SPRING HOMES SUBDIVISION CO., INC., SPOUSES PEDRO L.

LUMBRES and
REBECCA T. ROARING, Petitioners vs. SPOUSES PEDRO TABLADA, JR. and ZENAIDA
TABLADA, Respondents
G.R. No. 200009, January 23, 2017

FACTS
On October 12, 1992, petitioners, Spouses Pedro L. Lumbres and Rebecca T. Roaring,
(Spouses Lumbres) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Spring Homes Subdivision Co.,
Inc., through its chairman, the late Mr. Rolando B. Pasic, for the development of several parcels
of land. For reasons of convenience and in order to facilitate the acquisition of permits and licenses
in connection with the project, the Spouses Lumbres transferred the titles to the parcels of land in
the name of Spring Homes. On January 9, 1995, Spring Homes entered into a Contract to Sell with
respondents, Spouses Pedro Tablada, Jr. and Zenaida Tablada, (Spouses Tablada) for the sale of a
parcel of

ISSUE: Who should own the property on the case of good faith in a movable and immovable
property?

HELD:

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.

The Spouses Lumbres cannot claim good faith since at the time of the execution of their
Compromise Agreement with Spring Homes, they were indisputably and reasonably informed that
the subject lot was previously sold to the Spouses Tablada. They were also already aware that the
Spouses Tablada had constmcted a house thereon and were in physical possession thereof.
SPOUSES LARRY AND ROSARITA WILLIAMS, Petitioners vs
RAINERO A. ZERDA, Respondent
G.R. No. 207146, March 15, 2017

FACTS

On July 28, 2004, Zerda filed a complaint against Spouses Williams for easement of right
of way. The complaint alleged that Zerda's lot was without adequate outlet to a public highway,
that it could not be accessed except by passing through Spouses Williams' property; that the
isolation of Zerda's property was not due to his own acts, as it was the natural consequence of its
location; that the right of way he was claiming was at a point least prejudicial to Spouses Williams'
property; and that on January 27, 2004, Zerda wrote to Spouses Williams formally asking them to
provide him with right of way, for which he was willing to pay its reasonable value or to swap a
portion of his property, but Spouses Williams refused.

ISSUE: Does prior knowledge of an immovables would render the law on easements right of way
nugatory?

HELD

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own
acts.

ART. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

It explained that the isolation of Zerda's property was not due to his own acts, and to deny the
right of way to a purchaser of an enclosed estate simply because of his prior knowledge that the
same was surrounded by immovables would render the law on easements nugatory.
DASMARIAS T. ARCAINA and MAGNANI T. BANTA, Petitioners vs.
NOEMI L. INGRAM, represented by MA. NENETTE L. ARCHINUE, Respondent
G.R. No. 196444, February 15, 2017

FACTS
Arcaina is the owner of a lot locate at Albay, sometime in 2004 her attorney-in-fact,
Banta, entered into a contract with Ingram for the sale of the property. Banta showed Ingram and
the latters attorney-in-fact, respondent Ma. Nenette L. Archinue. Subsequently, Ingram caused
the property to be surveyed and discovered that Lot No. 3230 has an area of 12,000 sq. m. Upon
learning of the actual area of the property, Banta allegedly insisted that the difference of 5,800 sq.
m. remains unsold. This was opposed by Ingram who claims that she owns the whole lot by virtue
of the sale. In her Complaint, Ingram alleged that upon discovery of the actual area of the property,
Banta insisted on fencing the portion which she claimed to be unsold.

ISSUE

WON the immovable was considered sold in lump sum?

HELD
"A caveat is in order, however. The use of "more or less" or similar words in designating
quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the
description "more or less" with reference to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of
quantity in the land. Applying Del Prado to the case before us, we find that the difference of 5,800
sq. m. is too substantial to be considered reasonable. We note that only 6,200 sq. m. was agreed
upon between petitioners and Ingram. Declaring Ingram as the owner of the whole 12,000 sq. m.
on the premise that this is the actual area included in the boundaries would be ordering the delivery
of almost twice the area stated in the deeds of sale. Surely, Article 1542 does not contemplate such
an unfair situation to befall a vendor-that he/she would be compelled to deliver double the amount
that he/she originally sold without a corresponding increase in price.
ERLINDA DINGLASAN DELOS SANTOS and her daughters, namely, VIRGINIA, AUREA,
and BINGBING, all surnamed DELOS SANTOS, Petitioners vs
ALBERTO ABEJON and the estate of TERESITA DINGLASAN ABEJON, Respondents
G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017

