caucasian Social Democrats lost
several comrades, among whom were two Social Democratic bomb tlixowcn*
132 Appendixes
Turkish emigres In Europe. Beginning with 1905, the inluence of
the young Turks in Turkey itself grew rapidly and the Ittihad
party soon created a whole network of underground organizations

throughout the country, especially in the army. In 1906, the Young
Turk movement assumed such an imposing character that the
Party's Central Committee left Paris and moved to Salonika, where
the headquarters staff of the movement against the Sultan's govern-
ment was formed. In 1907 in Paris, upon the initiative of the
Dashnaktsutyun party, a congress of all the revolutionary parties

and organizations against Turkey was held. At this congress, it
was decided to begin a general offensive against the Sultan's govern-
ment on the thirtieth anniversary of the accession of Abdul Hamid
to the throne, with the object of overthrowing the bloodthirsty
Sultan.
The Anglo-Russiari project for Macedonian reforms, which fol-
lowed the historic meeting of the English and Russian sovereigns
at Reval, June 9, 1908, hastened the explosion. The Young Turk
party decided not to wait longer and forthwith to raise the banner
of revolt against the Sultan.
The role of the Turkish army in the liberation movement was
great. It does not follow, however, that one should belittle the
role of the other elements of the Turkish population in the con-

stitutional movement, as many have done. One may regard as al-
ready fully established the fact that the Turkish liberation move-
ment was not necessarily a movement which firstand foremost
seized the army, as the bourgeois writers of Europe and Tsarist
Russia described the 1908 Revolution.
The Turkish Revolution was a nationwide movement, in which
all strata of the Turkish population took a most active part. And
if it is true that of the first two Turkish battalions which raised

the banner of revolt against the Sultan, the battalion under the
command of Lt. Enver-Rey was composed to a considerable extent
of soldiers, on the other hand, the second and larger detachment
which advanced under the leadership of Major Niyazi-Bey, com-
mandant of the fortress of Ren, was composed almost exclusively
Appendixes 133
of civilians. The whole significance o immediately strikes
this fact
one. Thus, in the first two battalions, which began the uprising
together, there were more civilians than soldiers. Thus already
this initial episode of the Turkish Revolution, which represents
one of those factors to which we may apply the adage: "an ounce
of facts worth more than 40 pounds of arguments/* destroys the
is
concept of the Turkish Revolution of 1908 as a specific military

pronunciamento (uprising, revolt).
The tiny army of Niyazi-Bey and Enver-Bey proved invincible
because, first of all, the whole Muslim population of Macedonia
and all the Muslim peasantry of European Turkey immediately

went over to its side.
In the Turkish villages, the peasants equipped the Fedayeens

all
(volunteers) with provisions gratis, informed them of the move-

ments of government detachments, gave asylum to the Fedayeens
and hid them. For the head of Enver-Bey a huge sum was promised,
but this enticed no one. Many villages openly refused to obey the
government and to pay taxes. After the Turkish villages, the
Bulgarian villages likewise went over to the side of Niyazi-Bey.

It was only after the peasant masses resolutely declared their
sympathy and readiness to extend support to the revolutionary
plans of Niyazi-Bey, that the latter began his victorious march from
one city to another. In general, the June Revolution of 1908, in
can be safely characterized as a revolt of the Muslim
its initial stage,
peasantry of European Turkey against the old Abdul Hamid

regime, rather than a military revolt.
INDIA
In the English "Blue Book/* published in 1919 on the revolu-

tionary movement in India for the period from 1897 to 1918, we
find frequent references to the extent of the influence of the
Russian Revolution of 15105 and the Russo-Japanese War on the
upsurge of the revolutionary movement in India. To be precise,
after 1905 the terrorist movement became particularly strong, in
134 Appendixes
various parts of India antigovernment demonstrations took place
more and more frequently, disturbances among the tribes broke
out more often, the native press assumed more and more an opposi-
tion character, and the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy, frightened by
the growth of the revolutionary movement In the country, took
the most brutal repressive measures In order to suppress the move-
ment for which the Russian Revolution and the Russo-Japanese
War provided such a mighty impetus. First of all, the English
bureaucracy descended upon the press and threw into jail the
journalists who dared to raise their voices In defence of the op-
pressed country. Thus, in 1908 the famous Indian publicist, Tilak,
was sentenced to six years in prison for his articles about the regime
of terror which reigned in a country oppressed by the English
government. At the same time, eight leaders of the national move-

ment were arrested and exiled without trial by administrative order
to more or less remote
localities. Since that time, as substantiated by
English documents,
official many Indian journalists and owners of
printing shops shared the fate of Tilak and were sentenced to
hard labor for printing revolutionary articles. The law of Decem-
ber ii, 1905, restored the exceptional state of affairs of 1818, intro-
duced into the country by the robber British East India Company,
which made it
possible for the government of India to throw 130
journalists into jail. This law destroyed freedom of the press and
gave to local administrative authorities the right to confiscate all
publications that were suspect.

But all these repressive measures failed to stop the movement:
on November 2, 1908, antigovernment demonstrations occurred In
various parts of India, In connection with the burning of the body
of the Indian, Kanay, the assassin of a policeman; on November 7,
there was an attempt on the life of Andrew Fraser, governor-general
of Bengal; on November 9, the chief of police was assassinated;
on November 25, there was an attempt to kill Omma, the attorney-
general in Agarpar; on December 22, there was a second attempt

on the life of the same attorney-general; on May 7, 1909, came the
end of the notorious trial of the 35 Indians who, in connection
with the discovery of bombs in the suburbs of Calcutta, were
Appendixes 135
accused of plotting against the government, In which connection
two of the accused were sentenced to death and six to hard labor
for life; on June i, the acquittal by the high court of three Indians
In the case of the bomb plot In Midnapur led to a serious dis-
turbance the ranks of the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy. In
among
the conservative press of the mother country, and among many
members of the House of Commons; on June 5, occurred the
assassination in Dacca of the Indian, Gobbesh, In connection with
the delivery of members of the revolutionary society; on July i,
1909, came the assassination In London Itself of Colonel Sir Curzon

Willy by a young Indian, Madar-lal-Dingra; on November 14, 1909,
occurred the attempt In Amerabad on the life of the viceroy of
India, Lord Minto, and his wife, under whose coach a bomb was
thrown; on December 17, there was an attempt in Lahore, also
with a bomb, on the life of the government minister; on Decem-
ber 22, came the assassination of Jackson, the top English official
In Nasik, In connection with which thirty Brahmins implicated in
the plot were arrested.
And acts of terrorism did not cease in India, but were repeated,
now here, now there. Scarcely a day passed that the Anglo-Indian
papers did not publish news about disturbances among one tribe
or another, about executions, about numerous arrests,which at
times assumed a mass character. Thus, according to the Times
of September 16* 1909, in the province of Patiala alone, 160 men
were arrested In a single day. And such mass arrests were not
unusual in India. Arrests likewise began among the troops. Thus,
in January 1909, ten soldiers of the native Calcutta regiment were
arrested. According to official information, those arrested Joined
the regiment for purposes of propaganda,
CHINA
The Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution gave a
strong impetus to the reform and revolutionary movement in

China.
The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, with its unexpected results
136 Appendixes
the defeat of gigantic, but backward Russia and the brilliant vic-
tory of constitutional Japan made a strong impression on the

ruling circles of the Middle Empire. In the top bureaucracy around
the throne, there were at that time three well-defined government
parties: the Manchurian reactionary party, headed by Prince Ch'un,

the oldest representative in years of the reigning dynasty; here
were included all the obscurantist, former secret leaders of the
notorious Boxer Rebellion, all the influential Chinese Black Hun-

dreds, etc.; the Manchurian progressive party, which included
Prince Su, Viceroy Tuan Fang, Duke Tsai-tze, and many other
influential Manchurians.This group defended the idea of destroy-
ing every barrier between the Manchurians and Chinese, insisted
on the immediate carrying out of other reforms, but pointed out
the well known necessity for approaching this matter by degrees,
and proposed to begin the business of reform, first of all,with the
reorganization of one province, namely Manchuria. Finally, there
was the government party of the Chinese reformists, which ap-
peared to be carrying on the cause of Kang Yu-wei, so tragically
interrupted in 1898. The chief representatives of this group were
the viceroy of the two "H's" (Hupeh and Hunan), Chang Chih-
tung, viceroy of the Two Kwangs, Tsen Ch'un-hsiian, and many

