Nullum Crimen Sine Lege - 1 - PDF
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege - 1 - PDF
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege - 1 - PDF
1. INTRODUCTION
The maxim nullum crimen sine lege literally means no crimes without law.2 It means that
without any previous criminal law, a conduct cannot come within the definition of crime.
This maxim reads with another maxim, i.e., nulla poena sine lege which means no
punishment without a previous penal law.3 Taking these two maxims together it can be
commented that one cannot be punished for doing something that is not prohibited by law.
This principle is accepted as just and upheld by the penal codes of constitutional states,
including virtually all modern democracies. It is related to the principle called "Nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali", which means penal law cannot be enacted
retroactively.4
The question regarding the maxim nullum crimen sine lege found its importance during the
Second World War, when International Military Tribunal was set up in Nuremberg and
Tokyo for prosecuting the Second World Wars criminals. Thereafter vast development was
made to this maxim. During the course of this paper in the first chapter, the author will
discusses the importance of the international human rights instruments and the relevant
provisions dealing with the notion of nullum crimen sine lege. In the succeeding chapter, the
1
Assistant Professor of Law, Amity University Rajasthan, Jaipur. E-mail I.D. [email protected], Mob.:
(0)9587132477
2
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, Legal Information Institute, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
nullum_crime n_sine_lege (accessed 31 November 2014).
3
Nulla Poena Sine Lege, https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Nulla_poena_sine_lege.
html (accessed 31 November 2014).
4
Ibid.
author develop upon the aspect of International Military Tribunals and the reason for the
establishment of the same, their jurisdiction and the aspect of nullum crimen sine lege is
projected in these tribunals. Thereafter in the following chapter, the author discusses the role
of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the concept of nullum crimen sine lege. How this principle has
been dealt with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and the
International Military Tribunal for Rwanda; similarly its place and position under customary
international law will also be discussed by referring its discussion in comparison with other
concept like joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility in light of discussion
rendered in the case of Tadic and Yamashita. Further to conclude the discussion after
examining various aspects pertaining to nullum crimen sine lege, an comparative study of the
concept of nullum crimen sine lege will be undertaken with International Criminal Court,
with special emphasis being placed upon Article 22 and 23 of the Rome Statute.
5
Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: No one shall be held guilty of
any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under
national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the
one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission
of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit
thereby.
6
Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: In time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their
other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour,
sex, language, religion or social origin.
7
Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: No derogation from articles 6, 7,
8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.
international humanitarian law during armed conflict and there is no justification from those
guarantees even during emergency situation.
the charge regarding crime against humanity should be regarded as crime under the
international law.
The following section expresses the way in which these controversies were addressed in the
Nuremberg judgment.
a) Crimes against peace
Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter defines crimes against peace which includes
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression. Theo objection concerning
crimes against peace was that Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter constitutes as ex-post
facto laws and was therefore in conflict with the principle nullum crimen sene lege. However
this contention was rejected by the Tribunal with the argument that
The maxim .. is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To
assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaty and assurance have attacked
neighboring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the
attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it
would unjust if his were allowed to go unpunished. Occupying the position they did in the
government of Germany, the defendant, or at least some of them must have known of the
treaties signed by Germany, outlawing resources to war for the settlement of international
disputes; they must have known that they were acting in defiance of all international law
when in complete deliberation they carried out their design of invasion and aggression. On
this view of the case alone, it would appear that the maxim has no application to the present
facts.10
The Tribunal referred to various treaties and declarations, according to which aggression was
an international crime already before the constitution of the Charter, such as two Hague
Convention of 1899 and 1907 relative to the pacific settlement in international disputes and
the Versailles Treaty of 1919. According to the Tribunal
The charge in the indictment that the defendants planned and waged aggressive wars are
charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not
confined to the belligerent states alone but affect the whole world.
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme
international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the
accumulation evil of the whole.
10
Nuremberg Judgment, at pp. 39.
The first act of aggression referred to in the indictment is the seizure of Austria and
Czechoslovakia; and the first war of aggression charged in the Indictment is the war against
Poland begun in 1 September 1939.11
It was further argued that the acts in question are the act of the sovereign state and they
cannot be made personally liable and are protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the
state. The Tribunal rejected this argument by stating that it has long been recognized that
international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon states,
referring to the Article 228 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.12
11
Nuremberg Juggment, at pp. 13.