FACTS
The complaint alleged that Erlinda and her late husband Pedro Delos Santos (Pedro)
borrowed the amount of l00,000.00 from the former's sister, Teresita, as evidenced by a
Promissory Note dated April 8, 1998. As security for the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their
property in Makati City which was mortgage and annotated on the title. After Pedro died, Erlinda
ended up being unable to pay the loan, and as such, agreed to sell the subject land to Teresita for
l50,000.00, or for the amount of the loan plus an additional 50,000.00. On July 8, 1992, they
executed a Deed of Sale and a Release of Mortgage, and eventually, TCT No. 131753 was
cancelled and TCT No. 180286 was issued in the name of "Teresita, Abejon[,] married to Alberto
S. Abejon." Thereafter, respondents constructed a three (3)-storey building worth 2,000,000.00
on the subject land. Despite the foregoing, petitioners refused to acknowledge the sale, pointing
out that since Pedro died in 1989, his signature in the Deed of Sale executed in 1992 was definitely
forged.

ISSUE
Whether or not the immovable was built in good faith or bad faith?
HELD
In this case, it bears stressing that the execution of the Deed of Sale involving the subject
land was done in 1992. However, and as keenly pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S.
Caguioa during the deliberations of this case, Teresita was apprised of Pedro's death as early as
1990 when she went on a vacation in the Philippines. As such, she knew all along that the aforesaid
Deed of Sale - which contained a signature purportedly belonging to Pedro, who died in 1989, or
three (3) years prior to its execution - was void and would not have operated to transfer any rights
over the subject land to her name. Despite such awareness of the defect in their title to the subject
land, respondents still proceeded in constructing a three (3)-storey building thereon. Indubitably,
they should be deemed as builders in bad faith.
BALDOMERA FOCULAN-FUDALAN, Petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES DANILO OCIAL, et al
G.R. No. 194516, June 17, 2015

FACTS
Controversy began when the spouses Danilo Ocial and Davidica Bongcaras-Ocial,
represented by their Attomey-in-Fact, Marcelino Bongcaras, filed an action for the declaration of
validity of partition and sale, recovery of ownership and possession and damages against Flavio
Fudalan and Cristobal Fudalan. There are several claimants in the disputed property. The Fudalans,
on the other hand, claimed that they were the rightful owners of the subject land having purchased
the same from the Fuderanans on November 4, 1983; that the sale was evidenced by a private
document printed in a blue paper; that as owners, they planted "ubi," posted two "no-trespassing"
signs and installed a barb wire fence around the land; that since their purchase, they had been in
possession of the land in the concept of owners.

ISSUE
Whether or not the immovable property is acquired through prescription as assailed by
Baldomera?

HELD
In the present controversy, aside from Baldomeras bare allegation that her family had been
in possession of the subject property since it was sold to her parents, no other evidence,
documentary or otherwise, showing that the title to the subject property was indeed transferred
from Juana to her parents was presented. In fact, she never denied that the tax declaration of the
property was still in the name of Juana Fuderanan. As such, for lack of "just title," she could not
have acquired the disputed property by ordinary prescription through possession of ten (10) years.
Occupation or use alone, no matter how long, cannot confer title by prescription or adverse
possession unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner, that is, possession
under the claim of title.
SEVERINO BARICUATRO, JR., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. 105902, February 9, 2000

FACTS
On October 16, 1968, Severino Baricuatro, Jr., now deceased, bought two (2) lots on an
installment basis from Constantino M. Galeos. Petitioner, however, was unable to pay the full
amount to respondent Galeos. At the time the original action for quieting of title was filed in the
trial court, petitioner had an unpaid balance of P1,000.00. The titles to the said lots remained in
the name of respondent Galeos. As emphasized by the Court of Appeals, the contract of sale
involving Lot No. 10 expressly provided that "the parties both agree that a final deed of sale shall
be executed, in favor of the buyer upon full and complete payment of the total purchase price
agreed upon."
After the sale, petitioner introduced certain improvements on the said lots and started to reside
therein in 1970. Since then petitioner has been in actual and physical possession of the two (2)
lots.However, on December 7, 1968, about two (2) months from the date of the previous sale to
petitioner, respondent Galeos sold the entire subdivision, including the two (2) lots, to his co-
respondent Eugenio Amores.

ISSUE
Who has the better right over the immovable property if the property was sold to two
different party?