other bureaucrats of pure Chinese blood. Remaining loyal to the
dynasty, these officials pointed out the necessity of introducing

reforms throughout the empire, mainly in the field of education,
defended the idea of universal literacy, and the introduction of
compulsory military service, etc.
The aspiration for education was the basic feature of Chinese
society in the period after the Russo-Japanese War.
In 1904, there were 2,406 Chinese students in Japan; in 1906,
there were 8,620; and in 1907, the number already exceeded
10,000. The longing for education assumed an almost spontaneous
character after 1905, and in this respect private initiative went far
ahead of the government. During the "conference on the plague/*
German doctors said: "China, in only three or four years, has
made such a stride forward intellectually as would have taken
other nations several decades/*
Appendixes 137
The reform government, which continued to increase after the
Russo-Japanese WarIn the ranks of the Chinese merchants, pro-
gressive officialdom, the professors, etc., also forced the Manchu

dynasty to make concessions to the "spirit of the times.
1 *
After the Japanese victories of 1904-5, when the awareness of

the Indispensablllty of reforms began to develop with particular
strength even In the ruling circles of the Middle Empire, the

bureaucracy focused Its attention on Yuan Shih-k'ai as the only
statesman who could realize the great cause of the reorganization
of the empire, without infringing on the privileges of the Man-
darins and the entire ruling clique. Yuan Shih-k'ai was not only
the viceroy of an Important province, he was entrusted with the
command of six divisions of the reorganized Northern Army and
of the administration of the Ministry of Finance and Communica-
tions. It was precisely in 15*05 that Yuan Shih-k'ai directed the
first great maneuvers in China to which foreign military attaches
were invited, and about which many articles and even brochures
were printed in Europe and America. These maneuvers made a
great impression in China, which was so much afraid of foreign
enemies, and they were greatly instrumental In raising the prestige
of Yuan Shih-k'ai, even in those circles where he was hated for his
participation In the rebellion of 1898. After these maneuvers and

the glowing comments on them by European attaches, the in-
fluence of Yuan Shih-k'ai at the court rose to an unusual degree.
At the same time, the short-lived era of reforms from above began.
First of all, the government sent to Europe and the United States
two special commissions to acquaint themselves with the political
structure of various states, constitutional laws, the organization of
public education, the army, etc. A

decree was issued to abolish
torture in connection with judicial inquiry. Moreover, a decree was
promulgated concerning the reform of military schools, the Intro-

duction of European uniforms for the troops, and new schools were
opened In various parts of the empire. Measures were taken to
combat the use of opium. For the first time, the word "constitution"
began to be mentioned openly in the Chinese press in 1905, and
the first imperial decree which dealt with the early introduction of
1
38 Appendixes
a constitution was announced in September 1906. Meanwhile, the
popular discontent in the country became aggravated, and more or

disturbances broke out everywhere. The various classes
less serious
of the population were not content with half measures and de-
manded the immediate promulgation of a constitution. Finally,
in the spring of igoj a huge revolt broke out in the six southern
provinces. In Kwantung province alone, a huge army of 60,000
was formed, which engaged in a whole series of battles with the
imperial forces. The revolt was crushed; however, the revolution-
aries succeeded, in spite of defeat, in concealing weapons and
ammunition in secure places. This revolt produced great confusion
in government circles and sharpened the struggle between the court
party of the reactionaries and the group of "progressive" officials.
The terroristic act of November 6, 1907, the assassination by a
Chinese, Hsi Lin, of one governor-general, who was director of a
police school, the armed opposition of the future police to military
power, the confession of the director of the school that he belonged
to the revolutionary party and took the police post in order to
achieve his revolutionary plans more quickly and easily all this
made an unusual impression on all Chinese society and produced
unprecedented panic in the highest circles. The frightened Empress

immediately summoned Yuan Shlh-k'ai to court. Again the comedy
of reform began. A special decree announced the formation of a
new bureaucratic institution "Upper Chamber/' "Administra-
the
tive and Constitutional Control/* which was to draft constitutional
laws; a big new mission was dispatched abroad for the study of
foreign constitutions; finally, in all the provinces, "provincial diets"

were organized. But, because of bribes and graft prevalent among
the Chinese mandarins, any new reform served only as a new
means of extortion for officials.
At the beginning of 1908 the revolutionary movement, at the
head of which was Sun Yat-sen, doubled in strength, and after a
long struggle which dragged on with intermittent success, the
Manchu Dynasty was overthrown and the Chinese Republic was
proclaimed on 16/29 December, 1911, in Nanking. As provisional

Appendixes
president o the republic until its complete establishment through-
out the empire, the ideological leader of the Chinese Revolution,
the famous agitator, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was elected.
World Imperialism in the Struggle with the Awakening

East jôj and the October Revolution in the
History of the East
Thus, the Russian Revolution of 1905 was the starting point of

a great liberation movement throughout the East, This movement
of the peoples of the East was strangled by the very same forces
that triumphed temporarily over the Russian Revolution: the
alliance of Tsarism with world imperialism. The international
bourgeoisie gave Tsarism an opportunity after 1905 to cope with
both the workers' movement and the opposition in the State Duma,
having supplied the Tsarist government with the necessary financial
resources by permitting a loan on the Paris exchange a loan in
the distribution of which not only the French, but also the English,
Belgian, Dutch, and other banks took part. The very same inter-
national bourgeoisie eventually extended help in his struggle with
the republic to Yuan Shih-k'ai, the future dictator of China, the
pretender to the throne of the Emperor, by granting the leader

of the Chinese counterrevolution a foreign loan of 25 million
pounds sterling.
Having set on its feet a shaky Tsarism, which was tottering as

a result of the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution,
world imperialism acquired in the gigantic empire an ally for the
struggle against the peoples of the East, The fear of the revolution-
ary movement in India was much more instrumental than
the fear
of Germany in forcing England to agree to a rapprochement with

Russia.
Thus, this great liberation movement of the peoples of the East,
to which the Russian Revolution of 1905 lent sucfa a mighty im-
with the triumph of
petus, was retarded in its development along
reaction in Tsarist Russia. Attacked from the flank by the im-
140 Appendixes
perialist powers of Europe and from the rear by Tsarist Russia,
the peoples of the East In their struggle for liberation were forced
to retreat before the onslaught of internal and external reaction
in their own triumph of the Persian

countries. Thus, soon after the
constitutionalmovement, the new Persia was subjected to attack
simultaneously from Russia and England, which signed the notori-
ous agreement of 1907 on the partition of Persia into spheres of
influence between the two powers.
Not confining themselves to the struggle against the Persian
constitutional movement, imperialist England and Tsarist Russia
likewisewaged a struggle against the new Turkey. Not wishing to
permit the rebirth of this country, England and Russia, with the
cooperation of France, armed to the teeth the Balkan states

Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece and hurled them
against the new Turkey.
The triumph of reaction in Russia, the imperialist plans of
England, France, America, and Japan imperiled all the gains of

the Chinese Revolution for the period from 1905 to 1912. This
revolutionary movement led to the overthrow of the Manchu

Dynasty and the proclamation of a republic in China in 1912. But
soon Yuan Shih-k'ai, head of the counterrevolution, who was en-
and subsidized by the world powers, including
ergetically supported
America, one of whose representatives in China, a professor at
Columbia University by the name of Goodnow, was the chief ad-
viser to Yuan Shih-k'ai, dissolved Parliament,
destroyed all the
gains of the revolution and posed the question of the restoration
of the monarchy in China.
One of the basic causes which determined both the defeat of the
Russian Revolution of 1905 and the temporary defeat of the libera-
tion movement of the peoples of the East, was the lack of serious
support for these movements from the working masses of Western

