Tuzon v CA | CM

August 21, 1992.

DOMINGO A. TUZON and LOPE C. MAPAGU, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
SATURNINO T. JURADO, Respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
SUMMARY: Sangguniang Bayan adopted Resolution 9 which authorizes the municipal treasurer to enter into an
agreement with thresher operators to donate 1% of palay to fund the Nutritional Center. Mapagu the mun treas and
Mayor Tuzon refused to grant Jurados application for a license fee for thresher operators and mayors permit until he
complied with Resol 9. CFI declared Resol Valid. CA upheld but held Tuzon and Mapagu liable for damages. SC
absolved them from liability. As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had
not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts.
DOCTRINE: In the absence of a judicial decision declaring the resolution invalid, its legality would have to be
presumed. As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been
repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts.
As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not personally liable to one injured in
consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line of his official duty. An erroneous
interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party
to an award for damages.
FACTS:
March 14, 1977, when the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 9, reading pertinently as follows:
o "WHEREAS, the municipality of Camalaniugan, Cagayan has embarked in the construction of
Sports and Nutrition Center, to provide the proper center
o (to fundthe center) RESOLVED, therefore, as it is hereby resolved, that the municipal treasurer is
hereby authorized to enter into an agreement to all thresher operators, that will come to apply for a
permit to thresh palay within the jurisdiction of this municipality to donate 1% of all the palay
threshed by them
petitioner Lope C. Mapagu, then incumbent municipal treasurer, prepared the following document for
signature of all thresher/owner/operators applying for a mayors permit:
o AGREEMENT
That I, _____________ thresher-owner-operator hereby voluntarily agree to donate to the
municipality of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, one percent (1%) of all palay threshed by me within the
jurisdiction of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, to help finance the completion of the construction of the
sports and nutrition center building of Camalaniugan per Resolution No. 9 dated March 14, 1977 of
the Sanggunian Bayan;
That I also agree to report weekly the total number of palay threshed by me to the municipal
treasurer and turn over the corresponding 1% share of the municipality for the said project
mentioned above.
Soon thereafter, private respondent Saturnino T. Jurado sent his agent to the municipal treasurers office to
pay the license fee of P285.00 for thresher operators. Mapagu refused to accept the payment and required
him to first secure a mayors permit.
Mayor Domingo Tuzon, said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement
before the permit could be issued. Jurado ignored the requirement. Instead, he sent the P285.00 license fee
by postal money order to the office of the municipal treasurer who, however, returned the said amount. The
reason given was the failure of the respondent to comply with Resolution No. 9.
On April 4, 1977, Jurado filed with the CFI a special civil action for mandamus with actual and moral
damages to compel the issuance of the mayors permit and license. And a another petition for declaratory
judgment against the said resolution (and the implementing agreement) for being illegal either as a donation
or as a tax measure.
TC upheld the challenged measure. However, it dismissed the claims for damages for lack of evidence
CA affirmed the validity of Resolution No. 9 and the implementing agreement. Nevertheless, it found
Tuzon and Mapagu to have acted maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurados application
for the mayors permit and license. pay jointly and severally P20,000.00 as actual damages; P5,000.00 as
moral damages; and P3,000.00 as attorneys fees.
ARGUMENTS
Petitioners Mayor and Mun Treas.: they were acting in their official capacity when they enforced the
resolution, which was duly adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan and later declared to be valid by both the
trial and the appellate courts. For so acting, they cannot be held personally liable in damages, more so
because their act was not tainted with bad faith or malice.
Jurado: Signing of the implementing agreement was not a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a permit
and license. Hence the petitioners unwarranted refusal to issue the permit and license despite his offer to
pay the required fee constituted bad faith on their part. Resolution No. 9 and the implementing agreement
 compels the thresher to donate something which he does not yet own. It contravenes the limitations on the
taxing powers of local government units under Section 5, of the Local Tax Code. entitled to actual and moral
damages from the petitioners under Article 27 of the Civil Code, and to the payment of attorneys fees as
well, for their refusal or neglect, without just cause, to perform their official duties.
SC not ruling on validity of Resol 9
We need not concern ourselves at this time with the validity of Resolution No. 9 and the implementing
agreement because the issue has not been raised in this petition
CA in sustaining Resolution No. 9 said no more than:
o It was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan in the lawful exercise of its legislative
powers in pursuance to Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which provided that: "Each
local government unit shall have the power to create (sic) its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, subject to such limitation as may be provided by law." And under Article 4, Section 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 231 (Enacting a Local Tax Code for Provinces, Cities, Municipalities and
Barrios), it is provided that:
"Section 29. Contributions. In addition to the above specified taxing and other revenue-raising
powers, the barrio council may solicit monies, materials, and other contributions from the following
sources:"(c) Monies from private agencies and individuals."
That is an over simplification. The respondent court has not offered any explanation for its
conclusion that the challenged measures are valid nor does it discuss its own concept of the nature
of the resolution.
While it would appear from the wording of the resolution that the municipal government merely intends to
"solicit" the 1% contribution from the threshers, the implementing agreement seems to make the donation
obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance of the mayors permit. This goes against the
nature of a donation, which is an act of liberality and is never obligatory.
If, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown in view of the challenge
raised by the private respondents to have been enacted in accordance with the requirements of the Local
Tax Code. These would include the holding of a public hearing on the measure and its subsequent
approval by the Secretary of Finance, in addition to the usual requisites for publication of ordinances in
general.
ISSUE/ HELD: WON the petitioners are liable in damages to the private respondent for having withheld from him
the mayors permit and license because of his refusal to comply with Resolution No. 9 (NO)
RATIO:
NCC Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief
against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
One purpose of this article is to end the "bribery system, where the public official, for some flimsy excuse,
delays or refuses the performance of his duty until he gets some kind of pabagsak." Official inaction may
also be due to plain indolence or a cynical indifference to the responsibilities of public service.
According to Phil. Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, the provision presupposes that the refusal or omission of a
public official to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In any event,
the erring public functionary is justly punishable under this article for whatever loss or damage the
complainant has sustained.
CAB: it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzons refusal to act on the private respondents
application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot
be said either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly
negligent in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.
no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners singled out the private respondent
Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the
mayors permit and license. not Jurados business competitors
The resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without discrimination or
preference
The Court is convinced that the petitioners Tuzon acted within the scope of their authority and in
consonance with their honest interpretation of the resolution in question.
We agree that it was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring it
invalid, its legality would have to be presumed (in fact, both the trial court and the appellate court said there
was nothing wrong with it). As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long
as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts.
As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not personally liable to one
injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line of
his official duty.
 An erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that
would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages. (Philippine Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu).
Jurado complains that he was prevented from operating his business. But as the petitioners correctly
observed, he could have taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and later
challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate." Pendente lite, he could have continued to
operate his threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesante that he now says was the consequence
of the petitioners wrongful act.
REVERSED with respect to payment of damages. petitioners, having acted in good faith in the discharge of their
official functions, should be absolved from liability.