HELD
Under article 1544, the ownership of an immovable property shall belong to the purchaser
who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. For a second buyer to successfully
invoke the protection provided by article 1544 of the Civil Code, he must posses good faith from
the time of acquisition of the property until the registration of the deed of conveyance covering the
same.
SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC., Petitioner, vs.
BERNARD C. FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193426, September 29, 2014

FACTS
On 6 June 1997, the appellee's brother visited the Legenda Hotel and Casino, owned and
operated by the appellant. In the CCTV review, revealed that Ludwin changed $5,000.00 worthh
of chips into smaller denominations. Legenda admitted in its brief that its surveillance staff paid
close attention to Ludwin simply because it was "unusual" for a Filipino to play using dollar-
denominated chips. After Ludwin won $200.00 in a game of baccarat, he redeemed the value of
chips worth $7,200.00. An operation was launched by Legenda to zero-in on Ludwin. Shortly
thereafter, Legenda's internal security officers accosted Ludwin and Deoven and ordered them to
return the cash and they complied without ado because they were being pulled away.

ISSUE

Whether or not that the casino chips being a movable can be used as payment of debt?

HELD
There should be no basis to suppose that the casino chips found in Ludwin's and Deoven's
possession were stolen; petitioner acted arbitrarily in confiscating the same without basis. Though
casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law which prohibits their use or trade outside
of the casino which issues them. In any case, it is not unusual nor is it unlikely that respondent
could be paid by his Chinese client at the former' s car shop with the casino chips in question; said
transaction, if not common, is nonetheless not unlawful.

JUAN P. CABRERA, Petitioner, vs.

HENRY YSAAC, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166790, November 19, 2014

FACTS
The heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac co-owned a 5,517-square-meter parcel of land located
in Sabang, Naga City. Henry Ysaac leased out portions of the property to several lessees. Juan
Cabrera, one of the lessees, leased a 95-square-meter portion of the land beginning in 1986. On
May 6, 1990, Henry Ysaac needed money and offered to sell the 95-square-meter piece of land to
Juan Cabrera. He told Henry Ysaac that the land was too small for his needs because there was no
parking space for his vehicle. In order to address Juan Cabreras concerns, Henry Ysaac expanded
his offer to include the two adjoining lands that Henry Ysaac was then leasing to the Borbe family
and the Espiritu family. Those three parcels of land have a combined area of 439-square-meters.
However, Henry Ysaac warned Juan Cabrera that the sale for those two parcels could only proceed
if the two families agree to it.

ISSUE
WON an immovable property requires a notarization for a letter to rescind a contract?

HELD
The absence of a contract of sale means that there is no source of obligations for
respondent, as seller, or petitioner, as buyer. Rescission is impossible because there is no contract
to rescind. The rule in Article 1592 that requires a judicial or notarial act to formalize rescission
of a contract of sale of an immovable property does not apply. This court does not need to rule
whether a letter is a valid method of rescinding a sales contract over an immovable property
because the question is moot and academic.

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175707, November 19, 2014
FACTS
Petitioner claims that "the 10% value-added tax is based on the gross selling price or gross
value in money of the goods sold, bartered or exchanged." Petitioner likewise claims that by
definition, the term "goods" was limited to "movable, tangible objects which is appropriable or
transferable" and that said term did not originally include "real property."

ISSUE
WON the term goods are those describe as a movable and does not include those real
properties?

HELD
Petitioner is clearly mistaken.
The term "goods" has been defined to mean any movable or tangible objects which are appreciable
or tangible. More specifically, the word "goods" is always used to designate wares, commodities,
and personal chattels; and does not include chattels real. "Real property" on the other hand, refers
to land, and generally whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to land. It is therefore quite
absurd to equate "goods" as being synonymous to "properties". The vast difference between the
terms "goods" and "real properties" is so obvious that petitioners assertion must be struck down
for being utterly baseless and specious.

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. ABIGAIL R.

RAZON ALVAREZ AND VERNON R. RAZON, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 179408, March 05, 2014

FACTS
 Pursuant to its franchise, PLDT offers to the public wide range of services duly authorized
by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). To safeguard the integrity of its
network, PLDT regularly conducts investigations on various prepaid cards marketed and sold
abroad to determine alternative calling patterns (ACP) and network fraud that are being perpetrated
against it. During a test call placed at the PLDT-ACPDD office, the receiving phone reflected a
PLDT telephone number (2-8243285) as the calling number used, as if the call was originating
from a local telephone in Metro Manila. Upon verification with the PLDT's Integrated Customer
Management (billing) System, the ACPDD learned that the subscriber of the reflected telephone
number is Abigail R. Razon Alvarez. It further learned that several lines are installed at this address
with Abigail and Vernon R. Razon (respondents), among others, as subscribers.

