722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 94457. June 10, 1992.

VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC. and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, respondents.

Attorneys; Effect of failure of lawyer to answer court notices

relative to exercise of court's disciplinary powers.It should be
emphasized that the show-cause resolution was addressed to Atty.
Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer of a litigant in this Court. It was
addressed to him in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the
disciplinary powers of this Court. That he failed to immediately heed
the directive of the decision of March 18,1991 to show cause,
notwithstanding the grant of a 30-day extension for him to do so,
reects an unbecoming disrespect towards this Court's orders. We
cannot countenance such disrespect. As a lawyer, Atty. Coronel is
expected to recognize the authority of this Court and obey its lawful
processes and orders. Hence, the Court considers his failure to show
cause, notwithstanding reasonable notice therefor, as a waiver of his
rights to be heard and to due process, thereby warranting an ex parte
determination of the matter for which he had been required to explain.
Same; A lawyer must serve his client with competence and
diligence. Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18.The facts of the case
clearly show that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence." He failed to observe
particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
 Same; Same.Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the
travails attending the disposition of the case against her not to mention
the devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean Coronel
exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar. By
neglecting to le the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set
off the events which resulted in the deprivation of petitioner's rights
over her house and lot.

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* THIRD DIVISION.

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VOL. 209, JUNE 10, 1992 723

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same.Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, Atty. Coronel's

failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the
interest of his client caused the latter material prejudice. It should be
remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause, he
covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its nal
conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons
his client's cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by
the latter. Moreover, a lawyer owes fealty, not only to his client, but
also to the Court of which he is an ofcer, Atty. Coronel failed to obey
this Court's order even on a matter that personally affects him, such
that one cannot avoid the conclusion that be must be bent on
professional self-destruction. Be that as it may, Atty. Coronel cannot
escape this Court's disciplinary action for gross negligence which
resulted in depriving petitioner of her property rights.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals. Sempio Diy, J.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Singson, Valdez & Associates for petitioner.
 Ceferino Padua Law Ofce for private respondent
Cabrera.
E.A. Barangan & Associates Law Ofces for Nancy Saw
Cheung.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for

specic performance with damages led by private respondent
New Cathay House, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The complaint was aimed at compelling Victoria
Legarda to sign a lease contract involving her house and lot at
123 West Avenue, Quezon City which New 1
Cathay House, Inc.
intended to use in operating a restaurant.
As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining Victoria Legarda and her
agents from stopping the renovation of the property which was

_______________

1 Civil Case No. Q-43811.

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724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

being done by New Cathay House, Inc. After hearing, the lower
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, Antonio P. Coronel of the Coronel Law Ofce at
146 Katipunan Road, White Plains, Quezon City, entered his
appearance as counsel for Victoria Legarda. He also led an
urgent motion for an extension of ten (10) days from February
6, 1985 within which to le an answer to the complaint. The
motion was granted by the court which gave Victoria Legarda
until February 20, 1985 to answer the complaint
 However, Victoria Legarda failed to le her answer within
the extended period granted by the court. Hence, upon motion
of New Cathay House, Inc., she was declared in default, thereby
paving the way for the presentation of evidence ex parte. On
March 25, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision by default.
It ordered Victoria Legarda to execute and sign the lease
contract and to pay the following: (a) exemplary damages of P
100,000.00, (b) actual and compensatory damages in the total
amount of P278,764.37, and (c) attorney's fees of P10,000.00.
Atty. Coronel received a copy of the lower court's decision
on April 9, 1985 but he did not interpose an appeal therefrom
within the reglementary period. Consequently, the decision
became nal and, upon motion of New Cathay House, Inc., the
lower court issued a writ of execution. In compliance with the
writ, on June 27, 1985, the sheriff levied upon, and sold at
public auction, the property subject of the litigation to New
Cathay House, Inc., the highest bidder. The sheriff's certicate
of sale was registered in the Ofce of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City.
The one-year redemption period having expired on July 8,
1986, the sheriff issued a nal deed of sale which, on July 11,
1986, was duly registered with the Ofce of the Register of
Deeds. On November 6,1986, Victoria Legarda, represented by
her attorney-in-fact Ligaya C. Gomez, led in the Court of
Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment against her in
Civil Case No. Q-43811. She alleged therein that the decision
was obtained through fraud and that it is not supported by the
allegations in the pleadings nor by the evidence submitted.
Forthwith, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from dispossessing
petitioner of the premises in question. Private respondent New