12
Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles reads: The German Government recognizes the right of the Allied and
Associated powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of
the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishment laid down by law
; Treaty of peace between the Allied and Associated powers and Germany, Versailles, 28 June 1919 (entry
into force 10 January 1920).
13
Article 2 of the Hague Convention provides that the provisions contained in the regulations (Rules of Land
Warfare) as well as in the Convention itself do not apply except between contracting powers, and then if all
the belligerents are parties to the Convention.
Differentiating from the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter was not part of a treaty or
agreement among the Allies but it was significantly similar to the Nuremberg Charter. A
foremost exception was that Emperor Hirohito was excluded from being tried for crimes
against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
14
Bassiouni, M. Cherif, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, Wolters Kluwer, 1999, at
p. 32
15
Ibid.
16
Article 5, paragraph 1 of the IMTFE Charter.
17
Yale Law School, Nuremberg Trials Final Report Appendix D: Control Council Law No. 10, Lillian
Goldman Law Library, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp (accessed 1Decemeber 2014).
18
Ibid.
state shall not left alone for the acts which are criminal under the international law. In this
respect, the president of the Tribunal, Sir William Webb, concluded that
The view that aggressive war is illegal and criminal must be carried on its logical
conclusions, e.g., a soldier or civilian who opposed war but after it began decided it should be
carried on until a more favorable time for making peace was guilty of waging aggressive war.
There are no special rules that limit the responsibility for aggressive war, no matter how high
or low the rank or status of the person promoting or taking part in it, provided he knows, or
should know, it is aggressive.19
Philippine judge also rejected the objection concerning the prohibition of convictions on the
basis of ex post facto law. He considered nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege not applicable
to international law, distinguishing between national laws and national violators of those laws
on the one hand, and authors of international crimes on the other. He nonetheless emphasized
that, long before the war, the act of Japan and its leaders had been the subject of strong and
repeated protests and warnings on the part of the allied powers. They knew that, in case of
their defeat, they would be brought to justice and the fact that they had accepted those terms
of the Allied Powers would make the defense of ex post facto law unsustainable.20
Judge Pal, however, maintained a dissenting opinion and held that the rule concerning crime
against peace constituted ex post facto legislation. He stated that a victor nation is, under
international law, competent to set up a tribunal for the trial of war criminals, but such a
conqueror is not competent to legislate on international law. Regarding crimes against peace,
for which no internationally accepted definition existed, he stated that any trial such as that
conducted by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was merely the judgment of
the victors on the vanquished.21
19
Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the
Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, Intersentia nv (2002), p. 198.
20
Concurring Opinion of Judge Jaranilla, Tokyo Judgment, Member from the Republic of the Philippines, Vol.
1, p. 501.
21
Dissenting opinion of Judge Pal, Tokyo Judgment, Vol. 2, p.551.
Great Britain, France, and Russia- had the right within its own zone to bring to trial persons
accused of committed crimes during the Second World War.
It was argued that accused cannot be prosecuted as the crime and the punishment was not
prescribed at the time of the commission of the act and the violation of nullum crimen sine
lege. However, the Tribunal rejected the argument on the ground that at the time of the
alleged offence the act of the accused did in fact constitute punishable violation of
international law.
During this trial, charges of crimes against humanity were particularly subject of legal
argument with regard to the ex post facto laws. Article 2(c) of the Control Council Law No.
10 does not include the requirement that crimes against humanity be committed in connection
with other crimes included in this law. This has made several authors to criticize that the
restriction included in the Nuremberg Charter was lifted by the four powerful states by
deleting this qualifying ground.
Generally it has been held by the US Military Tribunal that Control Council Law No. 10 did
not constitute ex post facto legislation and thus does not violate the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege. They further said that ex post facto prohibition is in essence a principle of
justice and can therefore not be applied in war crimes trials where the ends of justice would
be violated with its application.
22
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bernard, Tokyo Judgment, Vol. 1, p. 489-490.
adequate provisions. This case could be tried by the International Tribunal only if the state
law fails to prosecute the accused or not willing to punish the accused.