Europe, whereas, at the time, the bourgeoisie of the capitalist
countries extended the most energetic support to the counter-
revolution in Russia and in all the countries of the East to defeat
the revolutionary movement
Appendixes 141
The general strike, the Moscow armed revolt, the workers* move-
ment in Russia in general, found a response in the East among
the oppressed masses of Turkey, Persia, India, and China. These
two mighty streams of the revolutionary movement among the
proletarian masses of Russia and the peasant masses of the East
were undoubtedly the factors which lay at the basis of the brilliant
theory of Lenin about the necessity for the creation of a united
front of the industrial proletariat of the advanced industrial states
with the enslaved masses of the colonial and semicolonial countries
for the struggle against capitalism.
At the time of the October Revolution the plight of the main
countries of the East was profoundly tragic. Turkey after the im-
perialist war was already on the eve of collapse. Persia, actually

divided Into two zones of Influence between Russia and England,
eked out a miserable existence. Afghanistan sighed under the yoke
of English capital. China was threatened with complete dismember-
ment among the members of the victorious Entente.
The triumph of the October Revolution was a turning point In
the history of the East. The appeal of the Soviet government to
the peoples of the East with a summons to liberation from the
chains of European capitalism, the famous theses of Lenin on
national and colonial questions adopted at the second congress of
the Comintern, the Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku
which followed the Comintern Congress all this played the role
of an alarm bell, calling these peoples to a new struggle against
the oppressors. "Peoples of the East, you are protected to the rear.
Rise for the struggle. Soviet Russia promises you its aid." This was
the significance of the summons of the Soviet government and it was
this which Infused new strength in the tortured peoples. Having
from now on a secure rear, freed from the fatal necessity of fighting
on two fronts, having encountered since the October Revolution in
multimillion, worker-peasant Russia not an enemy but, on the con-

trary, a friend and an ally of
the entire East in the struggle against
world imperialism, the oppressed peoples of the yellow and black
continents rose with energy tenfold for the straîe against the
142 Appendixes
oppressors. Now the entire colonial and semicolonial world from
Agadir (the tiny capital of the little state of the Riffs, which fights
successfully against two strong powers) to Canton, Shanghai, and
Mukden, represents a united front in the huge revolt of the op-
pressed peoples against the yoke of world capitalism.
The great October Revolution completed in the history of the
East the cause begun by the Revolution of 1905. That is why the
twentieth anniversary of the Revolution of 1905 is a holiday not
only for the Russian and international proletariat, but likewise

a holiday for all the oppressed and exploited peoples of the East;
for it was precisely after this Revolution, under the influence of
the infectious example of the heroic struggle of the Russian pro-
banner of the struggle against all their
letariat, that they raised the
oppressors.
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144
APPENDIX THREE
The Manifesto of October 17/30, 1905
BY THE GRACE OF GOD

WE, NICHOLAS II, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, Tsar
of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, Sec., &c, &c.
Declare to all our loyal subjects: Unrest and disturbances in the
capitalsand in many parts of Our Empire nil Our heart with great
and heavy grief. The welfare of the Russian Sovereign is insepara-
ble from the welfare of the people, and the people's sorrow is His
sorrow. The unrest, which now has made its appearance, may give
rise to profound disaffection among the masses and become a
menace to the integrity and unity of the Russian State. The great
vow of Tsarist service enjoins Us to strive with all the might of
Our reason and authority for the speediest cessation of unrest so
perilous to the State. Having ordered the proper authorities to
take measures to suppress the direct manifestations of disorder,
rioting, and violence, and to insure the safety of peaceful people

who incumbent upon them, We,
seek to fulfill in peace the duties
in order to carry out more successfully the measures designed by
Us for the pacification of the State, have deemed it necessary to
coordinate the activities of the higher Government agencies.
Weimpose upon the Government the obligation to carry out
Our inflexible will:
1. To
grant the population the unshakable foundations of civic
freedom based on the principles of real personal inviolability, free-
dom of conscience, speech, assembly, and association.
2. Without halting the scheduled elections to the State Duma,

to admit to participation in the Duma, as far as is possible in the
146 Appendixes
short space o time left before its summons, those classes of the
population which at present are altogether deprived of the fran-

chise, leaving the further development of the principle of universal
suffrage to the newly established legislature (i.e., according to the

law of August 6, 1905, to the Duma and Council of State).
3. To establish an unbreakable rule that no law can become

it as
effective without the sanction of the State Duma and that the
people's elected representatives should be guaranteed an oppor-

tunity for actual participation in the supervision of the legality of
the actions of authorities appointed by Us.
We call upon the loyal sons of Russia to remember their
all
duty to their country, to lend assistance in putting an end to the

unprecedented disturbances, and together with Us to make every
peace and quiet in our native land.
effort to restore
Issued at Peterhof on the seventeenth day of October in the year

of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and five. The original text signed
in His Imperial Majesty's own hand.
NICHOLAS
Notes
Notes
CHAPTER ONE The Revolution of 1905: A Definition
1. N. S. Trusova, et. aL, eds., Natchalo pervoi russkoi revolyutsii. Yanvar'-
Mart ^05 goda (AN, SSSR, Moscow, 1955), p. xii. Cited henceforth In these
notes as NPRR.
For the text of the petition, see
2. Ibid., pp. 28-31. For an English translation,
see Appendix One.
3. G. C. Gun'ko, "Dekabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie 1905 goda i ego

istoritcheskoe znatchenie," Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, No. i, 1956, p. 60.
See also, Novoe Vremya, January 22, 1905; and VL Korolenko, "9 yanvarya v
Peterburge," Russkoe Bogatstvo, No. i, January 1905 (St. Petersburg), p. 176.
Revolyutsiya v Rossii, a brochure published in Geneva in 1905 by P. Nikolayev,
which numbers the victims of Bloody Sunday at 1,200 killed and 3,700 wounded
(p. 27). It also states that no fewer than 15,000 were
killed by the Government's
armed forces during the first five months of 1905. Among those who claimed
that the revolutionists greatly exaggerated the number of victims of January 9
was V. I. Gurko, in Features and Figures of the Past. Government and Opinion
in the Reign of Nicholas II, edited by J. Wallace Sterling, Xenia Joukoff Eudin,
and H. EL Fisher (Stanford University Press, 1939), pp. 348-49.
4. NPRR, pp. 105-24.
5. Georges Bourdon, La Russie Libre (Paris, 1905), p. 108.
6. V. I. Lenin, Sotchinenie, 4th ed., VIII, 77.
7. NPRR, pp. 81-83.

See H. H. Fisher, ed., Out of My Past The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov
8.
(Stanford University Press, 1935), pp. 33-34. Kokovtsov claims to have opposed
this move to involve the Tsar, which he believed would serve no useful purpose.
He says that the radical elements were excluded from the delegation and that
the interview was a "very insignificant occasion/* ignored by the press, except
for a note in Novoe Vremya (pp. 38-39).
9."Trepovskii proekt retchl Nikolaya II k rabotchim posle 9 yanvarya 1905

g.," Krasnyi Arkhiv I (20), 1927, pp. 240-42.
10. "Perepiska Nikolaya II i Marii Federovny (1905-1906),** Krasnyi Arkhivf
in (22), 1927, pp. 153-209.
11. NPRR, p. 107.
150 Notes
12. Ibid., pp. 812-14.
13. G. Gapon, Istoriya mod zhizni (Berlin, 1925), pp. 68-69.

See also, B.
Romanov, "K 1905 godu (Istoriya Moei zhizni, G. Gapon)/' Krasnaya Letopis,
No. 3 (14), (Leningrad, 1925), pp. 268-69.
14. V. I. Lenin, Sotchinenie, 4th ed., VIII, "Pop Gapon," pp. 85-86 (from
Vpered, January 31, 1905).
15. M. B. Mitin, Vsemirno-istoritcheskoe znatchenie pervoi russkoi revolyutsii
(First Series, No. i, Moscow, 1956), p. 9.
1 6. V. Gurko, op. eft., p. 347.