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VOL. 209, JUNE 10, 1992 725

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

Cathay House, Inc. then led its consolidated comment on the

petition with a motion for the lifting of the temporary
restraining order. Victoria Legarda, through Atty. Coronel, led
a reply to the consolidated comment. The petition was
thereafter orally argued. Required by the Court of Appeals to
manifest if the parties desired to le their respective
memoranda, Dean Coronel informed the appellate court that he
was adopting Victoria Legarda's reply to the consolidated
comment as her memorandum.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on
November 29, 1989. On the issue of fraud, for which Victoria
Legarda claimed that Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., who represented
New Cathay House, Inc., made her believe through false
pretenses that he was agreeable to the conditions of the lease
she had imposed on the lessee and that the latter would
withdraw the complaint against her, thereby prompting her to
advise her lawyer not to le 2
an answer to the complaint
anymore, the Court of Appeals said:

"On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly

practiced upon her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is so improbable as to
inspire belief. For the Coronel Law Ofce had already entered its
appearance as petitioner's counsel by then, so that if it were true that
Cabrera had already agreed to the conditions imposed by petitioner,
said law ofce would have asked plaintiff to le the proper motion to
dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court, and if plaintiff had
refused to do so, it would have led defendant's answer anyway so that
she would not be declared in default. Or said law ofce would have
prepared a compromise agreement embodying the conditions imposed
by their client in the lease contract in question which plaintiffs had
allegedly already accepted, so that the same could have been submitted
to the Court and judgment on a compromise could be entered. All
these, any conscientious lawyer of lesser stature than the Coronel Law
Ofce, headed by no less than a former law dean, Dean Antonio
Coronel, or even a new member of the bar, would normally have done
under the circumstances to protect the interests of their client, instead
of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its complaint
against defendant, as it had allegedly promised the latter.

_______________

2 Justice Alicia V. Sempio Diy, ponente. Justices Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and Celso
L. Magsino, concurring.
 726

726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of pure and simple negligence
on the part of the defendant's counsel, who simply failed to le the
answer in behalf of defendant. But counsel's negligence does not stop
here. For after it had been furnished with copy of the decision by
default against defendant, it should then have appealed therefrom or
le (sic) a petition for relief from the order declaring their client in
default or from the judgment by default. Hence, defendant is bound by
the acts of her counsel in this case and cannot be heard to complain
that the result might have been different if it had proceeded differently
(Pulido v. C.A, 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon v. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257,
among other cases). And the rationale of this rule is obvious and clear.
For 'if such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for opening cases,
there would never be an end to a suit for long as new counsel could be
employed who could allege and show that the prior counsel had not
been sufciently diligent, or experienced, or learned' (Fernandez v. Tan
Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138)." (Italics supplied.)

Finding the second ground for the petition to be likewise

unmeritorious, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Surprisingly, however, inspite of the Court of Appeals' tirade on
his professional competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a nger
to le a motion for reconsideration. Neither did he initiate
moves towards an appeal to this Court of the decision which
was adverse and prejudicial to his client.
Thus, the Court of Appeals decision became nal. On
December 8,1989, counsel for New Catahy House, Inc. sent
petitioner through the Coronel Law Ofce, a letter demanding
that she vacate the property within three days from receipt
thereof. Atty. Coronel did not inform petitioner of this
development until sometime in March, 1990. Due to petitioner's
persistent telephone calls, Atty. Coronel's secretary informed
her of the fact that New Cathay House, Inc. had demanded her
eviction from the property. Consequently, petitioner had no
3
recourse but to oblige and vacate the property.
 On August 7, 1990, Victoria Legarda, represented by a new
4
counsel, led before this Court a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 contending that the decisions of the courts below "are