ISSUE
WON there is an existence of an movable or immovable property for the crime of theft to
be appreciated?

HELD
The CA ruled that the respondents could not have possibly committed the crime of theft
because PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services and these services themselves
are not personal properties contemplated under Article 308 of the RPC.
We disagree with PLDT. The fact that the printers and scanners are or may be connected
to the other illegal connections to the PLDT telephone lines does not make them the subject of the
offense or fruits of the offense, much less could they become a means of committing an offense.

PEBLIA ALFARO AND THE HEIRS OF PROSPEROUS ALFARO, NAMELY: MARY ANN
PEARL ALFARO & ROUSLIA ALFARO, Petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES EDITHO AND HERA DUMALAGAN, SPOUSES CRISPIN and EDITHA
DALOGDOG, ET. AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 186622, January 22, 2014
FACTS
On 14 June 1995, Bagano sold the subject property to petitioner Spouses Prosperous and
Peblia Alfaro through a Deed of Absolute Sale. According to respondent Spouses Editho and Hera
Dumalagan, they are the real owners of Lot No. 1710-H, a portion of the subject property. Right
after their purchase from Bagano, respondent Spouses Dumalagan immediately took possession of
the subject property and constructed a nipa hut therein, which they later on leased to Ramil
Quiineza, who then occupied the subject property until the end of 1997.

ISSUE
Who has the better right of the immovable property in good faith?
HELD
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to, or an interest in such property, and pays a full and fair price for the
same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of some other persons claim or interest
in the property. The petitioners are not such purchaser.
Petitioners had prior knowledge of the previous sales by installment of portions of the property to
several purchasers.1wphi1 Moreover, petitioners had prior knowledge of respondents possession
over the subject property. Hence, the rule on double sale is inapplicable in the case at bar. As
correctly held by the appellate court, petitioners prior registration of the subject property, with
prior knowledge of respondents claim of ownership and possession, cannot confer ownership or
better right over the subject property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.

EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186639, February 5, 2014

FACTS
 Cortez claimed that the subject parcel of land is a portion of Lot No. 2697, which was
declared for taxation purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that Lot No. 2697 was
inherited by his mother from her parents in 1946; that, on March 21, 1998, after his parents died,
he and his siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate over the properties of their
deceased parents and one of the properties allocated to him was the subject property. He alleged
that the subject property had been in the possession of his family since time immemorial; that the
subject parcel of land is not part of the reservation of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD).

ISSUE
WON the immovable was acquired through prescription?

HELD
The Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with the legal requirements for the registration
of the subject property under of P.D. No. 1529. There are two modes of prescription through which
immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article
1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. The ascertainment of good faith involves
the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, provisions
that more or less speak for themselves. The Court further stressed that the period of acquisitive
prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially declares that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development of
national wealth.

VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner, vs.

FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014

FACTS
 On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land
located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Caete. On
March 3, 1996, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15633 covering the parcel of land was issued
in Roldans name. On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a report,
Geodetic Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by
Roldans certificate of title. To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated
barangay conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II,
Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an
action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Sharia District Court.

ISSUE
WON the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction to decide cases over immovable or real
properties to a party who is non-muslim?

HELD
To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the
material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are examined. The law
conferring the jurisdiction of Sharia District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Sharia District Courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary
contracts, wherein the parties involved are Muslims In real actions not arising from contracts
customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Sharia District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such
real actions, Sharia District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which
in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the
action. This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Sharia District Courts over real actions
not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular courts.
MIDWAY MARITIME AND TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN/PRESIDENT PHD IN EDUCATION DR. SABINO M. MANGLICMOT,
PETITIONER, VS. MARISSA E. CASTRO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 189061, August 06, 2014
FACTS
The petitioner Midway Maritime and Technological Foundation (petitioner) is the lessee
of two parcels of land in Cabanatuan City. Its president, Dr. Sabino Manglicmot (Manglicmot), is
married to Adoracion Cloma (Adoracion), who is the registered owner of the property.
Respondents alleged that: (1) they are the owners of the residential building subject of the dispute,
which they used from 1977 to 1985 when they left for the United States of America and instituted
their uncle, Josefino C. Castro (Josefino), as the caretaker; (2) Manglicmot, who was the President
of the petitioner Midway Maritime and Technological Foundation, leased the building (except for
the portion occupied by Josefino) from Lourdes Castro, mother of the respondents, in June 1993
with monthly rent of P6,000.00, which was later to be increased to P10,000.00 in October 1995
after Josefino vacates his occupied portion; (3) the petitioner failed to pay rent starting August
1995, thus prompting the respondents to file the action.