The United Nation War Commission later on submitted that the right to punish war crimes is
not confined to the state whose nationals have suffered or whose territory the offence took
place but is possessed by any independent state whatsoever, just is the right to punish the
offence of privacy. According to this doctrine, under international law, every independent
state has jurisdiction to punish war criminals in custody, regardless of the nationality of the
victim or of the place where the offence was committed.23
According to the Moscow Declaration and the London Declaration, the war criminals other
than the major war criminals were to be sent back to the countries in which their alleged act
were done in order they may be judged and punished according to law of the liberated
countries and free Government that will be created therein.
23
Cf. International Law Associaation, Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice, Final
Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences, London
Conference (2000), p. 2, available at http://www.ila-hq.org/ (accessed 16 May 2011).
24
H. Kelsen, Will the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal Continue a Precedent in International Law?, The
International Law Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1947), p. 165.
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
for which there shall be individual responsibility:
a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,27
b) Violations of the laws or customs of war,28
c) Crimes against Genocide,29 and
d) Crimes against humanity.30
The Statute further says that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over the natural person31 and
a person accused of international crime shall be individually made liable. 32
27
Article 2 of ICTY: the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or property protected
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: (a) willful killing; (b) torture or inhuman treatment,
including biological experiments; (c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; (d)
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly; (e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power;
(f) willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial; (g) unlawful
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; (h) taking civilians as hostages.
28
Article 3 of ICTY: The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or
customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to: (a) employment of poisonous weapons or
other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity; (c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings; (d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and
science; (e) plunder of public or private property.
29
Article 4 of ICTY: The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide
as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this
article. 2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 3. The following acts
shall be punishable: (a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct and public incitement to
commit genocide; (d) attempt to commit genocide; (e) complicity in genocide.
30
Article 5 of ICTY: The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the
following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed
against any civilian population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e)
imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other
inhumane acts.
31
Article 6 of ICTY: The International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the
provisions of the present Statute.
32
Article 7 of ICTY
31 December 1994. It was established by the United Nations Security Council by Resolution
955 in November, 1994.
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda
and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of
neighboring States.33 Thus, in contrast to the Statute of the ICTY, the territorial jurisdiction
of the Rwanda Tribunal is not limited to the territory of Rwanda.
33
Article 1 and 7 ICTR Statute.
a) M
urder;
b) E
xtermination;
c) E
nslavement;
d) D
eportation;
e) I
mprisonment;
f) T
orture;
g) R
ape;
h) P
ersecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
i) O
ther inhumane acts.
In contrast to the ICTY Statute, which contains grave breaches of the Geneva Convention
and violation of laws or customs of war in Article 2 and 3 of the ICTY Statute respectively,
the ICTR Statute punishes an individual for serious violations of Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions and of provisions included Additional Protocol II. 34
4.2.3. A
d hoc tribunal and the application of nullum crimen sine lege
The ad hoc Tribunals were set up the United Nation Security Council, so it was required that
both the Tribunals ensure the right to a fair trial in accordance with the highest UN standard
34
Article 4 ICTR: The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing
or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations
shall include, but shall not be limited to: a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons,
in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; b)
Collective punishments; c) Taking of hostages; d) Acts of terrorism; e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; f)
Pillage; g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples; h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
at all stages of the proceedings. None of these ad hoc Tribunals contain the provision of
nullum crimen sine lege. Although the Secretary General had explicitly mentioned the nullum
crimen sine lege principle in his report, but he fails to further explain the applicability of the
principle to the jurisdiction of the International Ad Hoc Tribunal. However, it can be said that
the Tribunals are required to follow the customary international law beyond any doubt.
According to a memorandum submitted by President Cassese to the members of the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court:
As is clear from the reference in the Secretary Generals Report to nullum crimen sine lege,
this is not a definition of the principle of legality, which is well settled but an elaboration as
to what applicable law may be applied by the International Tribunal. It follows that
the International Tribunal is authorized to apply, in addition to customary international law,
any treaty which: (i) was unquestionably binding on the parties at the time of the alleged
offence; and (ii) was not in conflict with or derogated from peremptory norms of international
law, as are more customary rules of international humanitarian law. 35
The principle of joint criminal enterprise founded by the ICTY Tribunal in Tadic case was
the most disputable case. This doctrine is not mentioned in the ICTY Statute. According to
the third category of this doctrine a person who intends to participate in a common design
may be guilty of the acts which are outside that common design if such acts are foreseeable
by any member of the enterprise. This principle was criticized on the following grounds:
1. T
he principle of joint criminal enterprise is not mentioned in any provision of the
Statute.