I.
17.G. A. Gapon, Poslanie k russkornu krest'yanskomu i rabotchemu narodu,

n. p., 1905; and "Pis'mo Gapona," Krasnyi Arkhiv, II (9), 1925, pp. 294-97. Se e
also, Alexander Gerasimoff, Der Kampf gegen
die erste russische Revolution;
a gendarme officer,
Erinnerungen (Frauenfeld, 1934), pp. 91-108. Gerasimoff,
chief of the to Safeguard Public Safety and Order in St. Petersburg,
Department
claims that Gapon was a police agent.
18. V. I. Lenin, Sotchinenie, 4th ed., XIX, 345.
19. M. B. Mitin, op. cit., p. 8. See also, NPRR, Yanvar*-Mart, 1905. For the
October General Strike, see L. M. Ivanov, et. al., eds., Vserossiiskaya polititches-
kaya statchka v oktyabre 1905 goda AN, SSSR, Moscow-Leningrad, 1955).
(2 vols.,
20. NPRR, pp. 800-01. See also N. S. Trnsova, "A. M. Gorki i sobytiya 9
yanvarya 1905 goda v Peterburge," Istoritcheskii

Arkhw (AN, No. i, Moscow,
January-February, 1955), pp. 91-116;
and "Revolyutsiya 1905-1906 gg. v donesen-
III (16), 1926, pp. 220-24; and
iyakh inostrannykh diplomatov/* Krasnyi Arkhw,
Encarnacion Alzona, French Contemporary Opinions of the Russian Revolution
of z$o$ (New York, 1921).
21. V. A. Galkin, "Sovety rabotchikh deputatov v 1905 godu i ikh istoritcheskoe

znatchenie/' Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, No. i, January i, 1956, pp. 25-42.
22. For additional information regarding the Soviets, see and Izvestiya NPRR
soueta rabotchikh deputatov (October ^-December 14, 1905). Only ten issues
of the Iwestiya were published. No. 11 was seized by the police and lost.
23. V. I. Lenin, Sotchinenie, 4th ed., XVIII, 548.
24. See Zh. Maurer, "Osobennosti i

dvizhushchie sily pervoi russkoi revolyutsii.
Taktika boFshevikov v bor'be za krest'yanstvo," Vestnik Moskovskogo Uni-
versiteta, No. i, January, 1956, pp. 3-24.
25. A. Tchuloshnikov, "Istoriya

manifesta 6 avgusta 1905 goda/* Krasnyi
Arkhiv, XIV, 1926, pp, 262-78.
"
26. I. Tamarov, Manifest 17 oktyabrya," Krasnyi Arkhiv, IV-V (11-12), 1925,
PP* 39-106.
27. V. P. Semennikov, et. aL, eds., Revolyutsiya 1905 goda i samoderzhavie
(Moscow-Leningrad, 1928), pp. 5-7.
28. Graf S. Yu. Vitte, Vospominaniya^ 2nd ed., (Berlin, 1922), II, 36.
29. Edmund A. Walsh, The Fall of the Russian Empire (New York, 1928),
p. 81.
30. For an English translation of the Manifesto, see Appendix Three.

Notes 151
31. A. A. Shishkova,
"Iz istorii bor'by bofshevikov za soyuz rabotchikh i
krest'yan v gody pervoi russkoi revolyutsii," Voprosy Istorii , No. 2, February

1955, p. 16.
32. Paul N. Miliukov, Russia To-day and To-morrow (New York, 1922), p. 18.
33. V. Lembergskaya, "Dvizhenie v voiskakh na DaFnem Vostoke," Krasnyl

Arkhiv, XI-XII, 1925, pp. 289-386.
34. See, for instance, Moskovskiya Vedomosti, September 23/October 6, 1906.
35. Vitte, op. tit., II, 5.
36. See "Vnutrenneye Obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy, February, 1906, p. 770.
37. Ibid., p. 784.
38. See A. K. Drezin, ed., Tsarizm v borbe s reuolyutsiei 1905-190^ gg. (Mos-
cow, 1936), p. 153. Letter from V. N. Lamsdorff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to
P. N. Durnovo, then Minister of the Interior, December 8, 1905. See also, M. M.
Sheinman, "Revolyutsiya 1905-1907 gg. i pomoshch Vatikana tsarizmu," Iz istorii
rabotchego klassa i revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya. Sbornik Statei (Moscow, 1958),
pp. 398-404.
39. See"Vnutrenneye Obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy, February, 1906, p. 772.

Kokovtsov states that the incident of January 9 had hardly any influence on
the conclusion of a 41/2% loan in Germany, but affected "very significantly"
the negotiations in France. See Out of My Past. The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov,
p. 42.
40. V. Kokovtsov, "K peregovoram Kokovtsova o zaime v 1905-1906 gg./"

Krasnyi Arkhiv, III (10), 1925, pp. 3-35.
41. See Y. B. Zaitsev, "Mezhdunarodnoye znatchenie pervoi russkoi revolyutsii/'

K fo-letiya pervoi russkoi revolyutsii (Ufa, 1956), p. 40.
42. Out of My Past. The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov, p. 118.
43. "Perepiska Nikolaya II i Marii Fedorovny, 1905-1906," Krasnyi Arkhiv,

III (22), 1927, p. 187.
44. V. A. Galkin, '*Sovety rabotchikh deputatov v 1905 godu

i ikh istoritcheskoe
znatchenie/' Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, January 1956, pp. 35-36.
i dvizhushchie sily pervoi

45. See, in particular, Zh. Maurer, "Osobennosti
russkoi revolyutsii . . , /* Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, No. i, January
1956, PP- 3-24-
46. See the editorial, "Ob odnom nepravil'nom tolkovanii roli proletariata v
revolyutsii 1905-1907 godov," Kommunist (No. 2, January 1955), pp. 124-27.
47. Vitte, op. tit., II, 116-17.
48. M. Pokrovsky, Otcherki russkogo revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya XIX-KX w.

(Moscow, 1924), pp. 105-06.
49. November 13/26, 1905, No. i.
50. Russia in Flux (New York, 1948), p. 148.
51. Vitte, op. c*X, II, 125 C

152 Notes
52. Paul Miliukov, op. cit. t pp. 2, 18.
53. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York, 1958), p. 33.
CHAPTER TWO Asia
1. For a more detailed analysis, see M. Pavlovitch, Revolyutsionnyi Vostok,

Part I, "SSSR i Vostok," (Moscow-Leningrad, 1927), pp. 21-35.
2. Maurice Baring, Letters from the Near East 1909 and 1912 (London, 1913),
pp. 12-13.
3. M. Lentzner, La Revolution de 1905 (Paris: Petite Bibliotheque Com-
miraiste, 1925), p. 2.
4. Ibid., p. 48.
5. See I. D. Kuznetsov, et. al., "Musul'manskoe dvizhenie v period revolyutsii

i reaktsii," Natsional'nye dvizheniya v period pervoi revolyutsii v Rossii (Tcheb-
oksary, 1935), pp. 215-76.
6. Alexander Tamarin, Musul'mane na Rust (Moscow, 1917), No. 52, pp. 5-6.
7. See I. D. Kuznetsov et. al., op. cit., p. 225. See also

A. Arsharuni and Kh.
Gabiduliin, Otcherki Panslavizma i Panturkizma v Rossii (Moscow, 1931), pp.
35-38.
See Serge A, Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge,
8.
i korennoe naselenie Turkes-
Mass., 1960), p. 106. See also E. Fedorov, "1905 god
tana," Novyi Vostok, Vols. 13-14, 1926, pp. 132-57;and V. Apukhin, "Revolyut-
sionnoe dvizhenie 1905 g. sredi gortsev severnogo kavkaza," Ibid., pp. 158-78.
9. "The Birth of the Turkish Nation," New Outlook, III, No. 6 (28), Tel
Aviv, May 1960, pp. 24-25.
CHAPTER THREE Iran
i. L. S.
Sobotsinsky, Persiyaf Statistiko-Ekonomitcheskii Otcherk (St. Peters-
burg, 1913), p. 289. See also A. M. Pankratova, ed., Pervaya russkaya revolyut-
siya i mezhdunarodnoe revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie (Moscow, 1956), Part II,
p. 284.
g. Ibid., p. 289.
3. A. M. Matveev, "Iranskie otkhodniki v turkestane posle pobedy velikoi

oktiabr'skoi sotsialistitcheskoi revolyntsii (1918-1921 gg.)" Sovetskoe Vostokove-
denie, No. 5, 1958, p. 120.
See V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, "Narimanov and the East," Novyi Vostok,

4.
No. (7), 1925, pp. v-vii; and M. Pavlovitch, "SSSR i Vostok," Revolyutsionnii
i
Vostok, Part I (Moscow-Leningrad, 1927), p 27.
5. See **Novye materialy o sotsial-demokratitcheskoi gruppe v Tebrize v

1908 godu, Problemy Vostokovedeniya (AN, SSSR, No. 5, 1959), 179-83.
6. V. Tria, Kavkazskie sotsial'-demokraty v persidskoi
revolyutsii (Paris, 1910),
PP- 3-4-
Notes 153
7. E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1 pop (Cambridge, 1910),
p- 69.
8. Ibid., p. 70.
9. M.
Ivanov, "Sozyv pervogo Iranskogo Medzhlisa i bor'ba za ustanovlenie
S.
osnovnogo zakona (oktyabr'-dekabr* 1906)," Utchenye Zapiski Institute* Vostoko-

vedeniya, Vol. VIII, Iranskii Sbornik (AN, SSSR, Moscow, 1953), 75-112.
10. M. S. Ivanov, Iranskaya revolyutsiya 1905-1911 gg. (Moscow, 1957), p. 80.
11. Edward G. Browne, op. cit., pp. 120-21.