ISSUE
Who owns the residential building which is an immovable?

HELD
It is not improbable that at the time the petitioner leased the residential building from the
respondents mother in 1993, it was aware of the circumstances surrounding the sale of the two
parcels of land and the nature of the respondents claim over the residential house. Yet, the
petitioner still chose to lease the building. Consequently, the petitioner is now estopped from
denying the respondents title over the residential building. Contrary to the petitioners assertion,
the property subject of the mortgage and consequently the auction sale pertains only to these two
parcels of land and did not include the residential house.

AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS, Petitioner, vs.

SPOUSES ALFREDO AND THE HEIRS REVILLA OF PAZ REVILLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014
FACTS
Alfredo Revilla and Paz Castillo-Revilla owned an unregistered parcel of land in Silang,
Cavite. In 1983, the Revilla spouses faced financial difficulties in raising funds for Alfredo
Revillas travel to Saudi Arabia, so Paz Castillo-Revilla borrowed money from Amada. By way
of security, the parties verbally agreed that Amada would take physical possession of the property,
cultivate it, then use the earnings from the cultivation to pay the loan and realty taxes. Upon full
payment of the loan, Amada would return the property to the Revilla spouses. Unknown to the
Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihanng Lupa"
before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite. On August 25, 1984, Amada sold the property to the
spouses Adolfo and Elvira Casorla (Casorla spouses) by "Deed of Absolute Sale Unregistered
Land." Tax Declaration No. 30411-A was later issued in the name of the Casorla spouses.

ISSUE
WON the petitioners allegation that they have the right to the fruits immovable property?

HELD
We affirm the lower courts order of reinstatement and reconveyance of the property in
favor of respondents Revilla spouses. Petitioner argues that antichresis is a formal contract that
must be in writing in order to be valid. Respondents Revilla spouses were not able to prove the
existence of the alleged antichresis contract. On the other hand, the sale of the property to
petitioner was established by the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" and the testimony of Rosita
Castillo, the second wife of the previous owner, Felimon Castillo.
In the Civil Code, antichresis provisions may be found under Title XVI, together with other
security contracts such as pledge and mortgage. Antichresis requires delivery of the property to
the antichretic creditor, but the latter cannot ordinarily acquire this immovable property in his or
her possession by prescription.

CHARLES BUMAGAT, JULIAN BACUDIO, ROSARIO PADRE, SPOUSES ROGELIO and

ZOSIMA PADRE, and FELIPE DOMINCIL, Petitioners, vs.
REGALADO ARRIBAY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 194818, June 9, 2014
FACTS

On July 19, 2005, petitioners filed a Complaint for forcible entry against respondent, they
alleged that on May 9, 2005, respondent with the aid of armed goons, and through the use of
intimidation and threats of physical harm entered the above-described parcels of land and ousted
them from their lawful possession; that respondent then took over the physical possession and
cultivation of these parcels of land; and that petitioners incurred losses and injuries by way of lost
harvests and other damages.. Petitioners insist that the deed of donation executed by Ignacio
Gonzales validly transferred the ownership and possession of Lot 551-C which comprises an area
of 46.97 hectares to his 14 grandchildren. They further assert that inasmuch as Lot 551-C had
already been donated, the same can no longer fall within the purview of P.D.No. 27, since each
donee shall have a share of about three hectares only which is within the exemption limit of seven
hectares for each landowner provided under P.D. No. 27.

ISSUE
WON the immovable property was transferred by virtue of deed of donation?

HELD
It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his
grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with
law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in
said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between
the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-farmers who were not
parties to the donation.

ANTONIO JAMES, et al, Petitioners, vs.

EUREM REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 190650, October 14, 2013

FACTS
 On September 17, 2003, the heirs of Gorgonio James filed a Civil Case No. 5877 against
Eurem Realty Development Corporation. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that: (1) they
are the registered owners and possessors of a property in Dipolog City. (2) the respondent, on the
other hand, is the registered owner of a 344-sq m portion of the same property wned by the
petitioners, and covered by TCT No. T-10713 (Lot 1, Pcs-8080); (3) the respondent derived its
title from Eufracio Lopez (Lopez) who executed in its favor a Deed of Assignment and Exchange
on September 6, 1990, as annotated in TCT No. (T-19539) 12386 in the name of Lopez; (4) Lopez,
in turn, derived his title from Primitivo James (Primitivo), who was Gorgonios brother; (3) in the
same title, TCT No. (T-19539) 12386, there is an annotation made on April 20, 1992 of a final
decision by the CA in CA-G.R. No. 50208-R ( Civil Case No. 1447 ), declaring TCT Nos. T-6272
and T-6273 in the name of Primitivo as null and void.