2. T
he principle of joint criminal enterprise is to some extent similar to Nuremberg
criminal organization liability. But the criminal organization charges does make liable
to a defendant for the acts of the organization which was not intended. Thus, the
principle of joint criminal enterprise is a new crime founded by the ICTY Tribunal.
It is in violation of the notion of nullum crimen sine lege. Moreover, the decision of
the Nuremberg Tribunal is itself in dispute, than how can the Tribunal use this
principle under the umbrella of customary international law. This customary
international law was required to clear the test of beyond any doubt.
35
See, Prosecutor v. Tadic Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeal Chamber, Case No. IT-94-
1-AR72 (2 October 1995), para. 143.
36
Zhao Yongchen, Latest Development of the International Criminal Law Reflected from the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Gao Mingxuan and Zhao Bingzhi (ed.), Contemporary International Criminal
Law in Theory and Practice, Jilin People's Publishing House, 1st ed. (June 2001), p. 40.
37
See Preface written by M. Cherif Bassiouni, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Otto Trifftcrer (cd.), Baden-Baden (1999).
38
Mingxuan, Gao, Xiumei, Wang, A Brief Comment on History Development, Properties of Concept and
Definitions of Crime Committed in the Violation of International Criminal Law, p. 11.
39
Yanping, Gao, International Criminal Court, World Knowledge Publishing House, 1st ed. (April 1999), p. 2.
statute. This chapter will discuss about the notion of nullum crimen sine lege in Rome Statute
and some positive and negative of the presence of this principle in the Rome Statute.
40
Article 1 of the Rome Statute states: An International Criminal Court (the Court) is hereby
established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdicti on
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the
Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.
41
Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute states: The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance
with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against
humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.
authorize court to impose imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not
exceed a maximum of 30 years. This can again be criticized as indirect violation of the notion
of nullum crimen sine lege, as every person must know the punishment which shall be
imposed for violation of any provision of the Rome Statute and marking punishment as zero
to thirty years is not appropriate mention of the punishment.
6. CONCLUSION
The notion of nullum crimen sine lege has found its place in international human rights
documents, such as Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights etc. Thus, it is clear that the member
states are obliged to enumerate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege in their national law.
This principle founds its importance during the period of war. As there are certain principles,
which cannot be derogated even during the period of emergency, such as the principle of fair
trial.
The respect to this principle as we found in the current scenario was not same during the
period the period of Second World War. There was lots of criticism regarding the trial
conducted in Nuremberg and Tokyo. It has been argued that the Tribunals have no
jurisdiction to try the accused and the Tribunals are not following the nullum crimen sine lege
principle and applying the ex post facto laws. In contrast it was said that international law is a
developing law and is based on the practice of the various nations. The notion of nullum
crimen sine lege is not is not applicable in international law. Many of the judges said that the
act was already prohibited according to the natural law principle and does not violate the
principle. The perpetrators were aware of the immoral character of the act and are responsible
under the international criminal law. It has also been said that it is more important to punish a
person who has done an immoral act than to release him on the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege. Thus, with regard to the Nuremberg trial and the Tokyo trial it can be said that
these tribunals had applied the nullum crimen sine lege principles in much liberal way than it
is applied in national legal system.
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege has not been found in any of the Ad Hoc Tribunal
Statute. Since, the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia was established by the
resolution passed by the Security Council, it was expected that the Tribunal will apply only
those law which are the part of customary international law. Beyond any reasonable doubt
was the test which Yugoslavia Tribunal was required to satisfy before applying any
customary law in any case. The same policy was followed by the Rwanda Tribunal.
However, even after having so much restriction it has been argued that the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, by establishing joint criminal enterprise principle in Tadic case, has diluted the
theory of mens rea; which is necessary to be proved before prosecuting any person under
the criminal law.
After taking the experience of these two tribunals, the drafter of the Rome Statute has
expressly mentioned the principle of nullum crimen sine lege under Article 22 of the Rome
Statute. However, looking into the consequence of the implication of Article 77 again this
principle has been indirectly violated.
Thus, it can be concluded that even the Rome Statute have failed to properly acknowledge the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege. The international society must take appropriate steps to
bring amendment in Article 77 of the Statute so as to fully comply the principle of legality,
i.e, nullum crimen sine lege