12. I. M. Reisner and B. K. Rubtsov, eds., Novaya istoriya stran zarubezhnogo
vostoka (Moscow University, 1952), II, 338.
13. M. S. Ivanov, "Sozyv pervogo Iranskogo Medzhlisa i bor'ba za ustanovlenie

osnovnogo zakona (oktyabr'-dekabr', 1906)," op. cit.., pp. 90-91.. .
14. M.Ivanov, "Vliyanie pervoi russkoi revolyutsii na razvitie revolyutsii v

S.
Irane v 1905-1911 gg.," Pervaya russkaya revolyutsiya 1905-1907 gg. i mezhdunar-

odnoe revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie, A. M. Pankratova, ed. (AN, SSSR, Moscow,
1956), p. 299; see also, G. S. Arutyunian, Endzhumeny v iranskoi revolyutsii 1905-
1911 gg. i rol' bol'shevikov zakavkaz'ia, p. 16.
15. British Blue Book, Persia (No. i, 1909), p. 107.
A. A. Strutchkov, "Mezhdunarodnoe znatchenie pervoi russkoi revolyutsii,

16.
1905-1907,'* 50 let pervoi russkoi revolyutsii (Moscow, 1956), p. 208.
17. Edward G. Browne, op. cit., p. 146.

18. M.
Ivanov, "Vliyanie pervoi russkoi revolyutsii na razvitie revolyutsii v
S.
Irane v 1905-1911 gg.," op. cit., p. 288.
19. "Anglo-russkoe sopernitchestvo v persii v 1890-1906 gg. Krasnyi Arkhiv,

I (5&) 1933 PP- 33-64-
20. "Zhurnal osobogo soveshchaniya 14 aprelya, 1907 g. po afghanskomu
voprosu," Krasnyi Arkhiv, II (105), 1941, pp. 33-70.
21. Diplomatitcheskii Slovar*, I, 119.
22. Edward G, Browne, op. cit., p. 195.
23. M. Pavlovitch, "Kazatchya brigada v persii," Novyi Fostok, Vols. VHI-IX,

J
925. PP- 178-98.
24. V. I. Lenin, Sotchinenie, 4th ed., XV, "Sobytiya na balkanakh i v persii/'

p. 204.
25. Brigadier General Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia (London, 1921),
II, 418.
CHAPTER FOUR The Ottoman Empire
i. Among the Soviet scholars who have dealt with the Young Turk move-
ment are Kb. M. Tsovikian, "Vliyanie russkoi revolyutsii 1905 g. na revolyut-
sionnoe dvizhenie v Turtsii," Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie (AN, SSSR, Moscow-
Leningrad, 1945), pp. 14-35; A- ^* Valuiskii, "K voprosu o sozdanii pervykh
154 Notes
mladoturetsklkh organizatsii/' Utchenye Zapiski Instituta Vostokavedeniya (AN,
SSSR, Moscow, 1956), XIV, 197-222; A. M. Valuiskii, "Vosstaniya v vostotchnoi
aoatolii nakanune mladoturetskoi revolyutsii," Turetskii sbornik (AN, SSSR,
Instituta Vostokovedeniya, Moscow, 1958); A. F. Miller, "Mladoturetskaya
1
revolyutsiya/ Pervaya russkaya revolyutsiya 1905-1907 gg,

i mezhdunarodnoe
reuolyutsionnoe dvizhenie (AN, SSSR, Otdelenie istoritcheskikh nauk, Moscow,
1956), II, 313-48; and A. Popov, "Turetskaya revolyutsiya, 1908-1909 gg.,"
Krasnyi Arkhiv, Vol. XLIII (1930), pp. 3-54; Vol. XLIV (1931), pp-3'39; and
Vol. XLV (1931), pp. 27-52.
2. Paul Miliukov, Balkanskii krizis i

politika A. P. Izuol'skogo (St. Peters-
burg, 1910), p. 58.
3. A. F. Miller, op. cit., p. 320.
4. There is no unanimity in regard to this date. Miller, op. cit., p. 323, used
1889. See also, Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, Jr., The Young Turks. Prelude to
the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 14.
5. Ramsaur, op. cit., p. 27.
6. See A. Valuiskii,M. "K voprosu o sozdanii pervykh mladoturetskikh or-

ganizatsii," op. cit., p. 212.
7. Tsovikian, op. cit., p. 34.
8. Sir Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople. The Recollections of Sir

Edwin Pears, (New York, 1916).
1813-1915
9. Lt. Col. Sir Mark Sykes, The Caliph? Last Heritage: A Short History of
the Turkish Empire (London, 1915), p. 380.
10. Valuiskii, "K voprosu o sozdanii pervykh mladoturetskikh organizatsii,"

cit.3 p. 215.
op.
11. See A. F, Miller, op. cit., p. 330.
12. See M. Pavlovitch, Revolyutsionnaya Turtsiya (Moscow, 1921), p. 44.
13. See, however, Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jr., op. cit., p. 94, who does not sub-
scribe to this view.
14. A. N. MandeFshtam, Mladoturetskaya derzhava (Moscow, 1915), pp. 7-8.
15. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the

Origins of the War (1898-1914) (London, HMSO, 1936), Vol. X, No. 210, p. 268,
G. H. Fitzmaurice to Mr. Tyrell, August 25, 1908.
16. Krasnyi Arkhiv, Vol. II (9), 1925, p. 33.
17. V. I. Lenin, Sotchinenie, 4th ed., XV, 160.
1 8. Sir Charles Eliot, Turkey in Europe, new ed. (London, 1908), p. 426.
19. See British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. X, Chapter V,
"The HamicUan Diplomacy/* pp. 44, 74,
20. Quoted by Tsovikian, op. cit*, p. 17, from Tahsin Pasa, Abdillhamit ve
Yildh Hatiratari (Istanbul, 1931), p. 174.
21. V. I. Lenin, "Russkii tsar* ishchet zashchtity ot svoego naroda u turet-

skogo sultana/* Sotchinenie, 4th ed., VIII, 533.
Notes 155
22. See A. F. Miller, op. tit., p. 327.
23. Kh. M. Tsovikian, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
24. Ibid., p. 17.
25. See Ivar Spector, T&# Soviet Union and the Muslim World (University
of Washington Press, 1959), P- 35- See also, Charles W. Hostler, Turkism and
the Soviets (London, New York, 1957), pp. 132-37.
26. Charles W. Hostler, op. cit., p. 135.
27. Ibid., p. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley,

137. See also, eds., British
Documents on the Origins of the War, X, 583.
28. Charles W. Hostler, op. cit., pp. 137, 143.
29. Kh. M. Tsovikian, op. cit., p. 24.
30. A. F. Miller, op. cit., p. 330.
31. Kh. M. Tsovikian, op. cit., p. 24. Abdullah Jevdet's articles were reprinted
in the Azerbaijanian press.
32. Boris Pasternak, 1905, (Moscow, 1926).

33. Krasnyi Arkhw, Vol. 2(9), 1925, pp. 52-53.
34. Tsovikian, op. cit., p. 21.
35. Krasnyi Arkhw f Vol. 2 (9), 1925, p. 52.
36. A. M. Valuiskii, "K voprosu o sozdanii pervykh mladoturetskikh or-

ganizatsii," op. cit., p. 21.
37. Quoted in Tsovikian, op. cit., p. 21, from the Baku newspaper, Hay at,
No. 127, 13 VI, 1906.
38. See Ramsaur, op. cit., Chapter IV, pp. 94-139; also, Zeine N. Zeine, Arab-
Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, Lebanon,
1958), p. 64.
39. See Ivar Spector, op. cit., p. 70.
40. A. Popov, "Turetskaya revolyutsiya, 1908-1909 gg./' op. cit., Vol. XLIII,
p. 14.
41. Krasnyi Arkhiv, Vol. XLIV, 1931, pp. 5-6. The dispatch of Nekliudov to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 (7) August, 1908, from Paris, claimed this
effort had been going on for three or four years.
42. See E. E. Ramsaur, op. cit., p. 34, who says that, by and large, this policy
"must be regarded as one of the factors which helped to bring about his down-
fall/' See also, Sir Edwin Pears, op. cit., p. 227.
43. Sir Edwin Pears, op. cit., p. 227.
44. Ibid.f p. 222.
45. Ivar Spector, op. cit., p. 31.
46. A. M. Valuiskii, "Vosstaniya v vostotchnoi anatolii nakanune mladoturet-

skoi revolyntsii," op. tit,, pp. 50-51,
47. Ibid., p. 51.