ISSUE
WON res judicata and prescription period is present in which the petitioners are now
bared over the immovable?
HELD

Thus, even assuming that the petitioners action is subject to extinctive prescription, it
was error for the RTC to reckon the date when prescription began to run solely on the date of the
issuance of Lopez s title on October 11 1972. The petitioners cannot be expected to file the
action after the issuance of Lopez s title since at that time, the appeal in Civil Case No. 144 7, the
case between their predecessor Gorgonio and his siblings as against their other sibling Primitivo,
was still pending and was only resolved with finality by the CA only on November 7 1978.

HEIRS OF THE LATE FELIX M. BUCTON, Petitioners, vs.

SPOUSES GONZALO and TRINIDAD GO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 188395, November 20, 2013

FACTS
 Sometime in March 1981, Felix received a phone call from Gonzalo Go (Gonzalo)
informing him that he has bought the subject property thru a certain Benjamin Belisario (Belisario)
who represented himself as the attorney-in-fact of Felix. Surprised to learn about the transaction,
Felix made an inquiry whereby he learned that the owners duplicate certificate of title of the
subject property was lost while in the possession of his daughter, Agnes Bucton-Lugod (Agnes).
By an unfortunate turn of events, the said certificate of title fell into the hands of Belisario, Josefa
Pacardo (Pacardo) and Salome Cabili (Cabili), who allegedly conspired with each other to
unlawfully deprive Felix of his ownership of the above-mentioned property.

ISSUE
WON the spouses Go can avail of prescription period of an immovable property?
HELD
the Spouses Go miserably failed to meet the requirements of good faith and just title thus
the ten-year prescriptive period is a defense unavailable to them. It must be stressed that possession
by virtue of a spurious title cannot be considered constructive possession for the purpose of
reckoning the ten-year prescriptive period. The conclusion of the appellate court that prescription
has already set in is erroneously premised on the absence of forgery and the consequent validity
of the deed of sale. And extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership
over the property upon the Spouses Go since the law requires 30 years of uninterrupted adverse
possession without need of title or of good faith before real rights over immovable prescribes. The
Spouses Go purportedly took possession of the subject property since March 1981 but such
possession was effectively interrupted with the filing of the instant case before the RTC on 19
February 1996. This period is 15 years short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Article
1137.

LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, Petitioners, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and VITTORIO C.
ROMERO, Respondents
G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012
FACTS
Petitioners allege that upon their fathers death on 18 October 1974, their mother,
respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real and personal
properties in trust for her children. Since that year until the present, she continues to be the
administrator of the properties, businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her late
husband. Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several Deeds of Sale
were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal properties of their parents.
Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio through fraud,
misrepresentation and duress succeeded in registering the above-mentioned properties in his
name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora. Vittorio allegedly employed
force and threat upon her, and even administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable.
Thus, Aurora signed the Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their contents.

ISSUE
WON the RTC has the capacity to assign properties among the heirs?
HELD
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate
or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule
has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
CELERINO E. MERCADO, Petitioner, vs.
BELEN ESPINOCILLA AND FERDINAND ESPINOCILLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 184109, February 1, 2012
FACTS
Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land. After he died, his five children, Salvacion,
Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided Lot No. 552 equally among themselves. Later,
Dionisia died without issue ahead of her four siblings, and Macario took possession of Dionisia's
share. In an affidavit of transfer of real property. Thereafter, on August 9, 1977, Macario and his
daughters Betty Gullaba and Saida Gabelo sold5 225 sq. m. to his son Roger Espinocilla, husband
of respondent Belen Espinocilla and father of respondent Ferdinand Espinocilla.

ISSUE
WON the acclaimed rights over the immovable property by prescription is tenable?

HELD
petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents' possession with his assertion
that Macario's fraudulent acquisition of Dionisia's share created a constructive trust. In a
constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called
trustee (Macario) neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary
(Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel). The relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not in fact exist, and
the holding of a constructive trust is for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse.
Prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Respondents'
uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of Lot No. 552 was established.