_______________

3 Petition, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 15-16.

4 Singson Valdez and Associates.

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VOL. 209, JUNE 10, 1992 727

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

null and void as petitioner was deprived of her day in court and
divested of her property without due process of law through the
gross, pervasive and malicious
5
negligence of previous counsel,
Atty. Antonio Coronel."
In its decision of March 18,1991, this Court declared as null
and void the decisions of March 25, 1985 and November 29,
1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Court
of Appeals, respectively, as well as the sheriff's certicate of
sale dated June 27, 1985 of the property involved and the
subsequent nal deed of sale covering the same. The Court
further directed private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. to
reconvey the property to the petitioner and the Register of
Deeds to cancel the registration of said property in the name of
said private respondent and to issue a new one in the name of
the petitioner.
The same decision required the former counsel of petitioner,
Atty. Antonio Coronel, to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why he should not be held administratively liable for his
acts and omissions which resulted in grave injustice to the
petitioner. Said counsel having been inadvertently omitted in
6
the service of copies of said decision, On February 11,1992,
the Clerk of Court of this Division to which this case was
transferred, sent Atty. 7Coronel a copy thereof which he received
on February 12, 1992.
On the tenth day from his receipt of said copy, Atty. Coronel
led an urgent ex-parte motion for an extension of thirty (30)
days from February 22, 1992 within which to le his
explanation. He alleged as reason for the motion pressure of
work "consisting of daily hearings in several forums and
preparations of pleadings in equally urgent cases, such as the
more

_______________

5 Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 17.

6 The instant petition having been led by another counsel and not by Dean
Coronel, he was not been served any court processes prior to the promulgation
of the decision of March 18, 1991. Since the dispositive portion of said decision
does not mention specically the name of Dean Coronel, inadvertently, no copy
thereof was served on him.
7 Rollo, p. 364.

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728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

8
than 80 civil and criminal cases against the Marcoses."
The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992, granted said
motion for extension with warning that no further extension will
be given. Atty. Coronel received a copy of said resolution 9
on
March 27, 1992 but it appears that on March 24, 1992, a day
after the expiration of the 30-day extended period prayed for in
his rst motion for extension, he had mailed another urgent
motion for a second extension of thirty (30) days within which
to submit his explanation on the ground that since March
2,1992, he had been "treated and conned at the St. Luke's
Hospital." Attached to the motion is a medical certicate stating
that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic cardiomyopathy, diabetes
mellitus, congestive heart failure class IV and brain infarction,
10
thrombotic."
While off-hand, the reasons cited in the second motion for
reconsideration seem to warrant another extension, the fact that
it was led one day late, coupled with the circumstances of this
case do not call for a reconsideration of the resolution of March
9,1992. Hence, the second motion for extension must be denied.
Lawyers should not presume that their motions for extension of
time will always be granted by the Court. The granting or denial
of motions for extension of time is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court with a view of attaining substantial
11
justice.
It should be emphasized that the show-cause resolution was
addressed to Atty. Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer of a
litigant in this Court. It was addressed to him in his personal
capacity as a lawyer subject to the disciplinary powers of this
Court. That he failed to immediately heed the directive of the
decision of March 18, 1991 to show cause, notwithstanding the
grant of a 30-day extension for him to do so, reects an
unbecoming disrespect towards this Court's orders. We cannot
countenance such disrespect. As a lawyer, Atty. Coronel is
expected to recognize the authority of this Court and obey its
lawful

______________

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, pp. 381 & 386.
10 Ibid, p. 385.
11 Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76549, December 10, 1987,156
SCRA 252.

729

VOL. 209, JUNE 10, 1992 729

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

12
processes and orders.
Hence, the Court considers his failure to show cause,
notwithstanding reasonable notice therefor, as a waiver of his
rights to be heard and to due process, thereby warranting an ex
parte determination13 of the matter for which he had been
required to explain.
The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel
violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly
Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable."
Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the travails
attending the disposition of the case against her not to mention
the devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean
Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of
the Bar. By neglecting to le the answer to the complaint
against petitioner, he set off the events which resulted in the
deprivation of petitioner's rights over her house and lot. In this
regard, worth quoting is the observation of Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco in his ponencia of March 18. 1991:

"Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a

law school. It is to be expected that he would extend the highest quality
of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears
to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the
petitioner in the civil case led against her by private respondent, said
counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an
extension of time to le the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to le the
answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on the motion of
private respondent's counsel. x x x."