156 Notes
48. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
49. Ibid., p. 53.
50. Tsovikian, op. cit. f p. 23. The

articles from Turk were reprinted in the
Baku newspaper, Hayat> No. 123, 7 VI, 1906, and No. 118, i VI, 1906.
51. E. E. Ramsaur thinks the pressure from international events has been
overemphasized This was not the official British view, as expressed in
(p. 133),
British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. X, Chapter 38, "The Young
Turkish Revolution/' pp. 249, 268 ff.
52. Ramsaur ignores this episode. See Sir Edwin Pears, op. cit., p. 233.
53. The Fatwa was a religious or judicial sentence or decision pronounced

by the Khalifah or by a mufti, or qazi. It was usually written. See Shorter
Encyclopaedia of Islam, edited by H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers (Cornell
University Press, 1953).
54. See the account in William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Suc-
cessors, (Cambridge, 1936), p. 476. See
1801-1927 also, Kh. Z. Gabidullin,
Mladoturetskaya revolyutsiya (Moscow, 1936), p. 126.

55. See Zeine N. Zeine, op. cit., pp. 64-65, for the demonstration in Damascus.
56. August 22, 1908.
57. Depesha russkogo posla v Konstantinopole, ot 16/29 avgusta, 1908.

58. Letter from General AH Fuat Cebesoy to Ivar Spector, Istanbul, Septem-
ber i, 1960.
59. Zeine N. Zeine, op. tit., p. 65.
60. P. N. Miliukov, Vospominaniya (1859-1917) (New York, 1955), II, 34-5.
6 1. Sergei A. Zenkovsky, op. cit., pp. 127-28.

62. Ibid., p. 111.
63. $o~letie mladoturetskoi revolyutsii, p. 128.
CHAPTER FIVE China
1. "Torgovlya Rossii s Kitaem s 1880 goda po 1905 god," Vestnik Azii

(Harbin), No. 5, June 1910, pp. 102-06.
Exports from Russia to China* Imports from China to Russia*

1880 2434 1880 22.008
1885 1 *8<>S iSSs 24.077
1890 2.291 1890 31-616
1895 5.110 1895 42.087
1900 6.702 1900 45-945
*95 31-588 1905 6o-549
* In thousands of
rubles, at the rate of i ruble =1/15 imperial.
2, M. Z. Tutaev, pervoi russkoi revolyutsii na probuzhdenie
"VHyanie
i
reToIyiitsionno-demokratitcheskogonatsionarno-osvoboditeFnogo dvizheniya v
kitae/* Utchenye Z&piski Kamnskogo ordena trudogo krasnogo znameni go-
Notes 157
sudarstuennogo universiteta tmeni F. I. Ul'yanova-lenina (Kazan, 1957), Vol. 117,
Book i, p. 137.
3.G. B. Erenburg, Revolyutsiya 1905-190? godov v Rossii i

revolyutsionnoe
dvizhenie v Kitae (Moscow, 1955), Seriya i, No. 44, p. 13.
4. M. Betoshkin, Bol'sheviki dal'nego vostoka v pervoi russkoi revolyutsii

(Moscow, 1956).
5. G. S. Novikov-Daurskii, "Otzvuki revolyutsii 1905 g. sredi russkikh voenno-
plennykh v Yaponii," Priamur'e, No. 6, 1957, p. 109.
6. Mao Tze-dun, Izbrannye proizvedeniya (Moscow, 1953), III, 19.
7. Jung Meng-yuan, "E-kuo i-chiu-ling-wu nien ke-mlng tui Chung-

See
kuo-ti ying-hsiang" (The Influence of the Russian Revolution of 1905 on
China"), Li-shih Yen-chiu (Historical Research), No. 2, May 1954, pp. 53-70
(Peking); Li Shu, "I-chiu ling wu nien O-kuo ke-ming ho Chung-kuo" (The
Russian Revolution of 1905 and China), Ibid., No. i, 1955, pp. 1-18. An abridged
version of this important article was published in Russian under the title,
"Kitaiskaya pressa 1905 g. o russkoi revolyutsii/* Voprosy Istorii, No. 6 (Mos-
cow, June 1955), pp. 98-104.
8. R. Kim, "O sovremennoi kitaiskoi intelligentsia/' Novyi Fostok, Vol. XII,
1926, p. 41.
9. The Nation, Vol. V, 81, No. 2096, August 31, 1905, p. 179.
10. Roger Hackett, "Chinese Students in Japan, 1900-1910," Harvard Uni-
versity, Paper on China Regional Studies Seminars, III, 1949, p. 142.
11.This speech on Pan Asianism is to be found in China and Japan: Natural

Friends Unnatural Enemies; A Guide for China's Foreign Policy. Edited by
T'ang Leang-li (Shanghai, 1941), pp. 141 ff. See also, Marius Jansen, The
Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, for additional information pertaining to the speech
and its purpose.
12. "Demokratiya i naroditchestvo v kitae/* Sotchinenie f 4th ed., XVIII, 143.
13. Jung Meng-yuan, op. cit., p. 99. The information appears to have been
drawn from an article in Min-pao, No. 6, "The Secret of the Revolution in the
Chinese Republic," by a Japanese named Kayano Nagatomo.
14. See Shelley H. Cheng, "How the Chinese Communists Interpret the
Revolution of 1911." Seminar Paper, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, Uni-
versity of Washington, August 19, 1959.
15. See also E. A. Belov, Revolyutsiya 1911-1913 v Kitae (Moscow, 1958), p.

10.
16. Shelley H. Cheng, op. cit.,, p. 12.
17. E. A. Belov, op. dt.f p. 10.

"
18. V. I. Danilov, 'Ob'edinennaya liga' v revolyutsii 1911 g./' Savetskoe
Kitaievedenie (AN SSSR, No. 2> 1958), p. 47.
19. D. S. BeFfor, ed., et. aL, Sbornik, posvyashchennyi $o-letiyu pervoi russkoi
revolyutsii 1905-1907 gg. (Odessa, 1956), p. 131.
so. V. L Danilov, op. cit., p. 56.

158 Notes
21. A. Antonov, Sun'yatsenizm i kitaiskaya revolyutsiya (Kommunistitcheskaya

Akademiya, Moscow, 1931), p. 3.
22. "Sun Yat-sen," Novyi Vostok, Vol. I (7), 1925, p. xvii.
Mao Tze-dun, Izbr. sotch., Ill, 170. See also, D. S. Bel'for, op. dt., pp.
23.
130-31.
24. Mao Tze-dun, Izbr. Proizvedeniya, III, 19.
25. See Note 7 above.

26. Chinese version, p. 100. The passage was omitted in the Russian version
of this article.
27. Liflandia was a government district in the Russian Baltic provinces.
28. Shih Pao, January 28, 1905. A Shanghai paper.

29. Ibid., March 12 and April 2, 1905.
30. This item was reprinted in the journal, Tung-fang Tsa~chihf II, No. 4.
31. See Ivar Spector, op. cit.f p. 303, note 21.
32. Shih Pao, July 18, 1905.
33. Tuan Fang. Report on the Situation in Russia. Vol. VI. Manuscript. See
op. cit.f p. 66, for reference to Tuan Fang's report
to the
Jung Meng-yuan,
Empress.
CHAPTER six India
1. A. V. Raikov, "Rabo tehee dvizhenie v Indii v 1905-1908 godakh," Sovet-
shoe Vostokovedenie, No. 2, 1957, p. 145, quoting the Times of India, January 28,
1905.
2. M.
B. MItin, Vsemirno-istoritcheskoe znatchenie pervoi russkoi revolyutsii
(First Series,No. i, Moscow, 1956), p. 22; I. M. Reisner and B. K. Rubtsov,
eds., Navaya istoriya stran zarubezhnogo vostoka (Moscow University, 1952), II,
286; Congress Presidential Addresses, from the Foundation to the Silver Jubilee
(Madras, 1936), p. 729.
3. Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India

(Collected from Bombay Government Records), Vol. II, 1885-1920 (Bombay,
*95^) P. 922.
4. The Discovery of India

(New York, 1946), p. 349.
5. Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (New York, 1960), p. 8.
6. India (New York, 1926), p. 113.
7. H. H. Dodwell, ed., The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol.

V, The Indian Empire, 1858-1918 (New York & Cambridge, England, 1932), p.
55*-
S. See, for instance, Indian Unrest
(London, 1910), India Old and New
(London, 1921), and India (New York, 1925).
Notes 159
9. Report of Committee Appointed to Investigate Revolutionary Con-

spiracies in
India (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1918), referred to
henceforth as the Sedition Committee Report (1918),
10. Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vol.
II, 1885-1920.
11. Dr. Nandalal Chatterji, "The Foundation of the Congress and Russo
phobia," Journal of Indian History, XXXVI, Part II (1958, Serial No. 107), pp.
171-77.
12.Hirendranath Mukerjee, India Struggles for Freedom (Bombay, 1948), p.

86. Quoting R. Page Arnot, A Short History of the Russian Revolution (London,
1937), I, 64.
13. Hirendranath Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 64.
14. Ibid.
15. Major General A. C. Chatterji, India's Struggle for Freedom (Calcutta,

1947), pp. iii-iv.
16. I. M. Reisner 8c B. K. Rubtsov, eds., op. cit., II, 283; A. M. Pankratova,

et. at, eds., op. cit., II, 407.
17. Volume II (New York, 1917), p. 154.
18. See D. V. Tahmankar, Lokamanya Tilak. Father of Indian Unrest and

Maker of Modern India (London, 1956); many years earlier, Sir Valentine
Chirol referred to Tilak in similar terms. See Indian Unrest (London, 1910), p.
41.
19. See I. M. Reisner, "Vydayushchiisya indiiskii patriot i demokrat Bal

Gangadhar Tilak," Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, No. 4, 1956, pp. 75-89.
20. The Discovery of India (New York, 1946), p. 356.
21. Sir Aurobindo Ghose, Bankim-Tilak-Dayananda, 2nd ed. (Calcutta, 1947),
p. 19.
II, p. 212. Part II (pp. 195-333) is devoted to Tilak.
23. Ibid., p. 195. A London Secret Police report in 1919 indicated that Tilak
anticipated the deliverance of India by the Bolsheviks.
24. A. M. Pankratova, et. al., eds., op. cit., II, 414 (note).
25. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York, 1946), p. 356.
26. Sedition Committee Report (1918), p. 11.
II, pp. 218, 251.
28. A. V. Raikov, op. cit., pp. 144-152; see also, Statistical Abstract for British
India (London, 1911), p. 265.
29. Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India, II,
270.
30. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 256 ff.

160 Notes
31. A. V. Raikov, "Angloindiiskaya armlya i natsionarno-osvoboditel'noe

dvizhenie v indii v 1905-1907 godakh," Problemy Vostokovedeniya (Moscow,
AN, SSSR, No. 2, 1959), p. 129.
32. M. Reisner, "Vydayushchiisya

I. indiiskii patriot i demokrat, Bal
Gangadhar Tilak/' op. cit. p. 84.f
33. Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India, II,
215-16.
34. Ibid., II, 219-20.
35. Ibid.
36. Recollections, II, 231 and 265.
37. Ibid., II, 327.
38. Sedition Committee Report (1918), p. 12. From the issue of December,
1907-
39. See Dr. Nandalal Chatterji, "The Cult o Violence and India's Freedom
Movement," Journal of Indian History, Vol. XXXV, Part I (April 1957, Serial
no. 103), pp. 1-6, especially p, 3. See also, U. Rustamov, "Severoindiiskie
knyazhestva i revolyutsionnyi pod'em 1905-1908 gg. v Indii," Sovetskoe Vosto-
kovedenie, No. 2, 1956, pp. 134-35.
40. Source Materials for a History of the Freedom Movement in India, II,
4S9-
41. Ibid*, II, 397; and Sedition Committee Report, p. 13.
42. Sedition Committee Report (1918), p. 13.
43. Ibid., p, 42.
44. Ibid., p. 18.
45. I&idL,p. 42.
46. Ibid., p. 44.
47. Ibid., p. 76.
48. Navyi Fostok, Vol. I (7), 1925,

p. 157.
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Index
Index
Abdul Aziz, Sultan, 52 Cairo, 69

Abdul Hamid II, Sultan, 52-62, 68, 73- Catherine II, the Great, 35
74 Caucasus, 35, 66, 69
Academy of Sciences (USSR), 2 Cebesoy, General Ali Fuat, 74
Africa, 93, no Central Asia, 32, 34, 66
Ain-ed-Dowleh, 41 Chattorji, Major-General A. C., 97
Akgoraoglu, Yusuf, 65 Ch'ing government, 89
Albanians, 58, 66 China; Chinese, i, 30, 33, 77-93, 109-110
Alexander II, 24 Chirol, Sir Valentine, 96
Alexandra Fedorovna, Empress, 19 Christians, 44, 72
Al-hajj, 62 Circassians, 58, 66
Ali Swavi, 54 Committee of Progress and Union, 55,
Anatolia, 56, 68-69 59, 65, 68
Anglo-Russian Entente, 71 Communists. See Bolsheviks
Arabs, 58, 66 Constantinople, 49, 57, 68
Ardabil, 45 Constitution (1905), 2, 23, 28; Midhat,
Ardahan, 70 51
Armenians, 33, 58 Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), 36,
Asia, Asians, 29-37, 49, 81, 93, 99, 111 63, 86
Azad, Abul Kalam, 95 Cossacks, 3, 49
Azerbaijan; Azerbaijanians, 34, 50, 64 Crimea, 34, 66
Curzon, Lord George (Viceroy of India,
Baku, 20, 38, 50 1899-1905), 98
Bakunin, 86 Cyprus, 54
Balkans, 22, 74
Baring, Maurice, 33 Daghestan, 55
Bashkirs, 34 Damascus, 68
Belgium, 12 Derbent, 38
Bengal, 101, 106, 108 Doctor Zhivago, 65
Black Hundreds, 19
Dolgorukov, Prince P., 21
"Bloody Sunday/" 1-12, 20, 26, 70 Dostoyevsky, F. M., 105
Bokhara, 39
"Drang nach Osten/* 49
Bolsheviks, 18, 22, 31, 59, 78, 84, 85, Duma (Imperial), 15, 19, 36, 67
no, 113
Bombay, 101, 105
Bosnia-Herzogovina, 54 Edward VII (England), 71
Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), 78 Egypt, 33 49
Brinton, Crane, 26 Elisavetgrad, 20
British Empire, 33 Endzhumene, 44, 74
Browne, Edward, 46 England, 33, See also British Empire
Bulgaria, 32 Enzeli, 45
177
Index
Erivan, 38 Kars, 70
Erzeram, 65, 69 Kazan, 34, 65
Kemal, Ismail Bey, 58
Kemal Pasha (Ataturk), 59, 67, 76
Fabian Society, 12
Far East, 18
Kerman, 45
Kermanshah, 45
Fernau, Frledrich Wilhelm, 37
Khabarovsk, 77
jetwah, 52
Kharkov, 20
France; French, 12, 20, 31
Khiva, 39
Fullon, General I. A., 8
Khrustalev-Nosar, 13
Kiev, 20
Galkin, V. A., 21 Kirghiz, 34
Gapon, Father George, 1-11, 101 Kolokol, 83
Georgians, 33, 66 Kommunistj 23
Germany; Germans, 12, 31 Korea; Koreans, 33
Gershunl, G. A., 81 Krupp Arms Plant, 8
Gorky, Maxim, 12-13, 18 Kuang-fu Hui, 79
Great Britain. See British Empire Kurds, 58
Grozny, 38
Grusenberg, O., 3 Lamsdorff, V. N., 61
Gummetf 39 Lena, 25
Gurko, V. I. Assistant Minister of In- Lenin, V. I., 4, n, 23, 61-62, 11$
terior, 10 Lentzner, M., 34
Gusev, S. I., 9 Liakhov, Colonel, 49
Libau, 20
Herzen, A. I., 83 Lodz, 20
Hong- Kong, 84 London Stock Exchange, 21
"House of Justice/* 41 London Trades Council, 12
Hsing-chung Hui, 79
Hua-hsing Hui, 74 Macedonia, 68, 71
Hungarian Revolution, 50 Magna Carta, 17