This is not the only case wherein, in dealing with this Court's
orders, Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence,

______________

12 Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92862, July 4,1991,198 SCRA 806.
13 Santos v. CFI of Cebu, Branch VI, G.R. No. 58532, May 18, 1990,185
SCRA 472,486-487.

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730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

inattention to his obligations as counsel, sloppiness and

superciliousness. In G.R. No. 97418, "Imelda R. Marcos, et al.
v. PCGG, et al.," the Court en banc, in its Resolution of May
28, 1992, imposed upon Atty. Coronel a ne of Five Hundred
Pesos (P500.00) after he was found guilty of inexcusable
negligence in his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions.
The Court said:

"We nd the explanation for his failure to comply with the Resolutions
of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991 unsatisfactory. Atty. Coronel had
obviously taken this Court for granted. Although he received a copy of
the 4 June 1991 Resolution on 4 July 1991, he nonchalantly let the 10-
day period pass and even deliberately chose to remain silent about it
even he received a copy of the Resolution of 27 August 1991. It was
only on the last day of the period granted to him under said Resolution
that he showed initial efforts to comply with the Resolution by ling a
motion for a 20-day extension from 30 September 1991 to le the
Reply. This was a self-imposed period and, therefore, he was expected
to faithfully comply with it not only because of the respect due this
Court, but also because he had put his honor and virtues of candor and
good faith on the line, For reasons only known to him, he did not.
Worse, despite his receipt on 27 November 1991 of the Resolution of 5
November 1991 which granted his 30 September 1991 motion, Atty.
Coronel did not even move for a new period within which to comply
with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991. This Court
had to issue the Resolution of 30 January 1992 to compel compliance.
When he nally did, he committed, allegedly through inadvertence, the
blunder of placing his Reply under a wrong caption.
"For deliberately failing, if not stubbornly refusing, to comply with
the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991 and meet his self-
imposed deadline, Atty. Coronel was both unfair and disrespectful to
this Court. Furthermore, he has unduly delayed the disposition of the
pending incidents in this case." (italics supplied.)

Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, Atty. Coronel's failure to

exercise due diligence in protecting and attending14to the interest
of his client caused the latter material prejudice. It should be
remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause,

______________

14 See: Gutierrez v. Zulueta, Adm. Case No. 2200, July 19,1990, 187 SCRA
607.
 731

VOL. 209, JUNE 10, 1992 731

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until
its nal conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due
diligence or abandons his client's cause makes
15
him unworthy of
the trust reposed on him by the latter. Moreover, a lawyer
owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which
he is an ofcer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey this Court's order
even on a matter that personally affects him, such that one
cannot avoid the conclusion that he must be bent on
professional self-destruction. Be that as it may, Atty. Coronel
cannot escape this Court's disciplinary action for gross
negligence which resulted in depriving petitioner of her
property rights for, as this Court enunciated in the aforecited
Cantiller v. Potenciano case:

"Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering

justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing
criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance
with one's oath of ofce and the canons of professional ethics is an
imperative.
"Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and
beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not
synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of
public interest."

WHEREFORE, the second motion for an extension of time to

le explanation is hereby DENIED. Atty. Antonio P. Coronel is
hereby found GUILTY of gross negligence in the defense of
petitioner Victoria Legarda in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and
accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this
resolution. A repetition of the acts constituting gross negligence
shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his personal
record, another copy be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and copies thereof be circulated in all the courts.
 SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero,

_______________

15 Cantiller v. Potenciano, Adm. Case No. 3195, December 18, 1989,180

SCRA 246.

732

732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Court of Appeals

JJ., concur.

Motion denied. Antonio Coronel found guilty of gross

negligence and accordingly suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months.

Note.The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of

his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622).

o0o

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