Majlis, 41-42, 45-47
Manchu dynasty, 82-83, 89-90
India; Indians, 94-109
Manchuria, 77
Intelligentsia (definition), 28 Manifesto. See October Manifesto
Iran; Iranians, 32, 38-50 Mao Tse-tung, 78
Iraq, 95
Marag, 45
Iskra, 83 Maria Federovna, 21
Islam; Islamic, 36, 111
Marx, Karl; Marxist, 23, 88
Istanbul. See Constantinople
Matveev, A. M., 39
Italy; Italians, 12, 31
Mayakovsky, Vladimir, 112
Ittifak, 65
Maynard, Sir John, 25
Ivanov, M. S., 47
Mecca, 62
Ivanovo-Voznesensk, 13, 24 Medina, 62
Izvolsky, A, P., 48 Mensheviks, 13
Meshed, 45
Jaffa, 68 Middle East, 48, 93
Japan; Japanese, 29, 62, 77 Midhart Constitution, 51, 54
Jerusalem, 68 Miliukov, Paul N., 18, 63, 75
Jevdet, Dr. Abdullah, 51, 65 Min-pao, 83, 86-88
Jews; Jewish, 10, 19, 22 Mitra Mela, 105
Index 179
Mohammed All Shah, 49 Plehve, V. K. von (Minister of Interior,
Monarchist Party, 19 1902), 7
Mongols, 19, 33 Pobiedonostsev, Constantine (Procura-
Morozov, Savva, 18 tor of the Holy Synod), 8
Moscow, 13, 26, 30 Poles, 22
Moskovskiya Fedomosti, 19 Poltava, 7, 20
Murad V, Sultan, 52 Pope Pius X, 20
Murat Bey, 55 Port Arthur, 29, 81
Muslims, 34-37, 44> 63, 67, 95, 107 Portsmouth, Treaty of, 15
Muzaffar-ud-Din, Shah, 41-44 Potekhin, P., 3
Potemkin, 62
Narnik-Kemal, 53 Potemkin, General Fieldmarshal Greg-
ory, 35
Naoroji, Dadabhai, 94
Narimanov, N., 40
Narodniki (Populists), 88 Queen's Hall, 13
Nasir-al-Din, Shah, 40
NatchalOy 20, 24 Resht, 45
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 99-100 Reval, 71
Nesselrode, Count K. V., 21 Revolution (October), 31
New Ottomans, 52-54 Riga, 12, 20
Niazi Bey, 71 Riza, Ahmed, 56
Nicholas I, 50 Rumania, 32, 54
Nicholas II, 2-6, 9, 16-18, 41, 61, 70, 74 Russians (Great), 27
89 Russkoe Bogatstvo, 20
Nihilists, 109 Russkoe Znamya, 19
Nikolai Nikolayevitch, Grand Duke, l
War, 12,
^f)/kusso-Japanese 17, 29-30, 36,
Nizhny-Novgorod, 63 *~"
61-62, 77, 80, 96, 99
Nogai, 34 Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), 54
Novaya Zhizn, 20 Rutenberg, Peter M., 10
Novotcherkassk, 20
Salmas, 45
Obolensky, Prince A. D., 16 Salonika, 68
October Manifesto (October 17/30, Schmidt, Lieutenant Pyotr Petrovitch,
1905), 4, 10, 16-19, 67, 87 65-66
Odessa, 20 Serbia, 32
Opium War, 78 Sergei Alexandrovitch, Grand Duke, 5
Orthodox Church, 8-9, 72
Sevastopol, 65
Otkhodniki, 38 Shapshal, S. M., 49
Ottoman Empire, 51-76, 95, 111 Shariat, 42
Shi'a ulema, 42-43
Pan-Islamlsm, 56 Shimonoseki, Treaty of (1895), 30
Pan-Turkism, 63 Siberia, 34
Paris Commune (1871), 31 Slonimsky, L., 3
Pasternak, Boris, 65 Social Democrats, 9-10, 18, 24-25, 39
Pavlovitch, M., 29, 122 Social Revolutionists, 9-10, 18
Pears, Sir Edwin, 56 Society of the Friends of Russian
Persia; Persians, 33 Freedom, 12
Petropavlovsk, 13 South America, 12
Pilnyak, Boris, 112 Soviet of Workers* and Soldiers* Depu-
Planskon, V. 3 ties, 22
i8o Index
Soviets (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Sevas- Turk Yurdu, 65
topol), 13 Turkestan, 34
St. Petersburg, 12, 20, 26, 94 Turkey; Turks, 33-35, 51-76, 95, in
State Council, 15
Stolypin, Peter, 27 United States, 12, 22, 103
Strauss, Oscar, 12 University of St. Petersburg, 49
Sukarno, Achmed, 113 Urus-muhadjiry, 35, 69
Sun Yat-sen, 30, 33, 80-85, 88 USSR, 2
Sy n Otechestva, 20
Vickers Arms Plant, 8
Tabriz, 50 Vinaver, M., 3
Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), 1-2, 78 Volga, 34, 112
Tatars, 34, 63 Vperyod (Forward), 29
Teheran, 43, 45
Temir-Khan-Shuro, 38 Warsaw, 20
Tiflis, 20, 38 Western Europe, n, 22, 29, 77, 95
Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 98-104 Winter Palace, 3, 12
Tokyo, 80 Witte, Count S. Yu., 16, 19, 21, 23
Tomsk, 6 World War I, 35, 96, 107
ToptcMbashev, Mardan Bey, 36 World War II, 96, no, 112
Trapezund, 65
Trepov, General D. F., 4, 16 Yuan Shih-kai, 91
Trotsky, Leon, 13, 112
Tsarskoe Selo, 6 Zhdanov, L. G., 4
Tunisia, 54 Zoroastrians, 44
Turchaninov, A., 3 Zubatov, Sergei, 8
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if n

9-'?. 03 S?4f 63-03272

"1'he first Russi.an revolution:

I20p* (A Spectrum book, S-27)

ITS IMPACT ON ASIA

Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be repro-

Printed in the United States of America

This work, to the author's knowledge, is the first attempt to

respects than the October Revolution of 1917. The 1905 Revolution,

experience of Asian countries and in some instances its influence

For lack of other sources, the Soviet interpretation of the Revo-

gentsia. To offset this Soviet distortion, I have sought to provide a

This work was undertaken with the assistance of a grant from

special debt of gratitude to Dr. Jung-pang Lo of the Far Eastern

help in connection with Chinese sources pertaining to the Russian

ONE The Revolution of 1905: A Definition i

FOUR The Ottoman Empire 51

burg for Submission to Nicholas II on January 9, 1905 117

The unabridged Russian text of the Manifesto issued by Nicholas

The Revolution of 1905

"Dear blood brethren* the bullets of the Imperial soldiers

"To the palace they crept as petitioners.

With the exception of Soviet sources, there is no up-to-date

geois or Bolshevik leadership is that it was a "bourgeois demo-

problem emerged as the real essence of the Revolution, most

nineteenth-century Chinese economy, Western historians have

1864). A careful analysis of the programs of the leading Russian

its target, a constitution.

The unique feature of the Russian bourgeois democratic

"Bloody Sunday" (January g/%2, 1905) marked the beginning

Gapon led a crowd of several thousand people, most of them

classes to makeprovision for free universal education, recogni-

ing conditions. The petitioners, in a spirit o humility rather

bearing ikons and portraits of the Emperor and Empress,

crowd, making the sign of the cross as they did so.

Alexandrovitch, uncle of the Tsar, opened on the unarmed

masses, killing from 75 to 1,000 and wounding from 200 to

part to the fact that some eyewitnesses reported only what

pelled to remain on duty during three days of unremitting

day, by wanton attacks on people in the streets, in particular

on students and suppressing the demonstration

made by one of their number to a visiting Frenchman:

Quand les enfants ne sont pas sages, il faut bien commencer

The significance of Bloody Sunday can hardly be overesti-

tionary, V. I. Lenin, appraised the situation with insight:

The revolutionary uprising of the proletariat accomplished

The reaction of loyal citizens to Bloody Sunday was reflected

January 19, a carefully screened group of thirty-four workers

interview, the Tsar read the following statement, undoubtedly

prepared by Trepov, which later appeared in the press:

have received you in order to present my own version

fortunate, the majority of whom were innocent victims of

legitimate needs will be satisfied, with due consideration

Every Russian, irrespective of rank or station,

inviting the workers to Tsarskoe Selo, the Tsar accom-

have dispersed peacefully and violence could have been avoided.

replaceable secretary" and who had proved to be "experienced,